Selected Secret Documents from Soviet Foreign Policy Documents Archives

Selected Secret Documents from Soviet Foreign Policy Documents Archives - 1919 to 1941

Concentrated on 1st and 2nd WW Correspondence and Meetings related to Turkey, Balkans and Iran, with some additions from Afghanistan and India.

Download PDF

From: telegram of the chairman of the council of peopleʹs commissars of the USSR, peopleʹs commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR

V. M. Molotov to the general secretary of the cc VKP (b) J. V. Stalin

November 13, 1940

Top secret

......

As for last yearʹs Soviet‐German agreement, it really was in the interests of Germany (firstly, a strong rear in the east when the war was unfolding in the west. Secondly, the acquisition of Poland) and the USSR, which considers the agreement fulfilled, with the exception of the question of Finland, which, I think, will continue to speak more specifically and with all frankness. Now the time has come to talk about a broader agreement between the USSR and Germany, but at the same time it is necessary to first clarify something in connection with the presence of such a new fact as the tripartite pact. Then it will be easier for me to explain to Hitler the questions of interest to the USSR, and in the extreme case, the issues related to the black sea and the Balkans, where we will have to talk primarily about Romania and Bulgaria, and then about Turkey. I asked further to clarify to me, representing a government that did not participate in the preparation and resolution of the issue of the tripartite pact, what the authors of the pact meant by the concept of ʺnew order in Europeʺ, which countries and on what conditions will participate in this matter, what are the planned rates of implementation of the main ideas of the pact, what kind of ʺeast Asian spaceʺ is and where are its borders, to what extent the plans of the authors of the pact affect the USSR.

Hitler perked up noticeably and began to explain in relation to Europe, the tripartite pact established the agreement of two powers, Germany and Italy, which want to come to an agreement with the USSR on the question of Europe. With regard to Asia, japan must also come to an agreement with the USSR.

Germany (Hitler said “we”, and here, as in some other cases, there were ambiguities ‐ whether he spoke in this case on behalf of only the Germans or on behalf of all the participants in the pact) invites the USSR to participate in the tripartite pact as a fourth partner. At the same time, Hitler assured that ʺtheyʺ did not want to confront Russia with a fait accompli, that ʺtheyʺ would like to know what are the interests of the USSR in Europe and Asia in order to coordinate their interests with the USSR and be good brokers between the USSR and japan, as well as Italy, that the clarification of questions about Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey, of course, requires a certain amount of time, but that the pact specifically provided for so that the interests of the USSR would not be hurt or a foregone conclusion without the USSR.

I thanked for the clarifications, but still replied that I was waiting for some additional explanations from Hitler about the plans of the parties to the pact. I added that the USSR does not refuse to participate in certain joint actions of the four powers, but not in the pact of three, where the USSR is included only as an object. Hitler cheered up completely, confirmed that the USSR should not be an object, but a subject of a new agreement, and said that he was very interested in continuing the unanimously started conversation.

Since we had already sat in excess of the norm, and it was already the hour of the appointed lunch, we agreed that tomorrow, November 13, I would have breakfast with him and after that we would continue.

In conclusion, I add. Our preliminary discussion in Moscow correctly highlighted the issues that I faced here. While I’m trying to get information and probe partners. Their answers in conversation are not always clear and require further clarification. Hitlerʹs great interest in negotiating and strengthening friendship with the USSR on spheres of influence is evident. There is also a noticeable desire to push us towards Turkey, from which Ribbentrop wants only absolute neutrality. They keep silent about Finland, but I will make them talk about it. I ask for directions.

