Marx-Engels | Lenin | Stalin | Home Page
On A Fake History
At the end of XX century. in the Russian-language literature on the history of the Second World War, a fake appeared, to the spread of which a man respected in Russia, a front-line soldier, Hero of the Soviet Union, formerly a military intelligence agent, now well-known and authoritative writer Vladimir Karpov, attached his hand.
Already on the six pages of the second volume of his very interesting and generally objective (although without overlapping in the "moderate" anti-Stalinism too it was not done) of the book "Generalissimo" (M., 2002; the book was published in different publishing houses, the total circulation exceeds 50 thousand copies ., which is very much by modern standards) V. Karpov tried to convince the readers that the story given to them is true.
The essence of this fake is that, at the behest of Stalin, the Soviet intelligence agents allegedly held a secret meeting with representatives of German intelligence on February 20, 1942 in Mtsensk, during which they discussed the establishment of a separate armistice, and then the conclusion of a separate peace between The USSR and Hitlerite Germany and even a joint struggle against world Jewry in the person of the USA and England.
In support of this forgery, V. Karpov found it possible to rely on an even more monstrous lie in his hoax.
Unfortunately, having caused unhealthy interest among some, near-minded journalists and the media, the fake was picked up, and in the autumn of 2002 NTV already released a strange documentary. After that, the question went beyond the error (mistake?) Of one person. By the way, when NTV was stuck with TV cameras to Karpov, then, probably feeling wrong, he refused to communicate at the sight of telephoto lenses.
So, according to Karpov, it turns out that:
"In the counter-offensive near Moscow, the fighting spirit of the Soviet Army was on the rise: after long setbacks, the Nazis finally drove back the Nazis. Stalin had every reason to rely on this factor.
This, as they say, is what is on the surface, visible to all who attended the meeting of the Supreme Headquarters, and the intelligible General Staff, who made out Stalin's decision for a general offensive.
But, as it turned out quite recently (I saw these documents only when I was already working on this book - in 1999), Stalin had his own far-off strategic calculations far from anyone known to anyone.
It seemed to Stalin that the general offensive of the Soviet troops would demoralize the German leadership, which would see its troops retreating along the entire front and go to peace proposals, which he would propose, Stalin.
The Supreme Commander-in-Chief did not consult on this matter with his generals and even with members of the Politburo, because none of them mention this attempt either in oral memoirs or in published memoirs.
There was a situation similar to that observed at the time of the conclusion of the Brest Peace in 1918, when Lenin signed a bonded treaty for the salvation of the young Soviet state. Stalin saw - the Germans are already near Moscow, the losses of the Red Army are huge, there are no reserves, the formation of new units is possible only from new recruits, but there is no armament for them: defensive factories partially remained in the occupied territories, and the majority is in the evacuation stage; tanks, airplanes, guns, small arms are produced in a small number by enterprises that used to be in the interior of the country, and there are very few of them. It takes time to restore and organize the production of evacuated factories in new places in Siberia and Central Asia.
The respite was needed at all costs.
Stalin ordered the intelligence services to find outlets to the Hitlerite command and from him, Stalin, to name the proposal for a truce and even more (far-reaching plans) - about a radical turn in the war.
To implement these secret negotiations there were real opportunities: as early as 1938 an agreement on cooperation between the NKVD and the Gestapo was concluded. There is a genuine document confirming this ( VV Karpov gives it in the form of the following photocopy .-- AM ).
On cooperation, mutual assistance, joint activities between the Main Directorate of State Security of the USSR NKVD and the Main Security Directorate of the National Socialist Workers Party of Germany (Gestapo).
(This is followed by the text of the "General Agreement" on 9 pages, I omit it and give only the last sheet. -VK).
The text of the agreement is printed in Russian and German in a single copy, each of which is equally authentic, sealed with the signatures and seals of representatives of the NKVD and Gestapo. The Russian text of the agreement remains in the NKVD, German in Gestapo.
DONE at Moscow, November 11, 1938, at 3 pm 40 min. Signatures of the parties:
HEAD OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECURITY OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE USSR USSR STATE SECURITY DEPARTMENT COMMISSIONER I RANK
SIGNATURE (L. BERIYA)
HEAD OF THE FOURTH GOVERNMENT (GESTAPO) OF THE MAIN SECURITY MANAGEMENT OF THE NATIONAL-SOCIALIST WORKING PARTY OF GERMANY, THE BRIGADENFIURER SS
Scouts contacted the German "colleagues", the meeting took place in Mtsensk on February 20, 1942. Mtsensk at that time was in the territory occupied by the Nazis. Apparently, the idea of these negotiations arose in Stalin at the very beginning of the counteroffensive, and our intelligence agents began to search for contacts immediately. How it happened, I do not know.
Stalin personally wrote "Proposals to the German Command." They are printed in two copies, one remained with Stalin, the other was intended for the one who will negotiate. Apparently, this document was not supposed to be handed to the Germans, it is a summary, a list of issues that the Soviet representative was supposed to follow (V.V. Karpov cites him in the form of the following photocopy .-- AM).
OFFERS TO THE GERMAN COMMAND
1). Since May 5, 1942, from 6 o'clock throughout the front line to cease military operations. Announce the truce until August 1, 1942 until 18 hours.
2). Beginning on August 1, 1942, and until December 22, 1942, the German troops must retreat to the lines indicated on the map. Scheme 1. It is proposed to establish a border between Germany and the USSR in the extent indicated in Scheme No. 1.
3). After the redeployment of the armies, by the end of 1943 the armed forces of the USSR are ready to begin military operations with the German armed forces against Britain and the United States. i 4). The USSR will be ready to consider the conditions for declaring peace between our countries and accuse international Jews of England and the United States of America of fomenting a war, and in the subsequent 1943-1944 to conduct joint military offensives in order to reorganize the world space, (Scheme 2).
Note: In case of failure to comply with the above requirements in cl. 1 and 2, the German troops will be defeated, and the German state will cease to exist on the political map as such.
Warn the German command of responsibility.
Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the USSR
SIGNATURE OF STALIN
Moscow; The Kremlin on February 19, 1942.
The fact that the Proposals were drawn up by Stalin confirms his signature, and that this is only an abstract, indicate short "Stalinist" phrases printed not on a state or party letterhead, but on a plain sheet of paper without specifying the information in the official appeals executor and calculation of the distribution of copies.
Pay attention to the date - there is a general offensive of the Soviet troops. Stalin speaks with the Hitlerite command from a position of strength, even threatens with destruction in case of disagreement!
But he overestimated the possibility of extracting strategic dividends from the favorable military and political situation that it seemed to him. The Germans were not in a state of confusion. Their representative SS Gruppenfiihrer Wolf behaved not like a poor relative in a difficult situation (as Stalin supposed it was because of our common offensive), but confidently, and even with the arrogance peculiar to the Germans. Negotiations lasted for a week. As a result, the First Deputy People's Commissar for Internal Affairs of the USSR presented Stalin with the following report ( V.V. Karpov cites him in the form of the following photocopy: - AM .).
FIRST DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF THE INTERIOR OF THE USSR
No. 1/2428 February 27, 1942
To Comrade Stalin
During the talks in Mtsensk on February 20-27, 1942, with the representative of the German command and the head of the personal staff of the Reichsführer SS, Gruppenführer SS Wolff, the German command did not find it possible to satisfy our demands.
Our side was invited to leave the borders until the end of 1942 along the front lines as it is, ceasing hostilities.
The government of the USSR must immediately put an end to Jewry. To do this, it would initially be necessary to resettle all Jews to the far north, isolate, and then completely destroy them. At the same time, the authorities will protect the external perimeter and the hard commandant regime on the territory of the camp group. The Jews themselves will deal with the questions of annihilation (killing) and the disposal of corpses of the Jewish population.
The German command does not exclude that we can create a united front against England and the United States.
After consultations with Berlin, Wolff stated that if the world was to be reconstructed, if the leadership of the USSR accepts the demands of the German side, it is possible that Germany will push its borders to the east in favor of the USSR.
The German command as a sign of such changes is ready to change the color of the swastika on the national banner from black to red.
When discussing the positions under scheme No. 2, the following discrepancies arose:
1). Latin America. Should belong to Germany.
2). Difficult attitude to the understanding of "Chinese civilization". According to the German command, China should
become an occupied territory and a protectorate of the Japanese Empire.
3). The Arab world should be a German protectorate in the north of Africa.
Thus, as a result of negotiations, a complete divergence of views and positions should be noted. The representative of the German command Wolf categorically denies the possibility of destroying the German armed forces and defeating the war. In his opinion, the war with Russia will drag on for several more years and will end with the complete victory of Germany. The main calculation is made that, in their opinion, Russia, having lost sipy and resources in the war, will have to return to negotiations on a truce, but on more severe conditions, after 2-3 years.
First Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
How to assess this demarche of Stalin? You can, of course, practice about the unprincipled internationalist Stalin, who conspires to conspire with the fascists against the Allies. He himself considered and called these proposals "unethical" in relation to the allies, as well as what he later undertook before Pearl Harbor. But it is also obvious that he was ready to take on any great sin for the sake of saving the country and the peoples that inhabited it. Stalin knew about Hitler's intention to dismember the Soviet country, turn it into a colony and exterminate the "aborigines", "un-termenshey" to liberate the lands and distribute them to the conquering settlers.
Stalin did not betray "his" Jews, did not go to their extermination, as the fascists did, although in exchange the Nazis offered a very advantageous "creation of a united front against England and the United States." The price that the Hitlerites demanded for it-the "total extermination of the Jews"-was unacceptable for Stalin. (And think, gentlemen, those who still consider him an anti-Semite).
It seems to me that concessions and the very idea of Stalin about the turn of military operations for 180 degrees to conduct joint military operations against England and the United States are nothing more than a tactical move with the goal of gaining time. Promises to reorganize the armies and "after the conclusion of peace between our countries" to launch joint military operations in 1943-1944. - this, as the Russian proverb says, "Ulita goes, sometime will be." The main thing is to save the country now from the invasion. In two years, a lot of water will leak, it will be possible to explain things to the allies, and we will not start fighting against them. The main thing now is to catch our breath and prepare the Armed Forces and industry for a more successful reflection of Hitler's aggression, if the Germans dare to continue it. In general, Stalin was cunning, and this lie was for salvation. In politics, such maneuvers are a common thing ...
In this situation, Stalin was clearly bluffing. But bluffing in politics is not the same as bluffing in a card game or in any criminal business. Bluffing in politics is a rare art. One of its main properties is the combination of demonstrative openness with complete incomprehensibility of true (hidden) intentions. On the surface of the action seemingly ordinary, but not understandable to the opponent. And inside - the ultimate personal determination, the game "on the blade of the knife," willingly, in case of failure, to retreat. Bluffing, the politician approaches the closest possible distance to the impossible, staying in the zone still possible. Bluffing is based on unpredictability of behavior, on unexpectedness, transience, then puts in an impasse of the opponent, it also uses in its favor a bluffer.
To some extent, even if this attempt does not justify, it explains the insistent demand of Stalin to continue the offensive. During the negotiations, he needed, at whatever cost, the active actions of our troops.
And we will take it as another example of his strategic thinking. Although unsuccessful, but, as they say, with good intentions - for the sake of saving the Fatherland. "1
Attempted to understand in detail this fake the author of the book "Provocations against Russia" General NF. Chervov drew attention to the following:
"Separate negotiations describes in its own way the famous writer V.V. Karpov in the book "Generalissimo". Here is what he writes on this score: "Stalin ordered the intelligence to find outlets to the Hitlerite command and from his, Stalin, the name to make a proposal for an armistice and even more (far-reaching plans) - about a radical turn in the war ... The scouts contacted the German" colleagues ": the meeting was held in Mtsensk on February 20, 1942, Mtsensk was at that time in the territory occupied by the Nazis."
Proposals to the German command, formalized as if by a document, boiled down to the following:
1) On May 5, 1942, from 6 o'clock on the whole front line, to cease hostilities. Announce the truce until August 1, 1942 until 18 hours ...
2) After the redeployment of the armies, by the end of 1943 the Armed Forces of the USSR are ready to begin military operations against the German Armed Forces against England and the United States.
3) The USSR will be ready to consider the conditions for declaring peace between our countries and accuse international Jews of England and the USA of fomenting a war, during the next 1943-1944. to conduct joint military offensive actions in order to reorganize the world space ...
V. Karpov asserts that under the "document" there is an autograph (signature) of Stalin, although this is just a draft, "printed not on a state or party letterhead, but on a plain sheet of paper."
As V. Karpov writes, according to the report of Merkulov, First Deputy NKVD of the USSR, negotiations were held from February 20 to 27, 1942 in Mtsensk with the representative of the German command, head of the personal staff of the SS Reichsfuhrer with the SS Gruppenfuehrer K. Wolff. "The German command," Wolf declared, "does not exclude the possibility that we can create a united front against England and the United States ... With the reorganization of the world, if the leadership of the USSR accepts the demands of the German side, it is possible that Germany will push its borders in the East in favor of the USSR."
What can be said about the above opus on separatism? Only one thing is an illiterate fake. It even incorrectly indicates the position of Stalin (correctly: Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the USSR); Mtsensk was not suitable for negotiations of this scale, since by that time he was at the forefront and battles were fought on his outskirts; as far as the content of the proposals is concerned, they undoubtedly belong to the category of especially important ones and it would be undesirable to document them for the purposes of negotiations under those specific conditions. Therefore it is impossible to imagine that Stalin put his autograph and date under an unchecked document.
But the main lime of the opus lies in the time of holding separate talks. What happened then?
The great battle was near Moscow. The Germans retreated, bearing huge losses. The strategic initiative was on the side of the Soviet Union. Blitzkrieg failed. "It became clear to Hitler that since the winter of 1941-1942 a catastrophe had broken out, there could be no question of victory." (Testimony from Col. Gen. Alfred Jodl at the Nuremberg trial on 15.05.45.) The whole world welcomed the victory of the Red Army near Moscow, the enslaved peoples of Europe saw a ray of hope. The movement of Resistance to fascism has increased. Under the pressure of the Soviet government and the progressive public of the world, the governments of Britain and the United States were forced to pledge to open a second front in 1942 (but soon abandoned it). The legal registration of the military alliance between the USSR, the USA and Britain was completed, with Stalin and Churchill still in the summer of 1941. agreed on not going to separate negotiations with Germany. At the initiative of Stalin in the agreement of July 12 it was written that "during this war they will neither negotiate nor conclude a truce or a peace treaty, except by mutual agreement."
This was the most important historical fact of that time - it was marked by a radical change not only during the Great Patriotic War, but throughout the Second World War. The international prestige of the USSR and the Red Army rose high.
And what was on the opposite side? Germany "licked" its wounds from defeat. In the winter of 1941/42, on the fields near Moscow, near Tikhvin, Rostov, in the Donbass and in the Crimea, the Germans lost about 50 divisions, more than 830 thousand killed. In Germany, total mobilization was declared. The 800,000 march replenishment was sent to the Soviet-German front, and 39 divisions and six brigades were transferred from the West.
In Moscow, they closely followed the personnel leapfrog that is taking place in the German army: in December 1941 Hitler removed Field Marshal von Brauchitsch from the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces and himself took his place; commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal von Bock resigned; Four commanders of the Fourth Army (Field Marshal von Kluge, General Kübler, General Stumme, General Heinrici) were replaced during December-February. Cleaning and rearrangement of higher officers weakened the fighting efficiency of the German army, introduced nervousness into the control of the troops.
Information was received in Moscow about the defeatist sentiments in Berlin and among the generals of the Wehrmacht. On November 29, 1941, the Minister for Arms and Ammunition of Germany, Fritz von Todt, addressed Hitler with the appeal: "My Fuhrer, the war must be stopped immediately, because we have already lost it militarily and economically." Field Marshal von Rundstedt (commander of Army Group "South") invited Hitler to retreat to the border with Poland and end the war with the Soviets in a political way. The commander of the 3rd Panzer Group (from October 8, 1941 - the 17th Army), Colonel-General Herman Goth, expressed the opinion that "the attack on Russia was a political mistake and that therefore all military efforts from the very beginning were doomed to failure ". A similar opinion was shared by other generals of the Wehrmacht.
I think it does not take much intelligence to understand the absurdity of the statement that in the conditions of the victorious conclusion of the Moscow battle, Stalin allegedly, despite his contractual obligations not to go to separate negotiations and deals with Hitler, began to seek reconciliation with Germany for the joint war against the US and England. The clumsiness of such an assertion is obvious, whatever the reasons for this are (for the sake of saving the Fatherland, gaining time, catching up and preparing, misleading, political bluff, etc.).
All these arguments are pulled to the ears for that real situation. They do not stand up to criticism for the above reasons, and also because at that time the military threat in the Moscow direction was minimal. And this was well known to Stalin on the reports of military intelligence.
On March 3, 1942, the intelligence officer of the General Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (agent Gano) informed Moscow that Germany plans in the spring of 1942 to launch an offensive towards the Caucasus. For these purposes Berlin reached agreements on sending to the Eastern Front 16 new Romanian, 22 Italian, 10 Bulgarian, 2 Slovak divisions of the whole.
On March 12, GRU Shandor Rado, an agent of the GRU, sent a telegram to Moscow: "The main forces of the Germans will be directed against the southern wing of the Eastern Front with the task of reaching the turn of the river. Volga - Caucasus, to cut off the army and population of the central part of Russia from oil and grain resources. "
These reconnaissance facts from reliable and proven agents of the Soviet military intelligence immediately reported to Stalin. It was reported that from January 1 to March 10, 1942, the Germans transferred 35 divisions to the planned area of the offensive. In total, Hitler will deploy 65 divisions together with his allies for the offensive. The main blow should be expected in the direction of Rostov-Stalingrad.
Thus, the military efforts of the parties concentrated on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front, a relative lull was expected in the Moscow direction. All this, obviously, is known to the writer V. Karpov. Then it is permissible to ask: what military reasons forced Stalin to go, as it is written in the Generalissimo, to separate negotiations with Hitler? There were no such reasons.
Another thing is that at that time there could appear all sorts of "disinformation" about separatism. For example, on the part of Hitler, who at that time was like a "wolf in a kennel" and would not mind drawing Stalin into a "dice game" to "catch his breath," and if it succeeds, then immediately kill two birds with one stone: sow discord between allies in the antifascist coalition, and also to correct the course of the war, to gain time and to save the Wehrmacht from the rout. "Deza" of the Fuhrer with such a purpose at that time would be welcome.
As for Stalin, he then played a victorious game of chess. If the Allies had heeded his request and agreed with him about the opening of a second front in the West, then the war could have ended much earlier. In this chess game, the Soviet leader did not program any compromise, let alone a separate deal with Germany. "Deza" on his part on the Western theme, apparently, was also not excluded, with the help of her influence on Roosevelt and Churchill in the performance of their allied duty and at the same time confuse Hitler.
Why is V. Karpov propagating mythology? The reason, apparently, is that the author I respected was imprisoned in the discovery of a fake, took it for truth and told it as a sensation. It's hard to say what his plans were with this. Obviously, he wanted the best. "2
General Chervov is absolutely right, but this is not a question of a fake. It is necessary to keep in mind the following.
First of all, the general political situation in relations between the heads of the three main states participating in the anti-Hitler coalition, i.e. between Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill, especially between the first two. It was during this period, i.е. in February 1942 (as before February 19, and a little later), the situation was the following (evidence of genuine documents of personal correspondence between Stalin and Roosevelt):
Received on February 11, 1942.
