Beria Case

TRANSCRIPTS FROM SOVIET ARCHIVES

Lavrenty Beria Case

Soviet Archives/Beria Case/Beria Case Plenum.pdf

MEETING JULY 3

Morning session

Khrushchev: I declare the Plenum session open. We continue the discussion of Comrade Malenkov's report.

Comrade Bulganin has the floor, comrade Serdyuk - Lvov to get ready.

Bulganin: Comrades, Comrade Malenkov has reported everything thoroughly, correctly and, I would say, well. Comrades Khrushchev and Molotov have correctly continued to cover the matter . However, the question is of such importance that there is a need to say more and further on this issue.

Our party has seen more serious events. We know how the party broke the backs of adventurers and conspirators on a larger scale, who acted as a group and not as individuals. We also know from the party's history that the party, by suppressing and eliminating adventurers and conspirators, became tempered, grew stronger, and its authority among the people increased.

Everything we have heard about Beria, and what we now know about him, tells us, comrades, that we are dealing with an enemy of the party, with an enemy of the Soviet state and people.

Even during the life of Comrade Stalin, Beria behaved very suspiciously. In front of our eyes, we saw him, he behaved rudely, impudently, brazenly, disregarding the collective, disregarding comrades, intriguing before Comrade Stalin. Each of us, comrades , has seen many times cases of the most vile, most vile intrigues before Comrade Stalin about the comrades surrounding him. This was in his character and, apparently, he had long-term goals .

After the death of Comrade Stalin, he not only continued this line of disunity among the collective, intrigue, and discreditation, but, as you see, he behaved even more brazenly and engaged in direct anti-party, anti-state activity.

It became clear that we couldn't leave things like that. If we left things like that, we would end up in an adventure.

As the comrades here said, despite the fact that we tolerated him in our midst, moreover, as they rightly said, treated him with visible respect, in reality it was completely different. Comrade Khrushchev, Comrade Molotov, and Comrade Malenkov rightly spoke here about the actual mood of the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee in relation to him .

Comrade Khrushchev Nikita Sergeyevich, in the days before Comrade Stalin's death, when Comrade Stalin was still alive, actually said it directly to me, and I want to repeat it, to say it in more detail: "You know," he said, "you see, we are standing on the eve of the death of our leader, but know that I am afraid that Beria will greatly complicate matters for us. I foresee that when Stalin dies, he will rush to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. And why do you think he needs the Ministry of Internal Affairs? So that later he can place listeners among us, keep an eye on us and take matters into his own hands, subjugate the party and the state."

As you can see, such talk, such moods were already there then. And then it happened that way. The members of the Presidium were under the supervision of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Beria. The members of the Presidium were put under surveillance. Here they talked about eavesdropping.

Comrades, we have at our disposal the wiretapping records of Khrushchev, Malenkov, Molotov, Bulganin, Voroshilov. We were being watched. I will give you one small fact, perhaps , but it is characteristic so that you understand the situation, a small detail. Two or three days, I think, before we arrested him on June 26, we arrived by car at half past one at night, having finished working late , to the apartment - comrade Malenkov, comrade Khrushchev, me, and Beria - he gave us a ride to the apartment. We live - Georgy Maximilianovich, Nikita Sergeyevich, and I in the same house. Nikita and I live opposite each other on the same floor, and Georgy lives on the floor below. We arrived at the apartment. Georgy Maximilianovich went to the fourth floor, and Nikita and I went up to the fifth. We went up to the landing, stood there and said that it was hot at home, let's go to the dacha.

He says: "I'll go home and have a look." And I say: "I'll go straight to the dacha." I got into the same elevator, went down, and went to the dacha. The next day Nikita Sergeyevich calls me in the middle of the day and says: "Listen, I want to check. Didn't you tell anyone that we went to the dacha? Didn't you talk to anyone? How does Beria know that we went to the dacha? He calls me and says: You went to the dacha with Bulganin." We didn't attach any importance to this. The next day, in Comrade Malenkov's room, Beria says out loud: "They're being cunning. They went up to the apartment and then went to the dacha." I say: " You know , it's very hot at home, let's go to the dacha." "Come on," he says, "you didn't go into the apartment, you went down in the elevator and went to the dacha, and Khrushchev," he says, "he really did, without hesitation , go in and follow you." We decided to turn this into a joke. Nikita Sergeyevich says: "How could you possibly know that you have agents?"

Khrushchev. Spies.

Bulganin : That's right, he said - spies. He passed. He said nothing . This fact, comrades, shows that this man had already gone wild at the end. And to postpone it any further, of course, was dangerous.

Moreover, I will say one more fact, which I spoke point- blank to Beria at the Presidium meeting, which the comrades know about. The German question was discussed here - this was a major question, on which he was rebuffed at the Presidium meeting in essence. In essence, you heard from the report, from the speeches of Comrade Molotov, Comrade Malenkov, that the question was about which path we should take Germany - along the path of strengthening the German Democratic Republic or along the path of liquidating it and turning Germany into bourgeois Germany. Beria held the latter point of view. The members of the Presidium spoke out against Beria.

