Bolshevik Leaders correspondence

Bolshevik leadership Correspondence. 1912-1927
Collection of documents 1996.
Compiled by: A.V.Kvashonkin, L.P.Kosheleva, L.A.Rogovaya, O.V.Khlevnyuk.

No. 70

Telegram to G. K. Ordzhonikidze G. V. Chicherin

April 23, 1920

Rostov n / D [on].

April 23, 1920

I received your telegram only today, upon my arrival from Petrovsk . In general, we are already pursuing a policy here, but it is supported by quite impressive forces. I personally consider your answer to Azerbaijan to be quite appropriate 2 , but I would only ask you to delay it a little. You will receive an answer to the encryption today. The current situation in Baku is as follows: representatives of the Itgihadists 3 , socialists and other parties have left the government, so that Ussubbek's government 4 consists only of Musavatists 5 . The head of the national movement in Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, demands that Azerbaijan allow Soviet troops to pass to the borders of Turkey in order to defend them from British attacks 6. The possibility of our bloodless entry into Baku and declaring it Soviet 7 is not ruled out . Narimanov is very much needed in Baku. I earnestly ask you to send it to us tomorrow. Tomorrow evening I'm leaving again for Petrovsk.

Ordzhonikidze.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 13. D. 6. L. 1. Certified typewritten copy.

Notes:

1 We are talking about the events connected with the completion of the Sovietization of the North Caucasus and the beginning of actions for the Sovietization of Azerbaijan and Georgia. In response to a message from Ordzhonikidze about measures being taken to strengthen Soviet power in Chechnya (Ordzhonikidze G.K. Selected articles and speeches. 1911-1937. M., 1939. P. 80), on March 15, 1920, Lenin telegraphed him about the allocation SNK 200 million rubles as assistance to the mountaineers and said that Narimanov, sent at the request of Ordzhonikidze, would bring them to Petrovsk in connection with the upcoming actions in Azerbaijan (Lenin V.I. PSS. T. 51. P. 178).

2 In the autumn of 1919 - early 1920, the Soviet government repeatedly turned to the governments of Azerbaijan and Georgia with a proposal to conclude an agreement on joint military operations against Denikin's army, but each time it was refused. The strengthening of the positions of Soviet Russia in the North Caucasus and the threat of Sovietization forced the governments of Azerbaijan and Georgia in the spring of 1920 to send their representatives to Moscow to conclude agreements with Russia. However, in the changed conditions, Moscow dragged out the negotiations.

3 Ittihadists are members of the organization Ittihad (Ittihadi-Islam - Unity of Islam), a pan-Islamist party of Azerbaijan, founded in September 1917.

4 Refers to the government of Azerbaijan.

5 Members of the Musavat (Equality) party, founded in Baku in 1911. Remained ruling during the entire period of the existence of the Republic of Azerbaijan in 1918-1920.

6 In the spring of 1920, the Caucasian Bureau of the RCP(b) concluded an agreement with the leader of the national movement of Turkey, Kemal, on joint actions against the British.

7 As early as April 21, 1920, on the basis of a report from the front headquarters on the concentration of troops for the operation to seize Baku, Ordzhonikidze and Tukhachevsky ordered an attack on Baku and the Sovietization of Azerbaijan (Directives of the Front Command of the Red Army. Vol. 3. P. 310). On April 23, 1920, Tukhachevsky and Ordzhonikidze sent a clarifying telegram to the commander of the 11th Army, in which they ordered "the ultimate task of the 11th Army is not to take possession of the Baku province, but to take possession of the entire territory of Azerbaijan" (See ibid.).

No. 71

Telegram to G. K. Ordzhonikidze, S. M. Kirov to V. I. Lenin

May 4, 1920

Moscow. Lenin 1 .

On April 26, our troops crossed the border of Azerbaijan, knowing that the committee of Azerbaijani communists at midnight on April 28 demanded from the government to transfer power to the committee of communists 2 . [Our armored trains were in Khachmaso at that time]. After a short meeting, the government handed over power to the communists, who formed the Azerbaijani 3 and Baku Revolutionary Committees 4 , consisting exclusively [of] Muslims. An independent Socialist Soviet Azerbaijan Republic was proclaimed. The first act of the Revolutionary Committee was to appeal to Soviet Russia for armed assistance and to propose a military alliance.. Our troops marched without any resistance. After the transfer of power to the communists, two hours later, our armored trains were in Baku, having an infantry battalion with them. The next day our cavalry and army headquarters arrived .. The troops of Azerbaijan have completely gone over to our side. A very active role in favor of the revolution in Baku was played by Turkish askers and officers, a detachment of which prevented the government from fleeing Baku. The enthusiasm of the population, especially Muslims and workers, defies any description, can only be compared with the October in St. Petersburg, with the difference that there were no clashes. Everywhere is in perfect order. Industries, the commercial fleet are completely intact. Oil product reserves are over 300 million poods, monthly production is 20 million poods. So far, one and a half million pounds have been sent to Astrakhan. The amount of export will depend on Astrakhan. The first of May in Baku gave an incomparable picture. Tens of thousands of workers and almost the entire population were on the streets. Our army caused rejoicing. In the evening a grandiose organized meeting of workers took place. In our person, Soviet Russia and its army were warmly greeted. A colossal impression was made by the awarding of the orders of the Red Banner to the Azerbaijani commissar for naval affairs and the Turkish communist, who took with a group of askers during the coup, which did not allow the government to flee *, as well as the presentation of the banner from the 11th army to the Baku workers. Our meeting about an ultimatum to the Armenian government to stop hostilities within Azerbaijan caused delight. which did not allow the government to escape *, as well as the presentation of the banner from the 11 [th] army to the Baku workers. Delight was caused by our meeting on the ultimatum to the Armenian government to stop hostilities within Azerbaijan which did not allow the government to escape *, as well as the presentation of the banner from the 11 [th] army to the Baku workers. Delight was caused by our meeting on the ultimatum to the Armenian government to stop hostilities within Azerbaijan7 . Every word in the name of Soviet Russia caused an explosion of enthusiasm. Organic work has not yet begun, the organization of power is underway. The political and military side of the matter has been ensured, and we will deal with it further in Azerbaijan. The situation with the establishment of the economy is very serious, not at all. It is necessary to send them immediately, otherwise our firm strengthening is impossible. It will be the same with Georgia as with Azerbaijan in the nearest future 8 . Do not have any conversations with Georgia. We need your greetings to Azerbaijan and recognition of it in general form 9. We will carry out military-economic [and] economic unification with Soviet [Russian] Russia. Experience requires supplying us with the powers of the Council of People's Commissars for the entire Caucasus and beyond. Supply us by radio or send someone else, but immediately. Do not give such powers to Narimanov.

