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  Selected Secret Documents from Soviet Foreign Policy Documents Archives - 1919 to 1941

Concentrated on 1st and  2nd WW Correspondence and Meetings related to Turkey, Balkans and Iran, with some additions from Afghanistan and India.

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Letter of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Turkey A.V. Terentyev to the peopleʹs commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov

November 6, 1939

Top secret

It is now known for sure that the initiation of the Anglo‐French‐Turkish mutual assistance pact255 took place in Ankara on September 19. This action was carried out not only with the consent of Inonu, but at his direct insistence. He deliberately decided to bind Turkey with obligations to the British and French even before Saracoglu had to leave for Moscow. By initiation of the pact, the Turkish government wanted to present Moscow with a fait accompli and thereby harmonize the alleged Soviet‐Turkish agreement with the obligations assumed by Turkey under the pact with Britain and France.

Ankara kept abreast of all the negotiations in Moscow not only England and France, but also informed Romanians and Greeks. I know the fact when the Romanian ambassador Stoica, after another conversation with Saydam, who was then performing the duties of the minister of foreign affairs, said to one of his colleagues: ʺMoscow is threatening us.ʺ merit also noteworthy is the statement of the journalist Ebaziyazade, who said the following: “England and France were well aware that we were not doing anything against them, because we informed them about all phases of the negotiations. On our decisions, we received their consent, and even more, we played the role of just an intermediary between Britain and France and the Soviet Union. Thus, we were willing to provide a service in establishing an agreement between the two parties. ʺ it is hardly possible to say more clearly about the position of the Turks. It is clear that statements of this kind were the result of the relevant information sent to Saracoglu from Moscow and which here in extremely condensed tones was transmitted by the Turkish

government to representatives of the allied states.

Ismet, who has valued Soviet‐Turkish friendship for many years, has recently completely joined the channel of Anglo‐French politics and, together with the anglophile clique of such characters as Saracoglu, Fethi Okyar and Kazim Ozalp, is now acting in the country at the direct behest of London. The British are persistently and quite actively working here in the direction of politically separating Turkey from the Soviet Union. They are driving the idea into the heads of the leaders of the Ankara government that the USSR, which until recently stood aloof from international events, is now beginning to play a huge role in the field of international relations. The Turks are frightened by the fact that expansionist sentiments are allegedly developing in the Soviet Union, which once guided the policy of peter I. That is why, the British say, now, more than ever, the question of Soviet‐Turkish relations arises in all its breadth, for in its development “the USSR, undoubtedly , will try to realize his cherished dream ‐ to seize the straits and make the black sea an internal lake ”.

From all this, Turkeyʹs new allies are forcing the Ankara government to conclude that if Turkey wants to remain independent, then it must be on the side of the British and French, ʺfor none other than the British will be able to resist the Soviets.ʺ the British also frighten the Turks by the fact that the Soviet Union allegedly intends to take away the regions of Kars and Ardahan from them, thereby provoking the creation of the eastern front. The British persuade the Turks that if an Anglo‐Soviet clash ever takes place, from which the British emerge as a defeated country, ʹʹ then this will also be a defeat for Turkey. That is why, inciting Ankara, the Anglo‐French advisers to the Turkish government are forcing it to reject ʺany claims of the Soviet Union to establish control over the straits regime, for this control will already mean limiting Turkeyʹs sovereignty.ʺ

The work of the British and French in Turkey, as I have already said, is not limited only to tearing this country away from the Soviet Union, but Britain and France are significantly helping the Turks financially. They persuade Ankara not to worry about the fate of Turkish agricultural exports, promising to fill the gap after Germanyʹs withdrawal from the local market. At the same time, however, as we learned, as one of the main conditions, the British put forward the demand for the devaluation of the Turkish lira so that British exporters have the opportunity to buy local goods here. A commercial agreement was signed between England and Turkey on the basis of 100% tokas, that is, the Turks will receive 100% currency in England for the goods sold by Turkey, and vice versa, for the goods sold by the British in Turkey, the latter must pay only  mottos. In accordance with this agreement, the British will pay the Turks world prices for the goods they buy from them, and the difference between these world prices and market prices will be paid to Turkish sellers from the cash desk of the state bank. To pay for the ʹexport premium, Turkey receives a special loan from England in the amount of 10 million pounds.