Molotov

Avp rf, f. 059, on. 1, p. 338, d. 2314, l. 11‐18. Publ .: international life. ‐ 1991. ‐ no. B. ‐ s. 131‐132. Telegram of the first deputy peopleʹs commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR Vyshinsky to the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Germany A. Shkvartsevu

November 13, 1940

Top secret

For Molotov from instance199

1) as for the black sea, you can answer Hitler that it is not only about leaving the black sea, but mainly about the entrance to the black sea, which was always used by Britain and other states to attack the shores of the USSR. All the events from the Crimean war of the last century to the landing of foreign troops in the Crimea and Odessa in 1918 and 1919 indicate that the security of the black sea regions of the USSR cannot be considered ensured without settling the issue of the straits. Therefore, the USSRʹs interest in the black sea is a question of defending the shores of the USSR and ensuring its security. This is organically linked to the question of guarantees from the USSR, for it is impossible to ensure calm in the straits area without an agreement with Bulgaria on the passage of Soviet troops to protect the entrances to the black sea. This question is especially relevant now and does not tolerate delay, not only because Turkey is connected with Britain, but also because Britain occupied the islands and ports of Greece with her fleet, from where she can always threaten the shores of the USSR, using her agreement with Turkey.

2) in all other respects, proceed from the directives you know *, and if the results of the further conversation show that you can basically come to an agreement with the Germans, and for Moscow there will remain the end and formalization of the case, then so much the better.

3) we consider your behavior in negotiations to be correct.

Vyshinsky avp rf, f. 059, on. 1, p. 339, d. 2315, l. 29, 30. Publ .:

international life. ‐ 1991. ‐ no. 8. ‐ p. 104‐105.

Telegram of the first deputy peopleʹs commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR Vyshinsky to the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Germany al. Shkvartsev

November 13, 1940

Top secret

Molotov from Stalin

We advise:

1. Not to show our great interest in Persia and say that, perhaps, we will not object to the proposal of the Germans.

2. Regarding Turkey, for the time being, keep within the framework of a peaceful resolution in the spirit of Ribbentrop, but say that a peaceful resolution will not be real without our guarantee to Bulgaria and the passage of our troops to Bulgaria as a means of pressure on Turkey.

3. If the Germans propose a partition of Turkey, then in this case it is possible to open our cards in the spirit of the directive *, and in the second case ‐ the arguments of the encryption of the instance.

4. About china to agree with Ribbentrop about a compromise, without yet deploying directives *.

5. With regard to the declaration, agree in principle without reversing paragraphs.

A. V. Gminski

* * *

Molotov from instance

It must be said in the communique that the exchange of views took place in an atmosphere of mutual trust, that the exchange of views revealed mutual understanding on all important issues, and so on. We advise not to offer the Germans your draft communiqué, but to wait for the Germans to give their own draft.

P.s.: transferred on behalf of the instance.

Vyshinsky avp rf, f. 059, on. 1, p. 339, d. 2315, l. 35, 35a, 36, 38, 39. Publ .: international life. ‐ 1991. ‐ no. 8. ‐ p. 105.

From: telegram of the chairman of the council of peopleʹs commissars of the USSR, peopleʹs commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR

V. M. Molotov to the general secretary of the cc CPSU (b) J. V. Stalin

November 13, 1940

Top secret

....

Now we are talking about the east. First of all, relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey. This is a very important question, and here the USSR must express its opinion.

The great Asian space should be divided into east Asian and central Asian. The latter extends to the south, providing access to the open ocean, and is viewed by Germany as a sphere of Russian interests.

For all this, of course, a long time is required, 50‐100 years.

Molotov says Hitler touched on big issues that are not only of European importance. He wants to dwell first on matters closer to Europe. We are talking about Turkey. Noting that the USSR is a black sea power, or rather, the main black sea power, he believes that the German government will understand the importance that this issue has for the Soviet Union. Along the way, in this regard, he should touch on one more controversial point. We are talking about Romania and related issues. As far as Romania is concerned, the Soviet government here expressed its displeasure with the fact that, without consulting it, Germany and Italy guaranteed the inviolability of Romanian territory. He believes that these guarantees were directed against the interests of the Soviet Union. This fact has to be reckoned with. From what the Reich chancellor said, he understood that from what the Reich chancellor declared, he understood that Germany did not consider it possible for a certain period of time to waive these guarantees. This cannot but affect the interests of the Soviet Union as a black sea power, very interested in the position of the black sea powers and straits. With regard to the black sea straits, it must be said that they have more than once been the gateway for an attack on Russia. This was during the

Crimean war of 1855‐1856 and in 1918 and 1919.