The next day there was a meeting of the so-called special committee, chaired by Beria, and of which I am a member of the Presidium. Arriving at the meeting of the Presidium, he postponed the meeting for an hour to talk to me about the German question. He began the conversation on the merits. The conversation was essentially of the following nature. I gave him examples of neutralizing Germany, that nothing would come of it. I gave as an example (I had consulted with some comrades the day before) that in history there were such things as the Treaty of Versailles 31 , under which Germany was disarmed, and then what happened? Germany rose up and attacked the Soviet Union. I do not want to talk about that now. He rudely and rather brazenly stated the following: “This cannot continue any longer. If things go on like this, we will have to remove some ministers from the Presidium , remove ministers from their posts.”

I say that in our Presidium we have ministers Molotov, Bulganin, and Beria, who are we talking about? He says: "The current leadership will have to be changed." This is a direct threat that if, they say, you continue this line, do not vote for my proposals, then we will simply throw you out.

If we add to this style of conversation that conversation with Strokach, which Georgy Maximilianovich Malenkov spoke about here - "We will expel, arrest, rot in the camps, grind into dust" - there is no need to say more about who we were dealing with. These facts speak for themselves.

Moreover, comrades, there is every reason to believe, and we are perhaps convinced , that we are dealing with a big, seasoned international adventurer. To put it simply, there is every reason to believe that we are dealing with an international agent and spy. Georgy Maximilianovich and Vyacheslav Mikhailovich read here his letter, which remained unsent, to "comrades" Rankovich and Tito. I will cite some more facts. Just before his arrest, the day before, we learned that Beria was collecting military materials, in particular materials on our naval forces. He had developed a questionnaire, and data is being collected on this questionnaire, for example, what our naval forces can counter with the American and English fleets, what our coastal naval defense consists of, what kind of artillery we have, what its qualities are, and some other data. At the same time, they were asked questions and requested data on our air defense, what our anti-aircraft artillery was like, what its effectiveness was. Then, at the same time, questions were asked and this questionnaire was sent to the Air Force about our aircraft, what their features were, what their ceiling was, what their armament was, etc.

The investigation of this matter showed that this data was selected , as it were, in order to examine some special questions connected with rocket weapons. But, the question arises, why were these data required without the knowledge of the Central Committee of the Party, bypassing the Minister of Defense? Of course, all this data was not given to him , it was reported to me, and I reported to the Central Committee that this was the case. And it may not be by chance that this data was needed in order to give advice and instructions to someone.

Now, comrades, look at the internal issues that Georgy Maximilianovich reported on here and that Nikita Sergeyevich and Vyacheslav Mikhailovich spoke about. Every issue has a background that is extremely dangerous for the state. Take the issue of amnesty.

The release of thieves and repeat offenders is a blow to public order in the country. Is that clear?

Voices from the audience: Correct.

Bulganin: Let's take the questions of Latvia, Lithuania, Western Ukraine. Now it is clear to us that this was, undoubtedly, an attempt to strike a blow at the Leninist-Stalinist national policy and the moral and political unity of the Soviet people.

Voices from the audience: Correct.

Bulganin: Speaking about the national question, one cannot ignore the Georgian question. 32 You have read the material. This scoundrel has taken upon himself the monopoly right to decide all Georgian questions with regard to Georgia. I will express the general opinion of the Presidium of the Central Committee that he has confused this matter so much that it is necessary to seriously sort out what is happening in Georgia now.

Voices from the audience: Correct.

Bulganin: We hope that the Georgian party organization will be unanimous with the entire party in the matter of exposing and expelling this vile scoundrel and adventurer.

Comrades, if we add to this what Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev said here about our agriculture, then Beria's hand was undoubtedly involved here . Agriculture was brought to a state that was in the interests of Beria and his clique .

All these facts indicate that he acted on the principle: the worse, the better.

Comrades, we have heard about the supposedly positive role of Beria in his affairs on the release of doctors, the liquidation of the Georgian case, the liquidation of the case of the so-called Shakhurin and Novikov 33 , the case of Marshal Yakovlev 34 . We must debunk him here too. He has no positive role in these affairs. On the contrary, all this was done in order to create the appearance of popularity for himself.

Voices from the audience: Correct.

Bulganin: How did things really stand? I'll tell you that even during Comrade Stalin's lifetime, we, members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, said among ourselves, let's be honest , that the doctors' plot was a sham. Even during Comrade Stalin's lifetime, we said this among ourselves. Is that right, comrades?

Voices from the Presidium. Correct.

Bulganin: We said that the Georgian case is a phony, a phony case. The Shakhurin and Novikov case is a shameful case for us. Did you say that? We did. The Marshal Yakovlev case is a shameful case for us. Did you say that? We did, even when Comrade Stalin was alive.

Beria knew about these conversations. I ask, what was he supposed to do after Comrade Stalin's death, when he took over as Minister of Internal Affairs? Of course, he had to finish these things. These things were finished not because he played some positive role. No, the situation forced him to do so. He knew the opinion of the Central Committee, the opinion of the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee on these issues.

