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Lavrenty Beria Case
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Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU. July 1953. Verbatim report. July 2-7, 1953.
STENOGRAPHIC REPORT*
No. P420 1 2-7 July 1953
Workers of the world, unite!
TOP SECRET
Making copies is prohibited.
Subject to return
to the Chancellery of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU
SESSION ONE
July 2
Chairman Comrade Khrushchev: On behalf of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, I declare the Plenum open.
The following agenda is recommended:
1. On the criminal anti-party and anti-state actions of Beria. (Speaker: Comrade Malenkov G. M.)
2. On the convening of the next Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.
(Speaker: Comrade K. E. Voroshilov)
3. Organizational issues.
(Speaker: Comrade Khrushchev N.S.)
Will there be any comments on the agenda of the Plenum?
Voices. No.
Khrushchev: No one raises any other questions?
Voices. No.
Khrushchev: Vote or consider adopted?
Votes. Consider accepted.
Comrade Khrushchev presiding. Comrade Malenkov has the floor to make a report.
Malenkov 2 . Comrades! About 4 months have passed since the death of Comrade Stalin 3 .
You remember, comrades, how our enemies all over the world were inspired by the death of our great leader and teacher. They were counting on disunity in our ranks. The entire hostile world was counting on a struggle within the leadership of our Central Committee. The enemies were counting on the confusion of the party ranks, the lack of unity and a split at the top of the party leadership.
From here followed the main task that faced the party and our Central Committee in connection with the death of Comrade Stalin.
* Document title. — Comp.
The task was to prevent confusion in the ranks of our party, in the working class, in the country, in connection with the death of Comrade Stalin, in connection with this enormous loss for the party and the country. We were obliged to close our ranks, act energetically and decisively, ensure unity, and amicably lead the country forward along the path determined by the genius of humanity, Lenin, and his great successor, Stalin.
Our Leninist-Stalinist Central Committee solved this task successfully. The Central Committee acted energetically and appeared before our country and the whole world as a single, united, monolithic collective, worthy of the brilliant founder of our party - Lenin and his great successor - Stalin.
We upset the enemy's calculations, did not allow any hesitation, no panic, no semblance of panic. The Central Committee confidently led the country forward along the Lenin-Stalin path. The enemies were forced to recognize our strength and unity and abandon their calculations on the weakening of the Soviet Union after the death of Comrade Stalin.
Over the past 3-4 months, the party and government have done a great deal of positive work both in the area of foreign policy and in the area of the country's internal life ; a great deal of work has been done to unite the party and the people around the tasks of building communism and strengthening the economic and defensive might of our Motherland, and to boldly and proactively launch the struggle to preserve and strengthen peace.
But, comrades, the Presidium of the Central Committee is obliged to report to the Plenum of the Central Committee that soon after the death of Comrade Stalin, we, members of the Presidium, began to become convinced that Beria had dishonestly and, as it became increasingly clear later, for criminal purposes, begun to take advantage of our desire for unity, for friendly work in the leadership collective.
First of all, Beria began to use his position cleverly and skillfully as Minister of Internal Affairs and developed active activities in the criminal direction of placing the Ministry of Internal Affairs above the party and the government.
The Presidium of the Central Committee has many facts on this matter.
Several days ago, Comrade Strokach, the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Lviv region, reported the following to the Central Committee of the CPSU .
"In April of this year, the Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine , Meshik, gave me, as the head of the regional Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Lviv region, the order to collect and report to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR information on the national composition of the leading cadres of party bodies, starting from the party organizations of collective farms, enterprises and up to and including the regional party committee. At the same time, Meshik proposed reporting on the shortcomings in the work of party bodies on collective farms, at enterprises, in educational institutions, among the intelligentsia and among the youth.
a The words “After the death of I. V. Stalin by the Central Committee of the Party” have been removed. Here and further in G. Malenkov’s report, the footnotes on each page contain text that was deleted from the first version of the report during the process of preparing the verbatim report for printing and distribution to party organizations. — Comp.
ь Here and further in G. Malenkov’s report, the words that were included in the first version of the report during the preparation of the verbatim report are highlighted in bold. — Comp.
Considering such instructions incorrect, since the organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs should not and do not have the right to check the work of party organs, I personally called Meshik on the high frequency and checked whether he had really given such an instruction. Meshik confirmed that it was his instruction and demanded that the execution be expedited. Thinking that Meshik had given such an instruction by mistake or inexperience, I tried to convince him that collecting such information about the work of party organs through the organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was unacceptable. Meshik lashed out at me with curses and said with great irritation: “You should not be entrusted with our secret Chekist assignments at all, you will go to the regional committee right now and report them to the secretary, but know that this is Comrade Beria’s assignment and we cannot delay its execution, please do the work to complete it today.” I did not believe Meshik that this assignment came from Comrade Beria, since I believe that Comrade Beria, as a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, can at any time receive such information from the Central Committee of the CPSU or the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine.
Guided by my party duty, I reported to the secretary of the regional party committee, Comrade Serdyuk, about such an obviously incorrect instruction that I had received from Comrade Meshik.
That same evening, Comrade Beria called me in Lvov and said the following verbatim: "What are you doing there? You don't understand anything. Why did you go to the regional party committee and tell Serdyuk about the assignment you had received? Instead of helping, you are tripping up Comrade Meshik. We will expel you from the organs, arrest you and rot you in the camps. We will grind you into dust, we will turn you into camp dust. And then Comrade Beria, in a state of great irritation, repeated the following several times: "Did you understand this or not? Got it, got it? So take this into account." Comrade Beria did not listen to my attempts to explain this issue and hung up.
On June 12 of this year, the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs removed me from the position of head of the UMVD and recalled me to Moscow. When I asked to leave me to work in Ukraine, I was categorically refused.
Comrade Meshik, knowing about Comrade Beria's conversation with me, reminded me twice: "Well, did Comrade Beria get you in trouble? You'll be smarter in the future." Then Comrade Meshik mockingly told me literally the following: "And Comrade Melnikov, the Secretary of the Central Committee, is a bad Chekist. He immediately gave you away as a Central Committee spy, called me and said directly that Strokach reported to the Secretary of the Regional Committee Serdyuk that I, Meshik, was collecting information about the party organs. Is that how you can expose your agents?"
It is characteristic to note that the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, Comrade Milshtein, is also having the same conversations. For example, in March of this year he told me and Comrade Ivashutin, the former Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, that now everything will be different, the party organs will not interfere in the work of the Cheka organs as they did before. The heads of the regional UMVD should and will be independent of the secretary of the regional party committee.
