Bolshevik Leaders correspondence

Bolshevik leadership Correspondence. 1912-1927
Collection of documents 1996.
Compiled by: A.V.Kvashonkin, L.P.Kosheleva, L.A.Rogovaya, O.V.Khlevnyuk.

No. 23

Telegram from I. V. Stalin, S. K. Minin, K. E. Voroshilov to Ya. M. Sverdlov, Central Committee of the RCP(b)

October 5, 1918

5.X. 1918

MOSCOW, KREMLIN, CIK SVERDLOV.

Copy of the Central Committee of Party 1

The conversation with Trotsky2 was very short, deliberately offensive, logically incomprehensible, the conversation was interrupted by Trotsky, after which Sytin and Mekhonoshin began to transmit a secret order without a cipher and only after a protest did they transmit the rest in cipher. Unconditionally recognizing the necessity of centralization and subordination, we now, after what Trotsky said and after all the confusion in orders, are completely perplexed, because, even if we wish, any kind of subordination becomes impossible and impracticable on our part, and therefore all questions have to be postponed until Stalin's arrival in Moscow. Meanwhile, the delay in supplies is having a disastrous effect on the front. Telegram 657 received, report regularly sent once a day. Now it will be twice. Today Stalin leaves 3 .

Stalin, Minin, Voroshilov.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 5414. L. 2-4. Handwritten text on a telegraph form.

Notes:

1 The telegram was sent from Tsaritsyn to Moscow.

2On October 4, 1918, Trotsky from Tambov telegraphed Lenin to Moscow: “[...] I categorically insist on the recall of Stalin. On the Tsaritsyn front, things are not going well, despite the excess of forces. Voroshilov can command a regiment, but not an army of fifty thousand soldiers, nevertheless I will leave him in command of the tenth Tsaritsyn army on the condition of submission to the commander of the South Sytin. To this day, the Tsaritsyntsy do not even send operational reports to Kozlov, I ordered them to submit operational and intelligence reports twice a day, if tomorrow this is not done, I will put Voroshilov and Minin on trial and announce this in the order for the army. Since Stalin and Minin remain in Tsaritsyn, they, according to the constitution of the Revolutionary Military Council, enjoy only the rights of members of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 10th Army. We cannot recognize their collegial command, and responsibility for all operational actions is assigned directly to Voroshilov personally. There is a short time left for the offensive until the autumn thaw, when there is no road for either a pedestrian or a rider. Without coordination with Tsaritsyn, serious action is not possible, there is no time for diplomatic negotiations, Tsaritsyn must either submit or leave. We have successes [in] all the armies, except for the South, especially the Tsaritsyn, where we have a colossal superiority of forces, but complete anarchy at the top. This can be dealt with in 24 hours, subject to your firm and determined support; in any case, this is the only way that I see for myself [...]” (RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. On. 1. D. 2433. L. 33; The Trotsky papers. London-Paris, 1964. Vol. 1. P. 134-136). On October 5, 1918, Trotsky sent a telegram to Sverdlov, which he received from Kozlov from Vatsetis: “Stalin’s combat order number one hundred and eighteen must be suspended by execution. I have given all instructions to the Commander of the Southern Front, Sytin. Stalin's actions destroy all my plans [...]” (Ibid. R. 140). Obviously, after this telegram, Trotsky had a direct wire conversation with Stalin, Minin and Voroshilov, which is discussed in this telegram.

3 By decision of the Central Committee of the RCP(b), on October 5, 1918, Stalin left for Moscow.

No. 24

Telegram from K. E. Voroshilov to I. V. Stalin and L. D. Trotsky

October 7, 1918

ARZAMAS, MILITARY REVIEW COUNCIL OF THE REPUBLIC.

MOSCOW, KREMLIN, CEC TO STALIN.

