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  Selected Secret Documents from Soviet Foreign Policy Documents Archives - 1919 to 1941

Concentrated on 1st and  2nd WW Correspondence and Meetings related to Turkey, Balkans and Iran, with some additions from Afghanistan and India.

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Telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Turkey A.V. Terentyev to the peopleʹs commissariat of foreign affairs of the USSR

October 26, 1939 out of line. Top secret

Today I visited Saracoglu and posed a number of questions to him in connection with the signing of the Anglo‐French‐Turkish agreement. Saracoglu repeated much of what he said in Moscow. This time he said that the pact had been initialed even before he left for Moscow and that the signing of the treaty had been postponed only because of the negotiations that were to take place between the Turkish foreign minister of affairs and leaders of the Soviet government. It was also decided that if it is possible to conclude a Soviet‐Turkish agreement on mutual assistance, then at the same time Saracoglu in Moscow and Saydam in Ankara will sign, respectively, pacts between Turkey and the USSR and between Turkey, England and France. The minister explains the signing of the pact in Ankara before Saracogluʹs return from Moscow by the fact that there was no need to hear his report on the Moscow talks in advance, since he sent daily exhaustive telegrams and widely informed his government about everything. “since I, being in Moscow, did not conclude a pact with the USSR on behalf of Turkey, then, consequently, the trilateral agreement in Ankara was signed by Saydam, without waiting for my return.” I asked Saracoglu if the Turkish government had begun to study the documents that had been officially handed over to the foreign minister, comrade Molotov. Saracoglu replied that the Turkish government is currently studying Soviet proposals. “however, if the government of the USSR insists on accepting the German reservations, then we will hardly be able to discuss your proposals. We will not accept this reservation, since otherwise the value of the Soviet‐Turkish pact would have been zero. If the Soviets do not support us either against Italy or against Germany, then, consequently, the Soviets will not give us anything. ʺ turning to the question that in the Anglo‐French‐Turkish agreement, article 3 of the treaty and the Soviet reservations remained in the form in which they were stated in the draft submitted to Saracoglu to comrade Molotov, the minister of foreign affairs told me that if Turkey and the USSR will be able to conclude a pact of mutual assistance between themselves in the future, then Saracoglu will try to put before the British and French the question of changing article 3 and the Soviet reservation, which can be formulated as it was written by the hand of comrade Stalin. “if we agree with you on all points of the future pact, then I will declare to the British and French, since we have already come to an agreement on changing article 3 of the treaty and Soviet reservations, then, consequently, concluding a pact of mutual assistance with the USSR, it will be necessary to make corresponding changes to the existing Anglo‐French‐Turkish agreement. Although this is just my personal opinion, I think the British and French will agree with this. ʺ I asked Saracoglu what exactly would be the fulfillment of Turkeyʹs obligations under the Anglo‐French‐Turkish pact if Romania finds itself in a state of armed conflict with any state and if Britain and France try to pass through the straits to help Romania. Saracoglu answered the following: “if it is specifically about the German‐Romanian conflict, then I can answer you immediately. As for the Soviet‐Romanian conflict, I must get an answer from the government. ʺ then he immediately caught himself and added: ʺtomorrow I will give you the answer of the government on one and the other case, if we had to face the fact of joint assistance to Romania.ʺ referring to the question of our assessment of the agreement concluded by Turkey with Britain and France, I, on your instructions *, conveyed the following to Saracoglu: “the Soviet government believes that the conclusion of this treaty without the adoption of the amendments we proposed is a risky business for Turkey and the Soviet government cannot lay hands on this case. ʺ Saracoglu twice asked me to repeat these words, wrote them down and said, the Soviet government at one time approved our intentions to conclude a pact. Potemkin spoke about this in Ankara. It would be necessary that you tell me about this before my departure for Moscow. However, this is a matter of the past, we will now work for the future. In my opinion, ‐ he continued further, ‐ you should not have told me about this now, until I gave you my governmentʹs answer on the most important question that you asked me, that is, what will be the position of Turkey in the event of an armed conflict between Romania and any state. If I report to the council of ministers that the Soviet Union cannot lay its hands on this matter, that is, to the Anglo‐French‐Turkish agreement, then a bad atmosphere will immediately be created. A minute later, Sarajoglu added that, ʺin fact, he was already told about this in Moscow in the same spirit.ʺ

In conclusion, Saracoglu asked me to thank the Soviet government for the hospitality that was shown to him in Moscow as a representative of the Turkish government, and added that ʺregardless of any political, diplomatic and military situation that may occurʺ, he, Saracoglu, will remain my personal friend. This phrase, in my opinion, makes a lot of sense, although, quite naturally, I could not ask Saracoglu what this phrase means.

Terentyev wua rf. F. 059. On 1, I 293, d 2028, l 256‐260.