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  Selected Secret Documents from Soviet Foreign Policy Documents Archives - 1919 to 1941

Concentrated on 1st and  2nd WW Correspondence and Meetings related to Turkey, Balkans and Iran, with some additions from Afghanistan and India.

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Letter from the Chairman of the Russian‐Ukrainian‐Georgian delegation at the Lausanne Conference to the Deputy Peopleʹs Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR M. M. Litvinov  

December 12, 1922 No. 9

Dear comrade,

In recent days, the question of the straits has been clothed in the form of expert meetings, and the whole struggle has concentrated in and around these meetings, taking on a largely behind‐the‐scenes character. I will briefly reconstruct the course of events.

At an evening meeting of the Straits Commission on Friday 8 December, Curzon said that the allied experts would meet with Turkish experts. This caused the incident you know ***. During the polemic with me and Rakonsky, Curzon first said that the question of demilitarized zones did not concern Russia, but then he said that it was about unofficial meetings of experts. Barrer further emphasized that experts of any kind can talk privately with each other. When I demanded the convening of the subcommittee, Curzon said that the moment had not yet arrived. The written opinion presented by us on this matter is specially sent to you ****. In the days that followed, conversations between Turkish and Allied experts took on the character of real separate negotiations. The Turkish experts told us, they said, in an exhaustive way, what was happening at these meetings. In fact, a real bargaining took place there. On this occasion, we had a number of discussions and conversations, partly between us and the Turkish experts, and partly between us and the Turkish delegates.

When I was at Ismet Pasha on Sunday, he very much asked us to demand a meeting between our experts and the allies on Monday morning. Having discussed this, we came to the unanimous conclusion that in this way we will only contribute to the system of separate conversations between experts, unacceptable for us, leading to the elimination of the Russian delegation from the negotiations between the Turks and the Entente. In this sense, I wrote a letter to Ismet Pasha, which is also sent to you in a special way.

On Tuesday, that is, this morning, our experts were formally invited to a meeting of experts from all delegations. Against one comrade. Mdivani, we decided that it was impossible not to go there in view of the fact that the convocation of experts in full complement corresponds to what we ourselves demanded. But the experts were instructed to protest and even leave if it turns out that the meeting goes beyond purely informational explanations, and in this sense the experts had to demand clarification of the purpose of the meeting from the very beginning. Since it was clear from the messages made to us by Turkish experts that the Allies intend to return to the theory put forward by Curzon in passing that the demilitarization of the straits does not concern Russia, the experts were also instructed not to discuss the issue of the passage of ships into the Black Sea, if they were not given talk about the demilitarization of the straits. Further, since we learned that at this meeting of experts they would be presented with a new draft of the allies, the experts were instructed not to accept such a draft and to protest against the submission of such a draft not to the Commission and the subcommittee, but to experts. This would be a further step towards transferring all negotiations to a commission of experts who would replace the sub‐commission. On the 11th afternoon, Ismet Pasha came to us, and we agreed with him that our both delegations would demand the convocation of a subcommittee. We explained to Ismet Pasha that only in the sub‐commission is there an opportunity for our delegation and the Turkish delegation to jointly fight for acceptable conditions, while the transfer of negotiations to a meeting of experts makes it possible to completely eliminate Ias, and generally conduct negotiations with non‐political persons. On the basis of this agreement, we sent a note on the evening of the 11th demanding the convocation of a subcommittee, which will be sent to you separately *. The Turkish delegation sent a note of the same, apparently on the 12th morning.

So today, on the 12th morning, a meeting of experts from all delegations took place. A new draft was introduced by allied experts, and upon examination it turned out that it contains completely new articles. At the same time, their project on the demilitarization of the straits was not introduced, but only the project on the passage of ships through the straits to the Black Sea. When our experts demanded an explanation for this, the allied experts answered them that the demilitarization of the straits did not concern Russia. In view of these two circumstances ‐ the removal of Russia from the question of demilitarization of the straits and the transformation of the meeting of experts into a real subcommittee, our experts, by virtue of the directive we had given, demonstratively left the meeting. At the same time, our delegation was officially sent a new draft ʺfreedom of the straits,ʺ 3 that is, the passage of ships through the straits into the Black Sea. A few hours later, our delegation received from the secretariat of the conference, without any comments, also the draft demilitarization of the straits13. Thus, all the cards were confused: after Russia was officially denied the right to participate in the discussion of the demilitarization of the straits, this project was nevertheless sent to us. This did not stop us from sending a note of protest, which is especially sent to you, regarding the transformation of the meeting of experts into a subcommittee, and most of all, regarding the removal of Russia from the discussion of the demilitarization of the straits *. The last question is the most serious and can lead in the future to the most serious fights. Of course, it is out of the question for us to submit to such an act of violence.

Apparently, Karzai wants to push through the issue of the straits as quickly as possible. In the form of a meeting of experts, he wants to come to terms with the Turks and then confront us with a fait accompli, submit a finished draft to the commission and immediately raise the issue of signing or unsigning it, or simply postponing it until the end of the conference. Everywhere they talk about the likelihood of a critical moment in the near future. Curzonʹs goal is to sign a treaty with the Turks, and at the same time Russia does not sign this treaty. He sees success in such a formal rejection of Turkey from Russia.

To all the preceding, I must add that yesterday the British naval expert Admiral Keyes invited Behrens ** and had a long conversation with him. At our address, oi expressed many friendly feelings, but the main content of his conversation boiled down to the fact that it was very beneficial for us to sign an agreement in the form proposed by the Allies. At the same time, in the French spheres, they say that they hope that the Russians will appreciate the conciliatory spirit of the French, who prompted the British to make very important (?) Concessions.

