Selected Secret Documents from Soviet Foreign Policy Documents Archives

Selected Secret Documents from Soviet Foreign Policy Documents Archives - 1919 to 1941

Concentrated on 1st and 2nd WW Correspondence and Meetings related to Turkey, Balkans and Iran, with some additions from Afghanistan and India.

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Telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Germany Shkvartsev in the NKID of the USSR

November 4, 1940 top secret

In ʺMunicher Nachrichtenʺ of November 3, an article about Finland was published, indicating that real leaders have appeared in Finland, who have grown out of trench battles on the Karelian isthmus, and they do not need meetings, demonstrations, for fate is in firm hands. The newspaper underlines the common interests of Sweden and Finland. The frankfurter Zeitung, which is close to the foreign ministry, on November 4, calls on Sweden to arm itself on the model of the German army and glorifies Karl xii as a national hero of Sweden, whose work is being continued by Germany. Both articles are transmitted in detail by Tass. The connection between these press appearances and the visit to berlin of gedin192, Swedish journalists and the Schutzkorites is obvious. Germany seeks to secure a submissive north and to seal it, in particular, in order to reinsure the USSR. A similar line is being pursued in the Balkans, but with great Anti‐Soviet emphasis.

Over the past two days, large articles and photographs have been published in print about the difficulties of the Greek theater (military operations). According to the American correspondent Hotad Pavlov, the issue of the failure of the Italian offensive in Greece is being discussed in the German responsible circles. In this connection, the report of our military attaché about the intensified transfer of German troops to Romania from the Blekovits army, which requires verification, deserves attention.

The absence of Ribbentrop in berlin was officially confirmed today by Schmidt at a conference of journalists at the foreign ministry. The usually informed Bulgarian journalist Aganianov told the Tass correspondent * that a conference between Ciano, Ribbentrop and papsnom * is allegedly taking place in bohemia * and it is planned to propose to Turkey to pursue a clear outward political line and provide the axis countries with a base on the Anatolian coast.

In berlin, rumors about Molotovʹs arrival in Germany are being intensely circulated. The Swedish correspondent Svanström told our correspondent that he was told about this by a foreign ministry official, whose name he declined to give. It is possible that the rumors are spread by the Germans to put pressure on the Turks. The refutation of these rumors would have a certain resonance if it is beneficial to us now. Shkvartsev avp rf, f. 059, on. 1, p. 316, d. 2177, l. 96‐97.

Telegram of the first deputy commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR A. Y. Vyshinsky to the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Turkish republic Savinogradov

November 4, 1940

Soy, secret

At the reception on October 30 this year. Turkish ambassador Aktay addressed me with the following questions:

1) the Turkish government is interested in the point of view of the USSR government on the conflict between Italy and Greece.

2) how the Soviet government regards the position of Bulgaria in connection with the Italian‐Greek conflict.

3) the government of the republic of Turkey cannot remain aloof from the Italian‐Greek events. It decided to take all the necessary measures to resist the enemy as soon as any danger arises and regardless of direct aggression. The ambassador said that the Turkish government appeals to the government of the USSR with a request to inform whether the Soviet government will be able to provide assistance to the Turkish republic in the event of a threat to Turkey or a military conflict; in what form, in what size and in what time period it will be able to provide this assistance.

I told the ambassador that in view of the seriousness of the questions he raised, I would like to clarify them. So, I would like to know the opinion of the Turkish government on the Italian‐Greek conflict. The ambassador replied that the Turkish government expects the further course of events in Greece, since Italyʹs further intentions are still unknown. According to the ambassador, Italy presented an ultimatum to Greece not without the consent of Germany.

I asked the ambassador how the Turkish government views the situation in Bulgaria in connection with the Italian‐Greek conflict.

The ambassador said that Bulgaria continues to assure Turkey of maintaining neutrality. However, for some time, urgent military measures have been observed in Bulgaria: an increase in the army, partial mobilization, the supply of equipment, there is also an increase in the number of German troops in Bulgaria. Since none of the neighboring countries is going to encroach on the territory of Bulgaria, there is reason to believe that Bulgaria is ready to become an instrument of some foreign power. I replied to the ambassador that at present I cannot give him an official answer.

I will report the ambassadorʹs message to my government and then give the ambassador a reply. When the ambassador asked about my personal opinion, I referred to the position of the neutrality of the Soviet Union. Then the ambassador turned to me with a request for permission to transit 950 tons of barbed wire through the territory of the USSR.