Ordzhonikidze, Kirov 10

RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 13. D. 12. L. 9-10. Photocopy. Typewritten text.

Notes:

1 The telegram was sent from Baku to Moscow. Ordzhonikidze sent the first telegram outlining the events that took place on the night of April 27-28, 1920 in Azerbaijan to Lenin on April 30, 1920. It read: “From 27 to 28 at two o’clock in the morning, power in Baku passed to the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee, declaring Azerbaijan Soviet Republic. At 4 o'clock in the morning the armored trains entered. Follow the Black Sea coast [...]” (The struggle for the victory of Soviet power in Azerbaijan. 1918-1920. Documents and materials. Baku, 1967. P. 477).

2 This refers to the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist Party of Bolsheviks, which was formed on the initiative of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on February 11, 1920 on the basis of the merger of the Baku organization of the RCP (b) and the local communist organizations "Gummet" and "Adalet". It was subordinate to the Caucasian Regional Committee of the RCP (b), headed by Ordzhonikidze.

3 This refers to the Provisional Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee, formed from members of the Azerbaijan Communist Party.

4 The Baku Revolutionary Committee was established on April 30, 1920.

On April 28, 1920, the Azrevkom telegraphed to the Russian government: “Unable to withstand the onslaught of the united bands of external and internal counter-revolution on our own [...] we propose [...] to enter into a fraternal alliance [...] and ask you to immediately provide a real help by sending detachments of the Red Army ”(Essays on the history of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. Baku, 1963. P. 327-328).

6 This refers to the 11th Army.

7On May 1, 1920, relying on the strength of the Red Army, the Azerbaijani Soviet government presented an ultimatum to the government of Armenia, in which it declared the settlements of Zangezur and Nagorno-Karabakh (territories for which there was a long-standing struggle between Azerbaijan and Armenia) as part of Soviet Azerbaijan and demanded the withdrawal of Armenian troops . In the official response of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, sent to several addresses - Ordzhonikidze, Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee, Lenin, Chicherin on May 7, 1920, it was reported that there were no Armenian troops at the indicated points and it was proposed to send a neutral commission to Karabakh to clarify the true state of affairs (RTsKHIDNI. F 85. Inv. 13. D. 14. L. 1-6). In turn, the Armenian population of Zangezur and Karabakh made a decision at local congresses to refuse to obey the ultimatum. Representatives of the Karabakh community sent an alarming telegram to Ordzhonikidze, in which they persuaded him, in the interests of strengthening the prestige of Soviet power in Transcaucasia, not to send Soviet troops to the disputed territories (Ibid. D. 18. L. 1-3). On May 9, 1920, Ordzhonikidze received a telegram from Karakhan outlining Lenin's position, which, in particular, said: “We received a copy of the note from Azerbaijan and Armenia with an ultimatum. Ilyich instructed me to tell you that we should not hurry with our further expansion, firstly, in order to secure Azerbaijan, and, on the other hand [...] in view of the serious tasks on the Western Front and the need to be careful, considering our international position. Indeed, Armenia is not of immediate interest to us [...]” (Ibid. Op. 17. D. 3. L. 1-4).

8 The operation to Sovietize Georgia was planned simultaneously with the development of the Sovietization plan for Azerbaijan. In mid-April 1920, an unsuccessful uprising against the authorities took place in Georgia, organized by local communists. The Georgian government crushed the uprising. Many of its members were imprisoned. On April 23, 1920, Ordzhonikidze, telegraphing Lenin and Chicherin about the arrests of Georgian communists, reported: “[...] the mood is everywhere for us, they are waiting for the arrival of Soviet troops [...]” (Ibid. Op. 15. D. 7 L. 1-3).

On May 9 , 5, 1920, Lenin sent a telegram to the government of Soviet Azerbaijan: "The Council of People's Commissars welcomes the liberation of the working masses of the independent Azerbaijan Republic [...]" (Lenin V.I. PSS. T. 41. P. 119).

10 There is a note on the telegram: “Deciphered in the secretariat of the Deputy Pre-revolutionary Military Council of the Republic on May 4, 1920. 4/V was sent to T. Lenin.”

No. 72

Telegram to G. K. Ordzhonikidze V. I. Lenin, I. V. Stalin

May 4, 1920

C. SECRET

Moscow Kremlin to LENIN, STALIN.

Baku, May 4, 1920. I answer 1 for the second time: events are unfolding in such a way that we hope to be in Tiflis no later than the twelfth, everything has been done for this. It will go brilliantly. Any other resolution of the issue will cause a terrible beating of the rebels.

Ordzhonikidze 2 .

RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. On. 1. D. 2436. L. 34. Typewritten text.

Notes:

1 Already after the invasion of Azerbaijan, on May 3, 1920, in a telegram to Lenin and Stalin, Ordzhonikidze wrote: “[...] Events are developing in such a way that we hope to be in Tiflis no later than 15 [...]” (RTSKHIDNI. F. 5 On. 1. D. 2436. L. 33).

2 There is a note on the telegram: “Deciphered in the secretariat of the Deputy Pre-Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic on May 4, 1920. Sent to T. Lenin and Stalin. 4/V".

No. 73

G. K. Ordzhonikidze - V. I. Lenin, I. V. Stalin

[later May 4, 1920]

Pass it on to Stalin. Ask the political controller. Ask the political controller immediately. Asks comrade. Ordzhonikidze.

Stay at the phone all the time, all the time of the conversation. Pass the note to Stalin and Lenin. It goes without saying that we carry out all the orders of the Central Committee of the Central Committee 1 [with] accuracy and, of course, there is no need to repeat them. Not a single Red Army soldier entered the territory of Georgia, not a single Azerbaijani soldier entered the territory of Georgia. On the contrary, on the same day as our troops entered Baku, the Georgian troops drove off the border guards of the Azerbaijanis near Poili, occupied the bridge over the Kura, formerly occupied by the Azerbaijanis. They [required] the Muslim village of Shikhli to surrender immediately, otherwise, [use] artillery fire against them. It amazes me how you believe the false statements of Gegechkori 2. I repeat that [from] today not a single one of our Red Army soldiers has had time to approach the borders of Georgia. We all consider the salvation of the perishing Georgian Menshevik government an irreparable mistake, but it goes without saying that all your orders will be carried out by us very precisely and adamantly. The mood in Georgia is now unconditionally for us, according to stations, districts, Dusheti district, Lagodekhi, Abkhazia and almost the entire Kutaisi province are considered. With the approach of our troops to the borders, an uprising is inevitable here. In addition, our attitude [toward] Georgia will make the most disgusting impression on Muslims, especially if the former government of Musavat 3was ready to make peace with us on any terms. In my opinion, if the international situation imposes this comedy on us, at least it is necessary to demand from them the declaration of Soviet power. The Mensheviks4 will agree to this, because they have no other way out. If [in] the units bordering on us an uprising begins, what should we do, support them or leave them to the mercy of fate. How to explain your silence about Azerbaijan. Here they are looking forward to what Moscow will say. In my opinion, in general terms, a greeting from you is necessary. Ordzhonikidze. What about Armenia? Ordzhonikidze. Political controller at the apparatus. Everybody. The note is intended only for Stalin.

