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Lavrenty Beria Case
Soviet Archives/Beria Case/Beria Case Plenum.pdf
SESSION FOUR July 4
Chairman Comrade Khrushchev. Let us continue the work of the Plenum, comrades. Comrade Andrianov has the floor. Comrade Voroshilov, prepare.
Andrianov: Comrades! The resolution of the Presidium of the Central Committee on the enemy of the people Beria is the only correct and timely decision. Members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, comrades Malenkov, Khrushchev, Molotov, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, thoroughly and with all the necessary completeness revealed the face of this conspirator and insidious enemy.
As has now become quite clear, we are not talking about a simple careerist, an upstart. This is a dangerous enemy - a traitor who has penetrated into the core of leadership - the brain of our party, who had in his dirty hands an armed, and in some part loyal to him, apparatus. This is a man of the Bonapartist spirit, ready to go to power through mountains of corpses and rivers of blood.
This is why the creative activity of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the government was so difficult. This is precisely where the profound and courageous measures taken by the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU can be seen, which made it possible to neutralize this beast without the slightest shock. His main aspiration was to seize power in order to elevate himself to the rank of dictator in the style of Tito-Rankovich, and to replace the ideological foundations of our party - Marxism - with Americanism. Therefore, it is no accident that he aspired to rapprochement with Tito-Rankovich.
That is why, comrades, we are all deeply confident that the Plenum of the Central Committee and our entire party will unanimously approve this wise and at the same time courageous decision of the Presidium of the Central Committee of our party.
We, local workers, did not know much before the Plenum of the Central Committee, and it was difficult to assume the treachery of this man even slightly. When dealing with him on business, many had to listen to all sorts of insolence from him, not excluding the obscenities with which he equipped almost every remark. Often we attributed this to his specific nature, taking into account his position, and besides, we were afraid, since he could achieve his goal.
After the death of Comrade Stalin, he bit the bullet and, stopping at nothing and no one, achieved his goal . First of all, in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and locally, in the regions and republics, he carried out a mass replacement of Chekist personnel, and in selecting personnel he was guided by the sole principle of personal loyalty. The opinions of the party organs, as it turned out at the Plenum, were not taken into account and were recklessly trampled. On this issue, about personnel, I would like to dwell on the example of the Leningrad region. In the Leningrad region, about a year before this, in place of the dismissed bankrupt head of the Department, a comrade who was just beginning to get involved in the matter was approved by the Central Committee of the Party . New leadership came to the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs - they replaced the head of the Leningrad Regional Department, despite the objections of the Regional Party Committee, allegedly under the guise of illness, although he was a healthy person and did not want to admit that he was sick. I contacted the Ministry of Internal Affairs to find out the reasons for the dismissal and to ask to leave the working head of the department in his job. Apart from rudeness and impudence, nothing could be heard. I did not agree with such behavior of the Ministry and appealed to the Central Committee of the Party , especially since I knew that a number of dubious people were nominated to leadership positions in the Ministry , for example, the former head of the Leningrad Directorate Gorlinsky, removed by the decision of the Central Committee and dismissed from the organs, I will talk about him below. He was approved as the head of the Economic Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Union. Another "figure" was nominated to a responsible post in the Ministry . Rodionov, who was engaged in provocations in the Ministry and locally, one of the active participants in the concocted provocation case about Comrade Shakhurin and others, dismissed from the organs by the decision of the Central Committee before that , were nominated to the Ministry by such people as Kobulov and others. It seemed to me that such a concentration of forces in the Ministry of Internal Affairs was dangerous , and the practice of selecting personnel was unacceptable. I expressed my thoughts on all this to the Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Comrade Shatalin. I directly stated that it was unacceptable to have a dangerous concentration of dubious people in the Ministry and that the head of the Leningrad Region Directorate had been removed incorrectly. The new head of the Leningrad Directorate did arrive. He was appointed Minister and began to perform his duties. Apparently, he knew about my attitude to the transfer or for some other reasons, but did not come to me, did not consider it necessary to inform the regional party committee. Moreover, he forbade his staff to go to party organs.
About a month ago I was forced to call Comrade Kruglov at the Ministry of Internal Affairs and ask him to pay attention to the incorrect behavior of the head of the Department, so that he would change his attitude toward the regional party committee. I do not consider it necessary to talk here about the dirty tricks of this man, who, bypassing the Central Committee, collected all sorts of materials on party organs for information to the Ministry of Internal Affairs .
On the issue of amnesty. I think that the provocateurs from the Ministry of Internal Affairs left a dirty mark on this useful matter. Notorious thugs were released, even without any elementary training on the part of the police. As soon as these people appeared in the city, the daggers started working. An alarming situation arose among the population. And certainly justified complaints were sent to local authorities, to the Government, and to the Central Committee. The Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party, Comrade Khrushchev, drew our attention to the need to restore public order in the city of Leningrad and the region. We heard about the situation with ensuring public order at the regional committee bureau, outlined a number of measures for the fastest possible restoration of order, and criticized the police for their poor work.
The regional committee's interference in this matter was perceived painfully. When they began to correct these shortcomings, the Ministry of Internal Affairs bodies allowed distortions and unfounded, indiscriminate arrests of people. Instead of striking at the hooligans, many honest people were attacked . One could cite a number of other examples characterizing the arbitrariness of some employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
The question arises: why have such things been happening in the Ministry of Internal Affairs for a number of years? What is the matter here?
It seems to me, comrades, that it was certainly bad that such vile, if I may say so, people like Yagoda, Yezhov, Abakumov, Beria were making their way to the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs . They kept honest people and even the governing bodies in fear rather than their enemies, and all the basic norms of relations between the party and the Ministry of Internal Affairs were violated. The disproportionately large apparatus of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, costing 18 billion rubles, turned into such a brainchild that it stopped even taking into account the person who created this body. They held much in their hands in the country, but they fought the enemies poorly, as was quite rightly noted here at the Plenum.
It would be unforgivable to underestimate and belittle the role of Soviet intelligence. It is therefore not a question of weakening, but of strengthening intelligence, of doing everything to put it in its place. Comrade Stalin drew attention in good time to the fact that the spearhead of Soviet intelligence should now be turned against external enemies. Beria, for his own selfish purposes, completely ignored and discarded this Stalinist position. Contrary to the decisions of the Central Committee, he introduced economic and secret-political directorates and departments at the center and in the regions, when the situation at the time did not require this, and especially since such a structure contradicted the decision of the Central Committee of the Party. Other internal directorates and departments were also inflated, and intelligence and counterintelligence work was secondary, abandoned . The regional apparatuses were inflated, made colossal, and thousands of people were planted .
If we add to this and take into account that agents were planted in a number of cases without need or benefit for the cause in almost every institution and enterprise, then it is difficult to imagine fruitful, well-thought-out work for the actual intelligence and counterintelligence work of the Chekists. If in some places it was necessary to take a closer look at what kind of agents they were planting, then, comrades, one had to be perplexed as to who and with whom they were working.
Some time ago, while Comrade Stalin was still alive, we accidentally discovered that one of the terrorists who participated in the murder of Sergei Mironovich Kirov was brought from the camps to Leningrad to work, as we were told by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, among the anti-Soviet intelligentsia.
The second case: an agent of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Directorate was exposed, who was persuading a citizen to commit a terrorist act - the murder of one of the leaders who came to Leningrad. This person, whom the agent was persuading, honestly came, and told us about it . When we began to find out what kind of person it was who was persuading such provocations , then the directorate told us that the agent of the directorate was conducting such conversations allegedly to check the intentions of the person with whom he was talking. Of course, the provocation is obvious. Therefore, I wrote a note to Comrade Stalin on this issue and other equally important matters . Beria, among others, was entrusted with analyzing my note , but he did not say a word about these outrageous outrages that were set out in the note. Moreover, the former head of the department Gorlinsky, whom I mentioned above, was removed for these and other unseemly deeds, removed by the Central Committee with the active help of Comrade Malenkov personally and dismissed at one time from the organs, but when Beria came to the Ministry of Internal Affairs , this Gorlinsky ended up as the head of the Economic Department of the Ministry of the Union, and Rodionov was also promoted to a leading position in the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Union . What could be expected from such personnel?
It seems to me, comrades, that it is also wrong when we sometimes overestimate the work of the organs. In fact, we resolve any issue more quickly and often without discrimination when the question is brought up by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, rather than by other, more competent organs . This can be judged by the notes that we know about, as well as by a number of local facts. Moreover, some "activists" from the organs were made into specialists in Marxist theory, in the national question, whereas upon some familiarization it turned out that such "activists" had little to do with Marxism, and their offices were filled not with literature, but with means of debauchery. Such truth is, of course, bitter to hear, but the facts require that the proper conclusions be drawn from them.
