



ON RESTORATION of CAPITALISM

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Selected Articles on the subject

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INDEX

Introduction – P3

Lenin, The New Economic Policy and The Tasks of The Political Education Departments – P27

Lenin, The 1918 Decision of The All-Russia Central Executive Committee on The Role of The Peasantry – P28

Lenin, Third Congress of The Communist International – P49

Lenin, Speech in Defense of The Tactics of The Communist International – P59

Lenin, Report on The Tactics of The R.C.P. – P71

Lenin, From: Tenth All-Russian Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) - P92

Lenin, Speech at A Plenary Session of The Moscow Soviet – P350

Stalin, Concerning Questions of Leninism – P94

Stalin, to Kaganovich and Molotov – P166

Stalin, Reply to Comrade Sh.- P168

Stalin, The Foundation of Leninism – P 171

Stalin, Interview with Foreign Workers' Delegations – P185

Stalin, Questions & Answers to American Trade Unionists – P187

Stalin, Industrialization of the country and the Right Deviation in the C.P.S.U.(B.) – P211

Stalin, The Work of the April Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission – P252

Enver Hoxha, The Demagogy of the Soviet Revisionists Cannot Conceal Their Traitorous Countenance – P286

Enver Hoxha, Euro Communism is Anti- Communism – P324

Enver Hoxha, Imperialism and the Revolution – P328

H. Mara, Revisionist “Theories” of Restored Capitalism – P330

Notes

- (1) Stalin, On the Final Victory of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.
- (2) Lenin, 8th Party Congress
- (3) Hıdır Yesil, “The Question of Restoration in Socialism”
- (4) Moscow Court Proceedings
- (5) Vishinsky, Court Proceedings
- (6) Lenin, The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky,”
- (7) Lenin, Left-Wing' Communism, an Infantile Disorder
- (8) Lenin, Plan of The Pamphlet, The Tax in Kind
- (9) Resolution of the Fourteenth Conference of the CPSU
- (10) Stalin, Grain Procurements and the Prospects for the Development of Agriculture
- (11) Stalin, The Results of the First Five-Year Plan
- (12) Lenin, Preliminary Draft of Theses on the Agrarian Question
- (13) Lenin, Notes for a Speech at the 10th Congress
- (14) Lenin, State and Revolution, presentation of question by Marx
- (15) Lenin, State and Revolution
- (16) Lenin, Plan of The Pamphlet, The Tax in Kind

On Restoration of Capitalism

“Only blockheads or masked enemies who with their boastfulness want to conceal their hostility and are striving to demobilize the people, can deny the danger of military intervention and **attempts at restoration as long as the capitalist encirclement exists.**” (1) “We are living not merely in a State but in a system of States, and it is inconceivable that the Soviet Republic should continue to coexist for a long period side by side with imperialist States. **Ultimately one or other must conquer**” (2)

The question of “Restoration of Capitalism” in countries where the “dictatorship of Proletariat”- commonly called socialism (15) “reigned, with few exceptions, so far has been dealt with a bourgeois and Trotskyite- *bourgeois lackeys under left disguise* – outlook.

One of these exceptions is the book titled “the question of restoration in socialism” by Hidir Yesil, which takes up the study of the first and most advanced experience in the construction of socialism, the experience of the Soviet Union. In his book, Yesil, largely examines the economic theory and practice of economic construction side of the question of restoration during the phase of building socialism. In his book he is not taking up the social political, the education and cultural aspects of the question. He sees the economic field as the most neglected aspect of the question in the study of the question of restoration. Unlike most, he stresses that “**the whole book deals mostly with mistakes.** This is not done to **deny or minimize the achievements** in the construction of socialism.” He reasons that the construction of socialism in its real meaning and the uninterrupted continuation of the revolution will not be possible in the future without **discovering the mistakes of** the past experiences in building socialism and thus preventing their repetition. He states that “It is our duty and responsibility to

detect and overcome the mistakes of the past experience". He summarizes the reason for his taken up the subject and for the restoration:

"Undoubtedly, there are a number of studies conducted and efforts made to reveal the material, economic and class basis of corruption. But in my opinion, **none of this has been sufficient**. In this book, I want to make a complimentary contribution to eliminate this deficiency.

"The concept of "restoration", which is generally accepted in the Marxist-Leninist ranks, is not a concept that fully describes the truth. What has been experienced in the Soviet Union and the "Eastern Bloc Countries" clustered around it, and in China and Albania, **is not a "return to the old"** in the sense that the overthrown former rulers came back to the power. In this "return", there is a **new type of bourgeoisie emerged** and developed from within the socialist system. Restoration brought about a bourgeoisie made up of bureaucrats and technocrats who use their ruling and decision-making positions in the state and in the enterprises for their own interests, and a new type of capitalism, **a bureaucratic state capitalism**.

Undoubtedly, the first condition that makes a socialism the socialism is the class context of its political power. The political power, the "Dictatorship of the Proletariat" which the proletariat does not share with any faction of the bourgeoisie, **is an indispensable precondition for socialism**. As this is the case, in a country if power passes into the hands of revisionists speaking in the name of socialism which was once socialist, and they find the **opportunity to implement their own programs**, "corruption", "restoration" is inevitable in the process." (3)

It is crucially important to study the question of “restoration” **in all its aspects**. However, it is as crucially important **to bear in mind** and make the **dialectical connection** with the facts and the related theories. Yesil considers the economic aspect of the question as the most neglected. As far as a sincere Marxist Leninists study of the individual aspects of the question for the “lessons learned”, he may well be right. However, **as a whole**, the most neglected, overlooked or consciously disregarded aspects of the question in core is related to the continuing class struggle within the socialist country and with the “capitalist encirclement” abroad. The struggle **within** against the right and left deviation, **and** struggle **without**, against the international capitalist pressure, economic and political blockade **in combination** plays a decisive role in the process of restoration. Cuba, which has been subjected to economic and political blockade for 60 years is a good example for this - by taking back steps and forward steps in order not to be **defeated**. The study of the “defeat” - Restoration of capitalism” in Soviet Russia cannot be objective without **basing the study on the class struggle** within and without and without considering the **concrete conditions and situations** within those periods; the **world war, civil war, famine, plots** of counter revolutionaries in aligned with fascist Germany and other imperialists, second world war. One cannot study a question objectively **without making the distinction between** positive concrete conditions and negative conditions both of which will have different impact on and implications of the application of the economic and social programs. We cannot study a subject with the current or assumed “normal” conditions and **mind-set of “now”** while the question is related to the conditions and **mind-set of “then”**. There is no possible way of knowing the exact conditions and thereupon, mind-set of “then” with the second or third hand plus **knowledge of “now” related to then**. That’s why Marxist Leninists try their best to be objective and study the question as a whole with all the

dialectic connections to it. **Bourgeoisie and revisionist** counter revolutionaries search and handpick the aspects of the question **disconnected and isolated from the whole aspects of the question** in order to present a conclusion of “inherent failure of socialism “as a system.

Bourgeoisie portrays the question as the “**failure**” of socialism as a political and economic system. By doing so they try to create the illusion that capitalism is “eternal” because there is no other alternative economic system. The choice of word “failure” **is not a coincidental** one. **Failure implies** not succeeding in the achievement of intended objective, in this case, the lack of “inherent” ability for success, it does not imply being beaten in a struggle. Due to this lack of inherent ability, “failure” suggests giving up and not trying again.

“**Defeat**” implies being beaten in a struggle and it is not an end in itself. That’s why the bourgeoisie and variety of Trotskyites use the term or concludes “failure”.

What should be bore in mind is that;

- 1- Socialism has not “failed” but been” defeated”.
- 2- “Restoration of capitalism “has never been seen as “impossible” by Marxist Leninists. Contrary, the danger and possibility of restoration have always been seen as inevitable in small-peasant countries **in particular**, and as long as the capitalist encirclement existed **in general**.
- 3- The reasons for the restoration should not be studied “domestically”-**internal class struggle**- alone but in relation with the “international capitalists” - **external class struggle**. A study without this dialectic connection will end up either **blaming all** to the “internal” mistakes! or justifying, overlooking the “internal mistakes.”

- 4- Similarly, approach to the bureaucracy - as the scapegoat for restoration – should not be taken **as something existence of which is impossible** in Socialist Society- the lower phase of communism, but like the state, as a phenomenon which will wither away during the transition to communist society. It is not something that could be avoided but controlled.

I will not be dwelling on the bourgeois insidious use of the term “fail” in order to dismiss socialism as an alternative to capitalism. However, their servile Trotskyite approach which purposely disregards the above-mentioned facts **is not so much different than that of bourgeoisie** for it denies socialism and postpones the revolutions to an indefinite date.

It is beneficial to study the subject in the field of Bureacracy and Economy. However, this should be done by stressing the fact that this is not **the only and main reason** in isolation from the class struggle in general and from the struggle against the “right” and “left deviation” in the party in particular. Due to the same concequence kinship between the two deviations, the victory of either one or both will inevitably lay the ground for and **eventually** bring about the defeat of socialism and restoration of capitalism.

Right deviation **underestimates** the enemy, the danger of capitalist restoration, and fails to understand the nature of the class struggle under the proletarian dictatorship. As Stalin states in his reply; “ I said plainly in my speech that the Right deviation "underestimates the strength of capitalism" in our country, "**does not see the danger of the restoration of capitalism,**" "does not understand the mechanism of the class struggle," "and therefore so readily agrees to make concessions to capitalism." I said plainly in my speech that "**the triumph of the Right deviation in our Party**" would "**increase the chances of the restoration of capitalism in our country.**"

[P168]

On the other side of the kinship, **left deviation's overestimating** the forces of enemy, underestimating the possibility of and denial of socialism in one country and underestimating the importance of and animosity to the peasantry, to the rest of the laboring masses is **a tendency that weakens the proletarian dictatorship**. As Stalin pointed out; "As to the "Left," Trotskyist, deviation, I said plainly in my speech that it denies the possibility of building socialism in our country, rejects the idea of an alliance of the working class and the peasantry, and is prepared to carry out its fantastic plan of industrialization at the cost of a split with the peasantry. I said in my speech (if you have read it) that "the triumph of the '**Left' deviation in our Party would lead to the working class being separated from its peasant base, to the vanguard of the working class being separated from the rest of the working-class masses, and, consequently, to the defeat of the proletariat and to facilitating conditions for the restoration of capitalism.**" " [P168]

Stalin, in a Letter to Kaganovich and Molotov criticizing Pravda on the trial says; "They should have said that talk that the Zinovievites and Trotskyites have no platform is a fraud on the part of these scum and a self-deception by our comrades. These scums had a platform. **The gist of their platform was the defeat of socialism in the USSR and the restoration of capitalism...** As far back as the X party congress, Lenin said that if a faction or factions persist in their errors in their struggle against the party, under the Soviet system they will, without fail, slide down to the level of White Guardism, the defense of capitalism, a struggle against the Soviets, and must, without fail, merge with the enemies of Soviet rule. This proposition by Lenin has now been brilliantly confirmed." [P166]

During his 1938 trial, Bukharin stating that his followers organized a conference at the end of the summer of 1932 in where anticommunist, counter revolutionary bourgeois platform was

approved, said "I fully agreed with this platform and I bear full responsibility for it." (4)

At the same Court proceedings Vishinsky had summarized the role and consequences of deviations ;

"It is not an accident because prior to the October Revolution as well, Trotsky and his friends fought against Lenin and Lenin's Party as they fight now against Stalin and the Party of Lenin and Stalin.

They come to their shameful end because they have followed this role for many years, have sung the praises of capitalism and have lacked faith in the success of socialist construction and in the victory of socialism.

"That is why **they come finally to develop a program of capitalist restoration.** That is why they proceeded to betray and sell our native land." (5)

It is clear that the **question of restoration is not only limited to one side of subject.** Possible victory of the right or left deviation is **a tendency that paves the way for the restoration of capitalism** through strengthening the capitalist tendencies and weakening the socialist construction attempts in economy."

"Restoration of capitalism "has never been seen as "impossible" by Marxist Leninists.

"The revolution can defeat the bourgeoisie, can overthrow its power, even without the dictatorship of the proletariat. " says Lenin, and follows; "but the revolution will be unable to crush the resistance of the bourgeoisie, to maintain its victory and to push forward to the final victory of socialism **unless,** at a certain stage in its development, it creates a special organ

in the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat as its principal mainstay. " (6)

"The fundamental question of every revolution is the question of power." (Lenin.) Does this mean that all that is required is to assume power, to seize it? **No, it does not.** The seizure of power is only the beginning." [P 171]

Therefore, the conquest of political power by the proletariat and the establishment of **Proletarian Dictatorship is the precondition for the economic- socialist revolution** and building socialist economy. The economic Policy of the Proletarian dictatorship becomes the policy of transforming the capitalist (in some cases semi-feudal) economic foundation into a socialist foundation, whereby, at the same time laying the economic foundation for the protection and strengthening of the conquered political power. It is the policy of, as Lenin puts it "laying the economic foundation for the political gains of the Soviet state, **or we shall lose them all**" [P27] it was the policy of transition during the period when "capitalism has been smashed but socialism has not yet been built." [P59] with the Policy of "NEP Russia will become socialist Russia." [P350]

Unlike the **illusion that** the class struggle will cease in the morning of conquering the Political Power Lenin points out that "The dictatorship of the proletariat **is not the end of the class struggle**, but its continuation in new forms. The dictatorship of the proletariat is the class struggle of the proletariat, which has won victory and has seized political power, against the bourgeoisie, which although vanquished **has not been annihilated, has not disappeared**, has not ceased its resistance, has **increased its resistance**" [P94]

In reference to the possibility of "restoration", in a country such as Russia with a dominant peasant economy, " Lenin's thesis " says

Stalin, "remains valid that "as long as we live in a small-peasant country, there is a surer **economic basis for capitalism** in Russia than for communism," and that, consequently, **the danger of the restoration of capitalism is no empty phrase.** "[P211] "Lenin says that so long as individual peasant economy, which engenders capitalists and capitalism, predominates in the country, **the danger of a restoration of capitalism will exist.** Clearly, so long as this danger exists there can be no serious talk of the victory of socialist construction in our country." (10)

"The transition from capitalism to communism," says Lenin, "represents **an entire historical epoch.** Until this epoch has terminated, the **exploiters inevitably cherish the hope of restoration,** and this hope is converted into **attempts at restoration.** And after their first serious defeat. the overthrown exploiters -- who had not expected their overthrow, never believed it possible, never conceded the thought of it -- throw themselves **with energy grown tenfold,** with furious passion and hatred grown a hundredfold **into the battle for the recovery of the 'paradise' of which they have been deprived,** on behalf of their families, who had been leading such a sweet and easy life and whom now the 'common herd' is condemning to ruin and destitution (or to 'common' labour . . .). In the train of the capitalist exploiters **follow the broad masses of the petty bourgeoisie,** with regard to whom decades of historical experience of all countries testify that they vacillate and hesitate, one day marching behind the proletariat and the next day taking fright at the difficulties of the revolution; that they become panic stricken at the first defeat or semi-defeat of the workers, grow nervous, rush about, snivel, and run from one camp into the other." [P171]

The question of restoration is not only a question of "bureaucracy" but a question of setting up the economic foundation and creating the culture to root out all the causes for it – which is not a day

struggle and work but a struggle that extends through **entire phase of transition** from capitalism to communism – in its scientific meaning, the higher stage of communism. The struggle is not only from top down, but also from bottom up, a combined effort that relies on the change of people's attitudes, habits, culture.

"You will have to go through 15, 20, 50 years of civil wars and international conflicts," Marx said to the workers, **"not only to change existing conditions, but also to change yourselves** and to make yourselves capable of wielding political power." (See Marx and Engels, Works, Vol. VIII, p. 506.)

Lenin says: "It will be necessary under the dictatorship of the proletariat to **re-educate millions of peasants and small proprietors**, hundreds of thousands of office employees, officials and bourgeois intellectuals, to subordinate them all to the proletarian state and to proletarian leadership, to overcome their bourgeois habits and traditions," just as we must " -- in a protracted struggle waged on the basis of the dictatorship of the proletariat -- re-educate the proletarians themselves, who do not abandon their petty bourgeois prejudices at one stroke, by a miracle, at the bidding of the Virgin Mary, at the bidding of a slogan, resolution or decree, **but only in the course of a long and difficult mass struggle against mass petty-bourgeois influences.**" (7)

Against the revisionist illusion Lenin states that **"the transformation into something new by no means eliminates the old"** in all aspects overnight, and **"the economic foundations** for the withering away of the state": in this case we also have the **"economic foundations" for the withering away of bureaucracy,**" (8)

Hand picking one aspect of the question **in a way** that is dialectically broken off from all the rest of the aspects and studying

it, will bound to end in wrong overall conclusions regardless of the correctness of the subject taken.

Leninism teaches that "the final victory of Socialism, in the sense of full guarantee against the restoration of bourgeois relations, is possible only on an international scale" (9)

The reasons for the restoration should not be studied without the dialectic connection of "internal" and external class struggle.

"We have internal enemies. We have external enemies. This, comrades, must not be forgotten for a single moment." [P252]

The internal aspect of the question is related to the mutual relations of classes **within the country**. "The abolition of classes," says Stalin, "is not achieved by the extinction of the class struggle, but by its intensification." (11)

The class struggle continues under the proletarian dictatorship although, in altered form. The political Power of Capitalism has been overthrown, replaced by the political power of proletarian and economic foundation for socialism is being built. However, capitalism is far from being uprooted. Especially in early stages it survives with the unavoidable existence of capitalist ideology, of the small producers and unorganized market relations, thus, so the possibilities of a restoration of capitalism. the proletarian dictatorship under the leadership of the Communist Party wages relentless war against the restoration of capitalist conditions, against the remnants of the capitalist system and takes the necessary steps to construct the foundations of the new social order. However, the **bourgeoisie has its grounds for making attempts at restoration**, because for a long time after its overthrow it remains stronger than the proletariat which has overthrown it.

"If the exploiters are defeated in one country only," says Lenin, "and **this, of course, is the typical case**, since a simultaneous revolution in a number of countries is a rare exception, **they still remain stronger than the exploited.**" (*Lenin, Can There Be Equality Between the Exploited and the Exploiter?*)

Unlike capitalism which has centuries of experience to draw lessons from, **socialism is the first in the history** of class society in which the state power is not of the few rich, but of the working masses. Conquering the political power will have to follow **a long period of consolidating the rule** of working class – the proletarian dictatorship. As for the weakness and yet power of the working class as the ruling class, Stalin states;

“as regards promoting the cultural powers of the working class, developing in it the faculty of administering the country in connection with the carrying out of the slogan of self-criticism Lenin said:

"The **chief thing we lack is culture, ability to administer.** ... Economically and politically, N E P fully ensures us the possibility of laying the foundation of a socialist economy. It is 'only' a matter of the cultural forces of the proletariat and of its vanguard."

What does this mean? It means that one of the main tasks of our constructive work is to develop in the working class the **faculty and ability to administer the country**, to administer economy, to administer industry.

Can we develop this faculty and ability in the working class without giving full play to the powers and capacities of the workers, the powers and capacities of the finest elements of the working class, for criticizing our errors, for detecting our shortcomings and for advancing our work? Obviously, we cannot.

And what is required in order to give full play to the powers and capacities of the working class and the working people generally, and to enable them to acquire the faculty of administering the country? It requires, above all, honest and Bolshevik observance of the slogan of self-criticism, honest and Bolshevik observance of the slogan of criticism from below of shortcomings and errors in our work. If the workers take advantage of the opportunity to criticise shortcomings in our work frankly and bluntly, to improve and advance our work, what does that mean? It means that the workers are becoming active participants in the work of directing the country, economy, industry. And this cannot but enhance in the workers the feeling that they are the masters of the country, cannot but enhance their activity, their vigilance, their culture.

This question of the cultural powers of the working class is a decisive one. Why? Because, **of all the ruling classes that have hitherto existed**, the working class, as a ruling class, occupies a somewhat special and **not altogether favourable position in history**. All ruling classes until now—the slave-owners, the landlords, the capitalists—were also wealthy classes. They were in a position to train in their sons **the knowledge and faculties needed for government**. The working class differs from them, among other things, in that it is not a wealthy class, that it **was not able formerly to train in its sons the knowledge** and faculty of government, and has become able to do so only now, after coming to power." [P252]

As for the additional advantage of capitalist Stalin asks the Question "Wherein lies the strength of the overthrown bourgeoisie.?"

Firstly, "**in the strength of international capital**, in the strength and durability of the **international connections of the bourgeoisie**." (See Vol. XXV, p. 173.)

Secondly, in the fact that "for a long time after the revolution the exploiters inevitably retain a number of great practical advantages: they still have money (it is impossible to abolish money all at once); some movable property -- often fairly considerable; they still have various connections, habits of organization and management, knowledge of all the 'secrets' (customs, methods, means and possibilities) of management, **superior education, close connections with the higher technical personnel** (who live and think like the bourgeoisie), incomparably greater experience in the art of war (this is very important), and so on, and so forth." (See Vol. XXIII, p 354)

Thirdly, "in the force of habit, **in the strength of small production**. For, unfortunately, small production is still very, very widespread in the world, and small production engenders capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously, daily, hourly, spontaneously, and on a mass scale" . . . for "the abolition of classes means not only driving out the landlords and capitalists -- that we accomplished with comparative ease -- it also means abolishing the small commodity producers, and they cannot be driven out, or crushed; we must live in harmony with them, they can (and must) be remolded and re-educated only by very prolonged, slow, cautious organizational work." (See Vol. XXV, pp. 173 and 189.) [P171]

"The victory of socialism over capitalism and the consolidation of socialism " Lenin states, "may be regarded as ensured only when the proletarian State, **having completely suppressed all resistance on the part of the exploiters** and secured complete stability for

itself and complete obedience, reorganizes the whole of industry on the basis of large-scale collective production and on a modern technical basis (founded on the electrification of the whole of national economy). This alone will enable the towns to render such, radical assistance, technical and social, to the backward and scattered rural population as will create the material basis for enormously raising the productivity of agriculture, and of agricultural labour in general, thereby stimulating the small tillers of the soil by the force of example and in their own interests to adopt large-scale, collective mechanized agriculture." (12)

Most bourgeois and revisionist so called "studies" take up the question disregarding the fact that peasantry and petty producers still plays a large role in the country. "As long as we live in a petit-bourgeois country, "Lenin says, "**capitalism has in Russia a stronger economic basis than communism**" and that, "consequently, the danger of the restoration of capitalism is no empty phrase." [P211] "Lenin says that so long as individual peasant economy, which engenders capitalists and capitalism, **predominates in the country, the danger of a restoration of capitalism will exist**. Clearly, so long as this danger exists there can be no serious talk of the victory of socialist construction in our country." *Stalin, Grain Procurements and the Prospects for the Development of Agriculture*

In addition the existence of the division between mental and manual labor, inevitable distinguishing categories of managers and technicians apart from the working class as far as the differences in the nature of their work which brings about different life style, higher wages will always make the danger of the emergence of a new type of bourgeoisie and the attempts for and restoration of capitalism possible.

Right and or left deviations” whoever fights against the party and the government in the USSR stands for the defeat of socialism and the restoration of capitalism.” *Stalin to Kaganovich and Molotov*

The possibility is always there and will be there until the transition from socialism to communism which prerequisites the defeat of capitalism in world scale.

External Class Struggle

The international aspect of the question is related to the relations of proletarian dictatorship with **the capitalist countries**. Under the conditions of two opposite systems there always will be the danger of armed aggression against the socialist country by imperialist Powers. As Lenin puts it; “We are living not merely in a State but in a system of States, and it is inconceivable that the Soviet Republic should continue to coexist for a long period side by side with imperialist States. **Ultimately one or other must conquer**”(2)

Stalin pointing out the internal and external enemies says; “now the **bourgeoisie of the whole world** are supporting the Russian bourgeoisie, and they are still ever so much stronger than we are.” [P28] And “only blockheads or masked enemies who with their boastfulness want to conceal their hostility and are striving to demobilize the people, can deny the danger of military intervention and **attempts at restoration as long as the capitalist encirclement exists.**” (2)

Stalin, in his speech at the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I quotes from the Fourteenth Conference resolution in 1925 which summarizes the situation and the internal and external class struggle;

“Generally, the victory of **socialism in one country** (not in the sense of final victory) **is unquestionably possible.**”
And further:

". . . The **existence of two directly opposite social systems** gives rise to the constant menace of capitalist blockade, of other forms of **economic pressure, of armed intervention, of restoration**. Consequently, the only guarantee of the final victory of socialism, i.e., **the guarantee against restoration, is a victorious socialist revolution in a number of countries**. It by no means follows from this that it is impossible to build a complete socialist society in a backward country like Russia without the 'state aid' (Trotsky) of countries more developed technically and economically. An integral part of Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution is the assertion that 'real progress of a socialist economy in Russia will become possible only after the victory of the proletariat in the major European countries' (Trotsky, 1922)—**an assertion which in the present period condemns** the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. to fatalistic passivity. **In opposition to such 'theories,' Comrade Lenin wrote:** 'Infinitely hackneyed is the argument that they learned by rote during the development of West-European Social-Democracy, namely, that we are not yet ripe for socialism, that, as **certain "learned" gentlemen** among them express it, the objective economic prerequisites for socialism do not exist in our country' (Notes on Sukhanov)." (*Resolution of the Fourteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) on "The Tasks of the Comintern and the R.C.P.(B.) in Connection with the Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I."*)

"the **international bourgeoisie** is filled with furious hatred of, and hostility towards, Soviet Russia, and is prepared at any moment to fling itself upon her in order to strangle her... **In Russia**, the big landowners and capitalists have not vanished, but they have been subjected to total expropriation and crushed politically as a class, whose

remnants are hiding out among Soviet government employees. They have preserved their class organisation abroad, as émigrés, ... These émigrés are striving, with might and main, to destroy the Soviet power and restore capitalism in Russia... This being the internal situation in Russia, the main task now confronting her proletariat, as the ruling class, is **properly to determine and carry out the measures** that are necessary to lead the peasantry, establish a firm alliance with them and achieve the transition, in a series of gradual stages, to large-scale, socialised, mechanized agriculture." [P49]

Taking the issue of "external "aspect of the question Stalin says;

"External conditions. We have assumed power in a country whose **technical equipment is terribly backward**. Along with a few big industrial units more or less based upon modern technology, we have hundreds and thousands of mills and factories the technical equipment of which is beneath all criticism from the point of view of modern achievements. At the same time, **we have around us a number of capitalist countries whose industrial technique is far more developed** and up to date than that of our country. Look at the capitalist countries and you will see that their technology is not only advancing, but advancing by leaps and bounds, outstripping the old forms of industrial technique. And so we find that, on the one hand, we in our country have the most advanced system, the Soviet system, and the most advanced type of state power in the world, Soviet power, while, on the other hand, our industry, which should be the basis of socialism and of Soviet power, is extremely backward technically. Do you

think that we can achieve the final victory of socialism in our country so long as this contradiction exists?

What has to be done to end this contradiction? To end it, we must overtake and outstrip the advanced technology of the developed capitalist countries. We have overtaken and outstripped the advanced capitalist countries in the sense of establishing a new political system, the Soviet system. That is good. But it is not enough. In order to secure the final victory of socialism in our country, we must also overtake and outstrip these countries technically and economically. Either we do this, or we shall be forced to the wall.

This applies not only to the building of socialism. **It applies also to upholding the independence of our country in the circumstances of the capitalist encirclement.** The independence of our country cannot be upheld unless we have an adequate industrial basis for defense. And such an industrial basis cannot be created if our industry is not more highly developed technically." [P211]

Reiterating the possibility of restoration; "the **final** victory of Socialism, in the sense of **full guarantee against the restoration of bourgeois relations**, is possible only on an international scale" (9). Meaning the victory of socialism in one country does not guarantee the elimination of restoration, only the Final victory of socialism – defeat of capitalism in world scale can guarantee against the restoration.

Revisionist Views

Revisionist views seek to distort the scientific meaning of socialism and communism, the transition and the continuing class struggle within and without and to **disregard the actual circumstances of that given time.** Most revisionist study of the question rests on or

borrowed from the Trotskyite so called “critique of Soviets which at best is **based on economic determinism that takes the productive forces as primary** and politics either as secondary or not important at all. For Marxist-Leninists approach to the question is inseparably connected both economically and politically in which the protection and strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat under the guidance of the Communist Party has tantamount importance.

With their perverted understanding of “socialism” and consciously created confusion between socialism and communism, revisionists proceed from the claim that socialism never existed in Soviet Russia and or could not have been built. With this understanding, bourgeoisie found accomplices in its struggle to restore capitalism within the party in the form of right and left deviations who promoted reckless and irresponsible policies. Right deviation, specifically the Bukharinist revisionists promoted conciliation with the bourgeoisie. The conciliation was to condemn any effort for the elimination of the capitalist classes and capitalist exploitation and to protect the kulak capitalist class in the rural areas and various capitalist elements in urban areas.

Although lately in decreasing number, some Trotskyite variations who claim Lenin to be a revisionist for he introduced the “state capitalism” in Russia, bank on the lack of theoretical knowledge of the masses. It is worth to quote Lenin on the subject which they distort in order to fit their agenda:

“The restoration of capitalism would mean the restoration of a proletarian class engaged in the production of socially useful material values in big factories employing machinery, and not in profiteering, not in making cigarette-lighters for sale, and in other “work” which is not very useful, but which is inevitable when our industry is in a state of ruin.

The whole question is who will take the lead. We must face this issue squarely—who will come out on top? Either the capitalists succeed in organising first—in which case they will drive out the Communists and that will be the end of it. Or the proletarian state power, with the support of the peasantry, will prove capable of keeping a proper rein on those gentlemen, the capitalists, so as to direct capitalism along state channels and to create a capitalism that will be subordinate to the state and serve the state. The question must be put soberly." [P28]

It is no surprise that the Trotskyist, Ernest Mandel cheered the Khrushchevite coup after Stalin's death as revolutionary and the restoration as "revolution against the counter revolution" later on, greeted the final collapse, the demolishing of Berlin wall as "the sudden access of hundreds of millions of men and women from the Eastern countries **to political life.**"

CONCLUSION

Readers of the studies concerning the question should understand the fact that unlike capitalism with centuries old history and experience, socialism did not have previous experiences to draw lessons from.

That is why making "mistakes" were plausible and admitted with self-criticism and followed by correction. The impression that most bourgeois writings in the subject try to give is that as if socialism had so many previous experiences to draw lessons from yet they have made and continued to make mistakes or mistakes are unavoidable due to the fact that socialism inherently does not work. Lenin was clear about the fact that having no previous experiment of socialism trial and error, criticism and self-criticism was utmost important.

“At the beginning of 1918” he said, “we expected a period in which peaceful construction would be possible... But **we were mistaken**, because in 1918 a real military danger overtook us in the shape of the Czechoslovak mutiny and the outbreak of civil war, which dragged on until 1920.... **we made the mistake of** deciding to go over directly to communist production and distribution. We thought that under the surplus-food appropriation system the peasants would provide us with the required quantity of grain, which we could distribute among the factories and thus achieve communist production and distribution.

I cannot say that we pictured this plan as definitely and as clearly as that; but we acted approximately on those lines. That, unfortunately, is a fact. I say unfortunately, because brief experience convinced us that that line was wrong, that **it ran counter to what we had previously written** about the transition from capitalism to socialism, namely, that it would be impossible to bypass the period of socialist accounting and control in approaching **even the lower stage of communism.**” [P27]

It is not that the Soviet Leaders have not seen and were not aware of the possibility of restoration and have not taken the necessary precautions against it. The effectiveness of the precautions is not measured and the determining factor by itself but depends on the existing concrete conditions and the balance of power between the revolutionary and counter revolutionary forces – which way the internal and external class struggle weighing. **As long as the vanguard of the proletariat**, the party, is in the hands of Bolsheviks the restoration would be difficult if not impossible without a coup or military intervention. Party would take the necessary precautions against it even if it has to take some steps back to prevent the restoration. So, the **core of the question** of restoration is related to the struggle against the right and left deviations within the party, both deviations of which lays the foundation for - the

bureaucracy – “a policy in the service of bureaucracy” (13) and the restoration of capitalism.

Unlike the anarchist, revisionist claims” abolishing the bureaucracy at once, everywhere and completely, is out of the question. It is a utopia. But to smash the old bureaucratic machine at once and to begin immediately to construct a new one that will make possible **the gradual abolition of all bureaucracy**--this is not a utopia, it is the experience of the Commune, the direct and immediate task of the revolutionary proletariat.” (15) This “gradual abolition” may extend till the withering away of the “state” depending on the outcome of class struggle within and without. “The economic foundations for the withering away of the state”, Lenin says, “in this case we also have the “economic foundations” for the **withering away of bureaucracy...**” (16)

Each and every other aspect of the question is dialectically connected and stems from the **class struggle in general** and class struggle within **the party in particular**. Denying that and or isolating one specific aspect of the question from this fact would not be objective at best, would serve the interests of revisionist at worse.

As history has proven, socialism, even in its early stages, the less developed one, despite all the attacks and blockades of imperialists, does not fail – at least in its primary, minimal objectives – but can only be defeated.

Erdogan. A

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V. I. Lenin

The New Economic Policy and The Tasks of The Political Education Departments

Report to The Second All-Russia Congress of Political Education Departments October 17, 1921

Collected Works, Volume 33, pages 60-79

Comrades, I intend to devote this report, or rather talk, to the New Economic Policy, and to the tasks of the Political Education Departments arising out of this policy, as I understand them. I think it would be quite wrong to limit reports on questions that do not come within the scope of a given congress to bare information about what is going on generally in the Party or in the Soviet Republic.

Abrupt Change of Policy of The Soviet Government and The R.C.P.

While I do not in the least deny the value of such information and the usefulness of conferences on all questions, I nevertheless find that the main defect in the proceedings of most of our congresses is that they are not directly and immediately connected with the practical problems before them. These are the defects that I should like to speak about both in connection with and in respect of the New Economic Policy.

I shall speak about the Now Economic Policy briefly and in general terms. Comrades, the overwhelming majority of you are Communists, and although some of you are very young, you have worked magnificently to carry out our general policy in the first years of our revolution. Having done a large part of this work you cannot help seeing the abrupt change made by our Soviet government and our Communist Party in adopting the economic policy which we call "new", new, that is, in respect of our previous economic policy.

In substance, however, this new policy contains more elements of the old than our previous economic policy did.

Why? Because our previous economic policy, if we cannot say counted on (in the situation then prevailing we did little counting in general), then to a certain degree assumed—we may say uncalculatingly assumed—that there would be a direct transition from the old Russian economy to state production and distribution on communist lines.

If we recall the economic literature that we ourselves issued in the past, if we recall what Communists wrote before and very soon after we took power in Russia—for example, in the beginning of 1918, when the first political assault upon old Russia ended in a smashing victory, when the Soviet Republic was created, when Russia emerged from the imperialist war, mutilated, it is true, but not so mutilated as she would have been had she continued to “defend the fatherland” as she was advised to do by the imperialists, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries—if we recall all this we shall understand that in the initial period, when we had only just completed the first stage in the work of building up the Soviet government and had only just emerged from the imperialist war, what we said about our tasks in the field of economic development was much more cautious and circumspect than our actions in the latter half of 1918 and throughout 1919 and 1920.

The 1918 Decision of The All-Russia

Central Executive Committee on The Role of The Peasantry

Even if all of you were not yet active workers in the Party and the Soviets at that time, you have at all events been able to make, and of course have made, yourselves familiar with decisions such as that adopted by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee at the end of April 1918. That decision pointed to the necessity to take

peasant farming into consideration, and it was based on a report which made allowance for the role of state capitalism in building socialism in a peasant country; a report which emphasised the importance of personal, individual, one-man responsibility; which emphasised the significance of that factor in the administration of the country as distinct from the political tasks of organising state power and from military tasks.

Our Mistake

At the beginning of 1918 we expected a period in which peaceful construction would be possible. When the Brest peace was signed it seemed that danger had subsided for a time and that it would be possible to start peaceful construction. But we were mistaken, because in 1918 a real military danger overtook us in the shape of the Czechoslovak mutiny and the outbreak of civil war, which dragged on until 1920. Partly owing to the war problems that overwhelmed us and partly owing to the desperate position in which the Republic found itself when the imperialist war ended—owing to these circumstances, and a number of others, we made the mistake of deciding to go over directly to communist production and distribution. We thought that under the surplus-food appropriation system the peasants would provide us with the required quantity of grain, which we could distribute among the factories and thus achieve communist production and distribution.

I cannot say that we pictured this plan as definitely and as clearly as that; but we acted approximately on those lines. That, unfortunately, is a fact. I say unfortunately, because brief experience convinced us that that line was wrong, that it ran counter to what we had previously written about the transition from capitalism to socialism, namely, that it would be impossible to bypass the period of socialist accounting and control in approaching even the lower stage of communism. Ever since 1917, when the problem of taking power arose and the Bolsheviks

explained it to the whole people, our theoretical literature has been definitely stressing the necessity for a prolonged, complex transition through socialist accounting and control from capitalist society (and the less developed it is the longer the transition will take) to even one of the approaches to communist society.

A Strategic Retreat

At that time, when in the heat of the Civil War we had to take the necessary steps in economic organisation, it seemed to have been forgotten. In substance, our New Economic Policy signifies that, having sustained severe defeat on this point, we have started a strategical retreat. We said in effect: "Before we are completely routed, let us retreat and reorganize everything, but on a firmer basis. "If Communists deliberately examine the question of the New Economic Policy there cannot be the slightest doubt in their minds that we have sustained a very severe defeat on the economic front. In the circumstances it is inevitable, of course, for some people to become very despondent, almost panic-stricken, and because of the retreat, these people will begin to give way to panic. That is inevitable. When the Red Army retreated, was its flight from the enemy not the prelude to its victory? Every retreat on every front, however, caused some people to give way to panic for a time. But on each occasion—on the Kolchak front, on the Denikin front, on the Yudenich front, on the Polish front and on the Wrangel front—once we had been badly battered (and sometimes more than once) we proved the truth of the proverb: "A man who has been beaten is worth two who haven't." After being beaten we began to advance slowly, systematically and cautiously.

Of course, tasks on the economic front are much more difficult than tasks on the war front, although there is a general similarity between the two elementary outlines of strategy. In attempting to go over straight to communism we, in the spring of 1921, sustained a more serious defeat on the economic front than any defeat

inflicted upon us by Kolchak, Denikin or Pilsudski. This defeat was much more serious, significant and dangerous. It was expressed in the isolation of the higher administrators of our economic policy from the lower and their failure to produce that development of the productive forces which the Programme of our Party regards as vital and urgent.

The surplus-food appropriation system in the rural districts—this direct communist approach to the problem of urban development—hindered the growth of the productive forces and proved to be the main cause of the profound economic and political crisis that we experienced in the spring of 1921. That was why we had to take a step which from the point of view of our line, of our policy, cannot be called anything else than a very severe defeat and retreat. Moreover, it cannot be said that this retreat is—like retreats of the Red Army—a completely orderly retreat to previously prepared positions. True, the positions for our present retreat were prepared beforehand. That can be proved by comparing the decisions adopted by our Party in the spring of 1921 with the one adopted in April 1918, which I have mentioned. The positions were prepared beforehand; but the retreat to these positions took place (and is still taking place in many parts of the country) in disorder, and even in extreme disorder.

Purport of The New Economic Policy

It is here that the task of the Political Education Departments to combat this comes to the forefront. The main problem in the light of the New Economic Policy is to take advantage of the situation that has arisen as speedily as possible.

The New Economic Policy means substituting a tax for the requisitioning of food; it means reverting to capitalism to a considerable extent—to what extent we do not know. Concessions to foreign capitalists (true, only very few have been accepted,

especially when compared with the number we have offered) and leasing enterprises to private capitalists definitely mean restoring capitalism, and this is part and parcel of the New Economic Policy; for the abolition of the surplus-food appropriation system means allowing the peasants to trade freely in their surplus agricultural produce, in whatever is left over after the tax is collected—and the tax~ takes only a small share of that produce. The peasants constitute a huge section of our population and of our entire economy, and that is why capitalism must grow out of this soil of free trading.

That is the very ABC of economics as taught by the rudiments of that science, and in Russia taught, furthermore, by the profiteer, the creature who needs no economic or political science to teach us economics with. From the point of view of strategy, the root question is: who will take advantage of the new situation first? The whole question is—whom will the peasantry follow? The proletariat, which wants to build socialist society? Or the capitalist, who says, “Let us turn back; it is safer that way; we don’t know anything about this socialism they have invented”?

Who Will Win, The Capitalist or Soviet Power?

The issue in the present war is—who will win, who will first take advantage of the situation: the capitalist, whom we are allowing to come in by the door, and even by several doors (and by many doors we are not aware of, and which open without us, and in spite of us), or proletarian state power? What has the latter to rely on economically? On the one hand, the improved position of the people. In this connection we must remember the peasants. It is absolutely incontrovertible and obvious to all that in spite of the awful disaster of the famine—and leaving that disaster out of the reckoning for the moment—the improvement that has taken place in the position of the people has been due to the change in our economic policy.

On the other hand, if capitalism gains by it, industrial production will grow, and the proletariat will grow too. The capitalists will gain from our policy and will create an industrial proletariat, which in our country, owing to the war and to the desperate poverty and ruin, has become declassed, i.e., dislodged from its class groove, and has ceased to exist as a proletariat. The proletariat is the class which is engaged in the production of material values in large-scale capitalist industry. Since large-scale capitalist industry has been destroyed, since the factories are at a standstill, the proletariat has disappeared. It has sometimes figured in statistics, but it has not been held together economically.

The restoration of capitalism would mean the restoration of a proletarian class engaged in the production of socially useful material values in big factories employing machinery, and not in profiteering, not in making cigarette-lighters for sale, and in other “work” which is not very useful, but which is inevitable when our industry is in a state of ruin.

The whole question is who will take the lead. We must face this issue squarely—who will come out on top? Either the capitalists succeed in organising first—in which case they will drive out the Communists and that will be the end of it. Or the proletarian state power, with the support of the peasantry, will prove capable of keeping a proper rein on those gentlemen, the capitalists, so as to direct capitalism along state channels and to create a capitalism that will be subordinate to the state and serve the state. The question must be put soberly. All this ideology, all these arguments about political liberties that we hear so much of, especially among Russian emigres, in Russia No. 2, where scores of daily newspapers published by all the political parties extol these liberties in every key and every manner—all these are mere talk, mere phrase-mongering. We must learn to ignore this phrase mongering.

The Fight Will Be Even Fiercer

During the past four years we have fought many hard battles and we have learnt that it is one thing to fight hard battles and another to talk about them—something onlookers particularly indulge in. We must learn to ignore all this ideology, all this chatter, and see the substance of things. And the substance is that the fight will be even more desperate and fiercer than the fight we waged against Kolchak and Denikin. That fighting was war, something we were familiar with. There have been wars for hundreds, for thousands of years. In the art of human slaughter much progress has been made.

True, nearly every landowner had at his headquarters Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who talked loudly about government by the people, the Constituent Assembly, and about the Bolsheviks having violated all liberties.

It was, of course, much easier to solve war problems than those that confront us now; war problems could be solved by assault, attack, enthusiasm, by the sheer physical force of the hosts of workers and peasants, who saw the landowners marching against them. Now there are no avowed landowners. Some of the Wrangels, Kolchaks and Denikins have gone the way of Nicholas Romanov, and some have sought refuge abroad. The people no longer see the open enemy as they formerly saw the landowners and capitalists. The people cannot clearly picture to themselves that the enemy is the same, that he is now in our very midst, that the revolution is on the brink of the precipice which all previous revolutions reached and recoiled from—they cannot picture this because of their profound ignorance and illiteracy. It is hard to say how long it will take all sorts of extraordinary commissions to eradicate this illiteracy by extraordinary means.

How can the people know that instead of Kolchak, Wrangel and Denikin we have in our midst the enemy who has crushed all previous revolutions? If the capitalists gain the upper hand, there will be a return to the old regime. That has been demonstrated by the experience of all previous revolutions. Our Party must make the masses realise that the enemy in our midst is anarchic capitalism and anarchic commodity exchange. We ourselves must see clearly that the issue in this struggle is: Who will win? Who will gain the upper hand? and we must make the broadest masses of workers and peasants see it clearly. The dictatorship of the proletariat is the sternest and fiercest struggle that the proletariat must wage against the whole world, for the whole world was against us in supporting Kolchak and Denikin.

Now the bourgeoisie of the whole world are supporting the Russian bourgeoisie, and they are still ever so much stronger than we are. That, however, does not throw us into a panic. Their military forces were stronger than ours. Nevertheless, they failed to crush us in war, although, being immeasurably superior to us in artillery and aircraft, it should have been very easy for them to do so. Perhaps they would have crushed us had any of the capitalist states that were fighting us mobilised a few army corps in time, and had they not grudged a loan of several millions in gold to Kolchak.

However, they failed because the rank-and-file British soldiers who came to Archangel, and the sailors who compelled the French fleet to leave Odessa, realized that their rulers were wrong, and we were right. Now, too, we are being attacked by forces that are stronger than ours; and to win in this struggle we must rely upon our last source of strength. That last source of strength is the mass of workers and peasants, their class-consciousness and organisation.

Either organised proletarian power—and the advanced workers and a small section of the advanced peasants will understand this and succeed in organising a popular movement around themselves—in which case we shall be victorious; or we fail to do this—in which case the enemy, being technologically stronger, will inevitably defeat us.

Is This the Last Fight?

The dictatorship of the proletariat is fierce war. The proletariat has been victorious in one country, but it is still weak internationally. It must unite all the workers and peasants around itself in the knowledge that the war is not over. Although in our anthem we sing: "The last fight let us face", unfortunately it is not quite true; it is not our last fight. Either you succeed in uniting the workers and peasants in this fight, or you fail to achieve victory.

Never before in history has there been a struggle like the one, we are now witnesses of; but there have been wars between peasants and landowners more than once in history, ever since the earliest times of slavery. Such wars have occurred more than once; but there has never been a war waged by a government against the bourgeoisie of its own country and against the united bourgeoisie of all countries.

The issue of the struggle depends upon whether we succeed in organising the small peasants on the basis of the development of their productive forces with proletarian state assistance for this development, or whether the capitalists gain control over them. The same issue has arisen in scores of revolutions in the past; but the world has never witnessed a struggle like the one we are waging now. The people have had no way of acquiring experience in wars of this kind. We ourselves must create this experience and we can rely only on the class-consciousness of the workers and

peasants. That is the keynote and the enormous difficulty of this task.

We Must Not Count on Going Straight to Communism

We must not count on going straight to communism. We must build on the basis of peasants' personal incentive. We are told that the personal incentive of the peasants means restoring private property. But we have never interfered with personally owned articles of consumption and implements of production as far as the peasants are concerned. We have abolished private ownership of land. Peasants farmed land that they did not own—rented land, for instance. That system exists in very many countries. There is nothing impossible about it from the standpoint of economics. The difficulty lies in creating personal incentive. We must also give every specialist an incentive to develop our industry.

Have we been able to do that? No, we have not! We thought that production and distribution would go on at communist bidding in a country with a declassed proletariat. We must change that now, or we shall be unable to make the proletariat understand this process of transition. No such problems have ever arisen in history before. We tried to solve this problem straight out, by a frontal attack, as it were, but we suffered defeat. Such mistakes occur in every war, and they are not even regarded as mistakes. Since the frontal attack failed, we shall make a flanking movement and also use the method of siege and undermining.

The Principle of Personal Incentive and Responsibility

We say that every important branch of the economy must be built up on the principle of personal incentive. There must be collective discussion, but individual responsibility. At every step we suffer from our inability to apply this principle. The New Economic Policy demands this line of demarcation to be drawn with absolute sharpness and distinction. When the people found themselves

under new economic conditions, they immediately began to discuss what would come of it, and how things should be reorganized. We could not have started anything without this general discussion because for decades and centuries the people had been prohibited from discussing anything, and the revolution could not develop without a period in which people everywhere hold meetings to argue about all questions.

This has created much confusion. This is what happened—this was inevitable, but it must be said that it was not dangerous. If we learn in good time to separate what is appropriate for meetings from what is appropriate for administration, we shall succeed in raising the position of the Soviet Republic to its proper level. Unfortunately, we have not yet learnt to do this, and most congresses are far from business-like.

In the number of our congresses we excel all other countries in the world. Not a single democratic republic holds as many congresses as we do; nor could they permit it.

We must remember that ours is a country that has suffered great loss and impoverishment, and that we must teach it to hold meetings in such a way as not to confuse, as I have said, what is appropriate for meetings with what is appropriate for administration. Hold meetings but govern without the slightest hesitation; govern with a firmer hand than the capitalist governed before you. If you do not, you will not vanquish him. You must remember that government must be much stricter and much firmer than it was before.

After many months of meetings, the discipline of the Red Army was not inferior to the discipline of the old army. Strict, stern measures were adopted, including capital punishment, measures that even the former government did not apply. Philistines wrote and howled, “The Bolsheviks have introduced capital

punishment.” Our reply is, “Yes, we have introduced it, and have done so deliberately.”

We must say: either those who wanted to crush us—and who we think ought to be destroyed—must perish, in which case our Soviet Republic will live, or the capitalists will live, and in that case the Republic will perish. In an impoverished country either those who cannot stand the pace will perish, or the workers’ and peasants’ republic will perish. There is not and cannot be any choice or any room for sentiment. Sentiment is no less a crime than cowardice in wartime. Whoever now departs from order and discipline is permitting the enemy to penetrate our midst.

That is why I say that the New Economic Policy also has its educational aspect. You here are discussing methods of education. You must go as far as saying that we have no room for the half-educated. When there is communism, the methods of education will be milder. Now, however, I say education must be harsh, otherwise we shall perish.

Shall We Be Able to Work for Our Own Benefit?

We had deserters from the army, and also from the labour front. We must say that in the past you worked for the benefit of the capitalists, of the exploiters, and of course you did not do your best. But now you are working for yourselves, for the workers’ and peasants’ state. Remember that the question at issue is whether we shall be able to work for ourselves, for if we cannot, I repeat, our Republic will perish. And we say, as we said in the army, that either those who want to cause our destruction must perish, or we must adopt the sternest disciplinary measures and thereby save our country—and our Republic will live.

That is what our line must be, that is why (among other things) we need the New Economic Policy.

Get down to business, all of you! You will have capitalists beside you, including foreign capitalists, concessionaires and leaseholders. They will squeeze profits out of you amounting to hundreds per cent; they will enrich themselves, operating alongside of you. Let them. Meanwhile you will learn from them the business of running the economy, and only when you do that will you be able to build up a communist republic. Since we must necessarily learn quickly, any slackness in this respect is a serious crime. And we must undergo this training, this severe, stern and sometimes even cruel training, because we have no other way out.

You must remember that our Soviet land is impoverished after many years of trial and suffering and has no socialist France or socialist England as neighbors which could help us with their highly developed technology and their highly developed industry. Bear that in mind! We must remember that at present all their highly developed technology and their highly developed industry belong to the capitalists, who are fighting us.

We must remember that we must either strain every nerve in everyday effort, or we shall inevitably go under.

Owing to the present circumstances the whole world is developing faster than we are. While developing, the capitalist world is directing all its forces against us. That is how the matter stands! That is why we must devote special attention to this struggle.

Owing to our cultural backwardness we cannot crush capitalism by a frontal attack. Had we been on a different cultural level we could have approached the problem more directly; perhaps other countries will do it in this way when their turn comes to build their communist republics. But we cannot do it in the direct way.

The state must learn to trade in such a way that industry satisfies the needs of the peasantry, so that the peasantry may satisfy their needs by means of trade. We must see to it that everyone who

works devotes himself to strengthening the workers' and peasants' state. Only then shall we be able to create large-scale industry.

The masses must become conscious of this, and not only conscious of it, but put it into practice. This, I say, suggests what the functions of the Central Political Education Department should be. After every deep-going political revolution the people require a great deal of time to assimilate the change. And it is a question of whether the people have assimilated the lessons they received. To my deep regret, the answer to this question must be in the negative. Had they assimilated the lessons we should have started creating large-scale industry much more quickly and much earlier.

After we had solved the problem of the greatest political revolution in history, other problems confronted us, cultural problems, which may be called "minor affairs". This political revolution must be assimilated; we must help the masses of the people to understand it. We must see to it that the political revolution remains something more than a mere declaration.

Obsolete Methods

At one time we needed declarations, statements, manifestos and decrees. We have had enough of them. At one time we needed them to show the people how and what we wanted to build, what new and hitherto unseen things we were striving for. But can we go on showing the people what we want to build? No. Even an ordinary labourer will begin to sneer at us and say: "What use is it to keep on showing us what you want to build? Show us that you can build. If you can't build, we're not with you, and you can go to hell!" And he will be right.

Gone is the time when it was necessary to draw political pictures of great tasks; today these tasks must be carried out in practice. Today we are confronted with cultural tasks, those of assimilating that political experience, which can and must be put into practice.

Either we lay an economic foundation for the political gains of the Soviet state, or we shall lose them all. This foundation has not yet been laid—that is what we must get down to.

The task of raising the cultural level is one of the most urgent confronting us. And that is the job the Political Education Departments must do, if they are capable of serving the cause of “political education”, which is the title they have adopted for themselves. It is easy to adopt a title; but how about acting up to it? Let us hope that after this Congress we shall have precise information about this. A Commission for the Abolition of Illiteracy was set up on July 19, 1920. Before coming to this Congress, I purposely read the decree establishing that commission. It says: All-Russia Commission for the Abolition of Illiteracy. . . . More than that—Extraordinary Commission for the Abolition of Illiteracy. Let us hope that after this Congress we shall receive information about what has been done in this field, and in how many gubernias, and that the report will be concrete. But the very need to set up an Extraordinary Commission for the Abolition of Illiteracy shows that we are (what is the mildest term I can use for it?), well, something like semi-savages because in a country that was not semi-savage it would be considered a disgrace to have to set up an Extraordinary Commission for the Abolition of Illiteracy. In such country’s illiteracy is abolished in schools. There they have tolerably good schools where people are taught. What are they taught? First of all, they are taught to read and write. If we have not yet solved this elementary problem, it is ridiculous to talk about a New Economic Policy.

The Greatest Miracle of All

What talk can there be of a new policy? God grant that we manage to stick to the old policy if we have to resort to extraordinary measures to abolish illiteracy. That is obvious. But it is still more obvious that in the military and other fields we performed

miracles. The greatest miracle of all, in my opinion, would be if the Commission for the Abolition of Illiteracy were completely abolished, and if no proposals, such as I have heard here, were made for separating it from the People's Commissariat of Education. If that is true, and if you give it some thought, you will agree with me that an extraordinary commission should be set up to abolish certain bad proposals.

More than that—it is not enough to abolish illiteracy, it is necessary to build up Soviet economy, and for that literacy alone will not carry us very far. We must raise culture to a much higher level. A man must make use of his ability to read and write; he must have something to read, he must have newspapers and propaganda pamphlets, which should be properly distributed and reach the people and not get lost in transit, as they do now, so that no more than half of them are read, and the rest are used in offices for some purpose or other. Perhaps not even one-fourth reach the people. We must learn to make full use of the scanty resources we do possess.

That is why we must, in connection with the New Economic Policy, ceaselessly propagate the idea that political education calls for raising the level of culture at all costs. The ability to read and write must be made to serve the purpose of raising the cultural level; the peasants must be able to use the ability to read and write for the improvement of their farms and their state.

Soviet laws are very good laws, because they give everyone an opportunity to combat bureaucracy and red tape, an opportunity the workers and peasants in any capitalist state do not have. But does anybody take advantage of this? Hardly anybody! Not only the peasants, but an enormous percentage of the Communists do not know how to utilise Soviet laws to combat red tape and bureaucracy, or such a truly Russian phenomenon as bribery. What hinders the fight against this? Our laws? Our propaganda?

On the contrary! We have any number of laws! Why then have we achieved no success in this struggle? Because it cannot be waged by propaganda alone. It can be done if the masses of the people help. No less than half our Communists are incapable of fighting, to say nothing of those who are a hindrance in the fight. True, ninety-nine per cent of you are Communists, and you know that we are carrying out an operation on these latter Communists. The operation is being carried out by the Commission for Purging the Party, and we have hopes of removing a hundred thousand or so from our Party. Some say two hundred thousand, and I much prefer that figure.

I hope very much that we shall expel a hundred thousand to two hundred thousand Communists who have attached themselves to the Party and who are not only incapable of fighting red tape and bribery but are even a hindrance in this fight.

Tasks of Political Educationalists

If we purge the Party of a couple of hundred thousand it will be useful, but that is only a tiny fraction of what we must do. The Political Education Departments must adapt all their activities to this purpose. Illiteracy must be combated; but literacy alone is likewise not enough. We also need the culture which teaches us to fight red tape and bribery. It is an ulcer which no military victories and no political reforms can heal. By the very nature of things, it cannot be healed by military victories and political reforms, but only by raising the cultural level. And that is the task that devolves upon the Political Education Departments.

Political educationalists must not understand their job as that of functionaries, as often seems to be the case when people discuss whether representatives of Gubernia Political Education Departments should or should not be appointed to gubernia economic conferences. Excuse me for saying so, but I do not think

you should be appointed to any office; you should do your job as ordinary citizens. When you are appointed to some office you become bureaucrats; but if you deal with the people, and if you enlighten them politically, experience will show you that there will be no bribery among a politically enlightened people. At present bribery surrounds us on all sides. You will be asked what must be done to abolish bribery, to prevent so-and-so on the Executive Committee from taking bribes. You will be asked to teach people how to put a stop to it. And if a political educationalist replies that it does not come within the functions of his department, or that pamphlets have been published and proclamations made on the subject, the people will say that he is a bad Party member. True, this does not come within the functions of your department, we have the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection for that; but are you not members of the Party? You have adopted the title of political educationalists. When you were about to adopt that title, you were warned not to choose such a pretentious one, to choose something more modest. But you wanted the title of political educationalists, and that title implies a great deal. You did not take the title of general educationalists, but of political educationalists. You may be told, "It is a good thing that you are teaching the people to read and write and to carry on economic campaigns; that is all very well, but it is not political education, because political education is the sum total of everything."