Give Moscow to Stalin.

Have my and Kirov received a big note addressed to Lenin. If so, what about powers? 5 Everything will be done, but either keep in mind if you make peace with Armenia, it will be something terrible for the Muslims. We will not cross the borders, but only delay the world. One gets the impression that we, Christians, conquered Azerbaijan, left Georgia and Armenia aside. Everything was prepared for us: 9 would go over and 11, on the 12th 6 would be in Tiflis. But nothing can be done. Keep in mind once given orders, you do not need to [repeat], I will carry it out, whatever my views may be. Welcome telegram 7not received, it must be repeated through the front. A copy in my name and then it will certainly reach them. I shake Sergo's hand: Tell Yenukidze that I fell from the car he sent and broke my leg.

Ordzhonikidze.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 15. D. 53. L. 1-2. Photocopy. Ticker-tape.

Notes:

1 In connection with the events on the Polish front and the close attention of the Western public to the events in Transcaucasia, the Bolshevik leadership was inclined to the possibility of concluding a temporary peace agreement with Georgia. On May 5, 1920, Lenin and Stalin telegraphed Ordzhonikidze: “[...] the Central Committee obliges you to withdraw units from the borders of Georgia to the border and refrain from attacking Georgia. After negotiations with Tiflis, it is clear that peace with Georgia is not ruled out [...]” (From the History of the Civil War in the USSR, vol. 3, p. 512). On May 7, 1920, a peace treaty was concluded between the RSFSR and Georgia in Moscow. Kirov was appointed plenipotentiary to Georgia. Georgia undertook to expel the White Guard units from its territory and legalize the position of the Georgian Communist Party.

2 The representative of the Menshevik government of Georgia, Gegechkori, repeatedly broadcast reports on the radio about the actions of the Red Army in Transcaucasia.

3 This refers to the overthrown Azerbaijani government.

4 We are talking about the government of the Georgian Democratic Republic. Formed in May 1918 by the Georgian National Council on a coalition basis, from March 1919 this government became practically one-party (out of 130 deputies of the Constituent Assembly, 109 were Mensheviks).

5 See Document No. 71.

6 In a personal telegram to Lenin and Stalin dated May 6, 1920, Ordzhonikidze and Kirov asked “not to worry” about Gegechkori radio messages (RTsKhIDNI. F. 85. Op. 2/S. D. 1. L. 9). In response, during direct negotiations by telegraph, Stalin stated: “[...] the situation is such that now we should not [should] hurry with Georgia in the sense of turning it into a Soviet one, anyway, in a few months, if the communists are legalized, it will become Soviet anyway [...] We are not worried about the false statements of Gegechkori, but telegrams from you and Smilga about the readiness to occupy Tiflis by May 12, which we consider absolutely incompatible with our policy [...] ”(Ibid. L .6-8).

7 See note 9 to document No. 71.

No. 74

Telegram to G. K. Ordzhonikidze V. I. Lenin, I. V. Stalin

May 8, 1920

I consider Comrade to be the best candidate. Kirov, Mdivani's second candidacy. Pre-Control Commission - Kavtaradze. The members of the commission were Dumbadze and Tsintsadze 1 . Lenin's telegram made a tremendous impression 2. Today, the operational, administrative, organizational subordination of the Azerbaijani army to our command has been made. A big shortage of workers for the Economic Council. I have just received, by direct wire from Vladikavkaz, excerpts from a letter from the secretary of the regional committee, Nazaretyan. “On May 2, on the basis of the indignation of the soldiers who did not want to go to the front, there was an attempt to seize power in Tiflis, but unsuccessfully. On our side, one was killed, two were wounded and three were arrested. Governor-General Sulakvelidze shot them last night. Sandro Makharadze, who led the operation, escaped. The government introduces a state of siege today. The work is now very difficult, but the mood of the masses and parts of the troops is growing daily. A coup is expected. In Batum, the British command is making concessions. The overwhelming majority of the Batumi workers are behind us. On April 30, General Lyakhov was killed by three young men. Gubeli was arrested for this, but at the request of the workers, the British command released him, and on the first of May, in an English car, he was taken directly from prison to the meeting, and the next day he came to us.

Report it to the center. In Abkhazia, the performance is expected by May 10. It pushes through Northern Svaneti to the Gori district, this finally disperses the forces of the government. Mikha Tskhakaya was again arrested in Kutais. All Tiflis prisoners were transferred to Kutais. On May 1, our speakers attracted a large mass of listeners, 4 trucks, decorated with our slogans and posters, went to Golovinsky. They were attacked by units of a special detachment and the police. 55 people were beaten to a pulp, wounded and arrested. Official information about the execution of 12 communists. Throughout Armenia, with the announcement of Soviet power in Baku, there was a solemn and joyful mood among the masses. All Dashnak party premises were destroyed in Erivan and Alexandropol. The portraits of the leaders are torn and burned” 3 .

Ordzhonikidze.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 85 Op. 13. D. 17. L. 2-3. Uncertified typewritten copy.

Notes:

1 We are talking about the formation of the governing bodies of the Georgian Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Ordzhonikidze sent the first telegram on this issue to Lenin on May 7, 1920 (RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 13. D. 17. L. 1). The provisional Central Committee of the CP(b)G was formed on May 20, 1920.

2 See note 9 to document No. 71.

3 This information by Nazaretyan, reported by Ordzhonikidze to Lenin and Stalin, with the exception of the part concerning Abkhazia, is outdated. Perhaps the purpose of the message was a kind of pressure on Lenin to speed up the process of Sovietization of Georgia.

No. 75

Telegram from G. V. Chicherin to G. K. Ordzhonikidze

May 11, 1920

Tov. Ordzhonikidze.

Our policy is world politics, and is not limited to the Caucasus alone. In all your messages you absolutely ignore our world interests. By actions arising from local interests, you can terribly damage our world relations. With regard to England, we must not speed up the process, our peace with Georgia will have the greatest effect in England, complicating the policy of the Churchill group, this will increase our prestige throughout the world. A barrier is useful to us at the moment. You must at all costs keep your comrades from adventures that could harm us terribly. The question of these or those gorges recedes before the main world ones, but the gorges you listed are not given to Georgia at all. You are mistaken. The border was determined by the Revolutionary Military Council for relations with the Caucasus Front 1. The local Georgians confirm that the Zakatalsky district belongs to Georgia 2 , however, as a result of your protest, we put pressure on the Georgian troops not to enter there. In all disputable questions, the final decision will be in our hands, but you, for your part, will facilitate our task by preventing adventures.