In the national question, the exposed provocateur has caused great harm. He tried to oppose and embitter other nationalities against the Russian people. He inspired and activated the bourgeois nationalists. This is, undoubtedly, a great act of sabotage.
Furthermore, there is, it seems to me, a not entirely correct practice when, when appointing senior officials, including party officials, we, as a rule, resort to checking these officials through the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, while all the possibilities, and no less, are in the hands of the party bodies themselves. It is necessary to put everything in its place and oblige the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to conduct work in full accordance with the decision of the Central Committee on active reconnaissance against our external enemies.
In the Leningrad Region Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs we have an expensive, thousand-strong device, but this device has not revealed a single American or English intelligence officer, although the Leningrad Region, as is known, borders other countries both by sea and by land.
It is imperative, as Comrade Malenkov quite correctly said in his speech, to strengthen the leadership of the party at all levels and put an end once and for all to the violation of the norms of relations between the party and the Ministry of Internal Affairs , to increase the ideological education of Chekist cadres, to raise the responsibility of party organs for the implementation of daily and specific leadership of organs, constantly striving to increase revolutionary vigilance.
Comrades, I think there is no need to exaggerate the personality of this villain. The party masses and the people do not know him, he has never been anywhere, he did not know the life of party organizations. The leading cadres knew him as a bold and rude person, and now they know him as a provocateur and a traitor.
The Leningrad party organization, deeply devoted to the Central Committee of our party, like our entire party, will unanimously approve the decisions of the Central Committee and brand this insidious villain with shame and will rally even more closely around the Leninist-Stalinist Central Committee, our great Communist Party. (Applause.)
Chairman comrade Khrushchev. Comrade Voroshilov has the floor, Ketskhoveli, prepare.
Voroshilov: Comrades, the decision of the Presidium of the Central Committee of our party to expel Beria from its ranks and arrest him, as well as the current discussion of this issue at the Plenum of the Central Committee, are matters of great state and political importance, aimed at preserving the unity of the leading core of our party, and therefore the unity of the party and the people, aimed at ensuring Stalin's leadership of the party and the state and the further success of our entire cause.
Comrade Malenkov's report, the speeches of the members of the Presidium and the Central Committee have quite fully revealed all the criminal abomination of the traitor Beria, and have given an exhaustive and vivid description of this criminal adventurer . However, the question reasonably arises as to why this individual was able to operate unhindered in the leadership of the party and state for such a long time , without having been previously exposed, enjoyed such great authority, and occupied such high party and state posts? The question is entirely legitimate.
First of all, comrades, in answering this question, I must emphasize that I fully subscribe to the detailed report of comrade Malenkov . And on my own behalf I will say that it must be borne in mind that Beria is the type of insidious, cunning enemy, the type of a complete adventurer, an intriguer who knew how to cleverly gain the trust of the leader , who knew how to hide his vile plans for a long time and wait for a convenient moment for himself . He saw the daily life of the great Stalin. Together with the rest of us , he knew that Stalin, as a result of intense work in recent years, often began to fall ill . Obviously, this circumstance to a certain extent served as the basis for Beria's vile tactics . He waited in the hope that sooner or later Stalin would be gone. As the facts have now shown, after Stalin's death this adventurer hoped for the rapid implementation of his criminal plans against the party and the state. That is why he was in such a hurry after Stalin's death, and perhaps he was hurried. It is not all clear to us yet, we do not know everything yet , maybe he was hurried, pushed to speed up his criminal adventure . But all this vile and criminal fuss of the traitor is solved, well understood, and stopped in time.
During the life of the great Stalin, Beria was impudent, rude, arrogant, brazen, always trying to show his "superiority" over others, did not take into account the human dignity of those around him and especially those subordinate to him, be they ministers or scientists, or his comrades at work - he bullied everyone . Comrade Zverev looks at me and thinks: Voroshilov is telling the truth . How many nasty and rude things he said to Comrade Zverev over the years and how much undeserved insult he inflicted on him . There is not a single comrade here , at the Plenum of the Central Committee, from among the members of the government, towards whom Beria would not have spewed out at various times the most impudent, brazen and completely unprovoked insults and grievances on his part. All these insults rained down on people at official meetings, in the presence of many responsible comrades . With all this, he knew how to court the people he needed, to treat them in a familiar manner . That’s why there were always people who were on good terms with him for a day or two.
With all these qualities of his, Beria was afraid of Stalin, he fawned on him, he fawned on him in his own way, skillfully; he whispered all sorts of nasty things, he misled him . And only by the mood of Comrade Stalin, when we met in business and non-business settings, we all felt about whom of us had been “ whispered ”. (Laughter in the hall.) I recall how at one time, this is known to both Comrades Molotov, Kaganovich, and especially to the Georgians of Tbilisi, in particular to those who are present here, what a vile role Beria played in the life of the remarkable communist Sergo Ordzhonikidze. He did everything to slander, to besmirch this truly crystal-clear man and Bolshevik in front of Stalin. Sergo Ordzhonikidze told not only me, but also other comrades terrible things about this man, already then seeing in him a real enemy. He said that he was both an impudent person and an enemy who would still show himself .
Voices from the audience: Correct.
Voroshilov. He set the people he worked with against each other, creating an atmosphere of nervousness. Beria pursued this line of disunity throughout all the years of his work. He became especially unbridled during the illness and after the death of Comrade Stalin. Stalin was still alive, in a grave , unconscious state, and Beria had already begun to act. He is the first in everything and constantly, he proposes everything, he foresees everything, he knows everything, he commands everyone. Is that how it was, comrades? (Addressing the members of the Presidium.)
Voices from the Presidium: Yes, that's right.
Voroshilov. We were with our Stalin until his last breath , and Beria immediately demonstrated his “activity” – like, keep in mind, I’m here. They nominated Georgy Maximilianovich Malenkov for the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers . We all recognized Comrade Malenkov as a natural and legitimate candidate. Beria was unable to propose to himself , and it was impossible to expect that any of us would name him. (Laughter in the hall. Applause.) Therefore, he decided to take a roundabout , special route to the chairmanship of the Council of Ministers. He chose the path of the enemy, but even in this roundabout route he chose the most roundabout roads. First, he began with amnesty. We all saw that this act contained much that could be called “from the evil one,” but nevertheless, the Decree on Amnesty was to a certain extent a useful act . I must say that I have recently become familiar with our judicial practice and its results. In this area, things are, frankly speaking, not going well for us; our courts work hard and, applying the laws, especially the decrees of June 4, 1949, "On the Protection of Public and Personal Property", they issue excessively harsh sentences, often for trivial crimes and even simple misdemeanors to a large number of people. The amnesty mainly applies to this category of offenders . There has been too much talk lately about swindlers and repeat offenders . Much is said and especially written in anonymous and signed letters about murders, violence, etc. in connection with the alleged amnesty. However, when you inquire with responsible officials in those places from which alarming reports are coming, it turns out that in fact there is nothing like what is being reported.
The second act is the cleansing of the Augean stables of the Ministry of Internal Affairs . Everyone knows that Beria, throughout his entire stay in Moscow, was either the direct head of the MGB or was its patron . And those abominations and crimes that have now been uncovered in this most responsible department are, to a large extent, the result of Beria's own activities .
Voices. Correct.
Voroshilov. Mr. Beria was counting on this department, or rather, this individual was relying on certain "his" people . Suddenly , everyone started talking: Minister Beria discovered, Beria proposed, Beria exposed, Beria cleaned out the Ministry of Internal Affairs, etc., etc., and at the same time, he was openly shoving his people into places that corresponded to his plans.
Voices. Correct.
Voroshilov. He was distributing his forces, thinking that he could win at the right moment. It seems to me, comrades, that despite the fact that this man was cunning and, it seemed, not stupid , but this scoundrel, fortunately, did not have any real intelligence . And he did not know the Ministry of Internal Affairs, this very important state body, and did not know it in recent times, because there, along with the scoundrels who really did dirty work against the party and the government, the majority of the Ministry of Internal Affairs employees worked honestly, these are people on whom we can completely rely even now.
Voices. Correct.
Voroshilov: It is no coincidence that after Beria's arrest, not one of these people wrote a letter saying : "What have you done with our great leader, how will we manage without our Beria? ..." (Laughter.) Nothing like that happened. No one considered him a leader, no one really knows him and spits on him, and if we tell him what he was like in reality, everyone will remember this adventurer with a feeling of disgust .
Voices. Correct.
Voroshilov. He counted on first advertising himself , extolling himself , and then gradually getting closer to the intended goal . What abominations was he capable of? Yes, of everything, including the most monstrous ones. Thanks to the comrades sitting here, they exposed him. I was the last to know about it, though . (Laughter.) But I never trusted him, he sensed it and did not particularly "respect" me.
Malenkov: Correct.
Voices. Correct.
Voroshilov: We got rid of him in time. You can't assume, comrades, that this guy is just an adventurer. It's easy to imagine that if this scoundrel had stayed in his place longer, the entire top of the government could have disappeared at one time .
