Bolshevik Leaders correspondence

Bolshevik leadership Correspondence. 1912-1927
Collection of documents 1996.
Compiled by: A.V.Kvashonkin, L.P.Kosheleva, L.A.Rogovaya, O.V.Khlevnyuk.

No. 91

Telegram from J. V. Stalin to V. I. Lenin

July 24 [1920]

Moscow - the Kremlin, only to Lenin.

Kharkiv 24/7 1

First, the situation on the Budyonny front is good. The enemy, apparently, set the goal of exhausting the parts of Budyonny, because instead of the split parts of the enemy, new ones appear every time, and climb on Budyonny like flies. This circumstance somewhat slows down our progress 2. Yesterday we ordered Budyonny to break through the front and occupy Lvov before the thirtieth of July, it is possible that this operation will succeed. Secondly, we are preparing an offensive on the Crimean front, which can be launched no earlier than August 5-10. If the enemy does not warn our advance, the operation must succeed for sure. We take guarantee measures. Thirdly, I convey my opinion in response to your note No. 371. Now that we have the Comintern, a defeated Poland, and a more or less tolerable Red Army, when, on the other hand, the Entente is seeking a respite in favor of Poland in order to reorganize, rearm Polish army, create cavalry and then strike again, perhaps in alliance with other states - at such a moment and with such prospects, it would be a sin not to encourage a revolution in Italy. I have to admit that we have already entered a period of direct struggle against the Entente, that the policy of tacking has already lost its predominant importance, that we can now and must pursue a policy of offensive (not to be confused with a policy of rushing in) if we want to retain the initiative in foreign affairs, which we won recently. Therefore, on the order of the day of the Comintern, the question of organizing an uprising in Italy and in such states that have not yet grown strong, such as Hungary, the Czech Republic (Romania will have to be defeated) must be put on the agenda. Three hundred thousand lumpen in Germany, even if they really existed in nature, of course, do not and cannot change things. In short: it is necessary to weigh anchor and set off on the road before imperialism has managed to get its disordered cart in the slightest degree in order, and it can still somehow fix it for a certain period, and he himself did not go over to a decisive offensive. Fourth, the telephone conversation did not work out, because someone is listening on the line, interfering. I will report daily on the situation at the front by note.

Stalin.

RTSHIDNI; F. 558. On. 1. D. 5551. L. 3-4. Autograph.

Notes:

1 The text of the telegram is written on the inside cover of the Kommunist magazine, an organ of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U, No. 1.

2On July 25, 1920, Stalin sent a telegram to Voroshilov and Budyonny: “[...] The actions of your cavalry over the past week are striking in their non-cavalry character: until now, you usually acted in whole divisions, bypassed the enemy, hit him with horse masses; now you are acting in a strange way in separate brigades, tearing off squadrons from one division and attaching to another, crushing the cavalry masses into small parts and depriving them of specifically cavalry power, in a word, you are acting like bad inexperienced infantry, as a result of which enemy infantry often bypasses you, enters you rear. I repeat, you didn't have this before. This conversion of cavalry into infantry began, according to my guess, from the time the General Staff infantrymen appeared in your field headquarters. If my guesses are correct, I ask you not to succumb in the future to the influence of infantrymen of the General Staff, inexperienced in the cavalry, and to return to the old tactics of operations by whole divisions. If I am mistaken, please let me know your opinion” (RTSKHIDNI, F. 558. On. 1. D. 5552. L. 2-5).

No. 92

Telegram from I. V. Stalin to L. D. Trotsky

July 26 [1920]

Predrevsov[et] Trotsky,

copy of the Central Committee of the RCP.

Kharkov 26 July.

Another failure on the Wrangel Front is due to the belated approach of fresh divisions from the north, which can concentrate no earlier than August 10. Wrangel is obviously aware of the redeployment of divisions and is trying to warn us . Not a small role was played by the fact that Moscow does not pay due attention to the Crimean Front. In my opinion, the formation of a special Crimean Revolutionary Council will not be a plus. The whole question lies in the indicated circumstance, and not in the organization of a special Revolutionary Military Council for the Crimea. The last one is redundant in my opinion .

The loss of Orekhov and, even, Aleksandrovsk should have been expected in the event of Wrangel's attempt to warn us even if we were not ready. Now that Wrangel's strike has begun, our failures will probably continue for some period. I repeat, this is the question, not the formation of a new revolutionary council. That's why I find your suggestion 2 redundant .