May 11, 1920

Chicherin.

Transmitted 12/1-4 o'clock. 30 minutes.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 2/S. D. 4. L. 4. Typewritten copy.

Notes:

1 We are talking about the border between the RSFSR and Georgia, established in accordance with the peace treaty of May 7, 1920.

2The long-standing conflict between Azerbaijan and Georgia over the Zagatala district was used by the Soviet authorities of Azerbaijan and the representatives of the Caucasian Regional Committee of the RCP (b) who stood behind them as a pretext for the rapid sovietization of Georgia by force. In a telegram dated May 10, 1920, Ordzhonikidze, Kirov and Smilga assured Lenin that the Zagatala district transferred to Georgia under the May 7 agreement "is undeniably Azerbaijani and Muslim territory", reported that with the "blessing" of Moscow, Georgia launched an offensive against this district and threatened with an Azerbaijani-Georgian war (RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 2 / S. D. 1. L. 4). On May 11, 1920, Smilga gave the command of the 11th Army an order not to withdraw “units of the 11th Army that had entered the Zakatala District [...] until the border between Georgia and Azerbaijan was established [...]” (Ibid. F. 5. On. 1. D. 2436. L. 35). In an attempt to defuse tensions, the RSFSR government acted as a mediator in the Azerbaijani-Georgian-Armenian negotiations on borders and disputed territories.

No. 76

Telegram from G. K. Ordzhonikidze to L. M. Karakhan, V. I. Lenin, I. V. Stalin

May 24, 1920

Moscow - the Kremlin, Karakhan. Copy to Lenin and Stalin.

Armenia can be blown up, but as I pointed out, this will cost a very large food shortage. I do not think that the Dashnaks 1 would agree to let our troops and weapons through to Turkey. In any case, the fact that you propose to openly declare to Armenia the demand to let us through to the borders of Turkey would cause indignation among the Armenian masses. For the time being, we will occupy the Nakhichevan-Ordubat-Dzhulfa 2 region , and we will see from there. Today we received a letter from Kamil Pasha, in which he asks for help and offers an alliance 3. There is also a letter for Camila. Through our comrades, the Armenians propose, under our chairmanship, to resolve all disputes between Armenians and Turks in the region of Turkish Armenia. If an agreement is reached on this issue, Armenia will provide an opportunity for free communication with Turkey. There are no regular Turkish forces on the Armenian border, there are headquarters and armed local people around them. Once again, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the Georgians have sheltered the Musavatist government in Tiflis and they are operating from there. It is essential that Kamil openly speak out against Nuri Pasha, who is provoking here 4 . He disappeared. In an hour I am leaving for Anzeli with Raskolnikov.

24/5 20 10 hours Baku.

Ordzhonikidze.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. On. 3/S. D. 1. L. 2-6. Autograph.

Notes:

1 Dashnaks are members of the Armenian bourgeois-nationalist party "Dashnaktsutyun" ("Union"), which arose in 1890 in Tiflis. From May 1918 to November 1920 the ruling party of the Armenian Republic.

2 Disputed territories on the border between Azerbaijan and Armenia.

3 The appeal of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey to the government of the RSFSR with a request to establish diplomatic relations and military assistance was considered by the Bolshevik leadership of Russia in the context of a possible pretext for the relatively bloodless sovietization of Armenia and Georgia if the latter agree to let troops pass to the borders of Turkey. On May 23, 1920, Ordzhonikidze sent another telegram addressed to Lenin, Stalin and Chicherin, which, in particular, said: “[...] I consider any assistance to the Turks through Armenia under the Dashnak government more than doubtful. Its Sovietization is possible, but it is associated with great food difficulties [...]” (RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. On. 1. D. 2436. L. 39).

4 The commander of the Turkish troops in the Caucasus, Nuri Pasha, was one of the leaders of the anti-Soviet rebellion organized by the Musavatists in Ganja (Azerbaijan), which began on May 26, 1920. The 11th Army suppressed the rebellion.

No. 77

Telegram from L. D. Trotsky to F. F. Raskolnikov

May 26 [1920]

Komflot Raskolnikov.

I report the main policy directives in Persia 1 : “First, no military intervention under the Russian flag. No Russian expeditionary corps. An all-out emphasis on our non-interference with a direct reference to Moscow's demands to remove Russian troops and the Red Navy from Anzeli, so as not to arouse suspicion of an attempt to capture. Second, to provide all possible assistance to Kuchuk Khan and the people's liberation movement of Persia in general with instructors, volunteers, money, etc., handing over the territory we now occupy into the hands of Kuchuk Khan 2. Thirdly, if the participation of military courts is necessary for the success of the further struggle of Kuchuk Khan, leave them under the flag of the Republic of Azerbaijan and provide assistance to Kuchuk Khan on its behalf. Fourth, secretly help and leave a broad Soviet ... organization in Persia. Fifth, we need to make ruling England understand that we ... are not going to it in Persia, in general in the east and are ready to give real guarantees of our non-intervention. Notify immediately of receipt of this telegram. 26 of May. Trotsky 3 .

RTSKHIDNI. F. 17. Op. 109. D. 100. L. 5. Certified typewritten copy.

Notes:

oneApparently, this telegram was a response to a request sent by Ordzhonikidze on behalf of the party and military leadership of Transcaucasia on May 23, 1920: “[...] Give us precise instructions on what policy to follow in Persia. Ardabil is occupied by Muslim units. Without much difficulty we can blow up the entire Persian Azerbaijan south of Tabriz. My opinion: with the help of Kuchuk Khan and the Persian communists, start a struggle for Soviet power and expel the British. This will make a tremendous impression on the entire Middle East. Everything will be done from the outside as it should [...]” (RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. On. 1. D. 2436. L. 39). On May 25, 1920, the question of Persia was considered in the context of a discussion of the line of Eastern policy as a whole in the Politburo. The adopted decision, in particular, stated: “To approve in general the policy of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, intending to support the liberation movement of the peoples of the east, a) Make Comrade Raskolnikov responsible for providing the necessary assistance to Kuchuk Khan with property, instructors, etc., transfer Anzeli and other points of Persia, which are in our hands, to remove the fleet from these points , declaring that this is being done by order of the Soviet government, in view of the latter's complete unwillingness to interfere in the internal affairs of Persia. To leave in Anzeli some part of the courts under the guise of a police service, but under the Azerbaijani flag in the amount necessary for constant assistance to Kuchuk Khan [...]” (Ibid. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 83. L. 1) . transfer under the authority of the latter Anzali and other points of Persia that are in our hands, remove the fleet from these points, declaring that this is done by order of the Soviet government, in view of the latter’s complete unwillingness to interfere in the internal affairs of Persia. Leave in Anzali some of the ships under the guise of a police service, but under the Azerbaijani flag in the amount necessary for constant assistance to Kuchuk Khan [...]” (Ibid. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 83. L. 1) transfer under the authority of the latter Anzali and other points of Persia that are in our hands, remove the fleet from these points, declaring that this is done by order of the Soviet government, in view of the latter’s complete unwillingness to interfere in the internal affairs of Persia. Leave in Anzali some of the ships under the guise of a police service, but under the Azerbaijani flag in the amount necessary for constant assistance to Kuchuk Khan [...]” (Ibid. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 83. L. 1) .

