Bolshevik Leaders correspondence

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 Bolshevik leadership Correspondence. 1912-1927
Collection of documents 1996.

Compiled by: A.V.Kvashonkin, L.P.Kosheleva, L.A.Rogovaya, O.V.Khlevnyuk.
 

No. 7

V. A. Antonov-Ovseenko - V. I. Lenin

December 19, 1917

After reading, it is best to destroy. Off the record, absolutely secret.

There is a copy.

G. Lenin (personally) 1

To the Council of People's Commissars.
 

Upon my arrival in Moscow on December 8, the situation became clear as follows: the Moscow District sent only one detachment of 300 men against Kaledin, could give up to 30,000 people, mainly from the northern regions, the southern garrisons were demoralized by vacations, dismissals and ukrainization. There is a lot of artillery in Moscow, but its material part is almost in a hopeless state. I left Moscow armed with the best promises. On December 9th, Commander Muralov promised to immediately start forming detachments and send them to Voronezh, Kupyansk and Kharkov. On the way to Kursk, they found the revolutionary government still in the process of husking. One of our detachments, having lingered there, put things in order, seized 8 guns, which, with the blessing of the “Revolutionary Council” there, the Ukrainians were going to take out, and, having occupied the station, I gave him permission to seize the armored cars of the English mission, which for some reason got here, and gave him the authority to guard the station. According to information from Moscow, there was supposed to be a “convalescent team” (1000 people) in Kursk, to which Muralov sent 1000 rifles. This team turned out to be completely useless. In Belgorod, representatives of the Revolutionary Headquarters promised to send up to 3,000 people from the Polish revolutionary regiment, numbering from 8-10 thousand (Muralov sent rifles, machine guns and cartridges from Moscow to arm this regiment). In Kharkov, it turned out that the local garrison could provide no more than 650 people for military operations against Kaledin (500 from the 30th regiment and 150 from the 252nd), all the rest: automobile spare workshops 3 armored cars, 300 people - the protection of the city, the units do not actually exist (there are 50 people left of the squad - disbanded), the sapper regiment was sawn up, the reserve artillery battalion turned out to be without people and with spoiled guns. The 28th regiment was Ukrainianized, turned into [o] the 2nd Ukrainian regiment (3000 soldiers, 40 machine guns, 427 officers) and the Chigirinsky regiment was introduced (of the same number). Contrary to Moscow's story, the regiments stand behind the Central Ukrainian Rada, but are indecisive. "Volkazachestvo" - up to 300 people of the White Guard, vehicles of the 19th armored division - "neutral", before our arrival were captured by the Sievers detachment (4-5 good armored cars and 6-7 damaged ones). The Red Guard (we were told in Moscow that it had 10,000 men) actually numbered 3,500, of which 1,500 were mobilized, no more. Our forces in the Sievers detachment are 1300 infantry, 200 cavalry, 6 guns, and Khovrin’s detachment was a armored train (2 guns), 300 people, completely demoralized by “requisitions”. All our forces: 1,500 Kharkov Red Guards, 1,800 people in detachments, up to 30 machine guns, 6 guns, an armored train and up to 6 armored cars. The local Soviet is a coalition swamp, the Revolutionary Committee is useless, at the headquarters of the Red Guard there is the exaggerated vanity of the tops and the chief, the fighting spirit in the rest. The local Bolsheviks are sour. Artem raises sourness to a principle. Around - in Balakleya there are up to 10,000 ukrainized regiments, in Chuguev - a whole cadet school. In Kupyansk - a regiment (two) of Gaidamaks, in Lozova, Pavlograd - Gaidamaks, Alexandrovsk, Yekaterinoslav - in the hands of the Rada (in the latter it is unstable; in Aleksandrovsk - the destruction of the Soviet). In Oboyan there is a fluctuating heavy (6) division; in Sumy - a division (6 guns) of twelve inches without shells, 3500 rifles were sent from Moscow to their team. The team turned out to be almost Ukrainianized. With the silence of the local Bolsheviks, we were looked upon as ushkuin-robbers. Looking around, he immediately sent Muravyov to Moscow to form detachments and took all measures to stop unauthorized requisitions, etc. The absence of power in Kharkov forced the townsfolk to bring their complaints to us - court and reprisal were going on in the detachments and shook them completely. The food base was completely unsettled. There was no headquarters at all. I had to disperse those who were brought with me where for this whole organization. But the situation called for immediate action. The 2nd Ukrainian regiment was proposed by the Sievers detachment to be democratized - part of the officers fled, some were arrested, leadership has been chosen. We received information about the movement of the Rada troops to Poltava, the armored train and the march of military echelons to Kharkov. The plan was as follows: a defensive position from Poltava; the capture of the junction stations Lozovaya, Sipelnikovo (connection with Yekaterinoslav) - which ensures that hostile trains are not transported from the east and the way to the Donets Basin (from Lozovaya, bypassing the unreliable route through Balakleya). Capture of Kupyansk by