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  Selected Secret Documents from Soviet Foreign Policy Documents Archives - 1919 to 1941

Concentrated on 1st and  2nd WW Correspondence and Meetings related to Turkey, Balkans and Iran, with some additions from Afghanistan and India.

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Record of the conversation of the peopleʹs commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov with the ambassador of Germany in the USSR f. Schule n. Burg

November 13, 1939 secret

1. At the beginning of the conversation, comrade Molotov shared the message of the Turkish ambassador. The Turkish ambassador conveyed that the Romanian government has raised the issue with Turkey on the creation of a bloc of southeastern countries with the participation of the Balkan entente4 ʺ, that is, Romania, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece. This bloc should be bound by a non‐aggression pledge. It should enter into negotiations. With Hungary and Bulgaria to include the latter and then turn to Italy with a proposal to join this bloc. ” according to the Turkish ambassador, it turns out that Gafenku hopes that England, France, Italy and Germany will allegedly take a positive view of this idea, and now Turkey wants to find out the opinion of the USSR.

Comrade Molotov conveyed to Herr Schulenburg the text of the message of the Turkish government and noted that it was desirable to know the opinion of the German government on this issue *.

To this, Mr. Schulenburg replied that, judging by the reports of the

German representatives in the Balkans, neither Hungary, nor Yugoslavia, nor Greece ‐ and there is nothing to say about Bulgaria ‐ have no particular desire to deal with this issue.

This is the desire of Romania. ” the position of Italy, the ambassador says, is not yet known, and there are no indications from the German [government]. The ambassador promised to immediately request instructions by telegraph.

2.  The ambassador inquired whether the rumors about the concentration of significant forces of Soviet troops on the Bessarabia border were true, to which comrade Molotov ironically said that he had not heard of this.

3.  Then the ambassador dwelled on the question of the zones of German maritime control in the Baltic sea. The ambassador explained that the need for the eastern border of control on the Tallinn meridian is based on the fact that, according to their information, Estonian and Latvian ships carry timber by territorial waters, then go across the bay and follow again by territorial waters in the Aland islands region, thus reaching your goal. The German [government], said Mr. Schulenburg, fully complies with the wishes of the USSR to transfer German maritime control in the Baltic to its more western part, but reserves the fundamental right to fight against military smuggling.

To this, comrade Molotov replied to the ambassador that the Soviet] government not only had nothing against the fight against smuggling but sympathized with Germany in this and considered this fight absolutely necessary. The southern border of Soviet influence in the Baltic lies on the latitude of the southern border of Lithuania, and the question of the sea border is not a theoretical question, but a military question. Soviet interests in the Baltic north of the southern border of Lithuania, including Finland, must be taken into account by the German government as agreed.

The ambassador agreed with this and said that it would be done according to the wishes of the Soviet [government].

4.  After that, Schulenburg asked about the Soviet‐Finnish negotiations

*.

Comrade Molotov informed the ambassador, noting that the negotiations were not going well, that Britain was apparently working hard against the USSR. The Finns were offered two options from our side: 1) to lease or sell a plot of land in the Hanko area, 2) in case of unacceptability of the first proposal, to sell or exchange a number of islands east of Hanko in the Lappohja bay.

The Finns rejected both proposals. Finnish territorial concessions in the Leningrad region are completely insufficient

The rest of the questions in the Soviet‐Finnish negotiations do not meet with great difficulties. Our requirements are minimal, said comrade Molotov in conclusion, we will not deviate a step from them and will ensure their implementation.

The ambassador noted that berlin is interested in how these demands will be met, whether only by peaceful means.

To this comrade Molotov replied that it is difficult to say now, but the USSR will not deviate from its minimum requirements.

5.                   Further, the ambassador said that in berlin they were a little offended by the fact that the border was changed not quite the way they wanted. To which comrade Molotov remarked that this was a trifle, the border approved on September 28, 1939, should not be shaken. People are already firmly settled, the authorities have chosen, a partial change of the border in one area will cause uncertainty and unwanted responses in other areas.