Now it turns out that Beria took a written statement from all those released. Doctor Ryzhik 35 told me about this yesterday , accidentally being in the apartment, that he took a written statement from all those released about their future behavior, how they should behave. Naturally , the statements were taken in order to keep these people in their hands now .

Comrades, the exposure of Beria, I will tell you, especially the completion of this exposure and the arrest of Beria itself was a difficult matter and a risky matter. And here we must give credit to comrades Malenkov, Khrushchev, and Molotov (stormy applause), who organized this matter well and brought it to the end.

Comrades, after the death of Comrade Stalin, the Presidium of the Central Committee had to carry out very difficult work, to resolve complex issues of domestic and foreign policy.

Khrushchev: There is one amendment: do not exclude yourself from this. (Applause.)

Bulganin: I am very grateful to you, Nikita, for this remark and I declare to you and all other comrades that I acted only as every decent member of the party should act. (Applause.)

The exposure of Beria and his arrest testify to the firmness of Lenin-Stalin's principled stand, the irreconcilability towards the enemies of our Central Committee and its Presidium. The Beria case shows that our current Central Committee and its Presidium, educated and tempered by Comrade Stalin, are a loyal stronghold, a dependable leader of the party and our Soviet people. (Stormy applause.)

Now, comrades, I want to touch on some questions regarding practical measures regarding the Ministry of Internal Affairs. It must be admitted, comrades, frankly, that we have poorly controlled and checked the work of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and its organs, I mean here , when I say we, not only the Central Committee and the Presidium, but also you, all of you sitting here.

Voices. Correct.

Bulganin: Our regional party committees, the Central Committees of the republics, the territorial committees, despite the fact that we have written down many times in the Central Committee decisions the need to decisively put an end to the lack of control in the activities of these bodies, have still not exercised and do not exercise real, deep control over the work of these bodies. We must put an end to this. This is indisputable. Today at this Plenum this is especially clear. But I think, comrades, that it is not enough if we just say this. I think we must say it more specifically. We must establish control over these bodies on specific practical issues. The bureau of the regional committee, territorial committee, the Central Committee of the republic, the Presidium of the Central Committee must know who is being arrested, how they are being interrogated, who is in prison, what the rules are in prison .

Khrushchev: And most importantly, to strengthen party work among the employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Bulganin: Strengthen them and help them to remain good party members. They say that they do not allow it under the guise of imposing incredible secrecy on the whole matter . I ask, and our party organizations, instructors of regional and regional committees and other leading workers of party bodies have access to the most secret laboratories, research institutes, where exclusively secret work is done.

Why can't they go to prison and check on the conditions of those arrested?

Voroshilov. Check who was arrested and why .

Bulganin. How interrogations are conducted. This must be put an end to. Why can't the regional committee instructor go and check? Why can't the regional committee instructor go to any top secret laboratory, but can't come here?

And another question - about personnel. I think that we also did not finish the job with personnel, we also wrote down a lot, and we must admit that we did not do this work well, we did not do what needed to be done. We often talked about the need to replace people in the apparatus of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, to change them, to put in new ones. But how was this done? In the center, they took people from the periphery, the same people from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. We need to put new people there.

Voices. Correct.

Bulganin. From our party and state apparatus.

Voices. That's right, we need new people.

Bulganin: And I often heard that these were Chekists, experienced Chekists , and these experienced Chekists were the ones who spoiled the matter.

What is going on, what is the MVD? It is the Cheka – the Extraordinary Commission. 36 You remember, at least most remember and know the Cheka for combating counterrevolution, sabotage, and speculation. They were created in the most difficult years of the Soviet regime, during the civil war, and that is what they are now, nothing has changed, only the name has changed. But the rights are still the same, the methods of work are still the same, and we have already lived for 35 years. So can we tolerate this any longer? We need to put an end to this.

There are some questions that I think need to be reconsidered. For example, should all prisons be left under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs 37 , or should they be transferred to the justice authorities, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs made into an intelligence agency and an investigative agency?

Another question. We must implement Comrade Stalin's repeated instructions to make the Ministry of Internal Affairs a civilian ministry, not a military one.

Voices. Correct.

Bulganin. We have an army, there are generals, officers, and soldiers. We all know that Comrade Stalin more than once cursed and scolded Beria - he says, your tricks, your work. Why is our Ministry of Internal Affairs militarized? We need to de-militarize it. Why are there generals, officers, after all, it is a military organization. The employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs should be, on the contrary, the simpler, the better, and then their work will be even more effective.

Comrades, I am finishing. I have said everything I had to say, in conclusion I will only say that a great deal has been done. A serious and dangerous adventure for the party and the state has been prevented. All this shows that our party is a strong party and firm. Comrade Stalin left us a strong and united party. It is still like that today. This Plenum of the Central Committee speaks of this.

I mean that everything at the Plenum suggests that the present Plenum will be unanimous in its decision and will approve the actions of the Presidium of the Central Committee. (Prolonged applause.)