Molotov declares that he would like to know what the German government will say if the Soviet government gives guarantees to Bulgaria on the same grounds as Germany and Italy gave them to Romania, and with full preservation of the existing internal regime in Bulgaria, if you like, [not] hundreds, but thousands of years. He would like to reach an agreement on this issue as much as possible. Turkey knows that the Soviet Union is not satisfied with the Montreux 95 convention regarding the straits, therefore, this issue is very topical.

Hitler says that regarding the agreement in Montreux, this is exactly what Ribbentrop told him about, who also talked about it with Italy and found out that Italy was well disposed. He, Hitler, believes that the question of the straits should be resolved in favor of the Soviet Union.

In connection with the question posed by Molotov, Hitler considers it necessary to note two points:

1. Romania itself applied for a guarantee, since otherwise, it could not cede parts of its territory without war.

2. Italy and Germany gave guarantees, tk. This was demanded by the need to provide oil sources; Romania has applied for the protection of oil fields. For this, the air force and some ground troops were needed, because had to reckon with the possibility of the landing of British troops. However, as soon as the war is over, the German troops will leave Romania.

With regard to Bulgaria, Hitler believes that it is necessary to find out whether Bulgaria wishes to have these guarantees from the Soviet Union and what will be Italyʹs attitude to this, since she is most interested in this issue. With regard to the straits, Russia must obtain security in the black sea. He would like to personally meet with Stalin171, since this would greatly facilitate the negotiation, he hopes that Molotov will hand over everything to him, Stalin.

Molotov notes the latter with satisfaction and says that he will gladly convey this to Stalin. We want one thing: to guarantee ourselves against attack through the straits. The USSR can resolve this issue with Turkey. Bulgariaʹs guarantees would help to solve it more reliably. He adds that the USSR considers it necessary to ensure that in the future the Soviet Union cannot be attacked through the straits, as Britain has done more than once. He thinks that this issue can be resolved through an agreement with Turkey.

Hitler declares that this would be in line with what Ribbentrop said to him ‐ this is the absolute security of the black sea by revising the convention in Montreux, so that the straits would allow merchant ships to enter the straits in peacetime, but that Russian warships would always have a free exit and that the entrance to the warships of the nonblack sea powers was closed.

Molotov believes that with regard to the straits, the situation is that the USSR is interested in guaranteeing the straits against the possible penetration of Britain, which, especially thanks to Greece and Turkey, has military bases near the straits. He speaks of the desire of the Soviet government for the solution of this issue to be carried out in practice, and not remain a promise. He knows who determines the policy of Germany, so he wants to get an answer from the Reich chancellor to his question about guarantees for Bulgaria, and he reiterates that the internal regime in Bulgaria will not be affected at all and, in addition, the USSR is ready to support Bulgariaʹs desire to obtain exit to the Aegean sea, considering this her aspiration legitimate. Hitler believes that, in his opinion, this requires:

1) find out whether Bulgaria itself wants these guarantees from the Soviet Union,

And

2) discuss this issue with duce.

Molotov says that he does not believe that this issue should be resolved here now, but only wants to know the opinion of the Reich chancellor.

..............

Archive of the president of the Russian federation, f. 3, on. 64, d. 675, I. 49‐67.

Publ .: new and contemporary history. ‐ 1993. ‐ no. 5. ‐ p. 80‐88. Conversation of the chairman of the council of peopleʹs commissars of the USSR, peopleʹs commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V.M. Molotov with minister of foreign affairs of Germany I. Ribbentrop