We are carrying on propaganda against barbarism and against ulcers like bribery, and I hope you are doing the same, but political education is much more than this propaganda—it means practical results, it means teaching the people how to achieve these results, and setting an example to others, not as members of an Executive Committee, but as ordinary citizens who, being politically better educated, are able not only to hurl imprecations at red tape—that is very widely practiced among us—but to show how this evil can really be overcome. This is a very difficult art, which cannot be

practiced until the general level of culture is raised, until the mass of workers and peasants is more cultured than now. It is to this function that I should like most of all to draw the attention of the Central Political Education Department.

I should now like to sum up all that I have said and to suggest practical solutions for the problems that confront the Gubernia Political Education Departments.

The Three Chief Enemies

In my opinion, three chief enemies now confront one, irrespective of one's departmental functions; these tasks confront the political educationalist, if he is a Communist—and most of the political educationalists are. The three chief enemies that confront him are the following: the first is communist conceit; the second illiteracy, and the third, bribery.

The First Enemy—Communist Conceit

A member of the Communist Party, who has not yet been combed out, and who imagines he can solve all his problems by issuing communist decrees, is guilty of communist conceit. Because he is still a member of the ruling party and is employed in some government office, he imagines this entitles him to talk about the results of political education. Nothing of the sort! That is only communist conceit. The point is to learn to impart political knowledge; but that we have not yet learnt; we have not yet learnt how to approach the subject properly.

The Second Enemy—Illiteracy

As regards the second enemy, illiteracy, I can say that so long as there is such a thing as illiteracy in our country it is too much to talk about political education. This is not a political problem; it is a condition without which it is useless talking about politics. An illiterate person stands outside politics, he must first learn his ABC.

Without that there can be no politics; without that there are rumors, gossip, fairy tales and prejudices, but not politics.

The Third Enemy—Bribery

Lastly, if such a thing as bribery is possible it is no use talking about politics. Here we have not even an approach to politics; here it is impossible to pursue politics, because all measures are left hanging in the air and produce absolutely no results. A law applied in conditions which permit of widespread bribery can only make things worse. Under such conditions no politics whatever can be pursued; the fundamental condition for engaging in politics is lacking. To be able to outline our political tasks to the people, to be able to say to the masses what things we must strive for (and this is what we should be doing!), we must understand that a higher cultural level of the masses is what is required. This higher level we must achieve, otherwise it will be impossible really to solve our problems.

Difference Between Military and Cultural Problems

A cultural problem cannot be solved as quickly as political and military problems. It must be understood that conditions for further progress are no longer what they were. In a period of acute crisis, it is possible to achieve a political victory within a few weeks. It is possible to obtain victory in war in a few months. But it is impossible to achieve a cultural victory in such a short time. By its very nature it requires a longer period; and we must adapt ourselves to this longer period, plan our work accordingly, and display the maximum of perseverance, persistence and method. Without these qualities it is impossible even to start on the work of political education. And the only criterion of the results of political education is the improvement achieved in industry and agriculture. We must not only abolish illiteracy and the bribery which persists on the soil of illiteracy, but we must get the people

really to accept our propaganda, our guidance and our pamphlets, so that the result may be an improvement in the national economy.

Those are the functions of the Political Education Departments in connection with the New Economic Policy, and I hope this Congress will help us to achieve greater success in this field.

Lenin

Third Congress of The Communist International

June 22-July 12, 1921

Collected Works, Volume 32, pages 451-498

Theses for A Report on The Tactics of The R.C.P.

1. The International Position of The R.S.F.S.R.

The international position of the R.S.F.S.R. at present is distinguished by a certain equilibrium, which, although extremely unstable, has nevertheless given rise to a peculiar state of affairs in world politics.

This peculiarity is the following. On the one hand, the international bourgeoisie is filled with furious hatred of, and hostility towards, Soviet Russia, and is prepared at any moment to fling itself upon her in order to strangle her. On the other hand, all attempts at military intervention, which have cost the international bourgeoisie hundreds of millions of francs, ended in complete failure, in spite of the fact that the Soviet power was then weaker than it is now and that the Russian landowners and capitalists had whole armies on the territory of the R.S.F.S.R. Opposition to the war against Soviet Russia has grown considerably in all capitalist countries, adding fuel to the revolutionary movement of the proletariat and extending to very wide sections of the petty-bourgeois democrats. The conflict of interests between the various imperialist countries has become acute and is growing more acute every day. The revolutionary movement among the hundreds of millions of oppressed peoples of the East is growing with remarkable vigour. The result of all these conditions is that international imperialism has proved unable to strangle Soviet Russia, although it is far stronger, and has been obliged for the time

being to grant her recognition, or semi-recognition, and to conclude trade agreements with her.

The result is a state of equilibrium which, although highly unstable and precarious, enables the Socialist Republic to exist—not for long, of course—within the capitalist encirclement.

2. The International Alignment of Class Forces

This state of affairs has given rise to the following international alignment of class forces.

The international bourgeoisie, deprived of the opportunity of waging open war against Soviet Russia, is waiting and watching for the moment when circumstances will permit it to resume the war.

The proletariat in all the advanced capitalist countries has already formed its vanguard, the Communist Parties, which are growing, making steady progress towards winning the majority of the proletariat in each country, and destroying the influence of the old trade union bureaucrats and of the upper stratum of the working class of America and Europe, which has been corrupted by imperialist privileges.

The petty-bourgeois democrats in the capitalist countries, whose foremost sections are represented by the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals, serve today as the mainstay of capitalism, since they retain an influence over the majority, or a considerable section, of the industrial and commercial workers and office employees who are afraid that if revolution breaks out they will lose the relative petty-bourgeois prosperity created by the privileges of imperialism. But the growing economic crisis is worsening the condition of broad sections of the people everywhere, and this, with the looming inevitability of new

imperialist wars if capitalism is preserved, is steadily weakening this mainstay.

The masses of the working people in the colonial and semi colonial countries, who constitute the overwhelming majority of the population of the globe, were roused to political life at the turn of the twentieth century, particularly by the revolutions in Russia, Turkey, Persia and China. The imperialist war of 1914-18 and the Soviet power in Russia are completing the process of converting these masses into an active factor in world politics and in the revolutionary destruction of imperialism, although the educated philistines of Europe and America, including the leaders of the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals, stubbornly refuse to see this. British India is at the head of these countries, and there revolution is maturing in proportion, on the one hand, to the growth of the industrial and railway proletariat, and, on the other, to the increase in the brutal terrorism of the British, who with ever greater frequency resort to massacres (Amritsar), public floggings, etc.

3. The Alignment of Class Forces in Russia

The internal political situation in Soviet Russia is determined by the fact that here, for the first time in history, there have been, for a number of years, only two classes—the proletariat, trained for decades by a very young, but modern, large-scale machine industry, and the small peasantry, who constitute the overwhelming majority of the population.

In Russia, the big landowners and capitalists have not vanished, but they have been subjected to total expropriation and crushed politically as a class, whose remnants are hiding out among Soviet government employees. They have preserved their class organisation abroad, as émigrés, numbering probably from 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 people, with over 50 daily newspapers of all

bourgeois and “socialist” (i.e., petty bourgeois) parties, the remnants of an army, and numerous connections with the international bourgeoisie. These émigrés are striving, with might and main, to destroy the Soviet power and restore capitalism in Russia.

4. The Proletariat and The Peasantry in Russia

This being the internal situation in Russia, the main task now confronting her proletariat, as the ruling class, is properly to determine and carry out the measures that are necessary to lead the peasantry, establish a firm alliance with them and achieve the transition, in a series of gradual stages, to large-scale, socialised, mechanized agriculture. This is a particularly difficult task in Russia, both because of her backwardness, and her extreme state of ruin as a result of seven years of imperialist and civil war. But apart from these specific circumstances, this is one of the most difficult tasks of socialist construction that will confront all capitalist countries, with, perhaps, the sole exception of Britain. However, even in regard to Britain it must not be forgotten that, while the small tenant farmers there constitute only a very small class, the percentage of workers and office employees who enjoy a petty-bourgeois standard of living is exceptionally high, due to the actual enslavement of hundreds of millions of people in Britain’s colonial possessions.

Hence, from the standpoint of development of the world proletarian revolution as a single process, the epoch Russia is passing through is significant as a practical test and a verification of the policy of a proletariat in power towards the mass of the petty bourgeoisie.

5. The Military Alliance Between the Proletariat

And the Peasantry in The R.S.F.S.R.

The basis for proper relations between the proletariat and the peasantry in Soviet Russia was created in the period of 1917-21 when the invasion of the capitalists and landowners, supported by the whole world bourgeoisie and all the petty-bourgeois democratic parties (Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks), caused the proletariat and the peasantry to form, sign and seal a military alliance to defend the Soviet power. Civil war is the most intense form of class struggle, but the more intense it is, the more rapidly its flames consume all petty-bourgeois illusions and prejudices, and the more clearly experience proves even to the most backward strata of the peasantry that only the dictatorship of the proletariat can save it, and that the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks are in fact merely the servants of the landowners and capitalists.

But while the military alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry was—and had perforce to be—the primary form of their firm alliance, it could not have been maintained even for a few weeks without an economic alliance between the two classes. The peasants received from the workers' state all the land and were given protection against the landowners and the kulaks; the workers have been receiving from the peasant's loans of food supplies until large-scale industry is restored.

6. The Transition to Proper Economic Relations Between the Proletariat and The Peasantry

The alliance between the small peasants and the proletariat can become a correct and stable one from the socialist standpoint only when the complete restoration of transport and large-scale industry enables the proletariat to give the peasants, in exchange for food, all the goods they need for their own use and for the improvement of their farms. With the country in ruins, this could not possibly be achieved at once. The surplus appropriation system was the best measure available to the insufficiently organised state

to maintain itself in the incredibly arduous war against the landowners. The crop failure and the fodder shortage in 1920 particularly increased the hardships of the peasantry, already severe enough, and made the immediate transition to the tax in kind imperative.

The moderate tax in kind will bring about a big improvement in the condition of the peasantry at once and will at the same time stimulate them to enlarge crop areas and improve farming methods.

The tax in kind signifies a transition from the requisition of all the peasants' surplus grain to regular socialist exchange of products between industry and agriculture.

7. The Conditions Under Which

The Soviet Government Can Permit Capitalism and Concessions, And the Significance Thereof

Naturally, the tax in kind means freedom for the peasant to dispose of his after-tax surplus at his own discretion. Since the state cannot provide the peasant with goods from socialist factories in exchange for all his surplus, freedom to trade with this surplus necessarily means freedom for the development of capitalism.

Within the limits indicated, however, this is not at all dangerous for socialism as long as transport and large-scale industry remain in the hands of the proletariat. On the contrary, the development of capitalism, controlled and regulated by the proletarian state (i.e., "state" capitalism in this sense of the term), is advantageous and necessary in an extremely devastated and backward small-peasant country (within certain limits, of course), inasmuch as it is capable of hastening the immediate revival of peasant farming. This applies still more to concessions: without denationalizing anything, the workers' state leases certain mines, forest tracts,

oilfields, and so forth, to foreign capitalists in order to obtain from them extra equipment and machinery that will enable us to accelerate the restoration of Soviet large-scale industry.

The payment made to the concessionaires in the form of a share of the highly valuable products obtained is undoubtedly tribute, which the workers' state pays to the world bourgeoisie; without in any way glossing this over, we must clearly realise that we stand to gain by paying this tribute, so long as it accelerates the restoration of our large-scale industry and substantially improves the condition of the workers and peasants.

8. The Success of Our Food Policy

The food policy pursued by Soviet Russia in 1917-21 was undoubtedly very crude and imperfect and gave rise to many abuses. A number of mistakes were made in its implementation. But as a whole, it was the only possible policy under the conditions prevailing at the time. And it did fulfil its historic mission: it saved the proletarian dictatorship in a ruined and backward country. There can be no doubt that it has gradually improved. In the first year that we had full power (August 1, 1918 to August 1, 1919) the state collected 110 million poods of grain; in the second year it collected 220 million poods, and in the third year—over 285 million poods.

Now, having acquired practical experience, we have set out, and expect, to collect 400 million poods (the tax in kind is expected to bring in 240 million poods). Only when it is actually in possession of an adequate stock of food will the workers' state be able to stand firmly on its own feet economically, secure the, steady, if slow, restoration of large-scale industry, and create a proper financial system.

9. The Material Basis of Socialism and The Plan

For the Electrification of Russia

A large-scale machine industry capable of reorganizing agriculture is the only material basis that is possible for socialism. But we cannot confine ourselves to this general thesis. It must be made more concrete. Large-scale industry based on the latest achievements of technology and capable of reorganizing agriculture implies the electrification of the whole country. We had to undertake the scientific work of drawing up such a plan for the electrification of the R.S.F.S.R. and we have accomplished it. With the co-operation of over two hundred of the best scientists, engineers and agronomists in Russia, this work has now been completed; it was published in a large volume and, as a whole, endorsed by the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets in December 1920. Arrangements have now been made to convene an all-Russia congress of electrical engineers in August 1921 to examine this plan in detail, before it is given final government endorsement. The execution of the first part of the electrification scheme is estimated to take ten years and will require about 370 million man-days.

In 1918, we had eight newly erected power stations (with a total capacity of 4,757 kw); in 1919, the figure rose to 36 (total capacity of 1,648 kw), and in 1920, it rose to 100 (total capacity of 8,699 kw).

Modest as this beginning is for our vast country, a start has been made, work has begun and is making steady progress. After the imperialist war, after a million prisoners of war in Germany had become familiar with modern up-to-date technique, after the stern but hardening experience of three years of civil war, the Russian peasant is a different man. With every passing month he sees more clearly and more vividly that only the guidance given by the proletariat is capable of leading the mass of small farmers out of capitalist slavery to socialism.

10. The Role Of "Pure Democracy",

The Second and Two-And-A-Half Internationals,

The Socialist-Revolutionaries and The Mensheviks As the Allies of Capital

The dictatorship of the proletariat does not signify a cessation of the class struggle, but its continuation in a new form and with new weapons. This dictatorship is essential as long as classes exist, as long as the bourgeoisie, overthrown in one country, intensifies tenfold its attacks on socialism on an international scale. In the transition period, the small farmer class is bound to experience certain vacillations. The difficulties of transition, and the influence of the bourgeoisie, inevitably cause the mood of this mass to change from time to time. Upon the proletariat, enfeebled and to a certain extent declassed by the destruction of the large-scale machine industry, which is its vital foundation, devolves the very difficult but paramount historic task of holding out in spite of these vacillations, and of carrying to victory its cause of emancipating labour from the yoke of capital.

The policy pursued-by the petty-bourgeois democratic parties, i.e., the parties affiliated to the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals, represented in Russia by the S.R. (Socialist-Revolutionary) and Menshevik parties, is the political expression of the vacillations of the petty bourgeoisie. These parties now have their headquarters and newspapers abroad and are actually in a bloc with the whole of the bourgeois counter-revolution and are serving it loyally.

The shrewd leaders of the Russian big bourgeoisie headed by Milyukov, the leader of the Cadet (Constitutional Democratic) Party, have quite clearly, definitely and openly appraised this role of the petty-bourgeois democrats, i.e., the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. In connection with the Kronstadt mutiny, in

which the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and white guards, joined forces, Milyukov declared in favour of the "Soviets without the Bolsheviks" slogan. Elaborating on the idea, he wrote that the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks "are welcome to try" (Pravda No. 64, 1921, quoted from the Paris Posledniye Novosti), because upon them devolves the task of first taking power away from the Bolsheviks. Milyukov, the leader of the big bourgeoisie, has correctly appraised the lesson taught by all revolutions, namely, that the petty-bourgeois democrats are incapable of holding power, and always serve merely as a screen for the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, and a steppingstone to its undivided power.

The proletarian revolution in Russia again and again confirms this lesson of 1789-94 and 1848-49, and also what Frederick Engels said in his letter to Bebel of December 11, 1884.

. . . "Pure democracy . . . when the moment of revolution comes, acquires a temporary importance . . . as the final sheet-anchor of the whole bourgeois and even feudal economy. . . . Thus, between March and September 1848 the whole feudal-bureaucratic mass strengthened the liberals in order to hold down the revolutionary masses. . . . In any case our sole adversary on the day of the crisis and on the day after the crisis will be the whole of the reaction which will group around pure democracy, and this, I think, should not be lost sight of." (Published in Russian in *Kommunistichesky Trud* No. 360, June 9, 1921, in an article by Comrade V. Adoratsky: "Marx and Engels on Democracy". In German, published in the book, *Friedrich Engels, Politisches Vermächtnis, Internationale Jugend-Bibliothek, Nr. 12, Berlin, 1920, S. 19.*)

N. Lenin

Moscow, Kremlin, June 13, 1921

2.

Lenin

Speech in Defense of The Tactics of The Communist International

July 1

Comrades! I deeply regret that I must confine myself to self-defense. (Laughter.) I say deeply regret, because after acquainting myself with Comrade Terracini's speech and the amendments introduced by three delegations, I should very much like to take the offensive, for, properly speaking, offensive operations are essential against the views defended by Terracini and these three delegations. If the Congress is not going to wage a vigorous offensive against such errors, against such "Leftist" stupidities, the whole movement is doomed. That is my deep conviction. But we are organised and disciplined Marxists. We cannot be satisfied with speeches against individual comrades. We Russians are already sick and tired of these Leftist phrases. We are men of organisation. In drawing up our plans, we must proceed in an organised way and try to find the correct line. It is, of course, no secret that our theses are a compromise. And why not? Among Communists, who have already convened their Third Congress and have worked out definite fundamental principles, compromises under certain conditions are necessary. Our theses, put forward by the Russian delegation, were studied and prepared in the most careful way and were the result of long arguments and meetings with various delegations. They aim at establishing the basic line of the Communist International and are especially necessary now after we have not only formally condemned the real Centrists but have expelled them from the Party. Such are the facts. I have to stand up for these theses. Now, when Terracini comes forward and says that we must continue the fight against the Centrists, and goes on to tell how it is intended to wage the fight, I say that if these amendments denote a definite trend, a relentless

fight against this trend is essential, for otherwise there is no communism and no Communist International. I am surprised that the German Communist Workers' Party has not put its signature to these amendments. (Laughter.) Indeed, just listen to what Terracini is defending and what his amendments say. They begin in this way: "On page 1, column 1, line 19, the word 'majority' should be deleted." Majority! That is extremely dangerous! (Laughter.) Then further: instead of the words "'basic propositions', insert 'aims'". Basic propositions and aims are two different things; even the anarchists will agree with us about aims, because they too stand for the abolition of exploitation and class distinctions.

I have met and talked with few anarchists in my life, but all the same I have seen enough of them. I sometimes succeeded in reaching agreement with them about aims, but never as regards principles. Principles are not an aim, a programme, a tactic or a theory. Tactics and theory are not principles. How do we differ from the anarchists on principles? The principles of communism consist in the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and in the use of state coercion in the transition period. Such are the principles of communism, but they are not its aim. And the comrades who have tabled this proposal have made a mistake.

Secondly, it is stated there: "the word 'majority' should be deleted." Read the whole passage:

"The Third Congress of the Communist International is setting out to review questions of tactics under conditions when in a whole number of countries the objective situation has become aggravated in a revolutionary sense, and when a whole number of communist mass parties have been organised, which, incidentally, in their actual revolutionary struggle have nowhere taken into their hands the virtual leadership of the majority of the working class."

And so, they want the word “majority” deleted. If we cannot agree on such simple things, then I do not understand how we can work together and lead the proletariat to victory. Then it is not at all surprising that we cannot reach agreement on the question of principles either. Show me a party which has already won the majority of the working class. Terracini did not even think of adducing any example. Indeed, there is no such example.

And so, the word “aims” is to be put instead of “principles”, and the word “majority” is to be deleted. No, thank you! We shall not do it. Even the German party—one of the best—does not have the majority of the working class behind it. That is a fact. We, who face a most severe struggle, are not afraid to utter this truth, but here you have three delegations who wish to begin with an untruth, for if the Congress deletes the word “majority” it will show that it wants an untruth. That is quite clear.

Then comes the following amendment: “On page 4, column 1, line 10, the words ‘Open Letter’, etc., should be deleted.” I have already heard one speech today in which I found the same idea. But there it was quite natural. It was the speech of Comrade Hempel, a member of the German Communist Workers’ Party. He said: “The ‘Open Letter’ was an act of opportunism.” To my deep regret and shame, I have already heard such views privately. But when, at the Congress, after such prolonged debate, the “Open Letter” is declared opportunist—that is a shame and a disgrace! And now Comrade Terracini comes forward on behalf of the three delegations and wants to delete the words “Open Letter”. What is the good then of the fight against the German Communist Workers’ Party? The “Open Letter” is a model political step. This is stated in our theses and we must certainly stand by it. It is a model because it is the first act of a practical method of winning over the majority of the working class. In Europe, where almost all the proletarians are organised, we must win the majority of the

working class and anyone who fails to understand this is lost to the communist movement; he will never learn anything if he has failed to learn that much during the three years of the great revolution.

Terracini says that we were victorious in Russia although the Party was very small. He is dissatisfied with what is said in the theses about Czechoslovakia. Here there are 27 amendments, and if I had a mind to criticise them I should, like some orators, have to speak for not less than three hours. . . . We have heard here that in Czechoslovakia the Communist Party has 300,000-400,000 members, and that it is essential to win over the majority, to create an invincible force and continue enlisting fresh masses of workers. Terracini is already prepared to attack. He says: if there are already 400,000 workers in the party, why should we want more? Delete! (Laughter.) He is afraid of the word "masses" and wants to eradicate it. Comrade Terracini has understood very little of the Russian revolution. In Russia, we were a small party, but we had with us in addition the majority of the Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies throughout the country. (Cries: "Quite true!") Do you have anything of the sort? We had with us almost half the army, which then numbered at least ten million men. Do you really have the majority of the army behind you? Show me such a country! If these views of Comrade Terracini are shared by three other delegations, then something is wrong in the International! Then we must say: "Stop! There must be a decisive fight! Otherwise the Communist International is lost." (Animation.)

On the basis of my experience I must say, although I am taking up a defensive position (laughter), that the aim and the principle of my speech consist in defense of the resolution and theses proposed by our delegation. It would, of course, be pedantic to say that not a letter in them must be altered. I have had to read many resolutions and I am well aware that very good amendments could be introduced in every line of them. But that would be pedantry.

If, nevertheless, I declare now that in a political sense not a single letter can be altered, it is because the amendments, as I see them, are of a quite definite political nature and because they lead us along a path that is harmful and dangerous to the Communist International. Therefore, I and all of us and the Russian delegation must insist that not a single letter in the theses is altered. We have not only condemned our Right-wing elements—we have expelled them. But if, like Terracini, people turn the fight against the Rightists into a sport, then we must say: “Stop! Otherwise the danger will become too grave!”

Terracini has defended the theory of an offensive struggle. In this connection the notorious amendments propose a formula two or three pages long. There is no need for us to read them. We know what they say. Terracini has stated the issue quite clearly. He has defended the theory of an offensive, pointing out “dynamic tendencies” and the “transition from passivity to activity”. We in Russia have already had adequate political experience in the struggle against the Centrists. As long as fifteen years ago, we were waging a struggle against our opportunists and Centrists, and also against the Mensheviks, and we were victorious not only over the Mensheviks, but also over the semi-anarchists.

If we had not done this, we would not have been able to retain power in our hands for three and a half years, or even for three and a half weeks, and we would not have been able to convene communist congresses here. “Dynamic tendencies”, “transition from passivity to activity” — these are all phrases the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries had used against us. Now they are in prison, defending there the “aims of communism” and thinking of the “transition from passivity to activity”. (Laughter.) The line of reasoning followed in the proposed amendments is an impossible one, because they contain no Marxism, no political experience, and no reasoning. Have we in our theses elaborated a general theory of

the revolutionary offensive? Has Radek or anyone of us committed such a stupidity? We have spoken of the theory of an offensive in relation to a quite definite country and at a quite definite period.

From our struggle against the Mensheviks we can quote instances showing that even before the first revolution there were some who doubted whether the revolutionary party ought to conduct an offensive. If such doubts assailed any Social-Democrat—as we all called ourselves at that time—we took up the struggle against him and said that he was an opportunist, that he did not understand anything of Marxism and the dialectics of the revolutionary party. Is it really possible for a party to dispute whether a revolutionary offensive is permissible in general? To find such examples in this country one would have to go back some fifteen years. If there are Centrists or disguised Centrists who dispute the theory of the offensive, they should be immediately expelled. That question cannot give rise to disputes. But the fact that—even now, after three years of the Communist International, we are arguing about “dynamic tendencies”, about the “transition from passivity to activity”—that is a shame and a disgrace.

We do not have any dispute about this with Comrade Radek, who drafted these theses jointly with us. Perhaps it was not quite correct to begin talking in Germany about the theory of the revolutionary offensive when an actual offensive had not been prepared. Nevertheless, the March action was a great step forward in spite of the mistakes of its leaders. But this does not matter. Hundreds of thousands of workers fought heroically. However courageously the German Communist Workers' Party fought against the bourgeoisie, we must repeat what Comrade Radek said in a Russian article about Hölz. If anyone, even an anarchist, fights heroically against the bourgeoisie, that is, of course, a great thing; but it is a real step forward if hundreds of thousands fight against

the vile provocation of the social-traitors and against the bourgeoisie.

It is very important to be critical of one's mistakes. We began with that. If anyone, after a struggle in which hundreds of thousands have taken part, comes out against this struggle and behaves like Levi, then he should be expelled. And that is what was done. But we must draw a lesson from this. Had we really prepared for an offensive? (Radek: "We had not even prepared for defense.") Indeed, only newspaper articles talked of an offensive. This theory as applied to the March action in Germany in 1921 was incorrect—we have to admit that—but, in general, the theory of the revolutionary offensive is not at all false.

We were victorious in Russia, and with such ease, because we prepared for our revolution during the imperialist war. That was the first condition. Ten million workers and peasants in Russia were armed, and our slogan was: an immediate peace at all costs. We were victorious because the vast mass of the peasants were revolutionarily disposed against the big landowners. The Socialist-Revolutionaries, the adherents of the Second and the Two-and-a-Half Internationals, were a big peasant party in November 1917. They demanded revolutionary methods but, like true heroes of the Second and the Two-and-a-Half Internationals, lacked the courage to act in a revolutionary way. In August and September 1917, we said: "Theoretically we are fighting the Socialist-Revolutionaries as we did before, but practically we are ready to accept their programme because only we are able to put it into effect." We did just what we said. The peasantry, ill-disposed towards us in November 1917, after our victory, who sent a majority of Socialist-Revolutionaries into the Constituent Assembly, were won over by us, if not in the course of a few days—as I mistakenly expected and predicted—at any rate in the course of a few weeks. The difference was not great. Can you point out any country in Europe where you

could win over the majority of the peasantry in the course of a few weeks? Italy perhaps? (Laughter.) If it is said that we were victorious in Russia in spite of not having a big party, that only proves that those who say it have not understood the Russian revolution and that they have absolutely no understanding of how to prepare for a revolution.

Our first step was to create a real Communist Party so as to know whom we were talking to and whom we could fully trust. The slogan of the First and Second congresses was "Down with the Centrists!" We cannot hope to master even the ABC of communism, unless all along the line and throughout the world we make short shrift of the Centrists and semi-Centrists, whom in Russia we call Mensheviks. Our first task is to create a genuinely revolutionary party and to break with the Mensheviks. But that is only a preparatory school. We are already convening the Third Congress, and Comrade Terracini keeps saying that the task of the preparatory school consists in hunting out, pursuing and exposing Centrists and semi-Centrists. No, thank you! We have already done this long enough. At the Second Congress we said that the Centrists are our enemies. But we must go forward really. The second stage, after organising into a party, consists in learning to prepare for revolution. In many countries we have not even learned how to assume the leadership. We were victorious in Russia not only because the undisputed majority of the working class was on our side (during the elections in 1917 the overwhelming majority of the workers were with us against the Mensheviks), but also because half the army, immediately after our seizure of power, and nine-tenths of the peasants, in the course of some weeks, came over to our side; we were victorious because we adopted the agrarian programme of the Socialist-Revolutionaries instead of our own, and put it into effect. Our victory lay in the fact that we carried out the Socialist-Revolutionary programme; that is why this victory was so easy. Is it possible that you in the West can

have such illusions? It is ridiculous! Just compare the concrete economic conditions, Comrade Terracini and all of you who have signed the proposed amendments! In spite of the fact that the majority so rapidly came to be on our side, the difficulties confronting us after our victory were very great. Nevertheless, we won through because we kept in mind not only our aims but also our principles, and did not tolerate in our Party those who kept silent about principles but talked of aims, "dynamic tendencies" and the "transition from passivity to activity". Perhaps we shall be blamed for preferring to keep such gentlemen in prison. But dictatorship is impossible in any other way. We must prepare for dictatorship, and this consists in combating such phrases and such amendments. (Laughter.) Throughout, our theses speak of the masses. But, comrades, we need to understand what is meant by masses. The German Communist Workers' Party, the Left-wing comrades, misuse this word. But Comrade Terracini, too, and all those who have signed these amendments, do not know how the word "masses" should be read.

I have been speaking too long as it is; hence I wish to say only a few words about the concept of "masses". It is one that changes in accordance with the changes in the nature of the struggle. At the beginning of the struggle it took only a few thousand genuinely revolutionary workers to warrant talk of the masses. If the party succeeds in drawing into the struggle not only its own members, if it also succeeds in arousing non-party people, it is well on the way to winning the masses. During our revolutions there were instances when several thousand workers represented the masses. In the history of our movement, and of our struggle against the Mensheviks, you will find many examples where several thousand workers in a town were enough to give a clearly mass character to the movement. You have a mass when several thousand non-party workers, who usually live a philistine life and drag out a miserable existence, and who have never heard anything about politics,

begin to act in a revolutionary way. If the movement spreads and intensifies, it gradually develops into a real revolution. We saw this in 1905 and 1917 during three revolutions, and you too will have to go through all this. When the revolution has been sufficiently prepared, the concept "masses" becomes different: several thousand workers no longer constitute the masses. This word begins to denote something else. The concept of "masses" undergoes a change so that it implies the majority, and not simply a majority of the workers alone, but the majority of all the exploited. Any other kind of interpretation is impermissible for a revolutionary, and any other sense of the word becomes incomprehensible. It is possible that even a small party, the British or American party, for example, after it has thoroughly studied the course of political development and become acquainted with the life and customs of the nonparty masses, will at a favourable moment evoke a revolutionary movement (Comrade Radek has pointed to the miners' strike as a good example). You will have a mass movement if such a party comes forward with its slogans at such a moment and succeeds in getting millions of workers to follow it. I would not altogether deny that a revolution can be started by a very small party and brought to a victorious conclusion. But one must have a knowledge of the methods by which the masses can be won over. For this thoroughgoing preparation of revolution is essential. But here you have comrades coming forward with the assertion that we should immediately give up the demand for "big" masses. They must be challenged. Without thoroughgoing preparation, you will not achieve victory in any country. Quite a small party is sufficient to lead the masses. At certain times there is no necessity for big organisations.

But to win, we must have the sympathy of the masses. An absolute majority is not always essential; but what is essential to win and retain power is not only the majority of the working class—I use the term "working class" in its West-European sense, i.e., in the

sense of the industrial proletariat—but also the majority of the working and exploited rural population. Have you thought about this? Do we find in Terracini's speech even a hint at this thought? He speaks only of "dynamic tendency" and the "transition from passivity to activity". Does he devote even a single word to the food question? And yet the workers demand their victuals, although they can put up with a great deal and go hungry, as we have seen to a certain extent in Russia. We must, therefore, win over to our side not only the majority of the working class, but also the majority of the working and exploited rural population. Have you prepared for this? Almost nowhere.

And so, I repeat: I must unreservedly defend our theses and I feel I am bound to do it. We not only condemned the Centrists but expelled them from the Party. Now we must deal with another aspect, which we also consider dangerous. We must tell the comrades the truth in the most polite form (and in our theses it is told in a kind and considerate way) so that no one feels insulted: we are confronted now by other, more important questions than that of attacks on the Centrists. We have had enough of this question. It has already become somewhat boring. Instead, the comrades ought to learn to wage a real revolutionary struggle. The German workers have already begun this. Hundreds of thousands of proletarians in that country have been fighting heroically. Anyone who opposes this struggle should be immediately expelled. But after that we must not engage in empty word-spinning but must immediately begin to learn, on the basis of the mistakes made, how to organise the struggle better. We must not conceal our mistakes from the enemy. Anyone who is afraid of this is no revolutionary. On the contrary, if we openly declare to the workers: "Yes, we have made mistakes", it will mean that they will not be repeated, and we shall be able better to choose the moment. And if during the struggle itself the majority of the working people prove to be on our side—not only the majority of the workers, but

the majority of all the exploited and oppressed—then we shall really be victorious. (Prolonged, stormy applause.)

Lenin

Report on The Tactics of The R.C.P.

July 5

Comrades, strictly speaking I was unable to prepare properly for this report. All that I was able to prepare for you in the way of systematic material was a translation of my pamphlet on the tax in kind and the theses on the tactics of the Russian Communist Party. To this I merely want to add a few explanations and remarks.

I think that to explain our Party's tactics we must first of all **examine the international situation**. We have already had a detailed discussion of the economic position of capitalism internationally, and the Congress has adopted definite resolutions on this subject. I deal with this subject in my theses very briefly, and only from the political standpoint. I leave aside the economic basis, but I think that in discussing the international position of our Republic we must, politically, take into account the fact that a certain equilibrium has now undoubtedly set in between the forces that have been waging an open, armed struggle against each other for the supremacy of this or that leading class. **It is an equilibrium between bourgeois society, the international bourgeoisie as a whole, and Soviet Russia**. It is, of course, an equilibrium only in a limited sense. It is only in respect to this military struggle, I say, that a certain equilibrium has been brought about in the international situation. It must be emphasised, of course, that this is only a relative equilibrium, and a very unstable one. Much inflammable material has accumulated in capitalist countries, as well as in those countries which up to now have been regarded merely as the objects and not as the subjects of history, i.e., the colonies and semi-colonies. It is quite possible, therefore, that insurrections, great battles and revolutions may break out there sooner or later, and very suddenly too. During the past few years,

we have witnessed the direct struggle waged by the international bourgeoisie against the first proletarian republic. This struggle has been at the centre of the world political situation, and it is there that a change has taken place. Inasmuch as the attempt of the international bourgeoisie to strangle our Republic has failed, an equilibrium has set in, and a very unstable one it is, of course.

We know perfectly well, of course, that the international bourgeoisie is at present much stronger than our Republic, and that it is only the peculiar combination of circumstances that is preventing it from continuing the war against us. For several weeks now, we have witnessed fresh attempts in the Far East to renew the invasion, and there is not the slightest doubt that similar attempts will continue. Our Party has no doubts whatever on that score. The important thing for us is to establish that an unstable equilibrium does exist, and that we must take advantage of this respite, taking into consideration the characteristic features of the present situation, adapting our tactics to the specific features of this situation, and never forgetting that the necessity for armed struggle may arise again quite suddenly. Our task is still to organise and build up the Red Army. In connection with the food problem, too, we must continue to think first of all of our Red Army. We can adopt no other line in the present international situation, when we must still be prepared for fresh attacks and fresh attempts at invasion on the part of the international bourgeoisie. In regard to our practical policy, however, the fact that a certain equilibrium has been reached in the international situation has some significance, but only in the sense that we must admit that, although the revolutionary movement has made progress, the development of the international revolution this year has not proceeded along as straight a line as we had expected.

When we started the international revolution, we did so not because we were convinced that we could forestall its

development, but because a number of circumstances compelled us to start it. We thought: either the international revolution comes to our assistance, and in that case our victory will be fully assured, or we shall do our modest revolutionary work in the conviction that even in the event of defeat we shall have served the cause of the revolution and that our experience will benefit other revolutions. It was clear to us that without the support of the international world revolution the victory of the proletarian revolution was impossible. Before the revolution, and even after it, we thought: either revolution breaks out in the other countries, in the capitalistically more developed countries, immediately, or at least very quickly, or we must perish. In spite of this conviction, we did all we possibly could to preserve the Soviet system under all circumstances, come what may, because we knew that we were not only working for ourselves, but also for the international revolution. We knew this, we repeatedly expressed this conviction before the October Revolution, immediately after it, and at the time we signed the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty. And, generally speaking, this was correct.

Actually, however, events did not proceed along as straight a line as we had expected. In the other big, capitalistically more developed countries the revolution has not broken out to this day. True, we can say with satisfaction that the revolution is developing all over the world, and it is only thanks to this that the international bourgeoisie is unable to strangle us, in spite of the fact that, militarily and economically, it is a hundred times stronger than we are. (Applause.)

In Paragraph 2 of the theses I examine the manner in which this situation arose, and the conclusions that must be drawn from it. Let me add that my final conclusion is the following: the development of the international revolution, which we predicted, is proceeding, but not along as straight a line as we had expected.

It becomes clear at the first glance that after the conclusion of peace, bad as it was, it proved impossible to call forth revolution in other capitalist countries, although we know that the signs of revolution were very considerable and numerous, in fact, much more considerable and numerous than we thought at the time. Pamphlets are now beginning to appear which tell us that during the past few years and months these revolutionary symptoms in Europe have been much more serious than we had suspected. What, in that case, must we do now? We must now thoroughly prepare for revolution and make a deep study of its concrete development in the advanced capitalist countries. This is the first lesson we must draw from the international situation. As for our Russian Republic, we must take advantage of this brief respite in order to adapt our tactics to this zigzag line of history. This equilibrium is very important politically, because we clearly see that in many West-European countries, where the broad mass of the working class, and possibly the overwhelming majority of the population, are organised, the main bulwark of the bourgeoisie consists of the hostile working-class organisations affiliated to the Second and the Two-and-a-Half Internationals. I speak of this in Paragraph 2 of the theses, and I think that in this connection I need deal with only two points, which were discussed during the debate on the question of tactics. First, winning over the majority of the proletariat. The more organised the proletariat is in a capitalistically developed country, the greater thoroughness does history demand of us in preparing for revolution, and the more thoroughly must we win over the majority of the working class. Second, the main bulwark of capitalism in the industrially developed capitalist countries is the part of the working class that is organised in the Second and the Two-and-a-Half Internationals. But for the support of this section of the workers, these counter-revolutionary elements within the working class, the international

bourgeoisie would be altogether unable to retain its position. (Applause.)

Here I would also like to emphasise the significance of the movement in the colonies. In this respect we see in all the old parties, in all the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois labour parties affiliated to the Second and the Two-and-a Half Internationals, survivals of the old sentimental views: they insist on their profound sympathy for oppressed colonial and semi-colonial peoples. The movement in the colonial countries is still regarded as an insignificant national and totally peaceful movement. But this is not so. It has undergone great change since the beginning of the twentieth century: millions and hundreds of millions, in fact the overwhelming majority of the population of the globe, are now coming forward as independent, active and revolutionary factors. It is perfectly clear that in the impending decisive battles in the world revolution, the movement of the majority of the population of the globe, initially directed towards national liberation, will turn against capitalism and imperialism and will, perhaps, play a much more revolutionary part than we expect. It is important to emphasise the fact that, for the first time in our International, we have taken up the question of preparing for this struggle. Of course, there are many more difficulties in this enormous sphere than in any other, but at all events the movement is advancing. And in spite of the fact that the masses of toilers—the peasants in the colonial countries—are still backward, they will play a very important revolutionary part in the coming phases of the world revolution. (Animated approval.)

As regards the internal political position of our Republic I must start with a close examination of class relationships. During the past few months' changes have taken place in this sphere, and we have witnessed the formation of new organisations of the exploiting class directed against us. The aim of socialism is to

abolish classes. In the front ranks of the exploiting class we find the big landowners and the industrial capitalists. In regard to them, the work of destruction is fairly easy; it can be completed within a few months, and sometimes even a few weeks or days. We in Russia have expropriated our exploiters, the big landowners as well as the capitalists. They had no organisations of their own during the war and operated merely as the appendages of the military forces of the international bourgeoisie. Now, after we have repulsed the attacks of the international counter-revolution, organisations of the Russian bourgeoisie and of all the Russian counter-revolutionary parties have been formed abroad. The number of Russian émigrés scattered in all foreign countries may be estimated at one and a half to two million. In nearly every country they publish daily newspapers, and all the parties, landowner and petty-bourgeois, not excluding the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, have numerous ties with foreign bourgeois elements, that is to say, they obtain enough money to run their own press. We find the collaboration abroad of absolutely all the political parties that formerly existed in Russia, and we see how the "free" Russian press abroad, from the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik press to the most reactionary monarchist press, is championing the great landed interests. This, to a certain extent, facilitates our task, because we can more easily observe the forces of the enemy, his state of organisation, and the political trends in his camp. On the other hand, of course, it hinders our work, because these Russian counter-revolutionary émigrés use every means at their disposal to prepare for a fight against us. This fight again shows that, taken as a whole, the class instinct and class-consciousness of the ruling classes are still superior to those of the oppressed classes, notwithstanding the fact that the Russian revolution has done more than any previous revolution in this respect. In Russia, there is hardly a village in which the people, the oppressed, have not been roused. Nevertheless, if we take a cool

look at the state of organisation and political clarity of views of the Russian counter-revolutionary émigrés, we shall find that the class-consciousness of the bourgeoisie is still superior to that of the exploited and the oppressed. These people make every possible attempt and skillfully take advantage of every opportunity to attack Soviet Russia in one way or another, and to dismember it. It would be very instructive—and I think the foreign comrades will do that—systematically to watch the most important aspirations, the most important tactical moves, and the most important trends of this Russian counter-revolution. It operates chiefly abroad, and it will not be very difficult for the foreign comrades to watch it. In some respects, we ought to learn from this enemy. These counter-revolutionary émigrés are very well informed, they are excellently organised and are good strategists. And I think that a systematic comparison and study of the manner in which they are organised and take advantage of every opportunity may have a powerful propaganda effect upon the working class. This is not general theory; it is practical politics; here we can see what the enemy has learned. During the past few years, the Russian bourgeoisie has suffered a terrible defeat. There is an old saying that a beaten army learns a great deal. The beaten reactionary army has learned a great deal and has learned it thoroughly. It is learning with great avidity and has really made much headway. When we took power at one swoop, the Russian bourgeoisie was unorganized and politically undeveloped. Now, I think, its development is on a par with modern, West-European development. We must take this into account, we must improve our own organisation and methods, and we shall do our utmost to achieve this. It was relatively easy for us, and I think that it will be equally easy for other revolutions, to cope with these two exploiting classes.

But, in addition to this class of exploiters, there is in nearly all capitalist countries, with the exception, perhaps, of Britain, a class of small producers and small farmers. The main problem of the

revolution now is how to fight these two classes. In order to be rid of them, we must adopt methods other than those employed against the big landowners and capitalists. We could simply expropriate and expel both of these classes, and that is what we did. But we cannot do the same thing with the remaining capitalist classes, the small producers and the petty bourgeoisie, which are found in all countries. In most capitalist countries, these classes constitute a very considerable minority, approximately from thirty to forty-five per cent of the population. Add to them the petty-bourgeois elements of the working class, and you get even more than fifty per cent. These cannot be expropriated or expelled; other methods of struggle must be adopted in their case. From the international standpoint, if we regard the international revolution as one process, the significance of the period into which we are now entering in Russia is, in essence, that we must now find a practical solution for the problem of the relations the proletariat should establish with this last capitalist class in Russia. All Marxists have a correct and ready solution for this problem in theory. But theory and practice are two different things, and the practical solution of this problem is by no means the same as the theoretical solution. We know definitely that we have made serious mistakes. From the international standpoint, it is a sign of great progress that we are now trying to determine the attitude the proletariat in power should adopt towards the last capitalist class—the rock-bottom of capitalism—small private property, the small producer. This problem now confronts us in a practical way. I think we shall solve it. At all events, the experiment we are making will be useful for future proletarian revolutions, and they will be able to make better technical preparations for solving it.

In my theses I tried to analyse the problem of the relations between the proletariat and the peasantry. For the first time in history there is a state with only two classes, the proletariat and the peasantry. The latter constitutes the overwhelming majority of the

population. It is, of course, very backward. How do the relations between the peasantry and the proletariat, which holds political power, find practical expression in the development of the revolution? The first form is alliance, close alliance. This is a very difficult task, but at any rate it is economically and politically feasible.

How did we approach this problem practically? We concluded an alliance with the peasantry. We interpret this alliance in the following way: the proletariat emancipates the peasantry from the exploitation of the bourgeoisie, from its leadership and influence, and wins it over to its own side in order jointly to defeat the exploiters.

The Menshevik argument runs like this: the peasantry constitutes a majority; we are pure democrats; therefore, the majority should decide. But as the peasantry cannot operate on its own, this, in practice, means nothing more nor less than the restoration of capitalism. The slogan is the same: Alliance with the peasantry. When we say that, we mean strengthening and consolidating the proletariat: We have tried to give effect to this alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry, and the first stage was a military alliance. The three years of the Civil War created enormous difficulties, but in certain respects they facilitated our task. This may-sound odd, but it is true. The war was not something new for the peasants; a war against the exploiters, against the big landowners, was something they quite understood. The overwhelming majority of the peasants were on our side. In spite of the enormous distances, and the fact that the overwhelming majority of our peasants are unable to read or write, they assimilated our propaganda very easily. This proves that the broad masses—and this applies also to the most advanced countries—learn faster from their own practical experience than from books. In Russia, moreover, learning from practical experience was

facilitated for the peasantry by the fact that the country is so exceptionally large that in the same period different parts of it were passing through different stages of development.

In Siberia and in the Ukraine the counter-revolution was able to gain a temporary victory because there the bourgeoisie had the peasantry on its side, because the peasants were against us. The peasants frequently said, "We are Bolsheviks, but not Communists. We are for the Bolsheviks because they drove out the landowners; but we are not for the Communists because they are opposed to individual farming." And for a time, the counter-revolution managed to win out in Siberia and in the Ukraine because the bourgeoisie made headway in the struggle for influence over the peasantry. But it took only a very short time to open the peasants' eyes. They quickly acquired practical experience and soon said, "Yes, the Bolsheviks are rather unpleasant people, we don't like them, but still they are better than the white guards and the Constituent Assembly." "Constituent Assembly" is a term of abuse not only among the educated Communists, but also among the peasants. They know from practical experience that the Constituent Assembly and the white guards stand for the same thing, that the former is inevitably followed by the latter. The Mensheviks also resort to a military alliance with the peasantry, but they fail to understand that a military alliance alone is inadequate. There can be no military alliance without an economic alliance. It takes more than air to keep a man alive; our alliance with the peasantry could not possibly have lasted any length of time without the economic foundation, which was the basis of our victory in the war against our bourgeoisie. After all our bourgeoisie has united with the whole of the international bourgeoisie.

The basis of our economic alliance with the peasantry was, of course, very simple, and even crude. The peasant obtained from us

all the land and support against the big landowners. In return for this, we were to obtain food. This alliance was something entirely new and did not rest on the ordinary relations between commodity producers and consumers. Our peasants had a much better understanding of this than the heroes of the Second and the Two-and a-Half Internationals. They said to themselves, "These Bolsheviks are stern leaders, but after all they are our own people." Be that as it may, we created in this way the foundations of a new economic alliance. The peasants gave their produce to the Red Army and received from the latter assistance in protecting their possessions. This is always forgotten by the heroes of the Second International, who, like Otto Bauer, totally fail to understand the actual situation. We confess that the initial form of this alliance was very primitive and that we made very many mistakes. But we were obliged to act as quickly as possible, we had to organise supplies for the army at all costs. During the Civil War we were cut off from all the grain districts of Russia. We were in a terrible position, and it looks like a miracle that the Russian people and the working class were able to endure such suffering, want, and privation, sustained by nothing more than a deep urge for victory. (Animated approval and applause.)

When the Civil War came to an end, however, we faced a different problem. If the country had not been so laid waste after seven years of incessant war, it would, perhaps, have been possible to find an easier transition to the new form of alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry. But bad as conditions in the country were, they were still further aggravated by the crop failure, the fodder shortage, etc. In consequence, the sufferings of the peasants became unbearable. We had to show the broad masses of the peasants immediately that we were prepared to change our policy, without in any way deviating from our revolutionary path, so that they could say, "The Bolsheviks want to improve our intolerable condition immediately, and at all costs."

And so, our economic policy was changed; the tax in kind superseded the requisitions. This was not invented at one stroke. You will find a number of proposals in the Bolshevik press over a period of months, but no plan that really promised success. But this is not important. The important thing is that we changed our economic policy, yielding to exclusively practical considerations, and impelled by necessity. A bad harvest, fodder shortage and lack of fuel—all, of course, have a decisive influence on the economy as a whole, including the peasant economy. If the peasantry goes on strike, we get no firewood; and if we get no firewood, the factories will have to idle. Thus, in the spring of 1921, the economic crisis resulting from the terrible crop failure and the fodder shortage assumed gigantic proportions. All that was the aftermath of the three years of civil war. We had to show the peasantry that we could and would quickly change our policy in order immediately to alleviate their distress. We have always said—and it was also said at the Second Congress—that revolution demands sacrifices. Some comrades in their propaganda argue in the following way: we are prepared to stage a revolution, but it must not be too severe. Unless I am mistaken, this thesis was put forward by Comrade Smeral in his speech at the Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. I read about it in the report published in the Reichenberg Vorwärts. There is evidently a Leftist wing there; hence this source cannot be regarded as being quite impartial. At all events, I must say that if Smeral did say that, he was wrong. Some comrades who spoke after Smeral at this Congress said, “Yes, we shall go along with Smeral because in this way we shall avoid civil war.” (Laughter.) If these reports are true, I must say that such agitation is neither communistic nor revolutionary. Naturally, every revolution entails enormous sacrifice on the part of the class making it. Revolution differs from ordinary struggle in that ten and even a hundred times more people take part in it. Hence every revolution entails sacrifices not only for individuals, but for a

whole class. The dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia has entailed for the ruling class—the proletariat—sacrifices, want and privation unprecedented in history, and the case will, in all probability, be the same in every other country.

The question arises: How are we to distribute this burden of privation? We are the state power. We are able to distribute the burden of privation to a certain extent, and to impose it upon several classes, thereby relatively alleviating the condition of certain strata of the population. But what is to be our principle? Is it to be that of fairness, or of majority? No. We must act in a practical manner. We must distribute the burdens in such a way as to preserve the power of the proletariat. This is our only principle. In the beginning of the revolution the working class was compelled to suffer incredible want. Let me state that from year to year our food policy has been achieving increasing success. And the situation as a whole has undoubtedly improved. But the peasantry in Russia has certainly gained more from the revolution than the working class. There is no doubt about that at all. From the standpoint of theory, this shows, of course, that our revolution was to some degree a bourgeois revolution. When Kautsky used this as an argument against us, we laughed. Naturally, a revolution which does not expropriate the big landed estates, expel the big landowners or divide the land is only a bourgeois revolution and not a socialist one. But we were the only party to carry the bourgeois revolution to its conclusion and to facilitate the struggle for the socialist revolution. The Soviet power and the Soviet system are institutions of the socialist state. We have already established these institutions, but we have not yet solved the problem of economic relations between the peasantry and the proletariat. Much remains to be done, and the outcome of this struggle depends upon whether we solve this problem or not. Thus, the distribution of the burden of privation is one of the most difficult practical problems. On the whole, the condition of the peasants has

improved, but dire suffering has fallen to the lot of the working class, precisely because it is exercising its dictatorship.

I have already said that in the spring of 1921 the most appalling want caused by the fodder shortage and the crop failure prevailed among the peasantry, which constitutes the majority of our population. We cannot possibly exist unless we have good relations with the peasant masses. Hence, our task was to render them immediate assistance. The condition of the working class is extremely hard. It is suffering horribly. Those who have more political understanding, however, realise that in the interest of the dictatorship of the working class we must make tremendous efforts to help the peasants at any price. The vanguard of the working class has realized this, but in that vanguard, there are still people who cannot understand it, and who are too weary to understand it. They regarded it as a mistake and began to use the word "opportunism". They said, "The Bolsheviki are helping the peasants. The peasants, who are exploiting us, are getting everything they please, while the workers are starving." But is that opportunism? We are helping the peasants because without an alliance with them the political power of the proletariat is impossible, its preservation is inconceivable. It was this consideration of expediency and not that of fair distribution that was decisive for us. We are assisting the peasants because it is absolutely necessary to do so in order that we may retain political power. The supreme principle of the dictatorship is the maintenance of the alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry in order that the proletariat may retain its leading role and its political power.

The only means we found for this was the adoption of the tax in kind, which was the inevitable consequence of the struggle. This year, we shall introduce this tax for the first time. This principle has not yet been tried in practice. From the military alliance we

must pass to an economic alliance, and, theoretically, the only basis for the latter is the introduction of the tax in kind. It provides the only theoretical possibility for laying a really solid economic foundation for socialist society. The socialised factory gives the peasant its manufactures and in return the peasant gives his grain. This is the only possible form of existence of socialist society, the only form of socialist development in a country in which the small peasants constitute the majority, or at all events a very considerable minority. The peasants will give one part of their produce in the form of tax and another either in exchange for the manufactures of socialist factories, or through the exchange of commodities.

This brings us to the most difficult problem. It goes without saying that the tax in kind means freedom to trade. After having paid the tax in kind, the peasant will have the right freely to exchange the remainder of his grain. This freedom of exchange implies freedom for capitalism. We say this openly and emphasise it. We do not conceal it in the least. Things would go very hard with us if we attempted to conceal it. Freedom to trade means freedom for capitalism, but it also means a new form of capitalism. It means that, to a certain extent, we are re-creating capitalism. We are doing this quite openly. It is state capitalism. But state capitalism in a society where power belongs to capital, and state capitalism in a proletarian state, are two different concepts. In a capitalist state, state capitalism means that it is recognised by the state and controlled by it for the benefit of the bourgeoisie, and to the detriment of the proletariat. In the proletarian state, the same thing is done for the benefit of the working class, for the purpose of withstanding the as yet strong bourgeoisie, and of fighting it. It goes without saying that we must grant concessions to the foreign bourgeoisie, to foreign capital. Without the slightest denationalization, we shall lease mines, forests and oilfields to foreign capitalists, and receive in exchange manufactured goods, machinery, etc., and thus restore our own industry.

Of course, we did not all agree on the question of state capitalism at once. But we are very pleased to note in this connection that our peasantry has been developing, that it has fully realized the historical significance of the struggle we are waging at the present time. Ordinary peasants from the most remote districts have come to us and said: "What! We have expelled our capitalists, the capitalists who speak Russian, and now foreign capitalists are coming!" Does not this show that our peasants have developed? There is no need to explain to a worker who is versed in economics why this is necessary. We have been so ruined by seven years of war that it will take many years to restore our industry. We must pay for our backwardness and weakness, and for the lessons we are now learning and must learn. Those who want to learn must pay for the tuition. We must explain this to one and all, and if we prove it in practice, the vast masses of the peasants and workers will agree with us, because in this way their condition will be immediately improved, and because it will ensure the possibility of restoring our industry. What compels us to do this? We are not alone in the world. We exist in a system of capitalist states. . . On one side, there are the colonial countries, but they cannot help us yet. On the other side, there are the capitalist countries, but they are our enemies. The result is a certain equilibrium, a very poor one, it is true. Nevertheless, we must reckon with the fact. We must not shut our eyes to it if we want to exist. Either we score an immediate victory over the whole bourgeoisie, or we pay the tribute.

We admit quite openly, and do not conceal the fact, that concessions in the system of state capitalism mean paying tribute to capitalism. But we gain time, and gaining time means gaining everything, particularly in the period of equilibrium, when our foreign comrades are preparing thoroughly for their revolution. The more thorough their preparations, the more certain will the victory be. Meanwhile, however, we shall have to pay the tribute.

A few words about our food policy. Undoubtedly, it was a bad and primitive policy. But we can also point to some achievements. In this connection I must once again emphasise that the only possible economic foundation of socialism is large-scale machine industry. Whoever forgets this is no Communist. We must analyse this problem concretely. We cannot present problems in the way the theoreticians of the old school of socialism do. We must present them in a practical manner. What is modern large-scale industry? It is the electrification of the whole of Russia. Sweden, Germany and America have almost achieved this, although they are still bourgeois. A Swedish comrade told me that in Sweden a large part of industry and thirty per cent of agriculture are electrified. In Germany and America, which are even more developed capitalistically, we see the same thing on a larger scale. Large-scale machine industry is nothing more nor less than the electrification of the whole country. We have already appointed a special commission consisting of the country's best economists and engineers. It is true that nearly all of them are hostile to the Soviet power. All these specialists will come over to communism, but not our way, not by way of twenty years of underground work, during which we unceasingly studied and repeated over and over again the ABC of communism.

Nearly all the Soviet government bodies were in favour of inviting the specialists. The expert engineers will come to us when we give them practical proof that this will increase the country's productive forces. It is not enough to prove it to them in theory; we must prove it to them in practice, and we shall win these people over to our side if we present the problem differently, not from the standpoint of the theoretical propaganda of communism. We say: large-scale industry is the only means of saving the peasantry from want and starvation. Everyone agrees with this. But how can it be done? The restoration of industry on the old basis will entail too much labour and time. We must give industry a more modern

form, i.e., we must adopt electrification. This will take much less time. We have already drawn up the plans for electrification. More than two hundred specialists—almost to a man opposed to the Soviet power—worked on it with keen interest, although they are not Communists. From the standpoint of technical science, however, they had to admit that this was the only correct way. Of course, we have a long way to go before the plan is achieved. The cautious specialists say that the first series of works will take at least ten years. Professor Ballod has estimated that it would take three to four years to electrify Germany. But for us even ten years is not enough. In my theses I quote actual figures to show you how little we have been able to do in this sphere up to now. The figures I quote are so modest that it immediately becomes clear that they are more of propaganda than scientific value. But we must begin with propaganda. The Russian peasants who fought in the world war and lived in Germany for several years learned how modern farming should be carried on in order to conquer famine. We must carry on extensive propaganda in this direction. Taken by themselves, these plans are not yet of great practical value, but their propaganda value is very great.

