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  Selected Secret Documents from Soviet Foreign Policy Documents Archives - 1919 to 1941

Concentrated on 1st and  2nd WW Correspondence and Meetings related to Turkey, Balkans and Iran, with some additions from Afghanistan and India.

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Telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Turkey A.V. Terentyev to the peopleʹs commissariat of foreign affairs of the USSR

October 27, 1939 out of line. Top secret

Today Saracoglu invited me to the ministry of foreign affairs and read the following statement from his notebook:

ʺ1. We were sincere friends of the Soviets, and we are their sincere friends today. We ardently wish (and on the second reading he added ʺand we are sureʺ) to remain sincere friends.

2. In order to overcome the serious difficulties that arose in the Moscow negotiations, comrade Stalin reminded me that the difficulties that had taken place during the conference in Montreux, 251 were eliminated by Ismetʹs personal intervention, and comrade Stalin asked Saracoglu to resort to personal intervention of ismet. Then I said that it was my duty to fulfill this wish of comrade Stalin and I would write to Ankara. I wrote about it. As expected by comrade Stalin, ismet personally intervened and posed a question to the British and French about accepting comrade Stalinʹs phrase under the Soviet clause and about changing article three. I personally thought it would be impossible to get the consent of the British and French, but they agreed.

After that, Ankara thought that the Soviet‐Turkish pact would be concluded, but the pact could not be concluded, since two other difficulties, which I intended to resolve, in the presence of comrade Stalin were again put on the agenda of negotiations, and thus the projected the pact could not be concluded. Nevertheless, we have not lost hope of concluding a pact, but only on condition that the question of concluding a bilateral agreement is raised, since there is already an international convention, and provided that a reservation in favor of Germany is not added. Before leaving, I asked Saracoglu if it was already possible to draw with certainty the conclusion that the minister reported to his government on the merits of two documents officially handed in Moscow to minister comrade Molotov regarding the Bosporus strait and the German reservation, which the Turkish government was supposed to study, and that Saracogluʹs reply about the unconditional unacceptability of our proposals is the final resolved response of the Turkish government. The minister replied: ʺquite right.ʺ

I reminded Saracoglu that he had promised me, during the last conversation, after consulting with his government, how the Turkish government intends to interpret the Soviet reservations included in the Anglo‐French‐Turkish agreement255 and, in particular, what position Turkey will take in the matter the admission of warships, auxiliary ships and transports with troops and weapons, which Britain and France would now try to transfer to Romania in fulfillment of the guarantees given to it. Saracoglu replied that in this case, Turkey will scrupulously implement the Montreux convention. Speaking about the threat of military danger that may arise in the Balkans, I reminded Saracoglu of the word spoken to him in Moscow by comrade Stalin that anyone who is closely associated with Romania should always keep his sword ready. Saracoglu asked me: does the Soviet Union have any evidence that Romania is facing the fact of an imminent conflict with any country? I replied that it would be more convenient for Saracoglu to ask his allies ‐ the British and the French, who, while giving guarantees to the Romanians and inviting Turkey for help, themselves believe that Romania could become a hotbed of military danger, at least as a result of a conflict with Hungary, Bulgaria or any other country. Saracoglu replied that the British and French had given this guarantee 6‐7 months ago. To this I noticed that this all the more confirms the correctness of our point of view. Then there was no war in Europe, but now a European war is raging, in which just those two states that gave guarantees to Romania are participating. The desire of Britain and France, in the conditions of neutrality of Turkey and Romania, to transfer troops and military materials across the straits, will undoubtedly create a threat to the peaceful situation in the Balkans. Saracoglu said that if such eventualities become a reality, then we can be sure that the Turks will consult with the USSR. I pointed out the rapidly developing course of events to Saracoglu and added that it may happen that when a war breaks out, it will be too late to consult on certain general measures. Therefore, the Turkish government, taking into account both the fact of the European war and the fact that neutral Turkey has concluded a treaty of mutual assistance with the belligerent Britain and France, could now tell us how concretely the Soviet reservations will be implemented in what position the Montreux convention will operate under the neutrality of Turkey itself. Saracoglu replied that it is very difficult to foresee all this now. It may happen that the USSR, Greece, Turkey will also be in danger. Then we will try to find common ground with you. Consequently, we cannot at the moment say anything about certain events that could unfold in the Balkans, and about the specific application of the Anglo‐FrenchTurkish pact. I said that, based on Saracogluʹs answers, one can come to a conclusion about the intention of the British and French to actively send military materials and even military units to the Balkans, in particular to Romania, we left our draft Soviet‐Turkish pact in Moscow. If Moscow sends us another counter‐project, then we are ready to study it with benevolence, always having the firm conviction that in this way we will not fail to arrive at results that satisfy both sides.