movement from Kharkov and Belgorod (Polish regiment); an immediate start to arm the workers of the pool (at the Headquarters, I created a communications bureau with the Donetsk basin, Donetsk region, etc.). After the concentration of some forces in the Donets basin - the displacement of the Cossack gangs, prowling 100 miles south of Nikitovka, and movement in several ways to the east against Kaledin simultaneously with an offensive to the east - a head attack from Voronezh (Kaledin's main forces are located along the Voronezh-Rostov railway), from the west of Tsaritsyn (our 5th Caucasian Cossack division was reported to Minin and sent there) and from the south, from the Caucasus (reported to Stavropol by telegram in a roundabout way to the Military Revolutionary Committee, from Voronezh the Chairman of the Military Revolutionary Committee Moiseev promised to send it to Stavropol). He ordered to occupy Lyubotin, the junction, the most important station near Kharkov. A train of Ukrainians and a train of Cossacks were disarmed here, and many Ukrainian officers with weapons were captured. At the same time, the forces of the Kharkovites - (30 regiments and 500 Red Guards) with an armored train - occupied Lozovaya, through which the Cossack trains passed; the path had to be restored; the station is occupied almost without a fight. But the next day, the Gaidamaks pushed back our troops with an unexpected pressure (the 30th regiment fled) and recaptured the station, the Red Guards from this detachment sent a delegation with an "ultimatum", demanding uniforms and reinforcements. The delegation left, ashamed of their ultimatum; after that, the Red Guard went on the offensive and almost occupied Lozovaya. By this time, the Oryol battery (4 guns) had approached and turned out to be dead, the horses fell to their feet, the commander was sick, people were grumbling. A detachment from Tver approached - 500 people. On the 17th, the Polish regiment laid down its arms (8,000), the regiment commander, who called for resistance, was killed. The Chuguev School was disarmed by the evening of the 16th (after four shots from cannons and the persuasion of the city delegation), but the "Tverians", under the pretext of indignation at the requisitions, arbitrarily left Chuguev and disrupted the planned movement to Kupyansk, from where the Haidamaks fled when they heard that the "Bolsheviks" were coming. On the 18th, the "Tver" were disarmed and sent to Tver, except for a machine-gun team and 200 people who declared their full readiness to go into battle. Chuguev had horse patrols (apparently, from Balakley) and, due to the weakness of his detachment (an artillery platoon had been sent to the Sievers detachment even earlier), Khovrin returned to Kharkov. Sievers with a detachment reached Balakley by the evening of the 18th, where the Ukrainian regiment surrendered and is now being disarmed. Reinforcements are now being sent to Lozovaya for further movement to Slavyansk (with the Red Guards of Nikitovka and other places they were demolished, it was there until 2000) and to Sinelnikov (the people of Yekaterinoslav and Aleksandrovsk were sent to the Military Revolutionary Headquarters and to the Federation of Anarchists instructions on how to speak, instructors were sent to Yekaterinoslav). Sinelnikovo should [be] busy with our joint movement. Through Lozova sent 10,000 rifles and 6 machine guns to the workers. Approximately the same goes with the Sievers detachment. We still have the same number in reserve and five times more weapons are on the way. By evening, a movement will begin on Kupyansk (he communicated with Voronezh, ordering the Military Revolutionary Committee to send a detachment to Kupyansk as well), some units from Moscow should also move there. Sievers has to make his way with difficulty - the haidamaks spoil the paths; at Zmiev, two echelons of Sivers were tempted by vodka and got drunk, shelling them did not work either (the warehouse was soon blown up by us), 300 people with the appropriate attestation were sent back, only 10 were retained. Khovrin's detachment finally collapsed (the Baltic sailors, having made good, became useless anywhere). The 19th Rifle and 27th Vilna Regiments were sent to us from headquarters. In Bryansk, Vilensky had to be disarmed - he became so hooligan, the 19th in Orel is under an ultimatum from ours about the extradition of officers provocateurs (these regiments are from the vaunted northern front). The Moscow District gives no more than 12,000 instead of the planned 30,000, instead of 7 regiments, a rabble came from the front, and they will work for 10 days to organize it. Today I expect Petrograd (5,000 Red Guards were promised) and artillery from Moscow. In general, I have in Kharkov (by 2 pm on the 19th) 2000 infantry, 2 batteries of 4 guns (another one from Orel arrived, another asks to return, but I did not let it go). 750 infantry in Belgorod, 750 infantry in Balakleya, 200 cavalrymen and 6 gunners, 250 men in Lubatin, 1300 men in Lozova, armored train, 3 guns (now occupied us Pavlograd, the Gaidamaks surrendered, the echelon of Cossacks, which was making its way to the Don, was disarmed). In Voronezh, up to 4000 people, 2 batteries of 6 guns, 80 machine guns. Outside the Moscow District, there are another 2,500 people, 2 batteries and 20 airplanes that are stuck somewhere, a armored train is being completed in Bryansk.