At the end of the conversation, the ambassador inquired about the work of the mixed Soviet‐Turkish commission on the Sardarabad dam. Since this question was previously dealt with by comrade Dekanozov, the ambassador would like to know whether he should expect comrade Dekanozov arrival or whether he should contact another deputy of the peopleʹs commissar on this matter. I replied that I would study these questions, after which I could give him an answer.

Vyshinsky

Avp rf, f. 059, on. 1, p. 315, d. 2165, l. 70‐72.

Telegram of the first deputy commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR A. Y. Vyshinsky to the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Turkish republic sl. Vinogradov

November 4, 1940

Top secret

November 4 this year I received the Turkish ambassador in order to inform him, on the instructions of the Soviet government, of the answer to the questions raised by the ambassador in our conversation on 30 October 40 * (the text of the statement I made is attached).

The ambassador said that the Turkish government has not forgotten the assistance provided to him by the Soviet Union. The last paragraph of my statement made an unpleasant impression on the ambassador, from this paragraph the ambassador does not see a sufficiently friendly attitude of the Soviet] union towards Turkey. As for the position of Turkey in relation to the Soviet] union during the Soviet‐Finnish conflict, the ambassador believes that no one can accuse Turkey of being hostile to the USSR. I replied to the ambassador that the final paragraph of the answer was well founded. As proof, I reminded the ambassador of the fact that in just 25 days in December 1939, Turkish newspapers printed over 150 telegrams, notes, etc., directed against the USSR.

The ambassador again assured the loyalty of the Turkish government to the USSR, pointing out that the Anti‐Soviet articles that appeared in the Turkish press were mere reprints of messages from foreign agencies, but not a single article was inspired by the Turkish government. I replied that it was not at all necessary to reprint all kinds of Anti‐Soviet gossip. The ambassador said that comrade Molotov had twice pointed out to the ambassador the appearance of Anti‐Soviet articles in the Turkish press, but that in his last conversation, comrade Molotov had promised not to return to this question again. The ambassador noted that articles directed against Turkey appeared in the Soviet press. I denied it. Please, give us a try! The ambassador could not answer. I pointed out to the ambassador that our answer should be viewed not as proof of the lack of a benevolent attitude of the USSR towards Turkey, but, on the contrary, as proof of a friendly attitude. The last paragraph of the reply shows the ambassador how, in the opinion of the USSR, friendly relations should be understood and what should be done in order to avoid the reasons that hinder the strengthening of these relations. The ambassador thanked me for the answer and clarification. He then asked permission to come to me if he had any questions about my application.

A. Vyshinsky

Application

On the questions posed by the Turkish government through its ambassador, Mr. Aktay, on October 30 to deputy] peopleʹs commissar for foreign affairs Vyshinsky, the Soviet government instructed me to answer the following:

1. The outbreak of the Italian‐Greek war is one of the stages of the further expansion of the war. It is difficult for the Soviet government to judge what position Bulgaria can or should take in the Italian‐Greek war. This is the business of the Bulgarian government itself.

The attitude of the USSR to the Italian‐Greek war is determined by its general position in the ongoing war, which is based on the tendency to narrow the base of the war. However, with regard to Soviet policy in the future, much will depend on the course of events and on the situation that may develop in the Balkans in the near future.

2. The Soviet government takes note of the statement by Mr. Ambassador that the government of the Turkish republic cannot remain aloof from the Italian‐Greek events.

3. As for the request of the Turkish government about whether the Soviet government will be able to provide assistance to the republic of Turkey in the event of a threat to Turkey or a military conflict ‐ in what form, in what size and in what time period, the Soviet government is experiencing in connection with such a statement the question is some bewilderment. As you know, there is no mutual assistance pact between the Soviet Union and the Turkish republic that would oblige the USSR or Turkey to provide each other with military or other

assistance. Therefore, the Soviet government does not quite understand such a request from the Turkish government. However, in this matter, too, much will depend on the situation in the near future, which is not yet clear enough. In any case, we can now say that the behavior of the Soviet government will not be the same as the behavior of the political circles of Turkey during the Soviet‐Finnish conflict.

Avp rf, f. 059, on. 1, p. 315, d. 2165, l. 73‐74, 75‐76.