The peasants realise that something new must be created. They realise that this cannot be done by everybody working separately, but by the state working as a whole. The peasants who were prisoners of war in Germany found out what real cultural life is based on. Twelve thousand kilowatts is a very modest beginning. This may sound funny to the foreigner who is familiar with electrification in America, Germany or Sweden. But he laughs best who laughs last. It is, indeed, a modest beginning. But the peasants are beginning to understand that new work must be carried out on a grand scale, and that this work has already begun. Enormous difficulties will have to be overcome. We shall try to establish relations with the capitalist countries. We must not regret having

to give the capitalists several hundred million kilograms of oil on condition that they help us to electrify our country.

And now, in conclusion, a few words about "pure democracy". I will read you a passage from Engels's letter to Bebel of December 11, 1884. He wrote:

"Pure democracy . . . when the moment of revolution comes, acquires a temporary importance as the extreme bourgeois party, as which it already played itself off in Frankfort, and as the final sheet-anchor of the whole bourgeois and even feudal economy. . . . Thus between March and September 1848 the whole feudal-bureaucratic mass strengthened the liberals in order to hold down the revolutionary masses. . . . In any case our sole adversary on the day of the crisis and on the day after the crisis will be the whole of the reaction which will group around pure democracy, and this, I think, should not be lost sight of."

Our approach must differ from that of the theoreticians. The whole reactionary mass, not only bourgeois, but also feudal, groups itself around "pure democracy". The German comrades know better than anyone else what "pure democracy" means, for Kautsky and the other leaders of the Second and the Two-and-a-Half Internationals are defending this "pure democracy" from the wicked Bolsheviks. If we judge the Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, not by what they say, but by what they do, we shall find that they are nothing but representatives of petty bourgeois "pure democracy". In the course of our revolution they have given us a classic example of what "pure democracy" means, and again during the recent crisis, in the days of the Kronstadt mutiny. There was serious unrest among the peasantry, and discontent was also rife among the workers. They were weary and exhausted. After all, there is a limit to human endurance. They had starved for three years, but you cannot go on

starving for four or five years. Naturally, hunger has a tremendous influence on political activity. How did the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks behave? They wavered all the time, thereby strengthening the bourgeoisie. The organisation of all the Russian parties abroad has revealed the present state of affairs. The shrewdest of the leaders of the Russian big bourgeoisie said to themselves: "We cannot achieve victory in Russia immediately. Hence our slogan must be: 'Soviets without the Bolsheviks.'" Milyukov, the leader of the Constitutional-Democrats, defended the Soviet power from the attacks of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. This sounds very strange; but such are the practical dialectics which we, in our revolution, have been studying in a peculiar way, from the practical experience of our struggle and of the struggle of our enemies. The Constitutional-Democrats defend "Soviets without the Bolsheviks" because they understand the position very well and hope that a section of the people will rise to the bait. That is what the clever Constitutional-Democrats say. Not all the Constitutional-Democrats are clever, of course, but some of them are, and these have learned something from the French Revolution. The present slogan is to fight the Bolsheviks, whatever the price, come what may. The whole of the bourgeoisie is now helping the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who are now the vanguard of all reaction. In the spring we had a taste of the fruits of this counter-revolutionary co-operation.

That is why we must continue our relentless struggle against these elements. Dictatorship is a state of intense war. That is just the state we are in. There is no military invasion at present; but we are isolated. On the other hand, however, we are not entirely isolated, since the whole international bourgeoisie is incapable of waging open war against us just now, because the whole working class, even though the majority is not yet communist, is sufficiently class-conscious to prevent intervention. The bourgeoisie is compelled to

reckon with the temper of the masses even though they have not yet entirely sided with communism. That is why the bourgeoisie cannot now start an offensive against us, although one is never ruled out. Until the final issue is decided, this awful state of war will continue. And we say: "A la guerre comme à la guerre ; we do not promise any freedom, or any democracy." We tell the peasants quite openly that they must choose between the rule of the bourgeoisie, and the rule of the Bolsheviks—in which case we shall make every possible concession within the limits of retaining power, and later we shall lead them to socialism. Everything else is deception and pure demagoguery. Ruthless war must be declared against this deception and demagoguery. Our point of view is: for the time being—big concessions and the greatest caution, precisely because a certain equilibrium has set in, precisely because we are weaker than our combined enemies, and because our economic basis is too weak and we need a stronger one.

That, comrades, is what I wanted to tell you about our tactics, the tactics of the Russian Communist Party. (Prolonged applause.)

Lenin

From: Tenth All-Russian Conference of the R.C.P.(B.)

May 26-28, 1921

Collected Works, Volume 32, pages 399-437

From the standpoint of the interests of the bourgeoisie, Milyukov is absolutely right. Since we, being the party of the proletariat, are leading the peasantry, we must pursue a course towards strengthening large-scale industry, and must therefore be prepared to make economic concessions. The proletariat led the peasantry and did it in such a way that during the Civil War the peasantry obtained more economic benefits than the proletariat. In Martov's terms, this is Zubatovism. Economic concessions have been made to the peasantry. These concessions were made to a section of the working people constituting the majority of the population. Is this policy wrong? No, it is the only correct one! And no matter what you say about Martov's catchwords, about it being impossible to deceive a class, I ask you nevertheless: where is our deception? We say that there are two paths to choose: one following Martov and Chernov — and through them to Milyukov — and the other following the Communists. As for us, we are fighting for the abolition of capitalism and the establishment of communism. Ours is a very hard road, and many are weary and lack faith. The peasants lack faith. But are we deceiving them? It is ridiculous to say that we are deceiving a class, and have lost our way amidst three pines, or even two, for the working class and the peasantry are only two classes. The proletariat leads the peasantry, which is a class that cannot be driven out as the landowners and capitalists were driven out and destroyed. We must remold it by prolonged and persistent effort, entailing great privation. It depends on us, the ruling party, how much of the suffering will fall to the lot of the proletariat and how much to that of the peasantry.

How is this suffering to be shared? Is it to be on a basis of equality? Let Chernov and Martov say that. We say that we must be guided by the interests of the proletariat, that is, we must obtain safeguards against the restoration of capitalism and ensure the road to communism. Since the peasantry is now wearier and more exhausted, or rather it thinks that it is so, we make more concessions to it in order to obtain safeguards against the restoration of capitalism and to ensure the road to communism. That is the correct policy, and we are guided exclusively by class considerations. We tell the peasants frankly and honestly, without any deception: in order to hold the road to socialism, we are making a number of concessions to you, comrade peasants, but only within the stated limits and to the stated extent; and, of course, we ourselves shall be the judge of the limits and the extent. The concession itself is being made with an eye to distributing the burdens which, up to now, the proletariat has borne to a larger extent than the peasantry. During the three and a half years of the dictatorship of the proletariat, it has voluntarily borne more hardships than the peasantry. This is an absolutely obvious and incontrovertible truth. This is how the question stands in regard to the relations between the proletariat, and the peasantry: either the peasantry comes to an agreement with us and we make economic concessions to it—or we fight. That is why all other arguments are but evidence of a terrible confusion. As a matter of fact, any other road leads to Milyukov, and the restoration of the landowners and capitalists. We say that we shall agree to make any concession within the limits of what will sustain and strengthen the power of the proletariat, which, in spite of all difficulties and obstacles, is unswervingly advancing towards the abolition of classes and towards communism.

J. V. Stalin

From; Concerning Questions of Leninism

January 25, 1926

Works, Vol. 8, January-November 1926, pp. 13-96

...It goes without saying that the peasant question is of very great importance for Russia, that our country is a peasant country. But what significance can this fact have in characterizing the foundations of Leninism? Was Leninism elaborated only on Russian soil, for Russia alone, and not on the soil of imperialism, and for the imperialist countries generally? Do such works of Lenin as *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*,² *The State and Revolution*,³ *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*,⁴ *“Left-Wing” Communism, an Infantile Disorder*,⁵ etc., apply only to Russia, and not to all imperialist countries in general? Is not Leninism the generalization of the experience of the revolutionary movement of all countries? Are not the fundamentals of the theory and tactics of Leninism suitable, are they not obligatory, for the proletarian parties of all countries? Was not Lenin right when he said that “Bolshevism can serve as a model of tactics for all”? (See Vol. XXIII, p. 386.) Was not Lenin right when he spoke about the “international significance of Soviet power and of the fundamentals of Bolshevik theory and tactics”? (See Vol. XXV, pp. 171-72.) Are not, for example, the following words of Lenin correct?

“In Russia, the dictatorship of the proletariat must inevitably differ in certain specific features from that in the advanced countries, owing to the very great backwardness and petty-bourgeois character of our country. But the basic forces—and the basic forms of social economy—are the same in Russia as in any capitalist country, so that these specific features can relate only to what is not most important” (see Vol. XXIV, p. 508).

(..)

In the pamphlet *The Foundations of Leninism*, it stated:

“Some think that the fundamental thing in Leninism is the peasant question, that the point of departure of Leninism is the question of the peasantry, of its role, its relative importance. This is absolutely wrong. The fundamental question of Leninism, its point of departure, is not the peasant question, but the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat, of the conditions under which it can be achieved, of the conditions under which it can be consolidated. The peasant question, as the question of the ally of the proletariat in its struggle for power, is a derivative question.”⁹

Is this thesis correct?

I think it is correct. This thesis follows entirely from the definition of Leninism. Indeed, if Leninism is the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution, and the basic content of the proletarian revolution is the dictatorship of the proletariat, then it is clear that the main thing in Leninism is the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the elaboration of this question, the substantiation and concretization of this question.

Nevertheless, Zinoviev evidently does not agree with this thesis. In his article “In Memory of Lenin,” he says:

“As I have already said, the question of the role of the peasantry is the fundamental question of Bolshevism, of Leninism.”

As you see, Zinoviev’s thesis follows entirely from his wrong definition of Leninism. It is therefore as wrong as his definition of Leninism is wrong.

Is Lenin’s thesis that the dictatorship of the proletariat is the “root content of the proletarian revolution” correct? (See Vol. XXIII, p. 337.) It is unquestionably correct. Is the thesis that Leninism is the

theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution correct? I think it is correct. But what follows from this? From this it follows that the fundamental question of Leninism, its point of departure, its foundation, is the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Is it not true that the question of imperialism, the question of the spasmodic character of the development of imperialism, the question of the victory of socialism in one country, the question of the proletarian state, the question of the Soviet form of this state, the question of the role of the Party in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the question of the paths of building socialism—that all these questions were elaborated precisely by Lenin? Is it not true that it is precisely these questions that constitute the basis, the foundation of the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat? Is it not true that without the elaboration of these fundamental questions, the elaboration of the peasant question from the standpoint of the dictatorship of the proletariat would be inconceivable?

It goes without saying that Lenin was an expert on the peasant question. It goes without saying that the peasant question as the question of the ally of the proletariat is of the greatest significance for the proletariat and forms a constituent part of the fundamental question of the dictatorship of the proletariat. But is it not clear that if Leninism had not been faced with the fundamental question of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the derivative question of the ally of the proletariat, the question of the peasantry, would not have arisen either? Is it not clear that if Leninism had not been faced with the practical question of the conquest of power by the proletariat, the question of an alliance with the peasantry would not have arisen either?

Lenin would not have been the great ideological leader of the proletariat that he unquestionably is—he would have been a simple “peasant philosopher,” as foreign literary philistines often

depict him—had he elaborated the peasant question, not on the basis of the theory and tactics of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but independently of this basis, apart from this basis.

One or the other:

Either the peasant question is the main thing in Leninism, and in that case, Leninism is not suitable, not obligatory, for capitalistically developed countries, for those which are not peasant countries.

Or the main thing in Leninism is the dictatorship of the proletariat, and in that case, Leninism is the international doctrine of the proletarians of all lands, suitable and obligatory for all countries without exception, including the capitalistically developed countries.

Here one must choose.

(...)

THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION AND THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT

What are the characteristic features of the proletarian revolution as distinct from the bourgeois revolution?

The distinction between the proletarian revolution and the bourgeois revolution may be reduced to five main points.

1) The bourgeois revolution usually begins when there already exist more or less ready-made forms belonging to the capitalist order, forms which have grown and matured within the womb of feudal society prior to the open revolution, whereas the proletarian revolution begins when ready-made forms belonging to the socialist order are either absent, or almost absent.

- 2) The main task of the bourgeois revolution consists in seizing power and making it conform to the already existing bourgeois economy, whereas the main task of the proletarian revolution consists, after seizing power, in building a new, socialist economy.
- 3) The bourgeois revolution is usually consummated with the seizure of power, whereas in the proletarian revolution the seizure of power is only the beginning, and power is used as a lever for transforming the old economy and organising the new one.
- 4) The bourgeois revolution limits itself to replacing one group of exploiters in power by another group of exploiters, in view of which it need not smash the old state machine; whereas the proletarian revolution removes all exploiting groups from power and places in power the leader of all the toilers and exploited, the class of proletarians, in view of which it cannot manage without smashing the old state machine and substituting a new one for it.
- 5) The bourgeois revolution cannot rally the millions of the toiling and exploited masses around the bourgeoisie for any length of time, for the very reason that they are toilers and exploited; whereas the proletarian revolution can and must link them, precisely as toilers and exploited, in a durable alliance with the proletariat, if it wishes to carry out its main task of consolidating the power of the proletariat and building a new, socialist economy.

Here are some of Lenin's main theses on this subject:

“One of the fundamental differences between bourgeois revolution and socialist revolution,” says Lenin, “is that for the bourgeois revolution, which arises out of feudalism, the new economic organisations are gradually created in the womb of the old order, gradually changing all the aspects of feudal society. Bourgeois revolution was confronted by only one task—to sweep away, to cast aside, to destroy all the fetters of the preceding society. By

fulfilling this task every bourgeois revolution fulfils all that is required of it: it accelerates the growth of capitalism.

“The socialist revolution is in an altogether different position. The more backward the country which, owing to the zigzags of history, has proved to be the one to start the socialist revolution, the more difficult it is for it to pass from the old capitalist relations to socialist relations. To the tasks of destruction are added new tasks of unprecedented difficulty—organisational tasks” (see Vol. XXII, p. 315).

“Had not the popular creative spirit of the Russian revolution,” continues Lenin, “which had gone through the great experience of the year 1905, given rise to the Soviets as early as February 1917, they could not under any circumstances have seized power in October, because success depended entirely upon the existence of ready-made organisational forms of a movement embracing millions. These ready-made forms were the Soviets, and that is why in the political sphere there awaited us those brilliant successes, the continuous triumphant march, that we experienced; for the new form of political power was ready to hand, and all we had to do was, by passing a few decrees, to transform the power of the Soviets from the embryonic state in which it existed in the first months of the revolution into a legally recognised form which has become established in the Russian state—i.e., into the Russian Soviet Republic” (see Vol. XXII, p. 315).

“But two problems of enormous difficulty still remained,” says Lenin, “the solution of which could not possibly be the triumphant march which our revolution experienced in the first months . . .” (ibid.).

“Firstly, there were the problems of internal organisation, which confront every socialist revolution. The difference between socialist revolution and bourgeois revolution lies precisely in the

fact that the latter finds ready-made forms of capitalist relationships, while Soviet power—proletarian power—does not inherit such ready-made relationships, if we leave out of account the most developed forms of capitalism, which, strictly speaking, extended to but a small top layer of industry and hardly touched agriculture. The organisation of accounting, the control of large enterprises, the transformation of the whole of the state economic mechanism into a single huge machine, into an economic organism that works in such a way that hundreds of millions of people are guided by a single plan—such was the enormous organisational problem that rested on our shoulders. Under the present conditions of labour this problem could not possibly be solved by the ‘hurrah’ methods by which we were able to solve the problems of the Civil War” (ibid., p. 318).

“The second enormous difficulty . . . was the international question. The reason why we were able to cope so easily with Kerensky’s gangs, why we so easily established our power and without the slightest difficulty passed the decrees on the socialisation of the land and on workers’ control, the reason why we achieved all this so easily was only that a fortunate combination of circumstances protected us for a short time from international imperialism. International imperialism, with the entire might of its capital, with its highly organised military technique, which is a real force, a real fortress of international capital, could in no case, under no circumstances, live side by side with the Soviet Republic, both because of its objective position and because of the economic interests of the capitalist class which is embodied in it—it could not do so because of commercial connections, of international financial relations. In this sphere a conflict is inevitable. Therein lies the greatest difficulty of the Russian revolution, its greatest historical problem: the necessity of solving the international tasks, the necessity of calling forth an international revolution” (see Vol. XXII, p. 317).

Such is the intrinsic character and the basic meaning of the proletarian revolution.

Can such a radical transformation of the old bourgeois order be achieved without a violent revolution, without the dictatorship of the proletariat?

Obviously not. To think that such a revolution can be carried out peacefully, within the framework of bourgeois democracy, which is adapted to the rule of the bourgeoisie, means that one has either gone out of one's mind and lost normal human understanding, or has grossly and openly repudiated the proletarian revolution.

This thesis must be emphasised all the more strongly and categorically for the reason that we are dealing with the proletarian revolution which for the time being has triumphed only in one country, a country which is surrounded by hostile capitalist countries and the bourgeoisie of which cannot fail to receive the support of international capital.

That is why Lenin says that:

“The emancipation of the oppressed class is impossible not only without a violent revolution, but also without the destruction of the apparatus of state power which was created by the ruling class” (see Vol. XXI, p. 373).

“First let the majority of the population, while private property still exists, i.e., while the rule and yoke of capital still exists, express themselves in favour of the party of the proletariat, and only then can and should the party take power—so say the petty-bourgeois democrats who call themselves ‘Socialists’ but who are in reality the servitors of the bourgeoisie” (see Vol. XXIV, p. 647).

“We say: Let the revolutionary proletariat first overthrow the bourgeoisie, break the yoke of capital, and smash the bourgeois state apparatus, then the victorious proletariat will be able rapidly

to gain the sympathy and support of the majority of the toiling non-proletarian masses by satisfying their needs at the expense of the exploiters" (ibid.).

"In order to win the majority of the population to its side," Lenin says further, "the proletariat must, in the first place, overthrow the bourgeoisie and seize state power; secondly, it must introduce Soviet power and smash the old state apparatus to bits, whereby it immediately undermines the rule, prestige and influence of the bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeois compromisers over the non-proletarian toiling masses. Thirdly, it must entirely destroy the influence of the bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeois compromisers over the majority of the non-proletarian toiling masses by satisfying their economic needs in a revolutionary way at the expense of the exploiters" (ibid., p. 641).

Such are the characteristic features of the proletarian revolution.

What, in this connection, are the main features of the dictatorship of the proletariat, once it is admitted that the dictatorship of the proletariat is the basic content of the proletarian revolution?

Here is the most general definition of the dictatorship of the proletariat given by Lenin:

"The dictatorship of the proletariat is not the end of the class struggle, but its continuation in new forms. The dictatorship of the proletariat is the class struggle of the proletariat, which has won victory and has seized political power, against the bourgeoisie, which although vanquished has not been annihilated, has not disappeared, has not ceased its resistance, has increased its resistance" (see Vol. XXIV, p. 311).

Arguing against confusing the dictatorship of the proletariat with "popular" government, "elected by all," with "non-class" government, Lenin says:

“The class which took political power into its hands did so knowing that it took power alone. That is a part of the concept dictatorship of the proletariat. This concept has meaning only when this one class knows that it alone is taking political power in its hands and does not deceive itself or others with talk about ‘popular’ government, ‘elected by all, sanctified by the whole people’” (see Vol. XXVI, p. 286).

This does not mean, however, that the power of one class, the class of the proletarians, which does not and cannot share power with other classes, does not need aid from, and an alliance with, the labouring and exploited masses of other classes for the achievement of its aims. On the contrary. This power, the power of one class, can be firmly established and exercised to the full only by means of a special form of alliance between the class of proletarians and the labouring masses of the petty-bourgeois classes, primarily the labouring masses of the peasantry.

What is this special form of alliance? What does it consist in? Does not this alliance with the labouring masses of other, non-proletarian, classes wholly contradict the idea of the dictatorship of one class?

This special form of alliance consists in that the guiding force of this alliance is the proletariat. This special form of alliance consists in that the leader of the state, the leader in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat is one party, the party of the proletariat, the Party of the Communists, which does not and cannot share leadership with other parties.

As you see, the contradiction is only an apparent, a seeming one.

“The dictatorship of the proletariat,” says Lenin, “is a special form of class alliance between the proletariat, the vanguard of the working people, and the numerous non-proletarian strata of

working people (the petty bourgeoisie, the small proprietors, the peasantry, the intelligentsia, etc.), or the majority of these; it is an alliance against capital, an alliance aiming at the complete overthrow of capital, at the complete suppression of the resistance of the bourgeoisie and of any attempt on its part at restoration, an alliance aiming at the final establishment and consolidation of socialism. It is a special type of alliance, which is being built up in special circumstances, namely, in the circumstances of fierce civil war; it is an alliance of the firm supporters of socialism with the latter's wavering allies and sometimes with 'neutrals' (then instead of an agreement for struggle, the alliance becomes an agreement for neutrality), an alliance between classes which differ economically, politically, socially and ideologically" (see Vol. XXIV, p. 311).

In one of his instructional reports, Kamenev, disputing this conception of the dictatorship of the proletariat, states:

"The dictatorship is not an alliance of one class with another."

I believe that Kamenev here has in view, primarily, a passage in my pamphlet *The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists*, where it is stated:

"The dictatorship of the proletariat is not simply a governmental top stratum 'skillfully' 'selected' by the careful hand of an 'experienced strategist,' and 'judiciously relying' on the support of one section or another of the population. The dictatorship of the proletariat is the class alliance between the proletariat and the labouring masses of the peasantry for the purpose of overthrowing capital, for achieving the final victory of socialism, on the condition that the guiding force of this alliance is the proletariat."¹⁰

I wholly endorse this formulation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, for I think that it fully and entirely coincides with Lenin's formulation, just quoted.

I assert that Kamenev's statement that "the dictatorship is not an alliance of one class with another," in the categorical form in which it is made, **has nothing in common with Lenin's theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat.**

I assert that such statements can be made only by people who have failed to understand the meaning of the idea of the bond, the idea of the alliance of the proletariat and peasantry, **the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat within this alliance.**

Such statements can be made only by people who have failed to understand Lenin's thesis:

"Only an agreement with the peasantry can save the socialist revolution in Russia as long as the revolution in other countries has not taken place" (see Vol. XXVI, p. 238).

Such statements can be made only by people who have failed to understand Lenin's thesis:

"The supreme principle of the dictatorship is the maintenance of **the alliance of the proletariat and peasantry** in order that the proletariat may retain its leading role and state power" (ibid., p. 460).

Pointing out one of the most important aims of the dictatorship, the aim of suppressing the exploiters, Lenin says:

"The scientific concept of dictatorship means nothing more nor less than completely unrestricted power, absolutely unimpeded by laws or regulations and resting directly on the use of force" (see Vol. XXV, p. 441).

“Dictatorship means—note this once and for all, Messrs. Cadets—unrestricted power, based on force and not on law. In time of civil war any victorious power can be only a dictatorship” (see Vol. XXV, p. 436).

But of course, the dictatorship of the proletariat does not mean only the use of force, although there is no dictatorship without the use of force.

“Dictatorship,” says Lenin, “does not mean only the use of force, although it is impossible without the use of force; it also means the organisation of labour on a higher level than the previous organisation” (see Vol. XXIV, p. 305).

“The dictatorship of the proletariat . . . is not only the use of force against the exploiters, and not even mainly the use of force. The economic foundation of this revolutionary use of force, the guarantee of its effectiveness and success is the fact that the proletariat represents and creates a higher type of social organisation of labour compared with capitalism. This is the essence. This is the source of the strength and the guarantee of the inevitable complete triumph of communism” (see Vol. XXIV, pp. 335-36).

“Its quintessence (i.e., of the dictatorship—J. St.) is the organisation and discipline of the advanced detachment of the working people, of its vanguard, its sole leader, the proletariat, whose object is to build socialism, to abolish the division of society into classes, to make all members of society working people, to remove the basis for any exploitation of man by man. This object cannot be achieved at one stroke. It requires a fairly long period of transition from capitalism to socialism, because the reorganisation of production is a difficult matter, because radical changes in all spheres of life need time, and because the enormous force of habit of petty-bourgeois and bourgeois conduct of economy can be

overcome only by a long and stubborn struggle. That is why Marx spoke of an entire period of the dictatorship of the proletariat, as the period of transition from capitalism to socialism" (ibid., p. 314).

Such are the characteristic features of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Hence the three main aspects of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

1) The utilisation of the rule of the proletariat for the suppression of the exploiters, for the defense of the country, for the consolidation of the ties with the proletarians of other lands, and for the development and victory of the revolution in all countries.

2) The utilisation of the rule of the proletariat in order to detach the labouring and exploited masses once and for all from the bourgeoisie, to consolidate the alliance of the proletariat with these masses, to draw these masses into the work of socialist construction, and to ensure the state leadership of these masses by the proletariat.

3) The utilisation of the rule of the proletariat for the organisation of socialism, for the abolition of classes, for the transition to a society without classes, to a socialist society.

The proletarian dictatorship is a combination of all these three aspects. No single one of these aspects can be advanced as the sole characteristic feature of the dictatorship of the proletariat. On the other hand, in the circumstances of capitalist encirclement, the absence of even one of these features is sufficient for the dictatorship of the proletariat to cease being a dictatorship. Therefore, not one of these three aspects can be omitted without running the risk of distorting the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Only all these three aspects taken together give us the complete and finished concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The dictatorship of the proletariat has its periods, its special forms, diverse methods of work. During the period of civil war, it is the forcible aspect of the dictatorship that is most conspicuous. But it by no means follows from this that no constructive work is carried on during the period of civil war. Without constructive work it is impossible to wage civil war. During the period of socialist construction, on the other hand, it is the peaceful, organisational and cultural work of the dictatorship, revolutionary law, etc., that are most conspicuous. But, again, it by no means follows from this that the forcible aspect of the dictatorship has ceased to exist or can cease to exist in the period of construction. The organs of suppression, the army and other organisations, are as necessary now, at the time of construction, as they were during the period of civil war. Without these organs, constructive work by the dictatorship with any degree of security would be impossible. It should not be forgotten that for the time being the revolution has been victorious in only one country. It should not be forgotten that as long as capitalist encirclement exists the danger of intervention, with all the consequences resulting from this danger, will also exist.

THE PARTY AND THE WORKING CLASS IN THE SYSTEM OF THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT

I have dealt above with the dictatorship of the proletariat from the point of view of its historical inevitability, from the point of view of its class content, from the point of view of its state nature, and, finally, from the point of view of the destructive and creative tasks which it performs throughout the entire historical period that is termed the period of transition from capitalism to socialism.

Now we must say something about the dictatorship of the proletariat from the point of view of its structure, from the point of view of its "mechanism," from the point of view of the role and significance of the "transmission belts," the "levers," and the

“directing force” which in their totality constitute “the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat” (Lenin), and with the help of which the daily work of the dictatorship of the proletariat is accomplished.

What are these “transmission belts” or “levers” in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat? What is this “directing force”? Why are they needed?

The levers or transmission belts are those very mass organisations of the proletariat without the aid of which the dictatorship cannot be realized.

The directing force is the advanced detachment of the proletariat, its vanguard, which is the main guiding force of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The proletariat needs these transmission belts, these levers, and this directing force, because without them, in its struggle for victory, it would be a weaponless army in face of organised and armed capital. The proletariat needs these organisations because without them it would suffer inevitable defeat in its fight for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, in its fight for the consolidation of its rule, in its fight for the building of socialism. The systematic help of these organisations and the directing force of the vanguard are needed because in the absence of these conditions it is impossible for the dictatorship of the proletariat to be at all durable and firm.

What are these organisations?

Firstly, there are the workers’ trade unions, with their central and local ramifications in the shape of a whole series of organisations concerned with production, culture, education, etc. These unite the workers of all trades. They are non-Party organisations. The trade unions may be termed the all-embracing organisation of the working class, which is in power in our country. They are a school

of communism. They promote the best people from their midst for the work of leadership in all branches of administration. They form the link between the advanced and the backward elements in the ranks of the working class. They connect the masses of the workers with the vanguard of the working class.

Secondly, there are the Soviets, with their numerous central and local ramifications in the shape of administrative, economic, military, cultural and other state organisations, plus the innumerable mass associations of the working people which have sprung up of their own accord and which encompass these organisations and connect them with the population. The Soviets are a mass organisation of all the working people of town and country. They are a non-Party organisation. The Soviets are the direct expression of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It is through the Soviets that all measures for strengthening the dictatorship and for building socialism are carried out. It is through the Soviets that the state leadership of the peasantry by the proletariat is exercised. The Soviets connect the vast masses of the working people with the vanguard of the proletariat.

Thirdly, there are the co-operatives of all kinds, with all their ramifications. These are a mass organisation of the working people, a non-Party organisation, which unites the working people primarily as consumers, and also, in the course of time, as producers (agricultural co-operatives). The co-operatives acquire special significance after the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, during the period of extensive construction. They facilitate contact between the vanguard of the proletariat and the mass of the peasantry and make it possible to draw the latter into the channel of socialist construction.

Fourthly, there is the Youth League. This is a mass organisation of young workers and peasants; it is a non-Party organisation but is linked with the Party. Its task is to help the Party to educate the

young generation in the spirit of socialism. It provides young reserves for all the other mass organisations of the proletariat in all branches of administration. The Youth League has acquired special significance since the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, in the period of extensive cultural and educational work carried on by the proletariat.

Lastly, there is the Party of the proletariat, its vanguard. Its strength lies in the fact that it draws into its ranks all the best elements of the proletariat from all the mass organisations of the latter. Its function is to combine the work of all the mass organisations of the proletariat without exception and to direct their activities towards a single goal, the goal of the emancipation of the proletariat. And it is absolutely necessary to combine and direct them towards a single goal, for otherwise unity in the struggle of the proletariat is impossible, for otherwise the guidance of the proletarian masses in their struggle for power, in their struggle for building socialism, is impossible. But, only the vanguard of the proletariat, its Party, is capable of combining and directing the work of the mass organisations of the proletariat. Only the Party of the proletariat, only the Communist Party, is capable of fulfilling this role of main leader in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Why?

“ . . . because, in the first place, it is the rallying centre of the finest elements in the working class, who have direct connections with the non-Party organisations of the proletariat and very frequently lead them; because, secondly, the Party, as the rallying centre of the finest members of the working class, is the best school for training leaders of the working class, capable of directing every form of organisation of their class; because, thirdly, the Party, as the best school for training leaders of the working class, is, by reason of its experience and prestige, the only organisation capable

of centralizing the leadership of the struggle of the proletariat, thus transforming each and every non-Party organisation of the working class into an auxiliary body and transmission belt linking the Party with the class" (see *The Foundations of Leninism*¹¹).

The Party is the main guiding force in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

"The Party is the highest form of class organisation of the proletariat" (Lenin).

To sum up: the trade unions, as the mass organisation of the proletariat, linking the Party with the class primarily in the sphere of production; the Soviets, as the mass organisation of the working people, linking the Party with the latter primarily in the sphere of state administration; the co-operatives, as the mass organisation mainly of the peasantry, linking the Party with the peasant masses primarily in the economic sphere, in the sphere of drawing the peasantry into the work of socialist construction; the Youth League, as the mass organisation of young workers and peasants, whose mission it is to help the vanguard of the proletariat in the socialist education of the new generation and in training young reserves; and, finally, the Party, as the main directing force in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat, whose mission it is to lead all these mass organisations—such, in general, is the picture of the "mechanism" of the dictatorship, the picture of "the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat."

Without the Party as the main guiding force, it is impossible for the dictatorship of the proletariat to be at all durable and firm.

Thus, in the words of Lenin, "taken as a whole, we have a formally non-communist, flexible and relatively wide, and very powerful proletarian apparatus, by means of which the Party is closely linked with the class and with the masses, and by means of which,

under the leadership of the Party, the dictatorship of the class is exercised" (see Vol. XXV, p. 192).

Of course, this must not be understood in the sense that the Party can or should take the place of the trade unions, the Soviets, and the other mass organisations. The Party exercises the dictatorship of the proletariat. However, it exercises it not directly, but with the help of the trade unions, and through the Soviets and their ramifications. Without these "transmission belts," it would be impossible for the dictatorship to be at all firm.

"It is impossible to exercise the dictatorship," says Lenin, "without having a number of 'transmission belts' from the vanguard to the mass of the advanced class, and from the latter to the mass of the working people" (see Vol. XXVI, p. 65).

"The Party, so to speak, draws into its ranks the vanguard of the proletariat, and this vanguard exercises the dictatorship of the proletariat. Without a foundation like the trade unions the dictatorship cannot be exercised, state functions cannot be fulfilled. And these functions have to be exercised through a number of special institutions also of a new type; namely, through the Soviet apparatus" (see Vol. XXVI, p. 64).

The highest expression of the leading role of the Party, here, in the Soviet Union, in the land of the dictatorship of the proletariat, for example, is the fact that not a single important political or organisational question is decided by our Soviet and other mass organisations without guiding directives from the Party. In this sense it could be said that the dictatorship of the proletariat is, in essence, the "dictatorship" of its vanguard, the "dictatorship" of its Party, as the main guiding force of the proletariat. Here is what Lenin said on this subject at the Second Congress of the Comintern¹²:

“Tanner says that he stands for the dictatorship of the proletariat, but the dictatorship of the proletariat is not conceived quite in the same way as we conceive it. He says that by the dictatorship of the proletariat we mean, in essence, the dictatorship of its organised and class-conscious minority.

“And, as a matter of fact, in the era of capitalism, when the masses of the workers are continuously subjected to exploitation and cannot develop their human potentialities, the most characteristic feature of working-class political parties is that they can embrace only a minority of their class. A political party can comprise only a minority of the class, in the same way as the really class-conscious workers in every capitalist society constitute only a minority of all the workers. That is why we must admit that only this class-conscious minority can guide the broad masses of the workers and lead them. And if Comrade Tanner says that he is opposed to parties, but at the same time is in favour of the minority consisting of the best organised and most revolutionary workers showing the way to the whole of the proletariat, then I say that there is really no difference between us” (see Vol. XXV, p. 347).

But this, however, must not be understood in the sense that a sign of equality can be put between the dictatorship of the proletariat and the leading role of the Party (the “dictatorship” of the Party), that the former can be identified with the latter, that the latter can be substituted for the former. Sorin, for example, says that “the dictatorship of the proletariat is the dictatorship of our Party.” This thesis, as you see, identifies the “dictatorship of the Party” with the dictatorship of the proletariat. Can we regard this identification as correct and yet remain on the ground of Leninism? No, we cannot. And for the following reasons:

Firstly. In the passage from his speech, at the Second Congress of the Comintern quoted above, Lenin does not by any means identify the leading role of the Party with the dictatorship of the proletariat. He merely says that “only this class-conscious minority (i.e., the Party—J. St.) can guide the broad masses of the workers and lead them,” that it is precisely in this sense that “by the dictatorship of the proletariat we mean, in essence, the dictatorship of its organised and class-conscious minority.”

To say, “in essence” does not mean “wholly.” We often say that the national question is, in essence, a peasant question. And this is quite true. But this does not mean that the national question is covered by the peasant question, that the peasant question is equal in scope to the national question, that the peasant question and the national question are identical. There is no need to prove that the national question is wider and richer in its scope than the peasant question. The same must be said by analogy as regards the leading role of the Party and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Although the Party carries out the dictatorship of the proletariat, and in this sense the dictatorship of the proletariat is, in essence, the “dictatorship” of its Party, this does not mean that the “dictatorship of the Party” (its leading role) is identical with the dictatorship of the proletariat, that the former is equal in scope to the latter. There is no need to prove that the dictatorship of the proletariat is wider and richer in its scope than the leading role of the Party. The Party carries out the dictatorship of the proletariat, but it carries out the dictatorship of the proletariat, and not any other kind of dictatorship. Whoever identifies the leading role of the Party with the dictatorship of the proletariat substitutes “dictatorship” of the Party for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Secondly. Not a single important decision is arrived at by the mass organisations of the proletariat without guiding directives from the Party. That is perfectly true. But does that mean that the

dictatorship of the proletariat consists entirely of the guiding directives given by the Party? Does that mean that, in view of this, the guiding directives of the Party can be identified with the dictatorship of the proletariat? Of course not. The dictatorship of the proletariat consists of the guiding directives of the Party plus the carrying out of these directives by the mass organisations of the proletariat, plus their fulfilment by the population. Here, as you see, we have to deal with a whole series of transitions and intermediary steps which are by no means unimportant elements of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Hence, between the guiding directives of the Party and their fulfilment lie the will and actions of those who are led, the will and actions of the class, its willingness (or unwillingness) to support such directives, its ability (or inability) to carry out these directives, its ability (or inability) to carry them out in strict accordance with the demands of the situation. It scarcely needs proof that the Party, having taken the leadership into its hands, cannot but reckon with the will, the condition, the level of political consciousness of those who are led, cannot leave out of account the will, the condition, and level of political consciousness of its class. Therefore, whoever identifies the leading role of the Party with the dictatorship of the proletariat substitutes the directives given by the Party for the will and actions of the class.

Thirdly. "The dictatorship of the proletariat," says Lenin, "is the class struggle of the proletariat, which has won victory and has seized political power" (see Vol. XXIV, p. 311). How can this class struggle find expression? It may find expression in a series of armed actions by the proletariat against the sorties of the overthrown bourgeoisie, or against the intervention of the foreign bourgeoisie. It may find expression in civil war, if the power of the proletariat has not yet been consolidated. It may find expression, after power has already been consolidated, in the extensive organisational and constructive work of the proletariat, with the

enlistment of the broad masses in this work. In all these cases, the acting force is the proletariat as a class. It has never happened that the Party, the Party alone, has undertaken all these actions with only its own forces, without the support of the class. Usually it only directs these actions, and it can direct them only to the extent that it has the support of the class. For the Party cannot cover, cannot replace the class. For, despite all its important leading role, the Party still remains a part of the class. Therefore, whoever identifies the leading role of the Party with the dictatorship of the proletariat substitutes the Party for the class.

Fourthly. The Party exercises the dictatorship of the proletariat. "The Party is the direct governing vanguard of the proletariat; it is the leader" (Lenin).¹³ In this sense the Party takes power, the Party governs the country. But this must not be understood in the sense that the Party exercises the dictatorship of the proletariat separately from the state power, without the state power; that the Party governs the country separately from the Soviets, not through the Soviets. This does not mean that the Party can be identified with the Soviets, with the state power. The Party is the core of this power, but it is not and cannot be identified with the state power.

"As the ruling Party," says Lenin, "we could not but merge the Soviet 'top leadership' with the Party 'top leadership'—in our country they are merged and will remain so" (see Vol. XXVI, p. 208). This is quite true. But by this Lenin by no means wants to imply that our Soviet institutions as a whole, for instance our army, our transport, our economic institutions, etc., are Party institutions, that the Party can replace the Soviets and their ramifications, that the Party can be identified with the state power. Lenin repeatedly said that "the system of Soviets is the dictatorship of the proletariat," and that "the Soviet power is the dictatorship of the proletariat" (see Vol. XXIV, pp. 15, 14); but he never said that the Party is the state power, that the Soviets and the Party are one and

the same thing. The Party, with a membership of several hundred thousand, guides the Soviets and their central and local ramifications, which embrace tens of millions of people, both Party and non-Party, but it cannot and should not supplant them. That is why Lenin says that “the dictatorship is exercised by the proletariat organised in the Soviets, the proletariat led by the Communist Party of Bolsheviks”; that “all the work of the Party is carried on through the Soviets, which embrace the labouring masses irrespective of occupation” (see Vol. XXV, pp. 192, 193); and that the dictatorship “has to be exercised . . . through the Soviet apparatus” (see Vol. XXV1, p. 64). Therefore, whoever identifies the leading role of the Party with the dictatorship of the proletariat substitutes the Party for the Soviets, i.e., for the state power.

Fifthly. The concept of dictatorship of the proletariat is a state concept. The dictatorship of the proletariat necessarily includes the concept of force. There is no dictatorship without the use of force, if dictatorship is to be understood in the strict sense of the word. Lenin defines the dictatorship of the proletariat as “power based directly on the use of force” (see Vol. XIX, p. 315). Hence, to talk about dictatorship of the Party in relation to the proletarian class, and to identify it with the dictatorship of the proletariat, is tantamount to saying that in relation to its class the Party must be not only a guide, not only a leader and teacher, but also a sort of dictator employing force against it, which, of course, is quite incorrect. Therefore, whoever identifies “dictatorship of the Party” with the dictatorship of the proletariat tacitly proceeds from the assumption that the prestige of the Party can be built up on force employed against the working class, which is absurd and quite incompatible with Leninism. The prestige of the Party is sustained by the confidence of the working class. And the confidence of the working class is gained not by force—force only kills it—but by the Party’s correct theory, by the Party’s correct policy, by the Party’s devotion to the working class, by its connection with the masses of

the working class, by its readiness and ability to convince the masses of the correctness of its slogans.

What, then, follows from all this?

From this it follows that:

1) Lenin uses the word dictatorship of the Party not in the strict sense of the word (“power based on the use of force”), but in the figurative sense, in the sense of its undivided leadership.

2) Whoever identifies the leadership of the Party with the dictatorship of the proletariat distorts Lenin, wrongly attributing to the Party the function of employing force against the working class as a whole.

3) Whoever attributes to the Party the function, which it does not possess, of employing force against the working class as a whole, violates the elementary requirements of correct mutual relations between the vanguard and the class, between the Party and the proletariat.

Thus, we have come right up to the question of the mutual relations between the Party and the class, between Party and non-Party members of the working class.

Lenin defines these mutual relations as “mutual confidence between the vanguard of the working class and the mass of the workers” (see Vol. XXVI, p. 235).

What does this mean?

It means, firstly, that **the Party must closely heed the voice of the masses**; that it must pay careful attention to the revolutionary instinct of the masses; that it must study the practice of the struggle of the masses and on this basis test the correctness of its own policy; that, consequently, it must not only teach the masses, but also learn from them. It means, secondly, that the Party must day by day win

the confidence of the proletarian masses; that it must by its policy and work secure the support of the masses; that it must not command but primarily convince the masses, helping them to realise through their own experience the correctness of the policy of the Party; that, consequently, it must be the guide, the leader and teacher of its class.

To violate these conditions means to upset the correct mutual relations between the vanguard and the class, to undermine "mutual confidence," to shatter both class and Party discipline.

"Certainly," says Lenin, "almost everyone now realises that the Bolsheviks could not have maintained themselves in power for two-and-a-half months, let alone two-and-a-half years, without the strictest, truly iron discipline in our Party, and without the fullest and unreserved support of the latter by the whole mass of the working class, that is, by all its thinking, honest, self-sacrificing and influential elements, capable of leading or of carrying with them the backward strata" (see Vol. XXV, p. 173).

"The dictatorship of the proletariat," says Lenin further, "is a stubborn struggle—bloody and bloodless, violent and peaceful, military and economic, educational and administrative—against the forces and traditions of the old society. The force of habit of millions and tens of millions is a most terrible force. Without an iron party tempered in the struggle, without a party enjoying the confidence of all that is honest in the given class, without a party capable of watching and influencing the mood of the masses, it is impossible to conduct such a struggle successfully" (see Vol. XXV, p. 190).

But how does the Party acquire this confidence and support of the class? How is the iron discipline necessary for the dictatorship of the proletariat built up within the working class; on what soil does it grow up?

Here is what Lenin says on this subject:

“How is the discipline of the revolutionary party of the proletariat maintained? How is it tested? How is it reinforced? Firstly, by the class consciousness of the proletarian vanguard and by its devotion to the revolution, by its stamina, self-sacrifice and heroism. Secondly, by its ability to link itself with, to keep in close touch with, and to a certain extent, if you like, to merge with the broadest masses of the working people—primarily with the proletarian, but also with the non-proletarian, labouring masses. Thirdly, by the correctness of the political leadership exercised by this vanguard, by the correctness of its political strategy and tactics, provided that the broadest masses have been convinced through their own experience of this correctness. Without these conditions, discipline in a revolutionary party that is really capable of being the party of the advanced class, whose mission it is to overthrow the bourgeoisie and transform the whole of society, cannot be achieved. Without these conditions, attempts to establish discipline inevitably become a cipher, an empty phrase, mere affectation. On the other hand, these conditions cannot arise all at once. They are created only by prolonged effort and hard-won experience. Their creation is facilitated only by correct revolutionary theory, which, in its turn, is not a dogma, but assumes final shape only in close connection with the practical activity of a truly mass and truly revolutionary movement” (see Vol. XXV, p. 174).

And further:

“**Victory over capitalism requires** the correct correlation between the leading, Communist, Party, the revolutionary class—the proletariat—and the masses, i.e., the working people and exploited as a whole. Only the Communist

Party, if it is really the vanguard of the revolutionary class, if it contains all the best representatives of that class, if it consists of fully class-conscious and devoted Communists who have been educated and steeled by the experience of stubborn revolutionary struggle, if this Party has succeeded in linking itself inseparably with the whole life of its class and, through it, with the whole mass of exploited, and if it has succeeded in inspiring the complete confidence of this class and this mass—only such a party is capable of leading the proletariat in the most ruthless, resolute and final struggle against all the forces of capitalism. On the other hand, only under the leadership of such a party can the proletariat develop the full might of its revolutionary onslaught and nullify the inevitable apathy and, partly, resistance of the small minority of the labour aristocracy corrupted by capitalism, and of the old trade-union and cooperative leaders, etc.—only then will it be able to display its full strength, which, owing to the very economic structure of capitalist society, is immeasurably greater than the proportion of the population it Constitutes” (see Vol. XXV, p. 315).

From these quotations it follows that:

- 1) The prestige of the Party and the iron discipline within the working class that are necessary for the dictatorship of the proletariat are built up not on fear or on “unrestricted” rights of the Party, but on the confidence of the working class in the Party, on the support which the Party receives from the working class.
- 2) The confidence of the working class in the Party is not acquired at one stroke, and not by means of force against the working class, but by the Party’s prolonged work among the masses, by the correct policy of the Party, by the ability of the Party to convince the masses through their own experience of the correctness of its

policy, by the ability of the Party to secure the support of the working class and to take the lead of the masses of the working class.

3) Without a correct Party policy, reinforced by the experience of the struggle of the masses, and without the confidence of the working class, there is not and cannot be real leadership by the Party.

4) The Party and its leadership, if the Party enjoys the confidence of the class, and if this leadership is real leadership, cannot be counterposed to the dictatorship of the proletariat, because without the leadership of the Party (the “dictatorship” of the Party), enjoying the confidence of the working class, it is impossible for the dictatorship of the proletariat to be at all firm.

Without these conditions, the prestige of the Party and iron discipline within the working class are either empty phrases or boastfulness and adventurism.

It is impossible to counterpose the dictatorship of the proletariat to the leadership (the “dictatorship”) of the Party. It is impossible because the leadership of the Party is the principal thing in the dictatorship of the proletariat, if we have in mind a dictatorship that is at all firm and complete, and not one like the Paris Commune, for instance, which was neither a complete nor a firm dictatorship. It is impossible because the dictatorship of the proletariat and the leadership of the Party lie, as it were, on the same line of activity, operate in the same direction.

“The mere presentation of the question,” says Lenin, “‘dictatorship of the Party or dictatorship of the class? dictatorship (Party) of the leaders or dictatorship (Party) of the masses?’ testifies to the most incredible and hopeless confusion of thought. . . . Everyone knows that the masses are divided into classes. . . ; that usually, and in the majority of cases, at least in modern civilised countries, classes are

led by political parties; that political parties, as a general rule, are directed by more or less stable groups composed of the most authoritative, influential and experienced members, who are elected to the most responsible positions and are called leaders. . . . To go so far . . . as to counterpose, in general, dictatorship of the masses to dictatorship of the leaders is ridiculously absurd and stupid" (see Vol. XXV, pp. 187, 188).

That is absolutely correct. But that correct statement proceeds from the premise that, correct mutual relations exist between the vanguard and the masses of the workers, between the Party and the class. It proceeds from the assumption that the mutual relations between the vanguard and the class remain, so to say, normal, remain within the bounds of "mutual confidence."

But what if the correct mutual relations between the vanguard and the class, the relations of "mutual confidence" between the Party and the class are upset?

What if the Party itself begins, in some way or other, to counterpose itself to the class, thus upsetting the foundations of its correct mutual relations with the class, thus upsetting the foundations of "mutual confidence"? Are such cases at all possible?

Yes, they are.

They are possible:

- 1) if the Party begins to build its prestige among the masses, not on its work and on the confidence of the masses, but on its "unrestricted" rights;
- 2) if the Party's policy is obviously wrong and the Party is unwilling to reconsider and rectify its mistake;

3) if the Party's policy is correct on the whole but, the masses are not yet ready to make it their own, and the Party is either unwilling or unable to bide its time so as to give the masses an opportunity to become convinced through their own experience that the Party's policy is correct, and seeks to impose it on the masses.

The history of our Party provides a number of such cases. Various groups and factions in our Party have come to grief and disappeared because they violated one of these three conditions, and sometimes all these conditions taken together.

But it follows from this that counterposing the dictatorship of the proletariat to the "dictatorship" (leadership) of the Party can be regarded as incorrect only:

1) if by dictatorship of the Party in relation to the working class we mean not a dictatorship in the proper sense of the word ("power based on the use of force"), but the leadership of the Party, which precludes the use of force against the working class as a whole, against its majority, precisely as Lenin meant it;

2) if the Party has the qualifications to be the real leader of the class, i.e., if the Party's policy is correct, if this policy accords with the interests of the class;

3) if the class, if the majority of the class, accepts that policy, makes that policy its own, becomes convinced, as a result of the work of the Party, that that policy is correct, has confidence in the Party and supports it.

The violation of these conditions inevitably gives rise to a conflict between the Party and the class, to a split between them, to their being counterposed to each other.

Can the Party's leadership be imposed on the class by force? No, it cannot. At all events, such a leadership cannot be at all durable. If the Party wants to remain the Party of the proletariat it must know

that it is, primarily and principally, the guide, the leader, the teacher of the working class. We must not forget what Lenin said on this subject in his pamphlet *The State and Revolution*:

“By educating the workers’ party, Marxism educates the vanguard of the proletariat, which is capable of taking power and of leading the whole people to socialism, of directing and organising the new order, of being the teacher, the guide, the leader³⁹ of all the toilers and exploited in building up their social life without the bourgeoisie and against the bourgeoisie” (see Vol. XXI, p. 386).

Can one consider the Party as the real leader of the class if its policy is wrong, if its policy comes into collision with the interests of the class? Of course not. In such cases the Party, if it wants to remain the leader, must reconsider its policy, must correct its policy, must acknowledge its mistake and correct it. In confirmation of this thesis one could cite, for example, such a fact from the history of our Party as the period of the abolition of the surplus-appropriation system, when the masses of workers and peasants were obviously discontented with our policy and when the Party openly and honestly decided to reconsider this policy. Here is what Lenin said at the time, at the Tenth Party Congress, on the question of abolishing the surplus-appropriation system and introducing the New Economic Policy:

“We must not try to conceal anything but must say straightforwardly that the peasantry is not satisfied with the form of relations that has been established with it, that it does not want this form of relations and will not go on living in this way. That is indisputable. It has definitely expressed this will. This is the will of the vast mass of the labouring population. We must reckon with this; and we are sufficiently sober politicians to say straightforwardly: Let us reconsider our policy towards the peasantry” (see Vol. XXVI, p. 238).

Can one consider that the Party should take the initiative and leadership in organising decisive actions by the masses merely on the ground that its policy is correct on the whole, if that policy does not yet meet the confidence and support of the class because, say, of the latter's political backwardness; if the Party has not yet succeeded in convincing the class of the correctness of its policy because, say, events have not yet matured? No, one cannot. In such cases the Party, if it, wants to be a real leader, must know how to bide its time, must convince the masses that its policy is correct, must help the masses to become convinced through their own experience that this policy is correct.

"If the revolutionary party," says Lenin, "has not a majority in the advanced detachments of the revolutionary classes and in the country, an uprising is out of the question" (see Vol. XXI, p. 282).

"Revolution is impossible without a change in the views of the majority of the working class, and this change is brought about by the political experience of the masses" (see Vol. XXV, p. 221).

"The proletarian vanguard has been won over ideologically. That is the main thing. Without this not even the first step towards victory can be made. But it is still a fairly long way from victory. Victory cannot be won with the vanguard alone. To throw the vanguard alone into the decisive battle, before the whole class, before the broad masses have taken up a position either of direct support of the vanguard, or at least of benevolent neutrality towards it, and one in which they cannot possibly support the enemy, would be not merely folly but a crime. And in order that actually the whole class, that actually the broad masses of the working people and those oppressed by capital may take up such a position, propaganda and agitation alone are not enough. For this the masses must have their own political experience" (ibid., p. 228).

We know that this is precisely how our Party acted during the period from Lenin's April Theses to the October uprising of 1917. And it was precisely because it acted according to these directives of Lenin's that it was successful in the uprising.

Such, basically, are the conditions for correct mutual relations between the vanguard and the class. What does leadership mean when the policy of the Party is correct and the correct relations between the vanguard and the class are not upset?

Leadership under these circumstances means the ability to convince the masses of the correctness of the Party's policy; the ability to put forward and to carry out such slogans as bring the masses to the Party's positions and help them to realise through their own experience the correctness of the Party's policy; the ability to raise the masses to the Party's level of political consciousness, and thus secure the support of the masses and their readiness for the decisive struggle.

Therefore, the method of persuasion is the principal method of the Party's leadership of the working class.

"If we, in Russia today," says Lenin, "after two-and-a-half years of unprecedented victories over the bourgeoisie of Russia and the Entente, were to make 'recognition of the dictatorship' a condition of trade-union membership, we should be committing a folly, we should be damaging our influence over the masses, we should be helping the Mensheviks. For the whole task of the Communists is to be able to convince the backward elements, to be able to work among them, and not to fence themselves off from them by artificial and childish 'Left' slogans" (see Vol. XXV, p. 197).

This, of course, must not be understood in the sense that the Party must convince all the workers, down to the last man, and that only

after this is it possible to proceed to action, that only after this is it possible to start operations. Not at all! It only means that before entering upon decisive political actions the Party must, by means of prolonged revolutionary work, secure for itself the support of the majority of the masses of the workers, or at least the benevolent neutrality of the majority of the class. Otherwise Lenin's thesis, that a necessary condition for victorious revolution is that the Party should win over the majority of the working class, would be devoid of all meaning.

Well, and what is to be done with the minority, if it does not wish, if it does not agree voluntarily to submit to the will of the majority? Can the Party, must the Party, enjoying the confidence of the majority, compel the minority to submit to the will of the majority? Yes, it can, and it must. Leadership is ensured by the method of persuading the masses, as the principal method by which the Party influences the masses. This, however, does not preclude, but presupposes, the use of coercion, if such coercion is based on confidence in the Party and support for it on the part of the majority of the working class, if it is applied to the minority after the Party has convinced the majority.

It would be well to recall the controversies around this subject that took place in our Party during the discussion on the trade-union question. What was the mistake of the opposition, the mistake of the Tsektran,¹⁴ at that time? Was it that the opposition then considered it possible to resort to coercion? No! It was not that. The mistake of the opposition at that time was that, being unable to convince the majority of the correctness of its position, having lost the confidence of the majority, it nevertheless began to apply coercion, began to insist on "shaking up" those who enjoyed the confidence of the majority.

Here is what Lenin said at that time, at the Tenth Congress of the Party, in his speech on the trade unions:

“In order to establish mutual relations and mutual confidence between the vanguard of the working class and the masses of the workers, it was necessary, if the Tsektran had made a mistake . . . to correct this mistake. But when people begin to defend this mistake, it becomes a source of political danger. Had not the utmost possible been done in the way of democracy in heeding the moods expressed here by Kutuzov, we would have met with political bankruptcy. First, we must convince, and then coerce. We must at all costs first convince, and then coerce. We were not able to convince the broad masses, and we upset the correct relations between the vanguard and the masses” (see Vol. XXVI, p. 235).

Lenin says the same thing in his pamphlet *On the Trade Unions*¹⁵:

“We applied coercion correctly and successfully only when we were able to create beforehand a basis of conviction for it” (ibid., p. 74).

And that is quite true, for without those conditions no leadership is possible. For only in that way can we ensure unity of action in the Party, if we are speaking of the Party, or unity of action of the class, if we are speaking of the class as a whole. Without this there is splitting, confusion and demoralisation in the ranks of the working class.

Such in general are the fundamentals of correct leadership of the working class by the Party.

Any other conception of leadership is syndicalism, anarchism, bureaucracy—anything you please, but not Bolshevism, not Leninism.

The dictatorship of the proletariat cannot be counterposed to the leadership (“dictatorship”) of the Party if correct mutual relations

exist between the Party and the working class, between the vanguard and the masses of the workers. But from this it follows that it is all the more impermissible to identify the Party with the working class, the leadership (“dictatorship”) of the Party with the dictatorship of the working class. On the ground that the “dictatorship” of the Party cannot be counterposed to the dictatorship of the proletariat, Sorin arrived at the wrong conclusion that “the dictatorship of the proletariat is the dictatorship of our Party.”

But Lenin not only speaks of the impermissibility of such counter position, he also speaks of the impermissibility of counterposing “the dictatorship of the masses to the dictatorship of the leaders.” Would you, on this ground, have us identify the dictatorship of leaders with the dictatorship of the proletariat? If we took that line, we would have to say that “the dictatorship of the proletariat is the dictatorship of our leaders.” But it is precisely to this absurdity that we are led, properly speaking, by the policy of identifying the “dictatorship” of the Party with the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Where does Zinoviev stand on this subject?

In essence, Zinoviev shares Sorin’s point of view of identifying the “dictatorship” of the Party with the dictatorship of the proletariat—with the difference, however, that Sorin expresses himself more openly and clearly, whereas Zinoviev “wriggles.” One need only take, for instance, the following passage in Zinoviev’s book *Leninism* to be convinced of this:

“What,” says Zinoviev, “is the system existing in the U.S.S.R. from the standpoint of its class content? It is the dictatorship of the proletariat. What is the direct mainspring of power in the U.S.S.R.? Who exercises the power of the working class? The Communist Party! In this sense, we have the dictatorship of the Party. What is the juridical form of power in the U.S.S.R.? What is the new type

of state system that was created by the October Revolution? The Soviet system. The one does not in the least contradict the other."

