Bolshevik Leaders correspondence

Bolshevik leadership Correspondence. 1912-1927
Collection of documents 1996.
Compiled by: A.V.Kvashonkin, L.P.Kosheleva, L.A.Rogovaya, O.V.Khlevnyuk.

No. 151

J. X. Peters to I. V. Stalin

April 3, 1922

Old Bukhara.

Dear comrade. STALIN.

In addition [to] my memorandum of March 21, 1 I report the following, that the crisis of the Bukhara government has come to its end, unless this is prevented by some unexpected decision of Moscow or Tashkent.

The atmosphere around the tops of the Bukhara government has been extremely concentrated lately. The absence of Faizulla Khodzhaev, the Chairman of the Sovnazirs, made itself felt in everything, and with his arrival from Moscow he found complete disarray in the government. Basmachi gangs stood almost near Bukhara, and in Bukhara, clear agents of Enver Pasha 2 were walking freely . Nobody wanted to go to the front, half of the left communists who were in the Central Committee refused to do any work, with the exception of Nazir portfolios.

Such a situation finally corrupted all the work, and I insisted to Faizulla Khodzhaev that a meeting of responsible workers be convened, of which two were convened. The so-called leftists began to throw all sorts of accusations against individuals in the government as a whole; to declare that they have documents on the criminal actions of the government, when we, together with Sokolov, demanded the creation of a Commission to analyze all the accusatory materials, and I nominated Com. Sokolov. The commission is working, but it is already clear how Sokolov declares that all the accusatory materials do not stand up to scrutiny, and even a representative of the left itself signed [in] this. The final decision of the Commission should defuse the atmosphere and stop any mutual accusations. Our desire is to keep at all costs around the government and the Central Committee all the more efficient and energetic element from all the groupings that have not stained themselves in criminal and Basmachi cases. The most irreconcilable are the left communists, who themselves do not know what they want. I attacked them and exposed them at both meetings, Comrade. Sokolov to besiege them.

I am convinced that soon it will be possible to defuse the atmosphere and establish a workable and reliable government. Only I repeat, if there is no external interference.

Recently, there have been any number of such interventions from outside, especially from Turkestan, starting with the commander of the front 3and ending with the Turkcommission. A very bad impression is made here by the orders of the Turkfront to rush the Bukhara cavalry units and their horses to hand over to the sent Russian units. This was done after the Bukharians did everything to buy or select horses from the institutions for the Russian Red Army, but Tashkent, apparently, does not want to be considered. I think that it is necessary to take the most energetic measures to create the Revolutionary Military Council of the Bukhgroup of Troops and that military measures from the Bukhara territory be coordinated with political ones, otherwise there will be complete confusion. This is possible exceptional creation in Bukhara of a more or less independent Military Council by the introduction of representatives of the Bukhara authorities *.

I think that we are making the biggest mistake by outwardly showing that we are violating the independence of the Bukhrepublic, and by this we are setting the population against the Russians, giving rise to the Enver adventure, especially since, while observing the external independence of Bukhara, we have the full opportunity to carry out everything by internal and comradely pressure. whatever 4. Thus, without any external interference, we succeeded in completely reorganizing Buchchek and changing its personnel. It is planned to carry out the following measures in the near future: 1) To simplify the Soviet organs to the maximum. 2) Create workable top Soviet Party bodies. 3) Make all possible concessions to the peasantry to improve the situation. 4) Involve more representatives of dekhkans, handicraftsmen and individual nationalities in Soviet construction. 5) To take all measures to strengthen the combat power of the armed revolutionary forces of the Buhrepublic. 6) Cleanse it from the agents of pan-Islamism.

Note: With this letter I am enclosing three letters depicting the Emir's plans.

With communist greetings, Peters 5 .

RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 2275. L. 1. Typewritten text. The signature is an autograph.

