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  Selected Secret Documents from Soviet Foreign Policy Documents Archives - 1919 to 1941

Concentrated on 1st and  2nd WW Correspondence and Meetings related to Turkey, Balkans and Iran, with some additions from Afghanistan and India.

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Recording of the conversation of the USSR plenipotentiary representative in Iran with the minister of foreign affairs of Turkey Aras. 

June 30, 1937

Rushtu Aras, together with the Turkish ambassador, came to see me in Zergand [1] ... He reported on a telegram he had received from Ankara informing him that the Soviet government would provide him with a special ship on his return from Moscow to Turkey. In this regard, Rushtu Aras decided to reconsider his route. Previously, after his stay in Moscow, he intended to visit Stockholm to pay a visit to Sandler, but, given that the Soviet government is providing him with a special ship, he will postpone his visit to Sandler until a later time and will return directly to Ankara from Moscow. Rushtu Aras began to explain that, in general, his plans for a trip to Stockholm were connected precisely with the fact that there was no regular steamship service on the black sea. However, he immediately added that, while changing the route, he also tried to emphasize that his visit to Moscow does not have the character of a visit during transit but is an independent visit.

I told Rushtu Aras that on the question that interested him about the date of his trip to Moscow, I managed to find out that Moscow was expecting his arrival on July 13th. In order to be in Moscow on July 13, you need to leave Pahlavi on July 10, and on July 11 ‐ from Baku.

Regarding the message made to me by Rushtu Aras, I noticed that I had an assignment from comrade Litvinov to find out whether Rushtu Aras had in mind to visit Moscow by way of passage, or whether this visit was of an independent character. The message from Rushtu Aras about his change of the route gives me grounds to give the necessary explanation to comrade Litvinov.

Rushtu Aras further said that the afghan foreign minister is expected in

Tehran on July 6‐7, while the Iraqi foreign minister is expected on July 1. The signing of the pact will probably happen on July 8 or 9. Rushtu Aras thinks that some difficulties may still arise between the Iraqis and the Iranians during the final editing of the text of the Shatt al‐Arab convention, since there is no complete text yet.

It is assumed that after the signing of the pact, a council of the middle east entente will be formed, and Rushtu Aras intends to elect Iranian foreign minister Sami as chairman of this council for the first year. Rushtu Aras also thinks to propose on behalf of this council to send greetings telegrams to Litvinov and Eden, as representatives of neighboring countries.

Rushtu Aras said that he had a visit from an Italian envoy and asked him why they were in such a hurry to sign the middle east pact. Rushtu Aras states that the Italians are showing concern and dissatisfaction with the pact. He did not ask the Italian envoy about the reasons for such an unusual interest and limited himself only to a statement that the middle east pact poses no threat to anyone and that his task is only to consolidate peace. Rushtu Aras states that Germany and Poland are also showing interest in the fact of the conclusion of the middle east pact and the representatives of these countries in Ankara have contacted the ministry for relevant information. However, this interest was quite correct in form, without going beyond requests for ordinary information. In this way,

Speaking about the circumstances facilitating the conclusion of the middle east pact, Rushtu Aras gave a special place to the settlement of the Iraqi‐Iranian disputes over the Shatt al‐Arab. Rushtu Aras links the successful outcome of these disputes to the European situation. The European situation led to the fact that the most difficult moment, namely the requirement for a three‐member, with the participation of Great Britain, management of the Shatt al‐Arab, was subsequently removed.

Rushtu Aras said that in Ankara he had heard from the Soviet embassy about the unsatisfactory nature of Iranian‐Soviet relations. Comrade Litvinov told Ismet [Inonu] about the same [2]. Rushtu Aras allegedly even offered his mediation. Now, having arrived in Tehran, from conversations with prime minister jam and the minister of foreign affairs of Sami, he was convinced that such mediation, in fact, is not necessary. Both jam and Sami are quite satisfied with the cooperation with the Soviet embassy and the nature of the ongoing negotiations [3] ... In Sami, Rushtu Aras found a supporter of the settlement of IranianSoviet relations, moreover, according to Rushtu Aras, Sami would like to establish relations with the Soviet Union, so to speak, parallel to Turkey. After the settlement of the issue with Iraq and the signing of the middle east pact, Sami intends to take up the settlement of the Iranian‐Soviet governments to exchange views and reach mutual understanding.

A. Chernykh

[1]  suburban area near Tehran.

[2]  probably referring to the conversations on May 13‐14, 1937.

[3]  this refers to the negotiations on border issues and concerning the Soviet‐Iranian joint stock company ʺKevir‐Khurianʺ, which lasted for a number of years and actually broke off in 1937. The negotiations were held with great difficulties, especially in 1937; the Iranian side has repeatedly rejected the already agreed positions and put forward new proposals.

On December 2, 1954, an agreement was concluded between the USSR and Iran on the settlement of border and financial issues (see “Vedomosti of the supreme Soviet of the USSR”, 1955, no. 8). As for the joint‐stock company ʺKevir‐Khurianʺ, the Soviet government in July 1956 announced a free renunciation of its rights in favor of Iran. Telegram from the charge dʹaffaires of the USSR in Turkey to the peopleʹs commissariat of foreign affairs of the USSR. October 16, 1937

USSR foreign policy documents. T. 20. January ‐ December 1937 / ministry of foreign affairs of the USSR; ‐ m.: politizdat, 1976., p. 549.

October 16, 1937

I visited Bayar after Aras had previously inquired about the purpose of the visit. In response to my congratulations, in which I noted his personal influence on the course of the negotiations [1], Bayar said that, of course, I know his views and he will strive to expand our economic and political relations. If at first there will be difficulties in the implementation of the trade agreement, then with the good will of the parties, they will be eliminated. Then Bayar stopped at the opening of the Nazilli combine [2], asked if I was familiar with his speech, and noted the great satisfaction of Ataturk, who got acquainted with the combine not only externally, but also in essence.

Bayar behaved more like an economy minister than a prime minister. It is possible that at first, he is still very cautious, but I admit that he behaved this way on the advice of Aras.

Zalkind

[1]                this refers to the Soviet‐Turkish negotiations, which began in connection with the expiration of the trade agreement and ended on October 8, 1937 with the signing of an agreement on trade and navigation, as well as a trade and payment agreement.

[2]                the textile mill in Nazilli was built according to Soviet designs and equipped with equipment from the Soviet Union. The opening of the plant took place on October 9, 1937 in the presence of President Kemal Ataturk, prime minister Bayar, who delivered a speech, and other members of the Turkish government.