The decisions of the Plenum will further strengthen the ranks of our party, will further unite these ranks around our Leninist-Stalinist Central Committee, so that with honor and dignity we can carry forward the banner of Lenin-Stalin to communism. (Applause.)

Khrushchev. Comrade Serdyuk has the floor 38 . Comrade Bakradze, get ready.

Serdyuk: Comrades, the history of our Communist Party, as Comrade Malenkov, Comrade Khrushchev, Comrade Molotov, and Comrade Bulganin just spoke to me about it very vividly , has shown how the enemies of our Soviet people, the Soviet state, the party tried to strike a blow first of all at the leadership of our party, to sow discord, to disunite, to strike at the most sacred of our Soviet people - the workers, the collective farmers, the intelligentsia - this is our Communist Party, which leads our Soviet people to a bright future - to communism, and leads it successfully. And so at this Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party we are discussing the issue of one of the notorious enemies (I believe that this is an enemy of the party, the Soviet state) trying to strike a blow at our Communist Party, the leadership of the Leninist-Stalinist Central Committee of the Party.

But as Comrade Malenkov showed in his report, and Comrade Khrushchev, Comrade Molotov, and Comrade Bulganin showed in their speeches, the party exposed, destroyed, and after each destruction of enemies grew stronger, united, and led the people along the path to communism outlined by Lenin and Stalin.

I believe that the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Party, having removed from his posts an adventurer, a spy, a notorious enemy of our Soviet state who had infiltrated the leadership, having expelled him from the Party and arrested him, this decision of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Party found unanimous approval from all of us present at this Plenum, we approved it after listening to the report of Comrade Malenkov and the speeches of Presidium members Comrade Khrushchev, Comrade Molotov, Comrade Bulganin.

I can say with confidence, as can everyone present here, that this decision will find unanimous support and approval from all communists of our great party of Lenin and Stalin. (Applause.)

Comrades, our Leninist-Stalinist party will support our leadership, the communists will support it, our Soviet people, who have shed so much blood and sweat to build a new, bright, communist society in our country, will support it. From the detailed report of Comrade Malenkov, from the speeches of Presidium members Comrades Khrushchev, Molotov, and Bulganin, we see to what baseness the enemy who has infiltrated our ranks has reached. He, comrades, wanted to decapitate our Soviet state. He, as Comrade Malenkov and all those who have spoken here have said, wanted to sit on the party, wanted to subjugate the party. If you think about it, comrades, he was planning something terrible. He did not succeed, and in this lies the strength of the Leninist-Stalinist education of our party leadership.

Look at what this scoundrel did among the leadership? He sowed mistrust, but the leaders of our party, brought up by Lenin and Stalin, decided the issue correctly, and its solution will find, I repeat, the unanimous support of the entire Soviet state, the entire Soviet people.

Beria, as is now very clearly evident from Comrade Malenkov's report and other speeches, having made his way to the leadership, forced the plans he had outlined. I, comrades, knew Beria as one of the leaders and did not know him closely, and I believed that he was working for the benefit of our party, for the benefit of our state.

Voroshilov: That's what everyone thought.

Serdyuk. But now, in light of events, you can clearly see how skillfully he carried it out, at least in the examples after he became Minister of Internal Affairs, in the arrangement of personnel. Comrades, in one and a half to two months he replaced all the heads of the regional departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Ukraine. Comrades, there was order in the party.

I get up in the morning, Kirichenko tells me: "Serdyuk has arrived. Strokach is being recalled to Moscow, why?" Kirichenko will probably speak . This is probably because Strokach is a party man, a most devoted communist, he goes to the regional committee, informs me, as the secretary of the regional committee, what he is thinking of doing and what some Meshik, appointed by Beria, demands of him.

They say they change everyone; they select personnel. Just look - in two months he combed through, replaced people for himself. The undesirable Strokach is a communist, a real Bolshevik. And what's the matter? I heard it when comrade Malenkov reported at the plenum and from the speeches of comrades. I did not know these things as a communist. I, put by the party at the head of the party organization, was guided by the decisions of the Central Committee and carried out the party policy to strengthen the party, to strengthen the unity of the party and the Soviet people. And here are the facts.

Comrade Strokach comes to me at the regional party committee and says: "Comrade Serdyuk, it's not clear to me, maybe I've gotten out of hand." And he was recently the Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, and the MGB had all the intelligence, all the arrests, all the prisons...

Voroshilov: Everything was produced autonomously .

Serdyuk: This was all in the MGB. Comrade Strokach says: "Maybe I'm behind, but Meshik demands that I photograph the two most backward collective farms and give them to him." You understand, comrades, that of course, it's not a matter of photographing with a Leica, but simply of giving a description of these collective farms. I ask, why the most backward? We have huge shortcomings in agriculture, but we do have good collective farms, which can be used as examples. What was this necessary for?

Comrade Melnikov was then the secretary of the Central Committee. Where should I go? To the Central Committee. Comrade Melnikov was the secretary of the Central Committee of Ukraine, a candidate member of the Presidium. I reported to him that something was unclear to me.