Just a new important message - Slavyansk is busy with us. Communication with Nikitovka (with the Red Guard) has been established. Weapons are distributed. New flows. We are operating in a hostile environment and boldly say that if the northern front had fulfilled its obligation - had given at least 4 combat regiments (two regiments of Letts were needed) and Peter the promised 5,000, then in two weeks - no more - Kaledin would have been finished. Comrade will write about the situation in Ukraine. Sergey Bakinsky 2. The second courier will bring an addition and my appeal to the mine workers. I did not receive any money from you and took it from the emergency fund, and it is already running out. Now I have only 30,000. Food and uniforms are quite established. Drive out people who want to fight, our comrades who are devoted to the cause, send money. With 5,000 more men, we could easily take Poltava and Rostov. It is absolutely necessary to take Poltava, but there is no strength. We sit so boldly that if I did not know the moral situation of the enemies, I would put a bullet in my forehead, as a criminal for too bold actions. Muraviev proved himself beyond all praise in Moscow; there, before his arrival, the organization of the troops had not even begun. In three days, he organized and moved up to 4000 people, one battery and left in the formation period three light, two heavy batteries, a sapper company and several thousand are being formed (Odysseus began to work especially vigorously). It is necessary to put full pressure on the Moscow District.

Stop for Pozern, Muralov and the Red Guard in St. Petersburg.

Only to a narrow circle.

Destroy this letter or personally keep it secret - not a single line in print.

December 19, 1917, mountains. Kharkov. Antonov.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. On. 1. D. 3094. L. 1-3. Typewritten text. The signature is an autograph.

Notes:

1. On November 7, 1917, the Central Rada declared the formation of the Ukrainian People's Republic and, having finally formed the government, began the disarmament of the Soviet and Red Guard units located on Ukrainian territory. With this, the Rada provoked a sharply negative reaction from the Soviet government of Russia. Not without the influence of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b), the Ukrainian organization of the Bolsheviks was renamed the RSDLP (b) of Ukraine. On December 4 (17), the Council of People's Commissars of Russia sent an ultimatum to the government of the Ukrainian Rada, in which, having recognized the Ukrainian Republic de jure, it demanded assistance to the Soviet troops in suppressing the formations of General Kaledin on the Don. In response, the Rada turned to France for help. The Bolsheviks of Ukraine, having moved to Kharkov, formed there on December 11 (24) the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Ukraine and announced that they would assume full power in Ukraine. On December 16, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars of Russia recognized the new government as a "genuine government" and announced that it would be given all kinds of support. On December 5, 1917, by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars, Antonov-Ovseenko was sent to organize the fight against the Ukrainian Rada (Directives of the main commands of the Red Army (1917 - 1920). Collection of documents. M., 1969. P. 14). Since that time, the concentration of troops assigned to his disposal began. Due to the looseness of discipline and the collapse of the fronts, far from everything was possible to assemble the units, which Antonov-Ovseenko writes to Lenin about (Antonov-Ovseenko V. A. Notes on the Civil War. M. L., 1924. T. 1. S. 77 ).