SECRET AND PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TO HIS STALIN
In January and February, 449 light tanks, 408 medium tanks, 244 fighters, 24 B-25 and 233 A-20 were or will be shipped.
I understand the importance of delivering you our weapons as soon as possible, and all efforts are being made to send these goods.
The messages here indicate that you are successfully driving away the Nazis.
Despite the difficulties we are currently experiencing in the Far East, I hope that in the near future we will become so strong in this region that we will be able to stop the Japanese. But we are prepared for some further failures 3 .
Received on February 13, 1942.
F. ROOSEVELT TO JV STALIN
I am very pleased that your government has given its consent to accept my old and faithful friend Admiral Standley as Ambassador of the United States. For many years we were close colleagues, and he enjoys my complete confidence. I recommend him to you not only as an honest and energetic person, but also as a person who highly values the achievements of the Soviet Union and admires them.
He, as you remember, visited the Soviet Union last year with Mr. Harriman. Since returning from Moscow, Admiral Stanley has already done a lot to make the United States better understand the situation in the Soviet Union. I am sure that with his rich experience and knowledge of the problems facing our countries, and with your cooperation, his efforts to bring our countries even closer together will be crowned with success.
My attention has just been drawn to the fact that the Soviet Government has placed orders for goods and armaments in our country worth more than a billion dollars that was placed at the disposal of the Soviet Government last fall under the law on the transfer of armaments on loan or lease and on the basis of an exchange letters between us. In this regard, I propose that under the same law a second billion dollars be allocated to your government under the same conditions on which the first billion were granted. If you have any other suggestions regarding the conditions on which the second billion dollars should be provided to you, you can be sure that these proposals will be carefully and benevolently reviewed.
Sent on February 18, 1942.
I.V. STALIN TO F. ROOSEVELT
I received your message with a report on the next supply of arms from the United States for January and February months. I must confirm that it is at the present moment, when the peoples of the Soviet Union and his army are straining their efforts to throw further the Hitlerite troops by their persistent offensive, the fulfillment of American supplies, including tanks and aircraft, is of great importance for our common cause, for our further successes 5 .
Sent on February 18, 1942.
I.V. STALIN TO F. ROOSEVELT
Confirming receipt of your message of February 13 this year, I would first of all like to note that I share your confidence that the efforts of the newly appointed US Ambassador to the USSR, Admiral Stanley, whom you so flatteringly and highly appreciate, will bring our countries closer together, will be crowned success.
Your decision, Mr. President, to provide the Government of the USSR with a second billion dollars, according to the law on the transfer of armaments on loan or lease, under the same conditions on which the first billion was granted, the Soviet Government accepts with sincere gratitude. In connection with the question posed by you, I must inform you that at the moment, in order not to postpone decisions, the Soviet Government does not raise the question of changing the conditions for granting the said second billion dollars to the Soviet Union and for appropriately taking into account the extreme strain of the USSR resources in the war against our common enemy. At the same time, I fully agree with you and express the hope that later we will determine the appropriate time together,
I would like to take this opportunity to draw your attention to the fact that, at the present time, the relevant bodies of the USSR in the implementation of the loan granted by the USSR meet with great difficulties in transporting weapons and materials purchased in the United States to the ports of the USSR. We would consider, under the given conditions, the most expedient the order of transportation of arms from America is one that with positive results is used to transport armament items from England to Arkhangelsk, but which has not yet been implemented with respect to supplies from the United States. This order consists in the fact that the British military authorities, supplying weapons and materials, themselves select steamships, and organize loading in the port and convoying steamers to the port of destination. The Soviet Government would be very grateful,
With sincere respect I. STALIN 6
FROM PRESIDENT IV. STALIN
Sim is confirmed receipt of your message of February 20.
I want you to know that at the appropriate time we will be happy to review with you our agreement on the funds advanced by us under the law on the transfer of armaments on loan or lease. At the moment, the most important task is delivery of supplies to you.
I ordered the study of your proposal to centralize here the matter of arms deliveries to Russia.
New messages about the successes of your army are very encouraging. I send you my warmest congratulations on the 24th anniversary of the creation of the Red Army. February 23, 1942 7 .
It is quite obvious that Stalin did not have any need to apply to the German command with any suggestions, let alone a joint armed struggle against the United States and Britain, and for the purpose of opposing world Jewry! Especially on the eve of the 24th anniversary of the Red Army!
And is it not clear that Stalin under no circumstances would have signed this, not so much even an absurd ostensibly document, as clearly "a fizzy letter" ?!
Now a huge number of original documents with authentic signatures and Stalin's resolutions are being published. Stalin always put on the documents the resolution "I agree (or approve). I. Stalin (as a variant of the signature "I. St.") or simply "I. Stalin. " And put obliquely in the upper left corner, slightly capturing his signature and the first paragraph (or even two) of the text of the document!
On the photo-stick to this chapter, No. 1-10 shows samples of the original signature of I.V. Stalin for different years.
Samples of signatures under photographs I.V. Stalin can be considered classic, because they are taken from intravital editions of the brief biography of I.V. Stalin and the first volume of the collection of his works: the one on which I.V. Stalin is portrayed relatively young, refers clearly to the second half - the end of the 20's. the last century, and another - also under the photograph - by 1949, and the rest by 1934-1935, 1941-1944. And now compare with what is depicted on the allegedly Stalin's allegedly ostensibly document ...
Of course, we do not have the right to assign to ourselves expert handwriters to make a categorically competent conclusion about the mismatch of Stalin's signature samples on a fake and original, authentic documents. But do not notice this - there is no chance.
I will allow myself to make one assumption - it seems that it is close to the truth. If we compare the signature on the fake with the authentic samples of Stalin's signature, then it is not difficult to notice that the greatest similarity is found with the sample of the 1920s. And why?
Further. The addressee - the "German command" - is similar to the address of Chekhov's Vanka Zhukov's message. "To the village of my grandfather!"
With an impersonal addressee - after all, under the expression "German command" you can understand anything - in the "document"
is indicated, although inaccurate (this was noticed by General Chervov), the full status of the "signatory", i.e. Stalin ?!
Meanwhile, the issues touched upon in this "document" fall exclusively within the competence of the heads of state, who are also the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of their countries, under wartime conditions. As of February 19, 1942, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Adolf Hitler had already been with the German command for four years and 15 days.
Why refer to an impersonal addressee - the "German command" - if it was already clear that without Hitler as Supreme Commander, this faceless addressee will not decide anything ?!
After all, only the highest state men can decide the highest questions of world politics at the highest state level, and consequently, the addressee should then be: "To the Reich Chancellor and Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the German Armed Forces, Führer of the German Nation Adolf Hitler".
By the way, in that case, Stalin would have to be named as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the USSR!
And how do you want to regard what was supposedly proposed from May 5 to declare a truce as early as August 1, but withdraw troops from August 1 until December 22, that is, at the time when the truce is over? To suggest to the invaders to calmly sunbathe in the sun for almost three months, to bathe in Russian rivers and lakes, to rob the occupied territories, up to the last string, ripping off their population, and not consonants to destroy - after all, the Hitlerites, from the first minutes of aggression, clearly showed that they came to destroy all "Subhuman," that is, the Slavs, Jews, commissars, etc., and then quietly and calmly lay down the loot and peacefully clean up their fucking "futherland" ?! And all this should have been silently observed by Soviet troops, and in the period of the "exodus" of the Teutons - in the situation of a long-ago ceasefire?
In fact, if anyone wants to pretend to be a dumbhead, then this does not mean that Stalin is obliged to make such a fools company! Even in retrospect! ..
Delirium is delirious, but you have to seriously disprove it, as you can see. Once again, take a closer look at the allegedly proposed proposal for an alleged truce, and if you look closely, consider the following: could Stalin act as a round idiot who, putting forward the idea of an armistice, proposes to install it in 65 days after the proposal for it?
Oh, something, but the story is something, including. the history of wars, Stalin knew better than another professor of the Academy of the General Staff. And it, the history of wars, clearly shows that if there was a need for two belligerents to declare even a temporary truce, then no one ever announced or even tried to declare it 65 days after the nomination of a proposal for it!
During these 65 days, troops in direct contact with the fighting will break such "firewood", that then no clever diplomacy will help, unless, of course, someone remains to be wise!
The history of wars unequivocally testifies that the proposals for a truce always implied the announcement of this for the next day, but, as a rule, on the third day after the proposal was put forward. In the Second World War, and this did not happen - ultimatums with a temporary truce (rather, a cease-fire) were limited to a maximum of days!
Why should we believe that Stalin wrote this: "1). From May 5, 1942, from 6 o'clock on the whole front line to cease military operations. Declare a truce until August 1, 1942, until 6 pm "?
He knew Russian better than many professors of Russian literature, Stalin would write, if it, of course, he would need, only in the following way: "From 06:00. (for a time, the concept of Central European time would most likely have been used, since it was not for Greenwich to establish it) on May 5, 1942, to declare a truce throughout the Soviet-German front until 18:00. (on average European time) on August 1! 942 years, in connection with which to stop all combat actions of the parties. "
So or so approximately would Stalin write if it was necessary for him. By the way, in the same way would write and anyone who is at odds with the Russian language.
Or, for what reason should, for example, the content of paragraph 2 allegedly made by Stalin "proposal", which says: "2). Beginning on August 1, 1942, and until December 22, 1942, German troops must retreat to the lines indicated in Scheme 1. It is proposed to establish the border between Germany and the USSR in the extent indicated in Scheme No. 1 ?!
First of all, from the very first days of the war, Stalin consistently and consistently pursued the main goal - the complete and unconditional restoration of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the USSR within the borders as of June 4, This is so fully described in the literature that there is no need to repeat everything.
Nevertheless, although hypothetically, but still consider this case, however, only from the positions of the Russian language and the logic of the political document.
All over the world, borders are established along a line, and not in length, and therefore under no circumstances would Stalin have thought of using the wording "It is proposed (why this word, when the allegedly document itself is already allegedly called" Proposal ... 2 " ) to establish the border between Germany and the USSR, according to the extent indicated in Scheme No. 1. "
If this really were necessary for Stalin, then this, if I may say so, the "point of the proposal" would look at least as follows:
"2. To establish the border between the USSR and Germany along the line ... "and then the relevant settlements would be indicated, as well as the rivers for which it will pass.
However, with absolute accuracy it can be argued that in reality, if, of course, there was at least some need, this "point" would have the following form:
"2. To establish that from such and such a date of such and such a month of 1942 the border between the USSR and Germany will pass along the line ... "and then the relevant settlements and the rivers along which it passes will be indicated. On the link to latitude and longitude, I'm not saying ...
If further hypothetical to consider this delusion of falsifiers, then the following wording should be included in this "point" of alleged "proposals": "After the signing and ratification of the relevant agreement on the establishment of the border line, German troops must be withdrawn for this line of the Soviet-German border . The withdrawal of German troops for the specified line of the border is to be carried out from 00:00 onwards. for a time of 1 August to .00 h. 00 min. at such and such a time on December 22, 1942, under the supervision of a mixed Soviet-German commission. "
This, at least a little, would correspond to the elementary logic of a political document.
As a minimum, the minimalor Stalin would have stated this "point" so, if, of course, it would have been necessary for him. But it never occurred to him to write the following stupidity: "German troops must retreat to the lines indicated in Scheme No. 1," and only after that offer to establish the border!
Stupidity because the cart was in front of the horse. For first they indicate the line of the border, confirm it with the appropriate agreement and its ratification, and only then withdraw the troops, but not to the frontiers (for this is a military term), but on the line of the border! As the famous character Conan Doyle used to say, "it's elementary, Watson!".
But it would be even more elementary if the "cutlets" would be separate, and "flies" - the more separated. The fact is that in the exposition of falsifiers, the so-called. "P. 2 "of alleged" proposals "is a direct evidence of ignorance of the basic principles of international law.
Interstate borders have never been established (and not established) in the history of mankind in conditions, and even more so on the basis of only a truce.
To establish them, it is necessary to conclude a Peace Treaty or, at a minimum, an Agreement on Peace! Only this can be the basis for establishing a mutually recognized interstate border!
The falsifiers, however, decided to amuse the whole honest people by allegedly on behalf of Stalin suggested that the Hitlerites withdraw to some frontiers, without giving at the same time even to themselves, the report that this is purely a military action called "divorce". But it's a dashing trouble - further, on the basis of the divorce, the troops were offered to establish an interstate border, but at the same time both managed to plan for implementation in the conditions of an already ceased truce! Well is it worth so hard to pile up such a brainless design, at the base of which is impassable cretinism, and on top - the floors of idiocy alternate spans of frank debilism?
How could you not notice all this?! How could one get to the conclusion that this is "Stalin's phrase" - all the more incomprehensible! Even the most spiteful, desperately malicious anti-Stalinists of the opportunistic type - and never dared to deny the "dead lion" in the exceptional literacy and logic of both written and oral statements!
This is from what kind of hodon it was necessary to slide down to the conclusion that the phantasmagoric delirium in the form of the phrase "the German state will cease to exist on the political map as such" belongs to Stalin! To Stalin himself, who openly talked throughout the war that "the Hitlerites come and go, and the German people remain," and therefore, if there is a German people, there will always be a German state!
If Stalin wanted him, he would then threaten to destroy the Nazi regime itself, not the state. What, in fact, he did the whole war, as evidenced by his above-mentioned phrase!
And in conclusion of the topic - one more important nuance. In the Soviet Union, no one would ever write: "Moscow; The Kremlin on February 19, 1942 ».
Would write like this: "Moscow, the Kremlin, February 19, 1942"!
After the word "Moscow" there should be a comma, not a semicolon, after the word "Kremlin" - also a comma! From time immemorial in the Kremlin they write only so!
Concluding the topic, I want to draw attention to the following.
The world practice of conducting secret separate negotiations is such that none of the parties involved in them is using any written instructions of the heads of their states in their process. Those. they can formally exist, but never, firstly, no one takes them with them to the negotiations and, secondly, especially does not show them not only as a document, but as the very fact of their existence in nature.
Especially this does not make scouts - under any circumstances everything keeps in mind and is discussed orally! On that, in fact, there are secret negotiations.
Remember at least brilliantly (including the accuracy of the events) shown in the legendary film "Seventeen Moments of Spring" talks between Karl Wolf and Allen Dulles. Absolutely no papers on either side, or on the other hand - all just verbally. And Soviet intelligence had then had to work hard, almost to the seventh sweat, to present absolutely incontrovertible documentary evidence, exposing the very fact of such negotiations, not to mention their virulently anti-Soviet content.
For readers, it will be interesting to know that the legendary Soviet intelligence officer Iskhak Abdulovich Ahmerov, who headed the most powerful illegal residence of Soviet intelligence in the United States during the war, documented the very fact of these negotiations and especially their content. Under the close supervision of his high-ranking agents was the entire administration of the President of the United States, including the Office of Strategic Services (CSS) - the forerunner of the CIA. So Stalin knew about the content of the next round of these negotiations, sometimes earlier than President Roosevelt himself . 8
As for the real essence of the matter, an exceptionally cautious, brilliant conspirator with a colossal experience of underground, political and state activity, more than a very strong doctor of philosophy / political science - Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin under no circumstances would even consider such, let me say , "Document". For this would mean deadly slaughter against him, Stalin, as the leader of the USSR. And it is precisely this compromising material, the deadly killing, which would be manifested first of all in the Kremlin itself and, perhaps, in the most direct sense!
Because it would be impossible to conceal this from the rest of the Soviet party and political leadership, but if it knew about it, Stalin would have been arrested and shot without trial and investigation! Hunters to this in his environment was enough, as, indeed, and abroad ...
Stalin never suffered a penchant for either political or simply suicide.
In order to finally clarify the principled position of Stalin in such situations, I will permit myself to cite an example that is very "related" to the meaning and external features.
In November 1940, with the official visit (at the invitation of the German side), Germany was visited by the closest associate of Stalin, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov. Before leaving for Berlin, a confidential conversation took place between him and Stalin, during which Joseph Vissarionovich outlined the thematic content of the theses for Molotov's probing talks with the Nazi leadership of Germany, especially with Hitler.
Everything happened orally, i.e. even in conditions of peace, Stalin did not allow himself to send anything to Molotov in writing. Vyacheslav Mikhailovich personally, from memory, in a semi-encrypted form on a small sheet of paper, abstractly sketched out everything that Stalin said. Now they are trying to pass this scrap of paper out for some, almost on the verge of instructions, Stalin's instructions to Molotov for organizing collusion with Hitler!
And these were just theses for probing Hitler's intentions, as shown in detail in Stalin's reaction to the results of his visit, reported by Molotov to the Politburo.
The reason why Stalin defined the theses for the sounding of the Hitlerite leadership by Molotov is trivial. According to intelligence reports, he knew that, at the initiative of the British Duke of Bedford and several other influential representatives of the British elite, confidential negotiations between the emissary R. Hess in the person of Albrecht Haushofer and authorized representatives from the British side began in Geneva in late August 1940.
Moreover, Stalin knew for certain that the British representatives had conditioned the British's readiness to establish peace with Germany with the eventual consent of the latter to the dissolution of the Treaty of Non-Aggression with the USSR of August 23, 1939!
Stalin was aware of the fact that Hitler planned to postpone the beginning of specific peace talks with England before the Balkans, for in this case the Treacherous Albion would have been more accommodating, since. The main maritime communications linking England to the colonies would have been under the German threat. On the other hand, it was just as certain that Churchill, who was then prime minister, ordered British intelligence to ignite the flames of war in Europe, so that it inevitably spread to the USSR.
That is why Stalin and instructed Molotov, almost on the verge of a foul, to probe the intentions and position of the Nazi leadership, incl. and by carefully "playing" some of the geopolitical maps that are particularly attractive to the Hitler. Slandage was a success - Molotov was able to feel the position of the Hitler, as evidenced by the assessment of Stalin's results of his visit to Germany. Like any political and state figure in the world, Stalin was absorbed in the cares of the security of his state and, for this reason, committed precisely those diplomatic maneuvers that are universally accepted throughout the world. This example is given to show that even in relations with such a close ally as Molotov, moreover, in conditions of peace, Stalin did not even give anything in writing!
On the so-called report of Merkulov to Stalin, allegedly a photocopy of which is given above. This is a forgery - primarily because the issues mentioned in it were not within the competence of the Deputy People's Commissar for Internal Affairs of the USSR, V. Merkulov! This level is only Stalin - Molotov-Beria!
For example, the decision to conduct the reconnaissance operation of the NKVD, repeatedly mentioned in the book, on the impact on the top leadership of Hitler's Germany in order to keep it from attempts to use chemical weapons against Soviet troops was taken only at the Stalin-Molotov-Beria level. at the level of the three main and most full-fledged members of the State Defense Committee. On instructions from Stalin, Beria only personally instructed the executor of this operation, PA. Sudoplatov, which should be talked with the agent of our intelligence - the ambassador of Tsarist Bulgaria in Moscow Stamenov.
And only personally in front of Beria Sudoplatov reported on the work done, and, apparently, it was verbally. Beria, in turn, also verbally reported this to Stalin.
In the same way, even before the war, the operation "Snow" initiated by Stalin personally (by the way, based on the results of Molotov's visit to Germany) began on the pre-emptive reorientation of the direction of the inevitable armed expansion of Japan in the southern direction. against the United States and Great Britain, which resulted in the attack of the Land of the Rising Sun on Pearl Harbor and as a result of which the United States was finally drawn into World War II as a combat ally of the USSR.