Notes:

1 Note not found.

2The Bukhara People's Soviet Republic (BNSR) was formed on the territory of the Emirate of Bukhara in September 1920. Relying on the financial and military assistance of the Turkcommission of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), the Bukhara Communist Party prepared an armed uprising against the government of Emir Seyid-Alim Khan and turned for military assistance to RSFSR. During the Bukhara operation of the Turkestan Front, the troops of the emir government were defeated. At the same time, a significant part of the Bukhara gold was exported to Tashkent. “[...] During the Bukhara revolution, unfortunately, our units looted something,” Chicherin later wrote to Molotov, “and at the same time, a lot of valuables belonging to Bukhara were taken to Tashkent. The news of this has spread throughout the East and greatly harms our prestige [...] ”(RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 315. L. 83). In September 1920 in Bukhara, new supreme authorities were created - the All-Bukhara Revolutionary Committee (all of its members are communists) and the Council of People's Commissars (Nazirs), which, along with the communists, included representatives of other national organizations. This compromise, dictated by the extremely unstable political situation and the lack of forces and party personnel in the region, caused instability and squabbles in the BNSR government. In addition to the military presence, the Bolshevik leadership made large financial injections into Bukhara (partly as compensation for the exported valuables). From the end of 1920 to the middle of 1921, 4 billion rubles were transferred to the BNSR. On March 4, 1921, a union treaty and an economic agreement between the RSFSR and the BNSR, this assistance was legalized. Its official amount has reached 2 billion rubles a month. Nevertheless, the transformations in the Soviet spirit met with resistance both in the government and among the population. The situation escalated in the spring of 1922 after joining the anti-Soviet camp and leaving Moscow for Central Asia, one of the leaders of the Islamic movement, Enver Pasha. The appearance of the latter in Bukhara caused a split in the government. In particular, the head of the All-Bukhara Revolutionary Committee Mukhitdinov took the side of Enver. “Enver, threatening with the greatest complications, advises us to leave Central Asia and leave the Turkestans and Bukharians to decide their own affairs,” Zuckerman, a member of the Turkic Commission of the Central Committee, wrote to the Plenipotentiary of the RSFSR in Afghanistan, Raskolnikov. — [...] This is a strange story. We failed to tame this Turkic lion for our purposes. Perhaps carelessness on our part aggravated the psychological drama of this restless figure, driven into the Bukhara lair, as if in order to try to take revenge on us for this negligence [...] Of course, it is possible that the psychological moment here supplemented the thoughtfulness of some general policy that did not end with Enver alone. We know nothing about Afghan-Enver relations. But I have the impression that Enver began with psychology, and, thanks to the fortunate circumstances in Central Asia, ended with politics, which is already causing us the greatest difficulties ”(Ibid. F. 85. Op. 23. D. 106. L .15-16). In turn, Raskolnikov reported on March 19, 1922 from Kabul to Karakhan: “According to our friends who arrived from Eastern Bukhara, Enver is energetically implementing a plan to prepare a general uprising in the East ... from the Caucasus to the Caspian Sea. [In] the center of his activity are Eastern Bukhara, Fergana and Samarkand. He sent a number of emissaries to Khiva and all regions of Turkestan. His agents have been instructed to play the role of ardent supporters of the Soviet Power, while at the same time carrying out underground work against us. There is information about a trip to Samarkand of Mukhetdin and here, who, on the instructions of Enver, must turn himself in and demand the creation of a real communist government in Bukhara. Upon completion of organizational work in Eastern Bukhara and Ferghana, Enver proposes initially to raise an uprising in some point of Turkestan, followed by the expansion of the rebellious zone, simultaneously with the start of action, partisan raids should destroy the railways ”(Ibid. F. 558. On. 1. D. 2304. L. 1). With support from the Afghan side, the combined forces of Enver Pasha captured Dushanbe in February 1922 and concentrated on a campaign against Bukhara.