Stalin.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 1868. L. 2-4. Autograph.

Notes:

1 Text in italics was crossed out by Stalin's hand and was not included in the text of the sent telegram.

2 In connection with the failures on the Polish and Wrangel fronts, the Central Committee of the RCP (b), at the suggestion of Trotsky, discussed the issue of separating the Crimean sector of the Southwestern Front into an independent Southern Front. Stalin was against this. The final decision on the division of the fronts was made at a meeting of the Politburo on August 2, 1920 (See: Lenin V. I. PSS. T. 51. P. 247).

No. 93

Telegram from I. V. Stalin to L. D. Trotsky

July 28, 1920

Trotsky.

We intend to issue and distribute the order for the total extermination of the Wrangel command staff at the time of our general offensive.

Stalin.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 1875. L. 1. Handwritten text on a telegraph form.

No. 94

Telegram from I. V. Stalin to S. M. Budyonny and K. E. Voroshilov

[July 29, 1920]

First Cavalry.

Budyonny, Voroshilov.

We succeeded in insisting that the terms of the armistice be handed over to the Poles by us on the 4th of August, and not on the 30th of July . So you have four more days at your disposal. In addition, before receiving a formal order from the front, you can beat the Poles regardless of the timing. All this I tell you quite formally. So, hit the Lions, now you have time.

Stalin.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 5549. L. 2-3. Autograph.

Notes:

1 . On July 27, 1920, the issue of peace negotiations with Poland was considered by the Politburo. The decision, in particular, stated: “To approve the plan for dividing the peace talks with Poland into two sessions, the second to coincide with August 4, so that Poland sends persons authorized to sign preliminary peace conditions to this session” ( RTSKHIDNI, F. 17, List 3, D. 97, L. 1).

No. 95

Telegram from J. V. Stalin to V. I. Lenin

July 29 [1920]

Moscow Kremlin.

Only Lenin.

Kharkiv 29/VII 1 .

Tough fighting continues along the entire Crimean front, Orekhovo and neighboring stations change hands. Advancing along the entire front, Wrangel thinks of frustrating our forthcoming offensive, or, in any case, provoking us to a premature, insufficiently prepared offensive. Character and endurance are required of us, Wrangel's possible partial successes and the possible loss of some points cannot be of serious importance. Therefore, while conducting an active defense, we decided to persevere in concentrating new forces for the main attack. In the end, Wrangel will achieve that, jumping and jumping on us, he will exhaust his strength and then find himself in the face of our fresh forces. Please inform me about our plans in connection with the Polish truce 2. Budyonny reports that due to the exhaustion of the cavalry, it will probably not be possible to take Lvov before the thirtieth .

Stalin.

RTSHIDNI; F. 558. On. 1. D. 1881. L. 2-3. Autograph.

Notes:

1 On the reverse side of the second page of the document is the date "29/VII-20". On the typewritten copy of the same telegram, preserved in the file, there is Sklyansky's autograph: "Sk" and a note: "t. Sent to Lenin" (RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 1881. L. 4).

2On July 29 or 30, 1920, Stalin sent a telegram to Lenin, in which he outlined his views on the requirements for Poland in the event of peace negotiations: “Demobilization of the army and the military industry, arming the workers as the main guarantee of peace, class, the main culprit of the war and vandal destruction during the war - I propose to put these three main points and the secondary points arising from them as the basis for negotiations [...] ”(RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 5553. L .2-3). On July 31, the Politburo approved the draft armistice agreement with Poland (Ibid. F. 17. Op 3. D. 99. L. 1, 4-9). Later, in the face of a retreat, on August 25, 1920, the Politburo decided to yield to the British and refuse to demand that the workers be armed (Ibid. D. 104. L. 2).

3 In response to the report of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 1st Cavalry of July 28, 1920 about the unsuccessful attempt to take Lvov due to the large concentrations of enemy forces, Yegorov and Stalin on July 29, 1920 gave Voroshilov and Budyonny a new order to capture Lvov: “[... ] Your answer about the impossibility of completing the task by the deadline - the capture of Lvov - is completely incomprehensible [...] ”(Directives of the command of the fronts of the Red Army. T. 3. M., 1974. P. 235).

No. 96

Telegram from J. V. Stalin to V. I. Lenin

July 31 [1920]

Moscow - the Kremlin, only to Lenin.