Comrade Molotov asked the ambassador to send a message by telegraph that the German [government] government should no longer insist on changing the border.

6.                   In connection with the question raised by Mr. Schulenburg that the chairman and vice‐chairman of the border commission stayed too long in Moscow, comrade Molotov pointed out a number of shortcomings in the work of this commission (confidential protocol, imitation of political treaties) and said that there are no differences in substance and the protocol will be signed tomorrow.

7.                   On behalf of the German government, the ambassador said: the German [government] wants to end the war, how ‐ it is not yet known. They consider it necessary to exert strong pressure on England. Britain and France are concentrating troops in Syria and Egypt, like the Balkan front of the last war. Turkey is ready to help them and did the same in Thrace and the Caucasus. Perhaps Amanullah and his people should have been sent to Afghanistan to put pressure on the British, but the ideal would have been a military demonstration by the USSR on the borders of Afghanistan and the Caucasus without aggressive intentions. If this turns out to be impossible, then it is advisable that the Soviet [government] not refute such rumors, if any. The aim is to divert

England from preparations in the Balkans.

8.                   The ambassador inquired about the Bulgarian‐Soviet relations and the opinion of the Soviet] government on Italian‐Greek relations.

It was answered that Bulgaria is afraid of England and considers the mutual assistance pact too big for itself. It is possible that an airline will be opened between the USSR and Bulgaria.

9.                   When comrade Molotov asked about the opinion of the German [government]      government        on           the                 international       situation,              the ambassador said that peace cannot be achieved without strong pressure on England. England rejected the offer of the Dutch queen and the Belgian king. Ribbentrop did not answer specifically what to do. In fact, only the fuehrer knows about this. Italy, as friends say, will do whatever it takes

10.                Referring to poor communication with France, the ambassador asked about the mood in that country and received an answer from comrade Molotov that information from there was scanty and insufficient.

11.                The ambassador again returned to the question of peace. In berlin, he says, they want to know Maiskyʹs own opinion on the English hint of peace. On the one hand, chamberlain and Halifax make warlike speeches, on the other hand, they probe the possibilities of peace through the Norwegian crown prince, America, etc. In Germany, they do not believe Englandʹs peaceful intentions.

Comrade Molotov noted that Maisky did not have the impression that England was definitely talking about peace.

The ambassador asked if Mr. Molotov had in mind in his report to render assistance to Germany in the cause of peace in connection with the Soviet‐German treaty, and how this assistance was conceived. Berlin wants to know about it.

On that. Molotov replied that the Soviet [government] government considers Hitlerʹs speech the basis for peace negotiations. In the article ʺpeace or warʺ England. Is branded as a warmonger. Nobody else has done anything like this. If there is a more specific reason, the latter will be taken into account. Maiskyʹs statements are not yet specific enough.

12.                Bearing in mind the possible convocation of the league of nations, the ambassador admits that representatives of the Czech Republic and Poland may speak there, which will entail undesirable broad debates, in order to avoid which, it would be necessary to agree.

To this the ambassador received an assurance that in this matter the interests of Germany and the USSR are common.

13.                According to the information available to the ambassador, during the retreat, the poles took carpets and tapestries of great historical value from the Cracow castle and sent them to the east. The ambassador asked if these values were found on the territory of the USSR, to return them.

14.                In conclusion, the ambassador recalled the promise of the Soviet side to provide warm clothes to the German sailors in Murmansk who are experiencing difficulties in carrying out the winter watch, and noted that it would be desirable to receive at least a third of the previously requested.

In this he is promised *.

The reception was attended by the counselor of the German embassy, Mr. Hilger.

The conversation was recorded by Semenov

Avp rf, f. 06, on. 1, p. 1, d 4, l. 45‐49.

* see doc. 808.