Lieutenant General Kobulov A. Z. (brother of Deputy Minister Comrade Kobulov B. Z.) also told me: "You did not take into account that Comrade Beria came to the leadership of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and that now the organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs will not be as dependent on the party organs as they were before. You cannot imagine what rights Comrade Beria enjoys. He is decisively breaking all the old orders not only in our country, but also in democratic countries."
As it has now become known, Beria gave exactly the same orders to other republics - Lithuania, Estonia, Belarus, etc.
You remember, comrades, that quite recently, in December 1952, the Central Committee of the CPSU gave a directive to party organizations regarding the MGB organs 5 . This directive, developed under Comrade Stalin, stated:
"Consider the most important and urgent task of the party, the leading party bodies, and party organizations to exercise control over the work of the bodies of the Ministry of State Security. It is necessary to decisively put an end to the lack of control in the activities of the bodies of the Ministry of State Security and place their work at the center and locally under the systematic and constant control of the party, its leading party bodies, and party organizations."
Is it not clear that Beria criminally violated the said directive and went against the Central Committee?
I must also tell the Plenum of the Central Committee about such criminal actions of Beria as using the security of the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee to control them.
Now we know that Beria immediately learned about every movement of the Presidium members through security.
It is also known that telephone conversations with members of the Presidium of the Central Committee were eavesdropped on and reported to Beria. We have documentary evidence on this matter.
There is no need to prove that such actions of Beria are hostile towards the party. It is clear that Beria criminally planned to place the Ministry of Internal Affairs above the party, planned to place the Central Committee and the Government under the control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Comrades! It is quite obvious that in light of a what we have learned b about Beria, we have begun to look at his activities d in a new way, with different eyes .
It is known that he has become increasingly active in recent times. Beria's plans and goals have now become quite clear to us, and therefore it is our duty to critically approach his activities and proposals.
Here are the facts that the Plenum of the Central Committee should know.
a total
I already said
with must
d especially in the last period, after the death of Comrade Stalin.
Last week, on the eve of the day when we decided to consider Beria's case in the Presidium of the Central Committee 6 , he came to me with a proposal to take steps through the Ministry of Internal Affairs to normalize relations with Yugoslavia 7 . I told him that this issue should be discussed in the Central Committee. What kind of proposal was this? The materials now confiscated from Beria contain the following document:
“I take this opportunity to convey to you, Comrade Rankovich, a big greeting from Comrade Beria, who remembers you well.
Comrade Beria has instructed me to inform you personally, in strict confidence, that he and his friends 8 stand for the need for a radical revision and improvement of relations between the two countries.
In this connection, Comrade Beria asked you to personally inform Comrade Tito about this, and if you and Comrade Tito share this point of view, then it would be advisable to organize a confidential meeting of persons especially authorized to do so. The meeting could be held in Moscow, but if for some reason you consider this unacceptable, then also in Belgrade.
Comrade Beria expressed confidence that no one except you and Comrade Tito will know about this conversation.”
Beria did not have time to implement this measure due to the fact that we turned events in relation to him personally in a different direction.
Or another fact. The German question was discussed in the government 9 . The talk was about the serious troubles in the GDR. We all came to the conclusion that as a result of the wrong policy, many mistakes were made in the GDR, there was great discontent among the German population, which was especially clearly expressed in the fact that the population from East Germany began to flee to West Germany. Over the last period, about 2 years, about 500 thousand people fled to West Germany 10 .
We explained to our German friends, and they fully agreed with this, that it is impossible in modern international conditions to pursue a course towards the accelerated construction of socialism in the GDR.
Why did we come to this conclusion and believe that we should not pursue a course of accelerated construction of socialism in the GDR at the present time?
An analysis of the internal political and economic situation in the GDR, the facts of the mass flight of the population of East Germany to West Germany (about 500 thousand have already fled!) clearly show that we are facing the danger of an internal catastrophe. We were obliged to soberly look the truth in the eye and admit that without the presence of Soviet troops the existing regime in the GDR is unstable. The political and economic situation in the GDR is currently extremely unfavorable.
We believed that the most urgent task was for our German friends to quickly and decisively implement measures to improve the political and economic situation in the GDR. The events in the GDR on 11 showed the correctness of these measures. We were even late in implementing them, which the enemy, as you know, took advantage of.
Consequently, we believed and continue to believe, together with our German friends, that it is necessary to correct the course towards the accelerated construction of socialism.
It must be said that when discussing the German question, Beria did not propose to correct the course toward the accelerated construction of socialism, but to abandon any course toward socialism in the GDR and to hold a course toward bourgeois Germany. In light of everything we have now learned about Beria, we must re-evaluate this point of view of his. It is clear that this fact characterizes him as a bourgeois degenerate.
Then, comrades, a fact connected with the question of mass amnesty 12 . We considered and considered that this amnesty measure is absolutely correct. But, having now revealed Beria's true face, we come to the conclusion that he approached this measure from his own position, he had his own plans on this account. The facts have shown that he carried out this measure with harmful haste and seized contingents that should not have been released, for example, there was no need to release repeat offenders at all. (Voices. Correct!) After the events with Beria, we corrected this and will continue to correct it, but Beria's behavior around the amnesty issue is undoubtedly suspicious. We must learn a lesson for ourselves in this regard as well.
Furthermore, comrades, it is known that Beria was in charge of a special committee dealing with atomic matters 13 . We are obliged to report to the Plenum that here too he isolated himself and began to act, ignoring the Central Committee and the government in the most important questions of the work of the special committee. Thus, without the knowledge of the Central Committee and the government, he made the decision to organize the explosion of a hydrogen bomb 14 . Needless to say about the significance of this fact. When the leading workers of the special committee (here they are comrades Vannikov, Zavenyagin) gave him a draft resolution for submission to the government, he, Beria, crossed out this document and single-handedly made the decision, hiding it from the Central Committee and the government.
We are obliged to report to the Plenum of the Central Committee that even during Comrade Stalin's lifetime one could sometimes observe how he, Beria, skillfully and dexterously sowed the seeds of mistrust in relation to many leading comrades. (Voices: Correct!)
In this regard, unfortunately, it must be acknowledged that in the history of our country there have been more than one attempt by enemies who have infiltrated the organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to undermine the leadership of the party by slandering honest people who are selflessly devoted to the party, prominent party figures, and by composing slanderous “materials.”
I am obliged to say, and this is our unanimous opinion, that in the speech of I. V. Stalin at the Plenum of the Central Committee after the 19th Party Congress, 15 under the influence of slanderous libels from enemy elements in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, an incorrect, erroneous characterization was given of Comrade V. M. Molotov, whom the Party and the country have known for decades as a loyal and devoted fighter for communism, as the most prominent figure in the Party and the Soviet state. (Stormy applause.)