Voices. Correct.
Voroshilov: Finding ourselves in such a complex international situation surrounding us , having, so to speak, a kind of international camouflage (laughter), we would have found ourselves in a very difficult position. Therefore, now we must admit that this gentleman was removed in time. This is the greatest merit of our comrades from the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Party, and now of the entire Central Committee, which unanimously and with a genuine understanding of the seriousness of the matter examined this issue. (Stormy applause.)
After the death of the great Stalin, the tasks facing our party, its Central Committee , the state, the Soviet people as a whole, demanded, dictated to us the preservation of unity in our ranks, solidity, and strength. Each of us guarded the party as the apple of our eye, its steadfastness-unity and loyalty to the precepts of Lenin-Stalin .
We have made the unity of the leadership of the Party and the Government our sacred and obligatory task, with or without collusion . Each of us, even during Stalin's illness, and especially at the grave of our great leader, internally experienced all of this. We understood that unity is everything, the unity of feelings , thoughts and actions, the path that was shown to us by the great Lenin and Stalin, the path that we must at all costs keep free for our movement forward - this is our sacred and immutable task. And that vile enemy Beria believed that we, overwhelmed by such great grief, did not notice his vile tricks and machinations . This explains why he worked hard for three months and imposed some things on us, even things that we would not have wanted. Here I must say frankly that we needed to give this guy some freedom for a while , let him go wild further. And we saw, as I have already said, where this led. The final goal of this subject only became completely clear during his three-month exercises.
Our task, comrades, now consists not only in branding the crimes of Beria, who has done much harm to our cause, but also in directing our efforts to the implementation of all those plans that the great Stalin outlined for us together with our entire party. Today we are faced with some tasks that are particularly prominent. Comrade Malenkov spoke about this here, and other comrades have spoken about this, that we must cleanse ourselves of this filth, and this filth (the Russians have many good sayings, and one of them is to a certain extent appropriate here - every cloud has a silver lining) - this is a great evil, but the good will be no less. In what sense? We will now be more circumspect, more careful, more vigilant , and we will more quickly recognize and expose all sorts of scoundrels .
This is one task. But the main task that we must now, while maintaining the unity of our ranks, while preserving the strength of the ranks and the purity of our party, is to ensure that our economy and politics, both domestic and international, correspond to the place and position that our socialist state occupies in the world.
Our agriculture is, as has already been said here , in a somewhat neglected state. It is necessary to pay more attention to agriculture, to collective farming . Our state farms - Comrade Skvortsov, don't smile , you have worked hard, but have not done much to strengthen them - we need to make them real Soviet farms, profitable, exemplary in all respects , now they are very bad , unprofitable.
Voice. Correct.
Voroshilov: We need to truly raise our entire agriculture, both public and state, to the proper level.
Voice. Correct.
Voroshilov: This is a big, difficult, but urgent and quite solvable task. I will not speak about other issues: our industry as a whole and other issues of economy and culture are more or less in a proper state, but agriculture needs vigilance and, I would say, great attention from our party and the state.
Having cleansed ourselves of the traitor Beria and his ilk, if they still exist and will be encountered anywhere, we become only stronger, more united, even more confident in the rightness of our great cause - the cause of Lenin and Stalin. No enemy will knock us off that glorious path that was shown to us and to humanity by Lenin and Stalin. Our wise party has led and will lead the Soviet people with a confident gait to those shining heights of communism for which we have fought, are fighting, and are convinced that in this fight we will emerge victorious. (Prolonged applause.)
Chairman, Comrade Khrushchev. Comrade Ketskhoveli has the floor. 29. Comrade Arutsinov (Armenia), please prepare.
Chairman Comrade Khrushchev. Comrade Arutinov has the floor. Comrade Andrei Andreevich Andreyev, please prepare.
Arutinov. I consider the resolution of the Presidium of the Central Committee to expose the adventurer Beria and arrest him to be the correct Leninist-Stalinist approach to assessing the actions of Beria, this careerist and adventurer who resorted to any means to seize power .
I have not met Beria for the last 7-8 years, but when I was in Georgia, I worked during the period when Beria was the secretary of the Central Committee and the secretary of the regional party committee. The traits that have emerged in Beria recently , which we learned in detail from Comrade Malenkov's report and the speeches of the Presidium members, these traits had been evident in him before. This careerism, an unbridled desire for power, he subordinated everything to this - his attitude towards people, his attitude towards party cadres, his attitude towards the leaders of the party and government, and the behavior that Comrade Voroshilov spoke about in relation to Beria's provocation against Sergo Ordzhonikidze in the last years of his life.
Beria treated personnel exclusively from the point of view of using them not for the interests of the party, but in order to advance himself higher in the leadership. He had the habit of being almost a sycophant in relation to leading comrades - to ministers or other workers who have access to the leadership and can put in a good word for him, he established sycophantic relations for the time being, until he uses him, and then he begins to ridicule in inaccessible forms, laconically, in two or three words, in order to cool the political face of any leader.
The question is: how did all the previously known negative features take such monstrous forms and no one noticed this, did not take timely measures? In my opinion, one circumstance provides an explanation for this question - this is that the Central Committee absolutely correctly proclaimed the slogan of unity and cohesion both in the ranks of the party and, first of all, in the leading core of the party and the government as the main task facing the party after the death of Comrade Stalin .
Our party organizations have accepted the appeal of the Central Committee with exceptional approval. It is precisely this absolutely correct appeal and the correct formulation of the question that can fill the great loss that the party suffered with the death of Comrade Stalin. It seems to me that Beria wanted to use the atmosphere of unanimity and solidarity in his careerist interests, being convinced that in this atmosphere they would not so easily break away or condemn his adventurist actions , he used this atmosphere and began to put his feet on the table, which we were convinced of after familiarizing ourselves with the facts.
On the other hand, the atmosphere of unanimity among the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee helped expose him. Everyone knows that he was afraid of Stalin, had been afraid of him for a long time, ever since he worked in Georgia. After Stalin's death, he almost stopped taking into account the leaders of the party and government . I have not seen him in recent years, but from the documents that I read in the appendices to the minutes of the Presidium, I am convinced that this man does not take anyone into account, puts his own personal self above all else, tried to put pressure on the party in order to occupy a certain position as the successor of our leader, Comrade Stalin .
Knowing his careerist traits, when I read these documents, I was overcome with fear for the threat to the unity of the party leadership . I was also overcome with fear on Red Square when Beria spoke second. Then I thought that if he ends up in the leading troika, he will definitely strive for complete power. He has no party spirit, no principles in his actions, just as he never had such devotion to Stalin as he tried to portray by publishing a book on the history of the Transcaucasian party organizations . Comrade Molotov was right here that this book was not compiled by him, this is not his work on the history of the Transcaucasian party organizations.
He hasn't read a single book. How could he raise the party archives, raise these documents? Many people working in Georgia know that a certain Bedia and a renegade, a Menshevik well-known in Georgia, Pavel Sakvarlidze, participated in the compilation of this book. I don't know why the Georgian comrades don't talk about it. That's who authored this book. (Animation in the hall.) The whole point is that the party archives were raised earlier than our central party institutions could have raised them. That's the story of this book. The book was published for the purpose of a career. He achieved recognition that Beria was one of the Stalinists in the Transcaucasian organizations, who was the first to see the exceptional role of Comrade Stalin in the struggle to create our party.
I would also like to say something about some cadres. It is known that Beria, being a non-party man, being unprincipled, was a real ataman. He approached cadres from the point of view of their personal loyalty to him. He did not recognize, did not respect even a drop of party loyalty in a person. He could destroy anyone, any person loyal to the party . It is known how many good party cadres he killed in Georgia in 1937 only because many of them did not recognize him. It seems to me that in many places such cadres were placed who were loyal not to the party , but to him personally. Why he did this, we have learned now. Therefore, from the point of view of learning lessons from this great event and from the point of view of all of us helping the party to carry out the necessary work, it is necessary to carefully study the cadres placed by Beria in some areas .
Shatalin: And you tell me.
Arutinov: Here we are talking about the Ministry of Internal Affairs, we are talking about some Transcaucasian workers.
Voices. Correct.
Arutinov: I, not considering myself an outsider to the Georgian Republic, draw conclusions from the speeches of the Georgian comrades at this Plenum of the Central Committee .
Voices. Correct.
Arutinov: Comrades, I will not drag this out for long. I recalled the period in which I was aware of the matter, and what anti-party traits I noticed in Beria at that time . I must say that now the Presidium of the Central Committee can be firmly confident that the entire party will support this decision of the Central Committee of the party, including the party organizations of Transcaucasia and the workers of the Transcaucasian republics will unanimously approve and will even more closely unite their ranks around the Leninist-Stalinist Central Committee and our Soviet government. (Applause.)