November 13, 1940

Top Secret special folder

Ribbentrop states that he would like to make some additions and clarifications to what the fuehrer said *. At the same time, he wants to confine himself to statements about the possibility of defining broad lines of Soviet‐German cooperation for the future and repeating the prerequisites for such cooperation, about which he had already written to Stalin176. He would like to present ʺraw thoughtsʺ as he imagines them, i.e. Thoughts that, perhaps, in the future could be realized. These thoughts lie in cooperation between the state’s parties to the pact of three and the USSR. Ribbentrop thinks that first we need to find a way to jointly establish the spheres of interests of the four states in broad terms, and then come to a special agreement on the problem of Turkey. The problems of delimiting spheres of interest concern four states, while the problem of Turkey affects only Germany, Italy and the USSR. After Molotov talks with Stalin and after Germany and the USSR agree on this set of issues, the minister thinks that Germany and the USSR will come into contact with japan and Italy in order to find out the possibilities of bringing their interests into one formula. As for Turkey, he means contact with Italy. One could find a ʺmodus procedureʺ ** to influence the Turks in the desired direction. If it would be possible to bring the interests of these countries to a common denominator, which Ribbentrop considers not impossible and beneficial for the parties concerned, then it would be possible to fix these two complexes in confidential documents between them, if the USSR shares the views of Germany on preventing the expansion of the war and stands on the point of view its end. He adds that he thought he understood correctly from Molotovʹs words that all these questions deserve study. I imagine that the ultimate goal of this study should be to conclude an agreement between the parties to the pact of the three on the one hand and the USSR on the other hand on cooperation between the four powers in this sense. To address these cases more specifically, he sketched out several points from which, in his opinion, this agreement should consist. He would like to emphasize that in this specific form he, Ribbentrop, did not speak either with japan or with Italy. He thought that these thoughts should first of all be clarified between the USSR and Germany. Of course, he discussed these thoughts in general terms with japan and Italy.

............

One could think of a second additional protocol, which would fix the following: Germany, Italy and the USSR agreed in their views that it was in their interests to attract Turkey to cooperate with them. They undertake to pursue the same policy in this regard. Germany, Italy and the USSR will act in such a way that the statute of montreux95 is replaced by another statute. Under this new statute, the Soviet Union must be granted the right of passage for its naval fleet through the straits, while other powers, with the exception of the black sea, Italy and Germany, must waive their rights to allow their warships to pass through the straits. It goes without saying that the straits remain open to all merchant ships. If the USSR is inclined to cooperate with Italy and japan, Germany would welcome it. ʺ

............

On other questions raised by the Reich minister, Molotov would like to make a few comments and, in turn, pose a number of questions to Ribbentrop. With regard to Turkey and the straits, the Soviet government proceeded from the premise that, firstly, it was necessary to agree with Turkey on the issue of the straits. Second, that the Montreux convention is not good. Thirdly, for the USSR, as for the black sea power, it is necessary to obtain real guarantees against an attack from England across the straits, as Britain did several times before. It is necessary to discuss specific forms of guarantees against such an attack and ensuring security for the black sea powers and the USSR. This question needs to be studied and requires a certain time for its solution.

Ribbentrop (interrupting the translator) says that he thinks that cooperation between the USSR, Italy and Germany should free Turkey from its ties with England and lead to the fulfillment of the USSRʹs wishes for the straits. Moreover, the satisfaction of the USSRʹs desires must be carried out in spite of some of Italyʹs aspirations. Germany is interested in the straits in the second place. Russia is primarily interested in them. Our interests run parallel. While Germany is interested in the straits during the war, wanting to prevent the British from entering the black sea, the USSR is constantly interested in the straits.

Molotov, adding to the above, says that Ribbentrop must agree with the position that Germany is not a black sea power. For her, the straits have not the second, but, perhaps, the tenth significance; for Italy, also a nonblack sea power, the straits have, perhaps, the fifth significance. For the USSR, the question of the straits is extremely important, since the Soviet Union is subject to a direct attack on its borders from the side of the straits. Germany ʺdoes not have a pain in the soulʺ in this matter. In connection with the interests of ensuring the security of the USSR against attack across the straits, the question of Bulgaria is especially important. Moreover, Molotov emphasizes that the Soviet Union is not interested in the internal life of Bulgaria, which the Bulgarians can arrange as they want, for centuries and millennia. The USSR not only considers it necessary to touch upon Turkey, but also links the issue of the security of the USSRʹs black sea borders with Soviet guarantees to Bulgaria.