We also consider the comments made at the same Plenum against Comrade Mikoyan, accusing him of dishonesty before the Party, to be incorrect.
After the death of Comrade Stalin, Beria went wild and launched, with permission to say it, "activities" aimed at disuniting the leadership team, at suppressing the principles of collectivity in work , acting in such a way that the leading comrades worked with an eye on each other. We have many facts on this account.
a It follows straight
ь to organize disunity among the management team, suppressing the principles of collectivity in work.
It goes without saying that where a monolithic, united leadership team based on principles is needed, there is no place for adventurers trying to sow discord and bring discord among the members of the leadership team (Voices. Correct!)
I will not dwell on Beria's moral character. Although this must be said. The Plenum must know that in Beria we have a criminally degenerate person. I emphasize, criminally degenerate.
One might ask: why did the Presidium of the Central Committee not take action against Beria earlier, indulge him, give in to him, accept his incorrect proposals, and allow such an incorrect action as sending out some of his notes along with the decisions of the Central Committee, for example the note on Ukraine, on Lithuania 16 ?
The following must be said on this account.
Three, about four months have passed since the death of Comrade Stalin. It was necessary to unravel and see Beria in all his glory. Everyone had to see him as a violator, a subversive of the unity of our Central Committee. It was necessary to unite in order to unanimously, I emphasize - completely unanimously, resolve the issue of Beria.
When we in the Presidium of the Central Committee were all convinced of who we were dealing with, we convened a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee and in Beria's presence brought charges against him. He had behaved dishonestly. He could not deny the facts, but he began to cowardly and vilely hide the ends, declaring that he would improve.
The Presidium of the Central Committee unanimously recognized the need to act quickly and decisively, considering that we are dealing with an adventurer who has great opportunities in his hands, in order to put an end once and for all to the ulcer and rot poisoning the healthy atmosphere of the united and monolithic Leninist-Stalinist collective. (Stormy applause.)
The Presidium decided to remove Beria from his posts and expel him from the party.
The Presidium came to the conclusion that it was impossible to stop halfway with such an adventurer, and decided to arrest Beria as an enemy of the party and the people. (Voices. That's right!) (Loud applause.)
Having exposed and expelled such a degenerate as Beria turned out to be, our Central Committee will be even more united and monolithic.
In taking these drastic measures , the Presidium of the Central Committee was guided by the conviction that in this case these measures were the only correct ones; the Presidium of the Central Committee was guided by the conviction that Lenin would have acted this way, that Stalin would have acted this way. (Loud applause.)
We are confident that our actions will be unanimously approved by the Plenum of the Central Committee. (Loud applause.) As for the individual mistakes and irregularities we made during the period when we spent 3-4 months after Comrade Stalin's death exposing Beria, we will amicably correct these mistakes and irregularities.
a Without
ь large
I would say it is good that it took only 3 months (Shouts. That is right!) to see the real face of the adventurer, and, despite his position and considerable possibilities, to cut off this reptile completely unanimously, this diseased growth on a healthy body. (Applause).
Comrades! Will it be right if we reduce the whole matter to Beria’s personality?
Of course not!
We are obliged to understand how all this could have happened and to draw the necessary conclusions and lessons for the party. What are these conclusions and lessons?
1. The first conclusion and lesson concerns the task of strengthening the leading role of our party, increasing party leadership at all levels of our state work.
It is no coincidence that the enemies of the party, having infiltrated leadership positions and cleverly disguising themselves in their hostile work, first of all strike at and begin to undermine our leading party bodies, weakening their leadership activities.
But is everything all right with us, comrades, in the matter of observing the norms and Bolshevik principles of leadership developed by the great Lenin? No, not everything. Moreover, over many years we have accumulated significant abnormalities. I will refer, for example, to the fact that for years we have not convened a Plenum of the Central Committee, and in recent years the Politburo has ceased to function normally as the highest party organ in the period between plenary sessions of the Central Committee. I am not even talking about the fact that our 19th Party Congress convened 13 years after the 18th Congress 17 .
What kind of collectivity in leadership, what kind of criticism and self-criticism can we talk about, how can we ensure the leading role of the party and correctly implement party leadership with such abnormalities in the organization of the work of the Central Committee and its leading bodies?
This must be resolutely corrected. It is necessary to immediately establish regular work of the Plenum of the Central Committee, the Presidium of the Central Committee, the Secretariat of the Central Committee and ensure methods of collective leadership in the work of these bodies, and in fact instill methods of criticism and self-criticism in the work of these bodies.
It is necessary to check the work of any leader, to check whether any of us ensures the proper party spirit, Leninist-Stalinist principles.
Isn't it a fact that in the Beria case, during the fifteen years of his tenure at the top of the party leadership, all of us, both those who were older, starting with Comrade Stalin, and those who were younger, should have shown more vigilance and not allowed this adventurer to get so carried away that a direct threat to the unity of our party appeared.
It is necessary to decisively put an end to the lack of control in the work of anyone. Every member of the Central Committee, no matter what post he occupies, must be under the appropriate party control. The activity of any of the leaders must proceed under the guidance of the Central Committee of the party.
and should
b correct
with a gap of
d firmly
It is necessary to understand that only the Central Committee is capable and must ensure discipline in the work of party and state figures. Whoever undermines the authority of the Central Committee, tramples on the Bolshevik principles and traditions of our party, is our worst enemy, and such people must be mercilessly expelled from the party. No post, no past merits should serve as an obstacle to cleansing the party of presumptuous nobles who are trying to escape from the control of the party.
2. Another conclusion and lesson concerns the gross violation of party norms in the relations between the party and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Is it not a fact that over the course of many years the Ministry of Internal Affairs has acquired too much influence and has actually gone beyond the control of the party. In fact, for a number of years now the party has lost effective control over the organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
All this gave the opportunity to various adventurers, enemies of the party, who had infiltrated the Ministry of Internal Affairs, to try to use the apparatus of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in order to rise above the party, to subordinate the state apparatus, to rise above the government.
The urgent task of the party is to make it impossible for the party's enemies to use the apparatus of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. And for this, it is necessary to subordinate the Ministry of Internal Affairs in fact to the Central Committee of the CPSU, the government of the USSR.
The task is to ensure that the spearhead of our organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs is truly turned against our class enemies, against our external enemies and their agents, spies, saboteurs, and wreckers.
It is necessary to decisively put an end to the lack of control in the activities of the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and place their work at the center and in the localities under the systematic and constant control of the party, its leading bodies, and party organizations.