Chairman, Comrade Khrushchev. Comrade Andrei Andreevich Andreev has the floor. Comrade Tevosyan, please prepare.
Andreev: Comrades, I think it is very right that our Presidium did not limit itself to a simple report, but decided to conduct a thorough discussion of the Beria case at the Plenum in order to reveal the real face of this enemy, his goals, his tactics, and to draw all the necessary lessons from this.
Beria is an unusual type of the enemies that our party previously fought against , and he pursued unusual tactics compared to previously exposed enemies .
It is true that he was (yesterday Comrade Zavenyagin, speaking, spoke about this), he was a bureaucrat , rude, cynical, treated people badly, but this would be too simple an explanation of the face of this enemy. It seems to me that from the clear statements that Comrade Malenkov made in his report, the speeches of the members of the Presidium and the members of the Central Committee at the Plenum, it is evident that in the person of Beria the old provocateur has been exposed, which he undoubtedly was long before his transfer to Moscow. Now it has become obvious that his brochure , which had been so extolled for some time, was only an approach to the beginning of his broad hostile work.
I do not agree with comrade Zavenyagin that Beria was a narrow-minded person. No, comrades, we should not underestimate his abilities and the harm he caused . He was a smart, very clever enemy, otherwise he would have been exposed long ago, but look how long he held out. And finally , it is clear that he was a seasoned, very insidious, and dangerous political enemy of international scale, an agent of the imperialists. I think there is no doubt about this, he was not alone.
Voices. Correct.
Andreyev. If he could not have a more or less large number of his supporters in our country, he certainly relied on some force, and this force fed him , pushed him, dictated. He was certainly an international agent of the imperialists. Experience tells us that all the enemies of the party and Soviet power exposed so far were in one way or another connected with foreign intelligence services or general staffs, from where they were given directives. Beria could not be an exception. It is possible that they counted on him as a dictator of the fascist type. And I think that we must suck every sinew out of this scoundrel , so that there would be a clear picture of his relations with foreign countries, whom and how he served , then a lot will be revealed to us. We still do not know everything about him, the investigation must reveal all aspects of his enemy work. But even now, what the comrades members of the Presidium have told us is clear that he had a carefully developed plan, of course not by him alone, but dictated by his masters, for the liquidation of the Soviet system in our country.
What was Beria's plan? Unlike what the enemies of our people had carried out before, his plan was somewhat different . To split our party, as his predecessors had tried to do , is a hopeless endeavor, because our party is an unshakable monolith . To use terror, to incapacitate individual leaders, is also a proven endeavor in the sense that the party will unite even more after this. I do not mean to say that the enemies have abandoned terror; they will continue to use terror, and we must be vigilant in this regard .
Beria's plan in this sense differed from the plan of the traitors of the Soviet people, the former enemies. As is now clear, this plan consisted of:
First, to gain Comrade Stalin's trust at all costs. He considered this the main condition for his hostile activity . And so he used every means to gain Comrade Stalin's trust. Did he achieve this? Of course, he did. This was the first great harm that was done. Here, comrades have already said that Comrade Stalin had the weakness of excessive trust. This is true.
The second and, obviously , the main task that he had in his plan was to break the Bolshevik core of our leadership . You know that all our enemies, in order to weaken the leadership in the party, to disorganize the party - this foundation of everything - have long been trying to somehow shake, break the Bolshevik core, but they have not succeeded . And Beria, obviously, set this task as the main task - to break the Bolshevik core, to undermine the trust of individual leaders in Comrade Stalin, to sow discord within the leaders of the party and the government .
Did he achieve anything in this regard? Certainly, he did, temporarily.
Here comrade Voroshilov spoke in relation to comrade Ordzhonikidze. Sergo was the most honest, noblest Bolshevik, and there is no doubt that he became a victim of Beria's intrigues...
Voice. Correct.
Andreev. Beria caused a quarrel between Comrade Stalin and Ordzhonikidze, and Comrade Sergo's noble heart could not stand it: thus Beria put out of action one of the best leaders of the party and friends of Comrade Stalin.
Further. All of us, old members of the Central Committee, and new ones too, know what a warm friendship there was between Comrade Stalin and Molotov. We all considered this friendship natural and were happy about it . But then Beria appeared in Moscow – and everything changed radically, Comrade Stalin’s relations with Comrade Molotov deteriorated. Comrade Molotov began to be subjected to undeserved attacks from Comrade Stalin. It was Beria who , with his intrigues, succeeded in undermining the close friendship between Comrade Stalin and Comrade Molotov.
Let's take other facts about comrade Malenkov. Beria knew that comrade Stalin trusted comrade Malenkov completely and fully, considered him his friend. And so Beria needed to incite comrade Malenkov. As a true provocateur , pretending to be Malenkov's friend, in fact he cleverly concocted the Shakhurin and Novikov case. This case was undoubtedly done by Beria.
Voices. Correct.
Andreev. It is known that during the difficult years of transport restoration and during the war, Comrade Kaganovich did a lot for the successful operation of transport. And as soon as Beria , as a member of the Defense Committee , achieved patronage over transport, Comrade Kaganovich was relieved of his post as head of transport after some time , and Khrulyov, who understood nothing about railway transport, was appointed in his place .
Let's take this question. Everyone knows who Voroshilov is, what his specific weight is in our party, and everyone knows about the long-standing and close friendship of Comrade Stalin with Voroshilov. With the appearance of Beria, the situation changes completely, the friendship is broken, Comrade Voroshilov actually finds himself outside of leadership work for some time. This was the work of Beria.
Voroshilov. He worked and worked.
Andreyev: The same can be said about other members of the Politburo, for example, Khrushchev, Mikoyan, who were also subjected to great attacks. From all this it is clear , comrades, that he tried in every way to ensure that all members of the Politburo were marked in some way , that they had blemishes, but he, you see , was clean. And in fact, look, you can’t bring anything against him – he’s clean. (Laughter in the hall.) It was a subtle calculation. He tried to disarm Comrade Stalin, to deprive him of his friends and to remain alone as Comrade Stalin’s loyal and impeccable friend. I think that this should be regarded as a new method of work by our enemies. Previously, our enemies, all sorts of traitors, had the donkey ears of their political views sticking out, but with him – nothing could be noticed. Only recently has his bourgeois degeneration shown itself in German and other matters .
This means that to put individual leaders out of action, to disorganize the leadership, to destroy the friendship and unity that had developed in the core of our party, to undermine Comrade Stalin's trust in individual members of the Politburo, which means to undermine their trust in the country as well - this, in fact, was his main task. He managed to do some things for a time, but he was unable to achieve his goal, because the core of the Central Committee remained whole and unshakable.
This was attested to by the 19th Party Congress , and we can clearly see this at the present Plenum, when our leading core of Bolsheviks is stronger and more unanimous than ever before. (Applause.)
Beria's next move, as is evident from all the materials, was to disorganize the work of the Council of Ministers. Many ministers present here know that with Beria's appearance in the Council of Ministers and especially when he began to preside, the situation changed dramatically. A thorough discussion of issues became the exception, and a conveyor belt became the rule. 40-50 questions are planned, Beria, the chairman, reads out previously prepared proposals and submits the questions to the commission. I must say that sometimes I would like to express my thoughts. No way! He cuts me off. The question is submitted to the commission.
Now it is clear that it was not simply a matter of Beria's bureaucracy or his special operational methods, but that this was a special method of sabotage. He deliberately organized - I am deeply convinced of this - deliberately organized endless red tape of important issues in the Council of Ministers. Only those issues that were personally reported to Comrade Stalin by individual members of the Politburo were quickly resolved. The remaining issues were left lying around for months and were not resolved.
This was a special tactic of the enemy to disorganize the work of our government bodies.
From the report of Comrade Malenkov and the speeches of the members of the Presidium and the members of the Central Committee it is evident that he acted as a genuine provocateur. Beria cleverly created provocative cases and then, when these provocations became obvious, he took the initiative to expose them.
What else did the enemy try to do to strike at the Soviet system and the party? To sow discord between the peoples of the USSR . Beria did not dare to do this during Comrade Stalin's life, and if he did, he did it very carefully. And only when Comrade Stalin was gone, he subtly and cleverly carried out this vile business through his provocative notes on Western Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic republics. But, as you can see, he failed to do this, like many other things.
After Comrade Stalin's death, it is clear that he began to force his way to power, and, perhaps, he was rushed, as Comrade Voroshilov correctly said, and he became even more insolent. What he did not dare to do during Comrade Stalin's life, he began to do after his death, he began to discredit the name of Comrade Stalin, to cast a shadow on the greatest man after Lenin. In fact, the appearance of materials signed by Beria in the Presidium protocols on the Doctors' Case, on Georgia, etc. , where a shadow is cast on Comrade Stalin's name - after all, this is his business.