Everything was done verbally, including the promotion of relevant information to the top leadership of the United States and Japan. There were no written traces in the intelligence materials, and abroad - especially. If it were not for the memoirs of the veteran intelligence officer General V. Pavlov, then no one would ever have known about this operation10.
I emphasize that this is a general rule for reconnaissance operations, especially when the issues to be resolved are at the level of the highest world political science.
The general is common, but first of all it should be borne in mind that during the entire war, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin never and under no circumstances entered into any secret, including. and separate negotiations with the Hitlerites. On the contrary, during the entire war he faithfully observed the commitments made to the Allies on the anti-Hitler coalition to categorically prohibit such.
It's you, a million pardons and excuses, not some Winston Churchill, who has been suffering from an incurable Anglo-Saxon pathology since time immemorial - to constantly adore by the principle "one write, two daggers in the mind and three snakes in the bosom"!
For only Churchill and others like him, as a matter of course for the man of the West, could get into the head with one hand to sign an allied agreement with the USSR, the content of one of whose items forbade even an attempt to enter into secret separate negotiations with the Hitlerites, and another - to all the countries of Europe, including Hitler's Germany, in which he urged them to consolidate their efforts for the assured destruction of the USSR, and under the guise of which this defender of British democracy still managed to enter into secret negotiations with the Hitlerites in 1942 on the division of territories and property of the Soviet Union! "
Such, sorry ... (this word begins with the fourth letter of the Russian alphabet) was an "ally" in that war. A thousand times right already quoted above Yu.I. Mukhin, who called U. Churchill "our sneaky friend"!
And in conclusion of this aspect of the topic mentioned, it is interesting to note that the idea, more precisely, the ideix about the allegedly separate Soviet-German negotiations during the war, is not new. Immediately after the war, the historian Basil Liddel-Tartp, closely knit with British intelligence, "slightly moved his mind" on this.
He "jammed", I must say bluntly, very stupidly, for he carried these speculations to 1943, i.e. after the victories of the Soviet Army in Stalingrad and in the Battle of Kursk, when it became clear to everyone that the ridge of the fascist beast was broken and there was nothing to discuss with him, it was only necessary to finish him off.
"The Legend of Liddell-Hart" partly echoes with what, unfortunately, so easily bought V.V. Karpov ...
Further analysis of the fake leads to the conclusion that, in addition to everything else, it completely violates the attributes of secret reconnaissance with Stalin during the war.
From June 30, 1941 and until May 9, 1945, Soviet intelligence, in this case the NKVD, sent its communications to Stalin, while strictly observing the following attributes of especially secret correspondence. As of 1942, it looked like this:
In the upper right corner of the document was put the classification of secrecy, in this case -
"Sov. secret "(occasionally," Top Secret "). 13.
Immediately after the stamp of secrecy, the number of the specimen was indicated, i.e. it looked like this:
Ex. No. _ " 14 .
Of course, Stalin sent the first copy.
The addressee was indicated as follows:
"STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE t.Stalin, t.Molotov, t.Beria" (if the document was not signed by Lavrenty Pavlovich) 15.
In documents of that time, especially 1941-42, there are also such formulations of the addressee as, for example:
- "GOSUD. THE DEFENSE COMMITTEE OF THE USSR » 16 ,
- "STATE COMMITTEE OF DEFENSE OF THE USSR" 17 ;
- "STATE COMMITTEE OF DEFENSE OF THE UNION OF SSR" 18 .
Surnames can be specified either as "Comrade Stalin, t.Molotovu" or "Comrade Stalin, t.MOLOTOVU" or "tov.STALI-ou, tov.MOLOTOVU" occasionally "tt.STALINU, Molotov" 19 .
Those. specified in the so-called. "The report" to the addressee "To Comrade Stalin" is nothing but a farcical design of a fake.
The registration number given in the fake - No. 1/2428 of February 27, 1942 - in its turn, is capable of provoking an ironic smile.
The fact is that the registration of outgoing messages addressed to the head of state was carried out by intelligence separately, and, consequently, this number should mean its order character. In turn, this means that only the NKVD reconnaissance of the USSR from January 1 to February 27, 1942, i.e. in just 58 days (worldwide, in any business, registration starts from January 1 and ends on December 31) sent 2428 messages to Stalin! It turns out that only the NKVD intelligence sent him 42 messages a day ?!
Theoretically, it can be assumed that for a day or two, well, at most, five days out of these 58 days, intelligence could indeed send 42 messages, but not only to Stalin, but to all those who are interested in its information. But to survive such a frantic regime for 58 days in a row - after all, it's almost 2 messages per hour and then at the rate of round-the-clock work, which even during the war was not.
Yes, intelligence can get a huge amount of information per day, especially during the war, but not all of them meet the requirements presented to the head of state! This level corresponds to 10 to 20% of all extracted information, and Beria, as he treated, was a high-quality intelligence professional, in order not to rush to the Kremlin for nothing!
In this allegedly registration number, it especially "touches" that a clumsy faked out fake should be, in sense and spirit, treated as "OV", i.e. documents of "Special importance", but after all, she has a fake, then - the current registration number, while similar documents were then registered in a separate magazine! And consequently, the number would have to be much less!
Something, but in matters of secret record keeping in the days of Stalin-Beria reigned "iron order"!
Here the following words would be quite appropriate: "From 1938 to 1945, L.P. Beria was People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR. He was a good commissar, the best estimate in such cases is the evaluation of the enemy.
Collection "World War 1939-1945", section "War on land", General von Butlar:
"The special conditions that existed in Russia greatly hindered the obtaining of intelligence data on the military potential of the Soviet Union, and therefore these data were far from complete. The exceptionally skilful disguise by the Russians of everything that relates to their army, as well as strict control over foreigners and the impossibility of organizing a broad network of espionage made it difficult to verify the few information that intelligence officers could collect ... "
Specifically, personally in the USSR for "the impossibility of organizing a broad network of espionage" answered L.P. Beria 20 .
The "cap" of the supposedly documented "FIRST DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF THE INTERIOR OF THE USSR" - and the signature under this alleged document: "First Deputy People's Commissar for Internal Affairs of the USSR (Merkulov)" causes no less "emotion".
Never and under no circumstances during the war such documents addressed to Stalin from the NKVD of the USSR were not sent! Moreover, intelligence messages were not sent on official forms - this was not generally accepted in correspondence between state security bodies, especially intelligence agencies, and the USSR Instance, i.e. The Politburo, and above all Stalin.
Such a "cap" in this, if I may say so, "document" - one of the most lethal evidence that we have a fake. There is not a single sign of even a minimal correspondence to the blank documents of that time. As the main sign of conformity, the following should be the case: all attributes of the sender must have been typed in the upper left corner of the sheet, except for the date and number.
Since the beginning of the century, only one order of sending intelligence information to the USSR was adopted: on the clean sheet of white paper of the A-4 format, all restrictive attributes, the addressee, the content and signature of the head of the security services (intelligence), as well as the date with the registration number in the lower left corner of the last sheet of the document).
In those cases when intelligence messages for the above address were to be sent during the war, that is, in the "STATE COMMITTEE OF DEFENSE OF THE USSR T. Stalin, t.Molotov, t.beria," they were signed by the head of the NKVD intelligence P.M. Fitin, the formulation of his post up to the next division of the NKVD and NKGB in 1943 looked like: "Chief of Intelligence of the NKVD Union of the USSR", or "Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR (Fitin)" 21 .
When Fitina destination document signature was as follows: "The National Defense of the USSR (sometimes UNION SSR) Comrade Stalin, t.MOLOTOVU, t.BERIYa, and just below NKVD - Merkulova" 22 .
It was Fitin, as the intelligence chief, who signed the majority of intelligence reports of the USSR NKVD to Stalin as the chairman of the state short-term bonds. Yes, in general, Stalin had no address in the war years, except for "GKO, Stalin." I emphasize that it was Fitin who signed the majority of intelligence reports, incl. and on especially important issues.
It is connected with this, in particular, the additional addressee of the "NKVD of the USSR - T.Merculov", behind which lies one subtlety: Merkulov was informed in parallel as the first deputy of the People's Commissar and only. In the same cases, when the information was particularly important, the message was signed personally by L.P. Beria, whose wording for the signature looked like this:
"People's Commissar" of the USSR Internal Affairs "or
"People's Commissar of the" Internal Affairs of the USSR " 23
If something that, unfortunately, turned out to be accepted at face value would indeed have taken place, then the document would have to be signed in accordance with the above-mentioned rules that were valid at that time, and even more so would not look ridiculous the formulation of Merkulov's post "First deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR ".
However, even the totality of the above subtleties will clearly fade against the background of the most lethal documentary argument, even alone and unconditionally exposing this heinous fake.
Photographing under No. 11 shows the alleged signature of Merkulov under an alleged document in the name of allegedly Stalin, and under No. 12 is a sample of Merkulov's original signature under the official document for 1941, i.е. eight months before the date specified in document No. 11. In addition, samples of handwriting and signatures of Merkulov for 1938 (see No. 13) and for 1953 (see No. 14) are given to represent the dynamics of a possible transformation of the signature, which, as is known, takes place in life with the age of a person.
As you can see, the signatures of Vsevolod Nikolayevich Merkulov for 1938 and 1941. - the same, and even if in three years it has not undergone any transformation, especially in connection with a sharp change in the position of Merkulov (in 1938 he was only the head of the department of the Central Committee of the CP of Georgia, and in 1941 - already a People's Commissar state security of the USSR), then, you know, it hardly changed at least somehow on February 27, 1942!
That is why the sample of his signature (No. 12) under Directive No. 136/6171 of June 24, 1941 (the Directive of the NKGB of the USSR to the People's Commissars of the State Security of the Republics, the State Security Offices of the Borders and Regions of the Borderland on the tasks facing the state bodies security in wartime), the original of which is kept in the Central Intelligence Agency of the Federal Security Service. F. 12 wasps. Op. 3. D. 4. L. 241 242, 252-254. I emphasize that the above signature VN. Merkulov was taken directly from the original of the directive with which the state security organs headed by him entered the war - when publishing this document, the Central Intelligence Service of the FSB directly stipulated its authenticity!
Samples of handwriting are personal letters of V.N. Merkulov in the name of L, P. Beria, were taken from the archival investigation file against Vsevolod Nikolayevich as "an accomplice of Beria." The documents were quoted on the 123rd page of the book by A. Sukhomlinov "Who are you, Lavrenty Beria?" (M., 2003) 25.
Their value is also in the fact that they give a holistic view of the handwriting of V.N. Merkulov, which provides an opportunity to make sure once again that on the used V.V. Karpov's ostensibly document shows a stupidly forged signature of Merkulov!
In conclusion of the topic on the authenticity of Merkulov's signature, it would be interesting to point out that even the transformed one - apparently under the effect of his sudden arrest in 1953 - Merkulov's signature on the prison questionnaire of the arrested person (in his archival criminal case) does not look like the signature , depicted in the above V.V. A carp fake.
Compare once more the sample under number 11 (fake) with the signature of Merkulov on the prison questionnaire (No. 15) 26. The signature on the questionnaire is identical, in any case purely visually it is so, the signature on Merkulov's personal letter to Beria in 1953 (before the arrest).
3. To an even greater extent, the fact of falsification is proved by the fact that the basis of those alleged negotiations between Soviet and German intelligence officers was a "General Agreement" between the NKVD and the Gestapo.
So easily bought on fake VV. Karpov let the dust into his eyes, that he had only recently read this document, obviously having foreseen the fact that he had read it with a printed sheet of the notorious company "Memory" -the newspaper of the same name for No. 1 (26) of 1999, from. 12-13!
Not only Karpov "slipped" on that, if I may say so, "the printed edition." The author of the book "Guillotine for Demons" (St. Petersburg, 2001) Roman Perin almost all his work built on this ...
It was in this issue of the newspaper "Pamyat" that this fake was first published.
Look closely at the "caps" of the photocopies of the same alleged document: under No. 16, what was printed in the newspaper "Memory" and in the book by R. Perin, under No. 17 - what V. Karpov quoted.
And if you look closely, try at least to yourself to answer a simple question - how can the same document have two different "caps" ?!
But do not hurry with the answer, because it's still "flowers". As for "berries" - "wolf berries" of falsification, then please, here they are.
None of the international documents in their names:
a) are not listed in the order of homogeneous members of the proposal without (logical) completion of the meaning of the names of the spheres to which the documents apply; those. if someone was willing to burgle this fake, then it was necessary to think what should be done by nature and not by the opposite place and, accordingly, to call this dirty fake should be so: "The General Agreement on Cooperation, Mutual Assistance and Joint activities ";
b) the more not indicated are mutually absorbing synonyms, and if one wants to make a fake, then in Russian it should have the following form:
"General Agreement on Cooperation and Mutual Assistance" or
"General agreement on mutual assistance and joint activities".
The enumeration of the three synonyms, separated by commas, is meaningless, especially if one considers that the word "cooperation", especially in combination with the word "mutual aid", completely absorbs the meaning of the term "joint activity".
You can hate the past, the people of the past, their actions, after all, you can not be surprised that some anthropologists hate their homeland, but you should not assume that the people of the past were uniform idiots!
Firstly, because for all its Georgian origin, both Stalin and Beria spoke Russian better than another professor of Russian literature.
Secondly, in the Lubyanka and in those times were highly skilled, incl. and in the field of international law, experts, to prevent such oak blunders.
After all, the NKVD, and even earlier, the OGPU, even before the war, carried out international cooperation with the special services of Mongolia, Turkey and Czechoslovakia, and carried out on the basis of relevant treaties. And, accordingly, they knew well what and how to make out in writing. Meanwhile, even on formal, i.e. attributes, signs, everything is broken, to which the dirty paws of falsifiers have reached.
For example, in the title of the post LP. Beria has a gross distortion. The fact is that he is listed as the chief of the Main Directorate of State Security - the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR - while his main post at the time, which, in fact, he was transferred from Georgia, was called "First Deputy People's Commissar of Internal affairs of the USSR "28. And he was appointed to this post on August 22, 1938, 29 but the chief of the GUGBB Beria became only September 29, 1938, 30 and then concurrently.
The main position (especially so high) completely absorbs the second, which he held concurrently. This rule is all the more applicable, especially when signing contracts and similar documents, incl. and international, when the highest position of the signatory is indicated.
The moment is legally as subtle, equally important, especially as it is indicated in the forgery that the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR (we will immediately point out that this was not written in any document, for the usual formulation was that only , the word "Narodnyi" was written with a capital letter, the rest with a small, except, of course, the USSR .- AM), hereinafter: "The NKVD, represented by the head of the Main Directorate of State Security, State Security Commissioner I Rank Lavrenty Beria" which, by the way, would have been much handy her, if even the NKVD in his face, to indicate that the NKVD in his face as the First Deputy People's Commissar of the Interior! At least this would be legally more competent, especially for such an allegedly document with such a high-profile title as the "General Agreement" - that is, it would be understandable, that the document was signed by a truly authorized official. Beria was a pedagogue in matters of record keeping and knew the sense, incl. and in the papers. He certainly would not have thought of using the journalistic stamp "Lavrenty Beria" in an official document of an international character!
And, by the way, since the hunt was once again to trample LP. Beria, then we would have moved the date for another 14 days, i.e. until November 25, 1938, when Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria was officially appointed People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, 31 and they would have "soldered" to this "General Agreement
"in any case, a purely fake would have acquired a much more convincing appearance, without ceasing to be a fake, of course ...
But no, it was unbearable to "tie" this dirty fake to November 11, 1938. Why ?! Especially when you consider that the power of attorney was issued to "papa Muller" on November 3, 1938?! And there is an adequate answer to this story, which is a little lower, but for now that's what.
Before the "emotion" is struck by the unique dullness of the falsifiers, just to the point of stupid idiocy with names of institutions and the post of signatory on the German side.
In the "cap" of the so-called. "The General Agreement" (see No. 16), the German "signatory" is listed as the "General Directorate of Security of the National Socialist Workers' Party of Germany (Gestapo)".
Yes you will know that, firstly, in accordance with the decree of Hitler on November 1, 1938. The main security department of the NSDAP of Germany, and this is primarily the Security Service (Sicherheitsdienst-SD), i.e. SD, ceased to be the Security Service only NSDAP, i.e. party secret service, and was officially declared the security organ of the entire Third Reich . 32
On November 3, 1938, "Papa Müller" could not legally get a power of attorney on behalf of the NSDAP GUB. Moreover, he could not speak on behalf of the GUB NSDAP on November 11, 1938. So what, but you can not take away the sharpened accuracy in the papers from the Germans - they are world-famous pedants in terms of records management.
Secondly, in fact, this office since June 26, 1936 was called the General Directorate of the Security Police and SD! 33 It included the Gestapo and Creep (criminal police).
By the way, the name "Gestapo" is semi-legal, spontaneous.
When in 1933 H. Goering created in the Prussian Ministry of the Interior "Secret Department of the State Police", i.e. in German "Geheime Staatspolizeiabteilung", some official invented an abbreviation, which was read as "Gestapa."
For some time, but still under Gering, the term "Gestapa" was used, but then another "craftsman" from the same agency replaced the letter "a" at the end of the "term" with the letter "o" and it turned out that is notorious in the world - "the Gestapo" 34 .
Accordingly, the term "General Directorate of Security of the National Socialist Workers' Party of Germany (GESTAPO)" could not be used in the title of this supposedly "general agreement", since such writing means the complete identity of what is in brackets, to what is indicated in front of them, which in reality was not. The Gestapo was just one of the constituent parts of this office.
As of November 1938, already as a secret political police - from October 1, 1936 the term "Gestapo" was extended to the entire political police of the Reich - the Gestapo was just one of the departments of the Main Directorate of the Security Police and SD (the second was the Criminal Police Office - Creep, which was headed by one of the largest police forensic experts of Germany Arthur Nyobe) 35 .
Thirdly, the "confusion" of the falsifiers in the question of the post of "papa Muller" is especially "admired," because they managed "ahead of schedule" to raise him in office and rank!
As of November 11, 1938, Henry Muller was not the head of the IV Directorate (Gestapo) of the Main Directorate of the National Socialist Workers' Party of Germany - by the way, note that in the "cap" of this "document", ie. in its name, the GUB of the NSDAP of Germany was identified as "Gestapo," and in the preamble of the agreement the Gestapo is listed as "4th Department of the GUB NSDAP", which is already nonsense. This, of course, does not mean that horseradish is sweeter than radish, however, it is not a sin and a measure to know.
Such a delirium of a gray mare could only arise because of the fact that the Gestapo became the IV Office (AMT-4) only on September 27, 1939, when the so-called "Seventeen" the moments of spring "- RSHA (RSHA - Reichssicherheitshauptamt), i.e. General Directorate of Imperial Security 36 .
As of November 11, 1938 G. Muller could not subscribe to the "general agreement" as the head of the IV Office, the more so the GUB of the NSDAP. And even more so the Hitlerites could not give him the power of attorney as the head of the IV Department of the GUB NSDAP!
Because, as of November 11, 1938, he was only the head of the abstract (department) II-1A of the Main Directorate of the Security Police and the SD, was engaged in a struggle with the communists, church, sect, immigrants, Jews and Freemasons 37 .
Moreover, "papa Muller" especially could not act as the actual signatory on the German side, because at that time he was simply SS Standartenfiihrer, ie, only Colonel 38 . At that moment, Beria was the rank of commissar of state security of rank 1, i.e. General of the Army, and in post - First Deputy People's Commissar (Minister) of the Interior 39 .