That the one does not contradict the other is, of course, correct if by the dictatorship of the Party in relation to the working class as a whole we mean the leadership of the Party. But, how is it possible, on this ground, to place a sign of equality between the dictatorship of the proletariat and the "dictatorship" of the Party, between the Soviet system and the "dictatorship" of the Party? Lenin identified the system of Soviets with the dictatorship of the proletariat, and he was right, for the Soviets, our Soviets, are organisations which rally the labouring masses around the proletariat under the rally of the Party. But when, where, and in which of his writings did Lenin place a sign of equality between the "dictatorship" of the Party and the dictatorship of the proletariat, between the "dictatorship" of the Party and the system of Soviets, as Zinoviev does now? Neither the leadership ("dictatorship") of the Party nor the leadership ("dictatorship") of the leaders contradicts the dictatorship of the proletariat. Would you, on this ground, have us proclaim that our country is the country of the dictatorship of the proletariat, that is to say, the country of the dictatorship of the Party, that is to say, the country of the dictatorship of the leaders? And yet the "principle" of identifying the "dictatorship" of the Party with the dictatorship of the proletariat, which Zinoviev enunciates surreptitiously and uncourageously, leads precisely to this absurdity.

In Lenin's numerous works I have been able to note only five cases in which he touches, in passing, on the question of the dictatorship of the Party.

The first case is in his controversy with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, where he says:

“When we are reproached with the dictatorship of one party, and when, as you have heard, a proposal is made to establish a united socialist front, we reply: ‘Yes, the dictatorship of one party! We stand by it, and cannot depart from it, for it is that Party which, in the course of decades, has won the position of vanguard of the whole factory and industrial proletariat’” (see Vol. XXIV, p. 423).

The second case is in his “Letter to the Workers and Peasants in Connection with the Victory over Kolchak,” in which he says:

“Some people (especially the Mensheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries—all of them, even the ‘Lefts’ among them) are trying to scare the peasants with the bogey of the ‘dictatorship of one party,’ the Party of Bolsheviks, Communists.

“The peasants have learned from the instance of Kolchak not to be afraid of this bogey.

“Either the dictatorship (i.e., iron rule) of the landlords and capitalists, or the dictatorship of the working class” (see Vol. XXIV, p. 436).

The third case is Lenin’s speech at the Second Congress of the Comintern in his controversy with Tanner. I have quoted it above.

The fourth case is a few lines in the pamphlet “Left-Wing” Communism, an Infantile Disorder. The passages in question have already been quoted above.

And the fifth case is in his draft outline of the dictatorship of the proletariat, published in the Lenin Miscellany, Volume III, where there is a sub-heading “Dictatorship of One Party” (see Lenin Miscellany, Vol. III, p. 497).

It should be noted that in two out of the five cases, the last and the second, Lenin puts the words “dictatorship of one party” in

quotation marks, thus clearly emphasising the inexact, figurative sense of this formula.

It should also be noted that in every one of these cases, by the “dictatorship of the Party” Lenin meant dictatorship (“iron rule”) over the “landlords and capitalists,” and not over the working class, contrary to the slanderous fabrications of Kautsky and Co.

It is characteristic that in none of his works, major or secondary, in which Lenin discusses or merely alludes to the dictatorship of the proletariat and the role of the Party in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat, is there any hint whatever that “the dictatorship of the proletariat is the dictatorship of our Party.” On the contrary, every page, every line of these works cries out against such a formula (see *The State and Revolution*, *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*, “Left-Wing” Communism, an Infantile Disorder, etc.).

Even more characteristic is the fact that in the theses of the Second Congress of the Comintern¹⁶ on the role of a political party, which were drawn up under the direct guidance of Lenin, and to which Lenin repeatedly referred in his speeches as a model of the correct formulation of the role and tasks of the Party, we find not one word, literally not one word, about dictatorship of the Party.

What does all this indicate?

It indicates that:

a) Lenin did not regard the formula “dictatorship of the Party” as irreproachable and exact, for which reason it is very rarely used in Lenin’s works, and is sometimes put in quotation marks;

b) on the few occasions that Lenin was obliged, in controversy with opponents, to speak of the dictatorship of the Party, he usually referred to the “dictatorship of one party,” i.e., to the fact that our Party holds power alone, that it does not share power with other

parties. Moreover, he always made it clear that the dictatorship of the Party in relation to the working class meant the leadership of the Party, its leading role;

c) in all those cases in which Lenin thought it necessary to give a scientific definition of the role of the Party in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat, he spoke exclusively of the leading role of the Party in relation to the working class (and there are thousands of such cases);

d) that is why it never “occurred” to Lenin to include the formula “dictatorship of the Party” in the fundamental resolution on the role of the Party—I have in mind the resolution adopted at the Second Congress of the Comintern;

e) the comrades who identify, or try to identify, the “dictatorship” of the Party and, therefore, the “dictatorship of the leaders” with the dictatorship of the proletariat are wrong from the point of view of Leninism, and are politically short-sighted, for they thereby violate the conditions for correct mutual relations between the vanguard and the class.

This is apart from the fact that the formula “dictatorship of the Party,” when taken without the above-mentioned reservations, can give rise to quite a number of dangers and political setbacks in our practical work. This formula, taken without reservations, says, as it were:

a) to the non-Party masses: don’t dare to contradict, don’t dare to argue, for the Party can do everything, for we have the dictatorship of the Party;

b) to the Party cadres: act more boldly, tighten the screw, there is no need to heed what the non-Party masses say, we have the dictatorship of the Party;

c) to the top leadership of the Party: you may indulge in the luxury of a certain amount of complacency, you may even become conceited, for we have the dictatorship of the Party, and, “consequently,” the dictatorship of the leaders.

It is opportune to call attention to these dangers precisely at the present moment, in a period when the political activity of the masses is rising, when the readiness of the Party to heed the voice of the masses is of particular value to us, when attention to the requirements of the masses is a fundamental precept of our Party, when it is incumbent upon the Party to display particular caution and particular flexibility in its policy, when the danger of becoming conceited is one of the most serious dangers confronting the Party in its task of correctly leading the masses.

One cannot but recall Lenin’s golden words at the Eleventh Congress of our Party:

“Among the mass of the people we (the Communists—J. St.) are after all but a drop in the ocean, and we can administer only when we properly express what the people are conscious of. Unless we do this the Communist Party will not lead the proletariat, the proletariat will not lead the masses, and the whole machine will collapse” (see Vol. XXVII, p. 256).

“Properly express what the people are conscious of”—this is precisely the necessary condition that ensures for the Party the honourable role of the principal guiding force in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

THE QUESTION OF THE VICTORY OF SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY

The pamphlet *The Foundations of Leninism* (May 1924, first edition) contains two formulations on the question of the victory of socialism in one country. The first of these says:

“Formerly, the victory of the revolution in one country was considered impossible, on the assumption that it would require the combined action of the proletarians of all or at least of a majority of the advanced countries to achieve victory over the bourgeoisie. Now this point of view no longer fits in with the facts. Now we must proceed from the possibility of such a victory, for the uneven and spasmodic character of the development of the various capitalist countries under the conditions of imperialism, the development within imperialism of catastrophic contradictions leading to inevitable wars, the growth of the revolutionary movement in all countries of the world—all this leads, not only to the possibility, but also to the necessity of the victory of the proletariat in individual countries” (see *The Foundations of Leninism*17).

This thesis is quite correct and needs no comment. It is directed against the theory of the Social-Democrats, who regard the seizure of power by the proletariat in one country, without the simultaneous victory of the revolution in other countries, as utopian.

But the pamphlet *The Foundations of Leninism* contains a second formulation, which says:

“But the overthrow of the power of the bourgeoisie and establishment of the power of the proletariat in one country does not yet mean that the complete victory of socialism has been ensured. The principal task of socialism—the organisation of socialist production—has still to be fulfilled. Can this task be fulfilled, can the final victory of socialism be achieved in one country, without the joint efforts of the proletarians in several advanced countries? No, it cannot. To overthrow the bourgeoisie the efforts of one country are sufficient; this is proved by the history of our revolution. For the final victory of socialism, for the

organisation of socialist production, the efforts of one country, particularly of a peasant country like Russia, are insufficient; for that, the efforts of the proletarians of several advanced countries are required" (see *The Foundations of Leninism*, first edition¹⁸).

This second formulation was directed against the assertions of the critics of Leninism, against the Trotskyists, who declared that the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country, in the absence of victory in other countries, could not "hold out in the face of a conservative Europe."

To that extent—but only to that extent—this formulation was then (May 1924) adequate, and undoubtedly it was of some service.

Subsequently, however, when the criticism of Leninism in this sphere had already been overcome in the Party, when a new question had come to the fore—the question of the possibility of building a complete socialist society by the efforts of our country, without help from abroad—the second formulation became obviously inadequate, and therefore incorrect.

What is the defect in this formulation?

Its defect is that it joins two different questions into one: it joins the question of the possibility of building socialism by the efforts of one country—which must be answered in the affirmative—with the question whether a country in which the dictatorship of the proletariat exists can consider itself fully guaranteed against intervention, and consequently against the restoration of the old order, without a victorious revolution in a number of other countries—which must be answered in the negative. This is apart from the fact that this formulation may give occasion for thinking that the organisation of a socialist society by the efforts of one country is impossible—which, of course, is incorrect.

On this ground I modified and corrected this formulation in my pamphlet *The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists* (December 1924); I divided the question into two—into the question of a full guarantee against the restoration of the bourgeois order, and the question of the possibility of building a complete socialist society in one country. This was effected, in the first place, by treating the “complete victory of socialism” as a “full guarantee against the restoration of the old order,” which is possible only through “the joint efforts of the proletarians of several countries”; and, secondly, by proclaiming, on the basis of Lenin’s pamphlet *On Co-operation*,¹⁹ the indisputable truth that we have all that is necessary for building a complete socialist society (see *The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists*).

It was this new formulation of the question that formed the basis for the well-known resolution of the Fourteenth Party Conference “The Tasks of the Comintern and the R.C.P.(B.),”²⁰ which examines the question of the victory of socialism in one country in connection with the stabilisation of capitalism (April 1925), and considers that the building of socialism by the efforts of our country is possible and necessary.

This new formulation also served as the basis for my pamphlet *The Results of the Work of the Fourteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.)* published in May 1925, immediately after the Fourteenth Party Conference.

With regard to the presentation of the question of the victory of socialism in one country, this pamphlet states:

“Our country exhibits two groups of contradictions. One group consists of the internal contradictions that exist between the proletariat and the peasantry (this refers to the building of socialism in one country—J. St.). The other

group consists of the external contradictions that exist between our country, as the land of socialism, and all the other countries, as lands of capitalism (this refers to the final victory of socialism—J. St.)” . . . “Anyone who confuses the first group of contradictions, which can be overcome entirely by the efforts of one country, with the second group of contradictions, the solution of which requires the efforts of the proletarians of several countries, commits a gross error against Leninism. He is either a muddle-head or an incorrigible opportunist” (see The Results of the Work of the Fourteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.). 21)

On the question of the victory of socialism in our country, the pamphlet states:

“We can build socialism, and we will build it together with the peasantry under the leadership of the working class” . . . for “under the dictatorship of the proletariat we possess . . . all that is needed to build a complete socialist society, overcoming all internal difficulties, for we can and must overcome them by our own efforts” (ibid. 22).

On the question of the final victory of socialism, it states:

“The final victory of socialism is the full guarantee against attempts at intervention, and hence against restoration, for any serious attempt at restoration can take place only with serious support from outside, only with the support of international capital. Therefore, the support of our revolution by the workers of all countries, and still more the victory of the workers in at least several countries, is a necessary condition for fully guaranteeing the first victorious country against attempts at intervention and

restoration, a necessary condition for the final victory of socialism" (ibid.23).

Clear, one would think.

It is well known that this question was treated in the same spirit in my pamphlet Questions and Answers (June 1925) and in the political report of the Central Committee to the Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.)²⁴ (December 1925).

Such are the facts.

These facts, I think, are known to all the comrades, including Zinoviev.

If now, nearly two years after the ideological struggle in the Party and after the resolution that was adopted at the Fourteenth Party Conference (April 1925), Zinoviev finds it possible in his reply to the discussion at the Fourteenth Party Congress (December 1925) to dig up the old and quite inadequate formula contained in Stalin's pamphlet written in April 1924, and to make it the basis for deciding the already decided question of the victory of socialism in one country—then this peculiar trick of his only goes to show that he has got completely muddled on this question. To drag the Party back after it has moved forward, to evade the resolution of the Fourteenth Party Conference after it has been confirmed by a Plenum of the Central Committee,²⁵ means to become hopelessly entangled in contradictions, to have no faith in the cause of building socialism, to abandon the path of Lenin, and to acknowledge one's own defeat.

What is meant by the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country?

It means the possibility of solving the contradictions between the proletariat and the peasantry by means of the internal forces of our country, the possibility of the proletariat seizing power and using

that power to build a complete socialist society in our country, with the sympathy and the support of the proletarians of other countries, but without the preliminary victory of the proletarian revolution in other countries.

Without, such a possibility, building socialism is building without prospects, building without being sure that socialism will be completely built. It is no use engaging in building socialism without being sure that we can build it completely, without being sure that the technical backwardness of our country is not an insuperable obstacle to the building of a complete socialist society. To deny such a possibility means disbelief in the cause of building socialism, departure from Leninism.

What is meant by the impossibility of the complete, final victory of socialism in one country without the victory of the revolution in other countries?

It means the impossibility of having a full guarantee against intervention, and consequently against the restoration of the bourgeois order, without the victory of the revolution in at least a number of countries. To deny this indisputable thesis means departure from internationalism, departure from Leninism.

“We are living,” says Lenin, “not merely in a state, but in a system of states, and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end. And before that end comes, a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable. That means that if the ruling class, the proletariat, wants to, and will hold sway, it must prove this by its military organisation also” (see Vol. XXIV, p. 122).

“We have before us,” says Lenin in another passage, “a certain equilibrium, which is in the highest degree unstable, but an unquestionable, an indisputable equilibrium, nevertheless. Will it

last long? I do not know and, I think, it is impossible to know. And therefore, we must exercise very great caution. And the first precept of our policy, the first lesson to be learned from our governmental activities during the past year, the lesson which all the workers and peasants must learn, is that we must be on the alert, we must remember that we are surrounded by people, classes and governments who openly express their intense hatred for us. We must remember that we are at all times but a hair's breadth from every manner of invasion" (see Vol. XXVII, p. 117).

Clear, one would think.

Where does Zinoviev stand as regards the question of the victory of socialism in one country?

Listen:

"By the final victory of socialism is meant, at least: 1) the abolition of classes, and therefore 2) the abolition of the dictatorship of one class, in this case the dictatorship of the proletariat." . . . "In order to get a clearer idea of how the question stands here, in the U.S.S.R., in the year 1925," says Zinoviev further, "we must distinguish between two things: 1) the assured possibility of engaging in building socialism—such a possibility, it stands to reason, is quite conceivable within the limits of one country; and 2) the final construction and consolidation of socialism, i.e., the achievement of a socialist system, of a socialist society."

What can all this signify?

It signifies that by the final victory of socialism in one country Zinoviev understands, not a guarantee against intervention and restoration, but the possibility of completely building socialist society. And by the victory of socialism in one country Zinoviev understands the kind of building socialism which cannot and should not lead to completely building socialism. Building at

haphazard, without prospects, building socialism although completely building a socialist society is impossible—such is Zinoviev’s position.

To engage in building socialism without the possibility of completely building it, knowing that it cannot be completely built—such are the absurdities in which Zinoviev has involved himself.

But this is a mockery of the question, not a solution of it!

Here is another extract from Zinoviev’s reply to the discussion at the Fourteenth Party Congress:

“Take a look, for instance, at what Comrade Yakovlev went so far as to say at the last Kursk Gubernia Party Conference. He asks: ‘Is it possible for us, surrounded as we are on all sides by capitalist enemies, to completely build socialism in one country under such conditions?’ And he answers: ‘On the basis of all that has been said we have the right to say not only that we are building socialism, but that in spite of the fact that for the time being we are alone, that for the time being we are the only Soviet country, the only Soviet state in the world, we shall completely build socialism’ (Kurskaya Pravda, No. 279, December 8, 1925). Is this the Leninist method of presenting the question,” Zinoviev asks, “does not this smack of national narrow-mindedness?”

Thus, according to Zinoviev, to recognise the possibility of completely building socialism in one country means adopting the point of view of national narrow-mindedness, while to deny such a possibility means adopting the point of view of internationalism.

But if that is true, is it at all worthwhile fighting for victory over the capitalist elements in our economy?

Does it not follow from this that such a victory is impossible?

Capitulation to the capitalist elements in our economy—that is what the inherent logic of Zinoviev’s line of argument leads us to.

And this absurdity, which has nothing in common with Leninism, is presented to us by Zinoviev as “internationalism,” as “100 per cent Leninism”!

I assert that on this most important question of building socialism Zinoviev is deserting Leninism and slipping to the standpoint of the Menshevik Sukhanov.

Let us turn to Lenin. Here is what he said about the victory of socialism in one country even before the October Revolution, in August 1915:

“Uneven economic and political development is an absolute law of capitalism. Hence, the victory of socialism is possible first in several or even in one capitalist country taken separately. The victorious proletariat of that country, having expropriated the capitalists and organised socialist production, would stand up against the rest of the world, the capitalist world, attracting to its cause the oppressed classes of other countries, raising revolts in those countries against the capitalists, and in the event of necessity coming out even with armed force against the exploiting classes and their states” (see Vol. XVIII, pp. 232-33).

What is meant by Lenin’s phrase “having . . . organised socialist production” which I have stressed? It means that the proletariat of the victorious country, having seized power, can and must organise socialist production. And what does to “organise socialist production” mean? It means completely building a socialist society. It scarcely needs proof that this clear and definite statement of Lenin’s requires no further comment. Otherwise Lenin’s call for the seizure of power by the proletariat in October 1917 would be incomprehensible.

You see that this clear thesis of Lenin's, in comparison with Zinoviev's muddled and anti-Leninist "thesis" that we can engage in building socialism "within the limits of one country," although it is impossible to build it completely, is as different from the latter as the heavens from the earth.

The statement quoted above was made by Lenin in 1915, before the proletariat had taken power. But perhaps he modified his views after the experience of taking power, after 1917? Let us turn to Lenin's pamphlet *On Co-operation*, written in 1923.

"As a matter of fact;" says Lenin, "state power over all large-scale means of production, state power in the hands of the proletariat, the alliance of this proletariat with the many millions of small and very small peasants, the assured leadership of the peasantry by the proletariat, etc.—is not this all that is necessary for building a complete socialist society from the co-operatives, from the co-operatives alone, which we formerly looked down upon as huckstering and which from a certain aspect we have the right to look down upon as such now, under NEP? Is this not all that is necessary for building a complete socialist society? This is not yet the building of socialist society, but it is all that is necessary and sufficient for this building" (see Vol. XXVII, p. 392).

In other words, we can and must build a complete socialist society, for we have at our disposal all that is necessary and sufficient for this building.

I think it would be difficult to express oneself more clearly.

Compare this classical thesis of Lenin's with the anti-Leninist rebuke Zinoviev administered to Yakovlev, and you will realise that Yakovlev was only repeating Lenin's words about the possibility of completely building socialism in one country,

whereas Zinoviev, by attacking this thesis and castigating Yakovlev, deserted Lenin and adopted the point of view of the Menshevik Sukhanov, the point of view that it is impossible to build socialism completely in our country owing to its technical backwardness.

One can only wonder why we took power in October 1917 if we did not count on completely building socialism.

We should not have taken power in October 1917—this is the conclusion to which the inherent logic of Zinoviev’s line of argument leads us.

I assert further that in the highly important question of the victory of socialism Zinoviev has gone counter to the definite decisions of our Party, as registered in the well-known resolution of the Fourteenth Party Conference “The Tasks of the Comintern and the R.C.P.(B.) in Connection with the Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I.”

Let us turn to this resolution. Here is what it says about the victory of socialism in one country:

“The existence of two directly opposite social systems gives rise to the constant menace of capitalist blockade, of other forms of economic pressure, of armed intervention, of restoration. Consequently, the only guarantee of the final victory of socialism, i.e., the guarantee against restoration, is a victorious socialist revolution in a number of countries. . . .” “Leninism teaches that the final victory of socialism, in the sense of a full guarantee against the restoration of bourgeois relationships, is possible only on an international scale. . . .” “But it does not follow from this that it is impossible to build a complete socialist society in a backward country like Russia, without the ‘state aid’ (Trotsky) of countries more developed technically and economically” (see the resolution²⁶).

As you see, the resolution interprets the final victory of socialism as a guarantee against intervention and restoration, in complete contrast to Zinoviev's interpretation in his book *Leninism*.

As you see, the resolution recognises the possibility of building a complete socialist society in a backward country like Russia without the "state aid" of countries more developed technically and economically, in complete contrast to what Zinoviev said when he rebuked Yakovlev in his reply to the discussion at the Fourteenth Party Congress.

How else can this be described if not as a struggle on Zinoviev's part against the resolution of the Fourteenth Party Conference?

Of course, Party resolutions are sometimes not free from error. Sometimes they contain mistakes. Speaking generally, one may assume that the resolution of the Fourteenth Party Conference also contains certain errors. Perhaps Zinoviev thinks that this resolution is erroneous. But then he should say so clearly and openly, as befits a Bolshevik. For some reason or other, however, Zinoviev does not do so. He preferred to choose another path, that of attacking the resolution of the Fourteenth Party Conference from the rear, while keeping silent about this resolution and refraining from any open criticism of the resolution. Zinoviev evidently thinks that this will be the best way of achieving his purpose. And he has but one purpose, namely—to "improve" the resolution, and to amend Lenin "just a little bit." It scarcely needs proof that Zinoviev has made a mistake in his calculations.

What is Zinoviev's mistake due to? What is the root of this mistake?

The root of this mistake, in my opinion, lies in Zinoviev's conviction that the technical backwardness of our country is an insuperable obstacle to the building of a complete socialist society; that the proletariat cannot completely build socialism owing to the

technical backwardness of our country. Zinoviev and Kamenev once tried to raise this argument at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Party prior to the April Party Conference.²⁷ But they received a rebuff and were compelled to retreat, and formally they submitted to the opposite point of view, the point of view of the majority of the Central Committee. But although he formally submitted to it, Zinoviev has continued to wage a struggle against it all the time. Here is what the Moscow Committee of our Party says about this "incident" in the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) in its "Reply" to the letter of the Leningrad Gubernia Party Conference²⁸:

"Recently, in the Political Bureau, Kamenev and Zinoviev advocated the point of view that we cannot cope with the internal difficulties due to our technical and economic backwardness unless an international revolution comes to our rescue. We, however, with the majority of the members of the Central Committee, think that we can build socialism, are building it, and will completely build it, notwithstanding our technical backwardness and in spite of it. We think that the work of building will proceed far more slowly, of course, than in the conditions of a world victory; nevertheless, we are making progress and will continue to do so. We also believe that the view held by Kamenev and Zinoviev expresses disbelief in the internal forces of our working class and of the peasant masses who follow its lead. We believe that it is a departure from the Leninist position" (see "Reply").

This document appeared in the press during the first sittings of the Fourteenth Party Congress. Zinoviev, of course, had the opportunity of attacking this document at the congress. It is characteristic that Zinoviev and Kamenev found no arguments against this grave accusation directed against them by the Moscow Committee of our Party. Was this accidental? I think not. The

accusation, apparently, hit the mark. Zinoviev and Kamenev “replied” to this accusation by silence, because they had no “card to beat it.”

The “New Opposition” is offended because Zinoviev is accused of disbelief in the victory of socialist construction in our country. But if after a whole year of discussion on the question of the victory of socialism in one country; after Zinoviev’s view-point has been rejected by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee (April 1925); after the Party has arrived at a definite opinion on this question, recorded in the well-known resolution of the Fourteenth Party Conference (April 1925)—if, after all this, Zinoviev ventures to oppose the point of view of the Party in his book *Leninism* (September 1925), if he then repeats this opposition at the Fourteenth Party Congress—how can all this, this stubbornness, this persistence in his error, be explained if not by the fact that Zinoviev is infected, hopelessly infected, with disbelief in the victory of socialist construction in our country?

It pleases Zinoviev to regard this disbelief of his as internationalism. But since when have we come to regard departure from Leninism on a cardinal question of Leninism as internationalism?

Will it not be more correct to say that it is not the Party but Zinoviev who is sinning against internationalism and the international revolution? For what is our country, the country “that is building socialism,” if not the base of the world revolution? But can it be a real base of the world revolution if it is incapable of completely building a socialist society? Can it remain the mighty centre of attraction for the workers of all countries that it undoubtedly is now, if it is incapable of achieving victory at home over the capitalist elements in our economy, the victory of socialist construction? I think not. But does it not follow from this that disbelief in the victory of socialist construction, the dissemination

of such disbelief, will lead to our country being discredited as the base of the world revolution? And if our country is discredited the world revolutionary movement will be weakened. How did Messrs. the Social-Democrats try to scare the workers away from us? By preaching that "the Russians will not get anywhere." What are we beating the Social-Democrats with now, when we are attracting a whole series of workers' delegations to our country and thereby strengthening the position of communism all over the world? By our successes in building socialism. Is it not obvious, then, that whoever disseminates disbelief in our successes in building socialism thereby indirectly helps the Social-Democrats, reduces the sweep of the international revolutionary movement, and inevitably departs from internationalism? . . .

You see that Zinoviev is in no better position in regard to his "internationalism" than in regard to his "100 per cent Leninism" on the question of building socialism in one country.

That is why the Fourteenth Party Congress rightly defined the views of the "New Opposition" as "disbelief in the cause of socialist construction," as "a distortion of Leninism."²⁹

THE FIGHT FOR THE VICTORY OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

I think that disbelief in the victory of socialist construction is the principal error of the "New Opposition." In my opinion, it is the principal error because from it spring all the other errors of the "New Opposition." The errors of the "New Opposition" on the questions of NEP, state capitalism, the nature of our socialist industry, the role of the co-operatives under the dictatorship of the proletariat, the methods of fighting the kulaks, the role and importance of the middle peasantry—all these errors are to be traced to the principal error of the opposition, to disbelief in the

possibility of completely building a socialist society by the efforts of our country.

What is disbelief in the victory of socialist construction in our country?

It is, first of all, lack of confidence that, owing to certain conditions of development in our country, the main mass of the peasantry can be drawn into the work of socialist construction.

It is, secondly, lack of confidence that the proletariat of our country, which holds the key positions in our national economy, is capable of drawing the main mass of the peasantry into the work of socialist construction. It is from these theses that the opposition tacitly proceeds in its arguments about the paths of our development—no matter whether it does so consciously or unconsciously.

Can the main mass of the Soviet peasantry be drawn into the work of socialist construction?

In the pamphlet *The Foundations of Leninism* there are two main theses on this subject:

1) "The peasantry in the Soviet Union must not be confused with the peasantry in the West. A peasantry that has been schooled in three revolutions, that fought against the tsar and the power of the bourgeoisie side by side with the proletariat and under the leadership of the proletariat, a peasantry that has received land and peace at the hands of the proletarian revolution and by reason of this has become the reserve of the proletariat—such a peasantry cannot but be different from a peasantry which during the bourgeois revolution fought under the leadership of the liberal bourgeoisie, which received land at the hands of that bourgeoisie, and in view of this became the reserve of the bourgeoisie. It scarcely needs proof that the Soviet peasantry, which has learnt to

appreciate its political friendship and political collaboration with the proletariat, and which owes its freedom to this friendship and collaboration, cannot but represent exceptionally favourable material for economic collaboration with the proletariat.”

2) “Agriculture in Russia must not be confused with agriculture in the West. There, agriculture is developing along the ordinary lines of capitalism, under conditions of profound differentiation among the peasantry, with large landed estates and private capitalist latifundia at one extreme and pauperism, destitution and wage slavery at the other. Owing to this, disintegration and decay are quite natural there. Not so in Russia. Here agriculture cannot develop along such a path, if for no other reason than that the existence of Soviet power and the nationalisation of the principal instruments and means of production preclude such a development. In Russia the development of agriculture must proceed along a different path, along the path of organising millions of small and middle peasants in co-operatives, along the path of developing in the countryside a mass co-operative movement supported by the state by means of preferential credits. Lenin rightly pointed out in his articles on co-operation that the development of agriculture in our country must proceed along a new path, along the path of drawing the majority of the peasants into socialist construction through the co-operatives, along the path of gradually introducing into agriculture the principles of collectivism, first in the sphere of marketing and later in the sphere of production of agricultural products. . . .

“It scarcely needs proof that the vast majority of the peasantry will eagerly take this new path of development, rejecting the path of private capitalist latifundia and wage slavery, the path of destitution and ruin.”⁷⁰

Are these theses correct?

I think that both theses are correct and incontrovertible for the whole of our construction period under the conditions of NEP.

They are merely the expression of Lenin's well-known theses on the bond between the proletariat and the peasantry, on the inclusion of the peasant farms in the system of socialist development of our country; of his theses that the proletariat must march towards socialism together with the main mass of the peasantry, that the organisation of the vast masses of the peasantry in co-operatives is the high road of socialist construction in the countryside, that with the growth of our socialist industry, "for us, the more growth of co-operation is identical . . . with the growth of socialism" (see Vol. XXVII, p. 396).

Indeed, along what path can and must the development of peasant economy in our country proceed? Peasant economy is not capitalist economy. Peasant economy, if you take the overwhelming majority of the peasant farms, is small commodity economy. And what is peasant small commodity economy? It is economy standing at the cross-roads between capitalism and socialism. It may develop in the direction of capitalism, as it is now doing in capitalist countries, or in the direction of socialism, as it must do here, in our country, under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Whence this instability, this lack of independence of peasant economy? How is it to be explained?

It is to be explained by the scattered character of the peasant farms, their lack of organisation, their dependence on the towns, on industry, on the credit system, on the character of the state power in the country, and, lastly, by the well-known fact that the countryside follows, and necessarily must follow, the town both in material and in cultural matters.

The capitalist path of development of peasant economy means development through profound differentiation among the

peasantry, with large latifundia at one extreme and mass impoverishment at the other. Such a path of development is inevitable in capitalist countries, because the countryside, peasant economy, is dependent on the towns, on industry, on credit concentrated in the towns, on the character of the state power—and in the towns it is the bourgeoisie, capitalist industry, the capitalist credit system and the capitalist state power that hold sway.

Is this path of development of peasant farms obligatory for our country, where the towns have quite a different aspect, where industry is in the hands of the proletariat, where transport, the credit system, the state power, etc., are concentrated in the hands of the proletariat, where the nationalisation of the land is a universal law of the country? Of course not. On the contrary. Precisely because the towns do lead the countryside, while we have in the towns the rule of the proletariat, which holds all the key positions of national economy—precisely for this reason the peasant farms in their development must proceed along a different path, the path of socialist construction.

What is this path?

It is the path of the mass organisation of millions of peasant farms into co-operatives in all spheres of co-operation, the path of uniting the scattered peasant farms around socialist industry, the path of implanting the elements of collectivism among the peasantry at first in the sphere of marketing agricultural produce and supplying the peasant farms with the products of urban industry and later in the sphere of agricultural production.

And the further we advance the more this path becomes inevitable under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat, because co-operative marketing, co-operative supplying, and, finally, co-operative credit and production (agricultural co-operatives) are

the only way to promote the welfare of the countryside, the only way to save the broad masses of the peasantry from poverty and ruin.

It is said that our peasantry, by its position, is not socialist, and, therefore, incapable of socialist development. It is true, of course, that the peasantry, by its position, is not socialist. But this is no argument against the development of the peasant farms along the path of socialism, once it has been proved that the countryside follows the town, and in the towns, it is socialist industry that holds sway. The peasantry, by its position, was not socialist at the time of the October Revolution either, and it did not by any means want to establish socialism in our country. At that time, it strove mainly for the abolition of the power of the landlords and for the ending of the war, for the establishment of peace. Nevertheless, it followed the lead of the socialist proletariat. Why? Because the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the seizure of power by the socialist proletariat was at that time the only way of getting out of the imperialist war, the only way of establishing peace. Because there was no other way at that time, nor could there be any. Because our Party was able to hit upon that degree of the combination of the specific interests of the peasantry (the overthrow of the landlords, peace) with, and their subordination to, the general interests of the country (the dictatorship of the proletariat) which proved acceptable and advantageous to the peasantry. And so, the peasantry, in spite of its non-socialist character, at that time followed the lead of the socialist proletariat.

The same must be said about socialist construction in our country, about drawing the peasantry into the channel of this construction. The peasantry is non-socialist by its position. But it must, and certainly will, take the path of socialist development, for there is not, and cannot be, any other way of saving the peasantry from poverty and ruin except the bond with the proletariat, except the

bond with socialist industry, except the inclusion of peasant economy in the common channel of socialist development by the mass organisation of the peasantry in co-operatives.

But why precisely by the mass organisation of the peasantry in co-operatives?

Because in the mass organisation in co-operatives “we have found that degree of the combination of private interest, private trading interest, with state supervision and control of this interest, that degree of its subordination to the general interests” (Lenin) which is acceptable and advantageous to the peasantry and which ensures the proletariat the possibility of drawing the main mass of the peasantry into the work of socialist construction. It is precisely because it is advantageous to the peasantry to organise the sale of its products and the purchase of machines for its farms through co-operatives, it is precisely for that reason that it should and will proceed along the path of mass organisation in co-operatives.

What does the mass organisation of peasant farms in co-operatives mean when we have the supremacy of socialist industry?

It means that peasant small commodity economy abandons the old capitalist path, which is fraught with mass ruin for the peasantry, and goes over to the new path of development, the path of socialist construction.

This is why the fight for the new path of development of peasant economy, the fight to draw the main mass of the peasantry into the work of socialist construction, is the immediate task facing our Party.

The Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.), therefore, was right in declaring:

“The main path of building socialism in the countryside consists in using the growing economic leadership of socialist state industry,

of the state credit institutions, and of the other key positions in the hands of the proletariat to draw the main mass of the peasantry into co-operative organisation and to ensure for this organisation a socialist development, while utilising, overcoming and ousting its capitalist elements" (see Resolution of the Congress on the Report of the Central Committee³²).

The profound mistake of the "New Opposition" lies in the fact that it does not believe in this new path of development of the peasantry, that it does not see, or does not understand, the absolute inevitability of this path under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat. And it does not understand this because it does not believe in the victory of socialist construction in our country, it does not believe in the capacity of our proletariat to lead the peasantry along the path to socialism.

Hence the failure to understand the dual character of NEP, the exaggeration of the negative aspects of NEP and the treatment of NEP as being mainly a retreat.

Hence the exaggeration of the role of the capitalist elements in our economy, and the belittling of the role of the levers of our socialist development (socialist industry, the credit system, the co-operatives, the rule of the proletariat, etc.).

Hence the failure to understand the socialist nature of our state industry, and the doubts concerning the correctness of Lenin's co-operative plan.

Hence the inflated accounts of differentiation in the countryside, the panic in face of the kulak, the belittling of the role of the middle peasant, the attempts to thwart the Party's policy of securing a firm alliance with the middle peasant, and, in general, the wobbling from one side to another on the question of the Party's policy in the countryside.

Hence the failure to understand the tremendous work of the Party in drawing the vast masses of the workers and peasants into building up industry and agriculture, revitalising the co-operatives and the Soviets, administering the country, combating bureaucracy, improving and remodeling our state apparatus—work which marks a new stage of development and without which no socialist construction is conceivable.

Hence the hopelessness and consternation in face of the difficulties of our work of construction, the doubts about the possibility of industrialising our country, the pessimistic chatter about degeneration of the Party, etc.

Over there, among the bourgeoisie, all is going on fairly well, but here, among the proletarians, things are fairly bad; unless the revolution in the West takes place pretty soon, our cause is lost—such is the general tone of the “New Opposition” which, in my opinion, is a liquidationist tone, but which, for some reason or other (probably in jest), the opposition tries to pass off as “internationalism.”

NEP is capitalism, says the opposition. NEP is mainly a retreat, says Zinoviev. All this, of course, is untrue. In actual fact, NEP is the Party’s policy, permitting a struggle between the socialist and the capitalist elements and aimed at the victory of the socialist elements over the capitalist elements. In actual fact, NEP only began as a retreat, but it aimed at regrouping our forces during the retreat and launching an offensive. In actual fact, we have been on the offensive for several years now, and are attacking successfully, developing our industry, developing Soviet trade, and ousting private capital.

But what is the meaning of the thesis that NEP is capitalism, that NEP is mainly a retreat? What does this thesis proceed from?

It proceeds from the wrong assumption that what is now taking place in our country is simply the restoration of capitalism, simply a "return" to capitalism. This assumption alone can explain the doubts of the opposition regarding the socialist nature of our industry. This assumption alone can explain the panic of the opposition in face of the kulak. This assumption alone can explain the haste with which the opposition seized upon the inaccurate statistics on differentiation in the peasantry. This assumption alone can explain the opposition's special forgetfulness of the fact that the middle peasant is the central figure in our agriculture. This assumption alone can explain the under-estimation of the importance of the middle peasant and the doubts concerning Lenin's cooperative plan. This assumption alone can serve to "substantiate" the "New Opposition's" disbelief in the new path of development of the countryside, the path of drawing it into the work of socialist construction.

As a matter of fact, what is taking place in our country now is not a one-sided process of restoration of capitalism, but a double process of development of capitalism and development of socialism—a contradictory process of struggle between the socialist and the capitalist elements, a process in which the socialist elements are overcoming the capitalist elements. This is equally incontestable as regards the towns, where state industry is the basis of socialism, and as regards the countryside, here the main foothold for socialist development is mass co-operation linked up with socialist industry.

The simple restoration of capitalism is impossible, if only for the reason that the proletariat is in power, that large-scale industry is in the hands of the proletariat, and that transport and credit are in the possession of the proletarian state.

Differentiation in the countryside cannot assume its former dimensions, the middle peasants still constitute the main mass of

the peasantry, and the kulak cannot regain his former strength, if only for the reason that the land has been nationalised, that it has been withdrawn from circulation, while our trade, credit, tax and cooperative policy is directed towards restricting the kulaks' exploiting proclivities, towards promoting the welfare of the broad mass of the peasantry and levelling out the extremes in the countryside. That is quite apart from the fact that the fight against the kulaks is now proceeding not only along the old line of organising the poor peasants against the kulaks, but also along the new line of strengthening the alliance of the proletariat and the poor peasants with the mass of the middle peasants against the kulaks. The fact that the opposition does not understand the meaning and significance of the fight against the kulaks along this second line once more confirms that the opposition is straying towards the old path of development in the countryside—the path of capitalist development, when the kulaks and the poor peasants constituted the main forces in the countryside, while the middle peasants were “melting away.”

Co-operation is a variety of state capitalism, says the opposition, citing in this connection Lenin's pamphlet *The Tax in Kind*³³; and, consequently, it does not believe it possible to utilise the co-operatives as the main foothold for socialist development. Here, too, the opposition commits a gross error. Such an interpretation of co-operation was adequate and satisfactory in 1921, when *The Tax in Kind* was written, when we had no developed socialist industry, when Lenin conceived of state capitalism as the possible basic form of conducting our economy, and when he considered co-operation in conjunction with state capitalism. But this interpretation has now become inadequate and has been rendered obsolete by history, for times have changed since then: our socialist industry has developed, state capitalism never took hold to the degree expected, whereas the co-operatives, which now have over ten million members, have begun to link up with socialist industry.

How else are we to explain the fact that already in 1923, two years after *The Tax in Kind* was written, Lenin began to regard co-operation in a different light, and considered that “co-operation, under our conditions, very often entirely coincides with socialism” (see Vol. XXVII, p. 396).

How else can this be explained except by the fact that during those two years socialist industry had grown, whereas state capitalism had failed to take hold to the required extent, in view of which Lenin began to consider co-operation, not in conjunction with state capitalism, but in conjunction with socialist industry?

The conditions of development of co-operation had changed. And so, the approach to the question of co-operation had to be changed also.

Here, for instance, is a remarkable passage from Lenin’s pamphlet *On Co-operation* (1923), which throws light on this matter:

“Under state capitalism, co-operative enterprises differ from state capitalist enterprises, firstly, in that they are private enterprises and, secondly, in that they are collective enterprises. Under our present system, co-operative enterprises differ from private capitalist enterprises because they are collective enterprises, but they do not differ from socialist enterprises if the land on which they are situated and the means of production belong to the state, i.e., the working class” (see Vol. XXVII, p. 396).

In this short passage two big questions are solved. Firstly, that “our present system” is not state capitalism. Secondly, that co-operative enterprises taken in conjunction with “our system” “do not differ” from socialist enterprises.

I think it would be difficult to express oneself more clearly.

Here is another passage from the same pamphlet of Lenin’s:

“. . . for us, the mere growth of co-operation (with the ‘slight’ exception mentioned above) is identical with the growth of socialism, and at the same time we must admit that a radical change has taken place in our whole outlook on socialism” (ibid.).

Obviously, the pamphlet *On Co-operation* gives a new appraisal of the co-operatives, a thing which the “New Opposition” does not want to admit, and which it is carefully hushing up, in defiance of the facts, in defiance of the obvious truth, in defiance of Leninism. Co-operation taken in conjunction with state capitalism is one thing, and co-operation taken in conjunction with socialist industry is another.

From this, however, it must not be concluded that a gulf lies between *The Tax in Kind* and *On Co-operation*. That would, of course, be wrong. It is sufficient, for instance, to refer to the following passage in *The Tax in Kind* to discern immediately the inseparable connection between *The Tax in Kind* and the pamphlet *On Co-operation* as regards appraisal of the co-operatives. Here it is:

“The transition from concessions to socialism is a transition from one form of large-scale production to another form of large-scale production. The transition from small-proprietor co-operatives to socialism is a transition from small production to large-scale production, i.e., it is a more complicated transition, but, if successful, is capable of embracing wider masses of the population, is capable of pulling up the deeper and more tenacious roots of the old, pre-socialist and even pre-capitalist relations, which most stubbornly resist all ‘innovations’” (see Vol. XXVI, p. 337).

From this quotation it is evident that even during the time of *The Tax in Kind*, when we had as yet no developed socialist industry, Lenin was of the opinion that, if successful, co-operation could be transformed into a powerful weapon in the struggle against “pre-

socialist," and, hence, against capitalist relations. I think it was precisely this idea that subsequently served as the point of departure for his pamphlet *On Co-operation*.

But what follows from all this?

From all this it follows that the "New Opposition" approaches the question of co-operation, not in a Marxist way, but metaphysically. It regards co-operation not as a historical phenomenon taken in conjunction with other phenomena, in conjunction, say, with state capitalism (in 1921) or with socialist industry (in 1923), but as something constant and immutable, as a "thing in itself."

Hence the mistakes of the opposition on the question of co-operation, hence its disbelief in the development of the countryside towards socialism through co-operation, hence its turning back to the old path, the path of capitalist development in the countryside.

Such, in general, is the position of the "New Opposition" on the practical questions of socialist construction.

There is only one conclusion: the line of the opposition, so far as it has a line, its wavering and vacillation, its disbelief in our cause and its consternation in face of difficulties, lead to capitulation to the capitalist elements of our economy.

For, if NEP is mainly a retreat, if the socialist nature of state-industry is doubted, if the kulak is almost omnipotent, if little hope can be placed in the co-operatives, if the role of the middle peasant is progressively declining, if the new path of development in the countryside is open to doubt, if the Party is almost degenerating, while the revolution in the West is not very near—then what is there left in the arsenal of the opposition, what can it count on in the struggle against the capitalist elements in our economy? You cannot go into battle armed only with "The Philosophy of the Epoch."³⁴

It is clear that the arsenal of the "New Opposition," if it can be termed an arsenal at all, is an unenviable one. It is not an arsenal for battle. Still less is it one for victory.

It is clear that the Party would be doomed "in no time" if it entered the fight equipped with such an arsenal; it would simply have to capitulate to the capitalist elements in our economy.

That is why the Fourteenth Congress of the Party was absolutely right in deciding that "the fight for the victory of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. is the main task of our Party"; that one of the necessary conditions for the fulfilment of this task is "to combat disbelief in the cause of building socialism in our country and the attempts to represent our enterprises, which are of a 'consistently socialist type' (Lenin), as state capitalist enterprises"; that "such ideological trends, which prevent the masses from adopting a conscious attitude towards the building of socialism in general and of a socialist industry in particular, can only serve to hinder the growth of the socialist elements in our economy and to facilitate the struggle of private capital against them"; that "the congress therefore considers that wide-spread educational work must be carried on for the purpose of overcoming these distortions of Leninism" (see Resolution on the Report of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.)35).

The historical significance of the Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) lies in the fact that it was able radically to expose the mistakes of the "New Opposition," that it rejected their disbelief and whining, that it clearly and precisely indicated the path of the further struggle for socialism, opened before the Party the prospect of victory, and thus armed the proletariat with an invincible faith in the victory of socialist construction.

January 25, 1926

Stalin

to Kaganovich and Molotov

[Pravda's mistakes on the trial of the Zinovievites and Trotskyites]

Pravda fell flat on its face with its articles about the trial of the Zinovievites and Trotskyites. Pravda failed to produce a single article that provided a Marxist explanation of the process of degradation of these scum, their sociopolitical complexion, and their real platform. It reduced everything to the personal element, to the notion that there are evil people who want to seize power and there are good people who hold power and fed this paltry mush to the public.

The articles should have said that the struggle against Stalin, Voroshilov, Molotov, Zhdanov, Kosior, and others is a struggle against the Soviets, a struggle against collectivization, against industrialization, a struggle, consequently, to restore capitalism in the towns and villages of the USSR. Because Stalin and the other leaders are not isolated individuals but the personification of all the victories of socialism in the USSR, the personification of collectivization, industrialization, and the blossoming of culture in the USSR, consequently, the personification of the efforts of workers, peasants, and the working intelligentsia for the defeat of capitalism and the triumph of socialism.

They should have said that whoever fights against the party and the government in the USSR stands for the defeat of socialism and the restoration of capitalism.

They should have said that talk that the Zinovievites and Trotskyites have no platform is a fraud on the part of these scum and a self-deception by our comrades. These scums had a platform. **The gist of their platform was the defeat of socialism in the USSR and the restoration of capitalism.** It wasn't to these scum's

advantage to talk openly about such a platform. Hence their claim that they don't have a platform, which our bumblers took at face value.

They should have said, finally, that the degradation of these scum to the level of White Guards and fascists is a logical outgrowth of their moral decline as opposition leaders in the past. As far back as the X party congress, Lenin said that if a faction or factions persist in their errors in their struggle against the party, under the Soviet system they will, without fail, slide down to the level of White Guardism, the defense of capitalism, a struggle against the Soviets, and must, without fail, merge with the enemies of Soviet rule. This proposition by Lenin has now been brilliantly confirmed. But Pravda, unfortunately, failed to make use of it. That is the spirit and direction in which agitation should have been conducted in the press. All this unfortunately has been missed.

Stalin.

September 6, 1936 (Sent from Sochi on 6 September at 4:05 a.m. (RGASPI, f. 558, op. II, d. 94, l. 31.))

The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence (1931-36); R.W. Davies, Annals of Communism series; Yale University Press © 2003

Stalin

Reply to Comrade Sh.

October 27, 1928

Works, Vol. 11, January 1928 to March 1929

Comrade Sh.,

I have received your letter and must say that I cannot possibly agree with you.

1) It is clear from the quotation from Lenin that **so long as we remain a small-peasant country the danger of the restoration of capitalism will exist**. You say that this opinion of Lenin's "cannot be applied to the present period in the U.S.S.R." Why, one asks? Are we not still a small-peasant country?

Of course, inasmuch as our socialist industry is developing and collective forms of economy are beginning to take root in the countryside, the chances of the restoration of capitalism are diminishing. That is a fact. But does that mean that we have already ceased to be a small-peasant country? Does it mean that the socialist forms have developed to such an extent that the U.S.S.R. can no longer be considered a small-peasant country? It obviously does not.

But what follows from this? Only one thing, namely, **the danger of the restoration of capitalism in our country does exist**. How can one contest such an obvious fact?

2) You say in your letter: "It would appear from what you said about the Right and the 'Left' deviations that our difference both with the Rights and with the 'Lefts' is only over the question of the rate of industrialization. The question of the peasantry, on the other hand, was referred to in your assessment of the Trotskyist

position only sketchily. That gives rise to a very objectionable interpretation of your speech."

It is very possible that my speech is interpreted differently by different people. That is a matter of taste. But that the thoughts expressed in your letter are not in accordance with reality is quite evident to me. I said plainly in my speech that the Right deviation "underestimates the strength of capitalism" in our country, "does not see the danger of the restoration of capitalism," "does not understand the mechanism of the class struggle," "and therefore so readily agrees to make concessions to capitalism." I said plainly in my speech that **"the triumph of the Right deviation in our Party" would "increase the chances of the restoration of capitalism in our country."** You will realise, of course, that what is referred to here is not merely the rate of industrialization.

What more should be said about the Right deviation to satisfy you?

As to the "Left," Trotskyist, deviation, I said plainly in my speech that it denies the possibility of building socialism in our country, rejects the idea of an alliance of the working class and the peasantry, and is prepared to carry out its fantastic plan of industrialization at the cost of a split with the peasantry. I said in my speech (if you have read it) that **"the triumph of the 'Left' deviation in our Party would lead to the working class being separated from its peasant base, to the vanguard of the working class being separated from the rest of the working-class masses, and, consequently, to the defeat of the proletariat and to facilitating conditions for the restoration of capitalism."** You will realise, of course, that what is referred to here is not merely the rate of industrialization.

I think that everything fundamental we have ever said against Trotskyism is said here.

Of course, less was said in my speech about the "Left" deviation than about the Right. But that is because the theme of my speech was the Right deviation, as I definitely specified at the beginning of my speech, and as was fully in accordance with the agenda of the joint plenum of the M.C. and M.C.C. But one thing cannot be denied, and that is that, despite this, everything fundamental that at all distinguishes Trotskyism from Leninism on the one hand, and from the Right deviation on the other, was said in my speech.

What more should be said about Trotskyism in a speech devoted to the Right deviation to satisfy you?

3) You are not satisfied with my statement that in the Political Bureau there are neither Right nor "Left" deviations nor conciliation towards them. Was I justified in making such a statement? I was. Why? Because when the text of the Central Committee's message to the members of the Moscow organisation was adopted by the Political Bureau, not one of the members of the Political Bureau present voted against it. Is this a good or a bad thing? I think it is a good thing. Can such a fact be disregarded when characterizing the Political Bureau in October 1928? Obviously not.

With communist greetings,

J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 247, October 27, 1928

Stalin

THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT

THE FOUNDATION OF LENINISM

From this theme I take three fundamental questions:

- a) the dictatorship of the proletariat as the instrument of the proletarian revolution;
- b) the dictatorship of the proletariat as the rule of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie;
- c) Soviet power as the state form of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

1) The dictatorship of the proletariat as the instrument of the proletarian revolution. The question of the proletarian dictatorship is above all a question of the main content of the proletarian revolution. The proletarian revolution, its movement, its sweep and its achievements acquire flesh and blood only through the dictatorship of the proletariat. The dictatorship of the proletariat is the instrument of the proletarian revolution, its organ, its most important mainstay, brought into being for the purpose of, firstly, crushing the resistance of the overthrown exploiters and consolidating the achievements of the proletarian revolution, and, secondly, carrying the proletarian revolution to its completion, carrying the revolution to the complete victory of socialism. The revolution can defeat the bourgeoisie, can overthrow its power, even without the dictatorship of the proletariat. But the revolution will be unable to crush the resistance of the bourgeoisie, to maintain its victory and to push forward to the final victory of socialism unless, at a certain stage in its development, it creates a special organ in the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat as its principal mainstay. *"The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky," October-November 1918.*

"The fundamental question of every revolution is the question of power." (Lenin.) Does this mean that all that is required is to assume power, to seize it? No, it does not. The seizure of power is only the beginning. For many reasons, the bourgeoisie that is overthrown in one country remains for a long time stronger than the proletariat which has overthrown it. Therefore, the whole point is to retain power, to consolidate it, to make it invincible. What is needed to attain this? To attain this, it is necessary to carry out at least three main tasks that confront the dictatorship of the proletariat "on the morrow" of victory:

a) to break the resistance of the landlords and capitalists who have been overthrown and expropriated by the revolution, to liquidate every attempt on their part to restore the power of capital;

b) to organize construction in such a way as to rally all the working people around the proletariat, and to carry on this work along the lines of preparing for the elimination, the abolition of classes;

c) to arm the revolution, to organize the army of the revolution for the struggle against foreign enemies, for the struggle against imperialism.

The dictatorship of the proletariat is needed to carry out, to fulfil these tasks.

"The transition from capitalism to communism," says Lenin, "represents an entire historical epoch. Until this epoch has terminated, the exploiters inevitably cherish the hope of restoration, and this hope is converted into attempts at restoration. And after their first serious defeat. the overthrown exploiters -- who had not expected their overthrow, never believed it possible, never conceded the thought of it -- throw themselves with energy grown tenfold, with furious passion and hatred grown a hundredfold. into the battle for the recovery of the 'paradise' of which they have been deprived, on behalf of their families, who

had been leading such a sweet and easy life and whom now the 'common herd' is condemning to ruin and destitution (or to 'common' labour . . .). In the train of the capitalist exploiters follow the broad masses of the petty bourgeoisie, with regard to whom decades of historical experience of all countries testify that they vacillate and hesitate, one day marching behind the proletariat and the next day taking fright at the difficulties of the revolution; that they become panic stricken at the first defeat or semi-defeat of the workers, grow nervous, rush about, snivel, and run from one camp into the other." (See Vol. XXIII, p. 355)

The bourgeoisie has its grounds for making attempts at restoration, because for a long time after its overthrow it remains stronger than the proletariat which has overthrown it.

"If the exploiters are defeated in one country only," says Lenin, "and this, of course, is the typical case, since a simultaneous revolution in a number of countries is a rare exception, they still remain stronger than the exploited." (Ibid., p. 354)

Wherein lies the strength of the overthrown bourgeoisie?

Firstly, "in the strength of international capital, in the strength and durability of the international connections of the bourgeoisie." (See Vol. XXV, p. 173.)

Secondly, in the fact that "for a long time after the revolution the exploiters inevitably retain a number of great practical advantages: they still have money (it is impossible to abolish money all at once); some movable property -- often fairly considerable; they still have various connections, habits of organization and management, knowledge of all the 'secrets' (customs, methods, means and possibilities) of management, superior education, close connections with the higher technical personnel (who live and think like the bourgeoisie), incomparably greater experience in the

art of war (this is very important), and so on, and so forth." (See Vol. XXIII, p 354)

Thirdly, "in the force of habit, in the strength of small production. For, unfortunately, small production is still very, very widespread in the world, and small production engenders capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously, daily, hourly, spontaneously, and on a mass scale" . . . for "the abolition of classes means not only driving out the landlords and capitalists -- that we accomplished with comparative ease -- it also means abolishing the small commodity producers, and they cannot be driven out, or crushed; we must live in harmony with them, they can (and must) be remolded and re-educated only by very prolonged, slow, cautious organizational work." (See Vol. XXV, pp. 173 and 189.)

That is why Lenin says:

"The dictatorship of the proletariat is a most determined and most ruthless war waged by the new class against a more powerful enemy, the bourgeoisie, whose resistance is increased tenfold by its overthrow, . . ."

and:

"The dictatorship of the proletariat is a stubborn struggle -- bloody and bloodless, violent and peaceful, military and economic, educational and administrative -- against the forces and traditions of the old society." (Ibid., pp. 173 and 190)

It scarcely needs proof that there is not the slightest possibility of carrying out these tasks in a short period, of accomplishing all this in a few years. Therefore, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the transition from capitalism to communism, must not be regarded as a fleeting period of "super-revolutionary" acts and decrees, but as an entire historical era, replete with civil wars and external conflicts, with persistent organizational work and economic

construction, with advances and retreats, victories and defeats. This historical era is needed not only to create the economic and cultural prerequisites for the complete victory of socialism, but also to enable the proletariat, firstly, to educate itself and become steeled as a force capable of governing the country, and, secondly, to re-educate and remold the petty-bourgeois strata along such lines as will assure the organization of socialist production.

"You will have to go through 15, 20, 50 years of civil wars and international conflicts," Marx said to the workers, "not only to change existing conditions, but also to change yourselves and to make yourselves capable of wielding political power." (See Marx and Engels, Works, Vol. VIII, p. 506.)

Continuing and developing Marx's idea still further, Lenin wrote:

"It will be necessary under the dictatorship of the proletariat to re-educate millions of peasants and small proprietors, hundreds of thousands of office employees, officials and bourgeois intellectuals, to subordinate them all to the proletarian state and to proletarian leadership, to overcome their bourgeois habits and traditions," just as we must " -- in a protracted struggle waged on the basis of the dictatorship of the proletariat -- re-educate the proletarians themselves, who do not abandon their petty bourgeois prejudices at one stroke, by a miracle, at the bidding of the Virgin Mary, at the bidding of a slogan, resolution or decree, but only in the course of a long and difficult mass struggle against mass petty-bourgeois influences." (See Vol. XXV, pp. 248 and 247.) "'Left-Wing' Communism, an Infantile Disorder."

2) The dictatorship of the proletariat as the rule of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie. From the foregoing it is evident that the dictatorship of the proletariat is not a mere change of personalities in the government, a change of the "cabinet," etc., leaving the old economic and political order intact. The Mensheviks and

opportunists of all countries, who fear dictatorship like fire and in their fright substitute the concept "conquest of power" for the concept dictatorship, usually reduce the "conquest of power" to a change of the "cabinet," to the accession to power of a new ministry made up of people like Scheidemann and Noske, MacDonald and Henderson. It is hardly necessary to explain that these and similar cabinet changes have nothing in common with the dictatorship of the proletariat, with the conquest of real power by the real proletariat. With the MacDonalds and Scheidemanns in power, while the old bourgeois order is allowed to remain, their so-called governments cannot be anything else than an apparatus serving the bourgeoisie, a screen to conceal the ulcers of imperialism, a weapon in the hands of the bourgeoisie against the revolutionary movement of the oppressed and exploited masses. Capital needs such governments as a screen when it finds it inconvenient, unprofitable, difficult to oppress and exploit the masses without the aid of a screen. Of course, the appearance of such governments is a symptom that "over there" (i.e., in the capitalist camp) all is not quiet "at the Shipka Pass"; nevertheless, governments of this kind inevitably remain governments of capital in disguise. The government of a MacDonald or a Scheidemann is as far removed from the conquest of power by the proletariat as the sky from the earth. The dictatorship of the proletariat is not a change of government, but a new state, with new organs of power, both central and local; it is the state of the proletariat, which has arisen on the ruins of the old state, the state of the bourgeoisie.