It is not a right, but rather the most important duty of the governing bodies to exercise the strictest control over the work of the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
3. Next, we must speak about the task of increasing revolutionary vigilance in our ranks in every possible way. We often admit in words, but in practice we forget that since our party is the only party in the country and since it is the ruling party , the enemies, cleverly disguising themselves, have tried and will try to penetrate the ranks of the party. We must not forget that the class struggle continues, that the capitalist encirclement is trying and will try more than once to use any opportunity, to use people infected with the remnants of capitalism, including nationalist remnants, to weaken the Communist Party and the Soviet state. We must not forget either that the agents of our class enemies know how to cleverly disguise themselves and adapt, sometimes over many years. It is therefore necessary to evaluate workers not only from the point of view of their business qualities, but also necessarily from the point of view of their political honesty, their devotion to the party and the Soviet people, their ability to merge their will with the will and desires of the party, their ability to submit to the will of the party collective.
and in our country there is only one single ruling party and that is why
ь to consider
It must be frankly acknowledged that in our party there is still a businesslike approach to workers, which makes it difficult to expose people who are essentially alien to the party, who do not care about the party’s cause.
4. The next conclusion and lesson from the case under consideration is that we must significantly and comprehensively strengthen our party educational work. Our theoretical, ideological, and propaganda work of the party is far from up to par; there is still too much dogmatism and formalism in it. The task of propaganda educational work is not at all to ensure that communists learn well-known formulas, quotations, and dates by heart, but to ensure that they grasp with all their souls, minds, and hearts the essence of the great revolutionary teaching of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin, and grasp its colossal transformative power.
The main task of all our propaganda work is to cultivate a consciousness of the historical invincibility of our great cause, based on the knowledge of the objective laws of the development of society and on such a powerful factor as the revolutionary energy, organization, and unity of the Communist Party, the leading and transforming force of Soviet society and the world revolutionary movement.
The main task of our propaganda is to educate communists in the spirit of selfless devotion to the party, devotion to the cause of the working class, the Soviet people, the cause of communism, to educate communists as active, conscious fighters for the cause of the party.
5. Finally, we must also draw the most important conclusion that the highest principle of our leadership - collectivity, cohesion and monolithicity - must be strictly observed. Now, more than ever, we must understand that only the collective intelligence of the Party, the collective wisdom and political experience of the Central Committee can ensure correct leadership of the Party and the country in the current complex international situation, and ensure the successful construction of communism.
The invincible strength of our party lies in the cohesion and collective nature of its leadership, in the unshakable unity of its ranks. No one is allowed to undermine or violate this unity.
Comrades! The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, created 50 years ago by the great Lenin, will cast aside all attempts to shake the unity of the Party and to belittle the role of the Party as the leading force of Soviet society building communism.
Our mighty party, under the leadership of the genius of humanity, Lenin, under the leadership of his faithful student and comrade-in-arms, Stalin, forged and tempered numerous cadres of capable workers devoted to the great cause of communism.
Our Central Committee is made up of the best people in the Party, with valuable experience in all areas of building communism.
Our Central Committee has a leadership core that was forged over decades by Lenin and Stalin, tempered in battles with enemies, united and monolithic. (Loud applause.)
No enemies of the party will succeed in sowing discord in the leadership of our Communist Party! No renegades will succeed in breaking the will of our heroic party to build communism. Casting aside from its path the bourgeois degenerates and adventurers like Beria, our party, in close unity with the people, will confidently and firmly continue to solve its great world-historical tasks. (Stormy, prolonged applause.)
Chairman, Comrade Khrushchev. Comrades, there is a proposal to take a 20-minute break so that comrades can think, and then we will begin discussing Comrade Malenkov's report. Comrades who wish to speak are requested to sign up. Are there any other proposals?
A 20-minute break is announced.
Chairman Comrade Bulganin. Let us continue, comrades. Comrade Khrushchev has the floor.
Khrushchev. Comrade Malenkov reported in detail to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party on how the members of the Presidium organized their work after the death of Comrade Stalin , how they valued the preservation of unity in the leadership of the Party, so as not to give rise to a split or the slightest hesitation. We strove to maintain complete unity in our ranks , so that this unity would be transmitted through the Presidium of the Central Committee to the entire Central Committee, to the entire Party , in order to ensure the further cohesion and monolithicity of our great Party. This desire for unity was cleverly used by the adventurer Beria.
We have known Beria for many years. I have known him for about twenty years from the Central Committee plenary sessions, and communicated with him directly at work. I would like to express my opinion, my views on this person. Even before we began to come to a definite opinion about Beria 's behavior, before we took the path of decisive action, even during Comrade Stalin's life, we saw that Beria was a great intriguer. He was a cunning man, a clever careerist. He dug his dirty paws very firmly into Comrade Stalin's soul , he knew how to impose his opinion on Comrade Stalin. He found ways to raise doubts when considering this or that issue, found ways to show this or that comrade in a bad light . Beria managed to achieve, for a certain period of time, to set Comrade Stalin against this or that worker. Impudence and arrogance are Beria's main qualities.
a Here and further in the verbatim report, the text that was edited during its preparation for printing and distribution to party organizations is underlined. — Comp.
During Comrade Stalin's illness , when the doctors said that he was in a hopeless condition, there was an exchange of opinions about Beria between individual members of the Presidium of the Central Committee. It is clear that all members of the Presidium at that time could not exchange opinions on this issue. During Comrade Stalin's illness, two members of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee were constantly on duty with him. Comrade Bulganin and I had to be on duty together. During one of the shifts, about a day before Comrade Stalin's death, I said to Comrade Bulganin: "Nikolai Aleksandrovich, Comrade Stalin is hopelessly ill, how will the leadership develop after his death? I am worried that after Stalin's death Beria will try by all means to become Minister of Internal Affairs. Why does he need this post? He needs this post in order to seize such positions in the state, to be able to spy on members of the Politburo, eavesdrop, monitor, create cases, intrigue, and this will lead to very bad consequences for the party.”
Bulganin: There was such a conversation.
Khrushchev: I say we must not allow this to happen, otherwise our cause will perish . They may tell me: although you talked among yourselves , Beria nevertheless became Minister of Internal Affairs . You, they say, thought and talked, but neither you nor Comrade Bulganin spoke out on this issue when the Government was formed .
I will tell you, comrades, why it happened this way. This conversation took place during Comrade Stalin's illness. When Comrade Stalin died, everyone thought that we needed to unite even more. In these circumstances, I thought that when discussing the composition of the Government, it would have been untimely to speak out and express my opinion about Beria. Such a speech could have been misunderstood . It should be borne in mind that Beria, even during Comrade Stalin's lifetime, had achieved disunity between the members of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee.
