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  Selected Secret Documents from Soviet Foreign Policy Documents Archives - 1919 to 1941

Concentrated on 1st and  2nd WW Correspondence and Meetings related to Turkey, Balkans and Iran, with some additions from Afghanistan and India.

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Telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Turkish republic A.V. Terentyev in the NKID of the USSR

March 19, 1940

The Anti‐Soviet tone of the Turkish press in assessing the SovietFinnish peace treaty * in recent years noticeably interspersed with various kinds of guesswork ʺabout the future plans of the USSR.ʺ one category of ct2f journals adheres to the view that the Soviet Union, having ended the war with Finland, ʺwill not hesitate to move on to resolving another strategic problem of interest to it, mainly in the Balkans and the middle east.ʺ all articles of this type end with a warning at our address and advice is given ʺnot to forget that tur‐I is strong in its friendship with allies, who will immediately come to her ___ help in case of any external attackʺ. Another category of journalists in their editorials carries the idea that ʺthe Soviet Union after the Finnish war needs rest and therefore will take all measures to stay out of the European war as long as possible.ʺ

In either case, newspapermen do not skimp on explicit attacks on the USSR. Noteworthy is the inspired tone of several yesterdayʹs articles published by the Istanbul newspapers on the topic ʺthe possibility of signing a Turkish‐Soviet non‐aggression pact.ʺ the reason for these articles was the optimism of the Reiter’s telegram from Amsterdam, which refers to the diplomatic activity of Germany, and the telegram of the Anatolian agency from Moscow that “the foreign policy of the USSR has entered a new phase and that the program of the“ Stalinist peace ”proceeds from the principle of security of the USSR in in all directions

‐ in the south, northeast, west and northwest: ʺ. The Turks ascribe to Germany the intention, firstly, to prevent the Soviet Union from ʺrushing into a new adventureʺ, secondly, to reconcile the USSR with Italy and, finally, to ensure the conclusion of a non‐aggression pact between the USSR, Romania and Turkey. Newspapers eagerly seized on the message that appeared in the foreign press about ʺthe possibility of signing a Soviet‐Turkish non‐aggression pact.ʺ

Regarding the present Soviet‐Turkish relations as ʺnormalʺ, Yalchin writes that ʺit depends only on the desire of the Soviet Union to bring these relations to the level of the previous mutual sincerity and trust.ʺ newspapers repeat the thesis that ʺif there were any changes in relations between the two countries, they arose not through the fault of Turkey, but through the fault of Moscow.ʺ outlining the history of the Moscow negotiations with Saracoglu42, Yalchin makes the following conclusion: “if during the period that has elapsed after these negotiations, the statesmen of Moscow had the opportunity to think about everything and if they wish to return to relations of cordial friendship, then we will meet this desire with joy. Turkey will not refuse to conclude a non‐aggression pact with the USSR within the framework of the old project. However, a lot of time has passed since the first negotiations, and a non‐aggression pact between the USSR and Turkey can be concluded only to protect Turkish‐Russian interests, since we will not agree to be an instrument for protecting the interests of Germany. ʺ speaking about the ʺpossibilityʺ of starting some kind of negotiations on the conclusion of a bilateral pact, the Turks obviously want to probe the point of view and challenge us to some answer about the position of the USSR in relation to Turkey.

Terentyev

Avp rf, f. 059, on. 1, p. 314, d. 2160. L. 221‐223.