The dictatorship of the proletariat arises not on the basis of the bourgeois order, but in the process of the breaking up of this order, after the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, in the process of the expropriation of the landlords and capitalists, in the process of the socialization of the principal instruments and means of production, in the process of violent proletarian revolution. The

dictatorship of the proletariat is a revolutionary power based on the use of force against the bourgeoisie.

The state is a machine in the hands of the ruling class for suppressing the resistance of its class enemies. In this respect the dictatorship of the proletariat does not differ essentially from the dictatorship of any other class; for the proletarian state is a machine for the suppression of the bourgeoisie. But there is one substantial difference. This difference consists in the fact that all hitherto existing class states have been dictatorships of an exploiting minority over the exploited majority, whereas the dictatorship of the proletariat is the dictatorship of the exploited majority over the exploiting minority.

Briefly, the dictatorship of the proletariat is the rule -- unrestricted by law and based on force -- of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie, a rule enjoying the sympathy and support of the labouring and exploited masses. (Lenin, *The State and Revolution*.)

From this follow two main conclusions:

First conclusion : The dictatorship of the proletariat cannot be "complete" democracy, democracy for all, for the rich as well as for the poor; the dictatorship of the proletariat "must be a state that is democratic in a new way (for the proletarians and the non-propertied in general) and dictatorial in a new way (against the bourgeoisie)." (See Vol. XXI, p. 393.) The talk of Kautsky and Co. about universal equality, about "pure" democracy, about "perfect" democracy, and the like, is a bourgeois disguise of the indubitable fact that equality between the

exploited and exploiters is impossible. The theory of "pure" democracy is the theory of the upper stratum of the working class, which has been broken in and is being fed by the imperialist robbers. It was brought into being for the purpose of concealing the ulcers of capitalism, of embellishing imperialism and lending

it moral strength in the struggle against the exploited masses. Under capitalism there are no real "liberties" for the exploited, nor can there be, if for no other reason than that the premises, printing plants, paper supplies, etc., indispensable for the enjoyment of "liberties" are the privilege of the exploiters. Under capitalism the exploited masses do not, nor can they ever, really participate in governing the country, if for no other reason than that, even under the most democratic regime, under conditions of capitalism, governments are not set up by the people but by the Rothschilds and Stinneses, the Rockefellers and Morgans. Democracy under capitalism is capitalist democracy, the democracy of the exploiting minority, based on the restriction of the rights of the exploited majority and directed against this majority. Only under the proletarian dictatorship are real liberties for the exploited and real participation of the proletarians and peasants in governing the country possible. Under the dictatorship of the proletariat, democracy is proletarian democracy, the democracy of the exploited majority, based on the restriction of the rights of the exploiting minority and directed against this minority.

Second conclusion: The dictatorship of the proletariat cannot arise as the result of the peaceful development of bourgeois society and of bourgeois democracy; it can arise only as the result of the smashing of the bourgeois state machine, the bourgeois army, the bourgeois bureaucratic apparatus, the bourgeois police.

". . . The working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery, and wield it for its own purposes," say Marx and Engels in a preface to *The Communist Manifesto*. The task of the proletarian revolution is "no longer, as before, to transfer the bureaucratic-military machine from one hand to another, but to smash it and this is the preliminary condition for every real people's revolution on the continent," says Marx in his letter to Kugelmann in 1871.

Marx's qualifying phrase about the continent gave the opportunists and Mensheviks of all countries a pretext for clamoring that Marx had thus conceded the possibility of the peaceful evolution of bourgeois democracy into a proletarian democracy, at least in certain countries outside the European continent (Britain, America). Marx did in fact concede that possibility, and he had good grounds for conceding it in regard to Britain and America in the seventies of the last century, when monopoly capitalism and imperialism did not yet exist, and when these countries, owing to the particular conditions of their development, had as yet no developed militarism and bureaucracy. That was the situation before the appearance of developed imperialism. But later, after a lapse of 30 or 40 years, when the situation in these countries had radically changed, when imperialism had developed and had embraced all capitalist countries without exception, when militarism and bureaucracy had appeared in Britain and America also, when the particular conditions for peaceful development in Britain and America had disappeared -- then the qualification in regard to these countries necessarily could no longer hold good.

"Today," said Lenin, "in 1917, in the epoch of the first great imperialist war, this qualification made by Marx is no longer valid. Both Britain and America, the biggest and the last representatives -- in the whole world -- of Anglo-Saxon 'liberty' in the sense that they had no militarism and bureaucracy, have completely sunk into the all-European filthy, bloody morass of bureaucratic-military institutions which subordinate everything to themselves and trample everything underfoot. Today, in Britain and in America, too, 'the preliminary condition for every real people's revolution' is the smashing, the destruction of the 'ready-made state machinery' (perfected in those countries, between 1914 and 1917, up to the 'European' general imperialist standard)." (See Vol. XXI, p. 395.)

In other words, the law of violent proletarian revolution, the law of the smashing of the bourgeois state machine as a preliminary condition for such a revolution, is an inevitable law of the revolutionary movement in the imperialist countries of the world.

Of course, in the remote future, if the proletariat is victorious in the principal capitalist countries, and if the present capitalist encirclement is replaced by a socialist encirclement, a "peaceful" path of development is quite possible for certain capitalist countries, whose capitalists, in view of the "unfavourable" international situation, will consider it expedient "voluntarily" to make substantial concessions to the proletariat. But this supposition applies only to a remote and possible future. With regard to the immediate future, there is no ground whatsoever for this supposition.

Therefore, Lenin is right in saying:

"The proletarian revolution is impossible without the forcible destruction of the bourgeois state machine and the substitution for it of a new one." (See Vol. XXIII, p. 342.)

3) Soviet power as the state form of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat signifies the suppression of the bourgeoisie, the smashing of the bourgeois state machine, and the substitution of proletarian democracy for bourgeois democracy. That is clear. But by means of what organizations can this colossal work be carried out? The old forms of organization of the proletariat, which grew up on the basis of bourgeois parliamentarism, are inadequate for this work -- of that there can hardly be any doubt. What, then, are the new forms of organization of the proletariat that are capable of serving as the gravediggers of the bourgeois state machine, that are capable not only of smashing this machine, not only of substituting proletarian democracy for bourgeois democracy, but also of becoming the

foundation of the proletarian state power? *"The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky."*

This new form of organization of the proletariat is the Soviets.

Wherein lies the strength of the Soviets as compared with the old forms of organization.

In that the Soviets are the most all-embracing mass organizations of the proletariat, for they and they alone embrace all workers without exception.

In that the Soviets are the only mass organizations which unite all the oppressed and exploited, workers and peasants, soldiers and sailors, and in which the vanguard of the masses, the proletariat, can, for this reason, most easily and most completely exercise its political leadership of the mass struggle.

In that the Soviets are the most powerful organs of the revolutionary struggle of the masses, of the political actions of the masses, of the uprising of the masses -- organs capable of breaking the omnipotence of finance capital and its political appendages.

In that the Soviets are the immediate organizations of the masses themselves, i.e., they are the most democratic and therefore the most authoritative organizations of the masses, which facilitate to the utmost their participation in the work of building up the new state and in its administration, and which bring into full play the revolutionary energy, initiative and creative abilities of the masses in the struggle for the destruction of the old order, in the struggle for the new, proletarian order.

Soviet power is the union and constitution of the local Soviets into one common state organization, into the state organization of the proletariat as the vanguard of the oppressed and exploited masses and as the ruling class -- their union in the Republic of Soviets.

The essence of Soviet power consists in the fact that these most all-embracing and most revolutionary mass organizations of precisely those classes that were oppressed by the capitalists and landlords are now the "permanent and sole basis of the whole power of the state, of the whole state apparatus"; that "precisely those masses which even in the most democratic bourgeois republics," while being equal in law, "have in fact been prevented by thousands of tricks and devices from taking part in political life and from enjoying democratic rights and liberties, are now drawn unfailingly into constant and, moreover, decisive participation in the democratic administration of the state." (See Lenin, Vol. XXIV, p. 13.) *First Congress of the Communist International, March 2-6, 1919. "2. Theses and Report on Bourgeois Democracy and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat."*

That is why Soviet power is a new form of state organization different in principle from the old bourgeois-democratic and parliamentary form, a new type of state, adapted not to the task of exploiting and oppressing the labouring masses, but to the task of completely emancipating them from all oppression and exploitation, to the tasks facing the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Lenin is right in saying that with the appearance of Soviet power "the era of bourgeois-democratic parliamentarism has drawn to a close and a new chapter in world history -- the era of proletarian dictatorship -- has been opened."

Wherein lie the characteristic features of Soviet power?

In that Soviet power is the most all-embracing and most democratic state organization of all possible state organizations while classes continue to exist; for, being the arena of the bond and collaboration between the workers and the exploited peasants in their struggle against the exploiters, and basing itself in its work on this bond and on this collaboration, Soviet power is thus the

power of the majority of the population over the minority, it is the state of the majority, the expression of its dictatorship.

In that Soviet power is the most internationalist of all state organizations in class society; for, by destroying every kind of national oppression and resting on the collaboration of the labouring masses of the various nationalities, it facilitates the uniting of these masses into a single state union.

In that Soviet power, by its very structure, facilitates the task of leading the oppressed and exploited masses by the vanguard of these masses -- by the proletariat, as the most united and most politically conscious core of the Soviets.

"The experience of all revolutions and of all movements of the oppressed classes, the experience of the world socialist movement teaches us," says Lenin, "that the proletariat alone is able to unite and lead the scattered and backward strata of the toiling and exploited population." (See Vol. XXIV, p. I4.) The point is that the structure of Soviet power facilitates the practical application of the lessons drawn from this experience.

In that Soviet power, by combining legislative and executive power in a single state organization and replacing territorial electoral constituencies by industrial units, factories and mills thereby directly links the workers and the labouring masses in general with the apparatus of state administration, teaches them how to govern the country.

In that Soviet power alone is capable of releasing the army from its subordination to bourgeois command and of converting it from the instrument of oppression of the people which it is under the bourgeois order, into an instrument for the liberation of the people from the yoke of the bourgeoisie, both native and foreign.

In that "the Soviet organization of the state alone is capable of immediately and effectively smashing and finally destroying the old, i.e., the bourgeois, bureaucratic and judicial apparatus." (Ibid.)

In that the Soviet form of state alone, by drawing the mass organizations of the toilers and exploited into constant and unrestricted participation in state administration, is capable of preparing the ground for the withering away of the state, which is one of the basic elements of the future stateless communist society.

The Republic of Soviets is thus the political form, so long sought and finally discovered, within the framework of which the economic emancipation of the proletariat, the complete victory of socialism, must be accomplished.

The Paris Commune was the embryo of this form; Soviet power is its development and culmination.

That is why Lenin says:

"The Republic of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies is not only the form of a higher type of democratic institution . . . but is the only form capable of ensuring the most painless transition to socialism." (See Vol. XXII, p. 131.)

Stalin

Interview with Foreign Workers' Delegations

November 5, 1927

Works, Vol. 10, August - December 1927

SECOND QUESTION. Why is a Social-Democratic party not allowed in the Soviet Union?

ANSWER: A Social-Democratic party (that is, a Menshevik party) is not allowed in the Soviet Union for the same reason that counterrevolutionaries are not allowed here. Perhaps this may surprise you, but there is nothing surprising about it.

The conditions under which our country developed, the history of its development, are such that, whereas under the tsarist regime Social-Democracy was a more or less revolutionary party, after the overthrow of tsarism, under Kerensky, it became a government party, a bourgeois party, a party standing for imperialist war, and after the October Revolution it became a party of open counter-revolution, a party standing for the restoration of capitalism.

You must surely be aware that the Social-Democrats in our country took part in the Civil War on the side of Kolchak and Denikin, against Soviet power. At the present time that party stands for the restoration of capitalism, the liquidation of the Soviet system.

I think that this evolution of Social-Democracy is typical of it not only in the U.S.S.R., but also in other countries. In our country Social-Democracy was more or less revolutionary so long as the tsarist regime existed. That, in fact, explains why we Bolsheviks, together with the Mensheviks, that is, the Social-Democrats, formed one party. Social-Democracy becomes a bourgeois party, of the opposition or of the government, when the so-called democratic bourgeoisie comes into power. Social-Democracy turns

into a party of open counter-revolution when the revolutionary proletariat comes into power.

A delegate: Does that mean that Social-Democracy is a counter-revolutionary force only here, in the Soviet Union, or can it be described as a counter-revolutionary force in other countries too?

Stalin: I have already said that there is some difference here.

In the land of the proletarian dictatorship, Social-Democracy is a counter-revolutionary force striving for the restoration of capitalism and for the liquidation of the proletarian dictatorship in the name of bourgeois "democracy."

In the capitalist countries, where the proletariat is not yet in power, Social-Democracy is either an opposition party in relation to capitalist rule, or a semi-government party in alliance with the liberal bourgeoisie against the most reactionary forces of capitalism and also against the revolutionary working-class movement, or else an out-and-out government party directly and openly defending capitalism and bourgeois "democracy" against the revolutionary proletarian movement.

It becomes out-and-out counter-revolutionary, and its counter-revolutionary activities are directed against the proletarian regime, only when the latter has become a reality.

Stalin

Questions & Answers to American Trade Unionists: Stalin's Interview with the First American Trade Union Delegation to Soviet Russia

Introduction

ONE of the most important events in the recent history of the American labor movement is the visit of the First American Labor Delegation to the Soviet Union.

To the superficial observer it is difficult to understand why and how it is that the Soviet Union plays such an important role in the development of the American labor movement. In America, we have the most powerful capitalist system. In Soviet Russia, we have a growing socialist economic system. In America the capitalist class rules unchallenged effectively. In Soviet Russia the proletariat rules unchallenged and unchallengeable. But this sharp difference in class relations and in the economic structure of the countries does not itself serve to create a gulf between these two labor movements.

The American labor movement has some very worthwhile traditions. Yet, when compared with the older labor movements in some of the European countries, the traditions of our working class are few. Particularly in a country where the labor movement is young, and the traditions are not many, does the existence of a Soviet Republic in another country play an important role as a source of inspiration and a source of experience. At this particular moment great masses of American workers are not consciously, sufficiently interested in the development within the Soviet Republic. Still there is already an appreciable section of the American working class, virile in character and growing in number, which is keenly interested in the progress and

development of the First Workers and Farmers' Soviet Republic in the world.

The establishment of the 7-hour day in the Soviet Union, the steady progress towards building up socialism in the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, the increasing importance of Soviet Russia in the international arena, the marvelous growth and strength of the Russian trade union movement in contrast with the difficult position and collapse of the labor movement in the capitalist countries, all of these will serve to increase the interest of the great masses of American workers in the progress of the Soviet Republic.

Precisely because of the potentially powerful influences the progress of the Soviet Union will have on the United States as a whole and the American labor movement in particular, have the reactionary trade union bureaucrats mobilized prejudice, ignorance, slander and the vilest misrepresentation against the Soviet Union. Herein lies the reason for the trade union bureaucracy's present policy towards the Soviet Union. Our labor lieutenants of imperialism are well aware of the fact that once the great mass of workers would see through their lies about the Soviet Union, once this weapon of prejudice ended, then one of the most powerful bulwarks of capitalist reaction in the United States — the trade union bureaucracy — would be dealt a mortal blow. This is the specific cause why the official leadership of the American Federation of Labor fights so bitterly against Soviet recognition and why it struggles so desperately against any attempt to bring to the American workers the facts about the situation in the Soviet Republic.

Under these conditions the visit of an American labor delegation composed of bona fide conservative trade unionists, assumes paramount importance. Soviet Russia, as seen thru the eyes of American trade unionists, is portrayed in the Report of the First American Labor Delegation. "Questions and Answers to American

Trade Unionists" completes the study very thoroughly and gives the inside into the problems of the working class of the United States as well as Soviet Russia. This is true despite the fact that the labor delegation did not represent in a narrow form all the prejudices and misconceptions of most of the trade union bureaucracy now dominating the labor movement.

The gap between the developments of class consciousness among the American workers and the class consciousness of the workers in the Soviet Union, is clearly evidenced in the questions and answers herewith given. Equipped with a tremendous capacity for Leninist analysis, Comrade Stalin shows a remarkable understanding not only of the tasks and problems confronting the Russian proletariat, but also of the difficulties and tasks the American working class is facing. In his concise and lucid manner, Comrade Stalin explains very effectively the positive contributions of Leninism to Marxism, the development of the science of proletarian revolution, the role of the Communist Party, the proletarian dictatorship, the forms and methods of building up socialism and the effects of imperialism on the working class.

The discussion between Comrade Stalin and the American trade unionists also focuses attention on certain basic tasks and problems that our working class must meet and meet soon. Why are the American workers so poorly organized? Why is so small a proportion of American workers in the trade unions while so large a proportion of the Russian workers is — over 90 per cent — in the trade unions? What are the relations between the skilled and the unskilled workers in the United States? What lessons can we draw from these relations? How does it come about that the reactionary labor bureaucracy is often far more black in its conservative attitude than even some of the leaders of the bourgeoisie? Social insurance, the labor party, recognition of the Soviet Union, the Communist society, the role of the peasantry, incentive under

Socialist production, the structure of the Soviet system and the development of genuine working class democracy in the Soviet Union, are among the many questions briefly but thoroughly analysed and explained in this third volume of the Workers Library series.

And why is it that the American Federation of Labor Executive Council has not uttered one word of protest against the recognition of the Fascist Government of Italy and Poland by the United States but has worked overtime to prevent the recognition of the Workers' and Farmers' Soviet Republic of Russia by the United States?

It is seldom that American workers, particularly leaders of the American working class, engage in so thorough an examination of such basic questions as the ones raised in the interview of the First American Labor Delegation with Comrade Stalin. The American workers may consider themselves fortunate to have had some of their leaders secure an explanation of such fundamental problems from so authoritative and able a leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as Comrade Stalin.

Labor delegations from the United States to the Soviet Union are no longer a novelty. Since the ice has been broken by the delegation headed by James P. Maurer, President of the Pennsylvania State Federation of Labor, there has already gone to the Soviet Union another American Labor Delegation. This second trade union delegation is more representative of American labor in certain respects in that it has less of the officialdom and more of the rank and file in the basic industries of the country. Consequently, the growing interest on the part of increasing sections of the American working class in the problems and progress of our Russian brothers should be further stimulated by the contents of this volume.

"Questions and Answers to American Trade Unionists," by Comrade Stalin, should go a good deal of the way towards helping lift the fog that has impeded the vision of the American working class. The Workers' Library, Publishers, can be thankful to the founders of this series, particularly Comrades Bertha and Samuel Rubin, Comrade J. Barry, Dr. B., A. T., and others who have rendered valuable service through their contributions to make possible the publication of such timely literature.

Jay Lovestone

November 24, 1927

Joseph Stalin's Interview With The First American Labor Delegation in Russia

Questions Put By The Delegation and Stalin's Replies

QUESTION I: What are the new principles that Lenin and Communist Party practice in Russia have added to Marxism? Would it be correct to say that Lenin believed in "creative revolutions" whereas Marx was more inclined to wait for the culmination of economic forces?

REPLY: I think that Lenin "added" no "new principles" to Marxism nor did Lenin abolish any of the "old" principles of Marxism. Lenin always was and remained a loyal and consistent pupil of Marx and Engels, and wholly and entirely based himself on the principles of Marxism. But Lenin did not merely carry out the doctrines of Marx and Engels. He developed these doctrines further. What does that mean? It means that he developed the doctrines of Marx and Engels in accordance with the new conditions of development, with the new phase of capitalism and with imperialism. This means that in developing further the doctrines of Marx in the new conditions of the class struggle Lenin contributed to Marxism something new as compared with what was created by Marx and

Engels and with what they could create in the pre-imperialistic period of capitalism. Moreover, the contribution made by Lenin to Marxism is based wholly and entirely on the principles laid down by Marx and Engels. In that sense we speak of Leninism as Marxism of the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolutions. Here, for example, are a number of questions in the sphere of which Lenin contributed something new in developing further the doctrines of Marx:

First, the question of monopolistic capitalism, — of imperialism as the new phase of capitalism. Marx and Engels lived in the pre-monopolistic period of capitalism, in the period of the smooth evolution of capitalism and its "peaceful" expansion throughout the whole world. This old phase of capitalism came to a close towards the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries, when Marx and Engels had already passed away. Clearly Marx and Engels could only guess at the new conditions of the development of capitalism which arose out of the new phase of capitalism which succeeded the older phase. In the imperialistic monopolistic phase of development the smooth evolution of capitalism gave way to sporadic catastrophic development; the unevenness of development and the contradictions of capitalism emerged with particular force; the struggle for markets and spheres for the investment of capital conducted amidst conditions of extreme unevenness of development made periodical imperialist wars for a periodical redistribution of the world and of spheres of influence inevitable. The service Lenin rendered, and, consequently, his new contribution, consisted in that he made a fundamental Marxian analysis of imperialism as the final phase of capitalism, he exposed its ulcers and the conditions of its inevitable doom. On the basis of this analysis arose Lenin's well-known postulate that the conditions of imperialism made possible the victory of Socialism in separate capitalist countries.

Second: the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The fundamental idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat as the political domination of the proletariat and as a method of overthrowing the reign of capital by violence was created by Marx and Engels. Lenin's new contribution in this field consists in that (a) utilizing the experience of the Paris Commune and the Russian Revolution he discovered the Soviet form of government as the State form of the Dictator-ship of the Proletariat; (b) he deciphered the formula of Dictatorship of the Proletariat from the point of view of the problem of the proletariat and its allies and defined the Dictatorship of the Proletariat as a special form of class alliance between the proletariat, who is the leader, and the exploited masses of the non-proletarian classes (the peasantry, etc.) who are led; (c) he stressed with particular emphasis the fact that the Dictatorship of the Proletariat is a higher type of democracy in class society, the form of proletarian democracy, expressing the interests of the majority (the exploited) as against capitalist democracy which expresses the interests of the minority (the exploiters).

Third: the question of the forms and methods of the successful building up of Socialism in the period of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, in the period of transition from capitalism to Socialism in a country encircled by capitalist States. Marx and Engels regarded the period of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat as a more or less prolonged period replete with revolutionary conflicts and civil war in the course of which the proletariat in power would take the economic, political, cultural and organizational measures necessary for the purpose of establishing a new Socialist society, a society without classes and without a State, in place of the old capitalist society. Lenin wholly and entirely based himself on these fundamental postulates of Marx and Engels. Lenin's new contribution in this field was (a) he established the possibility of constructing a complete Socialist Society in a land of the

Dictatorship of the Proletariat encircled by imperialist States provided the country is not crushed by the military intervention of the surrounding capitalist States; (b) he outlined the concrete path of economic policy ("the New Economic Policy") by which the proletariat, being in command of the economic key positions (industry, land, transport, the banks, etc.), links up Socialized industry with agriculture ("linking up industry with peasant agriculture") and thus leads the whole of national economy towards Socialism; (c) he outlined the concrete channels by which the bulk of the peasantry is gradually brought into the line of Socialist construction through the medium of the cooperative societies, which, in the hands of the Proletarian Dictatorship, represent a powerful instrument for the transformation of petty-peasant economy and for the re-education of the masses of the peasantry in the spirit of Socialism.

Fourth: the question of the hegemony of the proletariat in revolution, in all popular revolutions — in the revolution against czarism as well as in the revolution against capitalism. Marx and Engels presented the main outlines of the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat. Lenin's new contribution in this field consists in that he further developed and expanded these outlines into a complete system of the hegemony of the proletariat, into a symmetrical system of proletarian leadership of the masses of the toilers in town and country not only in the fight for the overthrow of czarism and capitalism, but also in the work of building up Socialism under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. It is well known that, thanks to Lenin and his Party, the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat was skillfully applied in Russia. This, in passing, explains the fact that the Revolution in Russia brought the proletariat to power. In previous revolutions it usually happened that the workers did all the fighting at the barricades, shed their blood and overthrew the old order, but power passed into the hands of the bourgeoisie, which later oppressed and exploited the

workers. That was the case in England and in France. That was the case in Germany; in Russia, however, things took a different turn. In Russia, the workers did not merely represent the shock troops of the Revolution. While serving as the shock troops of the Revolution, the Russian proletariat at the same time strove for the hegemony, for the political leadership of all the exploited masses of town and country, rallying them around itself, detaching them from the bourgeoisie and politically isolating the bourgeoisie. Being the leader of the exploited masses, the Russian proletariat all the time waged a fight to seize power in its own hands and utilize it in its own interests against the bourgeoisie and against capitalism. This explains why every powerful outbreak of the Revolution in Russia, as in October, 1905, and in February, 1917, gave rise to Councils of Workers' Deputies as the embryo of the new apparatus of power, — the function of which would be to crush the bourgeoisie — as against the bourgeois parliament, the old apparatus of power — the function of which was to crush the proletariat. On two occasions the bourgeoisie in Russia tried to restore the bourgeois parliament and put an end to the Soviets: in August, 1917, at the time of the "Preliminary Parliament" prior to the capture of power by the Bolsheviki, and in January, 1918, at the time of the "Constituent Assembly" after power had been seized by the Proletariat. On both occasions these efforts failed. Why? Because the bourgeoisie was already politically isolated. The vast masses of the toilers regarded the proletariat as the sole leader of the revolution and the Soviets had been already tried and tested by the masses as their own workers' government. For the proletariat to have substituted these Soviets by a bourgeois parliament would be tantamount to committing suicide. It is not surprising, therefore, that bourgeois parliamentarism did not take root in Russia. That is why the Revolution in Russia led to the establishment of the rule of the proletariat. These were the results of the application of the Leninist system of the hegemony of the proletariat in Revolution.

Fifth: the national and colonial question. In analyzing the events in Ireland, India, China and the Central European countries like Poland and Hungary, in their time, Marx and Engels developed the basic, initial ideas of the national and colonial question. In his works Lenin based himself on these ideas. Lenin's new contribution in this field consists in (a) that he gathered these ideas into one symmetrical system of views on national and colonial revolutions in the epoch of imperialism; (b) that he connected the national and colonial question with the question of overthrowing imperialism, and (c) that he declared the national and colonial question to be a component part of the general question of international proletarian revolution.

Finally: the question of the Party of the proletariat. Marx and Engels gave the main outlines of the idea of the Party as being the vanguard of the proletariat without which (the Party) the proletariat could not achieve its emancipation, i.e., could not capture power or reconstruct capitalist society. Lenin's new contribution to this theory consists in that he developed these outlines further and applied them to the new conditions of the struggle of the proletariat in the period of imperialism and showed (a) that the Party is a higher form of a class organization of the proletariat as compared with the other forms of proletarian organization (labor unions; co-operative societies, State organization) and, moreover, its function was to generalize and direct the work of these organizations; (b) that the Dictatorship of the Proletariat may be realized only through the Party as its directing force; (c) that the Dictatorship of the Proletariat can be complete only if it is led by a single Party, the Communist Party, which does not and must not share leadership with any other parties; and (d) that without iron discipline in the Party the tasks of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat to crush the exploiters and to transform class society into Socialist society cannot be fulfilled.

This, in the main, is the new contribution which Lenin made in his works; he developed and made more concrete the doctrines of Marx in a manner applicable to the new conditions of the struggle of the proletariat in the period of imperialism.

That is why we say that Leninism is Marxism of the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolutions.

From this it is clear that Leninism cannot be separated from Marxism, still less can it be contrasted to Marxism. The question submitted by the delegation goes on to ask: "Would it be correct to say that Lenin believed in 'con-structive revolution' whereas Marx was more inclined to await the culmination of the development of economic forces?"

I think it would be absolutely incorrect to say that. I think that every popular revolution, if it is really a popular revolution, is a constructive revolution; for it breaks up the old system and creates a new. Of course, there is nothing constructive in such revolutions (if we can call them that) as take place, let us say, in Albania in the form of toy "rebellions" of one tribe against another. But Marxists never regarded such toy "rebellions" as revolutions. Apparently, it is not such "rebellions" that we are discussing, but mass, popular revolutions, the rising of oppressed classes against oppressing class. Such a revolution cannot but be constructive. Marx and Lenin stood for such a revolution and only for such a revolution. It must be added, of course, that such a revolution cannot arise under all conditions, but can unfold itself only under certain favorable economic and political conditions.

QUESTION II. Is it accurate to say that the Communist Party controls the Russian Government?

REPLY: It all depends upon what is meant by control. In capitalist countries they have a rather curious conception of control. I know that a number of capitalist governments are controlled by big

banks, notwithstanding the existence of "democratic" parliaments. The parliaments assert that they alone control the government. As a matter of fact, the composition of the governments is predetermined, and their actions are controlled by great financial consortiums. Who does not know that there is not a single capitalist "Power" in which the Cabinet can be formed in opposition to the will of the big financial magnates? It is sufficient to exert financial pressure to cause Cabinet Ministers to fall from their posts as if they were stunned. This is real control exercised by banks over governments in spite of the alleged control of parliament. If such control is meant, then I must declare that control of the government by moneybags is inconceivable and absolutely excluded in the U.S.S.R., if only for the reason that the banks have been long ago nationalized, and the moneybags have been ousted. Perhaps the delegation did not mean control, but the guidance exercised by the Party in relation to the Government. If that is what the delegation meant by its question, then my reply is: Yes, our Party does guide the Government. And the Party is able to guide the Government because it enjoys the confidence of the majority of the workers and the toilers generally and it has the right to guide the organs of the Government in the name of this majority.

In what is the guidance of the Government by the workers' Party of the U.S.S.R., by the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., expressed?

First of all it is expressed in that the Communist Party strives, through the Soviets and their Congresses, to secure the election to the principal posts in the Government of its own candidates, its best workers, who are loyal to the cause of the proletariat and prepared truly and faithfully to serve the proletariat. This it succeeds in doing in the overwhelming majority of cases because the workers and peasants have confidence in the Party. It is not an accident that the chiefs of Government departments in our country

are Communists and that these chiefs enjoy enormous respect and authority.

Secondly, the Party supervises the work of the administration, the work of the organs of power; it rectifies their errors and defects, which are unavoidable; it helps them to carry out the decisions of the Government and strives to secure for them the support of the masses. It should be added that not a single important decision is taken by them without the direction of the Party.

Thirdly, when the plan of work is being drawn up by the various Government organs, in industry or agriculture, in trade or in cultural work, the Party gives general leading instructions defining the character and direction of the work of these organs in the course of carrying out these plans.

The bourgeois press usually expresses "astonishment" at this "interference" by the Party in the affairs of the Government. But this "astonishment" is absolutely hypocritical. It is well-known that the bourgeois parties in capitalist countries "interfere" in the affairs of the government and guide the government and moreover that in these countries this guidance is concentrated in the hands of a narrow circle of individuals connected in one way or another with the large banks and because of that they strive to conceal the part they play in this from the people. Who does not know that every bourgeois party in England, or in other capitalist countries, has its secret Cabinet consisting of a close circle of persons who concentrate the guidance in their hands?

Recall, for example, Lloyd George's celebrated reference to the "shadow Cabinet" in the Liberal Party. The differences between the land of the Soviets and the capitalist countries in this respect are (a) in capitalist countries the bourgeois parties guide the government in the interest of the bourgeoisie and against the proletariat, whereas in the U.S.S.R. the Communist Party guides

the Government in the interests of the proletariat and against the bourgeoisie; (b) the bourgeois parties conceal from the people the role they play in guiding the State, and resort to suspicious, secret cabinets, whereas the Communist Party in the U.S.S.R. does not stand in need of such secret cabinets. It condemns the policy and practice of secret cabinets and openly declares to the whole country that it takes upon itself the responsibility for the guidance of the State.

ONE OF THE DELEGATES: On the same principles the Party guides the trade unions?

STALIN: In the main, yes. Formally, the Party cannot give instructions to the trade unions, but the Party gives instructions to the Communists who work in the trade unions. It is known that in the trade unions there are Communist fractions as there are also in the Soviets, cooperative societies, etc. It is the duty of these Communist fractions to secure by argument the adoption of decisions in the trade unions, in the Soviets, cooperative societies, etc., which correspond to the Party's instructions. This they are able to achieve in the overwhelming majority of cases because the Party exercises enormous influence among the masses and enjoys their great confidence. By these means is secured unity of action of the most varied proletarian organizations. If this were not done there would be confusion and clashing in the work of these working-class organizations.

QUESTION III. Since there is legality for one political party only in Russia how do you know that the masses favor Communism?

REPLY: It is true that in the U.S.S.R. there are no legal bourgeois parties, that only one party, the Party of the Workers, the Communist Party, enjoys legality. Have we the ways and means, however, of convincing ourselves that the majority of the workers, the majority of the masses of the toilers sympathize with the

Communists? We speak of course of the masses of the workers and peasants and not of the new bourgeoisie or of the remnants of the old exploiting classes which have been already crushed by the proletariat. Yes, it is possible. We have the ways and means of knowing whether the masses of the workers and peasants sympathize with the Communists or not. Take the most important moments in the life of our country and see whether there are any grounds for the assertion that the masses really sympathize with the Communists.

Take, first of all, so important a moment as the period of the October Revolution in 1917, when the Communist Party, precisely as a Party, openly called upon the workers and peasants to overthrow the rule of the bourgeoisie and when this Party obtained the support of the overwhelming majority of the workers, soldiers and peasants. What was the situation at the time? The Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs) and the Social Democrats (Mensheviks) allied with the bourgeoisie were in power then. The governmental apparatus, both in the center and locally, as well as the command of the 12-million army, was in the hands of these parties, in the hands of the government. The Communist Party was in a state of semi legality. The bourgeoisie of all countries prophesied the inevitable collapse of the Bolshevik Party. The Entente wholly and entirely supported the Kerensky Government. Nevertheless, the Communist Party, the Bolshevik Party never ceased to call upon the proletariat to overthrow this government and to establish the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. What happened? The overwhelming majority of the masses of the toilers in the rear as well as at the front most emphatically supported the Bolshevik Party — the Kerensky Government was overthrown, and the rule of the Proletariat was established. How is it that the Bolsheviks were able to emerge victorious at that time in spite of the malicious forecasts of the bourgeoisie of all countries of the doom of the Bolshevik Party? Does it not prove that the broad masses of the

toilers sympathized with the Bolshevik Party? I think it does. This is the first test of the authority and influence of the Communist Party among the broad masses of the population.

Take the second period, the period of intervention and civil war, when the British capitalists occupied the North of Russia, the districts of Archangel and Murmansk, when the American, British, Japanese and French capitalists occupied Siberia and pushed Kolchak to the forefront, when the French and British capitalists took steps to occupy "South Russia" and raised on their shields Denikin and Wrangel. This was a war conducted by the Entente and the counter-revolutionary generals in Russia against the Communist Government in Moscow, against the achievements of the October Revolution. In this period the strength and stability of the Communist Party among the broad masses of the workers and peasants were put to the greatest test. And what happened? It is generally known that as a result of the Civil War the occupationary troops were driven from Russia and the counterrevolutionary generals were defeated by the Red Army.

Here it was proved that the outcome of war is decided in the last analysis not by technique, with which Kolchak and Denikin were plentifully furnished by the enemies of the U.S.S.R., but by proper policy, the sympathy and support of the millions of the masses of the population. Was it an accident that the Bolshevik Party proved victorious then? Of course not. Does not this fact prove that the Communist Party in Russia enjoys the sympathy of the wide masses of the toilers? I think it does. This is the second test of the strength and stability of the Communist Party in the U.S.S.R.

We will now take up the present period, the post-war period, when questions of peaceful construction are the order of the day. The period of economic ruin has given way to the period of the restoration of industry and later to the period of the reconstruction of the whole of our national economy on a new technical basis.

Have we now ways and means of testing the strength and stability of the Communist Party, of determining the degree of sympathy enjoyed by the Party among the broad masses of the toilers? I think we have.

Take first of all the trade unions which combine nearly 10 million proletarians. Let us examine the composition of the leading organs of these trade unions. Is it an accident that Communists are at the head of these organs? Of course not. It would be absurd to think that the workers in the U.S.S.R. are indifferent to the composition of the leading organs of their trade unions.

The workers in the U.S.S.R. grew up and received their training in the storms of three revolutions. They learned, as no other workers learned, to try their leaders and to expel them if they do not satisfy the interests of the proletariat. At one time the most popular man in our Party was Plekhanov. However, the workers did not hesitate to isolate him completely when they became convinced that he had abandoned the proletarian position. And if these workers express their complete confidence in the Communists, elect them to responsible posts in the trade unions, it is direct evidence that the strength and stability of the Communist Party among the workers in the U.S.S.R. is enormous. This is one test of the undoubted sympathy of the broad masses of the workers for the Communist Party.

Take the last Soviet elections. In the U.S.S.R. the whole of the adult population from the age of 18, irrespective of sex and nationality, — except the bourgeois elements who exploit the labor of others and those who have been deprived of their rights by the courts — enjoys the right to vote. The people enjoying the right to vote number 60 million. The overwhelming majority of these, of course, are peasants. Of these 60 million voters, about 51 per cent, i. e., over 30 million, exercise their right. Now examine the composition of the leading organs of our Soviets both in the center and locally. Is

it an accident that the overwhelming majority of the elected leading elements are Communists? Clearly, it is not an accident. Does not this fact prove that the Communist Party enjoys the confidence of millions of the masses of the peasantry? I think it does. This is another test of the strength and stability of the Communist Party.

Take the Comsomol (Communist Youth League which combines nearly 2 million young workers and peasants. Is it an accident that the overwhelming majority of the elected leading elements in the Communist Youth League are Communists? I think that it cannot be said to be an accident. Thus, you have another test of the strength and authority of the Communist Party.

Finally, take the innumerable conferences, consultations, delegate meetings, etc., which embrace millions of the masses of the toilers, both workingmen and working women, peasants and peasant women, among all the nationalities forming the U.S.S.R. In Western countries, people wax ironical over these conferences and consultations and assert that the Russians like to talk very much. For us, however, these conferences and consultations are of enormous significance in that they serve as a test of the mood of the masses and also as a means of exposing our mistakes and indicating the methods by which these mistakes may be rectified; for we make not a few mistakes and we do not conceal them, because we think that to expose these errors and honestly to rectify them is one of the best means of improving the management of the country. Take the speeches delivered at these conferences and consultations. Note the business-like and ingenuous remarks uttered by these "simple people," these workers and peasants; note the decisions taken and you will see how enormous is the influence and authority of the Communist Party, an influence and authority that any party in the world might envy. Thus, you have still another test of the stability of the Communist Party.

These are the ways and means enabling us to test the strength and influence of the Communist Party among the masses of the people.

That is how I know that the broad masses of the workers and peasants in the U.S.S.R. sympathize the Communist Party.

QUESTION IV. If a non-party group should organize a fraction and nominate candidates for office on a platform which supported the Soviet Government, but at the same time demanded the abolition of the foreign trade monopoly, could they have a party treasury and conduct an active political campaign?

REPLY: I think there is an irreconcilable contradiction in this question. We cannot conceive of a group basing itself on a platform supporting the Soviet Government and at the same time demanding the abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade. Why? Because the monopoly of foreign trade is one of the irremovable foundations of the "platform" of the Soviet Government; because a group demanding the abolition of the foreign trade monopoly could not support the Soviet Government; because such a group would be profoundly hostile to the whole Soviet system.

There are, of course, elements in the U.S.S.R. who demand the abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade. These are the Nepmen, the Kulaks, and the remnants of the already defeated exploiting classes, etc. But these elements represent an insignificant minority of the population. I do not think that the delegation has these elements in mind. If, however, the delegation refers to workers and peasant toilers, then I must say that the demand for the abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade would merely call forth ridicule and hostility among them.

Indeed, what would the abolition of monopoly of foreign trade mean for the workers? For them it would mean abandonment of the industrialization of the country, cessation of the construction of new works and factories and of the expansion of the old works and

factories. To them it would mean that the U.S.S.R. would be flooded with goods from capitalist countries, the destruction of our industry, because of its relative weakness; increase in unemployment, deterioration of the material conditions of the working class, and the weakening of their economic and political conditions. In the last analysis it would mean the strengthening of the Nepmen and the new bourgeoisie generally. Can the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. agree to committing suicide like this? Clearly it cannot.

And what would the abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade mean for the toiling masses of the peasantry? It would mean the transformation of our country from an independent country into a semi-colonial country and the impoverishment of the masses of the peasantry. It would mean a return to the system of "free trade" which prevailed under Kolchak and Denikin when the combined forces of the counterrevolutionary generals and the "Allies" freely plundered the many millions of the peasantry. In the last analysis it would mean the strengthening of the Kulaks and other exploiting elements in the rural districts. The peasants have sufficiently experienced the charms of this system in the Ukraine, in the North Caucasus, on the Volga, and in Siberia. What grounds are there for believing that they desire to put their heads into this noose again? Is it not clear that the toiling masses of the peasantry cannot support a demand for the abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade?

A DELEGATE: The delegation put forward the point concerning the monopoly of foreign trade and of its abolition as a point around which a whole group of the population might organize if there was not the monopoly of a single party, the monopoly of legality in the U.S.S.R.

STALIN: The delegation consequently is returning to the question of the monopoly of the Communist Party, as the sole legal Party in

the U.S.S.R. I replied briefly to this question when I spoke about the ways and means of testing the sympathy of the millions of the masses of the workers and peasants towards the Communist Party. As for the other strata of the population, the Kulaks, the Nepmen, the remnants of the old, defeated, exploiting classes, they are deprived of the right to have their political organizations just as they are deprived of the right to vote. The proletariat deprived the bourgeoisie not only of the factories, workshops, banks, railroads, lands, and mines, but they also deprived them of the right to have their political organizations, because the proletariat does not desire the restoration of the rule of the bourgeoisie. The delegation apparently does not object to the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. depriving the bourgeoisie and the landlords of their factories and workshops, of their land and railroads, banks and mines (laughter, but it seems to me that the delegation is somewhat surprised that the proletariat did not limit itself to this, but went further and deprived the bourgeoisie of political rights. This, to my mind, is not altogether logical, or to speak more correctly, is quite illogical. Why should the proletariat be called upon to show magnanimity towards the bourgeoisie? Does the bourgeoisie in Western countries, where they are in power, show the slightest magnanimity towards the working class? Do they not drive genuine revolutionary parties of the working-class underground?

Why should the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. be called upon to show magnanimity towards their class enemy? You must be logical. Those who think that political rights can be restored to the bourgeoisie must, if they are to be logical, go further and raise the question of restoring to the bourgeoisie the factories and workshops, railroads and banks.

A DELEGATE: It is the task of the delegation to investigate how the opinion of the working class and the peasantry, as distinct from the opinion of the Communist Party, can find legal expression. It

would be incorrect to believe that the delegation is interested in the question of granting political rights to the bourgeoisie, or in the manner in which the bourgeoisie may find legal expression of their opinions. The question is, in what manner can the opinions of the working class and of the peasantry, as distinct from the opinion of the Communist Party, find legal expression?

ANOTHER DELEGATE: These distinctive opinions could find expression in the mass organizations of the working class, in the trade unions, etc.

STALIN: All right. Consequently, the question is not one of the restorations of the political rights of the bourgeoisie, but of the conflict of opinion within the working class and among the peasantry. Is there any conflict of opinion among the workers and the toiling masses of the peasantry at the present time? Undoubtedly there is. It is impossible for millions of workers and peasants to think all alike. This never happens. First of all, there is a great difference between the workers and peasants relative to their economic position and in their views concerning various questions. Secondly, there is some difference in outlook among various sections of the working class, difference in training, different ages, temperament, a difference between the old standing industrial workers and those who have migrated from the rural districts, etc. All this leads to a conflict of opinion among the workers and the toiling masses of the peasantry which finds legal expression at meetings, in trade unions, in cooperative societies, during elections to the Soviets, etc.

But there is a radical difference between the conflict of opinion now, under the proletarian dictatorship and conflict of opinion in the past, prior to the October Revolution. In the past, the conflict of opinion among the workers and the toiling peasantry was concentrated mainly on questions concerning the overthrow of the landlords, of czarism, of the bourgeoisie and of the breakup of the

whole capitalist system. Now, however, under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, conflict of opinion does not revolve around questions concerning the overthrow of the Soviet Government, of the break-up of the Soviet system, but around questions concerning the improvement of the organs of the Soviet Government and improvement of their work. This makes a radical difference. There is nothing surprising in the fact that the conflict of opinion in the past around questions concerning the revolutionary destruction of a prevailing system gave grounds for the appearance of several rival parties in the working class and toiling masses of the peasantry. These parties were: the Bolshevik Party, the Menshevik Party, the Socialist Revolutionary Party. On the other hand it is not difficult to understand that conflict of opinion under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, which has for its aim not the break-up of the existing Soviet system, but its improvement and consolidation, provides no nourishment for the existence of several parties among the workers and the toiling masses in the rural districts. That is why the legality of a single Party, the Communist Party, the monopoly enjoyed by that Party, not only raises no objection among the workers and toiling peasants, but on the contrary, is accepted by them as something necessary and desirable.

The position of our Party as the only legal Party in the country (the monopoly of the Communist Party is not something artificial and deliberately invented. Such a position cannot be created artificially by administrative machinations, etc. The monopoly of our Party grew up out of life, it developed historically as a result of the fact that the Socialist Revolutionary Party and Menshevik Party became absolutely bankrupt and departed from the stage of our social life. What were the Socialist Revolutionary Party and Menshevik Party in the past? They were channels for conducting bourgeois influence into the ranks of the proletariat. By what were these parties cultivated and sustained prior to October 1917? By the

existence of the bourgeois class and ultimately by the existence of bourgeois rule. Clearly, when the bourgeoisie was overthrown the basis for the existence of these parties disappeared. What did these parties become after October 1917? They became parties for the restoration of capitalism and for the overthrow of the rule of the proletariat. Clearly these parties had to lose all support and all influence among the workers and the toiling strata of the peasantry.

The fight between the Communist Party and the Socialist Revolutionary Party and Menshevik Party for influence among the workers did not commence only yesterday. It commenced when the first symptoms of a mass revolutionary movement manifested themselves in Russia, even before 1905.

Stalin

Industrialization of the country and the Right Deviation in the C.P.S.U.(B.)

Speech Delivered at the Plenum of the C.P.S.U.(B.)

November 19, 1928

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I shall deal, comrades, with three main questions raised in the theses of the Political Bureau.

Firstly, the industrialization of the country and the fact that the key factor in industrialization is the development of the production of the means of production, while ensuring the greatest possible speed of this development.

Next, the fact that the rate of development of our agriculture lags extremely behind the rate of development of our industry, and that because of this the most burning question in our home policy today is that of agriculture, and especially the grain problem, the question how to improve, to reconstruct agriculture on a new technical basis.

And, thirdly and lastly, the deviations from the line of the Party, the struggle on two fronts, and the fact that our chief danger at the present moment is the Right danger, the Right deviation.

I

The Rate of Development of Industry

Our theses proceed from the premise that a fast rate of development of industry in general, and of the production of the means of production in particular, is the underlying principle of, and the key to, the industrialisation of the country, the underlying

principle of, and the key to, the transformation of our entire national economy along the lines of socialist development.

But what does a fast rate of development of industry involve? It involves the maximum capital investment in industry. And that leads to a state of tension in all our plans, budgetary and non-budgetary. And, indeed, the characteristic feature of our control figures in the past three years, in the period of reconstruction, is that they have been compiled and carried out at a high tension. Take our control figures, examine our budget estimates, talk with our Party comrades—both those who work in the Party organisations and those who direct our Soviet, economic and co-operative affairs—and you will invariably find this one characteristic feature—everywhere, namely, the state of tension in our plans. The question arises: is this state of tension in our plans really necessary for us? Cannot we do without it? Is it not possible to conduct the work at a slower pace, in a more "restful" atmosphere? Is not the fast rate of industrial development that we have adopted due to the restless character of the members of the Political Bureau and the Council of People's Commissars?

Of course not! The members of the Political Bureau and the Council of People's Commissars are calm and sober people. Abstractly speaking, that is, if we disregarded the external and internal situation, we could, of course, conduct the work at a slower speed. But the point is that, firstly, we cannot disregard the external and internal situation, and, secondly, if we take the surrounding situation as our starting-point, it has to be admitted that it is precisely this situation that dictates a fast rate of development of our industry.

Permit me to pass to an examination of this situation, of these conditions of an external and internal order that dictate a fast rate of industrial development.

External conditions. We have assumed power in a country whose technical equipment is terribly backward. Along with a few big industrial units more or less based upon modern technology, we have hundreds and thousands of mills and factories the technical equipment of which is beneath all criticism from the point of view of modern achievements. At the same time, we have around us a number of capitalist countries whose industrial technique is far more developed and up-to-date than that of our country. Look at the capitalist countries and you will see that their technology is not only advancing, but advancing by leaps and bounds, outstripping the old forms of industrial technique. And so we find that, on the one hand, we in our country have the most advanced system, the Soviet system, and the most advanced type of state power in the world, Soviet power, while, on the other hand, our industry, which should be the basis of socialism and of Soviet power, is extremely backward technically. Do you think that we can achieve the final victory of socialism in our country so long as this contradiction exists?

What has to be done to end this contradiction? To end it, we must overtake and outstrip the advanced technology of the developed capitalist countries. We have overtaken and outstripped the advanced capitalist countries in the sense of establishing a new political system, the Soviet system. That is good. But it is not enough. In order to secure the final victory of socialism in our country, we must also overtake and outstrip these countries technically and economically. Either we do this, or we shall be forced to the wall.

This applies not only to the building of socialism. It applies also to upholding the independence of our country in the circumstances of the capitalist encirclement. The independence of our country cannot be upheld unless we have an adequate industrial basis for

defence. And such an industrial basis cannot be created if our industry is not more highly developed technically.

That is why a fast rate of development of our industry is necessary and imperative.

The technical and economic backwardness of our country was not invented by us. This backwardness is age-old and was bequeathed to us by the whole history of our country. This backwardness was felt to be an evil both earlier, before the revolution, and later, after the revolution. When Peter the Great, having to deal with the more highly developed countries of the West, feverishly built mills and factories to supply the army and strengthen the country's defences, that was in its way an attempt to break out of the grip of this backwardness. It is quite understandable, however, that none of the old classes, neither the feudal aristocracy nor the bourgeoisie, could solve the problem of putting an end to the backwardness of our country. More than that, not only were these classes unable to solve this problem, they were not even able to formulate the task in any satisfactory way. The age-old backwardness of our country can be ended only on the lines of successful socialist construction. And it can be ended only by the proletariat, which has established its dictatorship and has charge of the direction of the country.

It would be foolish to console ourselves with the thought that, since the backwardness of our country was not invented by us and was bequeathed to us by the whole history of our country, we cannot be, and do not have to be, responsible for it. That is not true, comrades. Since we have come to power and taken upon ourselves the task of transforming the country on the basis of socialism, we are responsible, and have to be responsible, for everything, the bad as well as the good. And just because we are responsible for everything, we must put an end to our technical and economic backwardness. We must do so without fail if we really want to overtake and outstrip the advanced capitalist countries. And only

we Bolsheviks can do it. But precisely in order to accomplish this task, we must systematically achieve a fast rate of development of our industry. And that we are already achieving a fast rate of industrial development is now clear to everyone.

The question of overtaking and outstripping the advanced capitalist countries technically and economically is for us Bolsheviks neither new nor unexpected. It was raised in our country as early as in 1917, before the October Revolution. It was raised by Lenin as early as in September 1917, on the eve of the October Revolution, during the imperialist war, in his pamphlet *The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It*. Here is what Lenin said on this score:

"The result of the revolution has been that the political system of Russia has in a few months caught up with that of the advanced countries. But that is not enough. The war is inexorable; it puts the alternative with ruthless severity: either perish or overtake and outstrip the advanced countries economically as well. . . . Perish or drive full steam ahead. That is the alternative with which history has confronted us" (Vol. XXI, p. 191).

You see how bluntly Lenin put the question of ending our technical and economic backwardness.

Lenin wrote all this on the eve of the October Revolution, in the period before the proletariat had taken power, when the Bolsheviks had as yet neither state power, nor a socialised industry, nor a widely ramified co-operative network embracing millions of peasants, nor collective farms, nor state farms. Today, when we already have something substantial with which to end completely our technical and economic backwardness, we might paraphrase Lenin's words roughly as follows:

"We have overtaken and outstripped the advanced capitalist countries politically by establishing the dictatorship of the

proletariat. But that is not enough. We must utilise the dictatorship of the proletariat, our socialised industry, transport, credit system, etc., the co-operatives, collective farms, state farms, etc., in order to overtake and outstrip the advanced capitalist countries economically as well."

The question of a fast rate of development of industry would not face us so acutely as it does now if we had such a highly developed industry and such a highly developed technology as Germany, say, and if the relative importance of industry in the entire national economy were as high in our country as it is in Germany, for example. If that were the case, we could develop our industry at a slower rate without fearing to fall behind the capitalist countries and knowing that we could outstrip them at one stroke. But then we should not be so seriously backward technically and economically as we are now. The whole point is that we are behind Germany in this respect and are still far from having overtaken her technically and economically.

The question of a fast rate of development of industry would not face us so acutely if we were not the only country but one of the countries of the dictatorship of the proletariat, if there were a proletarian dictatorship not only in our country but in other, more advanced countries as well, Germany and France, say.

If that were the case, the capitalist encirclement could not be so serious a danger as it is now, the question of the economic independence of our country would naturally recede into the background, we could integrate ourselves into the system of more developed proletarian states, we could receive from them machines for making our industry and agriculture more productive, supplying them in turn with raw materials and foodstuffs, and we could, consequently, expand our industry at a slower rate. But you know very well that that is not yet the case and that we are still the only country of the proletarian dictatorship

and are surrounded by capitalist countries, many of which are far in advance of us technically and economically.

That is why Lenin raised the question of overtaking and outstripping the economically advanced countries as one of life and death for our development.

Such are **the external conditions** dictating a fast rate of development of our industry.

Internal conditions. But besides the external conditions, there are also internal conditions which dictate a fast rate of development of our industry as the main foundation of our entire national economy. I am referring to the extreme backwardness of our agriculture, of its technical and cultural level. I am referring to the existence in our country of an overwhelming preponderance of small commodity producers, with their scattered and utterly backward production, compared with which our large-scale socialist industry is like an island in the midst of the sea, an island whose base is expanding daily, but which is nevertheless an island in the midst of the sea.

We are in the habit of saying that industry is the main foundation of our entire national economy, including agriculture, that it is the key to the reconstruction of our backward and scattered system of agriculture on a collectivist basis. That is perfectly true. From that position we must not retreat for a single moment. But it must also be remembered that, while industry is the main foundation, agriculture constitutes the basis for industrial development, both as a market which absorbs the products of industry and as a supplier of raw materials and foodstuffs, as well as a source of the export reserves essential in order to import machinery for the needs of our national economy. Can we advance industry while leaving agriculture in a state of complete technical backwardness, without providing an agricultural base for industry, without

reconstructing agriculture and bringing it up to the level of industry? No, we cannot.

Hence the task of supplying agriculture with the maximum amount of instruments and means of production essential in order to accelerate and promote its reconstruction on a new technical basis. But for the accomplishment of this task a fast rate of development of our industry is necessary. Of course, the reconstruction of a disunited and scattered agriculture is an incomparably more difficult matter than the reconstruction of a united and centralised socialist industry. But that is the task that confronts us, and we must accomplish it. And it cannot be accomplished except by a fast rate of industrial development.

We cannot go on indefinitely, that is, for too long a period, basing the Soviet regime and socialist construction on two different foundations, the foundation of the most large-scale and united socialist industry and the foundation of the most scattered and backward, small commodity economy of the peasants. We must gradually, but systematically and persistently, place our agriculture on a new technical basis, the basis of large-scale production, and bring it up to the level of socialist industry. Either we accomplish this task—in which case the final victory of socialism in our country will be assured, or we turn away from it and do not accomplish it—in which case a return to capitalism may become inevitable.

Here is what Lenin says on this score:

"As long as we live in a small-peasant country, there is a surer economic basis for capitalism in Russia than for communism. This must be borne in mind. Anyone who has carefully observed life in the countryside, as compared with life in the towns, knows that we have not torn out the roots of capitalism and have not undermined the foundation, the basis of the internal enemy. The latter depends

on small-scale production, and there is only one way of undermining it, namely, to place the economy of the country, including agriculture, on a new technical basis, the technical basis of modern large-scale production. And it is only electricity that is such a basis. Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country" (Vol. XXVI, p. 46).

As you see, when Lenin speaks of the electrification of the country he means not the isolated construction of individual power stations, but the gradual "placing of the economy of the country, including agriculture, on a new technical basis, the technical basis of modern large-scale production," which in one way or another, directly or indirectly, is connected with electrification.

Lenin delivered this speech at the Eighth Congress of Soviets in December 1920, on the very eve of the introduction of NEP, when he was substantiating the so-called plan of electrification, that is, the GOELRO plan. Some comrades argue on these grounds that the views expressed in this quotation have become inapplicable under present conditions. Why, we ask? Because, they say, much water has flown under the bridges since then. It is, of course, true that much water has flown under the bridges since then. We now have a developed socialist industry, we have collective farms on a mass scale, we have old and new state farms, we have a wide network of well-developed co-operative organisations, we have machine-hiring stations at the service of the peasant farms, we now practice the contract system as a new form of the bond, and we can put into operation all these and a number of other levers for gradually placing agriculture on a new technical basis. All this is true. But it is also true that, in spite of all this, we are still a small-peasant country where small-scale production predominates. And that is the fundamental thing. And as long as it continues to be the fundamental thing, Lenin's thesis remains valid that "as long as we live in a small-peasant country, there is a surer economic basis for

capitalism in Russia than for communism," and that, consequently, the danger of the restoration of capitalism is no empty phrase.