Kharkiv 31/7.

I already wrote that Commander- in-Chief 1 is coming to our front 2 . Today he writes that he is canceling the trip due to the situation on the Western Front. It seems to me that he was simply scared, intimidated by Wrangel's actions and does not want to connect himself with the fate of our operations against Wrangel, in which he apparently does not believe, although it is clear that such a connection remains, despite the cancellation of the trip. Wrangel continues frenzied attacks along the entire front, parts of Denikin 3 interned by Georgiaalready at Wrangel and are fighting with us at the front, in the Orekhov region, after fierce fighting, we lost six guns, in the Berdyansk region, the enemy is moving forward, took Verkhne-Tokmak, knocked out one of our armored trains. It can be said with certainty that the setbacks will continue until the concentration of our forces and the beginning of the strike, and the concentration of our forces is, as I already wrote, slowly, mainly because the Commander-in-Chief caught on late with the transfers, despite a number of warnings on my part. Tonight I'm leaving for the front with a comfront.

Stalin.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 1892. L. 3-5 Autograph.

Notes:

1 S.S. Kamenev. .

2 We are talking about the Crimean sector of the Southwestern Front.

3 This refers to military formations that were subject to internment from Georgia in accordance with the Soviet-Georgian agreement of May 7, 1920.

No. 97

Telegram from the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) to V. I. Lenin, L. D. Trotsky, N. N. Krestinsky, G. V. Chicherin

August 3 [1920]

Moscow Kremlin. Lenin, Trotsky, Krestinsky, Chicherin.

August 3rd

The Caucasian Bureau, having inquired about the decision of the Central Committee on the need to establish close ties with the Turkish revolutionary masses through Armenia 1 , while Sovietizing the latter, considers it its duty to indicate that the route of ties with Turkey should be established not through Armenia, but through Georgia, which it is more desirable to Sovietize for the following reasons :

the Sovietization of Georgia deprives the bases of the Terek and Kuban counter-revolutionaries and Wrangel's help to Georgia; 2) communication with Turkey is established by cabotage along the Black Sea coast, inaccessible to enemy ships; 3) Armenia, cut off from Europe, deprived of any help from England and America, will have to capitulate and surrender power to the Armenian communists, and this opens up a second path for Turkey; 4) according to the statement of the Komfront, for military-strategic reasons, Georgia is easier to conquer than Armenia. Taking the latter, the units are stretched out, having Georgia hostile to us on the flank, from which the possibility of a strike is not ruled out .

Caucasus Bureau.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 8. D. 23. L. 192-193. Handwritten text.

Notes:

On July 31, 1920, the Politburo accepted Chicherin's proposal on Armenia (RTsKhIDNI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 99. L. 1).

2Following this telegram, Frumkin, a member of the board of the People’s Commissariat of Food and Beverage, in a telegram to the Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) Krestinsky, reported: “I consider it my duty to add to the telegram of the Caucasus Bureau about establishing contact with Kemal Pasha through Georgia, that under the present conditions the decision of the Caucasus Bureau is impracticable and harmful. The main task of this moment is to quickly eliminate Wrangel and the Kuban Troubles as a continuation of the Wrangel Front. Any task that deviates from this task is fatal. We run the risk of upsetting the economic front in the Sevkavkaz, which should work without interruption. My point of view is in full agreement with the Revolutionary Military Council of the Front (Caucasian Front - Comp.). Please inform Lenin [...]” (Ibid. Op. 109. D. 15. L. 96). In the answer of Krestinsky on behalf of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), sent on August 11, 1920 to two addresses - the Soviet Labor Army (Frumkin) and the Caucasus Bureau, it was reported: “The decision regarding Armenia was suspended by the CECA until the liquidation of Wrangel. The same applies to your proposal on Georgia [...]” (Ibid. L. 97). A day earlier, on August 10, 1920, the plenipotentiary of the RSFSR in Armenia telegraphed Chicherin about the conclusion of a peace treaty on behalf of the RSFSR with the government of Armenia (The Great October Socialist Revolution and the victory of Soviet power in Armenia. S. 384-385).

No. 98

Telegram from J. V. Stalin to V. I. Lenin

August 4 [1920]

Moscow. Only to Lenin, hastily .

Lozovaya, 4/8.