2 On May 18, 1920, the combined forces of the rebels led by Kuchuk Khan and the Red Army expelled the British from Anzali, where the first Soviet Persian government was proclaimed. The new government asked the governments of the RSFSR and Soviet Azerbaijan to establish diplomatic relations and conclude a military treaty. The text of the appeal was set out in Raskolnikov's telegram to Lenin, Trotsky, Chicherin, Nemitz dated May 18, 1920 (Ibid. Op. 109. D. 100. L. 1-2).

3 The telegram was sent from Moscow, presumably to Baku, and then handed over to the commander of the Caspian flotilla, Raskolnikov and Ordzhonikidze, who left for Anzeli.

No. 78

Telegram from F. F. Raskolnikov to L. D. Trotsky, V. I. Lenin, G. V. Chicherin

June 7, 1920

Accepted: 6/VI-1920

Only tov. Lenin 1 .

Moscow tov. Trotsky, copy to Lenin, copy to Chicherin. Through Politkont, through his personal responsibility for urgent transfer to the address.

Just arrived from Rasht. On the night of June 4-5, a provisional revolutionary government of Persia 2 was formed in Rasht with the following composition: the chairman of the provisional revolutionary government and government and the military commissar - Comrade Mirza Kuchuk, the commissar of finance - Mirza Magomed Ali - Bazarl, the commissar of trade - Mirza Abul Kazum Reza Zadeh , Commissioner of Justice - Mahmud Agha, Commissioner of Posts and Telegraph - Nasrullah, Commissioner of Public Education - Khoja Magomed Jofar, Commissioner of National Economy and Agriculture - Mirza Magomed Ali Khan Khummi. All members of the provisional revolutionary government are old associates of Comrade. Mirza Kuchuk and participants of the first Persian Revolution 3. Along with the provisional revolutionary government, a revolutionary military council was formed with the following composition: Yehsakhulla ... Samkh Muzafet Zadeh. Two other members of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Persian Republic were elected our Russian comrades, the communists Kozhanov [and] Abukov. Despite the intensified requests of comrade. Mirza Kuchuk and his associates on the entry of our comrades into the Revolutionary Military Council, I stated that they would provide the fullest assistance, but they would not temporarily enter the Revolutionary Military Council. I ask for your instructions as to whether comrades Kozhanov and Abukov, for whose political preparedness I can absolutely vouch for, join the Revolutionary Military Council of the Persian Republic, or this should not be done. Perhaps you will allow them to enter the Revolutionary Military Council of Persia by completely transferring to the Persian service and formally breaking with Soviet Russia 4. The Provisional Revolutionary Government of Persia, at a meeting of which I was present, conveyed to me that at the forefront of its activities it puts the implementation of socialism on the basis of the principles of comrade. Lenin. At present, Comrade Mirza Kuchuk considers it expedient to put forward only one slogan: "Down with the British." After the occupation of Tehran, when the need to support the khans at first would be fully used, he announced the transfer of land to the people. The Provisional Revolutionary Government of Persia told me that, in view of their inexperience in public affairs, they are asking for both our constant instructions and assistance by seconding specialists to the Persian service. First of all, specialists on Soviet construction and income tax issues are needed. I ask you to inform me whether it is possible to count on sending relevant specialists and all kinds of instructors from the center, or whether it will be necessary to deploy on our own. Today, June 6, the provisional revolutionary government will openly announce its existence in a solemn manifesto to the Persian people. As soon as I receive this manifesto, I will hand it over to you. At the same time, Mirza Kuchuk draws up a secret note addressed to Comrade. Lenin. The entire population of Reshta, without distinction of class, met Mirza Kuchuk with unprecedented enthusiasm. At a rally in front of a crowd of thousands, Mirza Kuchuk announced his alliance with the Russian Bolsheviks and, as a sign of this alliance, kissed our representatives to the stormy applause of the crowd. According to your instructions, the expeditionary corps was disbanded by me. Yielding to the urgent requests of Comrade. Mirza Kuchuk, our first landing detachment of the flotilla and the cavalry battalion of military commanders entered the city of Rasht as volunteers in the Persian service and receiving maintenance and allowances from the Persian Revolutionary Government. In view of the strength of the military-political situation in Anzali, our cruisers and destroyers left Anzali for Baku.

