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  Selected Secret Documents from Soviet Foreign Policy Documents Archives - 1919 to 1941

Concentrated on 1st and  2nd WW Correspondence and Meetings related to Turkey, Balkans and Iran, with some additions from Afghanistan and India.

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 Recording of the conversation of the

chairman of the council of peopleʹs commissars of the USSR J. V. Stalin with the minister of foreign affairs of the Great Britain Eden

December 18, 1941

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Comrade Stalin proposed to Eden a new draft treaty on the post‐war organization of peace and security (the text is attached), expressing the opinion that, as it seemed to him, a formula was found in this draft for article 4 that could satisfy both sides.

Eden said that he had also worked out some compromise proposals, but that he would first like to discuss comrade Stalinʹs new draft.

Since the translation into English and the typewritten correspondence of article 4 of comrade Stalinʹs draft took a certain amount of time, while the meeting moved on to discussing the issue of a military treaty.

Comrade Stalin asked Eden why we could not now conclude an agreement in its entirety. Why is Eden proposing instead to sign only an agreement now? Great Britain has, for example, a mutual assistance agreement concluded in its entirety with Turkey. Is the USSR really worse than Turkey? If the British government sees any obstacles to concluding a formal treaty with the USSR, it would be best if it told us this frankly.

Eden objected that comrade Stalinʹs suspicions of the British governmentʹs unwillingness to conclude a formal treaty with the USSR had no basis at all. Eden proposes to conclude an agreement and not a treaty for reasons of a purely legal nature. The formal treaty is concluded in the name of the king, who is not only the king of Great Britain, but also the dominions and emperor of India. The conclusion of such a treaty requires the consent of not only the British government, but also the governments of the dominions. Eden has credentials from the British government, but no dominion governments. Therefore, he proposes to conclude an agreement, the legal force of which in the eyes of the British is no less than the strength of the contract. If, however, comrade Stalin prefers a treaty, then Eden proposes such a way out: to sign an agreement in Moscow, and then upon arrival in London and after a corresponding consultation with the dominions, convert this agreement into a treaty, which and ratify it. This procedure is possible.

Comrade Stalin agreed to accept Ideiaʹs proposal. Then he moved on to another issue and pointed out that if we do not want to turn the military agreement into a simple piece of paper, then it is necessary that it be confirmed by certain practical actions. In the past, we raised the question of a second front, the creation of which the British government rejected for various reasons. Then we put forward another proposal ‐ to send British troops to the Soviet front. If the British government considers this proposal to be hardly feasible at the moment, then we are ready not to insist on it and now put forward a new, third proposal: a joint Anglo‐Soviet operation in the north, in the Petsamo region, and in northern Norway. The USSR could have provided ground forces for this operation; Britain would have been required to help with the fleet and aviation. As a result, Petsamo would be occupied and a hotbed of resistance to German aggression would be created in northern Norway. In the future, Norwegian volunteers could also be sent there. There are few German troops in the area, while all of them are mostly Austrians. Comrade Stalin was interested in Eden’s opinion on the issue of the northern operation.

Eden replied that at the present time England did not have sufficient forces to send reinforcements to the Soviet southern front. As for the northern operation, it seems to him very desirable and feasible. He is ready to start negotiations on it now, during his stay in Moscow, involving general Ney in the discussion of this issue. I wanted to leave the idea, however, when approximately this operation is supposed.

Comrade Stalin replied that the northern operation could be launched in a month, or maybe in 6 weeks.

Eden promised to urgently address this issue.

Then the conversation touched the question of the possibility of sending British troops to the USSR at a later stage, and Eden asked

 

comrade Stalin to which sector of the front he would consider it expedient to send British troops.

Comrade Stalin replied that if British troops were sent by the northern route, they would be ready to send them to the Leningrad front, somewhere along the border with Estonia. He could, of course, give them a place on the Finnish front, but believes that the British would probably want to avoid military action against Finland. If the British troops came from the south, they could take part in operations on the Ukrainian front.

Eden replied that until the end of the Libyan campaign, including the trip to Tripoli, Britain would hardly be able to send any armed forces to the USSR. In addition, when deciding on the dispatch, it is also necessary to take into account the fact that the dispatch of British troops by the northern or southern route must inevitably affect the possibility of delivering the necessary military supplies to the USSR. From a military point of view, it seems to Eden to send troops to the USSR at the expense of bringing in equipment. In addition, the British do not have troops suitable for operations in the winter.

Nevertheless, if comrade Stalin considers it necessary. Eden is ready to raise this issue with the prime minister. Comrade Stalin, in response, remarked that he was by no means inclined to insist on sending British troops to the USSR if the British government considered it impossible.

It was then that the English text of the new wording of article 4, given by comrade Stalin, was brought in, and the meeting moved on to consider the second treaty ‐ on the post‐war organization of peace and security.

Eden proposed to add to article 1 of comrade Stalinʹs draft the words: ʺboth contracting parties undertake to jointly consult on the terms of a peace treaty, including the question of borders.ʺ

This proposal was accepted by comrade Stalin with the amendment that both sides would not ʺjointly consultʺ, but ʺact by mutual agreement in working out the conditionsʺ of a peace treaty, etc. Eden agreed with the proposed modification.

Then Eden proposed a new text for the first part of article 3 *, which read as follows: ʺboth contracting parties undertake to work together on the reconstruction of Europe after the war, taking full account of the interests of each of them.ʺ the mention of ʺacquisitionsʺ and noninterference in the internal affairs of other peoples were thrown out.