In principle, the Anglo‐Turkish negotiations on a loan of 45 million British pounds have been completed. According to another, perhaps the most probable version, the loan will be increased to 62 million pounds. The Turkish government will receive 15 million pounds from the British in gold bullion. 60 million the loan is distributed as follows: 10 million allocated to pay export premiums; £ 10 million to cover extraordinary budgetary expenditures and expenditures related to army mobilization; 20 million will be spent on the purchase of equipment and 20 million pounds ‐ for the implementation of fortifications. This latter case refers to the equipping of the ports in Chatalgazy, Trebizond, Cesme and many works in central Anatolia.

Many facts suggest that the Turks received three wagons of gold from them even before the signing of the loan agreement with the British, which roughly amounts to $ 45 million, or £ 10 million. It is believed that this gold is part of the gold fund that once belonged to Poland and ended up in Turkey.

During Saracogluʹs stay in Moscow, the Turkish press, undoubtedly, on the instructions of their government, extremely sparingly covered everything that was connected with the negotiations on the conclusion of a Soviet‐Turkish pact of mutual assistance. Recently, the press was preparing public opinion that the agreement in Moscow would not be signed, that the Soviet Union is now occupied in the Balkans and with Germany, and that the end result of the Moscow negotiations should be a ʺbridge between the USSR and the countries of democracyʺ, and Turkey in creating this the main role was assigned to the bridge. There were notes in the press that attempts to jeopardize Turkeyʹs obligations to Britain and France ʺwill remain unsuccessful.ʺ

On October 17, prime minister Saydam at the parliamentary group of the Mejlis * made an extensive statement on the Soviet‐Turkish negotiations. He said the following: “from the point of view of Turkey’s security, the guarantees we were given were not balanced by the commitments we were asked to sign. Moreover, the Soviet proposals could not be considered compatible with Turkish policy regarding the straits, since Turkey considers it most essential not to sign any other provisions than those arising from its general international obligations. ʺ Saydamʹs statement should be regarded as an attack on the USSR, and it is at odds with the spirit of the communique published by Tass in connection with the Moscow talks to Saracoglu.

The failure of Saracogluʹs mission has caused an extremely oppressive state in wide circles of the Turkish public and among the people, for the bulk of the population is afraid of losing the Soviet‐Turkish friendship. To defuse the depressed mood and conceal the failure of Saracogluʹs talks in Moscow, the tour [etsk] government [government] under a direct directive ismet Inonu, in an atmosphere of extreme haste, even before Saracogluʹs return to Ankara, signed a pact with the British and French on October 19. The fact that the signing of an alliance treaty with Britain and France was done hastily is at least confirmed by the fact that shortly before that Saydam had told Von Papen about the Turkish governmentʹs intention to wait for Saracogluʹs arrival and only after his detailed report on his trip to Moscow, ʺwe will slowly resolve the issue of the Anglo‐French‐Turkish pact.ʺ

The signing of the pact with the British and French is dissatisfied not only among the people, but also by individual politicians. In a conversation with one of the diplomats, Shukru kaya said that Turkey could now suffer the fate of Poland. Many believe that rapprochement with the British and French is fraught with great trouble for Turkey and that the triple pact could lead it to a clash with the USSR. The guarantees provided by the Turks to Romanians and Greeks are considered to be one of the significant mistakes that the Turkish government made.

The stay in Istanbul for 3 days of two Soviet warships, the crews of which were warmly greeted by the population, gave rise to thinking that Soviet‐Turkish relations are still cordial, and among the intelligentsia there was a glimmer of hope for the preservation of traditional friendship between the two neighboring countries. However, at the behest of the Turkish government and in this matter, the press hastened to cool the good mood that had appeared among the people in connection with the visit of the ships of a friendly country. Apart from short chronicle notes, no responses or articles to the stay of our red navy men in Istanbul, not a single newspaper was written.

Saracoglu returned to Istanbul on October 20 and, in a conversation with one of the deputies, proudly told him that the Anglo‐FrenchTurkish pact would not introduce any changes in Soviet‐Turkish relations because the Soviet government, “knowing about the superiority of the naval forces of England and France, in the event of their eventual appearance in the black sea, he will not want to create a conflict because of this ”. In exactly the same spirit, Saracoglu made a report at the party group of the Mejlis.

The tactics of the Turkish government are clear ‐ this is to widely declare that the Anglo‐French‐Turkish pact will not in any way affect the Soviet‐Turkish relations, and thereby try to calm down the disgruntled part of the deputies, tied by strong threads with those circles of the Turkish public, which is cool to say the least ‐ hostile, disposed towards the tripartite agreement.

There are many people among the thinking circles of Turkey who are perplexed by the fact that the people who are now in power in Ankara, until recently, fought against the British and French, were the best friends of the Soviet Union, from which they received help in their struggle for independence, and now forgetting everything and everyone, they went over to the side of the Anglo‐French bloc. Apparently, the British were able to firmly hammer into the minds of the Turks the idea that only the Anglo‐French navy could provide

Turkey from any unpleasant eventuality.