Voroshilov: Correct.
Khrushchev. At the time when we had before us the still warm body of Comrade Stalin, it was impossible to raise this question. Comrades could have said: he took advantage of Comrade Stalin's death and immediately brought dissension and confusion into the leadership of the party. Beria could have cleverly used this circumstance, and you would have been a fool, and what a fool! Could this have happened?
Voices. Quite right, it could have been.
Khrushchev. Beria was very keen to get the post of Minister of Internal Affairs. You, comrades, each know how much weight this "person" had in the party. Quite a lot. It would seem that such a person should be given the most sensitive area of work. Is the Ministry of Internal Affairs the most sensitive area at present? I may encounter some comments on my conclusions, but it seems to me that the Ministry of Internal Affairs is not such an area now . This is my personal opinion. Why do I think so? Let's look back, take the period of the last 10 years. What conspiracies within our country were discovered by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of State Security? There were many phony, inflated cases, but no conspiracies.
Voroshilov: That's right, none.
Khrushchev: Let's look at the cases of 1937 and after 1937, among them there were also many bogus cases.
Voice from the Presidium. More than half is fake, that's right.
Khrushchev. If we look at the cases of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security, both group and individual, we will find there many bogus cases. Take the case of the "doctors-saboteurs". This is a shameful case for us. The Mingrelian case in Georgia is also a bogus case. We can name other similar bogus cases.
We have spies, saboteurs, terrorists, and agents of imperialist intelligence operating within our country, but we have not had any significant group conspiracies against the Soviet system and there could not have been any, because we have the monolithic ranks of the party, the unity of our people around our party.
Voices from the floor. Correct.
Khrushchev: Comrades, when the war with fascist Germany began, Hitler counted on marching in tanks across the steppes of Ukraine, across our entire country, and quickly conquering it, capturing Moscow and everything falling to his army. The whole world knows how the war began and how it ended. What do the results of the war say? They testify to the strength of our party, to the unity of the Soviet people around the party, to the boundless trust of the people in our party and its leadership.
Beria knew this well. The question is, why did he strive for the post of Minister of Internal Affairs? He needed this post in order to take over this, I would say, difficult to control body and use it for his own vile purposes. We control any minister, any employee by checking the fulfillment of economic plans. Party organizations also speak out and expose shortcomings. But in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, everything is shrouded in secrecy. An employee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs says: "I'm going to a safe house." But what he does there, who he receives - no one knows. Here you can only rely on the honesty of the employee. The Ministry of Internal Affairs is an organ for the fight against our enemies. And Beria wanted to use this organ against the Party, against the Government . That was his goal. Pay attention to this detail. After the publication of reports on the shameful case of the "doctors-saboteurs", about the equally shameful Georgian case, I received a letter to the Central Committee from Colonel General Kryukov, who was sentenced to 25 years. Marshal Zhukov received the same letter. I sent this letter to the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, including Beria. There are other convicted generals. Beria did not undertake to examine these cases, and that this is a sham is indisputable.
Voroshilov. Linden.
Khrushchev: I think that Beria did not undertake to examine these cases because he wanted to "work" with the convicted generals and then release them. After all, he did not simply release them. He convinced those being released that it was Beria who had returned their freedom to them. Not the party, not the government - but Beria.
Several months ago, General Kuzmichev was released from prison. Perhaps he was released correctly. But was it necessary, after releasing him from prison, to immediately put a general's uniform on him and appoint him head of the Government's security? It was hardly necessary to do this, and Beria appointed Kuzmichev to this important post. Why? Because Kuzmichev became Beria's shadow, he needed such a person.
Beria tried to use the Ministry of Internal Affairs for criminal purposes. He wanted to establish his dictatorship through the Ministry of Internal Affairs, to place the Ministry of Internal Affairs above the Party. I consider it necessary to report to the Plenum that Beria was very resistant when it was necessary to invite the Ministry of Internal Affairs workers to the Central Committee. He called me and said: “You know, an employee of your Administrative Department called Kobulov, summoned him and asked how things were going in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This is impossible. I am a member of the Presidium, some shadow is being cast on me, someone is summoning my first deputy.” He put the question in such a way that it was impossible to summon the Ministry of Internal Affairs workers either to the Central Committee or to the regional committees. In reality, this meant freeing the Ministry of Internal Affairs bodies from any party control, so that Beria and his henchmen could commit arbitrary acts.
Voices. Correct.
Khrushchev: That's what Beria wanted. And I would say, comrades, that he achieved a lot in this. Take the notes on Ukraine, Latvia, and Belarus. Now you all know that these materials, all the facts for these notes were collected not through the regional committees, not through the central committees of the republics' communist parties, but through the employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, although such materials, moreover, more accurate and more correct , are in the party organs. There are also other facts showing that Beria tried to rise above the party, to subordinate the party to the Ministry of Internal Affairs . This must be acknowledged in order to exclude any possibility of even a hint of such anti-party actions in the future.
Comrades, I am deeply convinced that Beria is not a communist, that he was not a communist. Beria is a careerist and a provocateur. I draw this conclusion not only from the facts of today . Comrades, remember the Plenum of the Central Committee in 1937. Then it was announced from this rostrum that Beria worked in counterintelligence in Baku. Kaminsky said this. Then it was said that Beria worked in counterintelligence on the instructions of the party, although there is no evidence of this. Beria did not present any. And a lot of time has passed.
Bagirov. The underground work was then headed by Anastas Ivanovich, without him no one could go anywhere or be sent by the party organization, especially to Musavat intelligence, because under the counterrevolutionary Musavat regime of 18 in Baku and throughout Azerbaijan, the underground and party cadres and all party work were headed by comrade Mikoyan. As for the Baku archives, there are no traces that speak of Beria's work in Musavat intelligence on the instructions of the party organization.
Khrushchev: Comrades, we have already reached a decent age of Soviet power and many of us have grown grey and gained experience under Soviet power . Even if someone says that he had an assignment, why is evidence not presented to the Central Committee ? And who can guarantee that he did not work on another assignment, against us, having the cover that he allegedly worked on an assignment from the party?
Comrades, I have heard Beria's reasoning about the party and the construction of socialism many times . His last statements were made when we were discussing the state of affairs in the GDR and the Hungarian People's Republic. The question then arose of not allowing one person to lead both the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers. During the discussion, Comrade Rakosi asked: "I ask for advice on which issues should be resolved in the Council of Ministers and which in the Central Committee, what the distinction should be. If the leadership of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers is not to be combined in one person, then it is necessary to more clearly separate the issues that should be considered in the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers." Then Beria said dismissively: "What about the Central Committee? Let the Council of Ministers decide, and let the Central Committee deal with personnel and propaganda."