KOZLOV, PRE-WAR ADVISORY TO TROTSKY1

On September 17, the Military Revolutionary Council of the Republic appointed me a member of the Military Revolutionary Council of the Southern Front and Assistant Commander of the Southern Front. So far, I have not received a cancellation of my appointment from the Military Revolutionary Council of the Republic. At the same time, telegrams signed by the Pre-War Revolutionary Council of the Republic of Trotsky, received in recent days, indicate the creation of the Military Revolutionary Council of the Southern Front in a new composition and in which I am called the commander of the tenth army. Considering only the resolutions of the Military Revolutionary Council of the Republic to be lawful for myself, I ask for clarification whether I, along with comrades Stalin and Minin, have been removed from the post of members of the Military Revolutionary Council of the Southern Front. Before receiving instructions from the Military Revolutionary Council of the Republic, I do not consider myself entitled to carry out the sole orders of Trotsky. I consider it my duty to declare that the endless confusion of orders canceling one another, in recent days have had a detrimental effect on the situation at the front, which is already yielding deplorable results. If such phenomena are not urgently eliminated and the equipment does not work out, I relieve myself of responsibility for the consequences.2 .

VOROSHILOV

October 7th 1918.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. On. 5. D. 56. L. 1. Certified typewritten copy.

Notes:

1 The telegram was sent from Tsaritsyn to three addresses: 1) to Arzamas, where the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic was located (to Deputy Trotsky - Sklyansky); 2) to Moscow - to Stalin; 3) to the headquarters of the Southern Front in Kozlov, where Trotsky arrived.

2On October 6, 1918, Stalin telegraphed Voroshilov from Moscow: “The Congress of Soviets opens in five minutes. I am going there, by the way, in order to discuss your note with the Central Committee. Receive an answer as soon as possible, then the opportunity is today. Stalin "(K. E. Voroshilov on the Tsaritsyn Front. G. 83). It is quite probable that between Stalin and Voroshilov there was an agreement that the latter would send an official telegram addressed to Stalin and Trotsky. Stalin knew the contents of the telegram in advance. Most likely, it was a copy of the note referred to in Stalin's telegram dated October 6, 1918. The Central Committee did not support Stalin's position, decided to replenish the RVS of the Southern Front with Mekhonoshin, Legrand and Okulov and transferred its base from Tsaritsyn to Kozlov. Sverdlov went to Kozlov to settle the conflict. Apparently, Voroshilov on October 7, 1918 did not yet know about Trotsky's telegram to Lenin dated October 4, 1918 (See note 2 to document No. 23) and was not familiar with the decision of the Central Committee. Subsequently, Voroshilov had to obey. (Litvin A. L., Polikarpov V. D., Spirin L. M. Civil war. Breaking old dogmas and stereotypes // Historians argue. M., 1989. P. 63). An important role in understanding the further development of the conflict, as well as Sverdlov’s position and role in its settlement, is played by the set of correspondence for the second half of December 1918 between Sverdlov, Lenin and Trotsky (The Trotsky papers. Vol. 1. P. 158-164) . 63). An important role in understanding the further development of the conflict, as well as Sverdlov’s position and role in its settlement, is played by the set of correspondence for the second half of December 1918 between Sverdlov, Lenin and Trotsky (The Trotsky papers. Vol. 1. P. 158-164) . 63). An important role in understanding the further development of the conflict, as well as the position and role in the settlement of Sverdlov, is played by the complex of correspondence for the second half of December 1918 between Sverdlov, Lenin and Trotsky (The Trotsky papers. Vol. 1. P. 158-164) .

No. 25

Telegram to L. D. Trotsky to I. T. Smilga, M. M. Lashevich

October 8 [1918]

From Kozlov.

Permian. To members of the Revolutionary Military Council Smilga and Lashevich.

I propose that you immediately tell us what, in your opinion, are the main reasons for the complete failure of the actions of the third army 1 . The experience of other armies shows that there is no success when commanders and commissars are bad. I propose once a week to telegraph a general overview of the internal state of the army, commanders, commissars. It is clear that radical reforms are needed with respect to the third army. 8/10.

Pre-revolutionary military council Trotsky

RTSKHIDNI. F. 17. On. 109. D. 7. L. 2. Typewritten text.

Notes:

1 . In early October 1918, in the sector of the 3rd Army (Eastern Front), the Soviet units suffered a series of defeats and were forced to go on the defensive. In the report of the Commander-in-Chief Vatsetis to Lenin, Sverdlov and the Revolutionary Military Council of October 7, 1918, it was reported that on the Eastern Front the main enemy forces were directed from Yekaterinburg to Perm, exactly where the 3rd Army was located. (Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Republic I. I. Vatsetis. Collection of documents. Riga, 1978. P. 100, 103).