I was told that the army reacts differently to the breakdown of negotiations between Turkey and the USSR and the signing of a pact with the French and British. The generals of the Turkish army, brought up on the yeast of German culture, express a desire not to completely break with Germany. The middle echelon of the officers ‐ majors, colonels, etc. ‐ participants in the national liberation struggle for independence are in favor of strengthening the establishment of ties with the USSR, for they well remember the assistance that the Soviet Union provided to the impoverished, devastated Turkey. The bulk of the officers, who have recently graduated from military schools and brought up on the ultrapatriotic and chauvinistic desires of modern Turkey, are hostile to the Soviet Union and declare their ʺreadiness to go to war with anyone at any moment, including even the Soviet Union.ʺ

Pro‐Soviet sentiments in military circles are based on the fact that ismet must fully agree with the Soviet Union and ʺaccept the conditions of the latter, up to the provision of bases to Soviet warships with a pass through the territory of Turkey for the red army.ʺ ʺwe donʹt want to be Poland,ʺ they say in these military circles, and these words border on the threat that if the Turkish government does not fulfill all this, then ʺan internal revolution may occur.ʺ

Ankaraʹs ruling circles fueled the press to chat about the fact that the signing of the Anglo‐French‐Turkish pact took place almost without Moscowʹs knowledge and that the Soviet Union approves of this foreign policy action of the Turkish government. The Izvestia editorial of October 21 was commented by the Turks in this very spirit, with particular emphasis on the phrase which said that the Anglo‐FrenchTurkish pact did not directly affect the interests of the Soviet Union. The appearance of the possibility of extending the negotiations between Turkey and the USSR was created. The same Saracoglu, upon arriving from Moscow at the reception of journalists, said the following: ʺthe doors of negotiations between the two countries remain half‐open,ʺ but declined to answer the question of when these negotiations would be resumed.

The press shouted laudably about the Anglo‐French‐Turkish pact, presenting it to public opinion as ʺa factor of peace and order in the Mediterranean, the middle east and the Balkans.ʺ however, many people, both from the Turkish public circles and in the diplomatic corps, regard this act of Turkey as a crazy step, which runs counter to the traditional policy of friendship between the USSR and Turkey.

In his big speech, delivered on November 1 at the opening of the regular session of the Mejlis, Ismet Inonu devoted a large section to SovietTurkish relations. He said the following about the Moscow negotiations: “as you know, our foreign minister, who was in Moscow as a guest of the Soviet government, had contact with him and conducted negotiations for almost three weeks. We hoped that these negotiations would end in an agreement that could be a stage ahead of the stage of happy relations that we have today with our old friend, the Soviet Union. To achieve this goal, we did everything in our power, and there was already a moment when we were convinced that success was guaranteed. However, this time it was not possible to achieve a result that, we believed, corresponded as much to the interests of the USSR as to our own interests. However, you know that friendship between the two countries rests on solid foundations. Obligations and outlines arising from the temporary necessities of the modern period should not harm this friendship. Just as we did in the past, we will continue to sincerely follow the friendly course in Soviet‐Turkish relations. ʺ

As can be seen from the quote from Ismetʹs speech, the Turkish president tries to present the matter in such a way that the friendship between the USSR and Turkey still remains, that it rests on solid foundations and that this friendship in the future, as well as in the past, will follow a well‐established tradition. The Turks now widely use the thesis that the pact does not violate friendly relations existing with other countries and want to assure every one of their peaceful intentions and their desire to stay out of war.

During the first 2‐3 days, the Turks did not comment on comrade Molotovʹs speech at the fifth emergency session of the supreme Soviet of the USSR. By the way, it should be noted that the Anatolian agency deleted from the text of the speech that part where it was said about accusing us of intending to change the Montreux convention, and the section ʺon the reasons why Britain and France are waging an imperialist war against Germany.ʺ however, in the very last days the Turkish press has begun to comment on comrade Molotovʹs report, and the general tone of the press, in my opinion, should be regarded as a tone inspired by the leading circles of Ankara. So, for example, the deputy Asım in the newspaper ʺVakitʺ on November 4 wrote the following: ʺif Turkey agreed to the proposal of the USSR, then the German attack against the security of Turkey would not have caused assistance from the Soviet Union, while the USSR proposed to close the straits for the fleets non‐black sea powers. Given this situation, if the Soviet Union had not provided assistance to Turkey, then why should Turkey have to close the straits to those powers that would have helped her? Wouldnʹt it look like a person who is actively defending against an aggressor is tied hands and feet while at the same time giving the attacker freedom of action? ʺ another journalist, MP Hussein Jahid Yalchin on the 4th wrote: ʺby declaring that Molotov understood clearly the policy of Turkey, he thereby expresses an erroneous opinion about the true meaning of the union agreement signed by us with the democracies, and thereby contradicts.ʺ further saying that Turkey has no intention of being drawn into the conflict and that the Ankara pact is only defensive in nature, Yalchin wrote: “we are very touched and grateful to Molotov for the friendly feelings that he shows towards us, expressing the fear that Turkey might not repent of one fine day in your behavior. To calm him down, letʹs say right away that we, the Turks, learned from the lessons of the past, maturely thought it over and, taking all precautions, signed this agreement and will never regret it. ʺ

