Bolshevik Leaders correspondence

Bolshevik leadership Correspondence. 1912-1927
Collection of documents 1996.
Compiled by: A.V.Kvashonkin, L.P.Kosheleva, L.A.Rogovaya, O.V.Khlevnyuk.

No. 20

S. P. Medvedev - V. I. Lenin

September 24, 1918

Dear Comrade Lenin! one

Today from the newspapers for September 19 [November] I learn with the greatest joy that you are back in business! That the wounds inflicted on you do not threaten us with the possibility of losing you! 2 That you feel good! This last circumstance gives me the right to write you this message.

A whole month ago you sent me a letter 3 with a series of reproaches I deserved that I was badly fulfilling both my party and comradely duty by not informing you of the state of affairs here in our armed struggle front. In my justification, I can be served by the fact that, both at that time and now, I do not waste a single minute on anything that is not connected with the fulfillment of my direct duties, directly here at the place of my duties. There are so many of these duties that no matter how hard I try to seize the minutes to fulfill the duties indicated by you, I cannot do it.

Now, being overjoyed that you are with us again, I postpone my immediate duties - in order to tell at least briefly what we had and what we have.

I arrived at the Czechoslovak front in the first days of August. After a meeting and a talk with the Commissar of the 1st Army, I assumed the duties of Commissar of the Penza Division, where I immediately went. This division is advancing along the Syzran-Vyazemskaya railway [road] directly to Syzran. From the very first words of both the former Commissar of the Division and the officials of the Headquarters of the Division, I was convinced that we have crowds of armed people, and not strong military units. To overcome imperialism with the help of their mercenaries was out of the question. From this our first task flowed of itself - to do everything to turn these armed, sometimes dissolute crowds into military units. The evil that these crowds inflicted on the cause of the struggle against the Czechoslovaks and the White Guards is simply indescribable. As soon as, on their approach, they occupied any village or village, by their disorganization and dissoluteness of certain elements within them, they caused the greatest bitterness of the entire population. Every more or less independent resident and his house was regarded as a White Guard haven and was subjected to both open and secret robbery. Unauthorized seizure of horses, fodder, food, searches in houses and at the same time robbery, drunkenness - this is one side of the situation in which military operations were to be carried out. The other side of it is no less repulsive. In all these armed crowds, there was no concept of discipline, of subordination to command personnel during operations. The very same command staff turned out to be so weak, weak-willed, terrorized by a few, but worthless elements of the unit, that it was not he who commanded the units, but his units were pulled wherever they wanted. Even the most steadfast and resolute of them were sometimes going to run straight, so as not to make grief for themselves. In the presence of these two conditions, in the complete absence of supply apparatuses or, at best, their absolute helplessness and inexperience, in the presence of poor equipment with vehicles and insufficient armaments, it could be expected every minute that the whole struggle would collapse irrevocably. This fear sometimes did not pass me, too, when I observed the disposition of units in train cars. It was only necessary to arrange some kind of provocation by vile elements, and these units located in the cars would not be stopped even at a distance of 100 miles from the place of the provocation. their absolute helplessness and inexperience, with their poor transport equipment and insufficient armaments—it could be expected every minute that the whole cause of the struggle would collapse irrevocably. This fear sometimes did not pass me, too, when I observed the disposition of units in train cars. It was only necessary to arrange some kind of provocation by vile elements, and these units located in the cars would not be stopped even at a distance of 100 miles from the place of the provocation. their absolute helplessness and inexperience, with their poor transport equipment and insufficient armaments—it could be expected every minute that the whole cause of the struggle would collapse irrevocably. This fear sometimes did not pass me, too, when I observed the disposition of units in train cars. It was only necessary to arrange some kind of provocation by vile elements, and these units located in the cars would not be stopped even at a distance of 100 miles from the place of the provocation.

In such a situation, inhuman efforts were needed to achieve what we are seeing now. I will tell you - comrade. Lenin! - in order.

At the same time, and with me, a party of 40 people from our Petrograd and Moscow comrades, sent to the front, arrived. From this party, I was given the right to choose the required number of comrades as assistants. They have been chosen. Together with me they arrived in the Division. They heard a sad story about the state of the parts and gave their word that they would follow all my instructions without question in order to overcome the greatest evil that they told us about.