No. 26

Telegram from M. M. Lashevich to L. D. Trotsky

9 [October] 1918

KOZLOV, PRE-REVIEW VOENSOV TO TROTSKY1

Accepted 1918 9 hours 30 minutes

From the Headquarters of the 3rd army [s] Filed on the 9th 20 hours [hours] 40 m [minutes]

There are many reasons for failures on our front. It would be possible to cover the reasons comprehensively only with a personal report. I do not consider it possible to speak about many reasons by telegraph. I consider the main reason for the failures to be the excessive extension of the front - in the north of Cherdyn, in the south of Sarapul. The absence of a railway line parallel to the front, depriving us of the opportunity to fend off blows and conduct a maneuver war by means of a transfer. Further, the complete absence of reserves, local formations are too close to their families and, therefore, are not combat-ready, they rather serve the whites, since the majority of those mobilized from the kulaks. They asked to exchange mobilized other provinces, but in vain. Continuous fighting for three months disabled the best proletarians of the Urals. The internal work of the headquarters, in my deep conviction, is better than in other armies, and it is not here that one should look for the causes of failures. Most of the commissars of the division are at their best, I will name a few names, and they will tell you a lot: Zalutsky, Zof, Bakaev. Cultural, educational and party work has been established, the command staff of a significant part is quite talented. I agree that failures are often caused by bad command and commissars. Then Comrade. Trotsky, it is necessary for us to draw the appropriate conclusions. Smilga is at the front, upon arrival he will inform you of his judgment additionally. The only radical reform would be a change, even for two weeks, of the exhausted units. By reforming and putting them in order, we would have a fully combat-ready and heroic army. Cultural, educational and party work has been established, the command staff of a significant part is quite talented. I agree that failures are often caused by bad command and commissars. Then Comrade. Trotsky, it is necessary for us to draw the appropriate conclusions. Smilga is at the front, upon arrival he will inform you of his judgment additionally. The only radical reform would be a change, even for two weeks, of the exhausted units. By reforming and putting them in order, we would have a fully combat-ready and heroic army. Cultural, educational and party work has been established, the command staff of a significant part is quite talented. I agree that failures are often caused by bad command and commissars. Then Comrade. Trotsky, it is necessary for us to draw the appropriate conclusions. Smilga is at the front, upon arrival he will inform you of his judgment additionally. The only radical reform would be a change, even for two weeks, of the exhausted units. By reforming and putting them in order, we would have a fully combat-ready and heroic army. The only radical reform would be a change, even for two weeks, of the exhausted units. By reforming and putting them in order, we would have a fully combat-ready and heroic army. The only radical reform would be a change, even for two weeks, of the exhausted units. By reforming and putting them in order, we would have a fully combat-ready and heroic army.

Member of the Military Council LASHEVICH.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 17. On. 109. D. 7. L. 8-9. Handwritten text on a telegraph form.

Notes:

1 Telegram sent from Perm to Kozlov.

No. 27

Telegram of L. D. Trotsky to the Perm provincial military commissar, Revolutionary Military Council of the 3rd Army

18 [October 1918]

Send to both addresses: Perm [sky] Gubvoenkom,

copy of the Perm[sky] Revolutionary Military Council 3rd 1 .

About two weeks ago, several officers defected from the Perm division. I demanded the compilation of service records indicating the whereabouts of their families for the immediate arrest of such 2 . Didn't receive any response. In the same way, he demanded a message - whether the commissars of the division and regiments were shot, who allowed the betrayal of the officers. Didn't receive an answer. I demand immediate clarification on all points. 18th.

Prewar Council Trotsky.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 17. On. 109. D. 7. L. 7. Typewritten text.

Notes:

1 Telegram sent from Kozlov to Perm.

2 We are talking about the transition to the side of the White troops of the officers during the offensive of the White armies in the Perm direction. On October 13, 1918, in a telegram from Kozlov to Dzerzhinsky, Sklyansky, Lenin, Sverdlov, Trotsky proposed to unload prisons from arrested officers against whom there are no serious charges, provided that they agree to serve in the Red Army “[...] Simultaneously,” wrote Trotsky, - find out their marital status and warn that, in the event of their treason and transfer to the enemy camp, their families will be arrested, and take away from them the appropriate subscription [...] ”(The Trotsky papers. Vol. 1. P. 148) .