Lenin says the same thing, but in a sharper form, in the plan of his pamphlet, *The Tax in Kind*, which was written after the introduction of NEP (March-April 1921):

"If we have electrification in 10-20 years, then the individualism of the small tiller, and freedom for him to trade locally are not a whit terrible. If we do not have electrification, a return to capitalism will be inevitable anyhow."

And further on he says:

"Ten or twenty years of correct relations with the peasantry, and victory on a world scale is assured (even if the proletarian revolutions, which are growing, are delayed); otherwise, 20-40 years of the torments of white guard terrorism" (Vol. XXVI, p. 313).

You see how bluntly Lenin puts the question: either electrification, that is, the "placing of the economy of the country, including agriculture, on a new technical basis, the technical basis of modern large-scale production," or a return to capitalism.

That is how Lenin understood the question of "correct relations with the peasantry."

It is not a matter of coddling the peasant and regarding this as establishing correct relations with him, for coddling will not carry you very far. It is a matter of helping the peasant to place his husbandry "on a new technical basis, the technical basis of modern large-scale production"; for that is the principal way to rid the peasant of his poverty.

And it is impossible to place the economy of the country on a new technical basis unless our industry and, in the first place, the production of means of production, are developed at a fast rate.

Such are the internal conditions dictating a fast rate of development of our industry.

It is these external and internal conditions which are the cause of the control figures of our national economy being under such tension.

That explains, too, why our economic plans, both budgetary and non-budgetary, are marked by a state of tension, by substantial investments in capital development, the object of which is to maintain a fast rate of industrial development.

It may be asked where this is said in the theses, in what passage of the theses. (A voice: "Yes, where is it said") Evidence of this in the theses is the sum-total of capital investments in industry for 1928-29. After all, our theses are called theses on the control figures. That is so, is it not, comrades? (A voice: "Yes.") Well, the theses say that in 1928-29 we shall be investing 1,650 million rubles in capital construction in industry. In other words, this year we shall be investing in industry 330,000,000 rubles more than last year.

It follows, therefore, that we are not only maintaining the rate of industrial development but are going a step farther by investing more in industry than last year, that is, by expanding capital construction in industry both absolutely and relatively.

That is the crux of the theses on the control figures of the national economy. Yet certain comrades failed to observe this staring fact. They criticised the theses on the control figures right and left as regards petty details, but the most important thing they failed to observe.

The Grain Problem

I have spoken so far of the first main question in the theses, the rate of development of industry. Now let us consider the second main question, the grain problem. A characteristic feature of the theses

is that they lay stress on the problem of the development of agriculture in general, and of grain farming in particular. Are the theses right in doing so? I think they are. Already at the July plenum it was said that the weakest spot in the development of our national economy is the excessive backwardness of agriculture in general, and of grain farming in particular.

When, in speaking of our agriculture lagging behind our industry, people complain about it, they are, of course, not talking seriously. Agriculture always has lagged and always: will lag behind industry. That is particularly true in our conditions, where industry is concentrated to a maximum degree, while agriculture is scattered to a maximum degree. Naturally, a united industry will develop faster than a scattered agriculture. That, incidentally, gives rise to the leading position of industry in relation to agriculture. Consequently, the customary lag of agriculture behind industry does not give sufficient grounds for raising the grain problem.

The problem of agriculture, and of grain farming in particular, makes its appearance only when the customary lag of agriculture behind industry turns into an excessive lag in the rate of its development. The characteristic feature of the present state of our national economy is that we are faced by the fact of an excessive lag in the rate of development of grain farming behind the rate of development of industry, while at the same time the demand for marketable grain on the part of the growing towns and industrial areas is increasing by leaps and bounds. The task then is not to lower the rate of development of industry to the level of the development of grain farming (which would upset everything and reverse the course of development), but to bring the rate of development of grain farming into line with the rate of development of industry and to raise the rate of development of grain farming to a level that will guarantee rapid progress of the entire national economy, both industry and agriculture.

Either we accomplish this task, and thereby solve the grain problem, or we do not accomplish it, and then a rupture between the socialist town and the small-peasant countryside will be inevitable.

That is how the matter stands, comrades. That is the essence of the grain problem.

Does this not mean that what we have now is "stagnation" in the development of agriculture or even its "retrogression"? That is what Frumkin actually asserts in his second letter, which at his request we distributed today to the members of the C.C. and C.C.C. He says explicitly in this letter that there is "stagnation" in our agriculture. "We cannot and must not," he says, "talk in the press about retrogression, but within the Party we ought not to hide the fact that this lag is equivalent to retrogression."

Is this assertion of Frumkin's correct? It is, of course, incorrect! We, the members of the Political Bureau, absolutely disagree with this assertion, and the Political Bureau theses are totally at variance with such an opinion of the state of grain farming.

In point of fact, what is retrogression, and how would it manifest itself in agriculture? It would obviously be bound to manifest itself in a backward, downward movement of agriculture, a movement away from the new forms of farming to the old, medieval forms. It would be bound to manifest itself by the peasants abandoning, for instance, the three-field system for the long-fallow system, the steel plough and machines for the wooden plough, clean and selected seed for unshifted and low-grade seed, modern methods of farming for inferior methods, and so on and so forth. But do we observe anything of the kind? Does not everyone know that tens and hundreds of thousands of peasant farms are annually abandoning the three-field for the four-field and multi-field system, low-grade seed for selected seed, the wooden plough for

the steel plough and machines, inferior methods of farming for superior methods? Is this retrogression?

Frumkin has a habit of hanging on to the coat tails of some member or other of the Political Bureau in order to substantiate his own point of view. It is quite likely that in this instance, too, he will get hold of Bukharin's coat tails in order to show that Bukharin in his article, "Notes of an Economist," says "the same thing." But what Bukharin says is very far from "the same thing." Bukharin in his article raised the abstract, theoretical question of the possibility or danger of retrogression. In the abstract, such a formulation of the question is quite possible and legitimate. But what does Frumkin do? He turns the abstract question of the possibility of the retrogression of agriculture into a fact. And this he calls an analysis of the state of grain farming! Is it not ludicrous, comrades?

It would be a fine Soviet government indeed if, in the eleventh year of its existence, it had brought agriculture into a state of retrogression! Why, a government like that would deserve not to be supported, but to be sent packing. And the workers would have sent such a government packing long ago, if it had reduced agriculture to a state of retrogression. Retrogression is a tune all sorts of bourgeois experts are harping on; they dream of our agriculture retrogressing. Trotsky at one time harped on the theme of retrogression. I did not expect to see Frumkin taking this dubious line.

On what does Frumkin base his assertion about retrogression? First of all, on the fact that the grain crop area this year is less than it was last year. What is this fact due to? To the policy of the Soviet Government, perhaps? Of course not. It is due to the perishing of the winter crops in the steppe area of the Ukraine and partially in the North Caucasus, and to the drought in the summer of this year in the same area of the Ukraine. Had it not been for these unfavourable weather conditions, upon which agriculture is

wholly and entirely dependent, our grain crop area this year would have been at least 1,000,000 dessiatins larger than it was last year.

He bases his assertion, further, on the fact that our gross production of grain this year is only slightly (70,000,000 poods) greater, and that of wheat and rye 200,000,000 poods less, than last year. And what is all this due to? Again, to the drought and to the frosts which killed the winter crops. Had it not been for these unfavourable weather conditions, our gross production of grain this year would have exceeded last year's by 300,000,000 poods. How can one ignore such factors as drought, frost, etc., which are of decisive significance for the harvest in this or that region?

We are now making it our task to enlarge the crop area by 7 per cent, to raise crop yields by 3 per cent, and to increase the gross production of grain by, I think, 10 per cent. There need be no doubt that we shall do-everything in our power to accomplish these tasks. But-in spite of all our measures, it is not out of the question that we may again come up against a partial crop failure, frosts or drought in this or that region, in which case it is possible that these circumstances may cause the gross grain output to fall short of our plans or even of this year's gross output. Will that mean that agriculture is "retrogressing," that the policy of the Soviet Government is to blame for this "retrogression," that we have "robbed" the peasant of economic incentive, that we have "deprived" him of economic prospects?

Several years go Trotsky fell into the same error, declaring that "a little rain" was of no significance to agriculture. Rykov controverted him, and had the support of the overwhelming majority of the members of the C.C. Now Frumkin is falling into the same error, ignoring weather conditions, which are of decisive importance for agriculture, and trying to make the policy of our Party responsible for everything.

What ways and means are necessary to accelerate the rate of development of agriculture in general, and of grain farming in particular?

There are three such ways, or channels:

- a) by increasing crop yields and enlarging the area sown by the individual poor and middle peasants;
- b) by further development of collective farms;
- c) by enlarging the old and establishing new state farms.

All this was already mentioned in the resolution of the July plenum. The theses repeat what was said at the July plenum, but put the matter more concretely, and state it in terms of figures in the shape of definite investments. Here, too, Frumkin finds something to cavil at. He thinks that, since individual farming is put in the first place and the collective farms and state farms in the second and third, this can only mean that his viewpoint has triumphed. That is ridiculous, comrades.

It is clear that if we approach the matter from the point of view of the relative importance of each form of agriculture, individual farming must be put in the first place, because it provides nearly six times as much marketable grain as the collective farms and state farms. But if we approach the matter from the point of view of the type of farming, of which form of economy is most akin to our purpose, first place must be given to the collective farms and state farms, which represent a higher type of agriculture than individual peasant farming. Is it really necessary to show that both points of view are equally acceptable to us?

What is required in order that our work should proceed along all these three channels, in order that the rate of development of agriculture, and primarily of grain farming, should be raised in practice?

It is necessary, first of all, to direct the attention of our Party cadres to agriculture and focus it on concrete aspects of the grain problem. We must put aside abstract phrases and talking about agriculture in general and get down, at last, to working out practical measures for the furtherance of grain farming adapted to the diverse conditions in the different areas. It is time to pass from words to deeds and to tackle at last the concrete question how to raise crop yields and to enlarge the crop areas of the individual poor- and middle-peasant farms, how to improve and develop further the collective farms and state farms, how to organise the rendering of assistance by the collective farms and state farms to the peasants by way of supplying them with better seed and better breeds of cattle, how to organise assistance for the peasants in the shape of machines and other implements through machine-hiring stations, how to extend and improve the contract system and agricultural co-operation in general, and so on and so forth. (A voice: "That is empiricism.") Such empiricism is absolutely essential, for otherwise we run the risk of drowning the very serious matter of solving the grain problem in empty talk about agriculture in general.

The Central Committee has set itself the task of arranging for concrete reports on agricultural development by our principal workers in the Council of People's Commissars and the Political Bureau who are responsible for the chief grain regions. At this plenum you are to hear a report by Comrade Andreyev on the ways of solving the grain problem in the North Caucasus. I think that we shall next have to hear similar reports in succession from the Ukraine, the Central Black Earth region, the Volga region, Siberia, etc. This is absolutely necessary in order to turn the Party's attention to the grain problem and to get our Party workers at last to formulate concretely the questions connected with the grain problem.

It is necessary, in the second place, to ensure that our Party workers in the countryside make a strict distinction in their practical work between the middle peasant and the kulak, do not lump them together and do not hit the middle peasant when it is the kulak that has to be struck at. It is high time to put a stop to these errors, if they may be called such. Take, for instance, the question of the individual tax. We have the decision of the Political Bureau, and the corresponding law, about levying an individual tax on not more than 2-3 per cent of the households, that is, on the wealthiest section of the kulaks. But what actually happens? There are a number of districts where 10, 12 and even more per cent of the households are taxed, with the result that the middle section of the peasantry is affected. Is it not time to put a stop to this crime?

Yet, instead of indicating concrete measures for putting a stop to these and similar outrages, our dear "critics" indulge in word play, proposing that the words "the wealthiest section of the kulaks" be replaced by the words "the most powerful section of the kulaks" or "the uppermost section of the kulaks." As if it were not one and the same thing! It has been shown that the kulaks constitute about 5 per cent of the peasantry. It has been shown that the law requires the individual tax to be levied on only 2-3 per cent of the households, that is, on the wealthiest section of the kulaks. It has been shown that in practice this law is being violated in a number of areas. Yet, instead of indicating concrete measures for putting a stop to this, the "critics" indulge in verbal criticism and refuse to understand that this does not alter things one iota. Sheer hair-splitters! (A voice: "They propose that the individual tax should be levied on all kulaks.") Well then, they should demand the repeal of the law imposing an individual tax on 2-3 per cent. Yet I have not heard that anybody has demanded the repeal of the individual tax law. It is said that individual taxation is arbitrarily extended in order to supplement the local budget. But you must not supplement the local budget by breaking the law, by infringing

Party directives. Our Party exists, it has not been liquidated yet. The Soviet Government exists, it has not been liquidated yet. And if you have not enough funds for your local budget, then you must ask to have your local budget reconsidered, and not break the law or disregard Party instructions.

It is necessary, next, to give further incentives to individual poor- and middle-peasant farming. Undoubtedly, the increase in grain prices already introduced, practical enforcement of revolutionary law, practical assistance to the poor- and middle-peasant farms in the shape of the ' contract system, and so on, will considerably increase the peasant's economic incentive. Frumkin thinks that we have killed or nearly killed the peasant's incentive by robbing him of economic prospects. That, of course, is nonsense. If it were true, it would be incomprehensible what the bond, the alliance between the working class and the main mass of the peasantry, actually rests on. It cannot be thought, surely, that this alliance rests on sentiment. It must be realised, after all, that the alliance between the working class and the peasantry is an alliance on a business basis, an alliance of the interests of two classes, a class alliance of the workers and the main mass of the peasantry aiming at mutual advantage. It is obvious that if we had killed or nearly killed the peasant's economic incentive by depriving him of economic prospects, there would be no bond, no alliance between the working class and the peasantry. Clearly, what is at issue here is not the "creation" or "release" of the economic incentive of the poor- and middle-peasant masses, but the strengthening and further development of this incentive, to the mutual advantage of the working class and the main mass of the peasantry. And that is precisely what the theses on the control figures of the national economy indicate.

It is necessary, lastly, to increase the supply of goods to the countryside. I have in mind both consumer goods and, especially,

production goods (machines, fertilisers, etc.) capable of increasing the output of agricultural produce. It cannot be said that everything in this respect is as it should be. You know that symptoms of a goods shortage are still far from having been eliminated and will probably not be eliminated so soon. The illusion exists in certain Party circles that we can put an end to the goods shortage at once. That, unfortunately, is not true. It should be borne in mind that the symptoms of a goods shortage are connected, firstly, with the growing prosperity of the workers and peasants and the gigantic increase of effective demand for goods, production of which is growing year by year but which are not enough to satisfy the whole demand, and, secondly, with the present period of the reconstruction of industry.

The reconstruction of industry involves the transfer of funds from the sphere of producing means of consumption to the sphere of producing means of production. Without this there can be no serious reconstruction of industry, especially in our, Soviet conditions. But what does this mean? It means that money is being invested in the building of new plants, and that the number of towns and new consumers is growing, while the new plants can put out additional commodities in quantity only after three or four years. It is easy to realise that this is not conducive to putting an end to the goods shortage.

Does this mean that we must fold our arms and acknowledge that we are impotent to cope with the symptoms of a goods shortage? No, it does not. The fact is that we can and should adopt concrete measures to mitigate, to moderate the goods shortage. That is something we can and should do at once. For this, we must speed up the expansion of those branches of industry which directly contribute to the promotion of agricultural production (the Stalingrad Tractor Works, the Rostov Agricultural Machinery Works, the Voronezh Seed Sortter Factory, etc., etc.). For this,

further, we must as far as possible expand those branches of industry which contribute to an increase in output of goods in short supply (cloth, glass, nails, etc.). And so, on and so forth.

Kubyak said that the control figures of the national economy propose to assign less funds this year to individual peasant farming than last year. That, I think, is untrue. Kubyak apparently loses sight of the fact that this year we are giving the peasants credit under the contract system to the sum of about 300,000,000 rubles (nearly 100,000,000 more than last year). If this is taken into account, and it must be taken into account, it will be seen that this year we are assigning more for the development of individual peasant farming than last year. As to the old and new state farms and collective farms, we are investing in them this year about 300,000,000 rubles (some 150,000,000 more than last year).

Special attention needs to be paid to the collective farms, the state farms and the contract system. These things should not be regarded only as means of increasing our stocks of marketable grain. They are at the same time a new form of bond between the working class and the main mass of the peasantry.

Enough has already been said about the contract system and I shall not dwell upon it any further. Everyone realises that the application of this system on a mass scale makes it easier to unite the efforts of the individual peasant farms, introduces an element of permanency in the relations between the state and the peasantry, and so strengthens the bond between town and country.

I should like to draw your attention to the collective farms, and especially to the state farms, as levers which facilitate the reconstruction of agriculture on a new technical basis, causing a revolution in the minds of the peasants and helping them to shake off conservatism, routine. The appearance of tractors, large agricultural machines and tractor columns in our grain regions

cannot but have its effect on the surrounding peasant farms. Assistance rendered the surrounding peasants in the way of seed, machines and tractors will undoubtedly be appreciated by the peasants and taken as a sign of the power and strength of the Soviet state, which is trying to lead them on to the high road of a substantial improvement of agriculture. We have not taken this circumstance into account until now and, perhaps, still do not sufficiently do so. But I think that this is the chief thing that the collective farms and state farms are contributing and could contribute at the present moment towards solving the grain problem and the strengthening of the bond in its new forms.

Such, in general, are the ways and means that we must adopt in our work of solving the grain problem.

Combating Deviations and Conciliation Towards Them

Let us pass now to the third main question of our theses, that of deviations from the Leninist line.

The social basis of the deviations is the fact that small-scale production predominates in our country, the fact that small-scale production gives rise to capitalist elements, the fact that our Party is surrounded by petty-bourgeois elemental forces, and, lastly, the fact that certain of our Party organisations have been infected by these elemental forces.

There, in the main, lies the social basis of the deviations.

All these deviations are of a petty-bourgeois character.

What is the Right deviation, which is the one chiefly in question here? In what direction does it tend to go? It tends towards adaptation to bourgeois ideology, towards adaptation of our policy to the tastes and requirements of the "Soviet" bourgeoisie.

What threat does the Right deviation hold out, if it should triumph in our Party? It would mean the ideological rout of our Party, a free rein for the capitalist elements, the growth of chances for the restoration of capitalism, or, as Lenin called it, for a "return to capitalism."

Where is the tendency towards a Right deviation chiefly lodged? In our Soviet, economic, co-operative and trade-union apparatuses, and in the Party apparatus as well, especially in its lower links in the countryside.

Are there spokesmen of the Right deviation among our Party members? There certainly are. Rykov mentioned the example of Shatunovsky, who declared against the building of the Dnieper Hydro-Electric Power Station. There can be no question but that Shatunovsky was guilty of a Right deviation, a deviation towards open opportunism. All the same, I think that Shatunovsky is not a typical illustration of the Right deviation, of its physiognomy. I think that in this respect the palm should go to Frumkin. (Laughter) I am referring to his first letter (June 1928) and then to his second letter, which was distributed here to the members of the C.C. and C.C.C. (November 1928). Let us examine both these letters. Let us take the "basic propositions" of the first letter.

1) "The sentiment in the countryside, apart from a small section of the poor peasants, is opposed to us." Is that true? It is obviously untrue. If it were true, the bond would not even be a memory. But since June (the letter was written in June) nearly six months have passed, yet anyone, unless he is blind, can see that the bond between the working class and the main mass of the peasantry continues and is growing stronger. Why does Frumkin write such nonsense? In order to scare the Party and make it give way to the Right deviation.

2) "The line taken lately has led to the main mass of the middle peasants being without hope, without prospects." Is that true? It is quite untrue. It is obvious that if in the spring of this year the main mass of the middle peasants had been without economic hope or prospects, they would not have enlarged the spring crop area as they did in all the principal grain-growing regions. The spring sowing takes place in April-May. Well, Frumkin's letter was written in June. In our country, under the Soviet regime, who is the chief purchaser of cereals? The state and the co-operatives, which are linked with the state. It is obvious that if the mass of middle peasants had been without economic prospects, if they were in a state of "estrangement" from the Soviet Government, they would not have enlarged the spring crop area for the benefit of the state, as the principal purchaser of grain. Frumkin is talking obvious nonsense. Here again he is trying to scare the Party with the "horrors" of hopeless prospects in order to make it give way to his, Frumkin's, view.

3) "We must return to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Congresses." That the Fifteenth Congress has simply been tacked on here without rhyme or reason, of that there can be no doubt. The crux here is not in the Fifteenth Congress, but in the slogan: Back to the Fourteenth Congress. And what does that mean? It means renouncing "intensification of the offensive against the kulak" (see Fifteenth Congress resolution). I say this not in order to deprecate the Fourteenth Congress. I say it because, in calling for a return to the Fourteenth Congress, Frumkin is rejecting the step forward which the Party made between the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Congresses, and, in rejecting it, he is trying to pull the Party back. The July plenum of the Central Committee pronounced its opinion on this question. It stated plainly in its resolution that people who try to evade the Fifteenth Congress decision—"to develop further the offensive against the kulaks"—are "an expression of bourgeois tendencies in our country." I must tell Frumkin plainly that when

the Political Bureau formulated this item of the resolution of the July plenum, it had him and his first letter in mind.

4) "Maximum assistance to the poor peasants entering collectives." We have always to the best of our ability and resources rendered the maximum assistance to the poor peasants entering, or even not entering, collectives. There is nothing new in this. What is new in the Fifteenth Congress decisions compared with those of the Fourteenth Congress is not this but that the Fifteenth Congress made the utmost development of the collective-farm movement one of the cardinal tasks of the day. When Frumkin speaks of maximum assistance to the poor peasants entering collectives, he is in point of fact turning away from, evading, the task set the Party by the Fifteenth Congress of developing the collective-farm movement to the utmost. In point of fact, Frumkin is against developing the work of strengthening the socialist sector in the countryside along the line of collective farms.

5) "State farms should not be expanded by shock or super-shock tactics." Frumkin cannot but know that we are only beginning to work seriously to expand the old state farms and to create new ones. Frumkin cannot but know that we are assigning for this purpose far less money than we ought to assign if we had any reserves for it. The words "by shock or super-shock tactics" were put in here to strike people with "horror" and to conceal his own disinclination for any serious expansion of the state farms. Frumkin, in point of fact, is here expressing his opposition to strengthening the socialist sector in the countryside along the line of the state farms.

Now gather all these propositions of Frumkin's together, and you get a bouquet characteristic of the Right deviation.

Let us pass to Frumkin's second letter. In what way does the second letter differ from the first? In that it aggravates the errors of

the first letter. The first said that middle-peasant farming was without prospects. The second speaks of the "retrogression" of agriculture. The first letter said that we must return to the Fourteenth Congress in the sense of relaxing the offensive against the kulak. The second letter, however, says that "we must not hamper production on the kulak farms." The first letter said nothing about industry. But the second letter develops a "new" theory to the effect that less should be assigned for industrial construction. Incidentally, there are two points on which the two letters agree: concerning the collective farms and concerning the state farms. In both letters Frumkin pronounces against the development of collective farms and state farms. It is clear that the second letter aggravates the errors of the first.

About the theory of "retrogression" I have already spoken. There can be no doubt that this theory is the invention of bourgeois experts, who are always ready to raise a cry that the Soviet regime is doomed. Frumkin has allowed himself to be scared by the bourgeois experts who have their roost around the People's Commissariat of Finance, and now he is himself trying to scare the Party so as to make it give way to the Right deviation. Enough has been said, too, about the collective farms and state farms. So, there is no need to repeat it. Let us examine the two remaining points: about kulak farming and about capital investment in industry.

Kulak farming. Frumkin says that "we must not hamper production on the kulak farms." What does that mean? It means not preventing the kulaks from developing their exploiting economy. But what does not preventing the kulaks from developing their exploiting economy mean? It means allowing a free rein to capitalism in the countryside, allowing it freedom, liberty. We get the old slogan of the French liberals: "laissez faire, laissez passer," that is, do not prevent the bourgeoisie from doing its business, do not prevent the bourgeoisie from moving freely.

This slogan was put forward by the old French liberals at the time of the French bourgeois revolution, at the time of the struggle against the feudal regime, which was fettering the bourgeoisie and not allowing it to develop. It follows, then, that we must now go over from the socialist slogan—"ever-increasing restrictions on the capitalist elements" (see the theses on the control figures)—to the bourgeois-liberal slogan: do not hamper the development of capitalism in the countryside. Why, are we really thinking of turning from Bolsheviks into bourgeois liberals? What can there be in common between this bourgeois-liberal slogan of Frumkin's and the line of the Party?

(Frumkin. "Comrade Stalin, read the other points also.") I shall read the whole point: "We must not hamper production on the kulak farms either, while at the same time combating their enslaving exploitation."

My dear Frumkin, do you really think the second part of the sentence improves matters and does not make them worse? What does combating enslaving exploitation mean? Why, the slogan of combating enslaving exploitation is a slogan of the bourgeois revolution, directed against feudal-serf or semi-feudal methods of exploitation. We did indeed put forward this slogan when we were advancing towards the bourgeois revolution, differentiating between the enslaving form of exploitation, which we were striving to abolish, and the non-enslaving, so-called "progressive" form of exploitation, which we could not at that time restrict or abolish, inasmuch as the bourgeois system remained in force. But at that time, we were advancing towards a bourgeois-democratic republic. Now, however, if I am not mistaken, we have a socialist revolution, which is heading, and cannot but I head, for the abolition of all forms of exploitation, including "progressive" forms. Really, do you want us to turn back from the socialist revolution, which we are developing and advancing, and revert to

the slogans of the bourgeois revolution? How can one bring oneself to talk such nonsense?

Further, what does not hampering kulak economy mean? It means giving the kulak a free hand. And what does giving the kulak a free hand mean? It means giving him power. When the French bourgeois liberals demanded that the feudal government should not hamper the development of the bourgeoisie, they expressed it concretely in the demand that the bourgeoisie should be given power. And they were right. In order to be able to develop properly, the bourgeoisie must have power. Consequently, to be consistent, you should say: admit the kulak to power. For it must be understood, after all, that you cannot but restrict the development of kulak economy if you take power away from the kulaks and concentrate it in the hands of the working class. Those are the conclusions that suggest themselves on reading Frumkin's second letter.

Capital construction in industry. When we discussed the control figures, we had three figures before us: The Supreme Council of National Economy asked for 825,000,000 rubles; the State Planning Commission was willing to give 750,000,000 rubles; the People's Commissariat of Finance would give only 650,000,000 rubles. What decision on this did the Central Committee of our Party adopt? It fixed the figure at 800,000,000 rubles, that is, exactly 150,000,000 rubles more than the People's Commissariat of Finance proposed. That the People's Commissariat of Finance offered less is, of course, not surprising: the stinginess of the People's Commissariat of Finance is generally known; it has to be stingy. But that is not the point just now. The point is that Frumkin defends the figure of 650,000,000 rubles not out of stinginess, but because of his new-fangled theory of "feasibility," asserting in his second letter and in a special article in the periodical of the People's Commissariat of Finance that we shall certainly do injury to our economy if we

assign to the Supreme Council of National Economy more than 650,000,000 rubles for capital construction. And what does that mean? It means that Frumkin is against maintaining the present rate of the development of industry, evidently failing to realise that if it were slackened this really would do injury to our entire national economy.

Now combine these two points in Frumkin's second letter, the point concerning kulak farming and the point concerning capital construction in industry, add the theory of "retrogression," and you get the physiognomy of the Right deviation.

You want to know what the Right deviation is and what it looks like? Read Frumkin's two letters, study them, and you will understand.

So much for the physiognomy of the Right deviation.

But the theses speak not only of the Right deviation. They speak also of the so-called "Left" deviation. What is the "Left" deviation? Is there really a so-called "Left" deviation in the Party? Are there in our Party, as our theses say, anti-middle-peasant trends, super-industrialisation trends and so on? Yes, there are. What do they amount to? They amount to a deviation towards Trotskyism. That was said already by the July plenum. I am referring to the July plenum's resolution on grain procurement policy, which speaks of a struggle on two fronts: against those who want to hark back from the Fifteenth Congress—the Rights, and against those who want to convert the emergency measures into a permanent policy of the Party—the "Lefts," the trend towards Trotskyism.

Clearly, there are elements of Trotskyism and a trend towards the Trotskyist ideology within our Party. About four thousand persons, I think, voted against our platform during the discussion which preceded the Fifteenth Party Congress. (A voice: "Ten thousand.") I think that if ten thousand voted against, then twice

ten thousand Party members who sympathise with Trotskyism did not vote at all, because they did not attend the meetings. These are the Trotskyist elements who have not left the Party, and who, it must be supposed, have not yet rid themselves of the Trotskyist ideology. Furthermore, I think that a section of the Trotskyists who later broke away from the Trotskyist organisation and returned to the Party have not yet succeeded in shaking off the Trotskyist ideology and are also, presumably, not averse to disseminating their views among Party members. Lastly, there is the fact that we have a certain recrudescence of the Trotskyist ideology in some of our Party organisations. Combine all this, and you get all the necessary elements for a deviation towards Trotskyism in the Party.

And that is understandable: with the existence of petty-bourgeois elemental forces, and the pressure that these forces exert on our Party, there cannot but be Trotskyist trends in it. It is one thing to arrest Trotskyist cadres or expel them from the Party. It is another thing to put an end to the Trotskyist ideology. That will be more difficult. And we say that wherever there is a Right deviation, there is bound to be also a "Left" deviation. The "Left" deviation is the shadow of the Right deviation. Lenin used to say, referring to the Otzovists, that the "Lefts" are Mensheviks, only turned inside-out. That is quite true. The same thing must be said of the present "Lefts." People who deviate towards Trotskyism are in fact also Rights, only turned inside-out, Rights who cloak themselves with "Left" phrases.

Hence the fight on two fronts—both against the Right deviation and against the "Left" deviation.

It may be said: if the "Left" deviation is in essence the same thing as the Right opportunist deviation, then what is the difference between them, and where do you actually get two fronts? Indeed, if a victory of the Rights means increasing the chances of the

restoration of capitalism, and a victory of the "Lefts" would lead to the same result, what difference is there between them, and why are some called Rights and others "Lefts"? And if there is a difference between them, what is it? Is it not true that the two deviations have the same social roots, that they are both petty-bourgeois deviations? Is it not true that both these deviations, if they were to triumph, would lead to one and the same result? What, then, is the difference between them?

The difference is in their platforms, their demands, their approach and their methods.

If, for example, the Rights say: "It was a mistake to build the Dnieper Hydro-Electric Power Station," and the "Lefts," on the contrary, declare: "What is the use of one Dnieper Hydro-Electric Power Station, let us have a Dnieper Hydro-Electric Power Station every year" (laughter), it must be admitted that there obviously is a difference.

If the Rights say: "Let the kulak alone, allow him to develop freely," and the "Lefts," on the contrary, declare: "Strike not only at the kulak, but also at the middle peasant, because he is just as much a private owner as the kulak," it must be admitted that there obviously is a difference.

If the Rights say: "Difficulties have arisen, is it not time to quit?" and the "Lefts," on the contrary, declare: "What are difficulties to us, a fig for your difficulties—full speed ahead!" (laughter), it must be admitted that there obviously is a difference.

There you have a picture of the specific platform and the specific methods of the "Lefts." This, in fact, explains why the "Lefts" sometimes succeed in luring a part of the workers over to their side with the help of high-sounding "Left" phrases and by posing as the most determined opponents of the Rights, although all the world knows that they, the "Lefts," have the same social roots as the

Rights, and that they not infrequently join in an agreement, a bloc, with the Rights in order to fight the Leninist line.

That is why it is obligatory for us, Leninists, to wage a fight on two fronts—both against the Right deviation and against the "Left" deviation.

But if the Trotskyist trend represents a "Left" deviation, does not this mean that the "Lefts" are more to the Left than Leninism? No, it does not. Leninism is the most Left (without quotation marks) trend in the world labour movement. We Leninists belonged to the Second International down to the outbreak of the imperialist war as the extreme Left group of the Social-Democrats. We did not remain in the Second International and we advocated a split in the Second International precisely because, being the extreme Left group, we did not want to be in the same party as the petty-bourgeois traitors to Marxism, the social-pacifists and social-chauvinists.

It was these tactics and this ideology that subsequently became the basis of all the Bolshevik parties of the world. In our Party, we Leninists are the sole Lefts without quotation marks. Consequently, we Leninists are neither "Lefts" nor Rights in our own Party. We are a party of Marxist-Leninists. And within our Party we combat not only those whom we call openly opportunist deviators, but also those who pretend to be "Lefter" than Marxism, "Lefter" than Leninism, and who camouflage their Right, opportunist nature with high-sounding "Left" phrases.

Everybody realises that when people who have not yet rid themselves of Trotskyist trends are called "Lefts," it is meant ironically. Lenin referred to the "Left Communists" as Lefts sometimes with and sometimes without quotation marks. But everyone realises that Lenin called them Lefts ironically, thereby

emphasising that they were Lefts only in words, in appearance, but that in reality they represented petty-bourgeois Right trends.

In what possible sense can the Trotskyist elements be called Lefts (without quotation marks), if only yesterday they joined in a united anti-Leninist bloc with openly opportunist elements and linked themselves directly and immediately with the anti-Soviet strata of the country? Is it not a fact that only yesterday we had an open bloc of the "Lefts" and the Rights against the Leninist Party, and that that bloc undoubtedly had the support of the bourgeois elements? And does not this show that they, the "Lefts" and the Rights, could not have joined together in a united bloc if they did not have common social roots, if they were not of a common opportunist nature? The Trotskyist bloc fell to pieces a year ago. Some of the Rights, such as Shatunovsky, left the bloc. Consequently, the Right members of the bloc will now come forward as Rights, while the "Lefts" will camouflage their Rightism with "Left" phrases. But what guarantee is there that the "Lefts" and the Rights will not find each other again? (Laughter.) Obviously, there is not, and cannot be, any guarantee of that. But if we uphold the slogan of a fight on two fronts, does this mean that we are proclaiming the necessity of Centrism in our Party? What does a fight on two fronts mean? Is this not Centrism? You know that that is exactly how the Trotskyists depict matters: there are the "Lefts," that is, "we," the Trotskyists, the "real Leninists"; there are the "Rights," that is, all the rest; and, lastly, there are the "Centrists," who vacillate between the "Lefts" and the Rights. Can that be considered a correct view of our Party? Obviously not. Only people who have become confused in all their concepts and who have long ago broken with Marxism can say that. It can be said only by people who fail to see and to understand the difference in principle between the Social-Democratic party of the pre-war period, which was the party of a bloc of proletarian and petty-bourgeois interests, and the

Communist Party, which is the monolithic party of the revolutionary proletariat.

Centrism must not be regarded as a spatial concept: The Rights, say, sitting on one side, the "Lefts" on the other, and the Centrists in between. Centrism is a political concept. Its ideology is one of adaptation, of subordination of the interests of the proletariat to the interests of the petty bourgeoisie within one common party. This ideology is alien and abhorrent to Leninism.

Centrism was a phenomenon that was natural in the Second International of the period before the war. There were Rights (the majority), Lefts (without quotation marks), and Centrists, whose whole policy consisted in embellishing the opportunism of the Rights with Left phrases and subordinating the Lefts to the Rights.

What, at that time, was the policy of the Lefts, of whom the Bolsheviks constituted the core? It was one of determinedly fighting the Centrists, of fighting for a split with the Rights (especially after the outbreak of the imperialist war) and of organising a new, revolutionary International consisting of genuinely Left, genuinely proletarian elements.

Why was it possible that there could arise at that time such an alignment of forces within the Second International and such a policy of the Bolsheviks within it? Because the Second International was at that time the party of a bloc of proletarian and petty-bourgeois interests serving the interests of the petty-bourgeois social-pacifists, social-chauvinists. Because the Bolsheviks could not at that time but concentrate their fire on the Centrists, who were trying to subordinate the proletarian elements to the interests of the petty bourgeoisie. Because the Bolsheviks were obliged at that time to advocate the idea of a split, for otherwise the proletarians could not have organised their own monolithic revolutionary Marxist party.

Can it be asserted that there is a similar alignment of forces in our Communist Party, and that the same policy must be practiced in it as was practiced by the Bolsheviks in the parties of the Second International of the period before the war? Obviously not. It cannot, because it would signify a failure to understand the difference in principle between Social-Democracy, as the party of a bloc of proletarian and petty-bourgeois elements, and the monolithic Communist Party of the revolutionary proletariat. They (the Social-Democrats) had one underlying class basis for the party. We (the Communists) have an entirely different underlying basis. With them (the Social-Democrats) Centrism was a natural phenomenon, because the party of a bloc of heterogeneous interests cannot get along without Centrists, and the Bolsheviks were obliged to work for a split. With us (the Communists) Centrism is purposeless and incompatible with the Leninist Party principle, since the Communist Party is the monolithic party of the proletariat, and not the party of a bloc of heterogeneous class elements.

And since the prevailing force in our Party is the most Left of the trends in the world labour movement (the Leninists), a splitting policy in our Party has not and cannot have any justification from the standpoint of Leninism. (A voice: "Is a split possible in our Party, or not?") The point is not whether a split is possible; the point is that a splitting policy in our monolithic Leninist Party cannot be justified from the standpoint of Leninism.

Whoever fails to understand this difference in principle is going against Leninism and is breaking with Leninism.

That is why I think that only people who have taken leave of their senses and have lost every shred of Marxism can seriously assert that the policy of our Party, the policy of waging a fight on two fronts, is a Centrist policy.

Lenin always waged a fight on two fronts in our Party—both against the "Lefts" and against outright Menshevik deviations. Study Lenin's pamphlet, "Left-Wing" Communism, an Infantile Disorder, study the history of our Party, and you will realise that our Party grew and gained strength in a struggle against both deviations—the Right and the "Left." The fight against the Otzovists and the "Left" Communists, on the one hand, and the fight against the openly opportunist deviation before, during and after the October Revolution, on the other hand—such were the phases that our Party passed through in its development. Everyone is familiar with the words of Lenin that we must wage a fight both against open opportunists and against "Left" doctrinaires.

Does this mean that Lenin was a Centrist, that he pursued a Centrist policy? It obviously does not.

That being the case, what do our Right and "Left" deviators represent?

As to the Right deviation, it is not, of course, the opportunism of the pre-war Social-Democrats. A deviation towards opportunism is not yet opportunism. We are familiar with the explanation Lenin gave of the concept of deviation. A deviation to the Right is something which has not yet taken the shape of opportunism and which can be corrected. Consequently, a deviation to the Right must not be identified with out-and-out opportunism.

As to the "Left" deviation, it is something diametrically opposite to what the extreme Lefts in the prewar Second International, that is, the Bolsheviks, represented. Not only are the "Left" deviators not Lefts without quotation marks, they are essentially Right deviators, with the difference, however, that they unconsciously camouflage their true nature by means of "Left" phrases. It would be a crime against the Party not to perceive the vast difference between the "Left" deviators and genuine Leninists, who are the

only Lefts (without quotation marks) in our Party. (A voice: "What about the legalisation of deviations?") If waging an open fight against deviations is legalisation, then it must be confessed that Lenin "legalised" them long ago.

These deviators, both Rights and "Lefts," are recruited from the most diverse elements of the non-proletarian strata, elements who reflect the pressure of the petty-bourgeois elemental forces on the Party and the degeneration of certain sections of the Party. Former members of other parties; people in the Party with Trotskyist trends; remnants of former groups in the Party; Party members in the state, economic, cooperative and trade-union apparatuses who are becoming (or have become) bureaucratised and are linking themselves with the outright bourgeois elements in these apparatuses; well-to-do Party members in our rural organisations who are merging with the kulaks, and so on and so forth—such is the nutritive medium for deviations from the Leninist line. It is obvious that these elements are incapable of absorbing anything genuinely Left and Leninist. They are only capable of nourishing the openly opportunist deviation, or the so-called "Left" deviation, which masks its opportunism with Left phrases.

That is why a fight on two fronts is the only correct policy for the Party.

Further. Are the theses correct in saying that our chief method of fighting the Right deviation should be that of a full-scale ideological struggle? I think they are. It would be well to recall the experience of the fight against Trotskyism. With what did we begin the fight against Trotskyism? Was it, perhaps, with organisational penalties? Of course not! We began it with an ideological struggle. We waged it from 1918 to 1925. Already in 1924, our Party and the Fifth Congress of the Comintern passed a resolution on Trotskyism defining it as a petty-bourgeois deviation. Nevertheless, Trotsky continued to be a member of our Central Committee and Political

Bureau. Is that a fact, or not? It is a fact. Consequently, we "tolerated" Trotsky and the Trotskyists on the Central Committee. Why did we allow them to remain in leading Party bodies? Because at that time the Trotskyists, despite their disagreements with the Party, obeyed the decisions of the Central Committee and remained loyal. When did we begin to apply organisational penalties at all extensively? Only after the Trotskyists had organised themselves into a faction, set up their factional centre, turned their faction into a new party and began to summon people to anti-Soviet demonstrations.

I think that we must pursue the same course in the fight against the Right deviation. The Right deviation cannot as yet be regarded as something which has taken definite shape and crystallised, although it is gaining ground in the Party. It is only in process of taking shape and crystallising. Do the Right deviators have a faction? I do not think so. Can it be said that they do not submit to the decisions of our Party? I think we have no grounds yet for accusing them of this. Can it be affirmed that the Right deviators will certainly organise themselves into a faction? I doubt it. Hence the conclusion that our chief method of fighting the Right deviation at this stage should be that of a full-scale ideological struggle. This is all the more correct as there is an opposite tendency among some of the members of our Party— a tendency to begin the fight against the Right deviation not with an ideological struggle, but with organisational penalties. They say bluntly: Give us ten or twenty of these Rights and we'll make mincemeat of them in a trice and so put an end to the Right deviation. I think, comrades, that such sentiments are wrong and dangerous. Precisely in order to avoid being carried away by such sentiments, and in order to put the fight against the Right deviation on correct lines, it must be said plainly and resolutely that our chief method of fighting the Right deviation at this stage is an ideological struggle.

Does that mean that we rule out all organisational penalties? No, it does not. But it does undoubtedly mean that organisational penalties must play a subordinate role, and if there are no instances of infringement of Party decisions by Right deviators, we must not expel them from leading organisations or institutions. (A voice: "What about the Moscow experience?")

I do not think that there were any Rights among the leading Moscow comrades. There was in Moscow an incorrect attitude towards Right sentiments. More accurately, it could be said that there was a conciliatory tendency there. But I cannot say that there was a Right deviation in the Moscow Committee. (A voice: "But was there an organisational struggle?")

There was an organisational struggle, although it played a minor role. There was such a struggle because new elections are being held in Moscow on the basis of self-criticism, and district meetings of actives have the right to replace their secretaries. (Laughter.) (A voice: "Were new elections of our secretaries announced?") Nobody has forbidden new elections of secretaries. There is the June appeal of the Central Committee, which expressly says that development of self-criticism may become an empty phrase if the lower organisations are not assured the right to replace any secretary, or any committee. What objection can you raise to such an appeal? (A voice: "Before the Party Conference?") Yes, even before the Party Conference.

I see an incredulous smile on the faces of some comrades. That will not do, comrades. I see that some of you have an irrepressible desire to remove certain spokesmen of the Right deviation from their posts as quickly as possible. But that, dear comrades, is no solution of the problem. Of course, it is easier to remove people from their posts than to conduct a broad and intelligent campaign explaining the Right deviation, the Right danger, and how to combat it. But what is easiest must not be considered the best. Be

so good as to organise a broad explanatory campaign against the Right danger, be so good as not to grudge the time for it, and then you will see that the broader and deeper the campaign, the worse it will be for the Right deviation. That is why I think that the central point of our fight against the Right deviation must be an ideological struggle.

As to the Moscow Committee, I do not know that anything can be added to what Uglanov said in his reply to the discussion at the plenum of the Moscow Committee and Moscow Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.). He said plainly:

"If we recall a little history, if we recall how I fought Zinoviev in Leningrad in 1921, it will be seen that at that time the 'affray' was somewhat fiercer. We were the victors then because we were in the right. We have been beaten now because we are in the wrong. It will be a good lesson."

It follows that Uglanov has been waging a fight now just as at one time he waged a fight against Zinoviev. Against whom, may it be asked, has he been waging his present fight? Evidently, against the policy of the C.C. Against whom else could he have waged it? On what basis could he have waged this fight? Obviously, on the basis of conciliation towards the Right deviation.

The theses, therefore, quite rightly stress, as one of the immediate tasks of our Party, the necessity of waging a fight against conciliation towards deviations from the Leninist line, especially against conciliation towards the Right deviation.

Finally, a last point. The theses say that we must particularly stress the necessity at this time of fighting the Right deviation. What does that mean? It means that at this moment the Right danger is the chief danger in our Party. A fight against Trotskyist trends, and a concentrated fight at that, has been going on already for some ten years. This fight has resulted in the rout of the main Trotskyist

cadres. It cannot be said that the fight against the openly opportunist trend has been waged of late with equal intensity. It has not been waged with special intensity because the Right deviation is still in a period of formation and crystallisation, growing and gaining strength because of the strengthening of the petty-bourgeois elemental forces, which have been fostered by our grain procurement difficulties. The chief blow must therefore be aimed at the Right deviation.

In conclusion, I should like, comrades, to mention one more fact, which has not been mentioned here and which, in my opinion, is of no little significance. We, the members of the Political Bureau, have laid before you our theses on the control figures. In my speech, I upheld these theses as unquestionably correct. I do not say that certain corrections may not be made in the theses. But that they are in the main correct and assure the proper carrying out of the Leninist line, of that there can be no doubt whatever. Well, I must tell you that we in the Political Bureau adopted these theses unanimously. I think that this fact is of some significance in view of the rumors which are now and again spread in our ranks by diverse ill-wishers, opponents and enemies of our Party. I have in mind the rumors to the effect that in the Political Bureau we have a Right deviation, a "Left" deviation, conciliation and the devil knows what besides. Let these theses serve as one more proof, the hundredth or hundred and first, that we in the Political Bureau are all united.

I should like this plenum to adopt these theses, in principle, with equal unanimity. (Applause.)

Pravda, No. 273, November 24, 1928

Stalin

The Work of the April Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission

Report Delivered at a Meeting of the Active of the Moscow Organisation of the C.P.S.U.(B.)

April 13, 1928

Works, Vol. 11, January 1928 to March 1929

Comrades, the joint plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C.2 that has just concluded has one feature which distinguishes it from the series of plenary meetings held in the past two years. This feature is that it was a plenum of a purely business-like character, a plenum where there were no inner-Party conflicts, a plenum where there were no inner-Party dissensions.

Its agenda consisted of the most burning questions of the day: the grain procurements, the Shakhty affair, 3 and, lastly, the plan of work of the Political Bureau and plenum of the Central Committee. These, as you see, are quite serious questions. Nevertheless, the debates at the plenum were of a purely business-like character, and the resolutions were adopted unanimously.

The reason is that there was no opposition at the plenum. The reason is that the questions were approached in a strictly business-like manner, without factional attacks, without factional demagogy. The reason is that only after the Fifteenth Congress, only after the liquidation of the opposition, did it become possible for the Party to tackle practical problems seriously and thoroughly.

That is the good aspect and, if you like, the inestimable advantage of that phase of development which we have entered since the Fifteenth Congress of our Party, since the liquidation of the opposition.

Self-Criticism

A characteristic feature of the work of this plenum, of its debates and its resolutions, is that from beginning to end, its keynote was the sternest self-criticism. More, there was not a single question, not a single speech, at the plenum which was not accompanied by criticism of shortcomings in our work, by self-criticism of our organisations. Criticism of our shortcomings, honest and Bolshevik self-criticism of Party, Soviet and economic organisations—that was the general tone of the plenum.

I know that there are people in the ranks of the Party who have no fondness for criticism in general, and for self-criticism in particular. Those people, whom I might call "skin-deep" Communists (laughter), every now and then grumble and shrug their shoulders at self-criticism, as much as to say: Again this accursed self-criticism, again this raking out of our shortcomings— can't we be allowed to live in peace? Obviously, those "skin-deep" Communists are complete strangers to the spirit of our Party, to the spirit of Bolshevism. Well, in view of the existence of such sentiments among those people who greet self-criticism with anything but enthusiasm, it is permissible to ask: Do we need self-criticism; where does it derive from, and what is its value?

I think, comrades, that self-criticism is as necessary to us as air or water. I think that without it, without self-criticism, our Party could not make any headway, could not disclose our ulcers, could not eliminate our shortcomings. And shortcomings we have in plenty. That must be admitted frankly and honestly.

The slogan of self-criticism cannot be regarded as a new one. It lies at the very foundation of the Bolshevik Party. It lies at the foundation of the regime of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Since our country is a country with a dictatorship of the proletariat, and since the dictatorship is directed by one party, the Communist

Party, which does not, and cannot, share power with other parties, is it not clear that, if we want to make headway, we ourselves must disclose and correct our errors—is it not clear that there is no one else to disclose and correct them for us? Is it not clear, comrades, that self-criticism must be one of the most important motive forces of our development?

The slogan of self-criticism has developed especially powerfully since the Fifteenth Congress of our Party. Why? Because after the Fifteenth Congress, which put an end to the opposition, a new situation arose in the Party, one that we have to reckon with.

In what does the novelty of this situation consist? In the fact that now we have no opposition, or next to none; in the fact that, because of the easy victory over the opposition—a victory which in itself is a most important gain for the Party—there may be a danger of the Party resting on its laurels, beginning to take things easy and closing its eyes to the shortcomings in our work.

The easy victory over the opposition is a most important gain for our Party. But concealed within it is a certain drawback, which is that the Party may be a prey to self-satisfaction, to self-admiration, and begin to rest on its laurels. And what does resting on our laurels mean? It means putting an end to our forward movement. And in order that this may not occur, we need self-criticism— not that malevolent and actually counter-revolutionary criticism which the opposition indulged in—but honest, frank, Bolshevik self-criticism.

The Fifteenth Congress of our Party was alive to this, and it issued the slogan of self-criticism. Since then the tide of self-criticism has been mounting, and it laid its imprint also on the work of the April plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C.

It would be strange to fear that our enemies, our internal and external enemies, might exploit the criticism of our shortcomings

and raise the shout: Oho! All is not well with those Bolsheviks! It would be strange if we Bolsheviks were to fear that. The strength of Bolshevism lies precisely in the fact that it is not afraid to admit its mistakes. Let the Party, let the Bolsheviks, let all the upright workers and labouring elements in our country bring to light the shortcomings in our work, the shortcomings in our constructive effort, and let them indicate ways of eliminating our shortcomings, so that there may be no stagnation, vegetation, decay in our work and our construction, so that all our work and all our constructive measures may improve from day to day and go from success to success. That is the chief thing just now. As for our enemies, let them rant about our shortcomings—such trifles cannot and should not disconcert Bolsheviks.

Lastly, there is yet another circumstance that impels us to self-criticism. I am referring to the question of the masses and the leaders. A peculiar sort of relation has lately begun to arise between the leaders and the masses. On the one hand there was formed, there came into being historically, a group of leaders among us whose prestige is rising and rising, and who are becoming almost unapproachable for the masses. On the other hand, the working-class masses in the first place, and the mass of the working people in general are rising extremely slowly, are beginning to look up at the leaders from below with blinking eyes, and not infrequently are afraid to criticise them.

Of course, the fact that we have a group of leaders who have risen excessively high and enjoy great prestige is in itself a great achievement for our Party. Obviously, the direction of a big country would be unthinkable without such an authoritative group of leaders. But the fact that as these leaders rise they get further away from the masses, and the masses begin to look up at them from below and do not venture to criticise them, cannot but

give rise to a certain danger of the leaders losing contact with the masses and the masses getting out of touch with the leaders.

This danger may result in the leaders becoming conceited and regarding themselves as infallible. And what good can be expected when the top leaders become self-conceited and begin to look down on the masses? Clearly, nothing can come of this but the ruin of the Party.

But what we want is not to ruin the Party, but to move forward and improve our work. And precisely in order that we may move forward and improve the relations between the masses and the leaders, we must keep the valve of self-criticism open all the time, we must make it possible for Soviet people to "go for" their leaders, to criticise their mistakes, so that the leaders may not grow conceited, and the masses may not get out of touch with the leaders.

The question of the masses and the leaders is sometimes identified with the question of promotion. That is wrong, comrades. It is not a question of bringing new leaders to the fore, although this deserves the Party's most serious attention. It is a question of preserving the leaders who have already come to the fore and possess the greatest prestige by organising permanent and indissoluble contact between them and the masses. It is a question of organising, along the lines of self-criticism and criticism of our shortcomings, the broad public opinion of the Party, the broad public opinion of the working class, as an instrument of keen and vigilant moral control, to which the most authoritative leaders must lend an attentive ear if they want to retain the confidence of the Party and the confidence of the working class.

From this standpoint, the value of the press, of our Party and Soviet press, is truly inestimable. From this standpoint, we cannot but welcome the initiative shown by Pravda in publishing the Bulletin

of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection,⁴ which conducts systematic criticism of shortcomings in our work. Only we must see to it that the criticism is serious and penetrating and does not just skate on the surface. From this standpoint, too, we have to welcome the initiative shown by Komsomolskaya Pravda ⁵ in vigorously and spiritedly attacking shortcomings in our work.

Critics are sometimes abused because of imperfections in their criticism, because their criticism is not always 100 per cent correct. The demand is often made that criticism should be correct on all accounts, and if it is not correct on every point, they begin to decry and disparage it.

That is wrong, comrades. It is a dangerous misconception. Only try to put forward such a demand, and you will gag hundreds and thousands of workers, worker correspondents and village correspondents who desire to correct our shortcomings but who sometimes are unable to formulate their ideas correctly. We would get not self-criticism, but the silence of the tomb.

You must know that workers are sometimes afraid to tell the truth about shortcomings in our work. They are afraid not only because they might get into "hot water" for it, but also because they might be made into a "laughing-stock" on account of their imperfect criticism. How can you expect an ordinary worker or an ordinary peasant, with his own painful experience of shortcomings in our work and in our planning, to frame his criticism according to all the rules of the art? If you demand that their criticism should be 100 per cent correct, you will be killing all possibility of criticism from below, all possibility of self-criticism. That is why I think that if criticism is even only 5 or 10 per cent true, such criticism should be welcomed, should be listened to attentively, and the sound core in it taken into account. Otherwise, I repeat, you would be gagging all those hundreds and thousands of people who are devoted to

the cause of the Soviets, who are not yet skilled enough in the art of criticism, but through whose lips speaks truth itself.

Precisely in order to develop self-criticism and not extinguish it, we must listen attentively to all criticism coming from Soviet people, even if sometimes it may not be correct to the full and in all details. Only then can the masses have the assurance that they will not get into "hot water" if their criticism is not perfect, that they will not be made a "laughing-stock" if there should be errors in their criticism. Only then can self-criticism acquire a truly mass character and meet with a truly mass response.

It goes without saying that what we have in mind is not just "any sort" of criticism. Criticism by a counterrevolutionary is also criticism. But its object is to discredit the Soviet regime, to undermine our industry, to disrupt our Party work. Obviously, it is not such criticism we have in mind. It is not of such criticism I am speaking, but of criticism that comes from Soviet people, and which has the aim of improving the organs of Soviet rule, of improving our industry, of improving our Party and trade-union work. We need criticism in order to strengthen the Soviet regime, not to weaken it. And it is precisely with a view to strengthening and improving our work that the Party proclaims the slogan of criticism and self-criticism.

What do we expect primarily from the slogan of self-criticism, what results can it yield if it is carried out properly and honestly? It should yield at least two results. It should, in the first place, sharpen the vigilance of the working class, make it pay more attention to our shortcomings, facilitate their correction, and render impossible any kind of "surprises" in our constructive work. It should, in the second place, improve the political culture of the working class, develop in it the feeling that it is the master of the country, and facilitate the training of the working class in the work of administering the country.

Have you considered the fact that not only the Shakhty affair, but also the procurement crisis of January 1928 came as a "surprise" to many of us? The Shakhty affair was particularly noteworthy in this respect. This counter-revolutionary group of bourgeois experts carried on their work for five years, receiving instructions from the anti-Soviet organisations of international capital. For five years our organisations were writing and circulating all sorts of resolutions and decisions. Our coal industry, of course, was making headway all the same, because our Soviet economic system is so virile and powerful that it got the upper hand in spite of our blockheadedness and our blunders, and in spite of the subversive activities of the experts. For five years this counter-revolutionary group of experts was engaged in sabotaging our industry, causing boiler explosions, wrecking turbines, and so on. And all this time we were oblivious to everything. Then "suddenly," like a bolt from the blue, came the Shakhty affair.

Is this normal, comrades? I think it is very far from normal. To stand at the helm and peer ahead yet see nothing until circumstances bring us face to face with some calamity—that is not leadership. That is not the way Bolshevism understands leadership. In order to lead, one must foresee. And foreseeing is not always easy, comrades.

It is one thing when a dozen or so leading comrades are on the watch for and detect shortcomings in our work, while the working masses are unwilling or unable either to watch for or to detect shortcomings. Here all the chances are that you will be sure to overlook something, will not detect everything. It is another thing when, together with the dozen or so leading comrades, hundreds of thousands and millions of workers are on the watch to detect shortcomings in our work, disclosing our errors, throwing themselves into the general work of construction and indicating ways of improving it. Here there is a greater guarantee that there

will be no surprises, that objectionable features will be noted promptly, and prompt measures taken to eliminate them.

We must see to it that the vigilance of the working class is not damped down, but stimulated, that hundreds of thousands and millions of workers are drawn into the general work of socialist construction, that hundreds of thousands and millions of workers and peasants, and not merely a dozen leaders, keep vigilant watch over the progress of our construction work, notice our errors and bring them into the light of day. Only then shall we have no "surprises." But to bring this about, we must develop criticism of our shortcomings from below, we must make criticism the affair of the masses, we must assimilate and carry out the slogan of self-criticism.

Lastly, as regards promoting the cultural powers of the working class, developing in it the faculty of administering the country in connection with the carrying out of the slogan of self-criticism. Lenin said:

"The chief thing we lack is culture, ability to administer. . . . Economically and politically, N E P fully ensures us the possibility of laying the foundation of a socialist economy. It is 'only' a matter of the cultural forces of the proletariat and of its vanguard." 6

What does this mean? It means that one of the main tasks of our constructive work is to develop in the working class the faculty and ability to administer the country, to administer economy, to administer industry.