Voices from the audience: Correct.
Andreev: He did this deliberately in order to bury the name of Comrade Stalin and to come to power more easily .
Voices from the audience: Correct.
Andreev: I have no doubt that under his pressure, soon after the death of Comrade Stalin, all mention of Comrade Stalin suddenly disappears from the press.
Voices from the audience: Correct.
Andreyev: This is a disgrace for the press workers . Previously they were overzealous, and where necessary and unnecessary, they inserted the name of Comrade Stalin , and then suddenly the name of Comrade Stalin disappeared. What is this? I believe that it is his hand, his influence, he was able to confuse and intimidate some press workers .
The question of the personality cult has appeared from somewhere. Why did this question arise? After all, it was solved long ago in Marxist literature, it has been solved in life, millions of people know the significance of a brilliant personality standing at the head of a movement, they know the significance of Lenin and Stalin , and then the question of the personality cult appeared from somewhere. This is Beria's trick .
From the Presidium, comrade Voroshilov. Correct.
Andreev: He wanted to bury the name of Comrade Stalin, and not only the name of Comrade Stalin, but it was also directed against Comrade Stalin's successor, Comrade Malenkov.
Voices from the audience: Correct.
Malenkov: We are all successors; comrade Stalin does not have one successor.
Andreev: You are the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, a post that was occupied by Comrade Stalin.
Voices from the audience: Correct. (Loud applause.)
Andreyev: I believe that it was not without his influence that the decision was made, which we read in the minutes, about holding the demonstration without portraits, not hanging portraits. Why? On what grounds? The people should know their leaders by their portraits, by their speeches. It was the wrong decision.
From the Presidium, Comrade Kaganovich. Andrei Andreevich, this decision has been cancelled as incorrect. (Loud applause.)
Andreyev: This, comrades, was the subtle, clever work of a crafty and dangerous enemy to clear the way for himself, to begin to undermine the foundations of Leninism and the teachings of Comrade Stalin. But no one is given this, the teachings of Lenin and Stalin are eternal and unshakable.
Voices from the audience: Correct.
Andreev: In this respect he is very similar to Tito.
Voices from the audience: Correct.
Andreyev: Of course, comrades, people will ask how this fits together. Everyone had the idea that Beria was doing a lot of work, but turned out to be such a scoundrel. But the fact is that the enemy, in order not to expose himself, is forced to do useful work with us, otherwise he would disappear in no time, and especially in our Soviet conditions, where along with the party and the government , thousands, millions of eyes are watching an individual. And Beria , of course, did a lot of work at times, but it was camouflage work, and that was the difficulty of exposing him. He created an aura for himself, that he, for example , during the war, did a lot of work, etc., blackmailed with the name of Comrade Stalin. It was difficult to expose him.
How will all this be received by the party and the people? In my opinion, well.
Voices from the audience: Correct.
Andreev: Because Beria has no roots either in the party or in the people. I am deeply convinced of this.
Voices from the audience: Correct.
Andreev: The exposure and arrest of such a venerable, dangerous enemy will be regarded within the country and by our friends abroad as a major victory for us (stormy applause) and as a very serious defeat for the imperialist camp. (Applause.)
I have no doubt that everyone will say: this is a truly Leninist-Stalinist leadership, which did not lose its head, but acted decisively, as befits Leninists and Stalinists. (Stormy applause.)
Comrade Khrushchev presiding. Comrade Tevosyan 30 has the floor. Comrade Baibakov, prepare.
Chairman, Comrade Khrushchev. The floor is given to Comrade Baibakov 31 .
Chairman Comrade Khrushchev: Comrades, a proposal has been made to end the discussion of the report here.
Voices. Correct.
Chairman, Comrade Khrushchev. Are there any other proposals?
Voices. No.
Chairman: Comrade Khrushchev. 24 comrades out of 46 who signed up spoke.
Voices. Stop.
Chairman, Comrade Khrushchev. The question is clear. Apparently, no vote is required.
Voices. No.
Chairman, Comrade Khrushchev. Does no one demand continuation of the debate? No. The comrades unanimously agreed to end the debate.
Voices. Correct.
Chairman Comrade Khrushchev. The commission will report its proposals on Monday. On Monday at 8 o'clock in the evening we will continue the work of the Plenum. There will be no other proposals.
Voices. No.
Chairman Comrade Khrushchev. There is a motion to hear the second question now. Are there any objections?
Voices. No.
Comrade Khrushchev presiding. Comrade Voroshilov now gives the floor to make a report.
Voroshilov: The chairman, Comrade Khrushchev, calls my speech a report, but I have only a short sentence for 3 minutes.
The Presidium of the Central Committee submits to the Plenum of the Central Committee the question of convening the next session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The session is supposed to be convened in the second half of July of this year. The following questions are submitted for consideration by the session: firstly, approval of the state budget of the USSR for 1953 and approval of the execution of the state budget for 1951 and for 1952. The state budget of the USSR for 1953 has been reviewed by the Council of Ministers of the USSR and is submitted for approval to the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR . There is still enough time before the session for the work of the budget commissions of both chambers of the Supreme Soviet. Thus, this question will be fully prepared by the time the session opens.
Furthermore, by decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU, comrade Safonov was relieved of his duties as the Prosecutor General of the USSR. Instead, comrade Rudenko, the former prosecutor of the Ukrainian SSR , is planned to be the Prosecutor General . The appointment of the Prosecutor General of the USSR is carried out in accordance with the Constitution of the USSR by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, therefore it is necessary to include this issue in the agenda of the session.
In addition, it is intended to submit for approval to the session the following decrees adopted by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR: on the formation of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building of the USSR, on the appointment of ministers of the USSR and the chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR , and on the election of members of the Supreme Court of the USSR.
It is also necessary to make editorial changes to Article 126 of the Constitution of the USSR, arising from the decisions of the 19th Party Congress on changing the name of the party and on changes to the Charter of the CPSU .
That's the whole report.
Chairman Comrade Khrushchev. There is a proposal to adopt the following decision:
ON THE CONVENING OF THE REGULAR SESSION OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR
1. To convene the Fifth Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in the second half of July 1953 in Moscow.
2. Submit the following issues for consideration at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR :
a) approval of the State Budget of the USSR for 1953 and the report on the execution of the State Budget of the USSR for 1951 and 1952:
b) approval of decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.
3. To approve as rapporteurs: on the State Budget for 1953 and the report on the execution of the State Budget of the USSR for 1951 and 1952 - Comrade Zvereva A.G. and on the approval of decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR - Comrade Pegova N.M.
Votes. Accept.
Chairman, Comrade Khrushchev. Are there any objections?
Voices. No.
Chairman, Comrade Khrushchev. Accepted.
Comrades, let us conclude the Plenum meeting here. The next meeting is scheduled for Monday, at 8 o’clock in the evening.
SESSION FIVE
July 7
Chairman Comrade Bulganin. Comrades, are there any objections to continuing the work of the Plenum? Have you read the draft resolution distributed to you?
Voices. Read.
Chairman, Comrade Bulganin. Let us proceed to the third question on the agenda. Comrade Khrushchev has the floor.
Khrushchev: Comrades, on April 28, 1953, the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee decided to remove Comrade Ignatiev from the membership of the Central Committee. You know this issue , there is no need to report in detail. There is a proposal to reconsider this issue now and reinstate Comrade Ignatiev in the rights of a member of the CPSU Central Committee.
Voices. Correct.
Khrushchev: Because it was done on the basis of a well-known slander, and now this matter needs to be reviewed and corrected.
Chairman Comrade Bulganin. Allow us to vote on the proposal of the Presidium of the Central Committee:
about Mr. Ignatiev S.D.
Cancel the resolution of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU of April 28, 1953 (No. Pl. 3/2) and reinstate Comrade S. D. Ignatiev as a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
Chairman, Comrade Bulganin. I vote. Those in favor of this motion, please raise your hands. Please lower your hands. Those against? No. Abstaining? No. Adopted unanimously.
Khrushchev. A proposal is made to transfer comrade G.K. Zhukov from candidate to member of the CPSU Central Committee.
Voices. Correct.
Chairman Comrade Bulganin. Allow us to vote on the proposal of the Presidium of the Central Committee:
about comrade Zhukov G.K.
Transfer comrade Zhukov G.K. from candidate to member of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
Chairman, Comrade Bulganin. Those in favor of this motion, please raise your hands. Please lower your hands. Those against? No. Abstaining? No. Adopted unanimously.
Khrushchev. A proposal is made to remove S. A. Goglidze and B. Z. Kobulov from the list of candidates for membership in the Central Committee of the CPSU and to expel them from the ranks of the CPSU for hostile activities against the Communist Party and the Soviet state. 32
Voices. Correct.
Chairman, Comrade Bulganin. I vote on the proposal of the Presidium of the Central Committee:
about Goglidze S.A. and Kobulov B. 3.