The second question. Poperechko 39 and Strokach come to me with information. Melnikov was interested in what the political mood was in the western regions. Comrades Malenkov, Khrushchev and Molotov were right when they said that for this man the worse the situation , the better . That's how it's always been . What is the political situation in the western regions? They wanted to portray that there is no Soviet power in the western regions. During the day it is still supported by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but at night the OUN members are in complete control. 40

I then told Comrade Strokach, who is present here, and our party , the communists, have been working since 1939,41 then the Germans were driven out, the heroic Soviet people routed the enemies, people revived, began to breathe more freely. I go to the collective farms at night, I am present at the assignments , when the chairman of the collective farm gives assignments to the foremen and collective farmers. Soviet power is felt, why do scoundrels say that there is no Soviet power?

I told Melnikov what was going on, he was indignant. You can't say everything over the phone. If you allow me, I'll tell you why you can't say it. I felt it myself. Not because I was offended. I am a member of the great Communist Party, you can't offend me, it wasn't about one person, it was about the freedom of the Soviet people.

This is how far that the presumptuous provocateur has gone. We went to Melnikov and said, how can this be, the party is working, so much attention is given to the western regions, so many heroic deeds of our Soviet people - and suddenly they say that there is no Soviet power. Comrade Melnikov was indignant. What should I have done? Maybe go further. It is my fault that I did not report to comrades Khrushchev or Malenkov. But that is not the point.

Here is the latest case. Comrade Strokach comes in and says: "Comrade Serdyuk, I can't go on. Melnikov gave me the task of giving him information on how many Russians, Ukrainians, and locals work in the party apparatus, starting from the regional, city, and district committees. I don't know what to do." I know comrade Strokach as an honest communist, as the most devoted to our party, to the Soviet people. I tell him jokingly: "Well, go ahead. I know the Central Committee's resolution on the liquidation of agents."

We burned the files of the agents who were there in 1938. I know the decision of the Central Committee of the Party on the attention and observation by the Party committees of the organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, that it is necessary to interfere 42 . I say to Strokach: I have such information in the regional committee from the head of the special sector, but if you go to him, he will not give it without the permission of the Secretariat. Maybe you have agents, then the agents will give it, but this is a terrible thing. I decided to call comrade Melnikov, I think that things are going in the wrong direction, and then I think to myself: I will call comrade Melnikov, Melnikov will call someone. and Strokach will fall into disgrace. And then I think again: after all, I will not call some industrial cooperative (although our industrial cooperatives are good), but the Secretary of the Central Committee, and if some Meshik attacks Strokach, the Central Committee will protect him. I call Melnikov, I am indignant, I say, how is this possible, since when should the regional committee report to the MGB? I am new to the party, but I take an active part in the work, I know the decisions of the Central Committee, I know what line the Central Committee of the party is pursuing, and I do not allow the thought that the regional committee should report to the MGB. Of course, as the Ukrainians say, I “didn’t quite get it” that Beria was there. Melnikov tells me: yes, this is outrageous, I will find out and call. Strokach and I sit and wait for the call, I say to them: did you overhear anything ? After the decision of the Central Committee, I personally went to prisons, interrogated.

We have just captured one enemy of the people, the murderer of the writer Yaroslav Golon 43 .... I also interrogated this murderer, it was necessary to know who he was relying on, since not only the shoulder straps, but also the party committee should know about this,

Comrade Melnikov calls, he says: "Comrade Serdyuk, look at the information, maybe we should give this task to Beria." I say: if this is a call from the Central Committee, then I will give the information in two hours, and the MGB will collect it slowly and inaccurately. And so it happened. The Central Committee is the law for a Bolshevik, but not Beria's order. I received the decision of the Central Committee; I will speak about this note separately.

Strokach says to me: what should I do? I answer: I don’t know, I won’t give the information. Comrade Strokach is here and he will confirm that I didn’t give the information, but Beria did receive this information. Comrade Strokach, is it correct that I didn’t give you the information?

Take the Central Committee's decision, Beria's note. As a communist, as the regional committee secretary, I look, analyze the shortcomings, I see that there are a lot of shortcomings in practical work. Now, after Comrade Malenkov reported, after the members of the Presidium spoke, I came home yesterday and thought: everything is in this note, a lot is there, but what is missing?

There is no single figure, how many heads our communists laid down: Russians, Ukrainians, Georgians, all the communists whom the Central Committee of the Party sent to the western regions, so that the experience accumulated over the years by our Communist Party in building socialism could be passed on more quickly. The people of the western regions - collective farmers, intellectuals - accepted this experience. We are standing on the eve of a historic event - the three hundredth anniversary of the reunification of two great peoples 44 - Russian and Ukrainian. But now in the note we read that so many were killed.

Khrushchev: What's there to apologize for?

Serdyuk. Up to 30 thousand of our people were killed in the Lviv region. No one read the note . It was not advantageous for Beria to show it.