The British hastily retreat. Rasht was abandoned by them without a fight as soon as they, through their excellent espionage, learned about the impending attack on Rasht by the troops of Mirza Kuchuk. They burned uniforms and part of the food, not being able to evacuate from Rasht. Now, according to available information, a hasty evacuation of Qazvin is underway, and the British are retreating not to Tehran, but to Baghdad. The mood of the Hindu troops 5 resolutely against the war with the Bolsheviks. To us in Anzeli and to Comrade. Mirza Kuchuk defected a total of 20 Hindus, whom we received extremely cordially and surrounded with great attention. The Indian defectors say that our first shot will be the signal for the Indians to put the British officers on bayonets. The British command took into account the unreliability of the Hindu troops and, when the Hindu troops retreated, armored cars followed. The official organ of the government in the Sukub de Oule, Iran, 6 published in Tehran, is full of articles welcoming friendship with the Soviet government of Russia. According to the same newspaper, the Persian Shah arrived in Tehran on June 3 after a long trip abroad. The chief of staff of the division of the Persian Cossacks 7 came to meCaptain Kondratiev, on behalf of the head of the division, Staroselsky, declared that the Russian command of the Persian Cossack division would obey the orders of the Russian government, and since that is the Soviet government at the present time, he came to me to introduce himself and receive further instructions. I explained the situation to him and recommended to the head of the division, remaining aloof himself, to use all his influence to ensure that the interim government had a painless, bloodless entry into Tehran. In addition, I categorically forbade the recruitment of former officers of the volunteer army for service in the division. Kondratiev with these instructions has now left for Tehran. The division of the Persian Cossacks has from eight to nine thousand Cossacks and, being the only real force, actually holds Tehran in its hands. The one and a half thousand Persian Cossacks remaining in Rasht under the command of the Russian officer Bulazell declared [about] their loyalty to Comrade Mirza Kuchuk. Less reliable was the gendarmerie, which, already during our stay in Rasht, was about to leave the city at night, but was detained. In addition to instructors and volunteer detachments, we have already placed at the disposal of comrade. Mirza Kuchuk mountain battery and communications service battalion. One of these days armored cars, airplanes, rifles and machine guns will be sent from Baku. Along with the support of Mirza Kuchuk, we are taking measures to organize cells of the Persian Communist Party Adalet8 . This business is developing poorly due to the lack of proper Persian workers. Two Persian communists, who had gone through the Baku school of class struggle, came with us to Anzali, comrades Dzhevat Zade and Agayev. But, due to their tactlessness, one had to be sent to Baku, and the other left, putting him under the supervision of Comrade Abukov. The Adalet party is not very popular, while for Comrade. Mirza Kuchuk, who also professes communist views, but is not a member of the party, is followed by the entire population. Mirza Kuchuk impressed me as a revolutionary who certainly deserves trust, and I believe that our entire bet should be placed on him 9 . 6/VI 1920. Raskolnikov.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 17. On. 109. D. 100. L. 3-4. Typewritten text.

Notes:

1 On the first page of the telegram is the stamp of the Secretariat of the Pre-revolutionary Military Council of the Republic.

2The first composition of the revolutionary government was formed in May 1920 (See note 2 to document No. 77), but, officially, its composition was named only after the liberation from the British of Rasht, the central city of Gilan, a region of Iran on the southwestern coast of the Caspian Sea . The main goal of armed assistance to the Iranian rebels was the Sovietization of the country, as can be seen from subsequent correspondence. However, speaking with an official report at a meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR on June 17, 1920, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Chicherin said: “[...] We touched the Persian masses when the remnants of Denikin's fleet were saved in Anzeli. We made a landing only to finish off these remnants of Denikin's fleet, and we have already cleared Anzali. Our troops and fleet left Persian territory and Persian waters [...]” (Documents of foreign policy of the USSR. M., 1958. V.2. pp. 658-659).

3 This refers to the Iranian national liberation revolution of 1905-1911.

4 On June 8, 1920, the Politburo decided: “The Central Committee sees no way to prevent or prohibit comrades Abukov and Kozhanov, since they renounce the citizenship of the RSFSR, go over to the citizenship of Persia” (RTSKHIDNI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 86. L. 3).

5 We are talking about the Hindu units as part of the occupying British corps.

6 This refers to the printed edition of the Shah's government.

7 Persian Cossacks are elite government units organized in Iran with the assistance of military representatives of the Russian army in tsarist times.

8 We are talking about the Iranian Social Democratic Party Adalat. In June 1920, at the congress of the Adalat party in Anzali, a decision was made to rename the party into the Iranian Communist Party (ICP). After the first congress, the party entered the Comintern.

9 The bet on Kuchuk Khan did not materialize. On June 22, 1920, Ordzhonikidze telegraphed Trotsky to his inquiry on this matter: “[...] Kuchuk Khan has no units of his own. In that part of Persia where he is, there is no broad active revolutionary movement, there is only hatred for the British. The departure of the British from Rasht was caused by our demand in Anzali. Without our help at first it is difficult to move things forward. It is in no way expedient to send Russian units there. Today we are sending Azerbaijani Muslim units [...] We are forming a Persian regiment [...]” (Ibid. F. 85. Op. 17. D. 8. L. 1-2).

No. 79

Telegram from G. V. Chicherin to G. K. Ordzhonikidze

JUNE 19, 1920

June 19, 1920 By direct wire, immediately transfer to Rostov-on-Don for immediate transfer to Baku under the personal responsibility of the politkont in Rostov.

Tov. Ordzhonikidze. Send to Baku or Vladikavkaz and hand over at the location.

The policy of peace and compromise with bourgeois Georgia, Dashnak Armenia and Turkish nationalists was dictated by the Central Committee of the party for reasons of common policy and must be pursued unswervingly. Keep comrades from actions that go against her. Our representatives - Kirov in Tiflis and Legrand in Erivan - will carry it out, counteract the frauds of the governments, and protect the communists. We should not bombard the Ossetians: on the contrary, we should keep them, protecting them from repressions. If a counter-revolutionary center has been created in the Zakatala district, this is contrary to the agreement 1. Kirov will liquidate it, but we must not send new troops there. Karabakh, Zangezur, Shusha, Nakhichevan, Julfa should not join either Armenia or Azerbaijan, but should be under the Russian occupation authorities with the creation of local councils, because any other solution would frustrate our policy of peace, required by the general provision 2 . We are counting on you. We send a representative to Baku to carry out the policy established by the Central Committee of the Party.

June 19, 1920

Chicherin.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 2/S. D. 4. L. 5. Certified typewritten copy.

Notes:

1 This refers to the Soviet-Georgian agreement of May 7, 1920.

2These are disputed territories. On May 22, 1920, in a telegram to Lenin, Stalin and Chicherin, Ordzhonikidze insisted on bringing troops into the disputed territories: “I think that the regions of Shusha, Nakhichevan, Orduban and Julfa will be occupied without resistance from the Armenians [...]” (Great October Socialist revolution and the victory of Soviet power in Armenia, p. 346). Nevertheless, the issue of disputed territories was resolved in Moscow with representatives of the Armenian government. On May 25, 1920, the Politburo decided to “continue negotiations with the government of Armenia without taking the initiative of immediate Sovietization with the help of Russian troops [...]” (RTsKhIDNI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 83. L. 1 ). Not wanting to allow a positive result for the Armenians, Ordzhonikidze in a telegram dated June 19, 1920 addressed to Chicherin wrote: “[...] Azerbaijan claims to Karabakh, Zangezur, Nakhichevan and Sharuro-Daralagez district. Soviet power was proclaimed in Karabakh and Zangezur, and the above-mentioned territories consider themselves part of the Azerbaijan Soviet Republic. Nakhichevan has been in the hands of Muslim rebels for several months now [...]” (Ibid. F. 85. Op. 13. D. 32. L. 3).

No. 80

G. V. Chicherin - Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b)

June 22, 1920

22/VI 1920.

In the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP.