No. 28

I. T. Smilga, M. M. Lashevich - Central Committee of the RCP(b)

October 14, 1918

TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY 1 .

Dear comrades.

We ask the Central Committee of our Party to familiarize ourselves with the telegrams received by us from Comrade Trotsky and our report .

We completely brush aside all personal motives, although we do not hide the fact that the telegrams of the Chairman of the Military [military] Council of the Republic [republic] were an extremely unpleasant surprise for us. For the benefit of the cause, we consider it necessary to make the following statement to the Central Committee:

It is quite obvious to us that the center does not have a correct picture of the struggle in the Urals. From our report it is clear that the talk about the Urals, as about a bottomless barrel, aimlessly absorbing a mass of troops, is nothing but the chatter of ignorant people. All reserves intended for us were redirected to the Volga Front.

Before the arrival of fresh troops, successful active operations cannot be demanded of us. None of our regiments has yet been in reserve. There are parts that have not left their positions for five months. It is clear that they are mortally tired and incapable of attacking.

Now about commissioners. We categorically protest against Comrade Trotsky's extremely frivolous attitude towards such things as execution. He, having learned that several officers had defected in some regiment, demands the execution of the commissars of the regiment and division. According to the exact meaning of the telegram, we were supposed to shoot, among others, Bakaev and Zalutsky. We didn't do this, of course. Why only these commissars need to be shot. We do not have a single division in which there would be no cases of treason. It would be necessary to shoot down half of the Revolutionary Military Council, for Bogoslovsky, who had once been appointed commander of the third army, fled, did not take command. The result of such telegrams is only to undermine the authority of Comrade Trotsky and the commissars.

We have repeatedly pointed out that in the event of forced mobilization we must renounce the creation of territorial troops. Mobilized peasants will not fight in their province, in their district. It is clear. And this mistake of military policy cannot be corrected by any terror.

In conclusion, we cannot but tell the Central Committee that, in our opinion, only the Central Committee, and not individual members, can give an assessment of our work, although they are formally our "direct superiors" 3 .

MEMBERS OF THE CC I. Smilga. M. Lashevich.

October 14, 1918.

With this, we enclose a report and two telegrams.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 17. Op. 109. D. 7. L. 3. Typewritten text. Signatures - autographs.

Notes:

1 The letter was sent from Perm to Moscow.

2Trotsky's telegrams in question are Documents Nos. 25, 27. The mentioned report of Smilga and Lashevich was sent to Trotsky on October 14, 1918. Its full text: “In response to your telegrams Nos. 399 and 598, we have the honor to state the following. You ask us about the reasons for the "complete failure" of the third army. What are the failures? During the operation near Kazan and Simbirsk, we were given a specific task - to chain the enemy, which we, as it were, successfully completed. Commander Berzin received a telegram from the Commander-in-Chief, from which it is clear that, along with the “glorious name of Tukhachevsky”, there should also be the glorious name of Berzin, etc. in the same spirit. Now the third army is preparing for the last task - the attack on Yekaterinburg and Chelyabinsk. This task has been entrusted to us and the second army and will be carried out, as soon as the division promised by the Commander-in-Chief arrives. If, in general, the pace of our offensive operations seems too slow to the MILITARY-REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL OF THE REPUBLIC, then let me draw your attention to the following circumstances: I) There was a time at the beginning of operations when the front of the 3rd Army stretched from Ishim to Krasnoufimsk, that is, at a distance of 920 versts. Our forces did not exceed 6-7 thousand people. It is clear that the army at that time could not withstand the blow of the enemy, for he appeared quite unexpectedly. Now our front is moving from Nadezhdinsk to Bik-Bardinsky. It has been greatly reduced, but even now it is longer than the fronts of the Second, Fifth and Fourth Armies taken together. II) In addition, we should not forget that we have to fight in an area inhabited by the kulaks, who are set, at best, not against us, but not for us either. The only source of fighters is the workers of the northern Urals. The twenty-thousandth army was created exclusively on its own. Replenishment from the center does not have to be taken into account. During the last two years we received about 4,000-5,000 bayonets from Petrograd. But almost the same number of fighters, on the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, we gave to the second army for action against Izhevsk. We also consider it necessary to add to this that there was not a single day when our report would mark a lull at the front. Our losses average from 300-500 people per day killed, wounded and sick. There were battles when up to 2000 people were out of order. You have to fight all the time with regular Czech troops. Now on the question of commanders and commissars. It will be best when we call their names. They must be known to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic.