The general rule is that whoever and whatever signs on international cooperation issues, in all circumstances, full parity in posts, powers, and, if necessary, in titles, is observed.
Meanwhile, parity here is not respected, not only in principle, but even technically: Beria's status is indicated in the preamble in full, including his Chekist title at the time, but the status of G. Muller is limited to mentioning, and then inaccurate, only his office , without indicating the rank!
And at the same time G. Muller allegedly acted on the basis of an alleged power of attorney, and Beria - is unknown on the basis of what! Just the NKVD in his face ?!
However, no power of attorney in this area does not work - it's not a way to get the shoes from the warehouse! In the sphere of interstate relations, but regardless of the level at which they are implemented, the rule that is unshakable for centuries is that both parties are obliged to show each other their written powers, which is then reflected in the text of the interstate agreement.
For example, how the powers of the German Foreign Minister, I. von Ribbentrop, were signed in writing to sign the Non-Aggression Treaty with the USSR: Hitler personally signed these powers (see No. 18)! And we are offered to believe in a debilitating tale of some kind of power of attorney ?!
Falsifiers contrived to everything else to "extradite" G. Müller with a power of attorney from one organization at a time when he allegedly signed the agreement on behalf of another?
Well, how could you write such nonsense - "The General Directorate of Security of the National Socialist Workers Party of Germany, represented by the head of the Fourth Directorate (Gestapo), Henry Muller, on the grounds (before that, the word" acting "was clearly missed in the forgery.) -448 / 12-1 of November 3, 1938, issued by chief of the Reichsfuhrer SS Reinhard (correct: Reinhard-AM) Heydrich ... "?!
After all, it turns out that G. Muller from one office, and "power of attorney" was given to him "benefactors" from another office!
He is listed as the head of the Fourth Directorate of the German Social-Democratic Labor Party in Germany, and the power of attorney from the Reichsführer SS GU German G. Himmler!
Under no circumstances would Beria even sit down at the negotiating table with such a "representative", to put it mildly, which, moreover, is much lower than him both in rank and in office, so also he knows who "represents"! Not to mention the fact that the Party Security Service of the USSR NKVD under no circumstances would not have to deal.
In the NKVD of the USSR, as well as in the special services of Germany, it was quite brilliantly examined in international law and interstate contractual practice by professional lawyers to prevent such oak "blunders"!
... Hardly anyone knows, except, of course, a very narrow circle of specialists, that, for example, until the Second World War, the headquarters of Interpol was in Berlin, and already by this circumstance the Nazis were forced to clearly understand the issues of international cooperation between special services ...
No less "emotion" is caused by the allegedly signatures themselves, and especially by the format of these allegedly signatures under the so-called. "A general agreement."
If, for example, you use the nowadays frequently found yernike formula, then concoct a signature similar to the signature of Beria and Mueller, and at the same time print (how many announcements on poles!), Similar to the NKVD of the USSR and the GUB of the NSDAP or even of the entire Third Reich - easier to steam turnip!
Documents in the archives of a lot, including. and trophy, the corresponding "craftsmen", incl. and especially high-class, - all the more reason! So there is nothing complicated in this part.
Yes, as a matter of fact, which of the modern readers saw first-hand the authentic signatures of Beria or the same Mueller? Who knows the real press of the NKVD of the USSR, and even more so the Gestapo or the same GUB of the NSDAP or the Third Reich ?!
Anything you can "draw," produce and give out for the present, and no one even suspects falsification, especially since all photocopies of the print are deliberately blurred.
However, we are still suspicious and will not believe.
So, under No. 17, the alleged signature of Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria under the supposedly "general agreement" allegedly signed by him, and under No. 19-23 several samples of the signature of the true Beria in the late 1930s. - for 1937 and 1940, taken from various documents40. Naturally, as in the previous case, there is no need to lay claim to the laurels of the expert-graphologist (handwriter) - it's enough just to look closely at these samples with the naked eye.
A closer look, with surprise to find that there are no signs of even external similarity - and then no! Why? The question, of course, is interesting - in fact, in principle, the signature of Beria is not something top secret, because in the archives of thousands of documents with his "autographs". However, the answer to this question, strangely enough, is very simple: for a sample, LP Beriya's signature was taken at least 1944!
Compare: No. 17 - counterfeit and No. 23 - a sample signature of L.P. Beria in 1944. In this case, there is a partial similarity, and even a very close, but still fake, is seen from afar, because as a model for a counterfeit it was necessary to use Beria's signature of the late 1930s, not the end of 1944!
As for the signature of "Mueller's father", I regret to state that it was not possible to find yet undoubted samples of his true signature of the late 1930s. However, one must assume that everything above and below will be enough to recognize unconditionally that the whole "history" is a vile and mean falsification.
As for other aspects of the forgery, it is much more important that in the part concerning the universally accepted international legal signature format, everything that has only been possible to violate is violated. First, in accordance with the rules established in the international treaty practice that have been established for a long time and which have been applied in international treaty practice, it is also pointed out first of all that a certain document is drawn up (and not printed!) In so many copies and on such- then languages. Those. instead of a semi-anecdotal record that "printed in Russian and German in a single copy" (?!), which is also "tied up" (?!), in accordance with normal contractual practice, the following :
at least - "compiled in two copies, in German and Russian languages (in such a sequence that there is an indispensable element of the obligatory protocol courtesy of the receiving party in relation to the foreign one), in Moscow on November 11, 1938"; as an optimal variant - "this agreement is made in two originals, in German and Russian, each of which is authentic, in Moscow on November 11, 1938."
The use of these formulas makes it possible to avoid the idiocy indicated in the expression "printed in Russian and German in a single copy", since a normal formulation "is composed in two originals in German and Russian languages".
It contains both the meaning of the document and its printing in a single copy in each of the two languages, because the expression "composed in two originals" was used.
By the way, it was precisely this formula that ended, for example, the Treaty of Non-Aggression between the USSR and Germany of August 23, 1939.41
Secondly, never and under no circumstances bilateral treaties and agreements in international practice are signed in a column (successively) one after another - the standard format for signing signatures is long and unequivocally requires the equal distribution of signatures in one line (at the same level).
If this "general agreement" really took place in history, the signatures indicating the posts of signatories would have to be arranged as follows:
Head of the Main Directorate of State Security, Commissioner of State Security 1st Rank
Head 4 of the Office of the Chief Security Directorate of the National Socialist Workers Party of Germany, the SS brigadefuhrer
Falsification brazenly protrudes from the system of location of the signatures and seals in the Russian and German originals:
in German - in the first place in the column is the signature of G. Muller and, accordingly, the German press, and in Russian - on the contrary (see No. 26).
It happens only in stupid fakes, and not in these documents.
Third, technologically, the format of signatures in such documents must necessarily include a precondition in the form of an instruction, in which the signatures would look like this:
For the NKVD of the USSR (more precisely, for the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR)
Head of the Main Directorate of State Security, Commissioner of State Security 1st Rank
For the General Directorate of Security of the National Socialist Workers' Party of Germany Head 4 of the Office of the Chief Directorate of Security of the National Socialist Workers Party of Germany, the SS brigadefuhrer
Fourthly, between the preamble and the signatures - a crude legal discord: the fact is that "papa Muller" allegedly acted on the basis of a power of attorney, and Beria - is unknown on the basis of what. We have already spoken about this earlier.
The agreement between the special services is a matter that is strictly within the competence of the top leadership of any state, therefore, in both cases it should be stated that either "under the authority of the government (the Soviet formula of those times) or" for the government "(" on behalf of the government " ) - the German formula of the same times.
By the way, falsifiers missed one of the most important nuances from the practice of those years. In especially important and especially scrupulous cases, and cooperation with the special services of a foreign state from this category, a specially secret decision of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B.) On this issue was made, in which it was necessarily indicated that, after considering such and such a question, t .e. on cooperation with the special services of a certain state, the Politburo decides to recognize such cooperation as expedient and instructs such and such (ie, the head of the relevant Soviet special service) to resolve this issue in accordance with the current legislation, in this connection, authorizes him with the right of first signature, t .e. instructs him to sign such an agreement. On April 14, 1937, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B.) On the initiative of Stalin (see RGASPI.
F. 17. On. 163. D. 1145. L. 62-63) adopted a special resolution "On the preparation of questions for the Politburo of the CPSU (b)", according to which to resolve issues of a secret nature, incl. and foreign policy, a special commission consisting of five persons was created. Without the knowledge of this commission, not a single issue of this order was resolved.
Moreover, this should have been in the case under consideration, since speech allegedly was about cooperation with the secret service of an extremely odious and extremely hostile state of the USSR - Hitler's Germany.
Without such a decision, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B.) Beria would not even have thought about this topic, not to discuss it, especially in 1938. Moreover, when he was just the first deputy People's Commissar for Internal Affairs of the USSR. Already something, but crazy LP. Beria was not to take such an initiative and take full responsibility for such a step42.
Consequently, taking into account all the above circumstances, the format of authentic signatures, more or less consistent with the established rules of international legal practice, should have approximately the following form:
Under the authority of the Government of the USSR
For the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR First Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, State Security Commissioner 1st Rank
(tentatively) Under the authority of the Government of Germany
- For the General Directorate of the Security Police and SD of Germany (and not only the NSDAP!)
Head of the II-1A Division (Gestapo) of the General Directorate of the Security Police and SD of Germany, SS Standartenfiihrer
As you can see, in a more or less true form, there could be a sharp disparity of posts and titles of signatories.
From ignorance of the nuances of grief-falsifiers took and ahead of time raised G. Muller in rank before the brigadefuhrer SS, i.e. before the general-major, while in early November 1938, again I emphasize, he was just a standard-officer of the SS, i.e. Colonel.
The title of Brigadeführer SS Müller was received only on December 14, 1940. a year after joining the Nazi Party. And that I should not write "Brigadenfuhrer", but "Brigadefuhrer" - I'm not saying 44 .
Fifthly, the text of the agreements does not specify that there are so many pages numbered that there are so many pages punctured that the document itself is "sealed", etc. By themselves, or something, they convinced us of the weight of the deed?
Sixth, even the Soviet rules do not correspond to the indication of the place and time of signing: in Soviet documents of this type they never wrote in the manner of this agreement "mountains. Moscow, November 11, 1938. "
In Soviet documents, they would write:
"Moscow, November 11, 1938."
Moreover, the time of signing would not be indicated in the column:
" 15" hours.
"40" min. (see No. 26)
In Russian, if there was such a need, they would write like this: "15 hours. 40 min. "- i.e. in a line, but not in a column. And that such a nonsense of a gray mare would not have been handwritten, especially in an international document, it's impossible to say, as, indeed, and that, in principle, the time of signing, as a rule, is not is indicated.
In even greater "admiration" plunges the stupidity of falsifiers in the design of all this delirium with the so-called. "General agreement" in a particular case.
In the press photocopies of the covers of two cases appeared, allegedly from a special archive of the Central Committee of the CPSU (see No. 24-26).
Carefully look at the photocopy of the number 24. From the alleged ostentatious "Cases No. 36 t4" archival dies like follows the unambiguous conclusion that this is the cover of the ancestral case, started back in 1938, because in the lower right corner, where the word "store" is indicated, there is a stamp on the transfer of the case to the archives of the Central Committee of the CPSU. This should mean that the archives are transferred to the original in the original form.
And now, peering at the topmost line, with a bewildered astonishment, you will find that the typographical font is printed: "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Central Committee! " The most charming idiocy!
Figures on the pages of some publications and the above photos of covers are really an unprecedented blunt fake. Because the original cover of the case from the secret archive of the Central Committee of the Party was as follows:
- at the top in a typographical way, in large letters the following should have been printed: "Ts. V.K.P. (b). " I emphasize that this is exactly what the upper part of the original archive file looked like from the secret archives of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B)! 45
- in the middle of the cover a printed mesh of the following type was placed in a typographical way:
1 Table of Contents receipt date Signature
- In the bottom also printed "Save ______ years" 46 .
Those. nothing resembling the fact that the grieving falsifiers presented the world with light, there is no trace at all!
Until 1952, the only and the same ruling party was called the CPSU (B.), I.e. All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)! No CPSU in the 30's. did not have!
All this is all the more important, since it is stated on the cover of the allegedly primordial (primordial) case that the following materials are concentrated in this folder:
"1. Treaty of the NKVD - the Gestapo of the RSHA (11.11.1938)
2. Correspondence of the NKVD - Central Committee of the CPSU (b) (1939-1941 gg.)
3. Documentation of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) (1942 - 1945). "
I have to emphasize that the Stalin secretariat was distinguished by exceptional schooling, pedantry, accuracy, logically realized secret record keeping. And, naturally, the staff of his secretariat would never, under any circumstances, concentrate completely different documents in one folder!
Especially correspondence between the NKVD organs and the Central Committee of the CPSU (B.) For the period 1939-1941. could not be concentrated "under one roof", that is, in one folder, with the documentation of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B.) for the period from 1942 to 1945! This is complete nonsense, for Stalin did not keep fools in his secretariat.
Such uncharacteristic documents never and under no circumstances concentrate in one case, especially in one volume.
Obviously, the hidden meaning of this fake was to be an "unobtrusive suggestion" to readers, that the NKVD, that the Gestapo of the RSHA, that the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) were all one! It turned out, however, as always ...
This could not be because the correspondence of the NKVD with the Central Committee of the CPSU (B) is, first of all, information messages from security agencies on various issues.
And as a rule, one information message of the NKVD in the medium-minimal volume was 1.5-2 pages.
In principle, information on various issues was sent daily, but for greater objectivity of the following calculations, we assume that the messages were sent every other day. Altogether, 182 messages, each of which - according to the medium-minimum volume - 2 pages (including the incomplete second). Consequently, for the year this will amount to 364 pages, for two years - 728 pages.
Meanwhile, the Instruction on secret record keeping in the USSR limited the concentration of pages in one volume of the secret matter within 300-350 pages. I emphasize, at most, 350 pages!
And who would now explain how the falsifiers managed to cram only the materials of the NKVD correspondence with the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in volume No. 4 of Case No. 36 in the volume of up to 728 pages at a minimum ?!
But there is also the documentation of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B.) For 1942-1945. in fact in four years: 1942,1943,1944 and 1945!
Even if we assume that the volume of each of these documents was not more than one page, and they appeared every four days-for maximum objectivity of calculations I specifically allow this option in four years-then it turns out that only these documents should have been be at least 365 pages. Total, all together from 965 to 1,065 pages in one volume!
For such a secret record keeping in those years, you could easily fly out of work, not to mention the worst outcome! And so that the staff of the Stalin secretariat risk so much ?!
No less stupid is the cover of the supposedly "archival case" (see No. 25) - on it the "inscription " "CONTRACT BETWEEN THE NKVD AND THE SECRET POLICE OF HITLER GERMANY OF November 11, 1938 " flaunts itself . And where did this "Gestapo" disappear with the RSHA?
I emphasize that covers, stamps, samples of signatures and seals can be found without much effort or do much, but a fake from this will not cease to be a vile and mean counterfeit! Moreover, the general form of the genuine archival case of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) was mentioned above.
4. The fact that this is indeed a very vile and vile fake, directly indicates the date of this supposedly "general agreement" - November 11, 1938.
Beyond the field of view of all those who, for various reasons, tried to perceive this fake as the alleged "sermyazhnoy truth" of History, famously slipped through the most important circumstances, clearly recorded by the True Genesis and therefore never noticed by anyone, and often deliberately.
First of all, it should be pointed out that 42 days before the supposedly date of signing the alleged "general agreement", a dirty deal of the West with Hitler was made, better known from history as Munich, against which the Soviet Union strongly protested.
And on June 24, 1938, even the prolonged validity of the Treaty on Neutrality and Non-Aggression between the USSR and Germany of April 24, 1926. 47
His prolongation for a five-year period took place in the spring of 1931, but under the pressure of the West, the pre-Hitler leadership of Weimar Germany intentionally delayed the ratification of the protocol on its prolongation, tk. and at that time there was an intensive preparation for an armed attack on the USSR by the consolidated forces of the West, in whose plans Germany was assigned the role of shock "cannon fodder".
In the spring of 1933, although with great difficulty, Stalin managed to squeeze Hitler and his government and force to ratify this protocol.
The Hitlerites did this only under the pressure of realizing that the continued presence of Germany outside the system of any coordinates of interaction in the sphere of neutrality (and non-aggression) with the USSR is fraught with almost instantaneous alignment of the united anti-German front in Europe with the active participation especially of France and the USSR , which was extremely undesirable for Hitler at the beginning of his reign. Moreover, all the prerequisites were there, including the non-aggression pact between France and the USSR of 1932, not to mention the brilliant system of similar treaties of the Soviet Union with many European countries, especially along the perimeter of its western borders.
However, by the above date of 1938 the term of the protocol on prolongation and, accordingly, of the treaty of 1926, had expired, and the West and Hitler had already "played the game" with four hands, which eventually led to Munich as a direct prologue to the Second World War . Moreover, Britain, in the person of its premier N. Chamberlain, frankly pushed Hitler to attack the USSR.
It went so far that in the same 1938 in the USSR all German consulates were closed, leaving only the consular department at the embassy in Moscow.
And so, in such circumstances, Stalin went to cooperation between the special services of the two states ?! Moreover, knowing from reports that during a particularly confidential meeting between N. Chamberlain and A. Hitler immediately after the signing of the Munich deal, the brown jackal quite frankly told the British scoundrel that now, that is, after the conclusion of the Munich conspiracy, nothing can stop him, Adolf Hitler, from attacking the USSR, to which the gray-haired traitor of the world from the Insidious Albion complacently agreed that "even now, when the threat of using airfields of Czechoslovakia by Soviet aircraft has been eliminated." Really, one should not strive to consider himself cleverer than Stalin - more than a very strong doctor of philosophy (political science)! He was a realist, not an adventurer, like all these mobs of mindless interpreters of his actions!
The fact is that in the international practice of cooperation of special services a rule has been adopted a priori-it is always based on state-wide contracts, at least on partnership or on cooperation and mutual assistance.
So, without exception, all known facts of cooperation between the state security and military intelligence agencies of the USSR in the pre-war period were based only on this base.
So it was with Germany in the 1920s, when the Rapallo Treaty of 1922 lay at the basis, so it was with Mongolia, cooperation with special services was based on the relevant treaties of the 1920s, and especially from 1936 on the mutual assistance in repelling aggression, just as it was in cooperation with Turkish special services in the late 1920s, because it was based on the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the two countries of 1921, and, finally, absolutely exactly the same .e. in the development of the Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty on Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in Reflecting Aggression of May 16, 1935, an agreement on cooperation between intelligence services of the USSR and Czechoslovakia, primarily in the military sphere, was concluded at the same time.
Without a fundamental basis for normal interstate relations, no one in the world will cooperate with the special services! So it was then, so it continues today.
So, to put it mildly, Soviet state security agencies and British intelligence did not pay each other, but even as soon as July 12, 1941 the Anglo-Soviet agreement on a joint struggle against Hitlerite Germany was signed, as soon after its ratification, with mid-August 1941 in Moscow began close consultations authorized two special services, which, after a detailed discussion of issues of mutual interest culminated in the development of at least a detailed plan of joint actions 48 .
Or an example from our time. Everyone knows well how Lubyanka "loves" the CIA, however, the problem of combating international terrorism has only intensified, both on the basis of interstate agreements and especially agreements between the presidents of Russia and the United States, cooperation in this area between the FSB and the SVR GRU) with the CIA and the FBI ...