Immediately, all of them, including 6 people, were appointed, two people, to each unit, one as a unit commissar, the other as his deputy; I immediately tried to figure out for each of them what and how he should do in the Regiment. And everyone immediately went to their destination.

The situation that we found in the units, I have already described above *. I had to fight her. And we day after day for a month - almost without sleep, sometimes without eating - suppressed it by all means: by the word of persuasion, and by the distribution of literature, and by the threat of punishment, and by the punishment itself - up to and including execution - for robbery, for unauthorized appropriation of property residents, for soldering, selling alcohol and drunkenness. And this half of the task - to turn the armed crowds into military units - we succeeded relatively easily. As soon as we set about clearing a part of a dark, and sometimes vile element that terrorized the entire part, and, at times, pushed it to a provocation, we immediately met with a response and help from a healthy element of the parts. No matter how loose the parts were in the area of the internal structure, nevertheless, among them there turned out to be a lot of such an element, who, with full consciousness, is ready to give his life for the cause of our common struggle. It was only necessary - and not so much - to remove with all ruthlessness the vile, selfish and selfish element in order to let the healthy element show itself. In a word, we soon succeeded in this half of our task. But it is much more difficult, moreover, terribly difficult, to establish the positive side of the problem. Here we are still weak! Parts of our Red Army were formed in different places and in completely different ways. Most of them are made up of volunteers. Where they were formed, they carried out a simple security service. They were not subjected to any military training, and therefore it is too difficult to carry out military operations with them. They can make a guerrilla raid, but as soon as they fall under the military, and not under partisan fire - they reveal all their weakness and flee in panic from a pitiful handful of experienced enemy. To kill this weakness - in contact with the enemy - is directly impossible. But still, if we had in our units effective, resolute and militarily experienced command staff, we would soon be able to subordinate the unit to military order, make it a disciplined, properly equipped and armed military unit and subordinate its actions to the laws of war. Unfortunately for us, we don't have that. We have a number of honest former officers. They know what needs to be done to turn our struggle into a military struggle, but, by their nature, it is not given to them to do this. Those of them who could do it are terrorized by the militarily, and often morally unfit, element.

That is why - our dear comrade. Lenin! Until recently, we were moving very slowly forward. We did not represent military force in the face of our units that were at the front. And now we are still very weak. We do not have an experienced team leader. Our supply apparatuses are unreasonably weak. They do not know where and how to procure everything necessary to satisfy the army. And without the satisfaction of its most elementary needs—and this is all it claims to be—we will not be able to take a single step along the path of advancement—and lasting advancement—forward. In order to overcome all the innumerable obstacles that we encounter at every step, in order to bring our parts even a little closer to the desired view, one has to not know what day and night are. All day you have to deal with the impact on the part, in order to clarify and eliminate the disorder in the management of her, in her economy, then to fight against the promiscuity that has not yet been outlived in her midst, then to involuntarily interfere in the military leadership. The night will come - a new thing. In its darkness, military inexperience, and often licentiousness, threatens the whole cause of struggle with the greatest danger. If any part fails to protect itself - it will be attacked, it will abandon its position - then woe to all the rest. It is necessary to leave that place, which has just been barely mastered with enormous efforts. We must believe the guard *. If any part fails to protect itself - it will be attacked, it will abandon its position - then woe to all the rest. It is necessary to leave that place, which has just been barely mastered with enormous efforts. We must believe the guard *. If any part fails to protect itself - it will be attacked, it will abandon its position - then woe to all the rest. It is necessary to leave that place, which has just been barely mastered with enormous efforts. We must believe the guard *.

Nevertheless, no matter how difficult, no matter how hard our condition is now, it is already a hundred times better than it was before the arrival in the army of those several hundred comrades who were sent by both Peter and Moscow. All these comrades are still little experienced in organizing the army, its organs, but they are moving little by little towards the ability to build an army. With their arrival, we need skillful leadership in their distribution and work. It would be necessary to drive here from the centers, mainly those of our comrades who in the old army were members of army committees and other smaller units. From my own experience, having passed in the old army from a member of the company committee to the chairman of the army committee of the huge 600,000th army, I know that the organization and leadership of the army in the field would have moved significantly forward, because these comrades know - perhaps in imperfection, but they know how the various administration, command and supply apparatuses were built in the old army. They will be able to really help, build these devices in our Red Army. And with the creation of all these apparatuses in the Army, we will bring the triumph of our cause closer. Dear Comrade Lenin! The vast majority of the old army was with us - I remember that well. But she was with us without a clear consciousness that this was her salvation! Now it's not! In the ranks of our Red Army there are an enormous number of those who consciously march with us. This is the greatest guarantee of our confidence that we will defeat all our enemies. We need only give skillful guidance. And for some reason we can't fix that either. We still do not see in the center that for the triumph of our cause it is necessary to send to the active army not agitators in the old sense of the word, that is, a person who walks or drives to meetings and talks and talks. We need organizers, unquestioning workers who would come here not to parliament, but to unquestioningly carry out the work and duties that will be entrusted to them here. And then something absurd turns out, they are sent for agitation, and upon arrival at the place, the sent one is invited to take and fulfill the duties of the head of the economic part of the regiment or other division of the army.