Can we develop this faculty and ability in the working class without giving full play to the powers and capacities of the workers, the powers and capacities of the finest elements of the working class, for criticising our errors, for detecting our shortcomings and for advancing our work? Obviously, we cannot.

And what is required in order to give full play to the powers and capacities of the working class and the working people generally, and to enable them to acquire the faculty of administering the country? It requires, above all, honest and Bolshevick observance of the slogan of self-criticism, honest and Bolshevick observance of the slogan of criticism from below of shortcomings and errors in our work. If the workers take advantage of the opportunity to criticise shortcomings in our work frankly and bluntly, to improve and advance our work, what does that mean? It means that the workers are becoming active participants in the work of directing the country, economy, industry. And this cannot but enhance in the workers the feeling that they are the masters of the country, cannot but enhance their activity, their vigilance, their culture.

This question of the cultural powers of the working class is a decisive one. Why? Because, of all the ruling classes that have hitherto existed, the working class, as a ruling class, occupies a somewhat special and not altogether favourable position in history. All ruling classes until now—the slave-owners, the landlords, the capitalists—were also wealthy classes. They were in a position to train in their sons the knowledge and faculties needed for government. The working class differs from them, among other things, in that it is not a wealthy class, that it was not able formerly to train in its sons the knowledge and faculty of government, and has become able to do so only now, after coming to power.

That, incidentally, is the reason why the question of a cultural revolution is so acute with us. True, in the ten years of its rule the working class of the U.S.S.R. has accomplished far more in this respect than the landlords and capitalists did in hundreds of years. But the international and internal situation is such that the results achieved are far from sufficient. Therefore, every means capable of promoting the development of the cultural powers of the working class, every means capable of facilitating the development in the

working class of the faculty and ability to administer the country and industry—every such means must be utilised by us to the full.

But it follows from what has been said that the slogan of self-criticism is one of the most important means of developing the cultural powers of the proletariat, of developing the faculty of government in the working class. From this follows yet another reason why the carrying out of the slogan of self-criticism is a vital task for us.

Such, in general, are the reasons which make the slogan of self-criticism imperative for us as a slogan of the day.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the keynote of the April plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C. was self-criticism.

Let us pass now to the question of grain procurements.

The Question of Grain Procurements

First of all, a few words about the nature of the grain procurement crisis that developed here in January of this year. The essence of the matter is that in October of last year our procurements began to decline, reached a very low point in December, and by January of this year we had a deficit of 130,000,000 poods of grain. This year's harvest was, perhaps, no worse than last year's; it may have been a little less. The carry-over from previous harvests was bigger than it was last year, and it was generally considered that the marketable surplus of grain in our country this year was not smaller, but larger than in the previous year.

It was with this consideration in mind that the procurement plan for the year was fixed at slightly above last year's plan. But in spite of this, the procurements declined, and by January 1928 we had a deficit of 130,000,000 poods. It was an "odd" situation: there was plenty of grain in the country, yet the procurements were falling

and creating the threat of hunger in the towns and in the Red Army.

How is this "oddity" to be explained? Was it not due to some chance factor? The explanation many are inclined to give is that we had been caught napping, had been too busy with the opposition and had let our attention slip. That we really had been caught napping is, of course, true. But to put it all down to an oversight would be the grossest error. Still less can the procurement crisis be attributed to some chance factor. Such things do not happen by chance. That would be too cheap an explanation.

What, then, were the factors that led up to the procurement crisis?

I think there were at least three such factors.

Firstly. The difficulties of our socialist construction in the conditions of our international and internal situation. I am referring primarily to the difficulties of developing urban industry. It is necessary to pour goods of every kind into the countryside in order to be able to draw out of it the maximum quantity of agricultural produce. This requires a faster rate of development of our industry than is the case now. But in order to develop industry more swiftly, we need a faster rate of socialist accumulation. And to attain such a rate of accumulation is not so easy, comrades. The result is a shortage of goods in the countryside.

I am referring, further, to the difficulties of our constructive work in the countryside. Agriculture is developing slowly, comrades. It should be developing with gigantic strides, grain should become cheaper and harvests bigger, fertilisers should be applied to the utmost and mechanised production of grain should be developed at high speed. But that is not the case, comrades, and will not come about quickly.

Why?

Because our agriculture is a small-peasant economy, which does not readily lend itself to substantial improvement. Statistics tell us that before the war there were about 16,000,000 individual peasant farms in our country. Now we have about 25,000,000 individual peasant farms. This means that ours is essentially a land of small-peasant economy. And what is small-peasant economy? It is the most insecure, the most primitive, the most underdeveloped form of economy, producing the smallest marketable surpluses. That is the whole crux of the matter, comrades. Fertilisers, machines, scientific agriculture and other improvements—these are things which can be effectively applied on large farms, but which are inapplicable or practically inapplicable in small-peasant economy. That is the weakness of small-scale economy, and that is why it cannot compete with the large kulak farms.

Have we any large farms at all in the countryside, employing machines, fertilisers, scientific agriculture and so on? Yes, we have. Firstly, there are the collective farms and state farms. But we have few of them, comrades. Secondly, there are the large kulak (capitalist) farms. Such farms are by no means few in our country, and they are still a big factor in agriculture.

Can we adopt the course of encouraging privately owned, large capitalist farms in the countryside? Obviously, we cannot. It follows then that we must do our utmost to develop in the countryside large farms of the type of the collective farms and state farms and try to convert them into grain factories for the country organised on a modern scientific basis. That, in fact, explains why the Fifteenth Congress of our Party issued the slogan of the maximum development in forming collective and state farms.

It would be a mistake to think that the collective farms must only be formed from the poorer strata of the peasantry. That would be wrong, comrades. Our collective farms must comprise both poor and middle peasants, and embrace not only individual groups or

clusters, but entire villages. The middle peasant must be given a prospect, he must be shown that he can develop his husbandry best and most rapidly through the collective farm. Since the middle peasant cannot rise into the kulak group, and it would be unwise for him to sink, he must be given the prospect of being able to improve his husbandry through the formation of collective farms.

But our collective farms and state farms are still all too few, scandalously few. Hence the difficulties of our constructive work in the countryside. Hence our inadequate grain output.

Secondly. It follows from this that the difficulties of our constructive work in town and country are a basis on which a procurement crisis can develop. But this does not mean that a procurement crisis was bound to develop precisely this year. We know that these difficulties existed not only this year, but also last year. Why, then, did a procurement crisis develop precisely this year? What is the secret?

The secret is that this year the kulak was able to take advantage of these difficulties to force up grain prices, launch an attack on the Soviet price policy and thus slow up our procurement operations. And he was able to take advantage of these difficulties for at least two reasons:

firstly, because three years of good harvests had not been without their effect. The kulak grew strong in that period, grain stocks in the countryside in general, and among the kulaks in particular, accumulated during that time, and it became possible for the kulak to attempt to dictate prices;

secondly, because the kulak had support from the urban speculators, who speculate on a rise of grain prices and thus force up prices.

This does not mean, of course, that the kulak is the principal holder of grain. By and large, it is the middle peasant who holds most of the grain. But the kulak has a certain economic prestige in the countryside, and in the matter of prices he is sometimes able to get the middle peasant to follow his lead. The kulak elements in the countryside are thus in a position to take advantage of the difficulties of our constructive work for forcing up grain prices for purposes of speculation.

But what is the consequence of forcing up grain prices by, say, 40-50 per cent, as the kulak speculating elements did? The first consequence is to undermine the real wages of the workers. Let us suppose that we had raised workers' wages at the time. But in that case, we should have had to raise prices of manufactured goods, and that would have hit at the living standards both of the working class and of the poor and middle peasants. And what would have been the effect of this? The effect would undoubtedly have been directly to undermine our whole economic policy.

But that is not all. Let us suppose that we had raised grain prices 40-50 per cent in January or in the spring of this year, just before the preparations for the sowing. What would have been the result? We should have disorganised the raw materials base of our industry. The cotton-growers would have abandoned the growing of cotton and started growing grain, as a more profitable business. The flax-growers would have abandoned flax and also started growing grain. The beet-growers would have done the same. And so, on and so forth. In short, we should have undermined the raw materials base of our industry because of the profiteering appetites of the capitalist elements in the countryside.

But that is not all either. If we had forced up grain prices this spring, say, we should certainly have brought misery on the poor peasant, who in the spring buys grain for food as well as for sowing his fields. The poor peasants and the lower-middle peasants would

have had every right to say to us: "You have deceived us, because last autumn we sold grain to you at low prices, and now you are compelling us to buy grain at high prices. Whom are you protecting, gentlemen of the Soviets, the poor peasants or the kulaks?"

That is why the Party had to retaliate to the blow of the kulak speculators, aimed at forcing up grain prices, with a counter-blow that would knock out of the kulaks and speculators all inclination to menace the working class and our Red Army with hunger.

Thirdly. It is unquestionable that the capitalist elements in the countryside could not have taken advantage of the difficulties of our constructive work to the degree they actually did, and the procurement crisis would not have assumed such a menacing character, if they had not been assisted in this matter by one other circumstance. What is that circumstance?

It is the slackness of our procurement bodies, the absence of a united front between them, their competition with one another, and their reluctance to wage a determined struggle against speculating on higher grain prices.

It is, lastly, the inertia of our Party organisations in the grain procurement areas, their reluctance to intervene as they should have done in the grain procurement campaign, their reluctance to intervene and put an end to the general slackness on the procurement front.

Intoxicated by the successes of last year's procurement campaign and believing that this year the procurements would come in automatically, our procurement and Party organisations left it all to the "will of God," and left a clear field to the kulak speculating elements. And that was just what the kulaks were waiting for. It is scarcely to be doubted that, had it not been for this circumstance,

the procurement crisis could not have assumed such a menacing character.

It should not be forgotten that we, that is to say our organisations, both procurement and other, control nearly 80 per cent of the supply of manufactured goods to the countryside, and nearly 90 per cent of all the procurements there. It needs scarcely be said that this circumstance makes it possible for us to dictate to the kulak in the countryside, provided that our organisations know how to utilise this favourable position. But we, instead of utilising this favourable position, allowed everything to go on automatically and thereby facilitated—against our own will, of course—the fight of the capitalist elements of the countryside against the Soviet Government.

Such, comrades, were the conditions which determined the procurement crisis at the end of last year.

You see, therefore, that the procurement crisis cannot be considered a matter of chance.

You see that the procurement crisis is the expression of the first serious action, under the conditions of NEP, undertaken by the capitalist elements of the countryside against the Soviet Government in connection with one of the most important questions of our constructive work, that of grain procurements.

That, comrades, is the class background of the grain procurement crisis.

You know that, in order to end the procurement crisis and curb the kulaks' appetite for speculation, the Party and the Soviet Government were obliged to adopt a number of practical measures. Quite a lot has been said about these measures in our press. They have been dealt with in fairly great detail in the

resolution of the joint plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C. Hence, I think that there is no need to repeat that here.

I only want to say something about certain emergency measures which were taken because of the emergency circumstances, and which, of course, will lapse when these emergency circumstances cease to exist.

I am referring to the enforcement of Article 107 of the law against speculation. This article was adopted by the Central Executive Committee in 1926. It was not applied last year. Why? Because the grain procurements proceeded, as it is said, normally, and there were no grounds for applying this article. It was called to mind only this year, at the beginning of 1928. And it was recalled because we had a number of emergency circumstances which resulted from the speculating machinations of the kulaks and which held out the threat of hunger. It is clear that if there are no emergency circumstances in the next procurement year and the procurements proceed normally, Article 107 will not be applied. And, on the contrary, if emergency circumstances arise and the capitalist elements start their "tricks" again, Article 107 will again appear on the scene.

It would be stupid on these grounds to say that NEP is being "abolished," that there is a "reversion" to the surplus-appropriation system, and so on. Only enemies of the Soviet regime can now think of abolishing NEP. Nobody benefits more from the New Economic Policy now than the Soviet Government. But there are people who think that NEP means not intensifying the struggle against capitalist elements, including the kulaks, with a view to overcoming them, but ceasing the struggle against the kulaks and other capitalist elements. It needs scarcely be said that such people have nothing in common with Leninism, for there is not, and cannot be, any place for them in our Party.

The results of the measures taken by the Party and the Soviet Government to put an end to the food crisis are also known to you. Briefly, they are as follows.

Firstly, we made up for lost time and procured grain at a tempo which equaled, and in places surpassed, that of last year. You know that in the three months January-March we succeeded in procuring more than 270,000,000 poods of grain. That, of course, is not all we need. We shall still have to procure upwards of 100,000,000 poods. Nevertheless, it constituted that necessary achievement which enabled us to put an end to the procurement crisis. We are now fully justified in saying that the Party and the Soviet Government have scored a signal victory on this front.

Secondly, we have put our procurement and Party organisations in the localities on a sound, or more or less sound, footing, having tested their combat readiness in practice and purged them of blatantly corrupt elements who refuse to recognise the existence of classes in the countryside and are reluctant to "quarrel" with the kulaks.

Thirdly, we have improved our work in the countryside, we have brought the poor peasants closer to us and won the allegiance of the overwhelming majority of the middle peasants, we have isolated the kulaks and have somewhat offended the well-to-do top stratum of the middle peasants. In doing so, we have put into effect our old Bolshevik slogan, proclaimed by Lenin as far back as the Eighth Congress of our Party 7 : Rely on the poor peasant, build a stable alliance with the middle peasant, never for a moment cease fighting against the kulaks.

I know that some comrades do not accept this slogan very willingly. It would be strange to think that now, when the dictatorship of the proletariat is firmly established, the alliance of the workers and the peasants means an alliance of the workers

with the entire peasantry, including the kulaks. No, comrades, such an alliance we do not advocate, and cannot advocate. Under the dictatorship of the proletariat, when the power of the working class is firmly established, the alliance of the working class with the peasantry means reliance on the poor peasants, alliance with the middle peasants, and a fight against the kulaks. Whoever thinks that under our conditions alliance with the peasantry means alliance with the kulaks has nothing in common with Leninism. Whoever thinks of conducting a policy in the countryside that will please everyone, rich and poor alike, is not a Marxist, but a fool, because such a policy does not exist in nature, comrades. (Laughter and applause.) Our policy is a class policy.

Such, in the main, are the results of the measures we took to increase the grain procurements.

Undoubtedly, in the practical work of carrying out these measures there were a number of excesses and distortions of the Party line. A number of cases of distortion of our policy which, because of our blockheadedness, hit primarily at the poor and middle peasant—cases of incorrect application of Article 107, etc.—are familiar to all. We punish, and shall punish, people guilty of such distortions with the utmost severity. But it would be strange, because of these distortions, not to see the beneficial and truly valuable results of the Party's measures, without which we could not have emerged from the procurement crisis. To do so would be closing one's eyes to the chief thing and giving prominence to that which is minor and incidental. It would be overlooking the very substantial achievements of the procurement campaign because of a handful of individual instances of distortion of our line, distortions which have absolutely no warrant in the measures adopted by the Party.

Were there any circumstances which facilitated our procurement achievements and our fight against the attack of the capitalist elements in the countryside?

Yes, there were. One might mention at least two such circumstances.

Firstly, there is the fact that we secured the intervention of the Party in the procurement campaign and the blow at the kulak speculating elements after the Fifteenth Congress of our Party, after the liquidation of the opposition, after the Party had attained the maximum unity by routing its Party enemies. The fight against the kulaks must not be regarded as a trifling matter. In order to defeat the machinations of the kulak speculators without causing any complications in the country, we need an absolutely united party, an absolutely firm rear and an absolutely firm government. It can scarcely be doubted that the existence of these factors was in a large degree instrumental in forcing the kulaks to beat an instantaneous retreat.

Secondly, there is the fact that we succeeded in linking our practical measures for curbing the kulak speculating elements with the vital interests of the working class, the Red Army and the majority of the poorer sections of the rural population. The fact that the kulak speculating elements were menacing the labouring masses of town and country with the spectre of famine, and in addition were violating the laws of the Soviet Government (Article 107), could not but result in the majority of the rural population siding with us in our fight against the capitalist elements in the countryside. The kulak was scandalously speculating in grain, thereby creating the gravest difficulties both in town and country; in addition he was violating Soviet laws, that is, the will of the Central Executive Committee of Soviets of Workers', Peasants' and Red Army Men's Deputies—is it not obvious that this circumstance was bound to facilitate the work of isolating the kulaks?

The pattern was in a way similar (with the appropriate reservations, of course) to the one we had in 1921, when, because of the famine in the country, the Party, headed by Lenin, raised the

question of confiscating valuables from the churches with a view to acquiring food for the famine-stricken regions, and made this the basis of an extensive anti-religious campaign, and when the priests, by clinging to their valuables, were in fact opposing the starving masses and thereby evoked the resentment of the masses against the Church in general and against religious prejudices in particular, and especially against the priests and their leaders. There were some queer people at that time in our Party who thought that Lenin had come to realise the necessity of combating the Church only in 1921 (laughter) — that he had not realised it until then. That, of course, was silly, comrades. Lenin, of course, realised the necessity of combating the Church before 1921 too. But that was not the point. The point was to link a broad mass anti-religious campaign with the struggle for the vital interests of the masses, and to conduct it in such a way that it was understood by the masses and supported by them.

The same must be said of the Party's manoeuvre at the beginning of this year in connection with the grain procurement campaign. There are people who think that the Party has only now come to realise the necessity of a struggle against the kulak danger. That, of course, is silly, comrades. The Party has always realised the necessity for such a struggle and has waged it not in words, but in deeds. The specific feature of the manoeuvre undertaken by the Party at the beginning of this year is that this year the Party had the opportunity to link a determined struggle against the kulak speculating elements in the countryside with the struggle for the vital interests of the broad masses of the working people, and by means of this link it succeeded in winning the following of the majority of the labouring masses in the countryside and isolating the kulaks.

The art of Bolshevik policy by no means consists in firing indiscriminately with all your guns on all fronts, regardless of

conditions of time and place, and regardless of whether the masses are ready to support this or that step of the leadership. The art of Bolshevik policy consists in being able to choose the time and place and to take all the circumstances into account in order to concentrate fire on the front where the maximum results are to be attained most quickly.

What results, indeed, should we now be having if we had undertaken a powerful blow at the kulaks three years ago, when we did not yet have the firm backing of the middle peasant, when the middle peasant was infuriated and was violently attacking the chairmen of our volost executive committees, when the poor peasants were dismayed at the consequences of NEP, when we had only 75 per cent of the pre-war crop area, when we were confronted with the basic problem of expanding the production of food and raw materials in the countryside, and when we did not yet have a substantial food and raw materials base for industry?

I have no doubt that we would have lost the battle, that we would not have succeeded in enlarging the crop area to the extent that we have succeeded in doing now, that we would have undermined the possibility of creating a food and raw materials base for industry, that we would have facilitated the strengthening of the kulaks, and that we would have repelled the middle peasants, and that, possibly, we would now be having most serious political complications in the country.

What was the position in the countryside at the beginning of this year? Crop areas enlarged to pre-war dimensions, a securer raw materials and food base for industry, the majority of the middle peasants firmly backing the Soviet Government, a more or less organised poor peasantry, improved and stronger Party and Soviet organisations in the countryside. Is it not obvious that only because of these conditions were we able to count on serious success in organising a blow at the kulak speculating elements? Is it not clear

that only imbeciles could fail to understand the vast difference between these two situations in the matter of organising a broad struggle of the masses against the capitalist elements in the countryside?

There you have an example of how unwise it is to fire indiscriminately with all your guns on all fronts, regardless of conditions of time and place, and regardless of the relation between the contending forces.

That, comrades, is how matters stand with regard to the grain procurements.

Let us pass now to the Shakhty affair.

The Shakhty Affair

What was the class background of the Shakhty affair? Where do the roots of the Shakhty affair lie hidden, and from what class basis could this economic counter-revolution have sprung?

There are comrades who think that the Shakhty affair was something accidental. They usually say: We were properly caught napping, we allowed our attention to slip; but if we had not been caught napping, there would have been no Shakhty affair. That there was an oversight here, and a pretty serious one, is beyond all doubt. But to put it all down to an oversight means to understand nothing of the essence of the matter.

What do the facts, the documents in the Shakhty case, show?

The facts show that the Shakhty affair was an economic counter-revolution, plotted by a section of the bourgeois experts, former coal-owners.

The facts show, further, that these experts were banded together in a secret group and were receiving money for sabotage purposes

from former owners now living abroad and from counter-revolutionary anti-Soviet capitalist organisations in the West.

The facts show, lastly, that this group of bourgeois experts operated and wrought destruction to our industry on orders from capitalist organisations in the West.

And what does all this indicate?

It indicates that it is a matter here of economic intervention in our industrial affairs by West-European anti-Soviet capitalist organisations. At one time there was military and political intervention, which we succeeded in liquidating by means of a victorious civil war. Now we have an attempt at economic intervention, for the liquidation of which we do not need a civil war, but which we must liquidate all the same, and shall liquidate with all the means at our disposal.

It would be foolish to believe that international capital will leave us in peace. No, comrades, that is not true. Classes exist, international capital exists, and it cannot look on calmly at the development of the country that is building socialism. Formerly, international capital thought it could overthrow the Soviet regime by means of outright armed intervention. The attempt failed. Now it is trying, and will go on trying, to undermine our economic strength by means of inconspicuous, not always noticeable but quite considerable, economic intervention, organising sabotage, engineering all sorts of "crises" in this or that branch of industry, and thereby facilitating the possibility of armed intervention in the future. All this is woven into the web of the class struggle of international capital against the Soviet regime, and there can be no question of anything accidental here.

One thing or the other:

either we continue to pursue a revolutionary policy, rallying the proletarians and the oppressed of all countries around the working class of the U.S.S.R.—in which case international capital will do everything it can to hinder our advance;

or we renounce our revolutionary policy and agree to make a number of fundamental concessions to international capital—in which case international capital, no doubt, will not be averse to "assisting" us in converting our socialist country into a "good" bourgeois republic.

There are people who think that we can conduct an emancipatory foreign policy and at the same time have the European and American capitalists praising us for doing so. I shall not stop to show that such naive people do not and cannot have anything in common with our Party.

Britain, for instance, demands that we join her in establishing predatory spheres of influence somewhere or other, in Persia, Afghanistan or Turkey, say, and assures us that if we made this concession, she would be prepared to establish "friendship" with us. Well, what do you say, comrades, perhaps we should make this concession?

Chorus of shouts. No!

Stalin. America demands that we renounce in principle the policy of supporting the emancipation movement of the working class in other countries and says that if we made this concession everything would go smoothly. Well, what do you say, comrades, perhaps we should make this concession?

Chorus of shouts. No!

Stalin. We could establish "friendly" relations with Japan if we agreed to join her in dividing up Manchuria. Can we make this concession?

Chorus of shouts. No!

Stalin. Or, for instance, the demand is made that we "loosen" our foreign trade monopoly and agree to repay all the war and pre-war debts. Perhaps we should agree to this, comrades? Chorus of shouts. No!

Stalin. But precisely because we cannot agree to these or similar concessions without being false to ourselves — precisely because of this we must take it for granted that international capital will go on playing us every sort of scurvy trick, whether it be a Shakhty affair or something else of a similar nature.

There you have the class roots of the Shakhty affair.

Why was armed intervention by international capital possible in our country? Because there were in our country whole groups of military experts, generals and officers, scions of the bourgeoisie and the landlords, who were always ready to undermine the foundations of the Soviet regime. Could these officers and generals have organised a serious war against the Soviet regime if they had not received financial, military and every other kind of assistance from international capital? Of course not. Could international capital have organised serious intervention without the assistance of this group of white guard officers and generals? I do not think so.

There were comrades among us at that time who thought that the armed intervention was something accidental, that if we had not released Krasnov, Mamontov and the rest from prison, there would have been no intervention. That, of course, is untrue. That the release of Mamontov, Krasnov and the other white guard

generals did play a part in the development of civil war is beyond doubt. But that the roots of the armed intervention lay not in this, but in the class contradictions between the Soviet regime on the one hand, and international capital and its lackey generals in Russia on the other, is also beyond doubt.

Could certain bourgeois experts, former mine owners, have organised the Shakhty affair here without the financial and moral support of international capital, without the prospect of international capital helping them to overthrow the Soviet regime? Of course not. Could international capital have organised in our country economic intervention, such as the Shakhty affair, if there had not been in our country a bourgeoisie, including a certain group of bourgeois experts who were ready to go to all lengths to destroy the Soviet regime? Obviously not. Do there exist at all such groups of bourgeois experts in our country as are ready to go to the length of economic intervention, of undermining the Soviet regime? I think there do. I do not think that there can be many of them. But that there do exist in our country certain insignificant groups of counter-revolutionary bourgeois experts—far fewer than at the time of the armed intervention—is beyond doubt.

It is the combination of these two forces that creates the soil for economic intervention in the U.S.S.R.

And it is precisely this that constitutes the class background of the Shakhty affair.

Now about the practical conclusions to be drawn from the Shakhty affair.

I should like to dwell upon four practical conclusions indicated by the Shakhty affair.

Lenin used to say that selection of personnel is one of the cardinal problems in the building of socialism. The Shakhty affair shows

that we selected our economic cadres badly, and not only selected them badly, but placed them in conditions which hampered their development. Reference is made to Order 33, and especially to the "Model Regulations" accompanying the order.⁸ It is a characteristic feature of these model regulations that they confer practically all the rights on the technical director, leaving to the general director the right to settle conflicts, to "represent," in short, to twiddle his thumbs. It is obvious that under such circumstances our economic cadres could not develop as they should.

There was a time when this order was absolutely necessary, because when it was issued, we had no economic cadres of our own, we did not know how to manage industry, and had willy-nilly to assign the major rights to the technical director. But now this order has become a fetter. Now we have our own economic cadres with experience and capable of developing into real leaders of our industry. And for this very reason the time has come to abolish the obsolete model regulations and to replace them by new ones.

It is said that it is impossible for Communists, and especially communist business executives who come from the working class, to master chemical formulas or technical knowledge in general. That is not true, comrades. There are no fortresses that the working people, the Bolsheviks, cannot capture. (Applause.) We captured tougher fortresses than these in the course of our struggle against the bourgeoisie. Everything depends on the desire to master technical knowledge and on arming ourselves with persistence and Bolshevik patience. But in order to alter the conditions of work of our economic cadres and to help them to become real and full-fledged masters of their job, we must abolish the old model regulations and replace them by new ones. Otherwise, we run the risk of maiming our personnel.

Were some of our business executives who have now deteriorated worse than any of us? Why is it that they, and other comrades like them, began to deteriorate and degenerate and come to identify themselves in their way of living with the bourgeois experts? It is due to our wrong way of doing things in the business field; it is due to our business executives being selected and having to work in conditions which hinder their development, which convert them into appendages of the bourgeois experts. This way of doing things must be discarded, comrades.

The second conclusion indicated to us by the Shakhty affair is that our cadres are being taught badly in our technical colleges, that our Red experts are not being trained properly. That is a conclusion from which there is no escaping. Why is it, for example, that many of our young experts do not get down to the job, and have turned out to be unsuitable for work in industry? Because they learned from books, they are book-taught experts, they have no practical experience, are divorced from production, and, naturally, prove a failure. But is it really such experts we need? No, it is not such experts we need, be they young experts three times over. We need experts—whether Communists or non-Communists makes no difference—who are strong not only in theory but also in practical experience, in their connection with production.

A young expert who has never seen a mine and does not want to go down a mine, a young expert who has never seen a factory and does not want to soil his hands in a factory, will never get the upper hand over the old experts, who have been steeled by practical experience but are hostile to our cause. It is easy to understand, therefore, why such young experts are given an unfriendly reception not only by the old experts, and not only by our business executives, but often even by the workers. But if we are not to have such surprises with our young experts, the method of training them must be changed, and changed in such a way that already in

their first years of training in the technical colleges they have continuous contact with production, with factory, mine and so forth.

The third conclusion concerns the question of enlisting the broad mass of the workers in the management of industry. What is the position in this respect, as revealed by the Shakhty evidence? Very bad. Shockingly bad, comrades. It has been revealed that the labour laws are violated, that the six-hour working day in underground work is not always observed, that safety regulations are ignored. Yet the workers tolerate it. And the trade unions say nothing. And the Party organisations take no steps to put a stop to this scandal.

A comrade who recently visited the Donbas went down the pits and questioned the miners about their conditions of work. It is a remarkable thing that not one of the miners thought it necessary to complain of the conditions. "How is life with you, comrades?" this comrade asked them. "All right, comrade, we are living not so badly," the miners replied. "I am going to Moscow, what should I tell the centre?" he asked. "Say that we are living not so badly," was their answer. "Listen, comrades, I am not a foreigner, I am a Russian, and I have come here to learn the truth from you," the comrade said. "That's all one to us, comrade, we tell nothing but the truth whether to foreigners or to our own people," the miners replied.

That's the stuff our miners are made of. They are not just workers, they are heroes. There you have that wealth of moral capital we have succeeded in amassing in the hearts of the workers. And only to think that we are squandering this invaluable moral capital so iniquitously and criminally, like profligate and dissolute heirs to the magnificent legacy of the October Revolution! But, comrades, we cannot carry on for long on the old moral capital if we squander it so recklessly. It is time to stop doing that. High time!

Finally, the fourth conclusion concerns checking fulfilment. The Shakhty affair has shown that as far as checking fulfilment is concerned, things could not be worse than they are in all spheres of administration—in the Party, in industry, in the trade unions. Resolutions are written, directives are sent out, but nobody wants to take the trouble to ask how matters stand with the carrying out of those resolutions and directives, whether they are really being carried out or are simply pigeon-holed.

Ilyich used to say that one of the most serious questions in administering the country is the checking of fulfilment. Yet precisely here things could not possibly be worse. Leadership does not just mean writing resolutions and sending out directives. Leadership means checking fulfilment of directives, and not only their fulfilment, but the directives themselves—whether they are right or wrong from the point of view of the actual practical work. It would be absurd to think that all our directives are 100 per cent correct. That is never so, and cannot be so, comrades. Checking fulfilment consists precisely in our leading personnel testing in the crucible of practical experience not only the way our directives are being fulfilled, but the correctness of the directives themselves. Consequently, faults in this field signify that there are faults in all our work of leadership.

Take, for example, the checking of fulfilment in the purely Party sphere. It is our custom to invite secretaries of okrug and gubernia committees to make reports to the Central Committee, in order to check how the C.C.'s directives are being carried out. The secretaries report, they confess to shortcomings in their work. The C.C. takes them to task and passes stereotyped resolutions instructing them to give greater depth and breadth to their work, to lay stress on this or that, to pay serious attention to this or that, etc. The secretaries go back with those resolutions. Then we invite them again, and the same thing is repeated about giving greater

depth and breadth to the work and so on and so forth. I do not say that all this work is entirely without value. No, comrades, it has its good sides in educating and bracing up our organisations. But it must be admitted that this method of checking fulfilment is no longer sufficient. It must be admitted that this method has to be supplemented by another, namely, the method of assigning members of our top Party and Soviet leadership to work in the localities. (A voice: "A good idea!") What I have in mind is the sending of leading comrades to the localities for temporary work, not as commanders, but as ordinary functionaries placed at the disposal of the local organisations. I think that this idea has a big future and may improve the work of checking fulfilment, if it is carried out honestly and conscientiously.

If members of the Central Committee, members of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission, People's Commissars and their deputies, members of the Presidium of the A.U.C.C.T.U., and members of presidiums of trade-union central committees were to go regularly to the localities and work there, in order to get an idea of how things are being done, to study all the difficulties, all the good sides and bad sides, then I can assure you that this would be the most valuable and effective way of checking fulfilment. It would be the best way of enriching the experience of our highly respected leaders. And if this were to become a regular practice—and it certainly must become a regular practice—I can assure you that the laws which we write here and the directives which we elaborate would be far more effective and to the point than is the case now.

So much, comrades, for the Shakhty affair.

General Conclusion

We have internal enemies. We have external enemies. This, comrades, must not be forgotten for a single moment.

We had a procurement crisis, which has already been liquidated. The procurement crisis marked the first serious attack on the Soviet regime launched by the capitalist elements of the countryside under NEP conditions.

We have the Shakhty affair, which is already being liquidated and undoubtedly will be liquidated. The Shakhty affair marks another serious attack on the Soviet regime launched by international capital and its agents in our country. It is economic intervention in our internal affairs.

It needs scarcely be said that these and similar attacks, both internal and external, may be repeated and in all likelihood will be repeated. Our task is to exercise the maximum vigilance and to be on the alert. And, comrades, if we are vigilant, we shall most certainly defeat our enemies in the future, just as we are defeating them now and have defeated them in the past. (Stormy and prolonged applause.)

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Enver Hoxha

The Demagogy of the Soviet Revisionists Cannot Conceal Their Traitorous Countenance

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Demagogy has always been the favorite weapon of all traitors. That is very typical of the modern revisionists, especially of the Soviet revisionist leadership. This clique of renegades, while always advancing on the same road of treachery, has made use, according to circumstances, of various masks to conceal its real countenance.

The Alleged Return to Stalin's Correct Policy—the Basest Hypocrisy and the Most Desperate Maneuver of the Soviet Revisionists

Khrushchevite revisionism in the Soviet Union has undergone several stages, in compliance with which its forms, methods and tactics of struggle and action to carry out in practice its anti-Marxist and traitorous course and to camouflage it, have also changed.

The first stage was that of the building up, maintenance and establishment of the betrayal, accompanied with a great and scandalous noise and with a sham "optimism" to distract the minds of the people. It was characterized by the frantic campaign of attacks on J. Stalin, to discredit the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and the cause of the Bolshevik Party, under the fraudulent pretext of the "fight against the personality cult and its consequences."

But what was the line of the Bolshevik Party, the line of Stalin, against which the Khrushchevite revisionists hurled themselves so

furiously, what were its consequences for the development of the Soviet Union and the international communist and revolutionary movement?

In the ideological field the line pursued by the Bolshevik Party led by Stalin was the line of the consistent defence and the creative development of Marxism-Leninism in a merciless fight against the enemies and distorters of Leninism in the Soviet Union and outside it—against the Trotskyists, Bukharinists, social-democrats, Titoites etc., the line of the fight against the pressure and influences of bourgeois ideology and culture, for the implanting and development of socialist ideology and culture, the line of high proletarian partisanship in all spheres of spiritual life, for the communist education of the working people.

In the political-social field it was the line of the unceasing strengthening of the proletarian party and of its leading role in the whole national life, of the strengthening and consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, of the alliance of the working class and peasantry, of the friendship of the peoples of the Soviet Union, of the unity of the entire Soviet people around the Party and the power of the Soviets, through a fierce class struggle against the overthrown exploiting classes and their remnants outside the party and inside its ranks, the line of constant strengthening of the country's defensive power in order to stand up to any possible imperialist aggression.

In the economic field it was the line of the building of socialism with one's own efforts and at fast rates, in conditions of complete capitalist encirclement, and in a life and death struggle against the tide of petty-bourgeois spontaneity, the line of socialist industrialisation and collectivisation of agriculture, of the constant improvement of socialist relations of production, of the impetuous development of socialist production and of the uninterrupted growth of the well-being of the working people.

In the field of international relations it was the line of resolute opposition to imperialism, to its policy of war and aggression, as well as of the exploitation of contradictions in the imperialist camp for its weakening and the strengthening of the positions of socialism, the internationalist line of the powerful and unreserved support for the world revolutionary and liberation movement, the line of fraternal relations of mutual support and aid towards the socialist countries and the fraternal communist and workers' parties, the line of unceasing strengthening of the militant unity of the socialist camp and of the international communist movement on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and of proletarian internationalism, in the common struggle for the victory of the cause of socialism throughout the world.

As a result of the implementation of the correct revolutionary Marxist-Leninist line of the Bolshevik Party led by Stalin, the socialist transformations throughout the country were successfully carried out within a short period of time, the backwardness inherited from the Czarist regime was liquidated, and the Soviet Union was transformed into a powerful socialist State with modern industry, with a large-scale collectivized agriculture, with a most advanced technology and science, with a tremendous economic and military potential. The great historic victory over fascism in the years of the Second World War was achieved and the role and importance of the Soviet country in international life grew considerably. The consolidation and growth of the influence of the communist movement in the world, the creation and consolidation of the socialist camp after the Second World War, the general weakening of the positions of international imperialism and the great successes in the development of the world proletarian revolution are due, to a considerable extent, to the internationalist revolutionary line consistently implemented by J.V. Stalin.

The Khrushchevite modern revisionists, who after having taken over the leadership of the party and the state, relied on the great results of the Stalin epoch and used them to spread and consolidate their revisionist and treacherous course, frontally attacked all the Marxist-Leninist principles which guided Stalin's policy and underlay the tremendous strength of the Soviet Union, which they usurped and appropriated.

In the ideological field the revisionists replaced the ideas and the consistent Marxist-Leninist line of Stalin on all fundamental questions with the ideas and the anti-Marxist line of modern revisionism. Opportunists and various Trotskyist, Bukharinist and Zinovievist enemies, nationalists, and others, in the Soviet Union were proclaimed as "victims of Stalin" and were placed on the pedestal of "martyrs" and "heroes." The renegade Tito clique in Yugoslavia was rehabilitated and Titoism was proclaimed as a variant of "creative Marxism-Leninism" and of "socialism." In various socialist countries condemned traitors were rehabilitated and revisionist cliques attached to Khrushchev's chariot were brought to power. They launched the slogan of unity with the social-democrats on a national and international scale "in the joint struggle for socialism," and the way was paved for the complete ideological, political and organisational rapprochement and merger of the communist parties with the social-democratic parties. The principle of proletarian partisanship was discarded and, under the slogan of liberalization and "freedom of creative thought," the revival of all sorts of decadent and anti-socialist trends in the fields of culture, literature and arts was encouraged.

In the political field Khrushchev and his group besmirched and discarded the Marxist-Leninist theory and practice about the class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat, calling it a "Stalinist distortion" and proclaiming the whole historic period of Stalin's leadership a "dark, anti-democratic period, a period of violations

of socialist legality, of terror and murders, of prisons and concentration camps." The road was thus opened for the liquidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat and for its replacement with the bureaucratic and counterrevolutionary dictatorship of the new "socialist" aristocracy which was born and was developing, all this being covered with the deceptive slogans of "democratisation" and of "restoration of freedom and socialist justice" allegedly "lost and now regained."

In the economic field the Khrushchevites declared as erroneous and incorrect the Stalin line and methods of development and management of the socialist economy in all branches, especially in that of agriculture, rejected Stalin's directives on further improvement and development of socialist relations of production in the historic period of the transition from socialism to communism, and, under the pretext of overcoming the economic "stagnation" and difficulties allegedly created as a result of the Stalin "dogmatic" line, undertook a series of "reforms" which paved the way to the gradual degeneration of the socialist economic order and to the uncontrolled operation of the economic laws of capitalism.

In the field of international relations, the Khrushchevite revisionists proclaimed as "erroneous," "rigid" and "dogmatic" the Stalin foreign policy line, the line of the blow for blow fight against imperialism and of determined internationalist support for the revolutionary and liberation struggle. They replaced it with the "peaceful coexistence" policy as the general line of the foreign policy of the Soviet state. They trumpeted peaceful coexistence in all directions as a "great discovery," as an "invaluable contribution to the creative development of Marxism-Leninism," and as the "beginning of a new epoch in international relations." Everything—the cause of revolution, of the liberation of the peoples, of the independence and sovereignty of the socialist

countries, was subjected to the needs of "peaceful coexistence" and of "peace at any price" with imperialism, especially with U.S. imperialism. This was in fact the line of capitulation to imperialism, of renouncing the struggle against it, of rapprochement and collaboration with it.

The anti-Stalin campaign served the Khrushchevite renegades to pass over to the second stage—to that of the efforts for the strengthening and stabilisation of the betrayal in the economy, policy and ideology, at home and in foreign relations. This is the stage of the codification of the viewpoints of Khrushchevite revisionism and of the large-scale implementation of its policy.

N. Khrushchev and his group completely liquidated the Marxist-Leninist proletarian party, they transformed it into a weapon of the revisionist counter-revolution, they replaced the Leninist norms of party building with revisionist norms and, finally, they proclaimed it a "party of the whole people." They liquidated the dictatorship of the proletariat and it was proclaimed as a past stage, under the pretext of the transformation of the Soviet State into a "state of the whole people," which is nothing else but a "democratic" mask hiding the counterrevolutionary dictatorship of the new bourgeois class represented by the revisionist renegades. The process of restoration of capitalism in the economy began on a large scale. The proclamation of "profit" as the fundamental criterion and incentive of economic development, the decentralisation of some vital links of the management of the economy, the encouragement of tendencies towards private property, the transformation of socialist property into a means of exploitation of the working people and of ensuring large profits on the part of the leading section of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, the opening of the doors to the free penetration of foreign capital and, as a consequence of all this, the ever more powerful operation of the laws of capitalist economy, anarchy in production and competition between

enterprises, the considerable revival of the black market, profiteering, abuses, graft, etc.—such are some of the fundamental features of the bourgeois degeneration of the Soviet economy. Alongside this, the anti-Marxist course of the Khrushchevite revisionists flung open wide the doors to the irresistible penetration of the decadent bourgeois ideology and culture, to the mortal degeneration of the people, and in the first place of the rising generation, to the spreading of the "western way of life."

In the field of international relations this stage was characterized by the complete establishment of the counter-revolutionary alliance of the Soviet leadership with U.S. imperialism for sharing the domination of the world, at the expense of the freedom and independence of the peoples of the vital interests of the socialist countries, of the cause of revolution and socialism. The selling out of the interests of the liberation struggle of the Congolese people, the bargaining with U.S. and West-German imperialism to the detriment of the national interests of the German Democratic Republic, the treachery towards the Cuban people in the days of the Caribbean crisis, the joint plots with the U.S. imperialists and the Indian reactionaries against the People's Republic of China, the signing of the ill-famed Soviet-U.S.-British treaty on the partial prohibition of nuclear weapons tests, the sabotage of the revolutionary struggle of the Vietnamese people against the U.S. aggressors, and of the just struggle of the Arab people against the imperialist-Israel aggression, etc.—all these, and other acts, are links of the long chain of the counterrevolutionary alliance of the Soviet revisionist leadership with U.S. imperialism.

In this period, when Khrushchevite revisionism was still on the rise and had somewhat strong positions, it did not hesitate in many cases to take off its mask, to openly express its viewpoints, trying to place them on a "Marxist-Leninist" theoretical foundation and to justify them with the "new conditions." It was precisely in this

period that the entire revisionist chorus, under the absolute direction of the conductor's baton—Khrushchev's,—was loudly singing of peaceful coexistence, peaceful competition, the peaceful road, of the State and party of the whole people, of the world without weapons, without armies and without wars, when they were openly saying that imperialism and its chiefs have become sensible and peace-loving, that the fate of the peoples will be decided by U.N. resolution, that the Soviet-U.S. alliance was the greatest guarantee of world peace, etc., etc.

All this counter-revolutionary line and the anti-Marxist-Leninist viewpoints of the Khrushchevite revisionists were consecrated in the decisions of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, especially in the program of the CPSU adopted at this congress, which, due to the dominating position of the Soviet leadership in the revisionist camp, became the main code of the trend of international modern revisionism.

At this ill-famed congress were repeated openly and publicly now the monstrous attacks and calumnies against Stalin. This showed, in the first place, that the feelings of sympathy towards J. Stalin had remained alive among the Soviet people and this greatly worried the Khrushchevite leading clique; in the second place, that this clique was obstinately advancing on its anti-Marxist road, and in the third place, that it needed the "bogy of Stalinism" in order to defeat the ever more resolute resistance which was rising in the international communist movement against its treacherous line.

But the logic of treachery is such that the more deeply they submerge in the bog, the more it suffocates them. Revisionism was born as a retrogressive trend to save capitalism from its general crisis. But in this role, it, itself entered a deep and general crisis from which nothing can save it. The situation for the head of revisionism, for the Soviet ruling clique has become especially grave.

The struggle of the Marxist-Leninist parties and forces, and life itself, which is the best judge of every policy, rejected the line and theories of the Soviet revisionist leadership, exposed their anti-Marxist and counter-revolutionary essence. Difficult days have come for the Khrushchevite revisionists. Khrushchevite revisionism has entered the third stage, which is the stage of its decline, of its deep and general crisis, the stage when treachery develops but yields bitter fruits and brings defeats to the revisionists.

The efforts of the Khrushchevite revisionist leadership to impose its revisionist course and its chauvinist dictate on the whole international communist movement failed ignominiously. At a rapid rate the great and irresistible process of differentiation in the communist movement in various countries and on a world scale has developed. The principled and determined attitude of the Communist Party of China and of the Party of Labor of Albania in defence of the immortal principles of Marxism-Leninism, and their consistent fight against the treachery of Soviet revisionism played the main role in this important historic process. Within a few years, tens of new Marxist-Leninist parties and organisations were created which raised high the banner of the struggle against modern revisionism and have taken in their hands the cause of revolution. This is a heavy and irreparable defeat with lethal consequence to the revisionist renegades in all countries.

The ever deeper engagement of the Khrushchevite revisionists on the criminal road of capitalist restoration in the Soviet Union, of counter-revolutionary alliances with imperialism, of subversion and division of the world communist and revolutionary movement, their successive defeats in their domestic and foreign policies, accompanied with serious economic and political difficulties—all this has thrown the Soviet revisionist leadership into a deep, irreconcilable, and ever fiercer contradiction with the

Soviet people and with the revolutionary peoples of the whole world.

The contradictions of the Soviet revisionist leadership with the other revisionist groupings have greatly sharpened and these in compliance with the special interests of their national bourgeoisie whose representatives they are, are demanding faster rates of degeneration of the socialist order into an order of bourgeois democracy and greater independence and freedom of action from Moscow. The dominating positions of the Khrushchevite clique of the Soviet Union in the revisionist camp are weakening and being smashed with every passing day. The clearest testimony to this is the "rebellion" of the Czechoslovak and other revisionists against the dictate of the Soviet leadership and the repeated discrediting failures of the latter in its efforts to organise an international meeting of the revisionist communist and workers parties.

The positions of the revisionist cliques in power, especially the Soviet clique, have been shattered to their foundations. No longer are they in a position to conceal the deep splits and the struggle for power which is taking place ever more fiercely in their fold. The failure and inglorious overthrow of the inspirer and head of the Soviet modern revisionism, N. Khrushchev, were the most obvious expression of the deep crisis and of revisionist instability.

Khrushchev's successors were obliged to change tactics. They discarded into oblivion the noisy slogan and preaching of N. Khrushchev and decided to pass from words to deeds. If the "merit" of the working out of the general line of modern revisionism belongs to N. Khrushchev, to his successors, the Brezhnev-Kosygin clique, belongs the "merit" of the full implementation of this counter-revolutionary line.

But the "cautious" tactics of the Brezhnev-Kosygin clique were incapable of lifting Khrushchevite revisionism from the swamps

into which it has submerged. The iron laws of history irresistibly blaze their trail, deepening from day to day the crisis and difficulties of the revisionist renegades.

In face of the irreparable defeats, both at home and abroad, in face of the resistance and revolutionary struggle being waged against them from outside and inside by the Soviet people and revolutionaries, by the Party of Labor of Albania, the Communist Party of China and the Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries throughout the world, the Khrushchevite revisionists are striving to save their domination by establishing a military fascist dictatorship. This they need to quell the revolt of the working masses, of the Soviet people, and every activity of the revolutionary Marxist-Leninists, to curb the discrediting actions of the impatient liberal revisionists at home, to hold under control the revisionist cliques of the other countries, and to re-establish the Soviet dictate on their revisionist partners.

This policy found its most flagrant expression in the aggression of the Soviet revisionists and their satellites against the Czechoslovak people. This aggression entirely tore off the mask of the Kremlin clique. The methods used, beginning with the pressures, blackmail, the Judas kisses in Cerna and Tisu, and Bratislava, and ending with the surprise attack, in the darkness of the night, without any ground whatsoever, be it even as a matter of form, that could justify the brutal intervention with arms, gives this interference its true meaning — an imperialist, fascist aggression.

The strengthening of the aggressive, imperialist, fascist tendencies of the domestic and foreign policies of the revisionist Soviet Union, which is an expression not of strength, but of the weakness of the Khrushchevite leadership, demands its ideological foundation. The ideological servants of revisionism are now meeting this need. For this purpose, there have been published of late in the Soviet press a series of so-called theoretical articles, full of pseudo-

revolutionary demagoguery, which are aimed at creating a smokescreen so that the people should not see what is in reality hidden behind it. It is a question of dressing the revisionist treachery with new cloaks at these very critical moments which the Khrushchevite leadership of the Soviet Union is living. Above all, they are striving to justify the complete passage of the Soviet revisionist clique to the fascist dictatorship and methods and to conceal it by the alleged return to Stalin and to his Marxist-Leninist line.

To attack Stalin with the most rabid savagery for his correct, revolutionary, Marxist-Leninist policy in all the fields, as the Khrushchevite revisionist renegades did, and now, faced with their full defeat in all directions; to try to hide behind Stalin's name, claiming, at times directly and at times indirectly, that the Khrushchevite revisionists are allegedly returning to the correct Stalin policy, is out-and-out deception, the most shameless hypocrisy, the basest and most desperate demagoguery on the part of the Soviet revisionists.

It is the duty of the Marxist-Leninists squarely to expose this deceptive attempt of the Soviet revisionists and to wrest this dangerous weapon from their hands.

The Establishment of the Fascist Military Dictatorship Under the Disguise of Safeguarding the Idea of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat

One of the demagogical manoeuvres of the Soviet revisionist clique to justify its transition to the fascist dictatorship, is the noise which it is making in these recent times allegedly in defence of the Marxist-Leninist teaching about the dictatorship of the proletariat, although, as is known, it is precisely the Soviet leading clique itself that has destroyed the dictatorship of the proletariat in the Soviet Union and has slung the dirtiest mud at it, presenting it as a

"savage, barbarous, inhuman dictatorship which has done nothing but commit crimes against the working class and the laboring people."

They who come out today with the banner of the defence of the dictatorship of the proletariat are precisely those that have proclaimed it as liquidated in the Soviet Union under the pretext of the transformation of the Soviet State into a "State of the entire people." The Soviet revisionists are now striving to create the illusion that the so-called "State of the entire people" is allegedly "the direct continuation of the State of the dictatorship of the proletariat." This illusion can deceive only the naïve, because there is nothing and there can be nothing, in common between the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat and "the state of the entire people." The latter, in reality, is the complete negation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, its transformation into something entirely opposite—into a counter-revolutionary dictatorship of the new revisionist bourgeoisie.

"The continuation between the dictatorship of the proletariat and the state of the entire people," the scribblers of the Moscow Pravda write, —"is clearly seen in the preservation of the leading role of the working class." But how does the working class play this role when the socialist state and the communist party, as the revisionists claim, have lost their proletarian class character and have become a "state and party of the entire people"? It is obvious that we are faced here with a very clumsy and banal deception. In reality, the working class in the Soviet Union has not been in power for a long time. It is now a class which is being oppressed and exploited, being corrupted and exposed to degeneration. It is transformed from a leading force into a mere productive force, from a political force into an economic appendage. In fact, it is the new bourgeois class that is ruling and leading now in the Soviet

Union, the class that has established its savage dictatorship over the Soviet working class and the Soviet people.

The Soviet Khrushchevite revisionists, who are today playing with slogans of the dictatorship of the proletariat, are precisely those that have defended and propagandized, with a great noise, the revisionist theses which advocate the supra-class character of the present day capitalist state, and its use as a means for transition to socialism, who deny the necessity of smashing the bourgeois state machine as an indispensable condition for the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, who deny the leading role of the communist party in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat without which the latter cannot exist, etc.

The falsity of the whole demagogical noise of the Soviet revisionists, allegedly in defence of the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat, is quite obvious also in the fact that, as previously, indeed with a still greater intensity, they continue to attack the Party of Labor of Albania and the Communist Party of China for their firm loyalty towards the dictatorship of the proletariat. Just as at the time of the frantic campaign against Stalin and his work, they furiously attack the dictatorship of the proletariat in China and Albania calling it a "bureaucratic-military regime, strangler of freedom and socialist democracy," etc. They especially attack the Marxist-Leninist thesis of our parties pensable till the victory of communism on a world scale, because during this period the class struggle continue at home and in the international arena. There continues the struggle between the two roads—socialist and capitalist, a thesis which has been fully confirmed by revolutionary practice. The most convincing proof of the correctness of this thesis is the very fact of the revisionist counter-revolution and of restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union nearly 40 years after the triumph of the October Socialist Revolution.

It most clearly follows from all this that in the activity of the Khrushchevites we are by no means faced with a denial of the previous revisionist theses and with a return to the Marxist-Leninist positions on the dictatorship of the proletariat, but with a deceptive attempt to mask with "revolutionary" slogans what is happening in reality in the Soviet Union—the full transition to the methods of fascist military dictatorship. The dressing up of fascism with "socialist" and "revolutionary" phraseology is by no means new. These tactics were used by Hitler in Germany and Mussolini in Italy, in their time.

The coercive measures, the calls for the strengthening of the ideological struggle, of discipline, unity, etc., are measures serving the consolidation of the fascist dictatorship of the Khrushchevite revisionist clique. In reality, the coercive measures are actions of the fascist dictatorship for the suppression of all revolutionary activity of the Soviet people and of the genuine Bolsheviks. The intensification of the fight against all truly revolutionary thought. The discipline demanded by the Soviet leaders is the discipline of the "black hundreds," to bridle away everyone who rises against the revisionist treachery. The unity about which the Khrushchevite revisionists speak, is a unity on revisionist foundations, around the revisionist party and for the counter-revolutionary purposes of the revisionists.

The Soviet leadership is trying to create the impression that its measures are mainly directed against the liberal extremists who, of late, especially after the events in Czechoslovakia and Poland, have become still more active. Although the Soviet revisionist leaders and the extremist liberal elements are essentially advancing on the same anti-Marxist and treacherous road, the activity of these elements is undesirable for the revisionist leadership. It fears another counter-revolution within counter-revolution, it does not wish to suffer the fate of N. Khrushchev or of the Novotny clique.

But what worries the Soviet leadership most is the fact that the frenzied and unwise activity of these elements openly discloses the trickery of the revisionists, causes their demagogy to fall, openly reveals treachery, and this cannot help opening the eyes to the Soviet people, it cannot help intensifying their resistance and struggle to sweep away with the great broom of revolution both the liberal revisionists and the "conservatives," both the ultras and the "moderates."

Therefore, it is precisely against this revolution that all the measures, and the fascist dictatorship of the Soviet revisionist leadership, are directed. But however hard it may try to strangle this revolution through repressive measures and deception, the revolution is irrevocable. The Soviet people will not tolerate the revisionists' treachery for long. In the end they will have the final say.

Complete Degeneration of the CPSU Under the Call for the Defense of the Party Principles

In order to realise their counterrevolutionary aims, all the class enemies have always directed their main attack against the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary party which is the brain and heart of the working class. This is how the Khrushchevite modern revisionists, too, began their treachery. And now, it is precisely they who have transformed the great Bolshevik Party of Lenin and Stalin into a revisionist, counterrevolutionary, and anti-communist party, who have paved the way to the revisionist and bourgeois degeneration of many communist and workers' parties of other countries, precisely they are today coming out allegedly in defence of the teachings of Marxism-Leninism about the party and are "criticizing" those that are violating these principles. Seeking justification for their fascist aggression in Czechoslovakia they accuse the Czechoslovak revisionists in particular of having "launched a frantic campaign against the healthy cadres of the

party, who make up its fund of gold," of having "risen against the leading role of the communist party," of having "advocated the multiplicity of political parties," of having "sought to make the party a cultural-illuminist or ideo-preaching" organisation, of having "stood for the so-called equal partnership of all the social organisations within the communist party," of having "attacked the Leninist norms of inner party life," etc.

On the lips of the Soviet revisionist renegades such accusations resound as all-out hypocrisy, with an unprecedented cynicism, for it is precisely they themselves and their allies who, as before, are still advocating, defending and committing these crimes in their own parties.

The Party of Labor of Albania has long since, and more than once, pointed out the complete betrayal of the Soviet revisionist leaders of the teachings of Marxism-Leninism about the proletarian party. But in order to expose the deep-going demagogy of the revisionists that they are allegedly returning to the positions of the defense of these teachings, to the implementation of the Leninist norms of the party, it is necessary that we should once more dwell on some well-known facts.

If the Dubcek counterrevolutionaries attacked and purged the Soviet agency—the Novotny counter-revolutionaries whom the Soviet leadership call "the Party's fund of gold," the Khrushchevite counter-revolutionary clique of the Soviet Union in its own country attacked and purged the real revolutionary cadres who were remaining true to the Marxist-Leninist line of the Bolshevik Party and to the ideals of socialism. Under the slogan of the "fight against Stalin's personality cult," or under the pretext of rotation, the Khrushchevite revisionists rode roughshod over the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Seventy per cent of the members of the members of the Central Committee elected at the 19th Congress of the CPSU in 1952 were no longer figuring on the

list of the Central Committee members elected at the 22nd Congress in 1961. Sixty per cent of the CC members in 1956 were no longer figuring on the list of the CC members that were elected at the 23rd Congress in 1966. A still greater purge has been carried out in the lower party organs. For instance, during 1963 alone, more than 50 per cent of the members of the party central and regional committees in the Republics of the Soviet Union were relieved of their functions, while in the city and district party committees three quarters of their members were replaced with others. The purge of the revolutionary cadres has been carried out on a large scale also in the State organs, and especially in those of the army and State security.

As to the question of the leading role of the communist party, of the denial of which the Soviet leadership accuses the Czechoslovak revisionists, this role has long since been liquidated in the Soviet Union itself. Of what leading role of the working-class revolutionary party in the Soviet Union can we speak when the Khrushchevite revisionists have discarded the Marxist-Leninist line and the proletarian class character of the CPSU? They have forced upon it a treacherous revisionist line in the service of the new Soviet bourgeoisie and of world imperialism, headed by the United States, and have transformed it into a "party of the entire people"! The "party of the entire people" slogan is essentially a denial of the class character in general, because there are not and there can never be nonclass and above-class parties. But denial of its proletarian class character, is a label to conceal its transformation from a revolutionary proletarian Marxist-Leninist party into a counterrevolutionary bourgeois revisionist party.