But, of course, the main reason why this supposedly "general agreement" could not be in principle is the following.
November 10, 1938 (more precisely, the night of November 9 to 10) in the Third Reich was carried out the infamous operation "Red Rooster", better known in world history as the "Crystal Night" - the massive anti-Jewish pogroms in Nazi Germany, deliberately arranged by the Nazi leaders in retaliation for the murder of Ernst von Rath, the third secretary of the German embassy in Paris, by the Jewish seventeen-year-old youth Herschel (Herschel) Grinshan (Grynszpand, Grünschpan). Henry Muller directly supervised this operation-for his signature to all the Gestapo departments on November 9, 1938, a telegram went off:
To all organs and governing bodies of the state police.
It is urgent to give this telegram to the heads or their deputies.
1. In the next few hours throughout Germany (Austria was already part of the Third Reich - AM) there will be speeches against the Jews, especially with regard to the synagogues. Do not interfere.
2. If there is an important archival material in the synagogues, ensure its preservation by taking immediate measures.
3. Prepare throughout the empire the arrest of 20-30 thousand Jews. To select first of all the well-to-do. Further instructions will be given during the night.
4. The operation of the operation may involve both parts of the SS of special purpose, and the "General SS".
Head of Section II of the Gestapo Muller " 49 .
On November 10 and 11, the head of Division II (exactly II-1A) Henry Muller "summed up" this bloody operation with the head of the Main Directorate of the Security Police and SD, Gruppenfuhrer Reinhard Heydrich.
The "results" were really bloody: 815 different institutions and 29 department stores were destroyed, 171 apartment houses were destroyed, 191 synagogues were set on fire, of which 76 were completely destroyed, 11 communal houses and cemetery chapels were set on fire, 20,000 Jews were captured ... 50
So you now understand that in the text of the supposedly "general agreement" indicated in the text of the alleged "general agreement", on November 11, 1938, "Papa Muller" could not physically be in Moscow: he had bloody blood in Berlin "Worries" - both with the Jews, and with reports of their beatings and arrests, not to mention the "disassembly" with their Gestapo marauders, who openly tried to steal something from the Jews, while not giving up, "naturally," the values in the treasury of the Reich!
And that the next day after the anti-Jewish pogroms that have thundered all over the world, Stalin would so openly associate himself with the Nazis at the level of special services, even under the veil of special secrecy, and even on such a dirty and unworthy outstanding statesman the path of anti-Semitism, than Stalin in general did not suffer ?!
Already aristocratic anti-Stalinists known historians - the brothers Zhores and Roy Medvedev, but they unanimously repeat that this was not for Stalin . 51
Zhores Medvedev, who dealt specifically with this problem, even published the book "Stalin and the Jewish Question" and as a deeply studied man, the man stated unequivocally and categorically in a recent interview: "Stalin was not anti-Semitic, not even anti-Semitic ... Stalin did not have this It was. There is not a single statement either in his official speeches or in archival documents that could be cited as anti-Semitic! " 52
Quite frankly, on this statement of J. Medvedev there is a reason to at least slightly delay the attention. Just think about, from whose mouth this unequivocal and categorical confession sounded!
The Medvedev brothers are not just anti-Stalinists - they are the sons of one of the repressed associates of Tukhachevsky Alexander Medvedev. And they suffered a lot during this time because of this. This, in the first place. Secondly, it would seem, they, the half-breeds, - their mother Julia Reiman was Jewish - and the sons of repressed in the Tukhachevsky warlord's case, as they say, and the cards in hand for Stalin's accusations of anti-Semitism.
But no, the brothers did not sink to the common stupidity of the oak propaganda of the democrats - on the basis of accurate documentary knowledge they categorically reject such accusations against Stalin!
Moreover, even those cases in which the persons involved were Jews, considered not from the standpoint of the alleged Stalinist anti-Semitism, but only from the standpoint of internal and external political situation of that time and strongly recommend all approach to these issues is because the only way 53 .
On the whole, it must be said that since the publication of their book "Unknown Stalin" the Medvedev brothers began a logical and profound drift towards objective perception and analysis of Stalin's figure and its policies. And not only they.
Figuratively speaking, the "wind of history", about which Stalin spoke 60 years ago, refreshes even such people - in the past, ardent dissidents.
Meanwhile, all this dirty and vile fake with the so-called. "General agreement" is rigidly tied precisely to the supposedly taking place among the traits of the character, views and inclinations of Stalin's mind, which is yidophobia.
It is alleged, for example, that the contents of the "general agreement", and also allegedly Protocol No. 1, are also being allegedly published, impregnated with a thick, bitter anti-Semitism mixed with a zoological-racial-geopolitical delirium on the same theme that was inherent only to "Mine" Kampf. "
Woe-falsifiers, and then vlyapalsya, as they say, under the full program. They claim that the alleged "general agreement" consisted of 9 paragraphs and two protocols.
Well, was it really incomprehensible that, in fact, the inter-state character of the allegedly "general agreement" is, in fact, almost the same thing as the treaty, and there can not be paragraphs in it as the basic structure of the text?
In documents of this kind, the structure is based on the article-by-article principle - this is a universal rule known to any first-year student of a legal university!
This ostensibly "document" should consist of articles which, in turn, and also in accordance with world practice, should have paragraphs, and, if necessary, subparagraphs, in whose role they could, but by no means necessarily, be Paragraphs are also used. But not in the quality of the supporting structure of the entire document!
Well, V.V. Karpov claims that the text of the "general agreement" had nine pages?
But who would explain how the same supposedly authentic document can have two completely different variants of the main parameter? After all, nine paragraphs and two protocols are not the same as the nine pages ?! Oh, at least this must have been understandable! That's what a stupid fake ...
In allegedly p. 1 allegedly § 2 allegedly "general agreement" grief-oligophrenic from the falsification of the negligible sumnyashey laid out the next bullshit of the blue mare, resulting in t.ch. and directly from Mein Kampf:
Item 1. The NKVD and Gestapo will develop their relations in the name of prosperity of friendship and cooperation between our countries. "
"P. 2. The two sides will lead a joint struggle against common main enemies:
- international Jewry, its international financial system, Judaism and the Jewish worldview;
- the degeneration of mankind in the name of the improvement of the white race and the creation of eugenic mechanisms of racial hygiene.
n. 3. Kinds and forms of degeneration, to be sterilized and destroyed sides defined additional protocol № 1, which is an integral part of this agreement " 54 .
... Pay attention to the construction of the phrase in paragraph 1 - this is pure water nonsense, because neither friendship nor cooperation, neither then nor since there was.
Used in this paragraph, the speech turn is good for a toast or some kind of rug, and even after the third glass, but not for an official document.
Well, if we talk about the real realities of that time, there has always been only a very utilitarian and pragmatic approach on both sides, especially from Stalin, in particular. and from August 23, 1939. Thus, the head of the legal department of the German Foreign Ministry, Friedrich Gaue, for example, testified in his diaries that when I. Ribbentrop arrived in Moscow, he tried to start a dialogue with pompous words that "the spirit of brotherhood that linked the Russian and German peoples .. . "Molotov immediately cut him off with the following remark:" Brotherhood can not exist between us. If you like, let's talk about the case. "55
And Ribbentrop himself in a report to Hitler on his trip to Moscow wrote that Stalin told him the following: "There can be no neutrality on our part unless you yourself stop building aggressive plans for the USSR. We do not forget that your ultimate goal is to attack us. "56 Stalin had a long-standing and strictly principled position, and that in such a position he would instruct the NKVD in cooperation with Gesta-
on "to develop friendship and cooperation"?! I do not know how crazy it must be to even imagine such a thing!
After all, in the USSR as far back as 1938. All the German consulates were shut down, under the guise of which the German special services were actively working.
Moreover, even under the terms of the Non-Aggression Treaty of August 23, 1939, this very "cooperation" from January 1940 to March 1941 was such that Soviet security agencies routed 66 German intelligence offices, exposed 1596 German agents operating in their composition, of which 1338 in the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus, as well as in the Baltics. "
Even more "close cooperation" was on the border between the border guards of the NKVD of the USSR and the border police of the Main Imperial Security Directorate (RSHA): from October 1939 to December 1940 only over 5 thousand German agents were neutralized on the border! Only in 1940 alone over 235 conflicts and incidents occurred on the Soviet-German border, including and with fierce exchanges, as a result of which there were killed and wounded on both sides.
And there is no need to speak about the unprecedented scale of reconnaissance activity in the frontier zone of both sides - and so it is known!
Truly, the most that neither is "the closest cooperation for the sake of prosperity and friendship"!
As for Protocol No. 1, it was for some reason first named as "Protocol No. 1 - Annex to the Agreement of November 1938 between the NKVD and Gestapo."
First, either the protocol or the application - "and ... and" does not exist! It happens only this way: either the text of the agreement explicitly states that there is an application to it and it is disclosed, which means this or it is not indicated, but in this case the order of registration is the following: at the top of the sheet the "Application to such an agreement between and so on from such and such a number of such and such a year ", and then, just below, the title, in this case" Protocol No. ".
Secondly, if the "agreement" itself is called "general", then what is the "protocol-annex" to the "agreement" simply ?!
How can you not understand this ?! Nevertheless, the falsifiers published this "protocol" in the following form:
"Protocol No. 1
Annex to the Agreement
from November 11, 1938
between the NKVD and Gestapo
Among other things, the parties determined that in paragraph 2 of clause 3 of the signed agreement, it is a question of the following types of qualification of degenerative signs of degeneration, such as:
- Externally ugly, limping and horseshit from birth, with speech defects: lisp, cartilaginous, stuttering (congenital);
- Witches, sorcerers, shamans and clairvoyants, Satanists and devil-worshipers;
- hunchbacked, dwarfs and with other clearly expressed defects, which should be attributed to the division of degeneration and degeneration; persons with large birthmarks and multiple counts of small, different skin color, eye color, etc.
The parties will additionally determine the qualification of types (types) of degeneration and degeneration signs ".
Even with a cursory glance at this nonsense it is already clear that the falsifiers are at odds with the Russian language in the sphere of legal vocabulary, for if it was so desirable to pester such an abomination, then it was necessary to write this:
"The parties also determined that under the clauses of degenerate degeneration described in paragraph 3 of § 2 of the General Agreement, they understand the following: ..." However, the essence is different. In the USSR, there have always been plenty of highly professional medical professionals of various directions, so that without external clues, and especially in a much more decent, objective, humane form, describe the physical shortcomings on the basis of which doctors could make a highly professional conclusion about the unfitness of certain individuals to one or another professions, but not global conclusions about the degenerate degeneration of nations or races. Nobody was engaged in this in the USSR!
In Russia, and then in the USSR, there have always been highly professional schools of doctors, psychiatrists, psychoanalyst specialists, so as not to resort to secret cooperation with the sinister organization of the misanthropic regime of Nazi Germany.
In the USSR, especially in the late 1930s, no one was engaged in "combating the degeneration of mankind in the name of improving the white race and creating eugenic mechanisms of racial hygiene"! Then for this it was possible to easily shlopotat at least the famous "quarter", i.e. 25 years of intensive regime camps in Kolyma, or, what would be even more appropriate and justified, a natural "vyshak", i.e. shooting, for inciting interethnic discord in especially serious forms! Stalin on this topic did not stand on ceremony - that is why the Great Victory in the Great Patriotic War was provided, perhaps, by the most formidable weapon, which the USSR possessed, whose name is the Great Friendship of the Peoples of the USSR!
The outstanding role of this formidable weapon in the war was assessed by Stalin in the following way (from his speech on November 6, 1944): "During the war, the Nazis suffered not only military but also moral and political defeat. The ideology of equality of all races and nations, established in our country, the ideology of the friendship of peoples won a complete victory over the ideology of bestial nationalism and racial hatred of the Hitlerites "(cited in: Zhdanov, Yu., In the Past, Rostov, 2003). .
Naturally, it would be highly inappropriate to deny the fact that, using revolutionary revelry, in the Institute of Experimental Biology in 1920 a department was created, which was called the "Russian eugenic society". The society was created under the auspices of the People's Commissar of Public Health of the Azerbaijan Republic. Semashko, the chairman was N.K. Kozlov, members of the board - psychiatrist TI Yudin, anthropologists V. V. Bunak, V.A. Bogoyavlensky, A.S. Serebrovsky. In1925. the society had already 95 members.
To be surprised, all this does not follow - during the years of the revolution and the Civil War, it just did not arise in our country: from futura - creativity, brutally lurid art, meaningless, if not idiotic, projects to the use of a swastika on banners (on many frames of the old newsreel it is easy you can see such banners even at the time of Lenin's funeral - they were also inscriptions that threatened world capital) and on the first banknotes of post-Russia Russia, and even the direct use of frankly Masonic symbols in at ributs of the early Soviet records management. Even A.M. Gorky was portrayed by the artist B. Grigoriev (in 1926) in the ritualistic pose of a "mason", ie, Mason (see photo No. 30-32). So it's really not necessary to be surprised - at such times all the madness of the human race emerges, like that ...
And in 1921, Yu.A. Kozlov and in the framework of the Academy of Sciences was created, "the Bureau of eugenics" 59. Close to the problems involved and also specially organized at the beginning of the 20s Blood Institute 60 . Similar problems have been and the then Soviet psychoanalysts 61 .
By the mid-30's. such studies were completely covered up, and the most zealous, inclined to engage in scientific racism of scientists "pack" on the "bear corners" of the immense Gulag, and some - and at all to the wall set ...
You can treat this as you like, especially to the fact that the power of the Lubyanka was used, but hardly anyone would dare deny that the most important asset of the USSR-the Great Friendship of His Great Peoples-was thus secured! Otherwise, they would not have won in that terrible war, if they continued such inappropriate and harmful "scientific research." It is a pity, however, that genetics were also slammed, although, on the other hand, given the current fears about transgenic products, how to look at it it does not happen without good!
It should be borne in mind, however, that all these "scientific" formations arose long before the reign of Nazi racism in Hitler's Germany. This is in the first place. Secondly, as the development of Soviet science, incl. and especially its nationalization and the transition to powerfully meaningful research, all this near-scientific shamanism was covered up, and not without the participation of state security bodies, since many studies were clearly racist in nature, which came into sharp contradiction with the Constitution of the USSR, especially in 1936, proclaiming complete and absolute equality of all peoples of the USSR!
Yes, I understand that it is not without malice to recall the numerous, unfortunately, facts of betrayal during the war by representatives of different nationalities. And I'm not going to argue: what was it was! But the question is about the peoples, not about the renegades and scoundrels! The peoples stood shoulder to shoulder as an indestructible monolith - therefore they won!
Still, the "middlegame" of the special political meanness of this infamous fake is hidden in the alleged date of issuing an alleged power of attorney to G. Muller allegedly for negotiating with the NKVD and signing a supposedly "general agreement" (once again I apologize for "abuse" of the word "allegedly", but otherwise it just does not work).
It would seem that at this date this: November 3, 1938 - it is November 3, 1938. What can there be such a supernatural ?!
Do not tell, for, to a deep regret, this date bears in itself a huge, monstrous in its meanness meaning - as, indeed, November 11, 1938, too.
The fact is that before the Polish Jew Herschel (Herschel) Grinshpan "doused" the guilty third secretary of the German embassy in Paris Ernst von Rath without a fault, there were very serious events that had a wide international resonance, the consequence of which, in any case, , and it was this murder itself.
And the beginning of the sequence of events that led to the murder of E. Rath, and to Kristallnacht, was laid back in March 1938. Then, "in March 1938 the Polish government, using the Anschluss of Austria, declared invalid the passports of all Polish citizens , if they were not in Poland for more than 5 years - Polish officials were afraid that 20 thousand Jews who had Polish citizenship and lived in Austria, after the Anschluss will rush to Poland. Every owner of an overdue (under this law) passport was required to enter the country to get a mark in the Polish consulate.
This law, however, also affected 50,000 Polish Jews who lived in Germany for decades (that is, the total number of Polish Jews falling under this law was 70,000 - AM). Most of these people have been left without any citizenship " 62 .
Here it should be noted that anti-Semitism in the same Poland, in particular, in 1938-39. was an order of magnitude higher than even in Nazi Germany, with all its so-called. "Nuremberg laws" on racial purity and mass anti-Semitic antics of storm troopers.
In 1960, the American historian Hoggan wrote that before the war began, the treatment of Jews in Germany was much milder than in Poland: if before November 8, 1938, 600,000 Jews fled from Poland, then from Germany for the same time ie from 30.01.1933 to 08.11.1938) - only 170 thousand meters
Many researchers rightly emphasize that the anti-Semitism that prevailed in Poland in those years still needs to be evaluated accordingly. Moreover, they equally justly emphasize that "it is difficult to believe only in the humanistic motives of France and England, on the side of Poland who entered the war with Nazi Germany," A. Toynbee pointed out in his time "... 65
"... On the other hand, the Hitler government also lost the opportunity to get rid of Eastern Jews by crossing them across the Polish border, since they were no longer Polish citizens. The Polish-German negotiations on this issue did not lead to anything, the Poles resolutely refused to recognize these Jews as their citizens. The Gestapo received an order within four days to expel all Polish Jews from the country and energetically set to work. The striving of the Nazis at all costs to expel the Jews from the country in 1938 led to the so-called "Zboshchinsky expulsion" 66. The point is that in October 1938, when the Polish authorities annulled the passports of Polish Jews living in Germany and Austria, in order to prevent their return back, the Nazis took counter steps. " 67.
According to various reports, according to the order of R. Heydrich, the German police arrested between 17,000 and 18,000 Polish Jews and transported them to the Polish border 68 .
Again, according to different sources, the following happened: after one version, these Jews were driven to the Polish territory at the muzzle of rifles 69 , on the other - on the night of October 28-29, the SS men forced the first batch of deportees to take with them only the most necessary things, to cross the border 70 .
According to one version, followed by the Polish-German border began to play out gruesome scene when both sides want to get rid of the Jews, and, as evidenced by the foreign sources, according to the cynicism and brutality Polish officials far surpassed Hitlerite 71 .
According to another version, that group of Polish Jews, which was forced to go on the Polish territory on the night of 28 on October 29, came under machinegun fire Polish border guards and when they escape from the fire Poles rushed back, then came under fire already German border guards 72 .
Among these Jews was the family Grinshpanov (Grunshpanov), whose 17-year-old son - Herschel (Herschel) lived in Paris, where he studied.
According to one version, in the course of this bombardment, his father, a tailor, Grinshpann, who lived in Hanover since 1911, was killed (sometimes there is an indication that he was only badly injured), according to another version, having received from the sister a postcard describing the ordeals his family felt on border (much of accidents was deported to the Polish border village Zbonschin where, strictly speaking, and gave its name to this inhumane incident), which was contained in the extremely harsh conditions 74 .
Upon learning of the family tragedy, "the young man decided to act: on November 3, 1938, Herschel Grunshpan (he was mentally not quite a normal person) shot five times on the councilor (in fact, in the 3rd secretary - AM) of the German embassy in Paris, member of the NSDAP Ernst von Rath (he died of wounds) " 75 .
Ironically, and Ernst von Rath, and his father was a staunch opponent of persecution of the Jews (the latter in particular, subsequently provided assistance to Jews in the darkest times) 76 .
Who did not have, at least superficially, no, the more serious political motives, Mr. Grynszpan protested obviously wrong address - a true initiator of all this "Zbonschinskogo expulsion" was Poland 77 .