Remove Goglidze S. A. and Kobulov B. Z. from the list of candidates for membership in the Central Committee of the CPSU and expel them from the ranks of the CPSU for hostile activities against the Communist Party and the Soviet state.
Chairman, Comrade Bulganin. Those in favor of this motion, please raise your hands. Please lower your hands. Those against? No. Abstaining? No. Adopted unanimously.
Chairman Comrade Bulganin. So, the third question is exhausted. Let us return to the first question. The final word is given to Comrade Malenkov.
Closing remarks by comrade MALENKOV G. M. at the meeting of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU on July 7, 1953
Comrades! We all see what exceptional unanimity reigns at the Plenum of our Central Committee.
The speeches of the Plenum participants are imbued with a sense of responsibility for the fate of the party and the country and deep party principles; they testify to the unity, strength, and wisdom of the leadership of our great party. Against this strength and fortress all the intrigues of enemies, wherever they come from, will be shattered. (Prolonged applause.)
The enemy dared to encroach on what is most dear to each of us, on what is most sacred to a communist - on our party, on its leadership, on unity in leadership.
That is why, with such angry indignation and exceptional unanimity, our Central Committee makes the decision to cut off this reptile that has infiltrated the party leadership.
That is why we will be ruthless in our decision, so that enemies like Beria will not dare to enter into a fight with our party in the future. (Applause.)
Each of us asks ourselves: why did the Presidium of the Central Committee not immediately expose Beria and for some time left his individual criminal actions against the party and the government unpunished?
On this account, I would like to make some additions to what has already been rightly said here at the Plenum.
Now, after Beria's arrest, everything has become clearer to many. But we must not forget yesterday. Yesterday consisted of the following.
In the last period of Comrade Stalin’s life and, consequently, immediately after his death, the state of affairs in the Politburo as a leadership collective was clearly unfavorable.
The Politburo had not been functioning normally for a long time. Politburo members were not involved in the decision-making of many important issues and worked on separate assignments. As you now know, political mistrust was shown quite unfairly in relation to some Politburo members.
This was the situation at the time of Comrade Stalin’s departure from us.
It should be added to this that Beria not only remained unexposed, but he was also known as a person close to Comrade Stalin .
Isn’t it clear, comrades, that some time was needed for the leadership team to unite and ensure unanimity in deciding the issue of Beria.
It would have been an unpardonable stupidity to begin exposing Beria without the entire leadership team being united and unanimous in this regard. (Voices. Correct). In this regard, it was impossible to allow carelessness, lest we run into misunderstanding on the part of someone, a lack of unanimity and a firm understanding of the correctness of harsh measures in relation to Beria.
a The words "but he enjoyed great authority as a person close to Comrade Stalin" have been removed. Here and further in G. Malenkov's concluding remarks, the footnotes on each page contain text that was deleted from the first version of the concluding remarks during the process of preparing the verbatim report for printing and distribution to party organizations, and the words that were added are highlighted in bold. — Comp.
We were obliged to allow no hesitation and to ensure complete unanimity in the decision-making on the Beria case.
The course of consideration of this matter, first at the Presidium of the Central Committee, and now at the Plenum, has clearly shown that this complete unanimity has been fully achieved. (Loud applause.)
You see, comrades, that we are putting before the Plenum with complete frankness questions concerning the state of affairs at the highest level of the Party leadership.
And indeed, where, if not at the Plenum of the Central Committee, should one say with all directness what must be said in order to strengthen the leadership of the party, in order to ensure the best and correct organization of the most complex task of leading the work of the party and the state.
In this connection, I would like to dwell on some issues related to the leadership of the party. Especially since a number of comrades directly touched on these issues.
Here, at the Plenum of the Central Committee, they spoke about the cult of personality, and, it must be said, they spoke incorrectly. I have in mind the speech of Comrade Andreyev. Similar sentiments on this score could be detected in the speech of Comrade Tevosyan. Therefore, we are obliged to clarify this issue.
Khrushchev: Some of those who did not speak are harboring the same thoughts.
Malenkov. First of all, it must be openly acknowledged, and we propose to record this in the resolution of the Plenum of the Central Committee , that in our propaganda in recent years there has been a deviation from the Marxist-Leninist understanding of the question of the role of the individual in history. It is no secret that party propaganda, instead of correctly explaining the role of the Communist Party as the leading force in the construction of communism in our country, has strayed into the cult of the individual. Such a distortion of Marxism undoubtedly contributes to the belittling of the role of the party and its leading center, and leads to a decline in the creative activity of the party masses and the broad masses of the Soviet people.
But, comrades, it is not only a matter of propaganda. The question of the cult of personality is directly and immediately connected with the question of collective leadership.
I already said in my report that there is no justification for the fact that we did not convene a party congress for 13 years, that the Plenum of the Central Committee was not convened for years, that the Politburo did not function normally and was replaced by troikas, fives, etc. 33 that worked on the instructions of Comrade Stalin in a disjointed manner, on individual issues and assignments.
Didn't all of us, members of the Politburo and members of the Central Committee, if not all, then many, see and understand the wrongness of this situation? We saw and understood, but we couldn't fix it.
We are obliged to tell the Plenum of the Central Committee about this in order to draw the right conclusions and take measures to improve the leadership of the party and the country.
You must know, comrades, that the personality cult of Comrade Stalin in the daily practice of leadership took on painful forms and dimensions, methods of collective work were discarded, criticism and self-criticism were completely absent in our highest levels of leadership.
We have no right to hide from you that such an ugly cult of personality has led to the peremptory nature of individual decisions and in recent years has begun to cause serious damage to the leadership of the party and the country.
This must be said in order to decisively correct the mistakes made in this regard, to learn the necessary lessons and in the future to ensure in practice collective leadership on the fundamental basis of the Leninist-Stalinist teaching.
The Plenum must know, no one has given us the right to hide from our highest organ of party leadership between congresses, the fact that the ugly manifestation of the cult of personality and the destruction of methods of collectivity in the work of the Politburo and the Central Committee, the absence of criticism and self-criticism in the Politburo and the Central Committee have led to a number of mistakes in the leadership of the party and the country. Sad examples on this account are not isolated.
We all remember the following fact. After the Party Congress, Comrade Stalin came to the Plenum of the Central Committee in its current composition and, without any grounds, politically discredited Comrades Molotov, and Mikoyan.
Did the Plenum of the Central Committee, did we all agree with this? No. But we all kept silent. Why? Because the cult of personality was brought to the point of absurdity and there was a complete lack of control. Do we want anything like this in the future? Decidedly not. (Voices: Correct.) (Stormy applause.)
During the work of this Plenum, you, comrades, became aware of the following fact. In connection with the task of raising livestock farming, in February of this year, Comrade Stalin persistently proposed increasing taxes in the countryside by 40 billion rubles. After all, we all understood the blatant incorrectness and danger of this measure. We said that all the monetary income of the collective farms amounted to slightly more than this amount. However, this issue was not discussed, the collective spirit in the leadership was so humiliated and suppressed that the evidence presented to Comrade Stalin was categorically rejected.
Let us take, further, the decision on the Turkmen Canal. Was the need for building the canal determined in advance, was the necessary costs and economic efficiency of this construction calculated, was this issue discussed in the leading bodies of the party and the state? No. It was decided unilaterally and without any economic calculations. And then it turned out that this canal with an irrigation system would cost 30 billion rubles. People would have to be resettled to the completely unpopulated area of the canal from the inhabited areas of Central Asia, where we still have a lot of unused land, exceptionally suitable for the development of cotton. Comrades from Central Asia and agricultural workers can confirm this. (Voices. Correct.) Is it not clear that we must correct such mistakes, which are the result of an incorrect attitude in the leadership team, the result of the belittling of collectivity in work and the transition to the method of individual, peremptory decisions, the result of distortions of the Marxist understanding of the role of the individual.
Or take the well-known proposal of Comrade Stalin on product exchange, put forward in the work "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR". It is already clear that this position was put forward without sufficient analysis and economic justification. This position on product exchange, if not corrected, may become an obstacle to the solution of the most important task for many years to come - the comprehensive development of trade turnover. The question of product exchange, the timing, and forms of the transition to product exchange - this is a large and complex question affecting the interests of millions of people, the interests of our entire economic development, and it should have been carefully weighed, studied comprehensively, before being put forward to the party as a programmatic proposal.
As you see, comrades, we are obliged to tell you, members of the Central Committee, that decisions on the most important international issues, issues of state work and economic construction were often taken without due preliminary study and without collective discussion in the leading party bodies.
The presence of such abnormalities in fact led to insufficiently substantiated and incorrect decisions, and led to the belittling of the role of the Central Committee as the organ of collective leadership of the party.