The new projects of the allies do not differ at all from the original ones.

Regarding the passage of ships into the Black Sea, instead of granting [the right] to each state to have three ships, of which one can be more than 10,000 tons, the minimum right is established for each state to carry three ships through the straits to the Black Sea, each of which cannot exceed 10 000 ton. The size of foreign ships, thus, decreases, but a very unclear formula is obtained, from which it is not clear with complete certainty whether it refers to the presence of these forces in the Black Sea or to the moment of their passage through the straits.

In the area of demilitarizing the shores of the straits, there are some improvements, such as allowing small batteries or the refusal to prohibit the [use of] w [rail] d [orogs], which exclusively serve to facilitate the defense of land from landing, but do not in the least help protect the straits from passing foreign fleets. At the same time, it was established in a definite way that control over the implementation of the Straits Agreement is not entrusted to Turkey. [...]

There are, apparently, some points on which the agreement took place in Angora between Turkey and the allies. There is no general agreed game between them, but on certain points, apparently, there is an agreement. Such a point is Turkeyʹs obligation not to fortify the straits and to allow armed ships to pass within certain limits. Ismet Pasha partly sings Lazarus, partly fights stubbornly against the Entente, but it is precisely at these points that he systematically fails.

The main idea passing through the concessions of the Turks and making one think that a certain part of these concessions is more than voluntary is to completely separate the question of the fate of the straits and the Black Sea from the question of the security of the land and internal territories of Turkey. Our point of view is this: the security of the south of Russia is the security of Turkey and vice versa; there is no security for Constantinople without closing the straits, and this also determines the security of southern Russia and vice versa. The Turks reason like this: their capital will remain in Angora, the real Turkey will be in Asia Minor, and only partly in Thrace; no matter what happens in the straits, real, that is, land, Turkey will remain independent of this and will not be involved in the war; if we accept the Russian point of view, then in the event of a war between England and Russia, the former will demand that Turkey let the British fleet pass, Turkey will find it difficult to resist, or Turkey will be involved in the war; the Russian point of view therefore leads to Turkeyʹs involvement in the war; the Turkish point of view is to give up on the straits, since the internal territories of Turkey are protected; let the Entente fight with Russia, Turkey will watch and observe its own benefit; she herself will remain on the sidelines, but Turkey is not Constantinople, but is the inner territory of Asia Minor.

In recent days, this theory has often slipped into the words of Turkish delegates and is quite consistently embodied in the supposedly forced concessions of the Turks. This is connected with the complete illusory nature of Turkish control over the passage of ships through the straits. Previously, the matter was clear and simple: there were cannons at the entrance to the straits, a suitable ship had to stop, but if it did not stop, a cannon fired at it. Now there will be no cannons, they will be completely free to swim in the straits, there will not even be Turkish pilots, the passage will be open to everyone. The Turks are extremely willing to concede precisely on the issue of removing from them all control over the passage of ships through the straits. And since this is so, then any limitations become illusory. It is at this point that the Turks have an ambiguity that we have not yet been able to clarify. The OII strongly insist that the passage of ships through the straits should be in batches. We are interested in the fact that there are no warships in the Black Sea. The Turks say that they agree with us, but that we should fight for this, not they; they are only ready to support us (in words, maybe). The OII themselves are interested in the fact that the foreign warships between the entrance to the straits and the exit from the straits do not exceed the tonnage of their own Turkish fleet. Their theory is the passage of foreign warships in batches. We heard about this for a long time and, apparently, they already had some kind of agreement with the Entente about this. But for IAS it is completely unclear how the OII will control these packs, since they give up both control itself and the means of control over the straits.

At the meetings of their experts with allied experts, the following tendency was quite consistently manifested: the Turks should bother about the state of affairs in the Proli‐ichkh, and the situation in the Black Sea is of interest to Russia, and Russia should be the initiator on these issues. This practically coincided with an attempt by Kerzoia to eliminate the discussion of the demilitarization of the straits. The Turks themselves to rot this attempt of Kerzoia promise to protest, but their experts were silent when raising this question and did not support us. The Turkish note demanding the convocation of the sub‐commission states that this sub‐commission should study the entire complex of the question of the straits. In this form, Ismet Pasha fulfills his promise to support our demand for our participation in the issue of demilitarization as well.

In conversations with us, the Turks are developing a theory that is very reminiscent of our theory of the respite of the Brest‐Li‐tovsk period. They say that Turkey cannot under any circumstances continue the war. They want to temporarily improve their situation by means of a treaty, and they consider the regime established by the treaty to be temporary, transitional. They hope (are they simpletons or cunning?) By treaty to get rid of the allied troops and the British fleet occupying Constantinople (their system of packs should eliminate the English fleet). Then, getting rid of the allied forces and getting a little stronger, they will continue the war, according to them, in order to completely throw the allies out. They say that the Curzon peace will be extremely difficult for Turkey; as a result, the Turkish people will get closer and closer to the Russian people; They will immediately begin a struggle in order to throw off the bonds imposed by Curzon, and will conduct this struggle together with the Russian people. In this form, Ismet Pasha beats us with our good brow. As for allied control over the straits, he, he said, wants to outsmart the allies. By the way, Ismet Pasha categorically declares that in no case will Turkey accept the Allied Control Commission, which has real military and administrative power. OII agree only to a commission in the spirit of the Russian project, that is, a purely commercial one with technical functions.

So, the Turks are not doing their duty towards us in the sense that they are only concerned about the security of their internal territories, not waging a fight over the passage of ships through the straits into the Black Sea, and, secondly, they are ready to sign an agreement even without Ias. [...]

With communist greetings

Georgy Chicherin