I was surprised by such a statement. It means that Beria excludes the leading role of the party, limits its role to work with personnel (and that, apparently, at first) and propaganda. Is this a Marxist-Leninist view of the party? Is this how Lenin and Stalin taught us to treat the party? Beria's views on the party are no different from Hitler's views.
Why did he say that? It came from his awareness that the role of the party should recede into the background. Beria thought to strengthen himself and then completely destroy the party. Of course, not physically destroy it, but he could do a lot of harm . This, comrades, was a great danger for the party. Beria is not a party member, but a careerist, and maybe even a spy, we still need to dig into this.
Voice from the audience: Both.
Khrushchev. Beria and I were often together , so we could hear a lot from him. Sometimes he himself was indignant at what was happening in the MVD or MGB. But this was in words, while in reality he committed lawlessness . Recently he entered the Presidium of the Central Committee with a proposal for special meetings . We have not yet discussed this issue, we did not have time. We decided to put Beria in jail first and then discuss it. Beria made a proposal on the rights of a special meeting at the MVD. What is a special meeting? It means that Beria arrests, Beria interrogates and Beria judges.
The question arises: do we really have such a stream of counter-revolutionary uprisings that the judicial authorities do not have the opportunity to consider these cases? Do we really need a special conference to try cases without an investigation? Beria did not propose to abolish the special conference, but to preserve it. Why did he need it? So that, having a special conference in his hands, he would have the opportunity to convict any person. He himself said: "I can force any person to sign a confession that he has a direct connection with the English king or queen." And he did it. Having an investigator who interrogates Beria's orders, who obtains the testimony he needs, he could convict any person through a special conference . Is this conceivable? What did he propose to us ? He writes that, supposedly, it is necessary to "streamline" this case, and proposed that the special conference have the right to imprison for 10 years . This means that he will sentence for 10 years, and after 10 years he can return and sentence again for the same term. This is real terror for you. In this way he could turn any person into camp dust.
When I received this proposal, I called comrades Mikoyan, Bulganin, Molotov, Kaganovich and asked if they had read what Beria was proposing. Is it necessary to do this and for what purposes? It is clear that some matter may arise that should not be brought into the public eye. This may happen. But don't we have the opportunity to specifically discuss it and make the necessary decision? We have military tribunals where such matters can be decided. I think that we will probably not abandon closed courts in the future, but this must be an exception, so that the procedure for considering such matters is determined by a decision of the Central Committee and the Government. We cannot allow the Minister of Internal Affairs to have such rights and power. After all, adventurers like Beria could use these rights , terrorizing the party and the government.
Recently, Beria also proposed that all persons who have served their sentence or have been acquitted by the investigation or the court should be released only after the prosecutor reports to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. What does this mean? It means that Beria was trying to eliminate legality. What kind of legality can there be if the prosecutor is commanded by the Ministry of Internal Affairs? How can a judge or prosecutor work and enjoy trust when he must report to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, when the court has already proven that the person is not guilty. Who needs such "legality"?
Beria grabbed onto this because he wanted to hold the souls of not only those sitting in prison, but also those under investigation, those who had already been released from prison, so that they would tremble while Beria was in power. This was done for the sake of terror. This terror was directed against the party, against the government, against our people.
Voices. Correct.
Khrushchev. That's what this scoundrel needed. Beria, Yagoda, Yezhov, Abakumov - they're all berries of the same field.
The sword of our socialist state must be sharp and honed. We still have many enemies. We have a capitalist environment, we have a strong enemy and its agents inside the country. Therefore, it would be deeply mistaken to drag the organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs through the mud, it would be wrong to think that they are no longer needed. If we take this path , we may pay for it. But this sword must be kept sharp against the enemies and not allowed to be directed against our own people.
Kaganovich. And so that he would be in the hands of the party.
Khrushchev: And for this we need to put the Ministry of Internal Affairs in its place. We need to strengthen the intelligence and counterintelligence agencies even more . Put good, honest Bolsheviks on this job. And we will fix this job . The Ministry of Internal Affairs must be and will be under the control of the party, under the control of the government.
Malenkov: We spent 17.5 billion rubles on the Ministry of Internal Affairs, not counting what we spent on construction and economy.
Khrushchev: Georgy Maximilianovich made a completely correct remark here.
Comrades, I am a man of what is called the "old" regime. (Laughter). The first time I saw a gendarme, I was probably already 24 years old. There were no gendarmes in the mines. We had one Cossack policeman who went around drinking. There was no one in the volost except for one police officer . Now in each district we have a chief of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, he has a large apparatus , detectives. The chief of the Ministry of Internal Affairs receives the highest salary, more than the secretary of the district party committee.
S m e s t a. Twice as much as the district committee secretary.
Khrushchev: But if he has such a network, then he needs to show that he is doing something. If we now look through the archives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, I am convinced that there are questionnaires on a significant number of citizens and cases are being developed on many of them. (Laughter.)
Voices. Correct.
Khrushchev: Of course, if they pay money, then something needs to be done. But if there are no crimes , and the bosses ask and say : "You are such and such , you work poorly, show your work." Then some workers start fabricating cases, resort to meanness . After all, there was a case last year in Moscow, when a man was sentenced to 25 years, and then it turned out that the agent himself invented the case, and the conviction was in vain.
Comrades, we must restore order in the organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, leave there as many people as necessary , and those who would understand the party’s policy, strictly implement it and work under the leadership of party organizations.
Voices. Correct.
Khrushchev: Comrades, you may ask why you went there and didn’t expose Beria earlier. To this I can answer that Beria is not the kind of person who can be easily figured out and exposed to. Personally, I had different periods of relations with Beria. Our relationship changed especially after the death of Comrade Stalin. If I didn’t call him for a day, he would call and ask: “Why didn’t you call?” “I don’t have time,” you would answer, “I had things to do.” “You should call more often,” he would say. I, comrades, began to think about why such love had flared up for me, what was the matter? It seemed that nothing had changed, I remained the same as I was. Sometimes he would call and talk to me about Comrade Malenkov, about Comrade Molotov. He could poison anyone and at the same time somehow point out, emphasize that you were better than them. I later spoke about this to Comrades Malenkov and Molotov.
Malenkov: He considered us all simpletons.
Khrushchev. I say to Comrade Malenkov: listen, you probably say it against me, but he says it against you to me. He is an intriguer, he considers everyone to be fools, he thinks that he, only he, is a great intelligence officer and understands everything. But we turned out to be not such simpletons as he thought. He did a lot of harm for his provocative purposes.
