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  Selected Secret Documents from Soviet Foreign Policy Documents Archives - 1919 to 1941

Concentrated on 1st and  2nd WW Correspondence and Meetings related to Turkey, Balkans and Iran, with some additions from Afghanistan and India.

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Letter from the chairman of the Russian‐Ukrainian‐Georgian delegation at the Lausanne conference to the deputy peopleʹs commissar for foreign affairs of the RSFSR M Litvinov *

December 19, 1922 m 15

Dear comrade,

In my letter no. 12 ** I informed you about my meeting with Curzon, who said that on Monday there will be a meeting of the commission, and the Turks will finally express their opinion on the straits. Yesterday, Monday 18th, this meeting took place. The night before, the allies sent out their drafts no. 3 and no. 4. (draft no. 1 concerned the passage of ships through the straits, project no. 2 dealt with the demilitarization of the strait zones; both were introduced by Curzon on December 6; the draft no. 3 now international commission of the straits, and no. 4 on the guarantee of the league of nations; in addition, on Sunday evening the Turks sent us the text of their counter‐draft, which they sent to the delegations yesterday morning.21 yesterday, just before the meeting, we passed our counter‐draft *** to the conference secretariat.) [.. .]

You should know the progress of yesterdayʹs meeting from the detailed report of Rosta and the materials sent to you at the same time. First, the allies spoke about their projects no. 3 and no. 4. The Turks said that they had not yet had time to study these projects and would express themselves at another meeting. We joined in and stated the same. I read our declaration **** with an analysis of the union projects no. 1 and no. 2. Curzon polemicized against me, I polemicized against Curzon. I note the very essence of the matter: Curzon said that the center of the question lies in the fact that at present mankind is trying more and more to bring freedom of navigation, freedom of passage through the seas and straits, etc. I pointed out in my objection that the center the issue is that much more progressive is the desire to limit theaters of military operations, to limit armaments, to cut state spending, rather than to expand and not increase all this. Taking advantage of barreraʹs speech in favor of the league of nations, I pounced on the latter and illustrated her impotence by the fact that she gave up in front of Zheligovsky. This was followed by a rather lengthy debate about the late introduction of our counter‐projects. I pointed out that the allies themselves had just submitted their drafts no. 3 and no. 4 and that we could not have submitted our counter‐draft earlier, because the commission had not been convened for 10 days, and the sub‐commission had not been created at all. Curzon and Barrer pounced on the Turkish delegation for introducing new projects.

Today, on Tuesday, the 19th, there was a meeting, which, according to Curzon; had to be decisive and final. The Turks, however, did not speak out, and the meeting ended with Curzonʹs half‐frank ultimatum to the Turks: the inviting powers appoint one more last meeting on the straits, no more. In other words, a final answer is required from the Turks and no further negotiations are allowed.

You should know the course of the meeting from other materials. I will recapitulate in a nutshell: Curzon analyzed our counter‐project in a very summary and tendentious way, then analyzed in detail, article by article, the Turksʹ amendments to the union projects. Almost all the demands of the Turks, deviating from the proposal of the allies, Curzon on behalf of the latter rejected. Ismet pasha answered only on some points, and he rejected some of the most important demands of the allies. I then objected to Curzon and read our declaration on the union projects no. 3 and no. 4 *. Of my objections to Curzonʹs polemics, I will single out two points: 1) to our declaration of our readiness to convene a conference of the black sea states to discuss the mutual security of the shores, Curzon replied that this is completely insufficient, for Russia only expresses its readiness to speak with the black sea states, and other states to does not allow it. To this I replied that this was the same idea put forward by the British government in 1920, when it, together with other great powers, proposed to participate in the negotiations between Russia and the Limitrophes; we then rejected this, because we believed that we would more easily come to terms with the Limitrophes if, in our negotiations, we proceed from our interests and their interests and not add to this world conflicts and all the complexity of world politics *; I think in the same way that we ourselves will more easily come across the black sea states. 2) regarding Curzonʹs malicious remarks about our isolation, I ended my speech by saying that we have a powerful ally ‐ the taxpayer of all * countries, who will understand tomorrow that the system of expanding the scope of operations of military courts, increasing armed forces and multiplying conflicts at sea leads to increased costs, and therefore it will ensure the triumph of our point of view tomorrow.

All small states, of course, accepted the allied project. Roles were assigned and each had a specific role.

The end of the meeting was occupied by Kerzonʹs leaning against the Turks and Curzonʹs statements, which had the character of an ultimatum. Tomorrow at 4 pm there will be a meeting, which, according to Curzon, is regarded by the inviting powers as the last on the question of the straits.

Meanwhile, the Americans have just received a protest against the creation of an international commission in the straits. At the same time, the Turks continue to resolutely rebel against the provision of the international commission with the functions of overseeing the demilitarization of the shores and, in general, any functions falling within the competence of the Turkish government.

We just had a conversation with Ismet pasha. He most of all insists on the item on the competence of the international commission. Other questions also arise in the circles of the conference they say that the British want now to sign only a preliminary peace and postpone the final peace. This means that Turkeyʹs agreement in principle will be squeezed out of her, and the final peace, that is, the withdrawal of British troops and navy from Constantinople, will be postponed. On the question of the straits, the British want to end immediately and get the consent of the Turks to their demands and immediately sign a separate convention on the straits even without Russia. Therefore, the most important issue for them will thus be torn out of Turkeyʹs consent and formalized, and everything else will be postponed. Ismet pasha says that he will insist on the immediate evacuation of Constantinople by the allies and that on the points on which he accepts the demands of the allies regarding the straits, he will give a conditional agreement, depending on the agreement on all other controversial issues of the conference.

As a result of the departure of the courier, I have to interrupt at this, and I will write about tomorrowʹs decisive meeting with the next courier.

With communist greetings

Georgy Chicherin