5 [th] division - DAMBERG - an ally of Blucher. 3[th] division - EIDEMAH - a prominent worker of Siberia, former commander of the Siberian army. Consolidated division - OVCHINNIKOV - St. George Knight of all degrees, has gratitude from you for the deeds against the Germans. Of these, BLUCHER is a soldier, the rest are former officers. Commissars of divisions and brigades: BAKAEV, ZALUTSKY, ZOF, BELA-KUN, MRACHKOVSKY, LATSIS. It has not become a habit for us to write much about the exploits of our fighters, but if this were required, then we are sure that we would not have to blush for the leaders of the 3rd Army. If the chairman of the REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE REPUBLIC is convinced of the opposite, then we ask him to consider only us as bad commissars, and at any moment we are ready to clear the place for the best. Conclusions: Reinforcements are needed for successful active operations. One division of reliable troops is enough to force the two points entrusted to us. It is necessary to immediately replace the mobilized Permians with other units. Territorial troops proved their unsuitability for forced mobilization.

According to the second telegram, we are to shoot, apart from the others, BAKAGO and ZALUTSKY. We cannot do this, because we do not consider them guilty. We ask you to put us on trial for non-compliance with the combat order. October 14, 1918 Members of the Revolutionary Military Council III: I. Smilga, Lashevich (RTsKhIDNI. F. 17. Op. 109. D. 7. LL. 5-6).

3 At the end of December 1918, this episode will be used against Trotsky by a member of the Central Executive Committee Kamensky, who, in his article in Pravda on December 25, 1918, condemned the practice of using former officers in the army and accused the chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic of wanting to shoot seven of them for escaping the best communists of the front, including Zalutsky and Bakaev. According to the author of the article, only the resilience of Smilga saved the lives of the latter. In his letter to the Central Committee of the RCP (b) dated December 25, 1918, Trotsky had to justify himself and set out in detail the essence of the conflict (The Trotsky papers. Vol. 1. P. 204-208). After Trotsky's telegram (document No. 30), on October 25, 1918, the Central Committee decided to take into account the statement of Smilga and Lashevich and not make any specific decisions (Izvestiya of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 6. P. 164).

No. 29

V. A. Antonov-Ovseenko - V. I. Lenin

October 17, 1918

To Comrade V. I. LENIN Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.

In view of our supposed decisive offensive on the Don 1 , I consider it necessary to try again to raise the issue of assisting in the formation of the Cossack Soviet power 2 .

The attached report of the presidium of the Cossack marching circle contains a number of provisions, in my opinion, indisputable 3 .

It is undeniable that the Cossack counter-revolution can be broken only with the assistance of the so-called labor Cossacks. This assistance is currently not available in an active form. He is no more, thanks, among other things, to the irreconcilable policy of the Tsaritsyn comrades . These comrades make no secret of the fact that in order to consolidate Soviet power on the Don, they consider it necessary, now and decisively, to carry out the decossackization of the Cossacks. Such an attitude repels the Cossack masses from them, as representatives of the Soviet government, and unites the ranks of the Krasnov regiments.

Stalin told me that for 40,000 Red Army soldiers in Tsaritsyn we barely have 1.1/2 thousand Cossacks, but that many Cossacks are very reluctant to fight against us; these last, vacillating elements of the Cossacks, could be with us if our policy is appropriate.

This policy should take into account the peculiarities of Cossack life and, above all, strive to explode Krasnov from within, by creating a center within the Cossacks capable of crystallizing around itself the fermenting proletarianizing layers of the Cossacks.