Comrades, when I listened to Comrade Malenkov's speech , I understood that it was not about Serdyuk. After the Plenum of the Central Committee 45 , when I had a conversation with Meshik, I will say at the Plenum that the words were Ukrainian, but the essence is not Ukrainian, not Soviet, but anti-Soviet.

Khrushchev: I was told that one of the intellectuals who sat at the Plenum and listened to Meshik's speech said that he spoke Ukrainian-Bengali so well. (Laughter.)

Serdyuk: A couple more examples. The phone rings on the high frequency and they say that Minister Meshik will talk to you now. He was in the region for 10 days. I say that we need to go to the regional party committee and talk. But he walks around the region for 10 days and doesn’t go to the regional committee. Then I say that if this minister doesn’t go to the regional party committee, I’ll give him such a fuss, I’ll throw such a scandal that he’ll feel bad, because the minister comes, plans events, but where’s the party, why don’t they consult? Then they told him that an old secretary works for us, is a member of the bureau, is part of the Central Committee. He relented and came to the Central Committee. He says: Hello . I say: Hello, old friend. He said that he gave operational instructions, and that’s it, said goodbye, and I replied: All the best, goodbye. And he left. This minister wants to fight the enemies of our party, but outside the party.

Then there was another call. They ask me why, Comrade Serdyuk, I am the last to know about the issue. I say what issue. You raised the issue there of transferring the premises of the former prison to business organizations. And I actually raised the issue with the Ukrainian Central Committee about vacating the former prison and organizing a school for training machine operators in it . He says where he knew. I say that I found out from the Central Committee. He says how long I have been working in the organs, that we almost never turned to the Central Committee. And I say: Comrade Meshik, for as long as I have been working, I have always turned to the Central Committee, and not to the Central Committee . He put the phone down . And then I had the head of the regional administration Shevchenko, two secretaries of the regional committee, the chairman of the regional executive committee. I was very indignant and said to Comrade Shevchenko - what are you doing, you want to arrest me. The secretaries witnessed this. And before that, when there was a Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine - and what is the Central Committee for a communist and the Central Committee of the CPSU as the highest organ? Every party organ is a respected organ for a communist. But Meshik was invited to the Plenum of the Central Committee; comrade Struyev was there too , I tell him - look how he behaves at the Plenum. A meeting is scheduled for 11 o'clock, he comes at 1 o'clock. He leaves, comes, and so on without end. You, I say, serve the party, why do you treat me like that, I said this not to Meshik, but to Struyev, I exchanged opinions with him. If you tell him, he will arrest you. (Laughter.)

Frankly speaking, before Meshik's speech at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, I thought that he was simply a non-party person, did not know what a party was, that he was, excuse me, a martinet. I reasoned that he did not understand what a party was, what a Central Committee was, that's what I thought. And then, when he spoke at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Comrade Struyev and I exchanged opinions on this matter, I said then that he spoke in such a way that he wanted to intimidate everyone, to sit over the Central Committee here in Ukraine. Comrade Joe... was present here, a member of the military council, a member of the bureau of the Lvov regional committee, - I said, what kind of speech and what was the outcome. I went to Comrade Kirichenko, the secretary Comrade Nazarenko was there , I was outraged and I said to Comrade Kirichenko - Alexander Illarionovich, if Meshik continues to behave like this in Ukraine, especially in Western Ukraine, I will not tolerate it. He will arrest me. Right, Comrade Kirichenko?

Kirichenko. Right.

Serdyuk. He stands up and says, "Are you crazy?" And I say, "Comrade Kirichenko, he will arrest you and give you the inquiry report, and Serdyuk's signature will be there." He tells me again, "Are you crazy?" (Laughter.)

I, I say, Comrade Kirichenko, there are two of you secretaries here, if he arrests me, please take action. I beg you, help me, save me. I am an honest communist, I have been in the party for many years, I am not guilty of anything before the party. I shed blood together with the Soviet people, saving our Motherland. Can I say that? (Addresses the Presidium.)

From the Presidium. Yes.

Serdyuk: I told the secretary of the Central Committee. I came home (addressing the Presidium) - Nikita Sergeyevich, you know me , and I know you. Nikita Sergeyevich knows me, the children, my wife. I tell my wife with tears - you know what can happen, they can arrest me, then contact Nikita Sergeyevich. (Animation in the hall.)

And so she called me this morning, I didn't have time to call her yesterday. And so I burst into tears. She doesn't know whether I was arrested or not. (Laughter.)

She is aware of the matter, you can't ask like that whether I was arrested or not, because they are listening on the phone. She doesn't know what the matter is. I only said that I was not guilty before the party and asked that you contact Nikita Sergeyevich, he knows me. And about the fact that they could arrest me, the secretary, the nomenklatura worker ... and they can make it so that I will be the most notorious Banderite.

Voroshilov: And they can do it.

Serdyuk: They won't do it now. Our party is strong, and the leadership of our party unanimously cut off the dirty paws of these enemies of the people, now this will not happen to anyone. Now this will not happen to anyone .

Comrades, I've dragged my feet.