Now we have no such thing that we would not have to take on, not as agitation, but as a direct implementation of it. Part of it has moved forward - we must immediately help restore the organs of local government - the local Soviets. By helping them, we help ourselves more. With their assistance, we obtain for part everything that our supply organs cannot deliver to us. With such a relationship with the local population, we receive the most active assistance from him in all our troubles, which we are so overcome by virtue of our military weakness.

Occupying a new territory, we discover on it huge landlord savings, on which the grain is already compressed, stacked in the field in the sacrum, and so it stands and rots, no one cleans up. The peasants were afraid to clean up - it would fall from the White Guards. The Soviet organizations have been destroyed, and we, the political commissars of the army, have to take on the grain harvest. For all these things, people are needed, and people do not agitate with words, they need to be asked the question not about “can he speak at the current moment”, but does he know what the military and economic system was like in the old army, does he know those new forms armies on which our Red Army is built, and does he even know the names of those items that support the army, has he taken the trouble to find out how the Soviet Government builds its Food Policy. Then things will go even better for us than they do these days. But most needed are those of our comrades who were, as I said, in the Army Committees of the old Army. With us, the streamlining of affairs in a small part overtakes the streamlining of affairs in command, control and supply in the Army Centers.

We now have a lot of strength, a lot compared to the enemies! But we have one problem. Front management does not yet manage the armies. They are not yet obeying his orders. They act each separately from the other, and this happens because they do not yet feel the forces of front management on themselves - it is still weak, it has not yet subordinated them to its influence due to weak organization. The same must be said about the Army in relation to the Divisions that make it up. But these latter are just as weak in relation to the regiments.

Without strong, well-organized organs of command, control and supply of the Army, we will be forced to fight for a very long time without the desired results. We experience it at every step. It is also true that every day we move towards organization. Now we can already conduct operations, if not with the whole Army, then all the same with 2/3 of it at once. And this is already a lot compared to what it was. And promises us even more, because it acts encouragingly on the part. Inspires more self-confidence in each part.

Now we are very busy with preparatory operations for the capture of Syzran. She's already hanging by a thread. The capture of Syzran will finally open the way for us to Samara, Ufa, Orenburg and beyond. Maybe not right away. Maybe with a retreat - in a war, after all, this is no less common than in everyday life - but we will learn to win and not today, then tomorrow, not tomorrow - the day after tomorrow, but we will win.

Dear Comrade Lenin!

From the moment you are back in the ranks, our forces have multiplied tenfold. And they will multiply to the same extent that you will recover from the wounds inflicted on you. And by the time we hear that you have finally recovered, we will be full of new strength and defeat our enemies. Please accept this desire from us and give us this new strength as soon as possible.

V. Political Commissar of the 1st Army Medvedev.

September 24, 1918

RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. On. 1. D. 3073. L. 1-17. Autograph.

Notes:

1 The letter was sent from the Eastern Front (from near Syzran) to Moscow.

2 See note 1 to document No. 19.

3 We are talking about a letter from Lenin to Medvedev dated August 21, 1918: “Comrade. Medvedev! Comrade Bosch told me about your meeting at the front, about the state of affairs at the front, and about your doubts. You were convinced that Syzran could and should be taken, but you didn't want to write here. If this is so, then you are wrong, the commissar has been put in charge of complaining. Be sure to write (and telegraph) me about everything and more often. You never even a single line. Not good. Non-partisan and non-fulfillment of your state duty! Hey, it's not good. Accept! Your Lenin ”(Lenin V.I. PSS. T. 50. S. 163-164).