As you see, comrades, even great people can have weaknesses. Comrade Stalin had these weaknesses. We must talk about this in order to correctly, in a Marxist way, pose the question of the need to ensure collective leadership in the party, criticism and self-criticism in all party levels, including first of all in the Central Committee and in the Presidium of the Central Committee.
We must say this so as not to repeat the mistakes associated with the absence of collective leadership and with the incorrect understanding of the question of the personality cult, for these mistakes, in the absence of Comrade Stalin, will be three times dangerous. (Voices. Correct.)
We are obliged to raise this question sharply. There can be no omissions here. If mistakes were possible under Comrade Stalin, then their repetition is even more fraught with great dangers in the absence of such a leader as Comrade Stalin. (Voices. Correct.)
To respect, honor and sacredly follow the great teachings of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin means, first of all, to eliminate that which hinders its consistent implementation.
In the draft resolution submitted for your consideration, we consider it necessary to remind the party of Marx's views on the question of personality cult. In his famous letter to Wilhelm Blos in 1877, Marx wrote:
"I am not angry, and neither is Engels. Neither of us would give a broken penny for popularity. Here, for example, is proof: out of hostility to any cult of personality, during the existence of International 34 I never allowed the numerous appeals in which my services were recognized and with which I was pestered from various countries to be made public - I never even answered them, except occasionally to reprimand them. Engels and I first joined the secret society of communists on the condition that everything that promoted superstitious worship of authorities would be thrown out of the statutes (Lassalle subsequently did just the opposite)."
Comrades, here at the Plenum, the question of Comrade Stalin’s successor was carelessly and clearly incorrectly raised.
I feel obliged to respond to this speech and say the following.
No one dares, cannot, should or wants to claim the role of successor. (Voices. Correct.) (Applause.)
The successor of the great Stalin is a tight knit, monolithic team of party leaders, tested in the difficult years of struggle for the fate of our Motherland, for the happiness of the peoples of the Soviet Union, tempered in the struggle against the enemies of the party, proven fighters for the cause of communism, capable of consistently and decisively implementing the policy developed by our party, aimed at the successful construction of communism.
We have such a team, united on the principled basis of the great teaching of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin. The Party knows him. He is the successor of Comrade Stalin. (Stormy applause.)
The Central Committee must know and can be confident that this unanimous conviction unites all of us to whom you entrust the day-to-day leadership of the affairs of the Party and the country.
Comrades! At the Plenum of the Central Committee, many members of the Central Committee rightly spoke about serious shortcomings in the work of individual branches of industry and about the neglect of a number of branches of agriculture.
In the draft resolution, which is submitted for consideration to the Plenum of the Central Committee, we propose to openly acknowledge and draw appropriate conclusions from the fact that there are indeed significant shortcomings in the activities of our party in managing economic construction.
We have quite a few lagging industrial enterprises and even entire branches of industry. The Party's urgent task is to put an end to this abnormal situation and achieve a serious improvement in the work of lagging enterprises.
In the field of agriculture, there is a serious lag in the production of flax, potatoes, vegetables and oilseeds, and the situation with livestock farming is completely unsatisfactory. Quite a few collective farms and entire agricultural regions are in a neglected state. The yield of agricultural crops and the productivity of livestock farming are low, and do not correspond to the increased level of technical equipment of agriculture and the possibilities inherent in the collective farm system.
It must be admitted that the lag in a number of branches of agriculture is primarily a consequence of the insufficient interest of collective farmers in increasing the production of individual crops and in developing livestock farming. (Votes: Correct.) Therefore, in order to further advance agriculture, we are obliged to resolve this fundamental question of ensuring the material interest of collective farms and collective farmers in increasing all agricultural products. (Votes: Correct.)
Voroshilov: This is the most important thing.
Malenkov. To ensure further growth of agriculture, additional capital investments will be required. We will be obliged to do this.
Comrades! The draft resolution presented to you sets the task for our entire party to learn political lessons from the Beria case and draw the necessary conclusions for our future activities.
These conclusions are that our party must strengthen party leadership at all levels of the party and the state apparatus, eliminate the serious abnormalities that have developed in recent years in party life and in the methods of party leadership, and ensure the precise implementation of the principles of party leadership and the norms of party life developed by Lenin. Strictly ensure the implementation of the highest principle of party leadership - collective leadership.
We must always remember that only the collective political experience, the collective wisdom of the Central Committee, based on the scientific basis of Marxist-Leninist theory, ensures the correct leadership of the party and the country, the unshakable unity and cohesion of the party ranks, and the successful construction of communism in our country.
The conclusions and lessons are that we need :
- to correct the incorrect situation that has developed over a number of years, when the Ministry of Internal Affairs has effectively left the control of the party, and to take under systematic and unremitting control all the activities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs bodies at the center and in the regions;
- to increase in every possible way the revolutionary vigilance of communists and all workers;
- constantly strengthen and expand the party's ties with the masses, be sensitive to the demands of the workers, show daily concern for improving the material conditions of Soviet people, remembering that concern for the interests of the Soviet people is the most important duty of the party;
- to strengthen in every possible way the unbreakable friendship of the peoples of the USSR and our multinational socialist state, and to constantly educate Soviet people in the spirit of proletarian internationalism;
- use our reserves and capabilities to successfully fulfill and overfulfill the five-year development plan of the USSR;
- significantly improve the entire work of party propaganda and political-educational work among the masses. Our propaganda must educate communists and the entire people in the spirit of confidence in the invincibility of the great cause of communism, in the spirit of selfless devotion to our party and the socialist Motherland.
Comrades! When considering all questions of the internal life of the party and the development of the Soviet state, we must not forget for a moment about the international situation, about the existence of the capitalist encirclement.
The forces of communism are growing stronger every day. Our Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, the countries of people's democracy, the German Democratic Republic already represent a powerful, ever-growing stronghold of peace and democracy.
We all see the growth of our strength and rejoice in it.
But it is clear that our opponents, the enemies of peace, also see and watch with the greatest concern the growth of the forces of communism.
The steady growth of the forces of democracy and socialism and the general weakening of the forces of the imperialist camp are causing deep alarm among the imperialists. This must be seen as the reason for the sharp activation of the reactionary imperialist forces and their feverish desire to undermine the growing power of the international camp of peace and socialism, and above all its leading force, the Soviet Union.
Can imperialists come to terms with the fact that more and more countries and peoples are escaping from under their influence?
On the basis of the growth of our forces, there will inevitably be an aggravation of relations between the forces of communism and imperialism.
The imperialists are alarmed by the growth of our forces. They cannot come to terms with this growth.
That is why; in pursuing a consistent policy of peace, we must not allow the slightest weakness, any hesitation.
When necessary, we will negotiate with the imperialists, so-called conferences, but without any preconditions. We will not go to conferences under any conditions, we will not allow unilateral concessions a .
We firmly believe in our strengths.
By consistently, firmly, and unswervingly carrying out the policy worked out over many years by our party under the leadership of the brilliant founder of our party, Lenin, and the great continuer of his work, Stalin, we will force the imperialists to respect our forces. (Voices. Correct.) (Stormy applause.)
We will continue our peace initiative. It brings us serious success and splits the enemy camp. But at the same time, we are not going to satisfy any kind of ultimatum demands.
What does it mean to consistently pursue a policy of peace?
This means, first of all, not allowing any hesitation in relations with the enemy and being prepared to give a crushing rebuff to the imperialists' adventurous attempts to disturb the peace. (Stormy applause.)
and we recognize the coexistence of the forces of the peace camp and the camp of imperialism only on a mutually beneficial basis, on the basis of mutual concessions that are beneficial to both.
ь our great leaders Lenin and Stalin
Comrades! The greatest courage and confidence are instilled in each of us by the genuine Bolshevik atmosphere of solidarity and party unity, based on Leninist-Stalinist principles, which reigns at the present Plenum of our Central Committee. (Stormy applause.)
There is no doubt that we will successfully solve the tasks facing the party, eliminate the shortcomings in our work and further unite the entire party around the Central Committee and confidently lead the country to new victories for the benefit and happiness of our great Soviet people! (Loud and prolonged applause.)
Chairman Comrade Bulganin. Comrades, we move on to examining the draft resolution " On the criminal and anti-state actions of Beria ", prepared by the commission of the Plenum of the Central Committee. The text of the resolution has been distributed.
Are there any comrades who would like to speak and express their opinion on the draft resolution ?
Voices. No.
Chairman, Comrade Bulganin. There is a motion to vote on the draft resolution as a basis. No objections?
Voices. No.
Chairman, Comrade Bulganin. I vote. Whoever is in favor of accepting the draft resolution developed by the Plenum commission as a basis, I ask you to raise your hands. I ask you to lower your hands. Who is against? No. Are there any abstentions? No. It is adopted unanimously. (Applause.)
Chairman, Comrade Bulganin. Are there any amendments?
Voices. No.