What is the strength of our decision? In the fact that we, educated by Lenin and Stalin, consulted and made a decision. As a grassroots worker, as a secretary, as a communist, I believe that the party will perceive this as the greatest victory of our leadership, the people will support it, and we will go forward along the direct path that the great Lenin and Stalin showed us, under the leadership of the Leninist-Stalinist Central Committee, and build communism. (Applause.)

Khrushchev: Comrade Bakradze has the floor. Comrade Kaganovich, get ready.

Bakradze: Comrades, the facts and materials reported at the Plenum by Comrade Malenkov and then developed by Comrade Khrushchev, Comrade Molotov, Comrade Bulganin, prove beyond all doubt that in the person of Beria, the Party . The Presidium of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has exposed the greatest adventurer of international scale, a notorious troublemaker and intriguer, an irrepressible careerist and, in my opinion, I personally have no doubt, an absolutely seasoned spy.

With a feeling of some annoyance, which I personally have, I would like to say that in the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in the old Politburo - our holy of holies for our party - it is unfortunate that such a bandit was in this governing body for so long. But this feeling is more than compensated for by the fact that we finally managed to expose and cut off this absolutely exceptional Jesuit, and for the exposure of such a Jesuit , the period of 3 U months should still be considered short.

I think that a great deal has been done to further strengthen and unite our collective leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Not only this Plenum, but the entire party, the entire Soviet people will unanimously approve with a feeling of great satisfaction the decisions that have been taken with regard to the scoundrel Beria.

In light of the current facts presented here at the Plenum, I would like to recall the story of his rise to leadership in the Communist Party of Georgia in 1931 and then to the leadership of the Transcaucasian party organizations.

It must be admitted that even then he came to this leadership by not entirely honest means , gained Stalin's trust and unexpectedly (nobody knew him that well ) found himself at the head of the Transcaucasian party organizations. Subsequently, he literally did everything to exalt his personality, directed all his activities to this . He did not tolerate any criticism or contradiction. Having left Georgia in 1937 , 46 , he left his understudies. Officially, he was the secretary of the Central Committee, the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, unofficially he left understudies - Shariy and .... who actually ignored the Central Committee. did not respect the Council of People's Commissars, sat on their heads, with the support of Beria were left. and then they still managed to expose them, they told him . He limited himself to calling them and giving them a verbal dressing down . What Beria did from the point of view of Georgian affairs can be seen in the so-called provocative Mingrelian case. Beria knew this better than anyone from the very beginning. He knew from the very beginning that this was a provocation, but until the last moment, until it became advantageous to him , he said nothing about it. On the contrary, what he said when he came to the IV Plenum in 1952, 47 and now, when I reviewed his speech at this Plenum, and what he has just written are completely different things. He knew each of these workers well - both the past and the present, he knew who provoked and who did not provoke. And during Comrade Stalin's life, he did nothing to clarify this matter. After Comrade Stalin's death, when he became head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, he needed to drag this matter out and, as it were, create authority on this.

I must say that I fully agree with Comrade Bulganin's speech that Georgian affairs had a boss. This bossiness oppressed us until the very last days. It was impossible to work independently, it was impossible to bury a dead person without being told where to bury him. This wore us out, especially that impudent Sharia. Beria almost never contacted me personally; everything was through Sharia. The arrangement of some personnel is still unfavorable.

I fully agree with Comrade Khrushchev's statement that this case was indeed provocative from start to finish, but there were certain individuals to blame for this case, who were nevertheless correctly arrested, for example Sharia. But Sharia was released long before the decision of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. The decision of the CPSU Central Committee was made on April 10 of this year, and Sharia was released in mid-March. I think that no one needs to be asked about this . Among some of the workers involved in this case, there were certain workers who had no political charges, but had serious economic omissions, for which they should be punished .

Now it turns out that there is amnesty all around, people are strutting around, and some of them are demanding high positions, no lower than Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers or no lower than Minister.

Voice from the floor. Many were appointed.

Bakradze: Overall, the case is provocative, but in terms of individual personalities, in my opinion, we still need to sort it out .

I would like to dwell on one more issue. Vyacheslav Mikhailovich, all this fuss that Beoia started with the Georgian Menshevik emigration, 48 it seems to me that I have always been against it with all my heart. I told Charkviani at the time: "Listen, leave this bandit scum, who needs them in Georgia ." They are messing around with the Menshevik Georgian emigration in order to bring them here. It seems to me that in light of today's facts and what has become clear about Beria, this undertaking is not accidental.

As for the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the party leadership. Well, dear comrades, in Georgia the Ministry of Internal Affairs has been in charge of everything for a long time now. When Beria was in charge there, he had the Ministry of Internal Affairs in his pocket, and when he left, they appointed Rapava. He didn’t take anyone into account. Rukhadze didn’t take anyone into account either. Now, after the decision of the CPSU Central Committee, they obviously don’t trust us, they sent controllers in the form of the Georgian Minister of Internal Affairs Dekanozov and Mamulov to the party apparatus . When we received the decision of the Central Committee, we didn’t understand the appointment of Mamulov and Dekanozov with their introduction to the Bureau, and after the decision of the Presidium, Beria summoned me, as well as Dekanozov and Mamulov , and suggested that all issues be discussed only in the presence of Dekanozov and Mamulov. Dekanozov sat down as Minister of Internal Affairs.

