Selected Secret Documents from Soviet Foreign Policy Documents Archives - 1919 to 1941

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  Selected Secret Documents from Soviet Foreign Policy Documents Archives - 1919 to 1941
Concentrated on 1st and  2nd WW Correspondence and Meetings related to Turkey, Balkans and Iran, with some additions from Afghanistan and India.

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Telegram of the chairman of the council of peopleʹs commissars of the USSR, peopleʹs commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov to the general secretary of the cc CPSU (b) J. V. Stalin

November 14, 1940 top secret

Stalin. Today, November 13, we had a conversation with Hitler for three and a half hours, and in the afternoon, in addition to the programmed conversations, a three‐hour conversation with

Ribbentrop. So far, I am reporting these conversations briefly. Details follow. Both conversations did not produce the desired results. The main time with Hitler was spent on the Finnish question. Hitler said he was reaffirming last yearʹs agreement *, but Germany says it has an interest in keeping the Baltic sea peace. My indication that no reservations were made on this issue last year was not refuted, but also had no impact. (to be continued.)

(continuation) the second issue that aroused Hitlerʹs suspicion was the question of guarantees to Bulgaria from the USSR on the same grounds as guarantees to Romania were given by Germany and Italy. Hitler declined to answer, saying that on this issue he must first seek the opinion of Italy.

Ribbentrop stubbornly insisted that on the black sea straits we spoke out in favor of revising the Montreux convention95 and for a new convention with the participation of Turkey, the USSR, Italy and Germany with the provision of guarantees for the territory of Turkey and a promise to satisfy the legitimate wish of the USSR not to allow military vessels to enter the black sea non‐black sea powers. I replied that on this issue the USSR should come to an agreement with Turkey, bearing in mind that for Germany and Italy, which are not the black sea powers, the question of the straits is not essential from the point of view of their security, and for the USSR the issue of the straits is not only related to the conclusion of a new agreement with Turkey, but also with real guarantees of the security of the USSR. The issue of such guarantees concerns not only Turkey, but also Bulgaria in the sense I have indicated, that is, with the provision of guarantees for Bulgaria itself. To the questions posed, I answered him that the ʺjoint workʺ of the USSR, Germany, Italy and japan in the delimitation of the main spheres of influence between them I consider possible and desirable, but it is necessary to agree on this, and it is necessary to correctly link these questions of tomorrow with the questions of today ... Ribbentrop introduced, or rather read, rough sketches (ʺraw thoughtsʺ) of a draft joint open statement of the four powers and two draft secret protocols:

A)                 on the delimitation of the main spheres of interests of the four powers with the deviation of our sphere in the direction of the Indian ocean.

B)                  on the straits ‐ in the spirit of the agreement between Turkey, the USSR, Italy and Germany. Ribbentrop suggested that these projects be discussed in the usual diplomatic manner through ambassadors. (the ending follows.)

(end) I said that I do not mind this order of discussion of these projects. Thus, Germany is not now raising the question of Ribbentrop’s arrival in Moscow.

These are the main results. There is nothing to brag about, but at least I figured out Hitlerʹs current moods, which will have to be reckoned with.

I have not yet thought about what to give a communique on my departure from berlin, since I have just returned from Ribbentrop, and I have no suggestions from him on this. If you have time to give advice, please do so.

Molotov

Avp rf, f. 059, on. 1, p. 338, d. 2314, l. 41‐44.

Publ .: international life. ‐ 1991. ‐ no. 8. ‐ s. 117.

 

Telegram of the advisor of the plenipotentiary representation of the USSR in Germany Semenova in the peopleʹs commissariat for foreign affairs of the USSR

Sent to c. Stalin, c. Molotov, c. Voroshilov, c. Kaganovich, c. Mikoyan, c. Vyshinsky, c. Dekanozov, c. Lozovsky

November 14, 1940 top secret

It is widely believed among foreign correspondents in berlin that, as a result of comrade Molotovʹs berlin negotiations, the USSR is giving up its interest in the Balkans, in return for a free hand in Asia at the expense of Iran and Turkey. Journalists of various directions generally agree on this: Abola and Chalich (Yugoslavia), the American Lochner, the swede Svanström, Lekrenier (German) suspected of having connections with the gestapo and others. Note that on the eve of Molotovʹs arrival, the Italian correspondent of the Stampa newspaper assured that a pact of the four would be concluded, according to which the USSR would receive freedom in the central Asian space.

Svanström told our correspondent that these rumors come from the Germans themselves. Chalich asserted this in todayʹs conversation with attaché Mikhailov, without, however, naming the source by name201.

The communiqué published by the Germans is identical to our text *, with the exception of the second phrase, where instead of ʺthe most important questionsʺ it says ʺimportant questionsʺ in German.

Semenov

Avp rf, f. 059, on. 1, p. 316, d., 2177, l. 129.