I report for orientation the following data on the Crimean Front: the first, at the front and [in] the immediate rear, the enemy had thirty-six thousand bayonets and fourteen thousand sabers by July 30, of which eighteen thousand bayonets and eight thousand sabers were put into battle; we have forty thousand bayonets and six thousand sabers at the front and [in] the immediate rear, of which only ten thousand bayonets and five thousand sabers are brought into battle (the rest are being brought up and concentrated); this is what explains our present failures; thus, the nearest reserve of the enemy is six thousand sabers and eighteen thousand bayonets, our nearest reserve is one thousand sabers and thirty thousand bayonets; obviously, if we are good with infantry in terms of reserves, then it is very bad with cavalry, because the enemy outnumbers us in cavalry by more than twice. Second. Just got your questions 1We do not need a division of fronts, but a strengthening of the Crimean sector, the transfer of all Western armies to the Western Front without breaking Yugozap's front-line apparatus, I have already stated my considerations in a telegram addressed to Krestinsky 2 ; I have no deputy, the Central Committee can find one within two weeks; The Commander-in-Chief fails from the very beginning of the Crimean operation, because he (not only him) does not underestimate the Wrangel danger and is always late with the fulfillment of his promises exactly as much as Wrangel needs, there are a lot of examples, writing about them is an empty occupation; As for our diplomacy, I will keep silent about it, it would be better to talk about it later when we meet. Third. You must already know that we took Kovel, Lutsk and Bugach.

Fourth. Just sent me your request about the prospects on the fronts in anticipation of the plenum of the Central Committee 3. I don’t know why you actually need my opinion, therefore I am not able to convey to you the conclusion you demand and I confine myself to reporting bare facts without coverage: Budyonny’s hitch is temporary, the enemy threw the Lvov, Lutsk and Galician groups on Budyonny in order to save Lvov, Budyonny assures that he will defeat the enemy (he has already taken a large number of prisoners), but Lvov will obviously be taken with some delay. In a word, Budyonny's hitch does not mean a turning point in favor of the enemy. As for Wrangel, although we are now weak for the reasons stated above, we still hold the enemy back; not later than in a week we will put into play thirty thousand fresh bayonets and, according to all information, we will create an advantage on our side, we will move Wrangel from his position, and our position will improve every day, for the belated parts will fit. Of course, war is a game and it is impossible to take everything into account, but since it can be foreseen at all, Wrangel's chances must necessarily fall. The general outlook on the fronts, in my opinion, is this: Poland is relaxed and in need of a respite, in view of which we must lay down conditions that make it impossible for bourgeois Poland to recover. Wrangel will be shot down [in] the next few days, and if the Commander-in-Chief sends us cavalry, Wrangel will be completely eliminated by the beginning of autumn.

Stalin.

RTSHIDNI; F. 558. On. 1. D. 5556. L. 3-6. Autograph.

Notes:

On August 3, 1920, Lenin sent a telegram to Stalin, in which he raised questions: about the division of fronts, about Stalin's deputy, about the position of the Commander-in-Chief, about the activities of the NKID (Lenin V.I. PSS. T. 51. P. 248).

2 We are talking about Stalin's telegram dated August 4, 1920, in which it was proposed to combine forces in the Western direction, transferring the troops of the 2nd, 1st Cavalry and 14th armies to the Western Front so that the rest of the forces of the Southwestern Front were directed against Wrangel. On August 5, 1920, Stalin's proposal was considered by the Politburo. The adopted decision stated: “To approve the option proposed by Stalin, adopted by the RVSR” (Izvestiya of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 2, pp. 121, 123).

3 This refers to Lenin’s telegram to Stalin dated August 4, 1920, in which Lenin asked to send “an opinion on the nature of the hitches at Budyonny and on the Wrangel front, as well as on our military prospects on both of these fronts” in connection with the upcoming plenum of the Central Committee ( Lenin, V. I. PSS, vol. 51, p. 249). At the plenum of the Central Committee on August 5, 1920, the question of the situation on the Wrangel front and in the Kuban was considered. The decision was made: “To recognize that the Kuban-Wrangel front must go ahead of the western front and therefore the Orgburo and the People’s Commissariat of War must take the most energetic measures to send military forces and communists to this front” (Izvestiya of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 2. S. 12b).

No. 99

Telegram from J. V. Stalin to V. I. Lenin

[August 12, 1920]

Lenin.

First, I would like to greet you and myself with victory, but I must confess that I do not believe in Lloyd George's statement, transmitted by Kamenev .