Before that, at least the police chief reported to the Prime Minister about some criminal offenses committed in the city of Tbilisi. From that day on, that stopped too. Absolutely stopped. The man sat there for more than two months, and never called, never came in. I already said that it was impossible, I told Comrade Ketskhoveli that when we were in Moscow, we would raise this issue.

I would like to tell you about one more thing. The Presidium of the Central Committee instructed me to report to the Plenum on the Central Committee’s decisions on the Mingrelian issue. 49 After the decision of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Beria called and asked if I had received the decision. I said that I had. — Have you read it? — I said that I had read it. — How will you report it? — I said that I was thinking of reading the Central Committee’s decision. — No, he said, read it point by point. — There was a report and the minutes of the investigative commission.

That's it, he says, reading it from point to point. I say: good. Before the meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Comrade Malenkov received us, instructed us, told us how to do all this, and we held a plenum. I thought that we held the plenum correctly, but someone passed on the information. As it turned out later, the transcript of the Tbilisi plenum, the plenum of the Central Committee, was passed on to Beria Dekanozov. Suddenly the phone rang, I was sitting in the Council of Ministers. Beria says: what have you done? How did you hold the plenum? I say: well held. - Nothing of the sort, we held the plenum incorrectly, you don't understand anything, you're a canner, not a politician . (Laughter in the hall.)

True. I worked as the Minister of Food Industry of Georgia for five years and did something in this direction with the help of the Government. And he tells me that you don’t understand anything about politics. We were instructed here: hold a plenum, explain everything thoroughly, then call a congress. And don’t get into the weeds. That’s what we did. But we were forced to open a big campaign, because they know how to do that, all the activists got involved, they dropped their work, they failed the sowing. I say: we are failing the sowing, and in response to me - what sowing, we need to get involved in politics . (Laughter in the hall.)

Politics is handled by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government, and I must implement the directives of the Party and the Government. These directives say that collective farms should be strengthened, that state plans should be drawn up correctly and implemented, that our agriculture should grow stronger, that the political situation in the city and village should be strong. What other politics are needed? I cannot handle international politics, Comrade Molotov handles that. (Laughter in the hall.)

He didn't call me again. Now it's clear to me that he was demanding some other policy.

When I read in the press about Kobulov's appointment, my heart sank Although I had no direct facts, I knew this man as not entirely honest and then I said: who needed to drag him over to us, after all, he was kicked out during Stalin's lifetime. And so it happened, Beria gathered whoever he wanted .

I must report to the Plenum and Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU that even after the decision of April 10 on Georgian affairs , not everything has settled down, much has not been done, they interfered with us, we were not able to do everything. Comrade Bulganin spoke here about our affairs, I think that the Central Committee will help us sort things out to the end and normalize the situation. Now our situation is clear, abnormal, some people have sat on our heads, have become insolent. Beria conducted such a policy that part of the non-Soviet intelligentsia has become insolent, put their feet on the table. This is wrong, you can’t let people loose like that.

Regarding amnesty. People do not understand why murderers and bandits have returned to freedom and are killing people again. Much in this matter needs to be corrected.

The situation with agriculture is also difficult. Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev said that the number of cows in the Union decreased by 300 thousand .

In just one year, we have lost 63 thousand heads of cattle among collective farmers. There are some regions where 80% of collective farmers do not have any cattle at all. The situation is difficult. We need to fix all this, we need to work, but we have been confused here.

After the current Plenum, after the report that we heard regarding the exposure of a scoundrel, a major spy, a saboteur, and apparently not new, they said here that in 1937 he was in intelligence. This is news to me .

Everything that we have heard here regarding the exposure of the scoundrel, undoubtedly, I personally and the entire party have confidence, faith, and authority in our collective leadership, which is growing even more. Undoubtedly, not only the Plenum of the Central Committee, but the entire Communist Party will greet the decision of the Plenum regarding the scoundrel Beria with the greatest satisfaction and approval .

As for the Communist Party of Georgia, created in the distant past by Comrade Stalin, on the whole it is certainly healthy and united around the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union .

The Communist Party of Georgia, and Georgia as a whole , is and will always be one of the loyal detachments and reliable support of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. (Applause.)

As for the attitude of the Georgian people to all these matters, I can, comrades, assure the Plenum that the Georgian people many decades ago, saving themselves from physical and national destruction, united their fate with the great Russian people for all eternity 50 and no scoundrels like Beria will succeed in ruining the friendship of the Georgian people with the great Russian people, their devotion to the great friendship of the peoples of the Soviet Union, their confidence and devotion to the Soviet system, their great devotion to the cause of Lenin and Stalin. (Applause.)

Next - Khrushchev: Comrade Kaganovich has the floor. Comrade Bagirov, get ready.