Ribbentrop says he cannot agree that Italy is not interested in the straits. She is interested in them, tk. Located in the Mediterranean Sea.

Molotov makes the remark that no one from the black sea of Italy has ever threatened and no one will ever threaten. Ribbentrop replies that he is not a naval strategist and cannot judge the strategic position of Italy. As for guaranteeing Bulgaria, he does not know how the fuehrer said the same today, how Bulgaria thinks about this. Ribbentrop will have the opportunity to talk with the statesmen of these states on this issue. As he already said, some states (an allusion to Bulgaria. ‐ v.m.) May join the tripartite pact in a different form, of course, than it might be for the USSR. The question of guarantees for Bulgaria should be discussed with Italy. The minister is interested in how Molotov connects guaranteeing Bulgaria with the task of securing the USSR against an attack across the straits.

Molotov points out that Bulgaria, after Turkey, is the closest black sea country to the straits and is very interested in this issue as a black sea power. But in this case, since it is impossible to find out all the questions concerning other countries, it would be interesting to know the point of view of the German government on the issue of the Soviet Unionʹs guaranteeing Bulgaria. He repeats that he is not saying that there is no need to ask the opinions of other states on this question, but here in berlin it would be easier to clarify the point of view of the German government than other questions.

Ribbentrop reiterates that the German government cannot answer this question without consulting Italy. He would like to know if the USSRʹs desire to guarantee itself against attacks from England across the straits does not correspond to what Ribbentrop spoke about with Italy in this respect. Italy, despite its interest in the straits, promised to meet the wishes of the USSR and make concessions, which made him, Ribbentrop, very happy. What is the opinion of the Soviet government about this project?

Molotov expresses satisfaction with Italyʹs benevolent attitude to this issue. He expressed his point of view on the importance of this issue for Germany, Italy and the USSR, and again declares that the USSR needs not only an agreement on this issue with Turkey, which owns the straits, but also real guarantees. The corresponding answer of the USSR on this question also includes the Bulgarian question from that foreign policy point of view, which does not affect the internal life of Bulgaria. In this case, the USSR considers it possible, by analogy with Romania, to which Germany and Italy gave guarantees, but gave guarantees to Bulgaria without consulting the USSR in advance and without asking the USSRʹs opinion on this issue. The Soviet government considers itself entitled to raise the question of giving guarantees to Bulgaria, which in turn must guarantee the straits to the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Soviet government considers it necessary to ask Germanyʹs opinion on this issue.

(then the translator continues the interrupted translation of Molotov’s first answer.)

Molotov believes that the issues of interest to the Soviet Union are not limited to Turkey. In connection with the straits, the USSR is interested in the Bulgarian question. The Soviet Union is also interested in the question of the fate of Hungary and Romania as states bordering on the USSR. The Soviet Union cannot remain aloof from how the fate of these countries will be decided. Molotov says that he would like to receive information on what axis thinks about Yugoslavia and Greece. Then about the fate of Poland. The USSR and Germany have a protocol on this score *. Does this protocol, providing for the exchange of views on the fate of Poland, remain in force? Going even further to the west, the USSR is interested in the question of Sweden’s neutrality. At one time, the governments of both states ‐ the USSR and Germany ‐ expressed the opinion that they were both interested in Sweden’s neutrality87. The USSR still holds the same opinion on this issue. Has Germany also remained on the same point of view on the question of Sweden’s neutrality?

The USSR is interested in the issue of leaving the Baltic sea: small and big belt, sound, Kattegat and Skagerrak. Is it not advisable, following the example of the Danube issue, to also convene a meeting of interested countries on this issue? He is not now talking about the Finnish question, on which he has already expressed the point of view of the Soviet government. If Ribbentrop considers it necessary to touch upon these issues now, then it would be desirable to do so. After that, Molotov declares, he would like to touch upon the questions about which Ribbentrop spoke at the beginning.

..................

This concludes the conversation.

The conversation lasted from 9 pm to midnight in the Ribbentrop bomb shelter.

Recorded by v. Pavlov