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  Selected Secret Documents from Soviet Foreign Policy Documents Archives - 1919 to 1941

Concentrated on 1st and  2nd WW Correspondence and Meetings related to Turkey, Balkans and Iran, with some additions from Afghanistan and India.

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Telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Turkish republic ca. Vinogradova in the NKID USSR

November 26, 1940

Top secret

I saw Papen yesterday. The ambassador spoke with enthusiasm about his meeting in berlin with comrade Molotov, emphasizing at the same time that a very good impression of comrade Molotovʹs visit had remained in berlin. According to Papen, during the conversations, all issues of interest to Germany, from japan to the Balkans, were raised, and a common opinion was established on these issues. Turning to the situation in Turkey, Papen said: “I have found great anxiety and nervousness here. On Saturday I visited Saracoglu, who asked me about the results of Molotovʹs conversations with our leaders. I told him that our leaders had acquainted Molotov with the project of creating a new Europe and we had invited our Soviet friends to participate in establishing a new order. The Turks are very worried that Germany may come out today to help Italy in the Balkans, by virtue of which Turkey will be involved in the war. I told Saracoglu that Germany does not intend to affect Turkeyʹs interests. Germany wants Turkey to keep the peace. I also told him that even if Britain creates a front in the Balkans and we are forced to conduct military operations there, in this case Germany will take all measures not to affect the interests of Turkey. ʺ to my remark that Turkish newspapers wrote a lot about the statement made by Papen to foreign journalists and that now there are stories in Ankara that Papen had made a proposal to Saracoglu that required a special discussion at the party group of the Mejlis, the ambassador replied: “ immediately upon arrival, I made a statement to the ulus newspaper that I had never made the declaration attributed to me. As far as I know, this message was broadcast on the radio in Spanish, but here it was mistaken for a dnb message. The truth is that I was invited to a journalist club in berlin, where journalists asked me a number of questions. My answers to their questions were restrained and moderate. I was asked, in particular, a question about the straits. I replied that the straits are primarily of interest to Turkey and the USSR, and that Germany has no even secondary interest in this. There was no

question about the Persian Gulf, which appears in this message. I believe that one of the journalists deliberately presented my answers in such a way as to cause concern in public opinion. ʺ

I asked how Saracoglu reacted to Papen’s statement to him. The ambassador replied: “Saracoglu only took note of my words and did not say anything to me. I got the impression that after my conversation with him he felt great relief. The Turks had a very strong opinion that Germany intended to come to the aid of Italy. I believe that Italy has ample opportunity to improve its position in Greece. In any case, Mussolini did not ask us for help and is unlikely to do so. In connection with my conversations with the Turkish leaders, we can now state a certain relaxation of tension. As for their last preparations, I consider it nonsense, since no one threatens Turkey and she can remain calm until she does something herself. ʺ Papen went on to suggest that the Turkish government could change its foreign policy orientation if “you and I will act together. If you and I, Papen continued, we jointly put pressure on the Turkish government, persuading it to change its attitude towards the USSR and towards us and seeking to resolve the issues of interest to you and economic issues, the resolution of which is important for us, we can achieve positive results in this regard.

The basis for our common actions with you may be the statement that was made on our part to Molotov in berlin. We said that we are interested in preserving peace in Turkey and are not going to affect its interests, but we are ready to cooperate with the Soviet government in resolving issues of interest to your country. If you and I act together, along the same line, we can achieve a foreign policy turn in Turkey. ʺ I didn’t reply to what Papen said, confining myself only to the remark that I had not had the opportunity to talk with either Saracoglu or Menemencioglu for the last few days, and therefore I can’t say anything about what impression the recent events made on the Turkish government. Phalen said after my remark: “it is very difficult to reveal their common opinion, and in particular in relation to your country. In any case, in response to my comment on this, Saracoglu limited himself to an evasive indication that Turkey is sufficiently armed and that it can defend its independence with arms in hand, whether there will be a danger from Germany or the Soviet Union. I got the impression that the Turkish government, as a result of its policy, has reached an impasse and cannot get out of it. The Turks believe that it is better for them to fight now than to remain in their present situation, although they know in advance that their entry into the war will bring them destruction. Therefore, it would be nice to tell them that it is time to stop being so distrustful and not to look at us and the Soviet Union so angrily, you need to establish different relations with both the USSR and Germany.

ʺ

From my conversation with Papen, I get the following impression:

1.                   The Germans have launched a great deal of work here now, trying to achieve from the Turks, if not a turn in their foreign policy, then at least neutralize them at this stage.

2.                   In their conversations with the Turks, the Germans, of course, present them with all their attitudes under the sauce of the ʺunanimous opinionʺ of Germany and the Soviet Union both in relation to Turkey and the Balkans. Papenʹs proposal for joint pressure on the Turkish government is necessary for the Germans to support this thesis and cover up their own plans.

3.                   It is likely that the Germans are now doing double work here, that is, on the one hand, they are trying to persuade the Turkish government through diplomacy and, on the other hand, are preparing for a military action if they fail to achieve anything first *.

4.                   It is also possible that the Germans secretly carry out subversive work among the Turks against the USSR, stubbornly emphasizing and inspiring at any opportunity ʺthe USSRʹs interest in resolving the question of the straits.ʺ

5.                   With regard to the statement allegedly made by Papen to foreign journalists in berlin and then refuted by him upon his arrival in Ankara, I have the opinion that this statement was deliberately launched by berlin as a test step and was refuted only because the reaction caused by him, was too harsh for the moment.

Vinogradov

Avp rf, f. 059, on. 1, p. 314, d. 2163, l. 135‐140.