3 V. I. Shorin.

4The idea of the need to pursue a more cautious policy in the Central Asian region was also expressed by Ioffe, a member of the Turkcommission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR. Having familiarized himself with the situation on the spot, on December 10, 1921, he wrote to Chicherin from Tashkent: “I [...] spoke about the two republics that I got acquainted with, that is, about Bukhara and Khorezm. And, on the one hand, I objected to the concepts that they must go through the entire cycle of bourgeois-capitalist development [...] At the same time, I considered and continue to consider the coup d'état in Bukhara and Khorezm to be premature. There is no one to replace Khodzhaev and Mukhetdinov in Bukhara now, because the Persian Shiites cannot be put in power, and the "left-communist" group in the majority still consists of these latter. But do your job in order to make it possible to replace the merchant government with a worker- (or handicraft-) dehkan government in the near future, it is necessary, but Yurenev (the plenipotentiary representative of the RSFSR in the BNSR - Comp.) does not do this at all and actually pursues the policy of Faizulla Khodjaev and follows the latter's lead [. ..] Of course, you need to know in advance what can and cannot be done. And it would be ridiculous, for example, to try to force the merchant government of Bukhara or the Bai government of Khorezm to pursue a policy of organizing the dekhkan handicraft poor and preparing new governments of Bukhara and Khorezm. And in my reports, I wrote that this should be an illegal, covert work of our plenipotentiaries [...] A different directive should be given to plenipotentiaries: to work in such a way that by the next Kurultai there would be real communist parties in Bukhara and Khorezm,

5 In the upper left corner of the first page of the letter, Stalin’s inscription: “in the archives of P[olit]b[yuro] St.”, next to it is a stamp of the Bureau of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) with a note of receipt May 1922.

No. 152

Telegram of I. V. Stalin to G. K. Ordzhonikidze

April 21, 1922

Filed from Moscow on 21/IV, 7 hours 55 minutes.

Received 23/IV, 10 hours [hours] 30 minutes [minutes].

Decoded on 23/IV, 12 hours 15 minutes.

ZAKKRAIKOM Comrade Ordzhonikidze.

On April 21-22, you were instructed by the Central Committee to leave Tashkent immediately - within a week from the date of arrival, to examine the situation of the Turkfront from the point of view of the successful liquidation of the Basmachi movement in the regions of Ferghana and Bukhara and immediately send the Central Committee your conclusion. It was decided to introduce martial law in the regions of Bukhara and Turkestan, and you undertake to set a deadline for the introduction of martial law in agreement with the Turkburo and immediately bring this to the attention of the Central Committee. When drawing up a conclusion, it is necessary to answer the following questions:

First: Is it true that the native units supply the Basmachi with weapons.

Second: Do local authorities really interfere in military affairs and paralyze the actions of the military authorities?

Third: Is it necessary to make changes in the composition of the bodies of the TurkFront and which ones.

Fourth: Is it necessary to make [changes] in the composition of the Turkburo and Turkcommissions, and which ones.

Fifth: How great is the danger [of losing] Bukhara and Ferghana.

Sixth: What is the state and number of Basmachi detachments and how is the political struggle of local authorities and party organizations with the Basmachi movement staged.

Seventh: What is the degree of combat effectiveness of our units, their numbers and prospects for success.

Eighth: What practical measures do you find necessary to propose to the Central Committee as a result of the survey.

Receipt of this encryption and extract of the decision of the Politburo, as well as the day of departure for Tashkent, telegraph 1 .

Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP Stalin.

RTSKHIDNI. F.558. Op.1. D.2294. L.1. Certified typewritten copy.

Notes:

On April 23, 1922, Stalin sent Ordzhonikidze a telegram with the following content: “[...] I received your message about leaving in three or four days. There will be no additional directives” (RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 2296. L. 1). On May 12, 1922, Ordzhonikidze sent a report on the fulfillment of the order (See document No. 154).

No. 153

L. M. Karakhan - Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), I. V. Stalin

April 25, 1922

Copy.

25/IV-22

To the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP, Comrade Stalin.

In response to your [request] dated 23/IV on the issue raised by Comrade Gusev in his ciphered dispatch dated 18/IV 1 .

The formation of an autonomous Afghan Turkestan within Afghanistan, or the annexation of Northern Afghanistan to Bukhara and the formation of a new region of Turkmenistan from this new formation - this is the proposal of Comrade Gusev, for which he asks the permission of the Central Committee.

This plan, both from the point of view of the very political idea contained in it, and from the point of view of the possibility of carrying it out, must be rejected in the most decisive manner.

No uprising in Northern Afghanistan can be organized without our direct assistance. From the experience of Bukhara and Khiva (and Turkestan itself) we know that the degree of gratitude of the population to the governments formed instead of emirs is determined by the number of Russian bayonets stationed in these Republics.