2 . Kirov.

 

No. 8

V. A. Antonov-Ovseenko - Council of People's Commissars

December 25, 1917

December 25, 1917 1

On the 19th afternoon, as I told you in my first letter, I had 2,000 infantry in Kharkov, 2 batteries of 4 guns. Belgorod was occupied - 750 people, Balakleya (900 people, 6 guns), Lyubotin - 250 people, Lozovaya - 1300 people, armored train, 3 guns, Pavlograd, Slavyansk. In Voronezh, Petrov - 4,000 men, 2 batteries, 80 machine guns. On the 19th, 250 men were sent from Lozovaya and [with] an armored train, with the assistance of part of the infantry, the haidamaks in Sinelnikovo were defeated, the station was occupied. Sablin's detachment (from the Moscow regiments) was moved to Kupyansk, Moscow trains (250 people) from Belgorod went to join him, where the disbandment of the changed Polish regiment ended (despite the protests of all sorts of delegations and Muralov, commander of the Moscow District). Kupyansk was occupied without a fight - the Haidamaks fled or surrendered, but a split occurred in Sablin's joy - drunkenness and robberies, a military court, 200 people arbitrarily left back to Moscow; at first it seemed that 1,000 would leave. From Kupyansk, Sablin was moved to Radakovo - (he has 1,500 infantry and the Oryol battery - 4 guns). At the same time, the 423rd Regiment (from Finland), which arrived, will be sent to reinforce Sievers, who disarmed the Ukrainized regiment in Balakliya and Izyum. With these forces (up to 2,000 infantry, 400 horsemen, 40 machine guns, 6 guns), Sievers entered Nikitovka as commander of all local forces (up to 2,000 of the surrounding Red Guard). The arming of the workers went even more successfully. Up to now, up to 25,000 rifles, 20-30 machine guns have been distributed through workers' organizations (it is not known exactly how many were captured by Sievers). Sablin, busy with pacifying the rebellion at home, was late, and still has not taken Radakovo and has not entered into contact with Sievers.

The Voronezh detachment (commander - former Colonel Petrov), following our instructions, violated the truce concluded with the Cossacks, occupied Chertkovo and is preparing to put pressure on Millerovo as soon as Sablin is in Radakovo. At the first news of the approach of our troops, the workers of Yuzovo entered into a partisan struggle against the Cossacks, but, having no artillery, they could not push them back, and the actions were temporarily suspended. The Sievers detachment was forced, in violation of the general plan, to immediately, before the final grouping, go to support the workers from Nikitovka 2. According to information that had just arrived, Sablin occupied Radakovo and reached out to Debaltsev, where he got in touch with Sievers, whose detachment occupied Yasinovataya and was fighting the Cossacks from Mushketovo. Two echelons of Cossacks were disarmed in Gorlovka. In Kitovka, two wagons of pyroxylin were seized. Now I will send reinforcements to Sievers (the second Oryol battery, 4 guns), which we managed to remake morally and materially, and the Bryansk "proletarian detachment", of which 350 people now have 190 left; the rest fled or are sick - the holidays are bad. Little has been done in the direction of Yekaterinoslav. The Bolsheviks there are just as junk as the Kharkov ones, holding back the rush of workers (in Bryansk - up to 7,000 armed workers against the Haidamaks (a total of 1,000 people)).

