Bolshevik Leaders correspondence

Bolshevik leadership Correspondence. 1912-1927
Collection of documents 1996.
Compiled by: A.V.Kvashonkin, L.P.Kosheleva, L.A.Rogovaya, O.V.Khlevnyuk.

No. 64

S. M. Budyonny to V. I. Lenin

February 1, 1920

Stanitsa Bagaevskaya R[ostov] Don.

February 1, 1920.

Dear Leader Vladimir Ilyich!

Forgive me for writing this letter to you. I really want to see you personally and bow before you as the Great Leader of all the poor Peasants and Workers. But the affairs of Front 1 and the Denikin gang prevent me from doing this. I must inform you Comrade. Lenin that the cavalry army is going through a difficult time, once upon a time they didn’t beat my cavalry like the whites beat now, but they beat it because the commander of the front set the cavalry Army in such conditions that it could die completely. I am ashamed to tell you about this, but I love the cavalry Army, but I love the Revolution even more, and the Revolution still needs cavalry. Front commander comrade. Shorin first put the cavalry in the swamp of the Don and forced the river [river] to cross the Don, the enemy took advantage of this and almost destroyed the entire cavalry, and when I was the Revolutionary Council 2demanded to change the direction of the cavalry army comrade. Shorin left the infantry army entrusted to me; he handed over two infantry divisions to the 8th Army, and the cavalry army was thrown alone against the enemy and for the second time was badly dented. For all my command, there were no such sad phenomena. And as soon as Shorin received the right to dispose of the army entrusted to me, misfortune fell. Back on October 26, 1919, when I was under Comrade. Shorin 3he gave me a task that was harmful to us and useful to the enemy, then I told him about it by telegraph and he must have been offended and remembered, but now all this is reflected in our common revolutionary cause. And now I also received the task, but today the enemy has been defeated and will move forward 60 miles, and the neighboring armies stand in place according to the order and thereby enable the enemy to withdraw their units from the front and throw them against the cavalry army. This is an obvious transgression. I ask you to pay your attention to this and protect the red cavalry Army and other armies needlessly perishing from such an assault command.

I firmly shake your hand

From comrade hello

Commander of the 1st Cavalry Budyonny*

RTSKHIDNI. F. 2. On. 1. D. 12767. L. 1-2. Autograph.

Notes:

oneWe are talking about the Caucasian Front, formed by the Decree of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic of January 16, 1920 on the basis of the South-Eastern Front. The task of the front was to complete the liquidation of the North Caucasian grouping of Denikin's troops. The headquarters of the Caucasian Front was located successively in Millerovo and Rostov-on-Don. Shorin was the commander of the front from January 16 to January 23, 1920. From January 24 to February 3, the former chief of staff, Afanasyev, temporarily served as commander. On February 4, 1919, Tukhachevsky became commander. All these movements were the result of the struggle of groups within the command of the Caucasian and Southwestern fronts. The actions of the 1st Cavalry Army drew criticism from Shorin, a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian Front V. Trifonov, and the commander of the 8th Army, Sokolnikov. Budyonny and a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 1st Cavalry Army Voroshilov appealed to Stalin, a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southwestern Front, who supported them. This confrontation largely explained the transfer of Shorin to the post of assistant to the Commander-in-Chief. During the period of "interregnum", when the former deputy Shorina Afanasyev temporarily commanded the front, the leadership of the 1st Cavalry Army decided to strengthen the "conquered positions". On February 2, 1920, Voroshilov, Budyonny and Shchadenko sent a telegram to Trotsky, Lenin, Stalin and Kalinin - a report in which they qualified the actions of Shorin, Trifonov and Sokolnikov as a "partisan raid" "on the young, but certainly still badly needed by the Soviet Republic, Cavalry". “The cavalry,” they wrote, “can still render an indispensable service to the cause of the communist revolution, and for this alone it deserves a comradely and careful attitude on the part of higher-ranking persons and institutions. Revolutionary Military Council of the Cavalry, Considering the severity of the responsibility that lies on him, he considers it his duty to bring to the attention of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic that in the current situation his work is unthinkable and fruitless, and therefore we ask you to relieve us of our duties as members of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Cavalry by appointing deputies. We ask you to inform us of further instructions [...]” (RTSKHIDNI, F. 5. On. 1. D. 2435. L. 4-5). On February 3, along with the appointment of Tukhachevsky as commander of the front, Ordzhonikidze, close to Stalin, was introduced into the RVS of the front. On. 1. D. 2435. L. 4-5). On February 3, along with the appointment of Tukhachevsky as commander of the front, Ordzhonikidze, close to Stalin, was introduced into the RVS of the front. On. 1. D. 2435. L. 4-5). On February 3, along with the appointment of Tukhachevsky as commander of the front, Ordzhonikidze, close to Stalin, was introduced into the RVS of the front.

2 This refers to the RVS of the 1st Cavalry Army.

3 In October 1919, the 1st Cavalry Army was part of the South-Eastern Front, commanded by the same Shorin. At this time, the troops of the front were fighting on the Khoper River, in the area of the villages of Ust-Medveditskaya, Ilovlinskaya and the city of Kamyshin.

No. 65

Telegram from J. X. Peters, Yu. V. Lomonosov to V. I. Lenin, L. D. Trotsky, L. B. Krasin, Central Committee of the RCP(b)

February 12, 1920

FROM ROSTOV, NOTE.

12/11-1920 8 a.m. 45 min.

Cipher

MOSCOW TO LENIN, TROTSKY, THE CC RCP AND KRASIN 1 .