Chairman, Comrade Bulganin. I vote for the resolution as a whole. Those who are in favor of adopting the resolution of the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee "On the criminal anti-party and anti-state actions of Beria" as a whole, please raise your hands. Please lower your hands. Who is against? No. Are there any abstentions? No. The resolution was adopted unanimously. (Applause.)
Chairman Comrade Bulganin. This, comrades, concludes the work of the Plenum. I declare the meeting of the Plenum closed.
1 It was not possible to establish when the verbatim report of the plenum was sent out.
2 The report of G. Mapenkov is reproduced from the text of the stenographic report of the plenum, verified with the versions of the report deposited in the archive file with the author's copies of the stenographic record. On the first version of the report there is a note: "Original. July 2, 1953", on the second - "Original with amendments by comrade Malenkov G.M. D. Sukhanov. 28/IX-53".
3 I. Stalin died, as reported in the official announcement of his death, on March 5, 1953 at 9:50 p.m.
4 T. Strokach’s statement was sent to N. Khrushchev on June 28, 1953.
On June 30, N. Khrushchev sent this statement to the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, as well as to N. Shvernik, P. Ponomarenko and A. Kirichenko.
5 This refers to the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU “On the situation in the MGB” of December 4, 1952, sent to the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics, territorial, and regional party committees.
6 L. Beria was arrested on June 26, 1953, during a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which was held in the Kremlin. The arrest was carried out by G. Zhukov and a group of officers. The minutes of the meeting and the decision of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU are missing.
7 Relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia began to deteriorate in June 1948. In June 1948, on the initiative of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), a meeting of the Information Bureau of Communist and Workers' Parties adopted a resolution "On the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia." It noted that "the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia is pursuing an incorrect line in the main issues of foreign and domestic policy, representing a departure from Marxism-Leninism." The Yugoslav Communist Party was also accused of pursuing a policy unfriendly to the Soviet Union and the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), nationalism, and rapprochement with capitalist countries. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia did not participate in the meeting. In July 1948, at the 5th Congress of the CPY, a decision was made on the attitude towards the resolution of the Information Bureau, which stated that the criticism from the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the resolution of the Information Bureau were unfair, that the Central Committee of the CPY had not departed from the teachings of Marxism-Leninism, but on the contrary, was correctly applying this teaching in the specific conditions of Yugoslavia. From that time on, relations between the CPY and the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) became strained, and subsequently interstate relations with Yugoslavia were also interrupted, and they began to be restored only in 1954.
8 The archive contains a handwritten text of this note, apparently written by L. Beria. Instead of the words "Beria and his friends..." the note says "Malenkov, Beria and their friends..."
9 This refers to the meeting of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on May 27, 1953, at which the political and economic situation that had developed in the GDR was discussed. See also document No. 18, Section I.
10 From January 1951 to April 1953, 447 thousand people fled from the GDR to West Germany.
11 On June 16, 1953, a mass strike of construction workers began in East Berlin, which grew into a spontaneous demonstration. The following day, in addition to Berlin, strikes and demonstrations engulfed 14 other large cities in the southern and western parts of the GDR (Rostock, Leipzig, Magdeburg, etc.). Along with economic demands, political demands were also put forward: the immediate resignation of the government, the holding of uniform all-German elections, the release of political prisoners. In Berlin, demonstrators seized the Government House and a number of other buildings. Over 430,000 people took part in strikes from June 16 to 20, and over 330,000 people in demonstrations. On June 17, Soviet troops entered Berlin, where martial law was introduced that day, and several other cities, and, along with GDR police units, took part in dispersing the demonstrators. In a number of cases, fire was opened to kill. About thirty people died and about four hundred were injured.
12 See document No. 4, Section I.
13 The management of the work on the creation of atomic weapons in the USSR was entrusted to L. Beria even before the formation of the Special Committee under the State Defense Committee in 1945. “Observation of the development of work on uranium” was entrusted to him in accordance with the State Defense Committee resolution adopted on December 3, 1944, on I. Kurchatov’s laboratory.
In October 1949, by a resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Beria was thanked "for organizing the production of atomic energy and successfully completing the testing of atomic weapons." He was awarded the Order of Lenin, presented with a Certificate of Honor, and awarded the title of laureate of the Stalin Prize of the first degree.
14 The first test of a hydrogen bomb took place on August 12, 1953. In preparation for the test, a number of government decisions were made. It is not established which specific decree of the USSR Council of Ministers is referred to in the text.
The 15th XIX Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was held from October 5 to 14, 1952. G. Malenkov delivered the report of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). The congress considered the directives on the five-year plan for the development of the USSR for 1951-1955, and changes to the Charter of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). The congress changed the name of the party from the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), and made changes to the structure of its central bodies. The Politburo of the Central Committee was transformed into the Presidium of the Central Committee, the Orgburo was liquidated, and its functions were transferred to the Secretariat.
At the plenum of the Central Committee held on October 16, 1952, the largest Presidium of the Central Committee in the entire history of the party was elected, consisting of 25 members (V. Andrianov, A. Aristov, L. Beria, N. Bulganin, K. Voroshilov, S. Ignatiev, L. Kaganovich, D. Korotchenko, V. Kuznetsov, O. Kuusinen, G. Malenkov, V. Malyshev, L. Melnikov, A. Mikoyan, N. Mikhailov, V. Molotov, M. Pervukhin, P. Ponomarenko, M. Saburov, I. Stalin, M. Suslov, N. Khrushchev, D. Chesnokov, N. Shvernik, M. Shkiryatov) and 11 candidate members (L. Brezhnev, A. Vyshinsky, A. Zverev, N. Ignatov, I. Kabanov, A. Kosygin, N. Patolichev, N. Pegov, A. Puzanov, I. Tevosyan, P. Yudin) of the Presidium of the Central Committee. On the initiative of I. Stalin, the Bureau of the Presidium was separated from its composition, not provided for by either the Charter or any other documents The Central Committee, which, in addition to I. Stalin, included L. Beria, N. Bulganin, K. Voroshilov, L. Kaganovich, G. Malenkov, M. Saburov and N. Khrushchev.
I. Stalin’s speech with sharp criticism of V. Molotov and A. Mikoyan at the plenum of the Central Committee was not recorded in stenography and therefore is not included in the minutes of the plenum.
16 See documents No. 15 and No. 16 of Section I.
The 17th 18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was held from 10 to 21 March 1939. I. Stalin delivered the Central Committee's report. The congress reviewed the directives for the third five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR for 1938-1942 and changes to the Charter of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks).
18 Musavat is an Azerbaijani bourgeois party that emerged in Baku in 1911. After the collapse of the Transcaucasian Republic, it initiated the proclamation of the Azerbaijani bourgeois republic, in which it was the ruling republic throughout its entire existence (1918-1920). It relied on the interventionists (Turkish, then English). In April 1920, with the help of the Red Army, the Musavatists' power was overthrown.
19 No information about a meeting or decision of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the issue of relations with Yugoslavia has been found. Apparently, this refers to a proposal from the Soviet side to the Yugoslav government to exchange ambassadors: from 1949 - chargés d'affaires.
20 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a military-political alliance (bloc) formed on the initiative of the United States in 1949. The bloc included the United States, Great Britain, Canada, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Luxembourg, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Iceland, and in 1952 Greece and Turkey joined them.
21 We are talking about prisoners who were specialists in the field of aircraft construction, who worked in special design and technical bureaus of the OGPU-NKVD of the USSR. Among them were A. Tupolev, V. Petlyakov, V. Myasishchev and others.
22 Correct: Eitingon.
23 For the text of N. Patolichev’s speech, see document No. 11, section II (pp. 157-159 of this publication).
24 For the text of A. Kirichenko’s speech, see document No. 11, sections (pp. 159-165 of this publication).
25 Correct: M. Moussevi.
26 This refers to the article about L. Beria in the second edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia. Moscow, 1950-1958.
On March 27-31 , 1953, a resolution was adopted by the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR
on reducing retail prices for a number of food and industrial goods.
28 For the text of N. Mikhailov’s speech, see document No. 11, section II (pp. 177-181 of this publication).
29 For the text of Z. Ketskhoveli’s speech, see document No. 11, section II (pp. 198–201 of this publication).
30 For the text of I. Tevosyan’s speech, see document No. 11, section II (pp. 208-212 of this publication).
31 For the text of N. Baibakov’s speech, see document No. 11, section II (pp. 212-216 of this publication).
32 Correct: B. Kobulov.
33 This refers to the practice that existed in the post-war years of examining and preparing issues within the competence of the Politburo of the Central Committee and the Government of the USSR by commissions (groups) formed on the instructions of I. Stalin, without the participation of all members of the Politburo (Presidium) of the Central Committee or the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.
34 First International (International Workingmen's Association). The first mass organization of the proletariat. Founded by K. Marx and F. Engels in 1864. Existed until 1876.