In the Caucasus, for example, in Ossetia, we are pursuing just such a flexible policy, taking into account local peculiarities, and it is producing the desired results .

The convocation of a congress of the "labor Cossacks" could be a moment intensifying the disintegration of the Cossacks, and that would already be to our advantage. An impetus could come from it to formalize that spontaneous ferment that is currently raising the Cossack ranks, but we are not using it at all.

I propose to authorize one or another group of local workers on the Don to put into practice this idea of a congress of "labor Cossacks."

This congress will allocate a temporary executive body of the Cossack will, which, with the support of our troops, should organize Soviet power on the Don.

The class struggle on the Don, no matter how obscured by various remnants of a specific way of life, nevertheless develops rapidly, and the idea that, until these remnants are eradicated, we have to accept the Cossacks as a solid mass is completely unfounded.

We can have reliable allies among the Cossacks.

We had them - long live the bright memory of Comrade. Podtelkove - and they are. Let's reach out to them, help them get organized.

October 17, 1918

Devoted to you Antonov.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. On. 1. D. 3094. L. 5-6. Typewritten text. The signature is an autograph.

Notes:

1 As a result of the offensive in late September - early October 1918, the Don Army managed to reach the suburbs of Tsaritsyn by October 15, 1918. We are talking about the upcoming operation to clear the Tsaritsyno suburbs from the white troops. By the combined efforts of the 10th, 8th, 9th armies and the 1st Steel Division Zhloba, by October 25, 1918, the white formations were again driven back beyond the Don.

2 The Don Soviet Republic within the RSFSR was proclaimed on the territory of the Region of the Don Army by a decree of the regional Military Revolutionary Committee of March 23, 1918. Podtelkov, elected by the 1st Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Cossacks' Deputies, became the chairman of the government of the republic. In September 1918, due to the loss of most of the territory, the republic was liquidated by a decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. Podtelkov during the Cossack mobilization in the northern districts of the Don was captured by the White Cossacks and hanged on May 11. The Soviet lay on the Don was restored after the defeat of Denikin in March 1920.

3 Report missing.

4 First of all, we are talking about Stalin, whose position in relation to the Cossacks as a whole was extremely negative (see note 3 to document No. 9).

5 We are talking about the Terek Cossack army. In January (Mozdok) and March (Pyatigorsk, Vladikavkaz) 1918, the 1st and 2nd Congresses of the peoples of the Terek were held in the Terek region. The 2nd Congress proclaimed the Terek Soviet Republic as part of the RSFSR and recognized the authority of the SNK. Despite the difficult political and military situation, part of the Terek Cossacks constantly supported the Soviets.

No. 30

Telegram of L. D. Trotsky to M. M. Lashevich, I. T. Smilga, V. I. Lenin, Ya. M. Sverdlov

October 23 [1918]

PERM, TO THE MEMBERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL] LASHEVICH, SMILGA.

MOSCOW, PRESOVNARCOMOM TO LENIN,

FOREWORD TO SVERDLOV 1 .

You could only transfer my words about bad commissioners to yourself out of coquetry 2. Everyone knows, and you yourself know, that we cannot have better commissars than Lashevich [and] Smilga. Ultimately, the commissars attached to regiments and, in general, small units are of decisive importance. The Commander-in-Chief found that you had too many retreats. I consider it necessary to establish a regime at the front under which regimental commissars and others consider themselves not entitled to retreat under any circumstances. The same regime must be created for command personnel. You decidedly did not report anything before my telegram about the reasons for the extremely passive tactics of the third army. On the question of the betrayal of officers, I explain: Commissars are put in the first place with us to monitor the command staff. If the commander defected, the commissar is to blame, and in a combat situation he is responsible for this with his head. It's BAKAEV or anyone else, I don't care he must know his command staff and follow him. If there are extenuating circumstances, they should be reported. Meanwhile, the escape from the Perm division of several officers passed without a trace, as if this were in the order of things. 23/X.

TROTSKY, PRE-REVIEW MILITARY COUNCIL.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 17. On. 109. D. 7. L. 11. Typewritten copy.

Notes:

1 The telegram was sent from Kozlov to two addresses - to Perm and Moscow.

2 See note 2 to document No. 28.