It is necessary to immediately put an end to the conflict between the Eighth and Cavalry Armies, which threatens armed clashes. Budennov's army is decomposing every day: robberies, drunkenness, presence of suspicious women in the headquarters, according to rumors, there were cases of murder of the most conscious comrades. Budyonny ceases to reckon with anyone. The atrocities he perpetrates on the railway[s] are absolutely unbelievable: continuous seizures of fuel, steam locomotives, cars of emergency trains, plunder of trophy property. Each section is followed by a tail of wagons filled with women and loot. According to Comrade Mironov, the number of such cars is about 120 per division.

PETERS. LOMONOSOV.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. On. 1. D. 2435. L. 6. Typewritten text.

Notes:

1 At the top of the telegram is a note: "Copy sent to Sklyansky."

No. 66

Telegram to G. K. Ordzhonikidze V. I. Lenin

February 17, 1920

February 17, 1920, 8 p.m. Station [station] Millerovo. Only yesterday we arrived in Millerovo, having been on the road for 9 days. The Budyonny order to transfer their units from the Rostov region to the Velikoknyazheskaya region was carried out unquestioningly. While advancing, he deviated slightly to the right of the indicated line of attack, which he explained by the need to get [forage]. Tukhachevsky and I believe that the cries of decay in the sense of loss of combat capability are unfounded 1. Drunkenness and robbery are an old phenomenon among them. At night we go with Smilga to the front and upon arrival we will report in detail. During the month of our inactivity, the enemy has greatly intensified. At the moment, our armies are advancing. On the right flank (section of the 8th and 9th armies) - unsuccessfully, the main direction - the section of the 10th [army] of Budyonny - satisfactory. Tomorrow, the day after tomorrow are decisive days. The 8th and 9th [armies] are badly battered, partly by the inept leadership of the commanders, partly [due to] the organizational mistakes made by Shorin, who did not take sufficiently energetic measures to replenish the division in a timely manner. Both commanders will be replaced 2 . Mobilization has been announced on the sector of the Caucasian [Kazakh] front. Dumenko will be removed from the hull 3. The weakness of the general command is explained by the former isolation of the front headquarters from the army, I hope this will not happen now.

Ordzhonikidze 4 .

RTSHIDNI; F. 85. Op. 8. D. 3. L. 1-3. Autograph.

Notes:

1 This telegram was a response to a telegram from Lenin to Smilga and Ordzhonikidze dated February 17, 1920, which expressed concern about the state of the troops of the Caucasian Front, “the complete disintegration of Budyonny”, “the weakness of the general command, strife between the armies” (Lenin V. I. PSS. T. 51. S. 134).

2 We are talking about the commander of the 8th Sokolnikov and the temporarily acting commander of the 9th Dushkevich. Dushkevich March 1, 1920 was replaced by Uborevich. The 8th Army was disbanded in March 1920, its troops were transferred to the 9th and 10th armies.

3 In February 1920, Dumenko, on a false charge of murdering the military commissar of the corps, Mikeladze (similar to the charges against Mironov), was arrested and sentenced to death. In one of the telegrams to Stalin, Ordzhonikidze reported: “Dumenko and his headquarters have been arrested. Smilga thinks of organizing a Mironov comedy. Charge: murder of the corps commissar, banditry, preparation of a rebellion!

(RTsDIDNI. F. 85. Op. 8. D. 4. L. 1). May 11, 1920 Dumenko was shot.

4 At the end of the telegram there is a note: “Deciphered in the secretariat of the Deputy Pre-Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic on February 19, 1920 at 2:30 am.”

No. 67

Telegram from Ya. G. Doletsky, I. S. Unshlikht to V. I. Lenin

March 15, 1920

C. Secret.

Adopted 15/111 1920 5.50.

Moscow Kremlin, TO LENIN, copy NACHREGISTRUPR 1 .

Smolensk, March 14, 1920. I am reporting the official opinion of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Poland from the beginning of February regarding peace negotiations: “Poland will not conclude peace 2 . Pilsudski is deceiving everyone. The higher bourgeois Polish spheres, together with the Entente, in defiance of the demands of the social-patriots, are preparing for the March or April offensive . A two-week break in railway traffic in January, despite the declared reason - fuel economy, was actually used to transfer technical parts, cars, guns, shells and military equipment from France.

Member of the Polish Bureau under the Central Committee of the RCP Doletsky.

Member of the Revolutionary Military Council Unshlikht.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. On. 1. D. 2528. L. 28. Uncertified typewritten copy.

Notes:

1 At the end of the telegram there is a note: “Deciphered in the secretariat of the Deputy Pre-revolutionary Military Council of the Republic on March 15, 1920 by E. S[klyansky]”.

2 In early March 1920, the Polish government held a series of negotiations on joint action against Soviet Russia with representatives of the white movement and Finland. On March 5, 1920, Polish troops occupied Mozyr, Klinkovichi and Rogachev. The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR declared a note of protest, and the Ukrainian government again offered Poland peace talks. The possibility of the latter is discussed in the telegram (Documents and materials on the history of Soviet-Polish relations. M., 1965. Vol. 3. S. 562-563).

3 The leadership of the RSFSR knew about the impending offensive and took retaliatory steps. On March 11, 1920, Lenin telegraphed Unshlikht: “The Poles, apparently, will fight. We are doing everything possible to strengthen the defense. It is also necessary to intensify extremely agitation in the Polish language [...] ”(Lenin V.I. PSS. T. 51. P. 158). The doubts of Lenin and other party leaders about the outcome of the peace negotiations served as the basis for a telegram in response to Lenin by Unshlikht and Doletsky. The offensive of the Polish troops in the direction of Kyiv began on April 25, 1920.