It becomes clear that the persistence that Saracoglu adhered to in my conversation with him on October 27 *, and his reluctance to answer the question about the position of Turkey in the event that the British and French tried to navigate their military, auxiliary or commercial ships laden with troops and military materials , through the straits to the black sea. There is no doubt that the Turks will make all sorts of concessions to the British and French in this matter and, while talking about a possible consultation with the USSR, as well as their intention to remain neutral, will not get involved in a war against the USSR, they will nevertheless close their eyes to the fact that the British and French would intend to undertake to expand the boundaries of military danger in the Balkans and the black sea.

The British are trying in every possible way to create a Balkan front264 in order to strengthen their influence in the area. The fact that both the British and the French and the Turks are beginning to vigorously care for the Bulgarians deserves the most serious attention. According to the Bulgarian military attaché, the British are now actively engaged in AntiSoviet and anti‐German work in Sofia in order to attract the Bulgarians to their side as soon as possible, having achieved the inclusion of this country in the Balkan entente40.

In order to use the Balkans as a springboard for the fight against Germany and even against the Soviet Union, the British, apparently, will try or are already trying to persuade Romania to abandon Dobruja in favor of Bulgaria. Obviously, under pressure from Britain, France and Turkey, Yugoslavia has also noticeably begun to show interest in the Balkan entente in recent years. It is believed here that the AngloFrench combined forces can be sent to strike against Germany in the direction from Thessaloniki through Yugoslavia. However, such an operation could be carried out only if Bulgaria is in an alliance with the Balkan countries and with the same England and if it does not have close relations with the USSR, relying on which it could carry out its independence from England and Franceʹs foreign policy. Not only the British, but also the Turks, obviously, think to promise something to the Bulgarians in order to be calm about this Balkan area. The Bulgarian envoy to Ankara believes that the British want to take control of Bulgaria before it has finally come close to the USSR.

Fully included in the orbit of Anglo‐French foreign policy, Turkey is forced to take part in the conflict, acting on the side of England and France. During the autumn and winter, the Turkish government expects to further increase its army, which now reaches 800 thousand people, and equip it at the expense of the British and French with the latest technology. During September and October, the Turks received a significant amount of equipment and war materials from their allies. Information on this matter is contradictory, but everyone agrees that about 300 aircraft, 200 tanks, 400 guns, 300,000 rifles and many other weapons have already been delivered to Turkey.

The tactic of the Turks is to prepare for the spring in the event of an armed clash with Italy or even the Soviet Union, while chatting about peace and the preservation of neutrality. It is for this purpose that over the past two months there has been a transfer of troops to the eastern border of Turkey, that is, towards the Trans Caucasus. It is for this purpose that new units are being formed there. It was for this purpose and on this that negotiations were conducted in Ankara during the stay here of general Weygand and the British general Wavell.

The British and French promised the Turks their middle east armies of 250,000 men. It is assumed that all military units located near our border will be united by a single command and even Weygand is called as an adviser to this command. According to the most accurate information, the Turks have already sent several steamers from Istanbul to Trebizond with British and French military equipment and military materials. The Turkish general staff surrounds itself with former leaders of the counter‐revolutionary organizations operating in the Soviet Union, and mainly in the trans Caucasus.

In Istanbul, military measures are also being actively carried out: houses located along the Bosporus are registered, right up to the exit to the black sea, in order to create stationary machine‐gun and artillery fire centers in them.

That is why Ismetʹs speech at the parliamentary session should be viewed as an attempt to hide the real state of affairs. We will closely monitor everything that is happening in this country and inform our government in a timely manner so as not to face the fact of this or that surprise in the current foreign policy situation.

Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Turkey a. Terentyev

Wua rf, f 011, on 4, p. 31, d 166, l 353—365.