I agreed with a delegation from Ekaterinoslav (two Bryants and three St. Petersburg food commissars) to prepare an attack in Yekaterinoslav, and the participation of an armored train from our side is also necessary. But our armored with the holidays spread, requested artillerymen from the local division, they hid behind the Military Revolutionary Committee, in which the Compromisers dominate. Apparently, this counter-revolutionary committee will have to be arrested. Even the local regional officer reprimanded the Bolsheviks from the Military Revolutionary Committee for their attitude towards the work I was leading. New forces are coming in extremely slowly, and now I have only up to 500 Moscow Red Guards left at hand - everything else is put into action. I demanded English armored cars from Kursk here, politely indicating to the British that, after the need and danger for them at the hands of the counter-revolution, they would be returned. Ten of them are already here, but without machine guns. We will immediately equip them and put them into circulation. In Lozovaya, ours captured four Cossack guns (there are no gunners). Now 1,000 light machine guns ordered by me from near Gomel, up to 200 other machine guns, up to 20,000 rifles have arrived, and this will go to the mines. In Sevastopol, the formation of a new detachment began. There is not enough strength to go straight to visit Kaledin. Tsaritsyn cannot act - he is weak. Tikhoretskaya and the Caucasus is silent. For some reason, the 2nd Guards Corps was delayed in Zhmerinka. At headquarters, in Mogilev, everything is inert, and I can’t adjust them now. I work in unity with the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Ukraine (but there is deathly due to a lack of strength), through my guys today I officially began the formation of the first regiment of the “Red Cossacks” (Sharov and Nikitnichenko work). The other day I'm moving with headquarters to Nikitovka - it's difficult to direct operations from here. But you need to make connections. The sabotage of the postal[ovo-]telegraph[egraf] major employees is great. I will declare the district under martial law if I receive your approval. I can not establish the necessary relations with local organizations. The Regional Committee and the Kharkov Bolshevik [Committee] demanded that I act in the political sphere only with their knowledge and consent. I rejected the latter.  The Military Revolutionary Committee demanded that I not dispose of the troops and the Red Guard without his consent - I agreed only to a notification3. About the order of requisitions I had an agreement with them - they go through them. But they refused to produce the essentials for us. Workers from a number of Kharkov factories turned to me, not receiving salaries for 6 weeks. I asked the VRC what he intends to do for them. Asked for an answer within 24 hours (because it was December 22 [April]). There was no answer. Then I "convened" a conference of the most prominent capitalists, sending the Red Guards after them. The meeting stuttered. I invited the guests to sit in my 2nd class car until the required million rubles were issued to the workers. There is no million. The capitalists are sitting, and I will take them to the mines. The Duma protested. WRC too. The "Bolsheviks" grumble, reproaching me for the coalition with the Anarchist-Syndicalists, while they themselves coalesce with the Cadets. And the workers of five factories and the Central Council and the Republic of Kazakhstan expressed their greetings to the Central Soviet Power, suggested not to let the capitalists out. One million rubles collected 4 .

RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. On. 1. D. 2446. L. 7-8. Typewritten text.

Notes:

1 . In the upper right corner there is a note by Antonov-Ovseenko: “The second report of comrade. Antonov to the Council of People's Commissars.

2 . Above is inscribed: "Yuzovka".

3 . The relations of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks with the military representatives of Soviet Russia and the latter among themselves were rather tense. In addition to Antonov-Ovseenko, on December 19, 1917, the Council of People's Commissars appointed Ordzhonikidze as temporary extraordinary commissar of Ukraine (Directives of the command of the fronts of the Red Army (1917 - 1922). Collection of documents in 4 volumes. Vol. I (November 1917 - March 1919) .), M.^ 1971, p. 30). On December 30, 1917, Lenin telegraphed Antonov-Ovseenko: “The Council of People’s Commissars expresses confidence that Comrade Antonov will continue to act, as before, in full contact with the central Ukrainian Soviet government, which the Council of People’s Commissars welcomed and with the Extraordinary Commissar appointed by the Council of People’s Commissars” (Lenin V.I. PSS. T. 50. S. 22-23).

4 . In a reply telegram to Antonov-Ovseenko dated December 29, 1917, Lenin wrote: “[...] I wholeheartedly welcome your energetic activity and merciless struggle against the Kaledinites. I fully approve of the intransigence towards the local Compromisers, who seem to have confused some of the Bolsheviks. I especially approve of the arrest of millionaire saboteurs in the first and second class cars. I advise you to send them to forced labor in the mines [...] ”(Lenin V.I. PSS. T. 50. S. 21-22).