Comrade Stalin objected that he could not agree to such a formulation. On the contrary, he considers it necessary to leave both the mention of ʺacquisitionsʺ, specifying only both ʺterritorial acquisitionsʺ and the mention of non‐interference in the internal affairs of other peoples. This latter is especially necessary because many abroad talks about the USSRʹs intention to ʺbolshevize Europe.ʺ

Eden agreed with comrade Stalin. However, he refused to accept the wording of article 4 in comrade Stalinʹs draft, finding that it was a recognition of the border of the 1941 USSR, albeit in a slightly veiled form. Eden further proposed to give, simultaneously with the signing of the treaty, a letter in which he undertakes, upon his return to England, to take measures to arrange for a discussion of the issue of future borders between the united states, Great Britain and the USSR. Eden presented the draft of this letter to comrade Stalin. (text attached.)

Comrade Stalin agreed with the text of the letter, provided that the mention of the borders of the USSR was deleted from it.

Eden did not object to such a discard. With article 4, however, a dead end was created. Eden rejected comrade Stalinʹs formula, while comrade Stalin declared that Eden’s formula was unacceptable to us. Eden tried to defend his position, stating that his intention, when traveling to Moscow, was to develop and publish the Moscow charter, which, to a certain extent, would be a counterbalance to the Atlantic charter. Now he sees that it will not succeed. He would therefore ask comrade Stalin to accept his formulation of article 4 with an additional letter, the draft of which he had just handed over to him.

Comrade Stalin objected that this was not enough. Comrade Stalin also expressed surprise at Eden’s reluctance to recognize the need to restore our old borders, the border of 1941, although at the last meeting he was ready to recognize the expansion of the territory of Yugoslavia, Poland, Greece and other allied states. In the meantime, the restoration of the old borders is absolutely necessary. The best example of this is Leningrad.

Article 4 is mistakenly indicated in the original.

The tang government does not agree with this, the impression is created that it probably would not mind the dismemberment of the USSR.

Eden strongly opposed this suspicion. The point is that the British government, for the reasons that Eden has already spoken about, refuses altogether to recognize any new borders that arose during the war, be it the borders of Yugoslavia, Greece, or even Great Britain itself. Eden said that he very much regrets the need to persist in his point of view, but he has no other choice: without consulting the united states and the dominions, the issue raised cannot be resolved.

Comrade Molotov noted that now, in view of the upcoming meeting between Churchill and Roosevelt, the resolution of the border question could be facilitated.

Comrade Stalin emphasized the enormous sacrifices made by the Soviet people in the struggle against Germany. This struggle is not waged for the interests of the Prussian king, but for the sake of securing our own borders.

Eden, in support of his position, made the following argument: how could he explain the recognition of our 1941 border, for example, to the poles?

Cripps. In order to clarify, he posed the question: what kind of boundaries are implied in the wording of article 4 in comrade Stalinʹs draft? Borders 1941?

Comrade Stalin confirmed that this wording meant the 1941 border.

Eden said that the fulfillment of the requirements of comrade. Stalin would mean recognizing the polish border as it was in 1941.

Comrade Stalin objected that our agreement might not concern the polish border. He would have been ready to give a special letter to Eden on this matter simultaneously with the signing of the treaty.

Eden tried to defend his position by pointing out that this letter would be of a secret nature and, if the question about the polish‐Soviet border had been asked to Eden in parliament or elsewhere, he would not have been able to refer to it.

Comrade Stalin replied that he would have sent a copy of his letter to Eden to general xi Korekho and would even be ready to publish it.

However, Eden continued to resist the adoption of article 4 in the formulation of comrade Stalin.

For his part, comrade Stalin said that in view of the ambiguous attitude of the British government to the question of Soviet borders, which was discovered during yesterdayʹs meeting, the Soviet government was forced to insist on the introduction of a clause on the recognition of Soviet borders in the treaty on the post‐war organization of peace and security.

Comrade Molotov noted that we intend to sign a treaty of alliance with the British, but for this we need to know why we are fighting.

Eden replied that we are fighting in order to defeat Hitler. He refused to make any concessions on the wording of article 4.

Comrade Stalin expressed regret about this and said that in this case, the signing of the treaty could not take place.

Eden replied that no matter how unpleasant it was, he was forced to come to the conclusion that the signing really could not take place. He now understands the situation, he knows what difficulties are in question, and upon his return to London.

Will endeavor to take steps to remedy these difficulties. But now he sees no other way out but to postpone the question of the treaty.

Comrade Stalin remarked that Eden ought to have got in touch with the prime minister on this matter. During the chamberlain government, Churchill sharply attacked the latter in connection with the failure of negotiations on a mutual assistance pact over the Baltic states. Comrade Stalin does not think that the prime minister would object to the signing of the treaty on the basis of the project he proposed.

Eden objected that he was quite sure the prime minister would have taken the same position that he, Eden, took. Comrade Stalinʹs demands essentially mean the immediate recognition of a part of the future, a peace treaty. The time has not yet come for this. In addition, it is very difficult to get in touch with the prime minister now for technical reasons. Therefore, Eden can only propose to think over the situation once more and say the final word tomorrow.

The meeting ended at 21:00. 00 minutes

Translated by Maisky

Ap rf. F. 45. On. 1.d. 279. L. 115‐122.

Publ .: Soviet‐English relations ... ‐ t. I. ‐ s. 192‐197