The indiscipline of the Baku comrades] and the blatant contradiction between their actions and the political line established by the Central Committee make it necessary to take measures to curb them. Such a measure should be the appointment from here of an authoritative comrade, not connected with the Caucasian group of leaders, with authority from the Council of People's Commissars, as a representative in Baku. While the Central Committee decided to pursue a line of compromise with the bourgeois governments of Georgia and Armenia, to tear the ground out from under the feet of the Entente by diplomatic means and rejected the Sovietization of Armenia, considering it untimely to divert more of our forces in this direction, the Baku comrades, by their actions, disrupt compromises , reject the conclusion of an agreement with Armenia demanded by the Central Committee, promote uprisings 1, insist on the annexation to Azerbaijan of those disputed territories that it was decided to occupy with our forces and the annexation of which to Azerbaijan would make an agreement with Armenia completely impossible. All this combative policy of the Baku comrades is fundamentally contrary to the line already established by the Central Committee. The disruption of the latter can only be avoided if an authoritative representative of the center systematically restrains local comrades. The best thing would be the appointment in Baku of our representative comrade. Sokolnikov. If this is not possible, we see no other candidate than Comrade. Salkinda 2 .

At the same time, we must finally accelerate the implementation of our plans in Turkey. It is impossible to procrastinate and drag out the matter as we are dragging it out. The conjuncture will be missed, all hope for us will disappear. Comrade Eliava stayed here because of consideration of the question of Turkestan 3 . We must hasten to put an end to this matter. Tov. Eliava must immediately go to Turkey 4 . What is supposed to be sent there can be sent following 5 . The main thing is that he immediately begin his political activities there.

People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs Georgy Chicherin.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 314. L. 10. Typewritten text. Signature - autograph.

Notes:

1We are talking about the uprisings that took place in May - early June 1920. In the first days of May, uprisings organized by local communists with the support of the Caucasian Regional Committee of the RCP (b) took place in Alexandropol, Erivan, Kars, Sorokamysh, Bayazet-Kazakh and other settlements Armenia. On May 10, the Military Revolutionary Committee of Armenia, formed in Alexandropol, declared Armenia to be Soviet. However, the Armenian government managed to suppress the uprising by May 14. Many of its organizers were arrested. . On May 23, 1920, a new uprising with the creation of the Revolutionary Committee and the announcement of Soviet power was organized in the Caravanserai district of Armenia (RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 3 / S. D. 1. L. 1; The Great October Socialist Revolution and the victory of Soviet power in Armenia. pp. 350-351). On June 11, 1920, Ordzhonikidze ordered the commander of the 11th Army to provide military assistance to the Armenian rebels of the Kazakh district (Ibid., p. 365).

2 On June 22, the question "On Politics in the Caucasus" was considered by the Politburo. It was decided: “To propose to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs [c]to formulate exactly the instructions [...] to the most responsible workers in the East on the basis of the Politburo resolutions that are still available and the conclusions arising from them. To oblige the military department to submit this instruction, after the approval of the Politburo, for guidance to all responsible military workers with a warning that they undertake to strictly comply with these instructions in all their actions. Give the same instructions to all members of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee. Instruct the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to send instructions to comrades Kirov and Legrand ”(RTsKhIDNI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 90. L. 4). On the proposal of the NKID, the “Instruction to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian Front” was discussed and approved at a meeting of the Politburo on July 7, 1920 (Ibid. D. 94. L. 2). With reference to the existing treaties and agreements between the RSFSR and the republics of Transcaucasia, the instruction, in particular, stated: “[...] One should definitely refrain from attempts to provoke an uprising against the government of Georgia, Armenia and Turkey. It is necessary to explain to those elements in these republics who are striving for a revolution that, for general political reasons, in view of both the world conjuncture and our military situation, they should not at the present time proceed to the realization of their goal [...] Since our military situation does not allow the occupation of the Russian parts of Karabakh, the Zangezur district, Nakhichevan, Julfa, Sharuro and the Daralagez district, the Russian military authorities should limit themselves to occupying those areas disputed between Armenia and Azerbaijan that are now occupied by them [... ] with the elimination of interference by the troops of certain neighboring republics, as was already decided by the Russian government and transferred to the Soviet authorities in the Caucasus [...] ”(Ibid. L. 7-8). At the same meeting, the Politburo considered the proposal of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to appoint Axelrod as a representative in Baku. The adopted decision said: “Reject, in view of the decision already taken place on Comrade Sergo” (Ibid., L. 2).

3 A set of questions on Turkestan was considered by the Politburo on June 29, 1920 (RTSKHIDNI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 92. L. 4-7).

4 See note 1 to document No. 83.

5 This refers to helping the Turkish rebels with money and weapons (See Document No. 83).

No. 81

G. V. Chicherin - Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b)

June 22, 1920

22/VI 1920

IN THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP

The main question arising from the reports of the Galician communists who arrived here is whether it is possible for us to take under our protection and include Eastern Galicia within the limits of our power. After Baku, this is the most important source of oil in Europe. There, English, American and French capitals are fighting each other over the possession of oil. If we are strong enough to extend our power so far, we will dictate terms to England. If, on the contrary, we intercept over the edge, we will only achieve that England will go berserk, send Krasin, etc. This is a pure question of power. A year ago we did not go there, because Denikin was in the rear. Now the situation is different. But the decision can only be taken by an instance that surveys all our forces.

According to the Galician communists, Eastern Galicia has outlived the illusions of nationalism and is ripe for Sovietism. An uprising in the rear of the Poles would be a huge plus. But we can go to assist such an uprising and to promote the Sovietization of Galicia only if we decide in one form or another to extend the sphere of our power there.

The Galician communists assert that Eastern Galicia wishes to become part of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic and is only waiting for our call. Some skepticism is never misplaced. Perhaps an immediate action in the spirit of the annexation of Galicia would be imprudent. We cannot guarantee that we will not push some elements away. Better to go at a slower pace. It is entirely expedient to create a Galician Revolutionary Committee to carry out Soviet policy in Galicia, organize uprisings there, concentrate Galician units on the Galician front and prepare for a future merger with Ukraine. The members of the Revolutionary Committee were designated by the Galician communists. They will discuss the details of this plan with Comrade. Rakovsky. One thing that must be done now is to decide whether we can extend our scope of action so far at all .

NARKOMINDEL Georgy Chicherin

RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 314. L. 11. Typewritten text. Signature - autograph.

Notes:

1 On June 22, 1920, the Politburo considered Chicherin's note. The decision on this issue stated: “Approve the proposal of comrade. Chicherin on a cautious policy protecting the independence of Eastern Galicia” (RTSKHIDNI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 90. L. 4).

No. 82

F. E. Dzerzhinsky - V. I. Lenin

June 26, 1920

26/VI-1920

Kharkov

Dear Vladimir Ilyich!