Unfortunately, we could not make important decisions on agriculture either in the last period of Comrade Stalin's life or after his death. Why? Because when posing this or that question, Beria would sow doubts or often, during discussion, would try to get the question removed from discussion. We all respect Comrade Stalin. But the years take their toll. In recent times, Comrade Stalin did not read papers, did not receive people, because his health was poor. And this circumstance was cleverly exploited by the scoundrel Beria, very cleverly. He, as a provocateur, would prompt Comrade Stalin that the question had not been worked on, and he would be removed . And you know that on any question, no matter how well it was worked on, evidence can always be found for further work.
Voices from the floor. Correct.
Khrushchev. All the time these issues were "unfinished business" and not resolved. This was the case during Comrade Stalin's life, and he continued to do so after his death. I want to express my thoughts on why he acted this way . He is a provocateur. He believed that the worse, the better. You know that Comrade Malenkov was instructed to oversee agriculture. Beria, while outwardly demonstrating his friendship with Comrade Malenkov, in fact slowed down the issues that were introduced in agriculture in order to undermine the collective farms. In addition, he pursued the goal of acting against Comrade Malenkov. As a result, many branches of agriculture are in a neglected state: there is little milk, little meat. And what kind of communism is it if there are no flatbreads and butter?
Voice from the Presidium. There are not enough potatoes.
Khrushchev: Not enough potatoes. This was done in order to shift the blame onto others, and then, having reached power, to declare an amnesty, so that they would say: here is Beria saving. This is cheap demagogy.
Voice from the Presidium. He speaks absolutely correctly.
Khrushchev. He was a provocateur, a major provocateur. Comrades, recently the Secretariat of the Central Committee listened to a number of regional committees - Novgorod, Pskov, Smolensk - and made decisions. But, comrades, no matter how clever the resolution is written, no matter what decisions are made, if we pay four kopecks per kilogram of potatoes, no resolution will help agriculture.
Voices. Correct.
Mikoyan. It is necessary to take into account economic laws.
Khrushchev: We must calculate everything, comrades. At present we have 3.5 million fewer cows than we had before the war. And if there are fewer cows, that means less meat, less butter, less leather. Some have said that it will be necessary to abolish cows for individual use and supply collective farmers through the collective farm. There will be a time when the collective farmer himself will agree to this. If we do not believe in this, then we are not communists. Will the peasant collective farmer always hold on to the tail of her own cow? But it would be stupid to suggest this at the present time. This cannot be done. We must create conditions, we must raise the collective farms , raise the marketability of collective farming, and the productivity of livestock.
They say that the party organs do not pay attention to this issue. No attention will help if a certain amount of milk must be given from this cow and comrade Zverev takes a tax from this same cow. When you calculate everything that the collective farmer gives for the cow, it turns out that he is left with only manure. Therefore, the collective farmer decides to get rid of this cow. This is a very acute issue, and it must be resolved correctly . This issue is currently being studied, and we are convinced that the situation will be corrected.
Let's take the issues of potato and vegetable production . We have reduced prices for potatoes and cabbage, but there are no potatoes or cabbage in the stores. Cabbage has become more expensive or is the same price as bananas. Have our collective farmers forgotten how to grow potatoes and cabbage?
The adventurer Beria stubbornly thwarted all proposals on agriculture. For example, the issue of increasing potato production was discussed for three months and for three months we could not make a decision. As soon as we put it up for discussion, Beria would suggest reworking it. That was how this provocateur acted. He slowed down the resolution of many issues. I think he believed that if complications arose somewhere due to the population's discontent, it would be better for him. Oh, what a scoundrel he was!
Comrades, I fully agree with what Comrade Malenkov said about the decisions that were made regarding Western Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, and Latvia. We need to recall Beria's notes. We need to look at these decisions, and perhaps we will have to make adjustments to them.
It is quite obvious that Beria sought to undermine the friendship of peoples, he tried to stir up and activate bourgeois-nationalist elements . In recent days, the Central Committee has been receiving letters reporting distortions in this matter . I received a letter from a woman, an employee of the district party committee from the Stanislav region. She wrote to me: "You said that now there are no longer two Ukraine - Western and Eastern, but one Soviet Ukraine. I have been working in the Stanislav region for 13 years, and now I, a Ukrainian, am being expelled from Ukraine." And this is being done by our decision. That is how it happens, comrades. Such letters are also being written from Lithuania. One communist reports that recently nationalist elements have become insolent and have begun to speak out against Russian workers . Things have reached the point where shop assistants who know Russian do not sell goods if they are addressed in Russian. What do these facts indicate? That Beria’s proposals were aimed at setting Russians at odds with other nationalities, in order to incite enmity between the peoples of our country.
Voices from the floor. Correct!
Khrushchev. Beria is acting under the guise of carrying out Stalin's national policy, but in fact he is causing a split between nations. Now all of Beria's speeches must be viewed in a different light. Let's take his speech when he spoke about the Russian people. After all, it is vile! It is not by Beria's definitions that the Russian people are great, it is not by his will that the great Russian people rose up and created greatness for themselves. He needed to pat the Russian people on the head. He already considered himself Stalin's successor. Stalin proposed a toast to the great Russian people, and Beria spoke in words about the greatness of the Russian people, but in fact he had long had hostile intentions. He took a big swing, but he fell and crashed, he lost his spirit.
Beria showed himself most clearly as a provocateur and agent of the imperialists during the discussion of the German question, when he raised the question of abandoning the construction of socialism in the GDR and making concessions to the West. This meant giving 18 million Germans over to the domination of American imperialists. He said: "We must create a neutral democratic Germany."
Can democratic bourgeois Germany be neutral? Is it possible? Beria said: "We will conclude a treaty." And what is this treaty worth? We know the value of treaties. A treaty has its force if it is backed up by guns. If a treaty is not backed up by force , then it is worth nothing, they will laugh at us, they will consider us naive. But Beria is not naive, stupid, not a fool. He is smart, cunning, and treacherous. He did not behave like a communist, but like a provocateur, the devil knows, maybe he received assignments from foreign intelligence agents.
Comrades, the impudence of this man was simply unbearable. We recently listened to the Germans. The GDR leaders made mistakes, they had to be corrected, but not bullied. When we discussed this issue, Beria yelled at comrade Ulbricht and other German comrades so loudly that it was embarrassing to listen to . Ministers are present here, they know what insults they received from Beria and at the same time they were forced to smile at other times (animation in the hall), thinking that this was a friendly pill. Now I think that you have a different attitude towards this impudent fellow.