Nevertheless, Goebbels propaganda presented this case as alleged evidence of a world conspiracy of Jews against Germany. The very next day, the chief official of the Nazi Party, the Berlin newspaper Felkischer Beobachter, published a very meaningful phrase: "It is quite obvious that the German people will draw the appropriate conclusion from this event . " 78
The boss of Nazi propaganda - Joseph Goebbels - very cleverly beat then the fact that this murder was not isolated. The fact is that almost three years ago, on February 4, 1936, a Jewish student David Frankfurter (who was from Hungary, according to other sources, from Yugoslavia) killed the head of the local organization of the NSDAP, Wilhelm Gustloff, in Davos, Switzerland (his name was later named one of the largest ships of Germany, which the glorious Soviet submariner A. Marinesko sank in January 1945, having been awarded the "honor" for it to become Hitler's personal enemy, since along with the ship the entire elite of the German submarine fleet also died) ...
And on November 9, 1938, "at a traditional gathering in Munich in honor of the anniversary of the Beer Putsch" (09.11.1923 AM) in an already electrified atmosphere, Goebbels, the best speaker after Hitler in the Third Reich, delivered an inflammatory speech " . And that same evening, in Germany, the pre-planned monstrous anti-Jewish pogrom, which went down in history as "Kristallnacht" (in the documents of the Gestapo "The Red Rooster") began, as it appears from the above directive of G. Müller. "The crowd thundered shops, beat their owners, the streets of German cities were strewn with broken glass from broken windows. Hence the beautiful, almost romantic name ... " 79
I also do not know what "beautiful, almost romantic" the author of the book "The Secrets of the Special Services of the Third Reich" (M., 2003), Theodor Gladkov, has already seen, but so detailed, including. and with his help, the presentation here of those events was not brought by accident.
After all, if - do not bring, of course, the Lord God - a disgustingly infamous fake about allegedly taking place so-called. "General agreement" was rooted in the sharper information turnover of the so-called "general agreement". "Democratic propaganda," it would have turned out that the USSR, in the person of the NKVD, more than consciously went to this supposedly cooperation with the Gestapo "to combat world Jewry"!
Because the date of issue of the power of attorney G. Muller - November 3, 1938, and even more so the date of signing the "general agreement" should mean that the USSR, in the person of its leadership, knew everything in advance, and nevertheless consciously took such a step!
In the Soviet Union really well knew what was happening on the Polish-German border. And, by the way, for this it was not necessary to use information of intelligence - this was reported by all news agencies and the largest newspapers in Europe. Moreover, this ill-smelling consular-passport squabble Poland started in March 1938. So all the vicissitudes of this unsightly story were well known primarily through open information.
As for reconnaissance, both in Poland and in Germany, both Soviet intelligence services - the foreign policy (ING of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR) and the GRU - possessed extremely strong agent positions and despite the difficulties of a very specific period in our history of 1937-38. timely extracted and reported to the Soviet leadership all the necessary information, including. and on this issue.
Suffice it to say that only at the Foreign Ministry of Germany, the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR had such agents as Vin-terfeld and Marta (she was also Augusta, she was Yuna, the wife of a prominent German diplomat), not to mention other and military intelligence was almost literally "under the hood" kept by the entire German embassy in Warsaw, in which three of its agents - Ilsa Stöbe (Alta), Rudolf von Schelia ("Aryan") and Rudolf Gernstadt, worked at once.
But, of course, one of the most valuable agents, "our man in the Gestapo", the now famous "Breitenbach" - Willie Lehman, was the consummate diamond of the Soviet intelligence service network (INO GUGB of the 11th Interior Affairs of the USSR), whose stable connection was maintained until the end of November 1938 in
Communication with the "Breitenbach" was interrupted due to the death of an employee of the Berlin residence of A.I. Agayants (died in early December 1938 during surgery directly on the operating table). To restore the connection with the agent turned out to be very difficult, first of all because because of treachery and escapes of the former high-ranking intelligence officers - Walter Krivitsky (Samuil Gershevich Ginzburg), Alexander Orlova (Leiba Lazarevich Feldbin), etc., under the threat of decryption and failure a significant part of the experienced scouts, incl. and illegal aliens, as well as agent networks. In this situation, no reconnaissance can not do without, unfortunately, a period of passive waiting, the purpose of which is to check the extent of the damage incurred, to identify the unencrypted links of its network, to establish other,
During the first 10 years of cooperation with our intelligence - i.e. from 1929 to November 1938 inclusive - "Breitenbach" presented, as indicated in official intelligence documents, "an extremely plentiful amount of material covering the personnel and structure of the political police, and then the Gestapo, as well as military intelligence, warned about the upcoming arrests of illegal and the legal workers of our residence tour in Berlin, reported on the persons being developed by the Gestapo, most recently gave materials on military construction in Germany. He also directed inquiries on investigative cases in the Gestapo, which we were interested in, covered the general political situation in the country. "
Soviet intelligence had a large number of original documents and personal reports. "Breitenbach", up to 28 volumes, i.е. Based on the then accepted rules of secret record keeping from the agent, it was received from 8,400 to 9,800 pages of various information (300-350 pages in one volume)!
The best aces of Soviet intelligence worked in the German direction in those years, not to mention the fact that "Breitenbach" himself was a professional of the highest class and knew perfectly well what his Soviet "friends" were interested in.
In the presence of such a tandem and especially so many materials, it is completely out of the question that the Breitenbach did not inform the Soviet intelligence about the Polish-German conflict on anti-Jewish grounds, much less so that he did not disclose the planned Gestapo anti-Jewish pogrom on an all-German scale. Not to mention the information of other agents, as well as embassies, TASS and foreign correspondents of Soviet newspapers. And that if there are such data, Stalin would go to cooperation with the Gestapo ?!
However, the meanness of a fake is not limited to the above.
Apparently, its main goal was still in another, more precisely, in an attempt to provoke the emergence in a wide circle of "democratic public" of an extremely false impression that, having signed such a "general agreement", the Soviet Union allegedly was quietly approved the dirty Munich deal of the West with Hitler! That very deal, as a result of which Czechoslovakia was put to the mercy of not only the Hitlerites, but even Poland, insolent, right under the nose of Hitler, occupied Teshinskaya region of Czechoslovakia (at that time there lived 156 thousand Czechs and only 77 thousand Poles who did not crave, like the Sudeten Germans, to fall into the so-called "paradise" called Poland)!
On November 3 and 11, 1938, these are the dates that followed the Munich deal, and if the text of the "general agreement" includes unprecedented insanity about alleged "cooperation and prosperity" between the USSR and Germany, then, consequently, it must come out that the USSR Tacitly approved the Munich deal !?
Firstly, for six months preceding the Munich deal and the occupation of the Hitlerites of the Sudeten region of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union Ten Times officially, to the whole world, declared that it would fulfill its mutual assistance agreement in repelling the aggression that was signed between the USSR and Czechoslovakia as early as May 16, 1935 (this agreement was crossed and was closely interrelated with a similar treaty between the USSR and France on May 2, 1935. 80 )
Secondly, the Soviet Union four times privately reported this to France! 81
Third, Four times about the same and also privately reported to the government of Czechoslovakia, but Eduard Benes - the president of this unfortunate country - under the pressure of the West, surrendered his homeland to the Hitlerites! 82
Fourth, Three times about the same and also confidentially declared to the government of Great Britain! 83
Fifthly, the Soviet Union explicitly stated that it would fulfill its obligations under the treaty with Czechoslovakia, even if France refused it (under these treaties it was provided that the USSR would render assistance to Czechoslovakia only if the same thing, but in advance, will make France)! 84
Sixthly, thereby the Soviet Union clearly declared its readiness to enter into war with Germany, Poland and Romania (Poland at that time had a non-aggression treaty with Germany from 1934, more like a military alliance against the USSR, and an agreement with Romania, on mutual assistance in the struggle against the USSR, which eventually created a triumvirate of bandits to attack the USSR), even if it was necessary to fight only in an alliance in Czechoslovakia (as of autumn 1938, Czechoslovakia was one of the strongest states in Central Europe militarily, and that's why could easily crush even alone were just forming then Hitler's Wehrmacht) 85 . However, as indicated above, the head of Czechoslovakia, E. Benes, surrendered his homeland to the Hitlerites.
Seventh, as early as September 1938, when Poland began to prepare for an attack on Czechoslovakia and concentrate its troops at its borders, the USSR clearly and unequivocally warned Poland that if it were to attack Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union would tear up the Soviet-Polish pact on nonaggression without notice 86 .
It was at this moment that something happened that completely excludes the conclusion of any "general agreement".
As soon as the official Warsaw enlightened what this very insinuating hint of the Kremlin meant, it naturally rushed to the Nazi leaders who were dear to its heart for help. And they, of course, promised that "in the case of the Polish-Soviet conflict, the German government will take a more than friendly attitude towards Poland." Thus gitleryugi the mouth of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Third Reich Ribbentrop made it clear that the German government would have in this case help Poland 87 .
Stupefied by the Nazi "surprise", the Lyahs shouted with joy that "it is absolutely unbelievable that the Reich could not help Poland in its struggle against the Soviets" - in 1938 it was still like this, and only on September 1 of the following year, 1939 ., the Lyahs finally realized that the Polish goose of the Nazi pig is not a comrade!
In Moscow, of course, immediately learned about this. And who would now explain how, in such a situation, the Kremlin could allegedly go to the cooperation between the NKVD and the Gestapo "for the sake of prosperity of friendship and cooperation" between the USSR and Germany, as alleged in paragraph 1 allegedly § 2 of this "general agreement"? !! Especially if we take into account not only all the above circumstances, but also the fact mentioned earlier that even in the spring of 1938 the prolonged period of the Soviet-German treaty on neutrality and nonaggression of April 24, 1926, in connection with which, and as a result of the dirty Munich deal British prime-scum N. Chember-lin literally demanded of Hitler to attack the USSR!
And finally, although indirectly, but very weighty falsified about the so-called. "General agreement" reveals the following fact.
Already in the spring of 1939, clearly seeing that the West was still deliberately and maliciously unwilling to work with the Soviet Union to create a collective security system in Europe in order to resist the fascist aggression with a united front, and fully aware that the same West, primarily Britain, is quite consciously leading the matter to the USSR having to make an agreement with Germany on the eve of the latter's attack on Poland, which London already knew at the end of March 1939, and to the Kremlin even earlier, the Soviet arms The party decided to provide advance information preparation for such a deployment of events. And this was expressed in the following: in the Central Archives Office - and it, by the way, was then part of the NKVD of the USSR - within its structural subdivision,89 .
So, who would have explained what kind of horseradish leadership of the USSR, incl. and the NKVD of the USSR, took such a step, if they allegedly were supposedly supposed to have a "general agreement" allegedly with the Gestapo ?! And even for the sake of "the development of friendship and cooperation" ?!
It would be much simpler - and Stalin and Beria, by the way, were the highest class masters to find the simplest solutions in any complicated situations - through the channels of such alleged cooperation, called on the sly, to "rub out" the issues of mutual interest and, not collecting information on the crumbs, agree on a non-aggression pact!
However, the leadership of the state went exactly along the above path, incidentally very closely watching all the West's shabbiness with Hitler. In short, although indirectly, this fact also means that there was no "general agreement" at all!
And, incidentally, also because the grieving falsifiers clearly did not know that if such an "agreement", for example, was in reality, then after June 22, 1941 it should have been, according to the then existing rules, in the Special Archives of the NKVD, which, in turn, was to receive a corresponding documentary reflection, at least in the form of an imprint of a stamp that indicated the transfer of the file to the archive, but the NKVD archive!
But falsifiers for that and falsifiers to present to the world a stupid cover on which the CPSU is typographically printed, although, if for some reason, an idiotic legend, it should be so:
firstly, on the cover of the case should be the identification details of the NKVD of the USSR; most likely, the requisites of Beria's personal secretariat already as a People's Commissar for Internal Affairs of the USSR;
secondly, identification details on the transfer of this case to the Special Archive of the NKVD of the USSR;
thirdly, the identification details of the re-registration of the archive file of the NKVD of the USSR in the archive file first by the USSR NKGB, and then by the USSR MGB - after all, after the war, there was the MGB;
Fourthly, identification details about the transfer of this archive file from the Special Archive of the USSR MGB to the Special Archive of the Central Committee of the CPSU after 1953, etc. etc. And since there is nothing like this, the eloquent lack of such mandatory attributes is all the more indicative of a fake, especially in combination with all of the above. However, this is not all that needs to be said about this infamous fake.
The point is also that the texts of the documents of 1938 and the texts of the documents of 1942, the little-informed readers are "gently" hammered into an extremely false impression not only about the fact of their being in nature that never happened, but primarily about the alleged existence between them direct, eulogized Yudofobskoy connection, as evidence of a similar policy of Stalin.
Look closely at the "content" of paragraph 4 of the supposedly "proposals to the German command", allegedly signed by Stalin, and the "content" of the third paragraph of the "report" Merkulov addressed to Stalin, and then compare with the content of §2 allegedly "general agreement".
The falsely disregarding the need to know not only history in general, but also its details and nuances, the falsifiers and their supporters brought the matter to the point that, in asserting that "Stalin did not betray his Jews," in fact "solidarized" Stalin with a vile the Nazi idea for the so-called. "The final solution of the Jewish question in Europe"!
As a result, despite all his curtsey towards Stalin and his USSR, Karpov, of course, unwillingly, nevertheless simply framed both the USSR and Stalin, not only under accusations of vain anti-Semitism, but also under threat of accusations almost in practical assistance to Nazi crimes! Well, in fact, you must at least be a little more careful and more attentive to be with History: the "surprises" that she can present are unpredictable!
The fact is that a month before the beginning of the so-called. "Negotiations between Soviet and German scouts in the city of Mtsensk," ie, January 20, 1942, well-known for the history of World War II, but sadly "famous" Wannsee conference, which was adopted plan for the destruction of Jews in Europe. The conference was held at the villa of the SS, in the Berlin suburb of Wannsee, where its name comes from; until 1924 it belonged to the notorious in the history of the Russian revolution, AL. Parvus.
Pay attention to the fact that in this case, too, the time factor is played out very cunningly: on January 20, 1942, the Wannsee Conference, and on February 19, 1942, allegedly Stalin's proposals to the German command.
The fact is that at the time when this fake was being cooked, and it was evidently in 1998-1999, it was already known that the USSR even then, in early 1942, knew exactly about the Van-zee conference and its inhumane decisions (these were materials of British intelligence, which through the channels of the "Cambridge Five" came to Moscow). Accordingly, it should have been "unobtrusive" to get the impression that Stalin knew everything exactly, and yet, like in 1938, quite consciously entered into negotiations with the Hitlerites from the standpoint of rabid anti-Semitism! What did he really not suffer at all and what really was not and could not be!
But it could not be for the following reason. On Stalin's instructions on January 6, 1942, the NKVD of the USSR published for the first time an official document-note "On the widespread plunder, the ruin of the population and the monstrous atrocities of the German authorities in the Soviet territories that they had captured." The whole world then learned about the "terrible slaughter and pogroms committed in Kiev by the German invaders" against the Jews. In addition, the note also reported other horrific massacres of unarmed and defenseless Jews. Such was the official position of the USSR, Stalin and the NKVD subordinate to him.
The position is genuinely humanistic, principled, state. Stalin never forgot about Soviet citizens temporarily in trouble and did everything in his power to ease their situation.
It is interesting how, especially in the light of the just mentioned fact and against the background of all the above, Stalin should have had (and should have been) the idea of a joint struggle against world Jewry with the Hitlerites ?!
After all, even the very attempt to offer the Hitlerites such a deal would already have meant the deadliest compromising evidence against him, the Chairman of the State Defense Committee and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Josef Vissarionovich Stalin!
Because, if you get such information into the hands of a Hitler, then this beast would certainly use such priceless dirt to destroy and eliminate even the shadow of a hint of an anti-Hitler coalition!
Being neither an anti-Semite, nor even a anti-Semite, Stalin, naturally, from the very first months of the war included the "Jewish factor" in the struggle against Germany. Already August 24, 1941 in the open air of Radio Moscow, the first radiomiting representatives of the Jewish people, who exposed the atrocities gitleryug on Soviet territory, and called for Jews to actively fight against the enemy 90 . From this begins the prehistory of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, which became organizationally organized in the days of our glorious counter-offensive near Moscow. On December 15, 1941, the candidacy of S. M. Mikhoels was proposed and approved for the post of chairman of the JAC, and S. Epstein 91 became its executive secretary .. And on February 5, 1942, proposals on the functions, structure and tasks of the JAC were already considered and approved, including the following:
"First, through the means of propaganda pro-Soviet to set up the world community by establishing contacts with Jewish international organizations,
and, secondly, to attract a wide stream of Western aid to Russia" 92 .
As evidenced by the history of foreign policy intelligence of the Soviet Union, the most acute in the second half of 1941 the threat of the opening of a second front of aggression against the USSR, i. with the participation of Japan, was eliminated, incl. ive primarily at active use of intelligence "Jewish factor", as Stalin knew 93 .
Virtually all of the agents and confidential communication of the Soviet intelligence, who participated in a haunted this particular objective of the operation "Snow", was influential in the United States of President Roosevelt surrounded by Jews 94 .
Speaking about the role of the "Jewish factor" in 1941, we must not forget also that in no small part thanks to him could not only seriously hinder but actually stall the onset of the Finnish army against Leningrad 95 . It was the threats of the United States to Finland that played one of the decisive key roles in that Finland fairly tempered its fighting ardor. But before this happened, the Jewish lobby surrounded by Roosevelt did a great job ... 96
Yes, this does not mean, of course, that Mannerheim extended the hand of friendship to Moscow - with all these idiotic tales that the "Führer" of Finland was of kindness and nostalgia for kindness (Mannerheim lived for a long time, served and studied in Petersburg) has stopped the offensive on Leningrad, it's time to finish. Like any other politician, Karl-Gustav Mannerheim understood only the arguments of force that, at the request of Stalin, he was demonstrated by the United States! I emphasize that a significant role in this played very skillfully and very skillfully included by Stalin in the struggle for power "Jewish factor"!
With the help of the same "Jewish factor," Finland was eventually withdrawn from the war in 1944 - with the assistance of the world-famous Jewish banking clan Wallenberg ...
Well, as it was possible, as a Hero of the Soviet Union, to substitute, let him already sinking into oblivion of the USSR under accusations of almost direct indulging in Nazi atrocities ?!
But in fact, as we know, Russia is the legal successor of the USSR on the international arena with all the ensuing consequences. Well, is it really so difficult to show maximum caution in matters the true background of which is unknown and which, unfortunately, they even did not want to find out ?! But personally, Karpov personally has simply colossal possibilities for this!
Wish he, in a day's time, would have had reliable information about the origin of this whole story, with the allegedly taking place at the beginning of 1942 of the Soviet-German negotiations in Mtsensk!
Any myth, any falsification, any lie at its core always has some real fact. It is another matter, of course, that within their framework, naturally, it will be greatly "distorted", down to a fundamental distortion. This is exactly what happened in the history we are considering.
In the spring of 1942, on the way to a new duty station, owing to the tragic error of the pilots in the Mtsensk occupied by the Nazis, the Soviet military transport aircraft, sent to Yelets, with the newly appointed commander of the 48th Army, Major-General AG, landed. Samokhinym on board. And the pilots and passengers of the plane were captured 97.