Any attempt to liberate the Afghans from Uzbek oppression 2and the only way to win their sympathies over to our side is to bring in the Red Army. No other path leads there yet. And all these Pulatovs and Beimuratovs, who have ancient ties with the Uzbeks and Turkmens in Northern Afghanistan, will not create the necessary enthusiasm and determination to fight the Afghan authorities among the downtrodden and inert mass of Afghan Uzbeks. This requires lengthy propaganda work, which has not yet begun, and, most importantly, it is necessary to convince the Uzbek in Afghanistan, on the other side of the Amu Darya, that his fellow tribesman in Bukhara lives better, calmer and has advantages that the Emir’s power does not give him in Afghanistan. I affirm that he does not yet have this conviction and, despite some oppression that he experiences from the power of the Afghans, he will now prefer this power, than the obscure and dubious for him life in the Bukhara People's Republic. Not only the direct entry of our troops into Northern Afghanistan (and this is indispensable in the implementation of the plan, no matter what its authors say), but even the raising of individual uprisings against the Afg[an] emir will finally throw Afghanistan into the hands of the British, will lead to war with him; moreover, casus belli; there will be an attempt (even a failed one) to tear away (even if not for Russia) Afghan lands. We are not looking for a war with Afghanistan, on the contrary, it would be the greatest misfortune for us, not only politically, but also militarily, because an external war with a Muslim state [would] create a huge front: Turkestan, Afghanistan, Khiva, Transcaspian , and would force to raise the head of all the nationalist and hostile Muslim elements and would cost us a lot of effort and money,

Politically, a war with Afghanistan would cost us complete discredit in Muslim countries, which England would use against us more brilliantly than we did, taking advantage of our exclusive role in the East.

Meanwhile, Comrade Gusev's plan means nothing more than a war with Afghanistan. The modest task set by Comrade Gusev, namely, to separate Eastern Bukhara from Afghanistan as a "rebellion zone" - does not make any sense, because the insurrection zone will not be a solid wall separating Bukhara from Afghanistan, but, on the contrary, forms a convenient channel for more intensive, and, most importantly, more real support for the Basmachi movement in Eastern Bukhara. Now Afghanistan is providing this support, conspiring with great difficulty; if there is an insurgent zone, it will serve as a justification and cover for support and armaments on the largest scale.

Now all energy must be concentrated on the liquidation of the Basmachi movement in Eastern Bukhara, and organizing a new front would be an unjustifiable complication of our main task in Bukhara.

Just as the Basmachism in Fergana cannot be assigned to some external enemy supporting it, so the movement in Eastern Bukhara cannot be attributed to its support from Afghanistan. So far, apart from general indications, we have not had any concrete evidence of this support. I have no doubt that Enver has support from Afghanistan, but this support is not great and everything rests on it. This is evidenced by all the information and, by the way, the correspondence between the Bukh[ar] Emir and the leaders of the Basmachi, which was intercepted by us recently.

If we have the means and forces for an uprising in Northern [Northern] Afghanistan, then it is better to spend it on guarding the few mountain roads and passes connecting Bukhara with Afghanistan, and in this way isolate the area of the uprising from the Afghans, than by those complicated and risky methods, oh which are stated in the telegram of comrade. Gusev.

The only thing that could be agreed upon is [on] the organization of systematic “pin pricks” on Afghan territory: small, well-armed (preferably mounted) detachments that remove Afghan posts, attack Afghan mail, official institutions, individual military units or military warehouses, but without any political banners. The meaning of this case would be that we and the Bukharians would show the Afghans, and this could [be] made clear to them that as long as they act against us in Bukhara, they will also not have a peaceful life in Sev[ ern] Afghanistan.

PS I consulted on this issue with comrade. Surits and tov. Gopner, both of them, who know well the state of affairs both in Bukhara and Afghanistan, strongly speak out against Comrade's plan. Gusev.

L. Karakhan 3 .

RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 209. L. 14-16. Typewritten text. The signature is an autograph.

Notes:

1 Telegram not found.

2 This refers to the regime of the government of Amanullah Khan.

On April 25, a copy of Karakhan's note was sent to Lenin.