Secondly, our current blow to Wrangel cannot be crushing, since, due to the unmanagement of the headquarters, the northern divisions were transferred to the Crimean front slowly at long intervals, and we were forced to bring them into battle in parts, without waiting for the arrival of the rest of the troops, for example, a brigade Volunteers have not yet been brought up in their entirety, since the field headquarters for some reason set the standard for transporting one echelon per day, and there are twenty-three echelons in total in the brigade. My impression is that the Commander-in-Chief and the brothers are sabotaging the work of organizing the victory over Wrangel, in any case, they do not show a tenth of the desire to win, which they undoubtedly showed in the fight against Poland. In addition, the Commander-in-Chief refuses to provide cavalry 2 . In view of this, our present attack on Wrangel cannot be considered decisive.

Stalin.

RTSHIDNI; F. 558. On. 1. D. 1940. L. 1-3. Autograph.

Notes:

1 The telegram was a reply to Lenin's telegram of August 11, 1920: Kamenev's dispatch has just been received. England was afraid of the general strike, and Lloyd George announced that he was advising Poland to accept our armistice terms, including disarmament, and the transfer of weapons to the workers, and land, and so on. Our victory is great and will be the most complete if we finish off Wrangel. Here we take all measures. Go ahead and take the whole Crimea with the current blow at all costs. Everything now depends on it. The Poles are pulling and did not arrive on time. For us, this is archivally beneficial ”(Lenin V.I. PSS. T. 51. S. 254-255).

On August 12, 1920, Stalin and Yegorov sent a memorandum to S. S. Kamenev with a proposal to withdraw the 1st Cavalry Army to the reserve of the Southwestern Front "in case of Romania's intervention." On August 13, 1920, Kamenev issued a directive on the inclusion of the 1st Cavalry Army, along with the 12th Army, into the Western Front. (From the history of the Civil War in the USSR. Vol. 3, pp. 350, 351). Stalin's telegram to the Commander-in-Chief dated August 13, 1920, in particular, stated:

[...] Your latest directive [...] unnecessarily overturns the established grouping of forces in the area of these armies, already on the offensive; this directive should have been given either three days ago, when the cavalry was in reserve, or later, after the cavalry took the Lvov region [...] In view of this, I refuse to sign the corresponding order of Yugozap in development of your directive [...] ”(RTsKhIDNI F. 558. On. 1. D. 4137. L. 1). On August 14, 1920, in a telegram to Lenin, Stalin again complained about the Commander-in-Chief and asked for a definite decision of the Central Committee regarding the Wrangel Front (Ibid. D. 5567. L. 2).

On August 19, 1920, at a meeting of the Politburo, on the report of Trotsky and Stalin on the military situation on the Polish and Wrangel fronts, it was decided to withdraw the 6th division of the 1st Cavalry Army to the Wrangel front. True, in the event that a protest motivated by military considerations followed from S. S. Kamenev, the issue was subject to revision in the Politburo (Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 3. P. 160).

No. 100

I. V. Stalin - Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b)

[August 30, 1920]

TO THE POLITBURO OF THE CC 1 .

I propose that the Central Committee form a commission of three [persons] (through the Defense Soviet) to examine the conditions of our July offensive and August retreat on the Western Front . Give the commission a two-week deadline. I propose Comrade Serebryakov as chairman of the commission (if the Central Committee does not have a better candidate ) .

I. STALIN.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 5213. L. 1. Typewritten copy.

Notes:

1 In the upper left corner of the telegram, a note: “Ex. PB item 21 No. 40 І/IX-20”, below: “30/VІІІ”.

2 In mid-August 1920, the Polish army went on the offensive and, building on success, by the end of the month pushed the Soviet troops back to the borders of Poland.

3 On the same day, August 30, 1920, Stalin submitted a statement to the Politburo, in which he connected the failures on the Polish front with the mistakes of the country's top military leadership. In particular, he called the lack of serious combat reserves the main drawback of military policy and proposed adopting a “program for the formation of combat reserves of the Republic” (Stalin I. V. Works. Vol. 4. P. 348-350). Stalin's proposal was considered at a meeting of the Politburo on September 1, 1920. The adopted resolution stated: "to take into account Trotsky's message that the military department is taking measures in the spirit of Comrade Stalin's proposal [...]" (Izvestiya of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 3. S. 162).