3. The Montreux convention will be applied scrupulously. ʺ

All this through the straits, and the Turkish government, without specifically answering the question of whether or not it will let commercial ships with military materials into the black sea, limit itself only to a statement that at the right time it will consult with the government of the USSR. Saracoglu replied that Bulgaria is still receiving weapons from different sides, and in particular aircraft. It is very possible that this is directed against Turkey or against Romania and Yugoslavia. However, Saracoglu continued, the countries are neutral and in relation to the straits apply the provisions of the Montreux convention providing for peacetime. As long as none of the black sea states is at war, including Turkey, we will fully and scrupulously apply the Montreux convention. Turkey is now applying the peacetime regime to the straits. We have entered into our pact a reservation regarding the USSR, which will make us neutral in the event of a conflict between you, on the one hand, and the British and French, on the other. If we had agreed to conclude a pact with you with the inclusion of German reservations, then in fact we would have nullified our pact with Britain and France, since this pact means Italy and Germany.

Then I asked Saracoglu about the detention of our steamer Svaneti by the British warship. I have transmitted this part of the conversation to you in a separate telegram.

After I got up and said goodbye to Saracoglu, he told me the following: “when difficulties arose in Moscow during our negotiations, then Stalin asked me to write to ismet so that the latter, by his personal intervention, would eliminate them. I also ask you to write to Moscow and I think that the current difficulties will be resolved thanks to the personal intervention of comrade Stalin. ʺ I replied that I would bring Saracogluʹs request to the attention of my government, but at the same time I pointed out that the negative response of the Turkish government to both Soviet proposals could hardly be met favorably in Moscow. I reminded Saracoglu of the words of comrade Molotov that the conclusion of the Soviet‐Turkish pact of mutual assistance is inextricably linked with the Turkish governmentʹs acceptance of the proposals made in Moscow by the Soviet] government. The persistent refusal of Saracoglu to talk about the strait’s regime was regarded by the [Soviet] government] as a fact that naturally worries us. This alertness after what Saracoglu just told me, that is, after the Turkish government refused to accept our proposals, not only does not decrease, but, on the contrary, it can increase. I added that when the war breaks out, it will probably be too late to consult, and then the Soviet Union will independently take the necessary measures to protect its security. Saracoglu reiterated that [that] everything that specifically concerns the USSR and Turkey, in the presence of friendship between the two countries, can be quite calmly resolved. I replied that friendship is friendship, but at a time like this, it is not harmful to fix something concretely in separate documents.

Finally, I asked Saracoglu how true were the reports that Britain was providing Turkey with a £ 60 million loan. Saracoglu replied: “in principle, we have agreed on a loan, but the newspapers are somewhat exaggerating the amount. It is expressed in approximately 40‐45 million pounds. The British have already supplied us and are supplying materials, in particular aircraft. This is being done while still in a peaceful environment. In the event of war, of course, it will not be about 60 and not about 80 million pounds, and the amounts are much larger.

Experts are working on this now. ʺ the conversation ended there.

Saracoglu again asked me to convey the phrase he had said regarding the fact that comrade Stalin would personally intervene and remove the difficulties that had arisen.

In connection with a number of new points that were expressed by Saracoglu in his conversation with me, please indicate whether, regardless of this, I should now meet with ismet, or if I will receive additional instructions from you about a special conversation with ismet *.

Terentyev

Wua rf, f 059. On 1, n 293, d 2028, l 263‐270