During the war years, this was by no means a rarity - such cases have taken place both among our, and among the Hitlerites, and with the allies of both sides. Therefore, it would be possible not to focus attention on this case, if, as always, not one "but": Major General A.G. Samokhin before the war was a Soviet military attache in Yugoslavia and under the pseudonym "Sophocles" headed the "legal" residence of the GRU in Belgrade . 98
Moreover, after a short time - from July to December 1941 - the command of the 29th Rifle Corps and the post of deputy commander of the 16th Army for the rear, in December 1941 Alexander Georgievich Samokhin was again transferred to the GRU. At first he was an assistant to the chief, and then up to April 21, 1942, he was the head of the 2nd GRU Department. "
Thus, as a result of the tragic error of the pilots, a high-ranking Soviet military intelligence officer had fallen into Hitler's captivity in the past.
This is the true fact, and the already clearly distorted rumors about which, according to the malicious will of the falsifiers, were again distorted and this time almost to the point of being completely unrecognizable!
"String" on the textured allegedly "rod", which was twice subjected to deep distortion, necessary, according to the plan of genuine falsifiers (by the way, they are not members and not even the leadership of "Pamyat" - they are just a mouthpiece for those who are hidden behind the scenes) , the components of supposedly authenticity are not so difficult.
Something was diminished, something added, and - on you, not wanting to know and find out, but supposedly enlightened "democratic opinion", a new fake about the bad Stalin!
This is, in fact, the answer, in particular, to the question of why the allegedly Soviet-German secret talks between representatives of the intelligence services of both sides "occurred" in early 1942 and precisely in Mtsensk!
The history of the capture of Major-General A.G. Samokhin leaves a distinctly ambivalent impression.
Firstly, due to the fact that the versions of the history of his capture differ in details. For example, in the exposition of the military historian Viktor Aleksandrovich Mirkiskin, it reads: "On the way to a new duty station, his plane landed in the German-occupied Mtsensk instead of Yelets" 100 . Those. understand as you want, or indeed by mistake the pilot landed there, whether intentionally (including maliciously), or something else ...
In turn, the authors of the extensive directory "Russia in the faces. GRU. Cases and people "and did go a strange way. On one page, they indicate that Samokhin "... because of a pilot's error was captured by the Germans" 101 . It would seem that an unambiguous version ... However, two hundred pages after this statement, the same authors apparently did not bat an eyelid, reported that Samokhin "... flew to Yelets, but the pilot lost his bearings and the plane was hit over the location of the Germans. Samokhin was captivated by " 102 .
And now do not consider it agreeable to work, naturally, on the sound thinking that it's just not right where to land, it's one thing, by mistake the pilot landed not where it should be - another, but quite another - to make a forced, emergency landing due to the fact that the aircraft was hit, since the pilot lost his course.
The existence of three versions hardly helps to establish the truth. And, frankly, it's hard to believe that during landing, for example during the day, the pilots did not notice that they were landing at the German airfield: at least a couple of aircraft on the airfield stood, and the Luftwaffe crosses painted on them were clearly visible from afar. By the spring of 1942 our pilots had a good look at them. So, with regard to the first two versions, the question immediately arises: why did the pilots, who could not help but notice that they were landing on the Nazi airfield, did not try to turn around and fly away from the Germans ?!
The only thing that could remove this issue is the fact of a night flight. But in this case, of course, another circumstance will interfere. The fact is that during the war years, the commanders of armies and fronts were flown by a minimum of fighter jets, that is, three fighter planes. Moreover, if this flight was carried out from Moscow, and even with the documents of the Stavka (if you believe these versions). Measure, this is understandable, far from superfluous, especially in war.
Then it is asked, how did the fighters allow this? This issue becomes even more acute for the third version: how could it happen that our fighters, and yet these same combat pilots, allowed the pilot of the wrecker plane to know where to fly and besides it was also hit over the territory occupied by the Germans ?! No, something is wrong with these versions ...
Secondly, as the former chief of staff of the 48th Army, later Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei Semenovich Biryuzov, asserted after the war, "the Germans then seized, apart from Samokhin himself, Soviet planning documents for the summer (1942) offensive campaign, which enabled them to take timely action countermeasures ". In 1964, Biryuzov died in a strange plane crash during a visit to Yugoslavia.
The authors of the above-mentioned handbook on the GRU assert roughly the same thing - that "the enemy has mastered the operational map and the command of the RVGK" 104 .
If we take these two versions to be faithful, then, after excluding the more or less justified finding of the operational map under Samokhin, we will immediately rest on the depressing question: why did the newly appointed commander have, by definition, especially secret documents - the Supreme Headquarters Supreme Command directive and documents Soviet military planning for the summer campaign of 1942?! After all, in principle, the instructions of the Stavka were addressed to the commanding directions and fronts. But not the armies!
And Samokhin is not just a directive of the Supreme Headquarters, but "documents of Soviet planning for the summer (1942) campaign"!
To put it mildly, this is not his level, so that, as the well-known song says, "to know for the whole of Odessa" !?
And the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin was by no means so simple as to send his directives so. During the years of the war, the rules of secret correspondence, especially between the Supreme Command and the fronts, armies, etc., were very strictly observed. And without that, always secret courier service carried out the transportation of secret documents between the Stavka and the fronts under the special armed guard of the NKVD (since 1943 - Smersha).
However, the most depressing begins when you try to answer the above question, depending on the version of Samokhin's capture.
The range of answers is really disappointingly unpleasant because of its breadth: from the inevitable suspicions that some military intelligence operation was carried out (by whom and for what purpose?) - the right to this is provided by a history of the most sophisticated confrontation of intelligence services, rich in such examples, in two world wars XX century., - to criminal negligence (not excluding the option of playing under it), which, unfortunately, even then was by no means a rarity ...
Well, in fact, if, for example, we assume the most innocuous option, i.e. that the pilot really lost his course, as a result of which he got into the zone of reach of German air defense means (and what was the fighter at that time doing?), was hit and, as a result, was forced to make an emergency landing at an enemy airfield (even under the coercion of Luftwaffe fighters, which, naturally, sharply exacerbates the above question with regard to our "falcons"), what kind of question is being asked ... the professional scout, the army commander and finger did not move to destroy the secret documents of the Supreme Headquarters ?! Well, it was not a suitcase with documents he had on hand? Just a package and a map ...
Under what category of negligence (and whether negligence at all), will you order this option?
Doubts about the fact that it was negligence at all, unfortunately, reinforce the following facts.
In 2005, V. Lot's very interesting book, The Secret Front of the General Staff, came out of print. Exploration: open materials. " 410-th and 411-th pages are devoted to the fate of General AG. Samokhin. I also do not know how this could happen - after all, apparently, V. Lot - very knowledgeable in the history of military intelligence author - but from the very first lines devoted to the fate of AG. Samokhin, a respected colleague straight enters into a hurry. V. Lota points out that before appointment in the middle of April 1942 to the post of commander of the 42nd Army Samokhin was the chief of the Information Department of the GRU, an assistant to the chief of the GRU, and immediately adds that he was in military intelligence for only about two months! But this is complete nonsense! Samokhin had served in military intelligence before the war and was a resident of the GRU in Belgrade.
Therefore, if we take into account the service biography of A.G. Samokhin in the first six months of the war, it was necessary to indicate that these same "about two months" Samokhin served in the central apparatus of military intelligence, and not in general in the GRU system. So, obviously, it would be more correct, although this is inaccurate, for he was appointed to those posts in December 1941 and, therefore, by the time of his appointment to the post of commander, it was the fifth month of his tenure as assistant to the head of the GRU, (and not the Information Department) of the GRU.
Thirdly, A.G. Samokhin was appointed commander of the 42nd Army, which operated under Kharkov, that is, on the South-Western Front, and the 48th Army of the Bryansk Front. The difference still exists especially when you consider that there was no 42nd Army near Kharkov. And the fronts by name are fundamentally different ...
Fourthly, V. Lot argues that in the beginning A.G. Samokhin flew to the headquarters of the front, however, does not specify what. If we proceed from his statement about Kharkov, then it turns out to be a nonsense - what was he to do at the headquarters of the USP, if he was appointed commander of the Bryansk Front ?!
If, however, to take V. Lot's words seriously, there will be something sinister at all. Because, according to him, he received some instructions at the headquarters of the front, then he was transferred to another plane and then he was captured ...
However, in this case it is inappropriate to treat V. Lot's words seriously, because A.G. Samokhin flew all the same to the Bryansk Front, and not to the SWF.
Fifth, now take a look at the map and see for yourself: how could you please get to Mtsensk, having the purpose of appointing the Elets? The distance between them is more than 150 km! The flight to Yelets, especially from Moscow, in fact, strictly to the south, the flight to Mtsensk - to the south-west, in the direction of the Eagle ...
Sixthly, because of this strange flight, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was forced to cancel its decision of April 20, 1942 to hold operations in the beginning of May of the same year by forces of two armies and a tank corps on the Kursk-Lgov direction with the aim of mastering Kursk and cutting railroad Kursk-Lgov (History of World War II, Moscow, 1975. T. 5. P. 114). And, perhaps, this is one of those fatal premises for the tragedy of the offensive near Kharkov, because one of the two armies that were supposed to attack Kursk was headed by Samokhin. By the way, apparently, he had in his hands the Directive of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on April 20, 1942 on the above-mentioned offensive on Kursk (and Kursk-Lgov), and not at all documents of Soviet military planning for the entire spring-summer campaign of 1942, as it is usually written.
Seventh, according to V. Lot's statement, the fate of A.G. Samokhin cleared up after the Battle of Stalingrad. However, if we proceed from his own words, then it is painfully strange that it clears up. On the one hand, he points out that Samokhin was listed as missing since April 21, 1942, on the other, he reports that on February 10, 1943, the Main Directorate of Personnel losses of the Red Army issued Order No. 0194, according to which Samokhin was identified as missing , that, you see, does not bring any clarity. Because if the order was issued only on February 10, 1943, then it appears that since April 21, 1942, the fate of Samokhin was not known at all in any way, even to enroll him in the list of missing persons. And this is already superstrange, because the disappearance of the army commander, especially the newly appointed one, is an emergency of the highest category! This is the very state of emergency,
This is not a joke - the commander of the army disappeared, who a few days ago was a very high-ranking member of the GRU! Naturally, this was immediately reported to Stalin, and, believe me, the relevant strict instructions to the state security agencies and all military intelligence units to immediately find out the fate of the commander Supreme immediately gave.
V. Lot, however, reports that during the Battle of Stalingrad, a senior lieutenant of the Wehrmacht was captured, who during interrogations told that he took part in the interrogations of Major-General Samokhin, emphasizing in particular that "the plane of which by mistake landed on the captured Germans airfield. " According to this Lieutenant of the Wehrmacht, Samokhin allegedly concealed his "short service in the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army, gave himself up for an army general who had served all his life in the army, and behaved himself dignifiedly during interrogation." He did not say anything special about the Germans, referring to the fact that he was appointed to the post in mid-March and just arrived at the front. "
It's hard to say whether V. Lot noticed the obvious absurdity in his words or not, but it turns out that in the Abwehr there were round idiots! Yes, like the Wehrmacht, the Abwehr suffered a crushing defeat - Soviet state security agencies (both intelligence and counterintelligence) and military intelligence have directly won that fatal duel on the invisible front. But, deservedly proud of this immutable fact, one should not believe that the Abwehr consisted entirely of idiots. It was one of the strongest military intelligence services in the world of the Second World War. And if I was captivated by a Soviet general, especially a newly appointed commander, the Abwehr also stood on its ears, trying to squeeze out as much information as possible from such a captive. Moreover, the capture of the generals, and even more so of the army commanders, was immediately reported to Berlin. And if the army abwerovtsev Samokhin could still cheat, hanging them noodles on the ears, then the central apparatus of the Abwehr - a feature of a bald! All documents, incl. and personal, were with him, and as soon as in Berlin received a special message about the capture of the newly appointed commander of the 48th Army of the Bryansk Front, Major-General AG. Samokhin, they immediately checked him for his records of Soviet generals, and the clumsy crap immediately got out. Samokhin was almost immediately installed as a former resident of Soviet military intelligence in Belgrade! With the identification of the photo, tk. any military intelligence carefully assembles photo albums for all military intelligence officers, especially those states that consider their adversary. And Samokhin was the official military attaché of the USSR in Belgrade and, naturally, his photo was in the Abwehr.
So he, according to that Lieutenant of the Wehrmacht, that's why he did not tell the Germans anything special on the first or second interrogations, that he was immediately transferred to Berlin.
This is a completely natural, normal practice of military intelligence and not only the Abwehr; by the way, ours did the same, and such important prisoners were immediately sent to Moscow.
Yes, in general, it was easy to expose the lie to expose the Abwehr people also because all personal documents of Samokhin were with him, including. and the order to appoint the commander of the 48th and the order of the Supreme Headquarters to arrive and take office on April 21, 1942. So it was unlikely that he had held out with his lies for more than an hour - his own documents had been convicted of him.
But then the fact is that the Lieutenant of the Wehrmacht, who participated in the interrogations of Samokhin, was interrogated after the Battle of Stalingrad, which ended, as is known, on February 2, 1943. But then why the Main Directorate of the losses of the Red Army personnel on February 10, 1943 issued the very order No. 0194, according to which Samokhin was included in the lists of missing persons, not to mention why this order was canceled only on May 19, 1945, if immediately after the Battle of Stalingrad it became known what had happened to him? !! Despite the fact that the terrible war was still going on, there was not any more confusion in documents like the one that was going on in the first months of the war, at least on the scale that was then taking place. Not to mention the fact that it was still a major general, the army commander, and their accounts were conducted (and conducted) separately. AT.
So fast cancellation of the order of 10.02.1943 - as early as May 19, 1945 - for the victorious May 1945, a fantastic phenomenon: just 10 days after the Victory !? Then from the captivity were freed millions of our compatriots and so that the gears of the squeaky mechanism of personnel registration in the army would turn so fast! Yes, no zhist! And not because there were villains-idols, but because in order to cancel such an order, Samokhin had to go through the filtration of Soviet counterintelligence (Smersh), completely to be identified and identified exactly as Samokhin, brought to Moscow and only then, according to the logic of the cadre work of that time and taking into account all the specific specifics of that time, such an order could be canceled. And ten days after the Victory - this is even for the general too soon. Moreover, if we recall those facts, that they concern the further fate of Samokhin in captivity and after his release from captivity. According to the authors of the above-mentioned handbook on the GRU, in captivity Samokhin behaved decently, in May 1945 was liberated by Soviet troops105. Upon his arrival in Moscow he was arrested, and on March 25, 1952, he was sentenced to 25 years of labor camp 106. (V. Lot, and at all informs science fiction that on December 2, 1946 Samokhin was dismissed to the reserve, and on August 28 - without indication of the year - the order for dismissal was abolished, Samokhin was enrolled as a student of the Higher Academic Courses at the Military Academy of the General Staff, which really plunges into a "tailspin" of perplexity).
However, 200 pages before this statement, the same authors of the same GRU reference book indicated that in May 1945 General Samokhin was taken from Paris (?) To Moscow . 107
Immediately note that the Soviet troops did not release France and they were not in the territory of this beautiful country. There was only a Soviet military mission. Consequently, if it was the Soviet troops who liberated him, then, it seems, if it happened in May 1945, this happiest for a prisoner of Hitler's concentration camp Samokhin took place in Germany.
Here it is asked, how, miles sorry, he was brought to Moscow from Paris, where there was only a Soviet military mission ?!
Our generals, in fact, really flogged openly, but they were not so foolish in the euphoria of the Victory, that after the liberation of all Europe from fascism to export the liberated from Hitler's captivity the compatriot-general to Moscow through Paris ?! From Berlin to Moscow, whatever one may say, the path is shorter.
But if indeed Samokhin was taken out of Paris, then it is really bad. After all, the Hitlerites brought there all more or less significant prisoners of war, especially from among the scouts, for organizing reconnaissance and disinformation games against Soviet intelligence and the Soviet military command. It is interesting to note in this connection that in 1942 there were also massive failures of Soviet intelligence agents, including and military, in Europe, including Germany, especially the "Red Chapel", as well as in the Balkans. We should not forget that led Samohin 2nd GRU Office 108 , ie, he knew a lot, and many.
As already mentioned above, during the Great Patriotic War, 83 generals of the Red Army found themselves in captivity among the Hitlerites. 26 of them died for various reasons (shot, killed by camp guards, died of illness and exhaustion). The remaining 57 people. after the Victory they were deported to the USSR. Of these, 32 people were repressed (7 were hanged in the Vlasov case, 17 were shot on the basis of the Stavka order No. 270 of August 16, 1941 "On cases of cowardice and surrender and measures to curb such actions") and for "wrong" behavior in captivity 8 generals were sentenced to different terms of imprisonment. The remaining 25 people after more than a half-yearly checks justified " 109 .
Wishing once again to throw a cobblestone in the address of Stalin, the newly quoted author completed this phrase with the words "but then gradually fired into the reserve." This is true, and a lie. Some generals were left on active military service, as, for example, the former commander of the 5th KOVO Army M. Potapov and others. And some were fired for health reasons: it was hardly possible for the author of this quote to forget that Hitler's concentration camp is not a sanatorium of the Ministry of Defense.
Those. almost 44% of the generals were acquitted, and it took a bit more than six months to do this. Consequently, there can be no question of any bloodthirst of Smersh or Stalin's justice. Moreover, another 14% (8 people) of life was saved - they received different terms of imprisonment.
Among these most 8 people. (14%) - General Samokhin. But here in fact that is surprising. They arrested him in the same May 1945, but by 25 years ITL was sentenced only on March 25, 1952! Those. Samokhin was under investigation for almost 7 years!
And whatever the attitude towards Smersh or the MGB, it's absolutely obvious that the case with Samokhin was from the category of "difficult nuts".
Obviously, a laborious, painstaking test was conducted, as a result of which something was established, and something - and no. That is why the sentence is not executed. But all right, the dramatic odyssey of General Samokhin would have ended on that one. No sooner had the sarcophagus with Stalin's body put in the Mausoleum, as in May 1953 the verdict against Samokhin was abolished! And then, in May 1953, General Samokhin was rehabilitated! (V. Lota justifies the fact of the rehabilitation of AG Samokhin with the materials of the interrogation of that senior Lieutenant of the Wehrmacht, who was captured in the Soviet captivity during the Battle of Stalingrad.)
But if it was not only the sentence against Samokhin that was canceled for that period of time was already a colossal rarity - this is what unbelievable speed of actions was given to the apparatus of law enforcement bodies of the post-Stalinist USSR - but also the general's rehabilitation took place, which was even more unprecedented in the state of things for May 1953, especially with respect to the military, then why were not the general reinstated in military service? After all, he was appointed to the position of only senior teacher of combined arms training at the military department of Moscow State University! "
Yes, we can assume that such a decision was made on medical indicators, but the point is that Samokhin was then only fifty-one years old (1902) and his, as well as other prisoners released from exile and rehabilitated, could be safely treated, and then reinstated in active military service. According to the general's status, they would be cured with an extra class! .. That was, for example, Potapov. But no, from the snags were dragged out to the senior teachers at the military department of the Moscow State University!
Do you understand what the whole "zagulina" is? On the one hand, the "reactive" rate of pulling Samokhin out of the Gulag and its rehabilitation - only 2 months and 25 days (!) Have passed since the funeral of Stalin, and on the other - they immediately threw on the citizen.
The result is this: someone closely followed the Samokhin case, but under Stalin could not do anything, and as soon as the leader was spilled out into the next world, then Samokhin was yanked out of the Gulag, the verdict was canceled and rehabilitated, but they were still pushed out citizen.