Beria believed that he had the Ministry of Internal Affairs in his hands, and even if they wanted to arrest him, who would do the arresting? If they turned to Kobulov to arrest Beria, then he and Kobulov could arrest anyone before anyone else. He was convinced of this. But when we saw that we were dealing with a provocateur, we did not have any disagreement or disunity, which he had hoped for. We exchanged opinions with each other, asking: listen, do you like this man? At first, some looked at us in surprise and probably thought: “Why is he asking this question, for what purpose?” (Laughter.) Then we continued: “Why are you looking at him like that, he is a provocateur, look and see for yourself that he is a scoundrel.” After that, the answer was: “Yes, this is the correct way to pose the question, a matter of principle.” When we talked to each other , it turned out that we were all of the same opinion. After that, we organized a meeting of the Council of Ministers, and invited the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee who were not members of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers to this meeting, and then we opened the meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee and laid it all out there, we said straight to Beria's face: you are a provocateur, you are not a communist and were not a communist, we will not tolerate it any longer. And you should have looked at this hero, how he immediately went limp, and maybe even more. (Laughter.)
Comrades, when we took this decision , we were deeply convinced that the Central Committee would understand us correctly and approve our decision. (Prolonged applause.)
A unanimous decision of the Presidium of the Central Committee about Beria had to be achieved. This had to be said outright, so that they wouldn’t whisper about it later. Some said: how is that possible, Malenkov often walks arm in arm with Beria, probably the two of them talk about me. And others were probably told that Khrushchev also walks with him. (Laughter.) And that’s right. They did, and I did too. Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov once even said: “You walk around and discuss something all the time.” I replied: “Nothing worthwhile, he says all sorts of nasty things, it’s disgusting even to listen to.”
I think that for a time this walking was useful to us and was necessary. On Thursday we - Malenkov, me, and Beria - were riding in the same car, although we knew that he was an intriguer, that he was intriguing me against Malenkov and against others, and mainly against Malenkov. He said goodbye, shook my hand, I also responded with a "hot" handshake: well, I thought, you scoundrel, the last handshake, tomorrow at 2 o'clock we'll squeeze you. (Laughter.) We won't squeeze your hand, we'll tuck your tail between our legs.
Comrades, this is the only way to deal with such a treacherous man . If we had told him even a little earlier that he was a scoundrel, I am convinced that he would have dealt with us. He knows how to do this. I told some comrades about this. And when they told me that I was exaggerating, I answered: look, don’t be a weirdo, he will bury you, give a speech and hang a plaque: “Here lies a figure of the party and government,” and then he will say: “Fool, rest there.” He is capable of this. He is capable of adding poison, he is capable of all kinds of vileness. We were not dealing with a party member, with whom we must fight using party methods, but with a conspirator, a provocateur, and therefore we could not reveal ourselves. We thought that if he found out that the meeting would discuss the issue of him, it could turn out like this: we would come to this meeting, and he would raise his thugs and God knows what he would do, because we were dealing with an adventurer and a provocateur. Therefore, we had to think through all these issues thoroughly. The situation was such that it was impossible to act otherwise. After all, things had reached the point that if the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs reported to the Central Committee about irregularities in the organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, he was considered an "agent" of the Central Committee.
Now you see what kind of "friendship" this was and how it ended. I think that the party members will understand us correctly. Now we need to organize the work well so that nothing like this happens in the future. First, we need to put honest people in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and second, we need to strengthen the control of party organizations over the work of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
It should be noted that when deciding the question of Beria, we were all unanimous - Comrade Malenkov, Comrade Molotov, Comrade Bulganin, Comrade Kaganovich and all the other comrades. I believe that this operation, if one can put it that way, will not weaken, but rather strengthen the leadership of the Central Committee. (Applause).
Voices. Correct.
Khrushchev: There should be no fears on this score. Some doubted: how will this be assessed in the party, will it not be understood as weakness? And if we do not solve the problems of agriculture, when the country has a shortage of meat, milk and even potatoes and cabbage, is this strength? This, comrades, is a disgrace. After all, our friends can tell us: listen, dear comrades, you teach us how to build socialism, but you do not know how to grow potatoes, you cannot provide for your people, you have no cabbage in your capital. And why? Because they could not solve it, the provocateur is disrupting.
Therefore, I believe that the decision about Beria strengthens our leadership, strengthens our party. They may ask, how will other countries evaluate this decision? Of course, they will find out there, even if we do not publish it . They will still find out. I am convinced that this will be assessed correctly everywhere . And in bourgeois circles they will think: if they did not stop and arrested Beria (and there was a reputation for his strength), it means he has character. (Applause.)
Therefore, comrades, we are convinced that this decision is correct.
Comrade Malenkov spoke correctly about Comrade Stalin's speech at the Plenum of the Central Committee after the XIX Party Congress addressed Comrades Molotov and Mikoyan. We know very well that what he said on this issue did not happen in real life . It was said as a result of slander and a certain age and physical condition of Comrade Stalin.
Comrades, I am concluding my speech. We are firmly convinced that no one will be able to turn us away from the correct path that our party is following, the path indicated by Lenin and Stalin. (Applause.)
Now, after cleansing ourselves of this scum and removing the enemy Beria, we will move forward with even more confidence and acceleration towards new victories. (Applause.)
Having expelled Beria, we, comrades, became even stronger. I would like to give you a detail. When Comrade Malenkov told Comrade Voroshilov about this matter before the meeting, Comrade Voroshilov, who is the oldest member of the party, rushed to embrace Comrade Malenkov. At the same time, Comrade Voroshilov warned Comrade Malenkov: "Quiet, he will overhear." Then Kliment Efremovich was told that even if he overhears, he will not have time to decipher it. We have already deciphered it. That is the kind of atmosphere he created within the Presidium! Sometimes someone would say: "That's right, Lavrenty Pavlovich," and then quietly spat. Is it possible to create such an atmosphere in the party? This will not happen now. There will be collective leadership, real party leadership. It is necessary that the atmosphere of collective leadership be not only in the Central Committee, but also in the localities , including the primary party organizations . It is necessary that plenary sessions of the Central Committee be held regularly. Meetings of the party committees, sessions of working people's deputies, and they must be organized without pomp and circumstance, without pompous meaningless chatter. All this must be rebuilt. We have great strength. And the better and deeper we develop intra-party democracy, criticism, the better we organize and attract the masses to an active discussion of our policy and all our economic and political work, the stronger we will be. The people stand like a wall behind our party, they confidently follow the party.
Comrades, I conclude with the confidence that the cleansing of this vile traitor and provocateur will contribute to the further strengthening of our Leninist-Stalinist leadership. (Prolonged applause.)
The chairman is Comrade Bulganin. Comrade Molotov now has the floor.