I hasten to answer that I did not obey only the letter of the order of the Central Committee 1 , I am not at the dacha, but I am intensively treated with hydrotherapy. Doctors found only nervous fatigue, and everything else is in perfect order, including the lungs. And I am being treated diligently - wanting to work more.

The internal situation here is generally going uphill. It can be said with confidence that if the Center tirelessly pushes and sends workers, then Ukraine will soon become honest, Soviet. The villagers are tired of gangs and yearn for solid power. Every honest worker of ours sent to the provinces finds ground, and the results are already visible. Only these workers are terribly few. Local communists are some kind of noobs, they live in petty interests. I didn’t notice any rudeness, and I didn’t hear any complaints either. In the area of my specialty - there is a bountiful harvest 2. All, one might say, the average Ukrainian intelligentsia are Petliurists. A huge hindrance in the struggle [is] the absence of Chekists - Ukrainians. I have no luck with Makhno. He could be dealt with soon, having cavalry. I didn't have it. Only now I manage to put together a regiment from the squadrons that I managed to beg. I hope to put this regiment into action in a week.

I would like the Central Committee to decide how long I should stay here. My stay here increases the pace of the work of the Cheka, and it seems to me that a further stay is necessary. But from Moscow, Comrade Ksenofontov and others in the Cheka and the Main Committee of Labor complain that I have spent too much time in the Ukraine and work there is suffering from this. It's hard for me to decide. I'm thinking of staying here for another two weeks, then returning to Moscow for a week, and then coming back here. I will wait for the decision of the Central Committee *.

Hello F. Dzerzhinsky.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 2. On. 1. D. 14505. L. 1. Autograph.

Notes:

1 We are talking about prescribing Dzerzhinsky a course of treatment in connection with extreme nervous and physical overwork.

2 In April 1920, Dzerzhinsky was sent to Ukraine to lead the fight against banditry. In May-July 1920, he was head of the rear of the Southwestern Front.

3 The underlining in the last paragraph was made by Lenin. At the request of Lenin, Krestinsky sent a telephone message to Dzerzhinsky on July 4, 1920, in which, in particular, he said: “In response to your letter to Vladimir Ilyich dated 26/VІ on the question of the length of your stay in Ukraine, I inform you: We are waiting for you in Moscow for the plenum, i.e. . not later than July 15; you will probably have to stay here for two weeks (the plenum, the International, the meeting of the Komtrudov), then you can return to Ukraine ”(RTsKhIDNI. F. 2. On. 1. D. 14505. L. 2).

No. 83

G. V. Chicherin - Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b)

June 28, 1920

June 28, 1920

In the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP.

By a resolution of the Politburo, it was decided to provide assistance with weapons and gold to the government of Mustafa-Kemal in Turkey, and at the same time Comrade Eliava was appointed ambassador to Turkey .

By another resolution of the Central Committee, it was decided to provide assistance to Afghanistan with gold and military equipment 2 . With regard to Persia, it was decided to provide assistance with equipment and instructors (Kozhanov and Abukov) 3 .

All these resolutions (and others) show that our policy in the east is determined, if not by direct assistance by the armed forces against the Entente, then in any case by assistance in arms and gold.

On the basis of these resolutions of the Central Committee, we made corresponding statements and promises that must be implemented.

We have been feeding Afghanistan with promises for more than six months. To delay their implementation any longer would mean to frustrate our entire policy in Afghanistan. It is necessary to immediately send there the promised military equipment (the list was once sanctioned by the Politburo), if we do not want to lose Afghanistan and turn it from a friendly state into a hostile state.

Turkey must be given the promised assistance with weapons immediately, because delay, after the promises made, will force Mustafa Kemal to look at us as talkers and deceivers, and what is even more important, revolutionary Turkey can be crushed, while the help, insignificant, from the point of view of even our weak resources, would be of great practical and moral importance.

But despite the decisions taken by the Politburo, we cannot get weapons.

A policy that decides today and does not carry out its decisions the next day, promises help today and does not give it tomorrow, discredits us and undermines (we feel it) our enormous authority and influence in the East.

We encounter opposition in our work in the East in other ways as well.

The Eastern Department of the Academy of the General Staff trains workers for the East, we asked the War Department and the Central Committee to give us 23 people for Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, India and the Far East; after three weeks of trouble, almost all of our 23 candidates are sent to the western front, most of them knowing eastern languages and more than half of them Muslims. This is being done at a time when there are Russian general staff officers of the 1st course who have not studied oriental languages and who have not been sent to the western front. This is a peculiar form of opposition to our Eastern policy. We asked the Central Committee to put at our disposal at least those of the General Staff who know Turkish, Persian and Hindu languages. Otherwise, we will not be able to send missions to Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan 4. And this will mean, not in words, but in deeds, the failure of the Persian Republic , 5 the probable failure of the revolutionary struggle in Turkey and the abandonment of our work in India.

We note that what we are asking is an insignificant, insignificant part of what is needed for the Western Front, but this insignificant thing in the east gives unexpected enormous results, and we think that our successes in the east are in general connection with victories in the west are of some importance, for which both military equipment and a grain of our manpower 6 should be spent .

NKID Georgy Chicherin.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 314. L. 12. Typewritten text. Signature - autograph.

Notes:

1 The decision to appoint Eliava as the diplomatic and military representative of the RSFSR under the Turkish national government of Kemal was made at a meeting of the Politburo on June 8, 1920. The protocol of the Politburo meeting does not contain a decision on material and military assistance to Turkey (RCKHIDNI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 86. L. 4).

On May 22, 1920, the Politburo adopted a decision “On Afghanistan”: “a) Suggest to Comrade Karakhan in further negotiations to try to achieve a reduction in the required, b) Be sure to set a longer deadline for the delivery of the required items, c) Establish exact forms of exchange” (Ibid. D. 81. L. 2).

3 See Note 4 to Document No. 78. The decision to provide equipment and instructors to the Persian rebel movement was taken at the suggestion of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs at a meeting of the Politburo on May 25, 1920 (Ibid. D. 83. L. 1).

On June 29, 1920, the Politburo adopted a resolution on this issue, which, in particular, stated: “Provide 14 non-Russian General Staff officers who know Eastern languages at the disposal of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs [...]” (Ibid. D. 92. L . eight).

5 We are talking about the Republic of Gilan on the territory of Iran, proclaimed on June 5, 1920. In July 1920, the united national liberation front in Gilan disintegrated.

On June 29, 1920, the Politburo adopted a decision “On Turkey and Afghanistan”: “Instruct Comrade Comrade Sklyansky and Karakhan to reach an agreement tomorrow on the issue of Turkey and Afghanistan” (Ibid.).