What did he know of such-and-such, who in his case so closely watched why this someone had to be extremely influential - so much that he could pull it out of the Gulag and even rehabilitate it less than three months after the funeral of Stalin?
Samokhin air of freedom left to breathe for only two years - July 17, 1955, he died 113 .
Naturally, in a human sense, it is truly a pity that General Samokhin passed away at the age of 53. It is all the more regrettable, considering that many of the prisoners of the Nazi concentration camps, as well as those who served their sentences in the Soviet penitentiary system, have survived to the present day.
And the next, in 1956, the first explosion took place, the furious anti-Stalinism of Khrushchev's "bottling" was swept away - a dirty wave of brainless, vile accusations of Stalin, including. and first of all for the tragedy of June 22, 1941, with simultaneous, but no less indiscriminate and stupid obelenie of the whole generalship.
You will look at this chronology and involuntarily think about whether the former high-ranking military intelligence officer, the 48th Major-General Samokhin, who did not take command of the army, left the life too "in a timely manner", so to say, in a preventive manner.
And this thought will be all the more sad depressing if it is imposed both on the chronology of the war and on certain events of the summer of 1953.
If you go back to the fact of capturing Samokhin, then you are surprised to learn that shortly after he fell into the captivity of the Germans under strange circumstances, Soviet pilots intercepted a German aircraft, whose passengers had been seized with documentation on plans to hold a summer (1942) campaign of German army 114. It is a question of the important staff documents captured by the Soviet troops, captured on June 20, 1942, incl. and related to Operation Blau. They were transported by plane to the Major of the Staff of the 23rd Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht Reichel. The plane was hit by Soviet air defense. The pilot and two officers accompanying Reichel were killed when the plane fell to a neutral strip. Reichel miraculously survived, but in a shootout with Soviet soldiers was killed at the time of the attempt to burn documents. By the end of the same day, at the personal order of Commander Yuzef Tymoshenko, the captured documents were delivered to Stalin. Stalin, by that time, already had extensive and reliable information about Operation Blau and did not see anything particularly new in the captured documents. Moreover, he acted on his own plan, in order to certainly break the ridge of the Wehrmacht. As for Mirkinkin's statement, that ignoring Stavka (Stalin) of the documents seized led to the defeat near Kharkov, then, let the colleague be forgiven, is a blatant lie. The Kharkov offensive operation began on May 12, on May 18, it was already drowned, and on the afternoon of May 19, the commander of the Yuzef Tymoshenko was forced to give a clearly belated order to go over to the defense. By May 30, the operation ended with the actual rout of our troops, which suffered heavy losses in manpower and technology. Documents transported by Reichel fell into the hands of Soviet troops only on June 20, that is, twenty days after the Kharkov operation under the command of Tymoshenko ended with another tragedy for the Soviet troops, since the commander of the USF still did not see a shuck of the new in the strategic experience of the Wehrmacht.
Reporting on this, the military historian mentioned repeatedly, VA Mirskin, notes that "Moscow either got wrong conclusions from them (ie from the contents of captured documents .-- AM), or ignored them altogether, which led to the defeat Soviet troops near Kharkov " 115 (I'd add that it has also led to the further promotion and gitleryug deep into Soviet territory, up to Stalingrad and the Caucasus -. AM).
It is difficult to say whether the distinguished colleague saw in his own words a certain ambiguity or not, but in the end, perhaps, contrary to his desire, it was she who turned out. For it turned out that there was a certain exchange of messages about plans for the summer campaign of 1942
Worse than that. With the inevitable emergence of suspicion of this type, the following fact becomes sinister.
After the war, the ex-head of the Nazi foreign policy intelligence service (VI RSHA Directorate) Walter Schellenberg showed during an interrogation with the American investigator that "in the spring of 1942, one of the Japanese naval officers in a conversation with the German Military Attache (AM) in Tokyo raised the issue on whether Germany would not go to the honorary peace with the USSR, in which Japan could help. This was reported to Hitler "(Motov V. NKVD v. Abwehr, M., 2005. S. 282).
The ominous significance of this fact is manifested first of all in the time of its accomplishment - in the spring of 1942.
Why should this happen, in fact, a unique (up to a certain) parallel-consecutive coincidence of events: in the spring of 1942, a plane with Samokhin horseradish knows why he flies to the Hitlerites, and he has in his hands documents of Soviet military planning for the summer campaign of 1942, in t.ch. and the directive of the Northern Caucasus High Command, as well as the operational map, a little later on, again, the hell knows why the Hitlerites come to us with their documentation of the plans for holding the summer 1942 campaign of the Hitlerite Wehrmacht, and at the same time a strange probing by a Japanese naval officer his German counterpart in Tokyo on the subject of the possible consent of the Reich to conclude a secret separate peace with the USSR on honorable terms ?!
First of all, it should be borne in mind that under the impression of a powerful counteroffensive of Soviet troops near Moscow, the Japanese leadership discussed in mid-February 1942 the demand of the Germans to act against the USSR and came to the conclusion that it was premature. This meant that the threat of an attack by Japan on the USSR was reduced. And this despite the fact that Hitler personally pressed on the Japanese ally, demanding from him to speak in the spring of 1942, promising that a major offensive would be resumed on the Eastern Front. In short, Tokyo sent Hitler's demands to the "Japanese mother", and Stalin knew about it.
Accordingly, it turns out that the sounding was an initiative purely Japanese. And considering that the probe was carried out by a Japanese naval officer, that the leadership of the Japanese Navy had already clearly realized what it had got into by attacking the US - the difficulties experienced by the Japanese Navy were colossal. And the more furious was the fury of the Americans, who were furious at Tokyo because of Pearl Harbor. There is an involuntary impression that this was a serious provocation designed to drive a wedge between allies in the anti-Hitler coalition (the Japanese, by the way, did the same thing in the spring of 1943, that is, after the Battle of Stalingrad), in the first turn between the USSR and the United States.
At the same time, one cannot but note that the impression that it was a provocation was an impression, but what, miles, sorry ... it should, firstly, coincide in time with both strange airs of ours and Hitler's high-ranking officers with the most important documents on their hands, and secondly, in the main features, the scenario of a tripartite military-geopolitical plot involving German, Soviet (led by Tukhachevsky) and Japanese high-ranking military, whose main Soviet unit was About liquidated as far back as 1937.
Who would explain what is behind all this? Especially considering how aggressively the USSR sought after the war to interrogate the same W. Schellenberg, and the former allies not only did not openly interfere with this, they also finally arranged for the former Reichs' obsequious boss "hurricane cancer", as a result of which he quickly "Gave the oak," not waiting for the first-dreaded Allies to deserved a meeting with Soviet Chekists.
And yet, in relation to the spring of 1942, one of the numerous reports of the illegal resident of the GRU in Switzerland, "Dora" (Shandor Rado) of September 25, is kept in the Central Department of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (Issue 24121. D. 3. L. 599) 1941 In view of its brevity, I will quote the contents of the report completely: "From the Berlin representative of the Japanese agency, Domei received the following information:" In the high circles of the German officers, the point of view is increasingly strengthened that, in view of the failure of the plans for a blitzkrieg, victory is impossible, and we must wait for defeat and Bolshevisation of all Euro s, if you can not make a separate peace with England. But for this it is necessary first to liquidate Hitler and establish a military dictatorship. Most of the generals still still for Hitler and agree to a coup in Germany only if the victory is not achieved in the spring of 1942.
So, who would have explained in a really intelligible manner why, between such scattered facts, suddenly, for no apparent reason, the lines of mutual attraction begin to spring up almost on the verge of autonomous alignment, although vague, but still some kind of the overall picture?
True, wishing to bow to the option that after all it was an accident, i.e. the arrival of Samokhin into temporarily occupied territories, anyone will be forced to slow down their desires, because before the defeat near Kharkov, our troops "valiantly" brought all the same Tymoshenko, to whom and so immense fault for the tragedy of June 22, 1941 (for good reason he is up to end of life stubbornly refrained from writing memoirs), and the tragedy near Kharkov strikingly recalled the tragedy of June 22, only on the scale of one front, and one of the most vile enemies of our country - in the near future the infamous bald corncobble-Trotskyite "Maki and "Khrushchev.
However, even though this was a stretch, it could also be attributed to chance, if not, as always, not one "but", however, even a few.
The fact is that Tymoshenko and Khrushchev knew in advance, in March 1942, that the Hitlerites would strike on the southern flank. "5 And Samokhin was the source of their knowledge about this!" Here the whole "zagulina" is that in March 1942, Samokhin's classmate at the academy, head of the operational group of the South-Western direction, Lieutenant-General Ivan Khristoforovich Bagramyan (later Marshal of the Soviet Union) flew to Moscow from the front, Bagramyan, naturally, visited the GRU and from his friend Alexander Georgievich Samokhin, who was already the head of the 2nd Directorate Ia GRU learned of intelligence about the plans of the Nazis in the summer of 1942 Returning to the front, Baghramyan shared this information with Timoshenko and Khrushchev - they were his direct superiors 116 .
Tymoshenko and Khrushchev cheerfully promised Stalin that the Hitler in the South would be defeated, begging for the promised success huge forces. But, alas: in the words of a bald maize, so that, having killed a lot of people and equipment, they suffered a crushing defeat.
And they ditched with absolutely "inexplicable" stubbornness in the unwillingness to see the obvious, for even when the General Staff from Moscow saw the colossal threat of an offensive operation near Kharkov and therefore insistently recommended measures to prevent it, it was Tymoshenko who in unanimity with Khrushchev persistently misinformed Stalin about allegedly a notable success, until once again a bloody tragedy broke out.
Now it's time to compare: the investigation into the Samokhin case lasted almost seven years, although with others it was sorted out quickly enough and 25 generals were rehabilitated under Stalin, but as soon as the leader was gone, Samokhin was immediately torn from the Gulag, revoked the sentence, rehabilitated, but pushed out onto the citizen, and two years later Samokhin is no more. The speed of the accomplishment of these events was simply inconceivable for that time, for then at the top there was a bitter prickle for the liberated throne and in principle there was very little to rehabilitate one of the many.
Well, that's not all. Moreover, if we remember that on Khrushchev's falsified case against Beria, on June 26, 1953, without trial, the illegally murdered Lavrenty Pavlovich, in hindsight, tried in vain to "sew" an accusation that he was allegedly preparing to defeat the Soviet troops in the Caucasus, to the approaches to which the Hitlerites broke through to a great extent thanks to the "valorous" command of Tymoshenko and Khrushchev, the Kharkov operation ...
But who always screams louder than all: "Hold the thief!"? Correctly...
Then, in 1942, the situation almost became stalemate: on the one hand, as has been repeatedly noted above, after the catastrophic failure of the Kharkov operation (and, after it, also the Crimean operation), Stalin simply did not remain, as evading major battles , only to draw the Hitler into the depths of Russia, in order to inflict the first truly, Stalinally, fatal blow to Hitler.
In stating this, I nevertheless can not help but recall that, since the defeat of our troops near Kharkov, the involvement of the Hitler in the depths of Russia was already firmly embedded in Stalin's plans. This was discussed in Chapter II of Section III. Conclusions Stalin made his conclusions.
But, on the other hand, Stalin himself nearly got a death blow - in the same year of 1942 "generals organize the defense of passes very badly, pulling their divisions into thin lines" 117 , i.e. in fact, willingly or unwittingly projected the tragedy on June 22. Projected in the version of the static front "narrow tape"! "The Soviet generals act as if they are subject to the will of another, making the most stupid decision" 118 .
And if it had not arrived in Tbilisi Lavrentiy Beria, "people will truly armor and powerful intellect," that the Caucasus would be captured gitleryugami 119 .
It was he, Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria, in recognition of even the most vicious and rabid modern anti-Stalinists (for example, V. Beshanov, author of the book "Year 1942 -" educational. "Minsk, Harvest, 2002), saved the Caucasus!
Then what must the false screams of the bald Trotskyite-corn culprit and his camarilla, who had gone mad from impunity, mean that they allegedly wanted to hand over the Hitlerites to the Caucasus ?! What does this mean if, for example, it's hard to remember the answer to the question, who is the loudest screamer: "Keep thief!". That's what it is ...
And what, in this case and in this light, should mean the facts of an unprecedented speedy reversal of the severe sentence of Samokhin, his rehabilitation, but pushing him to the citizen, along with the escaping of life on the eve of the unbridled bacchanalia of despicable and vile accusations against Stalin, which was accelerating for a 53-year-old man? !!
Should this mean that Samokhin, who was sitting in the Gulag, was an extremely dangerous witness for someone at the top and that is why he was urgently pulled out and then, after rehabilitating (by the way, it is not very clear how it happened) was sent to a citizen. Where just two years later he passed away. In 53 years something ?!
It is immensely difficult to say anything definitely, but all the above circumstances can not fail to attract attention.
Obviously, the matter is now in time - this is the only unquestionable "Archimedes' lever," which alone can crack the notorious seven seals behind which the Genuine History of the Great Patriotic War hides. A story that they still hope to keep secret from the people.
Because she will leave, the True History of the Great Patriotic War, then she will silently, without any emotion, even the dead, make her on her knees beg forgiveness from Russia for the most important crime of hers - for insolent theft from our national heritage of the Brilliant The grandeur of the Generalissimo Stalin, and therefore of the Mightiest Greatness of Russia!
1 Karpov V. The Generalissimo. M., 2002. T. 2. S. 9-14,
2 NF Chervov. Provocations against Russia. Pp. 187-192.
3 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. Correspondence between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and the US Presidents and Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. T. 2. Correspondence with F. Roosevelt and G. Truman (August 1941-December 1945). M., 1957. S. 17.
4 Ibid. Pp. 17-18.
5 Ibid. C. 18.
6 Ibid. Pp. 18-19.
7 Ibid. Pp. 19-20.
8 See: Pavlov V. Operation "Snow". M., 1996.
9 On this topic, especially "overdone" LA. Bezymensky (see, for example, his book: Operation "Myth", or How many times Hitler was buried., M., 1995. pp. 29-32).
10 See No. 8.
11 Platonov O. Secret History of Russia. XX century. The Epoch of Stalin. M., 1996. P. 136.
12 IEE. 2001. №45.
13-19 Essays on the History of the Russian External Intelligence. T. 4. M., 1999. P. 527-552. I ask you to pay special attention to the special reservation of the editorial board of the SVR: "Documents are published with preservation of style, spelling and punctuation of copies stored in the Archive of the SVR."
20 The Duel. 1999. № 13. C. 3.
21 ~ 24 See No. 13-19.
25 See also Sukhomlinov A. Who are you, Lavrenty Beria? C. 117-
27 On this issue, see: Essays on the History of the Russian External Intelligence. M., 1996. T. 3.
28 ~ 31 Mlechin L. Chairmen of the KGB. Declassified Fates M., 1999. P. 178-179.
32 Melnikov D., Chernaya L. The Empire of Death. M., 1987. P. 176.
33 Ibid. P. 70, and also: Gladkov T. Secrets of the special services III Reich M., 2004. P. 81.
34 Gladkov T. Secrets of the special services of the III Reich S 64-65
35 See No. 33. from. 81.
36 See No. 34, p. 85.
37 Mader U. In the footsteps of a man with a scar. M., 1963. S. 29.
38 Gladkov T. Secrets of the special services of the III Reich. 74; No. 32 C 196
39 See No. 28-30.
40 See No. 24.
41 The year of the crisis 1938-1939. T. 2. M., 1993. P. 319-321.
42 See also: Zhukov, Yu. Ina Stalin. M., 2003
43 See No. 32, 34.
44 See No. 37, p. eleven.
45-46 doc TV movie about the fate of M. Rosenberg, prepared by the son of the famous scout Sudoplatov; the film was shown on ORT on August 8, 2004 and during its show five close-ups were shown the cover of a genuine case from the archives of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B.).
47 Kremlev S. West against Russia. Russia and Germany: The Way to the Covenant. M., 2004. P. 10.
48 See No. 13-19, p. 663.
49 See No. 37, p. 29.
51 ~ 53 See the interview of J. Medvedev "A and F". 2003. № 51. P. 13.
54 Perin R. Guillotine for the demons. St. Petersburg, 2001. P. 32-33.
55 ~ 56 See Mukhin Yu. Anti-Russian meanness. M., 2004. P. 128; Rozanov GL. Stalin and Hitler. M., 1991. P. 95.
57 ~ 58 Border troops of the USSR. 1939 - June 1941: Sat. documents and materials. M., 1970. S. 17; Mader Yu. Imperialism: Spying in Europe yesterday and today. M., 1984. P. 151.
59 ~ 61 Schmuhl H.-W. Rassen-hegiene in Deutschland-Eugenik in der Sowjetunion: Ein Vergeleich // Beyrau D. (Hg) Intellektuelle Prafessionen unter Hitler und Stalin. Tubingen, 2000. S. 366; Plenkov O.Yu. III Reich. Socialism of Hitler. M., 2004. P. 237; Dugin AG Conshyrology. M. 1993. P. 77.
62 Grame H. Reichskristallnacht. Antisemitismus und Judeverfolgung im Dritten Reich. Munchen, 1988. S. 10-11; Mommsen H. Der Weg zum Volkermord an europiiiche Juden // Universitas.1995. No. 5. S. 433.
63 ~ 64 See: Eich E. Die unheilichen Deutschen. Dusseldorf, 1963. S. 172.
65 Plenkov O.Yu. III Reich. Pp. 326-327.
66-78 ibid. 327; Gladkov T. Secrets of the special services of the III Reich. Pp. 362-364; see also No. 62; Grenville D. The history of the XX century. People. Developments. Data. M., 1999. P. 241; Graig G. Deutsche Geschichte 1866-1945. Munchen, 1983. S. 559; Maser W. Das Regime. Alltag in Deutschland. Munchen, 1983. S. 1195; Bracher KD Deutschland 1933-1945. Dusseldorf, 1992. S. 279 et al.
79 Gladkov T. Secrets of the special services of the III Reich. 364.
80-86 Meltukhov M. Soviet-Polish wars. M., 1991. P. 162; Mukhin Yu. Anti-Russian meanness. M., 2004. P. 100.
87 Meltyukhov M. Decree. op. 162.
The year of crisis. T. 1. P. 37-39.
89 Shishkin O. To Kill Rasputin. M., 1996. P. 7.
90-92 Kostyrchenko G. In the captivity of the red pharaoh. M., 1994. P. 27-29, as well as: RChIDNI. F. 17. Op. 125. D. 59. L. 29; D. 35. L. 62-63; D. 103. L. 1-3; D. 112., L. 126.
93 ~ 94 See No. 8. 95 ~ 96 See No. 3, p. 3, 281.
97 IEE. 2004. № 16.
98 GRU. Business and people. M., 2003. P. 96-97. "See No. 97-98.
100 See No. 97, p. 97.
101 See No. 98, p. 296.
102 See No. 98, p. 296.
103 See No. 97.
104 See No. 98.
105 Ibid., P. 97.
107 Ibid. С. 295.
108 See No. 98.
109 See No. 97.
110 See No. 98, p. 296.
112 GRU. Business and people. С. 295.
113 See No. 98, p. 295.
114 See No. 97.
115 Mlechin L. Joseph Joseph Stalin, his marshals and generals. M., 2004. S. 540. 117-119 Kalashnikov M., Krupnov Yu. Great confrontations. Saddle the lightning! America against Russia. M., 2003. P. 87-88.
Source Stalinism RU