Of what norms can the Soviet revisionists speak when they have long since buried these norms in their own party, when they have transformed them from Marxist-Leninist norms into revisionist norms which serve their counterrevolutionary aims and line. The

Soviet revisionists speak of democratic centralism; they speak of Bolshevik criticism and self-criticism, but in reality they are hypocritical; they speak of conscious party discipline, but in reality it is a fascist discipline; they speak of proletarian morality, but in reality it is a bourgeois morality; they speak of freedom of thought, but every free expression of revolutionary Marxist-Leninist thought leads one to jail, to committal to mental hospital or concentration camp. Irrespective of the disguises, the present-day norms in the CPSU are anti-Leninist, bourgeois, reactionary, fascist norms.

It was precisely the revisionist course of the 20th Congress of the CPSU that paved the way, not only for the degeneration of this party itself, but also for the degeneration of a number of other communist and workers parties in socialist and capitalist countries. It was precisely this counterrevolutionary course that inspired and encouraged the spreading of all sorts of anti-Marxist viewpoints of the revisionists in various countries about the transition to socialism under the leadership of anti-proletarian parties, which indeed do not even call themselves socialist, about unity with the social-democratic renegades through the complete organisational merger with them into a so-called united working class party, about the liquidation of the communist parties and their merging into fronts led by the bourgeoisie, etc. As a result of this revisionist line, the communist parties in many capitalist countries in reality no longer exist as such; they have been transformed into a new variant of the old discredited social-democracy, they have abandoned all revolutionary ideals and are collaborating with the bourgeoisie for the defence of the capitalist order. While in the former socialist countries they have been transformed from working class parties for the building of socialism into parties of the new bourgeoisie for the complete restoration of capitalism.

Pluralism, the many party system, against which the Soviet revisionists are making a noise today, exists not only in Czechoslovakia, but also in many other revisionist countries, and signs are appearing everywhere of the revival and political and organisational activation of other parties to obtain leading and ruling positions in the "socialist state," which is ever more assuming the features of a bourgeois state. These viewpoints are being noisily defended and propagandized also by many other revisionists in capitalist countries, especially in Italy and France, who are bringing pressure to bear upon their colleagues in the former socialist countries to advance as quickly as possible on this road, to adapt "socialist democracy" as far as possible to bourgeois democracy.

Why then does the Soviet leadership precisely now show itself so worried about the question of the leading role of the party and come out forcefully against pluralism? They do this not only to find additional justification for the legalisation of their aggression in Czechoslovakia. There are other deep reasons. The Brezhnev-Kosygin clique is very much worried about the defence of its dominating position from the great dangers threatening it both inside and outside the party. There is not and there can be no unity in the Soviet revisionist party. Revisionism is certain division. In the Soviet Union as well as in any other revisionist country, there exists the factional struggle for power between the revisionist groups and trends, as is clearly confirmed by N. Khrushchev's overthrow and the other changes in Soviet leadership. This disintegration process will irrevocably deepen. The course of capitalist restoration in the Soviet Union cannot but lead to the revival of the various bourgeois and nationalist groups. This prepares the objective conditions for the birth, sooner or later, also of the bourgeois many party systems. The Brezhnev-Kosygin revisionist clique, with a view to preserving its dominating position, is trying and will try with all its might without hesitating

to use even means of violence, to curb this process. For this purpose, it is trying, and it will try, to exploit the tradition of the existence of a single party and of the fight of the Bolsheviks against the factionists and deviators. The Soviet leading clique is opposed to the disintegration of the single party also because of the position of the Soviet Union as a great multi-national State, for this would lead to an internal national division, consequently also to the undermining of the role of the revisionist Soviet Union on the international arena as a great imperialist power.

But above all, the Khrushchevite revisionists are striving to exploit the Bolshevik single party tradition, with which the Soviet communists and the Soviet people have been molded, to keep them attached to the CPSU in which there remains nothing communist. They are striving to exploit this tradition in order to prevent the organisation of the Soviet revolutionaries and the creation of a new Marxist-Leninist Party in the Soviet Union. Despite the fact that not all the communists and the working class in the Soviet Union see that the present-day Communist Party of the Soviet Union has nothing in common with the Bolshevik Party of Lenin-Stalin, bolshevism is always alive in the Soviet Union and the Soviet Bolshevik revolutionaries will not be defeated in the face of the tragedy which the land of the Soviets is living, but they will restore the great traditions of October Revolution, of the heroic times of Lenin and Stalin. And the only road to this is the recreation of the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist revolutionary party, that must take in its hands the banner of the struggle for the overthrow of the revisionist clique and the restoration of the dictatorship of the proletariat, to turn the Soviet Union back to the road of communism.

The Revisionists Against Revisionism

Revisionism, as a bourgeois-ideological, anti-Marxist and counter-revolutionary trend, has been so badly discredited that even the

chiefs of revisionism themselves, especially those of the Soviet Union, are using the term "revisionist" to criticize their most irresistible and liberal allies. Here and there they let out even the words that revisionism is today the main danger, and the fight against it—the primary duty. They need this, both to justify their aggression in Czechoslovakia and for home consumption. The tactics of the Soviet revisionists are tactics of the thief who calls: "catch the thief." They accuse others of all that they have done or are doing themselves.

Modern revisionism was born about the time of the Second World War. Its first representatives were Browder in America and Tito in Europe. But due to the struggle of the Marxist-Leninist parties, headed by the Bolshevik Party led by Stalin, neither Browderism nor Titoism could flourish very widely; they were isolated and fully exposed. Modern revisionism was transformed into a major international trend only after the 20th Congress of the CPSU and due to this ill-famed congress. After this congress Khrushchevite revisionism was developed and raised to a whole system of political, ideological and economic bourgeois viewpoints. But while they now take "anti-revisionist" poses, the Soviet revisionists persist in the entirely revisionist line of the 20th and 22nd congresses. This shows that all their present-day fuss against "revisionism" is a great bluff.

The Soviet leaders accuse the Czechoslovak revisionists of having "discarded loyalty towards principles under the banner of the fight against dogmatism. They advocate the liquidation of the revolutionary convictions, of the foundations of socialist ideology," etc. But is it not the Soviet revisionists themselves who up to today have proclaimed that "dogmatism" (meaning Marxism-Leninism) was the main danger; and is it not they themselves who, under the banner of the fight against dogmatism, betrayed Marxism-Leninism, widely spread revisionism, and furiously attacked the

Stalin revolutionary line, the Party of Labor of Albania, the Communist Party of China and the other Marxist-Leninist parties? Is it not the Soviet revisionist leaders who, while they throw fireworks against "revisionism," are furiously continuing the fight against the parties which really stand on Marxist-Leninist positions, especially against the Party of Labor of Albania and the Communist Party of China, which have waged and continue to wage a consistent, principled and inflexible struggle against revisionism? This is another proof exposing the "anti-revisionist" demagoguery of the Soviet leadership.

When the Czechoslovak revisionists, for the realisation of their counterrevolutionary aims, made extensive use of the false slogans of "freedom," "democracy," "liberalisation," "humanism," these slogans, according to the Soviet leadership, were a mask "to cover counterrevolutionary activity," but when these slogans are used by that leadership itself, which is just as much counterrevolutionary as the Czechoslovak leadership, these slogans are allegedly revolutionary! Freedom and democracy on the lips of the revisionists, whether Khrushchevite, Titoite, Novotnist or Dubcekist, mean freedom and democracy for the revisionists, for the traitors and counterrevolutionaries; liberalisation means destruction and liquidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat; humanism means replacement of the class struggle with Christian pacifism and love for all the class enemies.

When the Czechoslovak revisionists speak of "grave errors in the past," "distortions of democracy and violations of legality" and use them to blacken and undermine the gains of socialism, this, according to the Soviet leaders, is "diabolic tactics" of the enemies of socialism. But did the Khrushchevite clique not pursue precisely these "diabolical tactics" in the Soviet Union? The attacks and calumnies made by the Khrushchevites against the heroic past of the Soviet Union outdid even those of the most rabid imperialist

enemies of the Soviet Union. Nobody has discredited the Soviet Union more than the Khrushchevite clique. The "secret" report of the 20th Congress is a document which is known to everybody and Khrushchev's successors have never, in the slightest, put this document in doubt. Their manoeuvres in publishing some writing or in producing some film showing the great historic role of J. Stalin during the great patriotic war, cannot conceal their out-and-out treachery towards the ideas and the activity of Stalin. They are only a testimony to the fact that Stalin is always alive in the minds and the hearts of the Soviet men and women, and are aimed at throwing dust in the eyes, and at quelling the resistance of the Soviet people towards the Khrushchevite clique which has buried the glorious historic period of the Stalin leadership.

Just as demagogical on the lips of the Soviet revisionist renegades, are their slogans about the necessity of intensifying the struggle against the bourgeois ideology and its efforts for the "erosion of socialist ideology," "against a multiplicity" of socialist ideologies and of socialism as a social order. Today they accuse the Czechoslovak revisionists of having had opened the doors to the flood of western ideology, of making efforts to liquidate the foundations of socialist ideology, of advocating a new model of socialism which is not based on Marxism-Leninism, etc. By rising against these "sins" of the Czechoslovak revisionists, the Soviet newspaper Pravda discovered America for the second time, as it were, pointing out that "there is not and there can be no socialism without the leading role of the Communist Party, armed with the ideas of Marxism-Leninism," that "there can be no other form of socialism since the birth and development of scientific socialism, no 'other' socialist ideology which is not based on Marxism-Leninism can exist in our times." (see Pravda of September 19 and 22, 1968).

Of what fight against bourgeois ideology can the Soviet revisionists speak while revisionism is nothing else by a manifestation of the bourgeois ideology in theory and practice, while egoism and individualism, the running after money and other material benefits are thriving in the Soviet Union, while career seeking and bureaucratism, technocratism, economism and intellectualism are developing, while villas, motor-cars and beautiful women have become the supreme ideal of men, while literature and art attack socialism, everything revolutionary, and advocate pacifism and bourgeois humanism, the empty and dissolute living of people thinking only of themselves, while hundreds of thousands of western tourists that visit the Soviet Union every year, spread the bourgeois ideology and way of life there, while western films cover the screens of the Soviet cinema halls, while the American orchestras and jazz bands and those of the other capitalist countries have become the favorite orchestras of the youth, and while parades of western fashions are in vogue in the Soviet Union? If until yesterday the various manifestations of bourgeois ideology could be called remnants of the past, today bourgeois ideology has become a component part of the capitalist superstructure which rests on the state capitalist foundation which has now been established in the Soviet Union.

As to the criticism against the "multiplicity" of socialist ideologies and of socialist orders," it is the Soviet leaders themselves that have wiped out in theory and practice any distinction between socialist ideology and bourgeois ideology, between the socialist order and the capitalist one. It is precisely the Soviet revisionists who have declared, and continue to declare, that many countries newly liberated from the colonial rule of imperialism and in which the bourgeoisie and landlords and their reactionary ideology are dominating, have embarked on the road of socialism or are building socialism. Does this not indicate that the Soviet leaders themselves are advocating the possibility of transition to socialism

without the leadership of the working class, of its revolutionary party, and of the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, in other words, the possibility of transition to socialism under the leadership of non-proletarian classes and parties, that there exist, thus, several kinds of socialism and several kinds of socialist ideology?

Or let us take the case of Yugoslavia. In "criticizing" the Yugoslav Titoites, who supported the Dubcek clique and spoke against the Soviet aggression in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet revisionists thought of pointing out that the program of the Communist League of Yugoslavia is the complete embodiment of the ideology of revisionism. But how does this comply with the other statements of the Soviet leaders who, after having kissed and embraced the Tito clique, proclaimed and continue even today to call Yugoslavia a socialist country? What is this socialism which is allegedly being built in Yugoslavia on the basis of revisionist ideology, which is nothing else but a variant of the bourgeois ideology? Does the Soviet leadership itself not admit by this that socialism can allegedly be built also on the basis of revisionism, that is of anti-Marxism, of bourgeois ideology?

Expressing dissatisfaction with the attitude of the Tito clique towards the Czechoslovak events, the Soviet propaganda accuses the Titoites of being "inspirers and supporters of the Czechoslovak counterrevolutionaries." But the Soviet leaders themselves who, in an entirely arbitrary way, rehabilitated the Tito clique as an "innocent victim," introduced it into the communist movement, proclaimed it as "a "fighter for socialism" and maintain close ties with it, are they not themselves inspirers and supporters of the inspirers and supporters of the counterrevolutionaries? Thus, they themselves are as much counterrevolutionaries as the Tito clique. After the 1956 Hungarian events, also, the Khrushchevite clique of the Soviet Union undertook a campaign of criticisms against the Yugoslav revisionists, but only as a matter of form, for it had

collaborated with them behind the scenes to bring counter-revolutionary Kadar to power, and as soon as the tension relaxed somewhat the honeymoon started again. This is what will surely happen this time, too. Indeed, the tone of the anti-Yugoslav propaganda in the Soviet Union has already greatly diminished. The Brezhnev-Kosygin clique can deceive nobody by its sham criticism of the Tito clique. They are two revisionist cliques which, despite the contradictions they have about the questions of the roads of development of revisionism and of relations between the revisionist countries and parties, belong to a single revolutionary trend—modern revisionism.

The Soviet revisionists have allegedly discovered in Czechoslovakia a "new," "unknown" form of counterrevolution. The sin of those who condemned the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia as aggression, they say, is allegedly the "deep incomprehension of the essence of this new historical phenomenon," as people have been so far accustomed to "imagine counterrevolution only in its armed form, through violence."

Summing up the experience of the revisionist tragedy that happened in the Soviet Union and in other socialist countries where the revisionist cliques are in power, the Marxist-Leninists have long since drawn the conclusion that the danger to the destinies of socialism does not stem only from external imperialist aggression nor only from the armed counterrevolution of the exploiting classes and their survivals, but also from peaceful bourgeois revisionist degeneration, which is the result of the influence of bourgeois ideology from inside and of the pressure of imperialism from outside.

The first example of peaceful counterrevolution was provided by the Titoites, then this road was pursued by the Khrushchevite clique of the Soviet Union and by the cliques of the other socialist countries of Europe in succession. The attempt of the Soviet

revisionists to present peaceful counterrevolution as a "new historic phenomenon" which occurred only during the Czechoslovak events, is in reality an attempt, on the one hand, to justify their aggression against the Czechoslovak people and, on the other hand, to camouflage the peaceful counterrevolution which they themselves have carried out in the Soviet Union.

Although the ideologists of the Soviet revisionists speak a great deal of peaceful counterrevolution, they only skirt around this phenomenon. They present it in a very simple way, as something directly instigated and organised by the remnants of the exploiting classes and by the agencies of imperialism. In reality, peaceful counterrevolution is a counterrevolution which is carried out from above, by the degenerated and bureaucratized cadres of the very class and party which are in power. And this process of degeneration has its own deep internal and external social-economic causes, in the same way as it has also its own historic and ideologic sources. The Soviet revisionists do not and cannot make any analysis whatsoever of the causes and sources, because this would mean for them to make an autopsy of themselves. The autopsy of the birth of revisionism has been and will be made ever more fully only by the Marxist-Leninists, by the Bolshevik revolutionaries, who will throw out the revisionist carrion and will purge the whole atmosphere of its bad smell.

With their own words, the Khrushchevite revisionists expose themselves, because if they admit the danger of peaceful counterrevolution even after the liquidation of the exploiting classes, how can they proclaim that "the victory of socialism is complete and final," how can they say what was said in the program of the CPSU approved by the 22nd Congress that "in the countries of people's democracy the social-economic possibilities for the restoration of capitalism have been removed"? One or the other: Either the thesis of peaceful counterrevolution is a bluff or

the other thesis that all danger to the destinies of socialism has been removed, is a deception, an attempt to legalize the revisionist treachery, to lull the vigilance and revolutionary action of the communists and the working people.

In contrast with what they have previously advocated, that allegedly with the liquidation of exploiting classes the class struggle also comes to an end and its place is occupied by the political and social-economic unity of society, at present the Soviet revisionists are not opposed to admitting the class struggle after the liquidation of the exploiting classes as such and to oppose also "abstract national unity." There is no end to demagogy. They speak of class struggle, but only in other countries, while they do not utter a single word about the class struggle in the Soviet Union, as if harmony and everlasting peace were reigning there. But what about the struggle which the Khrushchevite revisionists themselves undertook after the death of J.V. Stalin in the Soviet Union; is it not an open expression of the struggle of the class enemies who opened the road to the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union, to its transformation from a socialist proletarian state into a new bourgeois and imperialist state? This class struggle, but from the positions of the new bourgeoisie and its interests, is being waged most savagely by the Soviet revisionist leadership against the healthy revolutionary forces both at home and in the international arena, resorting to all the means of the military fascist dictatorship.

Life, facts, the very experience of revisionist treachery show that the class struggle continues, not only after the liquidation of the exploiting classes as such, not only after the victory of socialism, but indeed, for some time, even after the victory of communism on a world scale, as long as the influences of bourgeois ideology continue to exist. Therefore, the complete victory of socialism and communism can be achieved and be guaranteed only when, in

addition to other things, there has been achieved the full victory of socialist ideology over bourgeois ideology in every individual country and on a world scale. And, as long as this struggle continues, the existence of the dictatorship of the proletariat is indispensable, as the main weapon of the class struggle of the proletariat for the destruction of all the class enemies and for the building of socialism and communism.

The whole demagogy of the alleged fight against revisionism and of the alleged return to the Leninist-Stalinist positions is needed by the Soviet revisionist leadership to conceal its complete transformation into a social-fascist clique.

But the Soviet leaders, due to their very position as a revisionist clique, cannot go very far in the so-called "fight against revisionism," for such a thing is fraught with extremely dangerous consequences unexpected and undesirable for them. Therefore, at the same time they are furiously continuing their fight against revolutionary Marxism-Leninism and the parties remaining faithful to it, especially against the Communist Party of China and the Party of Labor of Albania. This most clearly shows the falsity of their demagogical fuss about the "fight against revisionism."

Precisely to conceal its bluff, the Soviet leadership is striving to create the illusion that it allegedly stands on the Leninist positions of the struggle on two fronts, that it is allegedly fighting against the rightists, the revisionists, as well as against the "leftists," "dogmatists," "adventurers," etc. This dangerous manoeuvre must be fully exposed, and the real social-fascist features of the Soviet leading clique should be nakedly revealed.

Social-Imperialism Disguised as Proletarian Internationalism

Social-fascism in the home policy has social-imperialism as its direct continuation in foreign policy; and while they seek to camouflage fascism with "socialist" phraseology, the Soviet leaders

strive to conceal their imperialism with the slogan of "proletarian internationalism."

It is known that the Khrushchevite revisionists started their treachery with capitulation and concessions to imperialism and with renouncing the fight against it; while the liquidation of the foundations of socialism and the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union, its transformation from a socialist state into a capitalist state of the new type, created the economic, social and class premises for its transformation into a great imperialist power in the international arena, and for the counterrevolutionary alliance with U.S. imperialism. The Soviet Union has become an imperialist power which seeks to have its zones of influence, which is striving to enslave and exploit the peoples of other countries, which, in alliance with U.S. imperialism, is striving for the establishment of the world domination of the two great powers.

But if, until recently, Soviet imperialism was trying to preserve and extend its zone of influence, to dictate its will to others through "peaceful means"—through economic penetration and subjugation, through political and ideological influence and pressure, through military and economic alliances, etc., now it has passed over to open fascist methods, to the use of armed violence, to direct military aggression even against its own allies. Precisely this is the new feature in the evolution of Soviet imperialism. The most typical example in this direction is the Soviet fascist military aggression in Czechoslovakia.

By what they did in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet revisionists quite evidently showed that now for them there do exist neither friendship, alliances and treaties, freedom and independence, nor sovereignty of peoples. The only "principle" existing for them is the right of the more powerful to make the law everywhere, while all other principles are violated, trampled underfoot, placed under the heel, through arms and bloodshed.

To justify this cynical and fascist policy, the Soviet revisionists are now seeking to convince none other than their own allies from the revisionist camp that the independence, self-determination, sovereignty of the parties and peoples of various countries have no value whatsoever, that they must submit to the interests of the so-called socialist community, in other words, to the interests of the chauvinist great power of the Soviet Union, that for the sake of these interests this power can violate these principles when, where, and in what way, it likes.

The demagogy of the Soviet aggressors, that by attacking and occupying Czechoslovakia with arms they carried out their internationalist duty towards the Czechoslovak people and towards the cause of socialism and the world revolutionary movement, inasmuch as they allegedly saved the victories of socialism in Czechoslovakia from the danger of counterrevolution, can hoodwink nobody. How can they defend the gains of socialism in another country who have destroyed socialism in their own country, how can they avoid the danger of counterrevolution who themselves are the head of counterrevolution? We showed above that all those things of which they accused the Czechoslovak revisionists in order to justify their aggression, the Soviet revisionists have done and are doing themselves. Therefore, all the "arguments" of the Soviet revisionist leadership are empty and false. Their actions have no political, ideological, moral or legal foundation whatsoever.

Fully defeated also, was the "legal" argument of the Soviet revisionists to justify their aggression in Czechoslovakia. The "famous" letter of some Czechoslovak personalities allegedly addressed to the Soviets and to some other Warsaw Treaty countries "to ask for their aid in suppressing counterrevolution in Czechoslovakia" was absolutely proved to be a fraud. Nobody came out to confirm being the author of that letter. The Soviet

troops were not invited either by the Czechoslovak Government, or by the President of the Republic, by the parliament or the Central Committee of the Party. Even Hitler in his time acted with some tact: at least he obtained by force the signature of the President Hacha, when he occupied Czechoslovakia.

As to the Czechoslovak people and the healthy socialist forces in Czechoslovakia, they had no reason to address themselves for aid to the Soviet revisionist renegades and their allies, for the defence of the gains of socialism from the Czechoslovak revisionist renegades, for both the Soviet revisionist clique and the Novotny or Dubcek revisionist cliques, are advancing, all of them, on the same anti-Marxist and anti-socialist road. And life showed, and confirms through numerous facts with every passing day, that despite the capitulation of the Dubcek clique, the Czechoslovak people met the armies of the Soviet revisionists as occupiers and, in various forms, they resisted and are resisting occupation. They are ever more clearly realizing that the actions of the Dubcek clique which overthrew the Novotny clique, were a counterrevolution within the counterrevolution, just as the Soviet military intervention was the suppression through the force of arms of the internal Czechoslovak counterrevolution by the Soviet external counterrevolution.

As an important instrument of the implementation of its imperialist policy, the Soviet leading clique is using the Warsaw Treaty military alliance. This treaty, which has changed its nature from top to bottom, from a treaty of peace into a means of war, from a defensive treaty into a weapon of aggression, is being used by the Soviet leading clique also against the very participants in this treaty. In reality, with the exception of Rumania, all the other member countries of this ill-famed treaty are under the control of the armed forces of Soviet revisionism. The so-called "socialist family" or "socialist community" resembles a concentration camp,

a prison of peoples, Soviet troops are stationed everywhere, and they make the law in these countries. In these conditions, the freedom, independence, equality and sovereignty of the peoples, have been turned into empty slogans which are used to deceive and lull the peoples.

But the appetite of Soviet imperialism goes beyond the limits of the zone which is directly under its influence. It is openly threatening the other Balkan countries, especially the People's Republic of Albania; it is committing open military provocations against the People's Republic of China, and, in close collaboration with the U.S. imperialists, the Japanese militarists, with the Indian, Indonesian, and other reactionaries, it is preparing the big anti-China plot. The Soviet revisionist rulers, in alliance and vying with the U.S. imperialists, are extending the zone of action of their military fleet, they have led their warships to the Mediterranean to threaten the People's Republic of Albania as well as to extend their imperialist grip at the expense of the Arab people and of the peoples of other countries.

This typical imperialist policy of the Soviet revisionists cannot be concealed. It cannot help meeting with the determined opposition and resistance of all the peoples who cherish the ideals of freedom, independence, sovereignty, revolution and socialism. This policy is ever more exposing and isolating the Soviet leading clique before the peoples of the whole world.

And not only that. In implementing its imperialist aggressive course, it has had great difficulties also with its own allies. The Soviet leadership, in order to keep control of the other revisionist cliques, is openly passing over to the use of force, as was known by the Czechoslovak events, which are a very serious warning of what awaits the other cliques if they dare advance on the road of "polycentrism," autonomy, etc. But instead of strengthening the dominating positions of the Soviet revisionist leading clique, this

will lead to a further division of the revisionist front and will still more undermine the positions of Soviet revisionism. This was very clearly seen in the reaction of the revisionist cliques of other countries which, in a joint chorus, rose up against the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and condemned it as aggression, taking the Dubcek clique under protection. The additional difficulties created for the Soviet leadership in convening an international meeting of the revisionist parties, which was against postponed, is further evidence of this.

The recent events, especially those in Czechoslovakia, are a catastrophic defeat for the whole of modern revisionism, which most obviously indicates its complete degeneration, especially of the head of modern revisionism—the Khrushchevite clique of the Soviet Union, into a social-fascist and social-imperialist clique. Nobody should allow himself to be deceived by the manoeuvres to conceal this degeneration with demagogy, with the slogans of "internationalism." It is the duty of all the real Marxist-Leninists and revolutionaries to expose and smash this dangerous manoeuvre. In the first place, the Soviet people themselves must rise with determination against this imperialist aggressive course and should not allow the Khrushchevite renegade clique in power to use Soviet men and women, the Soviet armed forces, for the realisation of its imperialist and oppressive aims. One should not forget for a single moment the great teaching of Marx that the people of a country that oppresses other peoples are not and can never be free.

Stalin Belongs to the Marxist-Leninists, He Belongs to Proletarian Revolution

Analysis of the facts shows that there can be no question of any moderation of the revisionist positions of the Soviet renegade leadership. All its efforts to create the impression that it is allegedly returning to the old Stalinist positions are a big bluff. There should

be no illusion whatsoever that the events in Czechoslovakia, in Poland, and the activation of the liberal extremists in the Soviet Union have opened the eyes of the Soviet counter-revolutionary clique and brought them down to earth. All this has only caused it to change its tactics, to adopt still more demagogical tactics to establish and consolidate the full fascist military dictatorship of revisionist capital and to disguise it.

The Brezhnev-Kosygin clique places great hopes in achieving this success inside the Soviet Union, where there is brutal oppression, a terrible censorship, where the communists and people have been educated merely to repeat and not to do a thorough-going study of the content of the formulas and slogans, and where, finally, the cult of megalomania of the "great and powerful socialist state" continues to develop. It hopes to achieve this also by speaking in a low voice about a "return to the Stalin epoch," to satisfy and deceive thereby the apolitical, the sentimental and the naïve.

It is a duty of all the Marxist-Leninists, in the first place of the Soviet Bolshevik revolutionaries themselves, to expose right to the end this diabolical manoeuvre of the Khrushchevite ruling clique, to reject any illusion with regard to this clique, to intensify the fight against it, to thoroughly expose its real social-fascist and social-imperialist countenance. Faced with the fact of the transformation of the Soviet State into a fascist-type military dictatorship, the Soviet revolutionaries must rise up, organise themselves and throw themselves into struggle and revolution. Their historic responsibility is today greater than ever. There is no doubt that this will be a difficult struggle which will require self-denial and heavy sacrifices. But the Leninist-Stalinist Bolsheviks have never been frightened. We express our deep conviction that they will one day perform with honor their great duty towards their own people and international communism. And the sooner they do this, the better it will be.

The demagogy of the Soviet leading clique for an alleged return to the revolutionary positions of the Stalin epoch, must be exposed also outside the Soviet Union, where it could be established and used by the other revisionist cliques. But, on the other hand, it is obvious that these tactics will sharpen the contradictions in the camp of the revisionists, will lead to the division of the revisionist parties into pro-Soviet and anti-Soviet groups. Indeed, right now the Novotnyists in Czechoslovakia, the Vermeerschists and Thorezists in France, are being called "tough," "Stalinist," because they are supporters of the Soviet revisionists, their agents. The Soviet leading clique is giving and will give to these elements, its whole support so as to establish through them, its control and shattered rule over the other revisionist parties. This cannot avoid meeting the resistance of the other revisionist elements, which will further deepen the division in the revisionist camp.

The duty of the Marxist-Leninists in these countries is to mercilessly unmask the pseudo-revolutionary phraseology of the pro-Soviet agency, to prevent the creation of any illusion whatever in this direction, to exploit the deepening of the contradictions in the fold of the revisionists and to intensify the fight against all the revisionist renegades for their complete destruction.

As to the countries which are ruled by the Soviet revisionists, and where they make the law through the military forces they have stationed there, this manoeuvre can hardly serve because the strengthening of the imperialist-fascist aggressive character of the policy being pursued by the Soviet leading clique cannot help arousing the ever more resolute indignation and protest of the peoples of these countries. Indeed, even the revisionist Quislings who are necessarily obeying the Soviet clique, for their ruling positions have been built on sand, do not want them to undertake a manoeuvre of an alleged return to the Stalin epoch, be it even as a bluff, because, on the one hand, this would attach them still more

closely to the Soviet chariot, from which they want to be as independent as possible, and on the other hand, such a manoeuvre would undermine their foundations, inasmuch as they came to power precisely under the banner of the fight against Stalinism. Therefore, here too, divisions will be further sharpened and deepened, inside the revisionist parties as well as between the ruling revisionist cliques and the Soviet leadership. The submission of the revisionist Quislings to the Soviet fascist military dictatorship is temporary. There will be fierce disputes and blows between them up to armed clashes.

All these things create favorable conditions for the revolutionary struggle of the peoples and the Communists of these countries, to expose the local revisionist Quislings as well as the Soviet occupiers, to drive the occupation armies out of the country, and to overthrow the revisionist renegade cliques in power. The only correct road for the attainment of those aims is the creation everywhere of Marxist-Leninist parties, and the organisation of armed revolutionary struggle.

The Party of Labor of Albania, which has always consistently abided by the Marxist-Leninist line and principles, and has waged and is waging a resolute fight against modern revisionism headed by the Soviet renegade leadership, will mercilessly unmask the present dangerous, pragmatist tactics of the Brezhnev-Kosygin clique for an alleged return to the revolutionary positions of Stalin. It has not and it will never allow the name and the great Marxist-Leninist revolutionary activity of Joseph Stalin to be besmirched by the Khrushchevite revisionists, or to be used by them as a camouflage to conceal their revisionist treachery. Stalin belongs to the Marxist-Leninists, to the proletarian revolution.

Enver Hoxha

EUROCOMMUNISM IS ANTI - COMMUNISM

The name and work of Stalin were linked with the establishment of the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the Soviet Union and the construction of socialism in that country. By denigrating Stalin and the social system for which he fought and worked throughout his life, reaction and all the anti-communist scum wanted to destroy not only the greatest and most powerful base of socialism, but also the communist dream of hundreds and hundreds of millions of people throughout the world. With their attack on Stalin and his work, they wanted to create an atmosphere of pessimism among the fighters for the revolution, the bitter disappointment of someone who unwittingly, has been guided by a false ideal. However, besides all the great hopes they had pinned on the campaign against Stalin, despite the victory of the counter-revolution in the Soviet Union and other countries, the revolution was not conquered, Marxism-Leninism was not eliminated, and socialism was not snuffed out. The Khrushchevite, betrayal was a major one, but it could never pull down the glorious banner A Marxism-Leninism which the genuine revolutionaries, millions of people who believe in its inexhaustible power, always hold high. While Khrushchevism was unmasked as a counterrevolutionary ideology of the restoration of capitalism and as a great power policy for the domination of the world, Marxism-Leninism remained the ideology which leads to the triumph of the revolution and the liberation of the peoples.

Khrushchevism and the other revisionist currents have in common the liquidation of the communist party and its transformation into a political force which serves the bourgeoisie. In the Soviet Union too, the Communist Party of Lenin and Stalin has been liquidated. It is true that the party there did not change its name, as occurred in Yugoslavia, but it was stripped of its revolutionary essence and

spirit. The role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union altered, and its work for the strengthening of the Marxist-Leninist ideology was replaced with the distortion of the Marxist-Leninist theory, under different disguises, through empty phraseology and demagoguery. The political organization of the party, like the army, the police and the other organs of the dictatorship of the new bourgeoisie, was transformed into an organization to oppress the masses, not to mention the fact that it also became the bearer of the ideology and policy of their oppression and exploitation. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union degraded, was weakened, and became a "party of the entire people", that is, no longer the vanguard party of the working class, which carries forward the revolution and builds socialism, but a party of the new revisionist bourgeoisie, which causes the degeneration of socialism and carries forward the restoration of capitalism.

In the face of these internal and external pressures, Khrushchev surrendered and capitulated. He began to present the situation in rosy colours, in order to conceal his own pacifist illusions. His theses about the "construction of communism", the "end of the class struggle", and the final victory of socialism looked like something new, but in fact they were reactionary. They were the expression of the concealment of a new reality which was being created, of the birth and development of the new bourgeois stratum and its pretensions to establish its own power in the Soviet Union.

The line and program which Khrushchev presented at the 20th Congress of the CPSU constituted not only the line of the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union, but also the line of undermining the revolution, and of the subjection of the peoples to imperialism and the working class to the bourgeoisie. The Khrushchevites preached that at the present stage, the main road of transition to socialism was the peaceful road. They advised the communist parties to follow the policy of class conciliation and

collaboration with social-democracy and other political forces of the bourgeoisie. This line assisted the attainment of those objectives for which imperialism and capital had long been fighting with every means, including arms and ideological diversion. It opened broad roads to bourgeois reformism and gave capital the possibility to manoeuvre in the difficult economic, political and military situation created for it after the Second World War. This is the explanation for all that great publicity which the bourgeoisie gave the 20th Congress of the CPSU all around the world and which called Khrushchev "a man of peace" who "understands the situation", unlike Stalin who was for "communist orthodoxy", "incompatibility with the capitalist world", etc.

With their preaching of the peaceful road to socialism, the Khrushchevites sought to impede the communists and the revolutionaries of the world from preparing for and carrying out the revolution, and wanted them to reduce all their work to propaganda, to debates and electoral manoeuvres, to trade-union demonstrations and day-today demands.

This was the typical social-democratic line which Lenin had fought so fiercely and the October Revolution had overthrown. The Khrushchevite views, which were borrowed from the arsenal of the chiefs of the Second International, aroused dangerous illusions and discredited the very idea of the revolution. They did not prepare the working class and the working masses to be vigilant and to oppose the bourgeois violence but urged them to remain submissively at the mercy of the bourgeoisie. This was also proved in the events in Indonesia and Chile, etc., with the communists and peoples of those countries paying very dearly for the revisionist illusions about the peaceful road to socialism.

Equally in favour of imperialism and the bourgeoisie and harmful to the revolution was the other thesis of the 20th Congress of the CPSU about "peaceful coexistence", which the Khrushchevites

tried to impose on the whole communist movement, extending it even to relations between classes, and between the peoples and their imperialist oppressors. According to the Khrushchevites, who presented the problem as "either peaceful coexistence or devastating war", there was no other solution for the peoples and the world proletariat but to bend their backs, to give up the class struggle, the revolution and any other action which "might anger" imperialism and provoke the outbreak of war.

In fact, the Khrushchevite views about "peaceful coexistence", which were closely linked with those about the "changed nature of imperialism", were practically identical with the preaching of Browder that American capitalism and imperialism had allegedly become a factor of progress in post-war world development. The prettifying of American imperialism and the false image created about it slackened peoples' vigilance towards the hegemonic and expansionist policy of the United States of America and sabotaged the peoples' anti-imperialist liberation struggle. Both as an ideology and a practical political line, Khrushchevite "peaceful coexistence" urged the peoples, especially in the new states of Asia, Africa and Latin America, etc., to extinguish the "hotbeds from which the flames of war might burst out", to seek rapprochement and conciliation with imperialism, to take advantage of "international co-operation" for the "peaceful development" of their economy, etc. In its expressions, terms and other formulas, this line was the same as that preached by Browder, that in the conditions of the "peaceful coexistence" between the United States of America and the Soviet Union, wealthy America could assist restoration and advance of the whole world. It was the same line which Tito advocated and applied in Yugoslavia, which had opened the doors of that country to American aid, credit and capital.

Enver Hoxha

Imperialism and the Revolution (1979)

Having seized state power in the Soviet Union, the Khrushchevites set themselves as their main objective the destruction of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the restoration of capitalism and the transformation of the Soviet Union into an imperialist superpower.

With the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union and the other revisionist countries, the banks there assumed all the features characteristic -of monopolies. In these countries, the banks serve the exploitation of the broad masses of the working people, both at home and abroad, in the same way as in all other capitalist countries.

The restoration of capitalism has led to a polarization of the present-day Soviet society, in which a small section rules and exploits the overwhelming majority of the people. Now, the stratum consisting of the bureaucrats, the technocrats and the upper creative intelligentsia has been created and assumed the form of a separate bourgeois, exploiting class which appropriates and divides up the surplus value extracted from the savage exploitation of the working class and the broad working masses. Unlike the countries of classical capitalism, where this surplus value is appropriated in proportion to the amount of capital of each capitalist, in the Soviet Union and the other revisionist countries it is distributed according to the position people of the higher bourgeois stratum occupy in the state, economic, scientific, and cultural hierarchy, etc. The high salaries, routine and special bonuses, prizes and stimuli, privileges, etc., have been built up into a whole institution for the appropriation of the surplus value extracted from the toil and sweat of the working people. The stratum which represents the "collective capitalist" protects this

plunder through a host of laws and norms, which guarantee the capitalist oppression and exploitation.

The Soviet economy has now become integrated into the system of world capitalism. While American, German, Japanese and other capital has penetrated deeply into the Soviet Union, Soviet capital is being exported to other countries and, in various forms, is merging with local capital.

Revisionist "Theories" of Restored Capitalism

From Albania Today, 1978, 3

Hekuran Mara – Professor, member of the Academy of Sciences of the PSR of Albania

The deep and all-round counterrevolutionary and aggressive process which has taken place in all the countries ruled by the revisionists has already led to the elimination of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the complete restoration of capitalism in these countries. Now the question on the agenda for the traitor revisionist ruling cliques and their ideologists and apologists is to invent, elaborate and publicize "theories", as demagogical and disguised as possible, in order to strengthen the restored capitalism, to present it as "mature socialism", etc.

All this is intended to disorientate the working class and the other masses of the working people ideologically and politically, to prevent the emergence of doubts in their ranks about what has happened and is happening in these countries, to benumb their vigilance, and revolutionary thinking and action, to avert their blows and, finally, to suppress the proletarian revolution when it breaks out. This is a tactic to gain time, to prolong the existence of the restored capitalism.

Revisionism, like all other kinds of opportunism, is a great evil for the Marxist-Leninist ideology, socialism and the world proletarian revolution. The restoration of capitalism in the countries which were building socialism was prepared and accompanied by the spread of the opportunist ideological trend of modern revisionism. At the head of the modern revisionist front stands Khrushchevite revisionism. "Soviet revisionism," stressed comrade Enver Hoxha at the 7th Congress of the PLA, "represents the most completely elaborated theory and practice of the revisionist counter-revolution which has revised the Marxist-Leninist theory in all

fields and on all questions” (Enver Hoxha, Report to the 7th Congress of the PLA, Tirana 1976, p. 234, Engl. ed.).

The frontal attack of Soviet revisionism on the fundamental questions of Marxism-Leninism could not leave the theory and practice of scientific socialism untouched. First, doubts were raised about the truth and scientific value of the fundamental theses of socialism formulated by the classics of Marxism- Leninism, then the revisionists went over openly to abandonment of them and struggle to overturn them, while today they have been replaced with all kinds of “new” revisionist theories, always veiled in the smokescreen of eclecticism and demagogy about “creative” Marxism, in order to conceal the true face of the capitalism they have restored. The Soviet revisionists dress themselves in the cloak of Marxism- Leninism precisely to cover up their betrayal of Marxism-Leninism, socialism and the proletarian revolution, just as the bourgeoisie and the criminals in bourgeois society do when, in order to cover up their crimes, they don the robe of the “guardian of public order” or the “law-abiding person”.

In the system of “theories” and views of the Soviet revisionists which serve to cover the restored capitalism with a false luster of socialism, the question of the historical limits of the period of transition from capitalism to communism occupies an important place. On the correct solution of this question depends the stand towards a series of fundamental theses of the theory and practice of scientific socialism, the implementation of which is decisive for the preservation and strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the continuous advance of the revolution and the construction of socialism and communism, the impossibility of the turn back and the restoration of capitalism.

The Soviet revisionists maintain the view that the period of transition does not extend right up the construction of the classless society but is a separate period of the transition from capitalism to

socialism, which ends with the construction of the economic base of socialism. "The period of transition from capitalism to socialism," writes the academician Pyotr Fedoseyev, "begins with the triumph of the socialist revolution and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and ends with the elimination of capitalist private property" (Voprosy Ekonomiki, N° 5, 1975, p. 27). In connection with the same question, the text of political economy of Moscow University says: "In every country the period of transition begins from the moment of the establishment of socialist relations in production" (Kurs Politicheskoy Ekonomii, Izdatelstvo Ekonomika, Moskva, 1974, pp. 8-9).

It is evident that this view is not a chance aberration or simply an "isolated ideological distortion", but a consciously chosen prevailing official view. The reduction by the Soviet revisionists of the period of transition from capitalism to communism to a period that ends with the construction of the economic base of socialism is done for the purpose of justifying the revisionist counter-revolution "theoretically" and denying the class struggle, of justifying the elimination of the dictatorship of the proletariat and its replacement with the dictatorship of the new bourgeoisie, and disguising the restoration of capitalism.

And in fact, they assert that after the completion of the period of transition from capitalism to socialism "the main problem" of "who will win?" is solved, "socialism achieves its complete triumph over capitalism", in the socialist economy the struggle between the two roads of development no longer exists, "in the developed socialist society classes disappear and only occupational or social-psychological distinctions between the intelligentsia, the workers and collective farmers remain", etc. etc. (Kurs Politicheskoy Ekonomii, pp. 10, 50, 79). Likewise, according to them, after the establishment of socialist relations of production the class struggle ceases and, therefore, the ideo-political or socio-

economic soil for the possibility of the degeneration of socialism and the restoration of capitalism cannot be created.

After this period, according to the Soviet revisionists, "the tendencies of private ownership cease to operate", "the forms of small-scale private production cannot serve as a breeding ground for the emergence of the new capitalist elements in the economy", "the contradictions between socialist production and small-scale production no longer have an antagonistic character", "within the country, any cause for political struggle is eliminated, and the possibility of antagonistic class conflicts and political counter-revolution disappears" (Kurs Politicheskoy Ekonomii, tom. II, Moskva, 1974, pp. 33, 60). As a consequence of all these false, anti-scientific and anti-Marxist argumentations they arrive at the conclusion that "socialism is not a temporary co-existence of immature communism and vestiges of capitalism, but a new, independent, mode of production" (Voprosi Ekonomii, N° 6, 1975, p. 27). And finally, the eclectic circle of the revisionist betrayal is completed with the thesis that in the conditions of the so-called developed socialist society, the existence of the dictatorship of the proletariat is no longer necessary, therefore it is transformed into a state of the entire people.

We need only confront the views of the Soviet revisionists on the period of transition from capitalism to communism with the theses of the classics of Marxism-Leninism, the teachings of our Party and comrade Enver Hoxha to disclose their anti-scientific and anti-Marxist character and their bourgeois capitalist content.

The classics of Marxism-Leninism always treated the period of transition as a very long historical period which extends throughout the whole period of the construction of socialism up to communism, as a whole epoch of the transition from capitalism to communism. Likewise, in broad outline, they also defined the fundamental socio-economic characteristics of this period.

Between capitalist and communist society, wrote K. Marx, "lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other" (K. Marx, "Criticism of the Gotha Program", p. 30). On another occasion he writes that the period of transition from capitalism to communism is "that indispensable step to go on to the elimination of class distinctions in general, to the elimination of all relations of production on which these distinctions are based, to the elimination of all social relations which correspond to these relations of production, to the overthrow of all ideas that stem from these social relations" (K. Marx – F. Engels, Selected Works, Vol. I, p. 226, Alb. ed.).

When he speaks about the society of the period of transition from capitalism to communism, Marx is speaking not about a communist society which is developing on its own communist base, but about a society which has just emerged from capitalist society, a society which, for this reason, still preserves in all directions traces of the old society from the womb of which it has just been born.

Lenin, too, maintained the same stand whenever he dealt with the question of the period of transition from capitalism to communism or individual problems connected with this period. "The transition from capitalist society which, in its development, is moving towards communism, to communist society, cannot be made without a political transition period" (V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 25, p. 540, Alb. ed.).

When he deals with this period, Lenin especially stresses that it combines in itself features and qualities of two socio-economic orders, that it is a period of the struggle between capitalism which is dying and communism which is in the process of its birth. Finally, Lenin, like Marx, links the period of transition with the disappearance of classes, and class distinctions in society, and all the relations of production on which these distinctions are based.

Proceeding from the notion of the socio-economic formation as a separate social organism which has its objective laws of birth and development, in which a given mode of production corresponds to a given social class structure and a given superstructure, the classics of Marxism-Leninism have laid it down that communism is a single socio-economic formation with two phases: with a lower phase – socialism, and a higher phase – full communism.

Hence the anti-Marxist character of the revisionist view, which considers and proclaims socialism as a mode of production in itself and communism as another mode of production, emerges very clearly. Within one economic-social formation there have never been and cannot be two different modes of production.

The arbitrary declaration of socialism as a mode of production in itself was necessary to the Soviet revisionists as a "theoretical argument" in order to negate the existence of classes and class struggle in socialism.

The revolutionary experience of the construction of socialism in our country is more and more confirming the correctness of the Marxist-Leninist view that the transition period is the whole historical period of the transition from capitalism to communism. It starts with the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and continues up to the achievement of full communism, until classes are eliminated, until all class distinctions disappear, and classless society is achieved.

In accord with this concept, socialism represents a stage in the transition to communism in which the new socialist relations of production have been established, the exploitation of man by man has been wiped out, antagonistic classes have been eliminated, but non-antagonistic classes exist, class distinctions and contradictions exist, the class struggle exists as the principal motive force, and the struggle between the socialist road and the capitalist road of

development continues according to Lenin's formula "Which will win?" in the base and the superstructure. As long as all these problems have not been resolved, socialism cannot be considered as completely built, and consequently, its triumph cannot be considered as final. For these reasons the socialist revolution must continue uninterruptedly during the whole period of the transition from capitalism to communism. In regard to the final triumph of socialism, this question has to do with the development of the world proletarian revolution, with the ratio of forces between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie on a world scale. When this ratio has been definitively solved in favour of the proletariat, that is to say, when the proletarian revolution has triumphed and socialism is built completely in all the countries of the world, then its complete victory is turned into a final victory. Under these conditions, there is no longer any danger threatening socialism either within the country or from outside.

The true Marxist-Leninist concept of socialism as the first stage of communism brings to light the sheer falsity of the revisionist view which treats it as a social order of social homogeneity in which class interests and class struggle allegedly no longer exist, in which the struggle between the socialist road and the capitalist road is no longer waged because the question of "who will win?" has allegedly been finally solved.

During the whole period while socialism is being built and friendly classes exist within it, along with elements of the overthrown classes and the capitalist encirclement, there still remains the possibility of the birth of new bourgeois elements, the possibility of degeneration of socialism, hence also the possibility of the restoration of capitalism. This possibility is not an inevitability. It can be totally averted when the socialist revolution continues uninterruptedly, when the Party of the working class, which leads the entire process of the construction of socialism, bases itself

firmly on, and remains loyal to, the triumphant and ever young ideology of Marxism-Leninism. The great historical merit of our Party with comrade Enver Hoxha at the head is that it not only brought our country into the brilliant epoch of the transition from capitalism to communism but is also leading it with determination and wisdom in the consistent construction of true socialism. It is self-evident that in the scheme of the Soviet revisionists about socialism or “the developed socialist society”, the question of the possibility of degeneration of socialism and the restoration of capitalism is left completely unmentioned, because to speak of it would be like speaking of the noose in the home of the hanged.

Until the final victory of communism is achieved, the historical period of the construction of socialism is characterized by the preservation of the political organization of society in the form of the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In this period, the dictatorship of the proletariat and its economic, organizational, educational and repressive functions go through a dialectical process of growing stronger and more perfect, which goes on right up until the internal and external conditions for the withering away of the state are created universally.

The view of the Soviet revisionists on the transformation of the dictatorship of the proletariat into the so-called state of the entire people after the construction of the economic base of socialism, when classes still exist, is an anti-Marxist, counter-revolutionary view, to disguise the social-fascist dictatorship established by the revisionist bourgeoisie. In reality, the so-called “state of the entire people”, which has been established today in the Soviet Union, is a state without the working class at the head, without the leadership of its party and without the Marxist-Leninist ideology. This type of state represents the political domination of the new bourgeoisie, its dictatorship, which oppresses, enslaves and exploits the working class and the other masses of the working

people, which protects the restored capitalist order by force of arms and other means of coercion.

The open abandonment by the Soviet revisionists of the scientific Marxist-Leninist concept of socialism comes out clearly, also, when they proclaim the development of the productive forces as the only decisive factor of its construction. "In the conditions of developed socialism," write the ideologists of Soviet revisionism, "the problem of the economic efficiency of social production emerges as primary. Raising this efficiency constitutes the decisive condition for the construction of socialism" (*Voprosi Ekonomiki*, N° 5, 1975, p. 77). This, too, is a very dangerous anti-Marxist view which opens the way to the revisionist counter-revolution. It is aimed at creating and spreading the erroneous idea that such factors as the leadership of the working class and the Marxist-Leninist party, keeping the dictatorship of the proletariat in the hands of the working class to ensure that it is not usurped by new bourgeois elements, the strengthening and perfecting of the socialist relations of production, the waging of the class struggle on all fronts and in all fields at the same time, are allegedly not factors just as decisive as the development of the productive forces for the fate of the socialist revolution and the construction of socialism.

The negative experience of the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union shows unequivocally that the fatal damage did not come from any low level of the development of the productive forces but from the degeneration of the economic base and superstructure, from the replacement of the proletarian political line of the party with a revisionist line. And this same evil may threaten the dictatorship of the proletariat and socialism in any country that builds socialism if the emphasis is placed one-sidedly on the development of the productive forces alone, and

revisionism is allowed to spread in the superstructure, especially in ideology, and in the base.

The Marxist-Leninist theory and revolutionary practice teach us that true socialism can be built consistently and can advance successfully towards communism when the revolution and the class struggle are developed ceaselessly in all fields of social life, when they include not only the development of productive forces, but also the strengthening and perfecting, in the correct revolutionary Marxist-Leninist course, of socialist relations of production, when they also include the defence and strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat and, above all, when they include the preservation of the revolutionary proletarian line, the defence of the purity of the Marxist-Leninist ideology. Otherwise, if the revisionist counter-revolution is allowed to spread, no level of development of the productive forces, however high, can save socialism from the danger of degeneration and the restoration of capitalism. Any illusion created about the role of the productive forces alone in the construction of socialism is fatalistic determinism, a vulgar metaphysical concept of materialism, which history has punished severely.

Another field of the revision of the theory and practice of scientific socialism on the part of the Soviet revisionists is their elimination of the dividing line, their confusing of the economic laws of socialism with their methods, forms and practices of management of the economy. As a result, their analysis of socialism is not based on the relations of production but on their so-called theories and practices of planning, of the total social product and the factors of its growth, of the necessary product and the surplus product, of the criteria for measuring the efficiency of production, etc. The "theories" and views of the Soviet revisionists, which replace the economic laws of socialism with their forms and practices of the management of the economy, represent an entire ideological and

political mechanism specially selected to provide "theoretical" justification for the restoration of capitalist practices in the organization and management of the economy in the Soviet Union.

In the textbook of the political economy of socialism published by the University of Moscow, the analysis of the so-called developed socialist society begins with the planning of production, which is considered as the fundamental relation of socialism, its foundation. Here it is quite obvious that the Soviet revisionists have gone over completely to bourgeois idealist positions, in open opposition to the well-known thesis of historical materialism which says that the most profound secret, the invisible foundation of the whole social structure, should be sought in the relations of production which arise from the type of ownership over the means of production.

The anti-Marxist position of the Soviet revisionists becomes even more clear when they affirm that "the necessity of planning springs from the high level of development of the material and technical base" (*Kurs Politicheskoy Ekonomii*, p. 110) and that "the technical-scientific revolution, and the utilization of mathematical economic models should be made the foundation of planning" (*Voprosi Ekonomiki*, N° 5, 1976, p. 30). That these statements are a negation of the law of the planned and proportional development of the economy, is clear from the "arguments" that the revisionists themselves employ on this question.

The Soviet revisionists claim that the law of the proportional development of the economy is a universal law that operates in all socio-economic formations, therefore there can be no special law for socialism. In this connection they usually refer to the known thesis of Marx to the effect that the need for the social division of labour in definite proportions cannot be eliminated from social production in any instance, that only the form of its expression can alter. But with this thesis Marx means that every nation is obliged to expend part of its labour on the production of material blessings

and divide the labour in certain proportions. This need Marx considered as similar to the "laws of nature" which cannot be eliminated.

But can it be claimed on this basis, as the Soviet revisionist do, that Marx was of the opinion that the law of the proportional development of the national economy has operated and continues to operate in all the socio-economic formations? Certainly not! In fact, Marx does speak of the need for the division of social labour in certain proportions for any nation, regardless of its economic-social order, but not of the possibility of this. As is known, the economic law does not comprise only the need, but also the objective possibility through which the need is realized. It is also known that as long as social ownership over the means of production and the dictatorship of the proletariat have not been established, the objective possibility for social labour to be divided in a planned manner and in regulated proportions among the various branches of material production is not created either.

That the law of the proportional development of the economy is a law peculiar to socialism and, therefore, had no possibility of existing, and in fact did not exist prior to socialism, emerges without any doubt also in the case of capitalist production. For this reason, Marx never claimed that the law of the proportional development has operated in the capitalist economy. Let us recall that as early as his work "The Poverty of Philosophy", Marx described the efforts of Proudhon and the other ideologists of the petty bourgeoisie to achieve proportional production, to ensure a correct ratio between supply and demand in the conditions when private ownership of the means of production prevailed, as a reactionary Utopia. Consistently pursuing the same line of thought, in the first volume of the "Capital" Marx proved that, in capitalism, the distribution of labour and the means of production among the various branches of social production is regulated only

by the interplay of the momentary and arbitrary forces that operate in the market. Of course, here, too, there is a permanent trend towards the establishment of a balance among the different branches of social production, but this tendency manifests itself only as a reaction against the permanent and continuous upsetting of this balance.

It is known also that Lenin, too, in his time, categorically refuted Struve's attempt to interpret Marx's theory on the realization of social product as a theory of the proportional distribution of labour and means of production in capitalism. In this instance Lenin stresses that, in his theory of the realization of the social product in capitalism, Marx, by means of scientific abstraction, deals with the conditions that must exist for extended reproduction, including the proportional distribution of the product among the different branches of the production, although this in no way means that Marx's theory on the realization of social product presupposes and affirms that the products are, or can be, always distributed in a proportional manner in capitalist society. The proportional distribution of the product is the ideal of capitalist production, but by no means the reality of it. Therefore, the proportions in capitalist production are not established and realized except as an accidental occurrence in the permanent state of disproportion. And when these disproportions reach their ultimate critical point, then the economic crisis breaks out which, through its destructive force, re-establishes some sort of new equilibrium, to open the way for a new cycle of disproportions.

The law of the planned and proportional development of the national economy is born, exists and operates only in the conditions when socialist social ownership over the means of production and the dictatorship of the proletariat prevail. It is exclusively an economic law specific to socialism. Its operation necessarily requires the management of the national economy by

the socialist state, that is to say, from a single centre, on the basis of democratic centralism, requires the drawing up and implementation of a unified over-all state plan, based on all the other economic laws of socialism, in order to attain the objective of socialist production – the fulfilment of the material and cultural needs of the members of society.

The endeavours of the Soviet revisionists to present the law of the planned, proportional development as a universal law that operates in other socio-economic formations, too, is an opportunist view which coincides with the view of the bourgeois apologists of capitalism, who claim that the capitalist economy, too, can be developed and planned in a proportional manner. They need this in order to conceal their going over to methods and practices of “planning” of the capitalist type with demagogy. If we add to this the creation of branch and inter-branch combines of the monopoly type, with complete economic independence, as well as the going over of enterprises to full economic freedom (to a completely self-supporting basis), we can see the decentralization of the Soviet revisionist economy, which has been turned into a market economy in which the law of profit and the other laws of capitalist production prevail.

The question of the use of commodity and money relations represents a whole system in the “theories” and views of the Soviet revisionists. One of the directions of the revisionist onslaught that was launched following the 20th Congress of the revisionist Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the Marxist- Leninist theoretical legacy in the field of economic science began with the question of commodity production and the law of value, until, step by step, it reached the point of the elaboration of the so-called theory of “market socialism” which serves today as the basis to proclaim profit as “the fundamental criterion of the efficiency of production” in the Soviet economy.

In attacking the Marxist-Leninist view in regard to commodity production in socialism, the Soviet revisionists claim that history knows only two types of social production: the natural economy and the market economy. Therefore, they assert, either socialism and an economy without the system of commodity and money relations, or socialism and a market economy with commodity, value, money, economic spontaneity, competition, prices, profits, credits, interest, taxes on the fundamental means, rent, etc., which extend over the whole people's economy. According to the revisionists, any commodity production in socialism is identical with capitalist commodity production. According to them, to assert the existence of commodity production of a special type in socialism means, allegedly, to decide "arbitrarily", contrary to the objective reality.

This view of the Soviet revisionists is refuted, first of all, by the history of the birth and development of commodity production itself and of all the other economic categories related to it. Commodity, money, market are economic categories which do not belong to only one socio-economic formation; they extend beyond the bounds of capitalism and capitalist private ownership in general, they have their beginnings before the emergence of capitalism and capitalist private property. Following the thread of the history of the birth and development of commodity relations shows that in different economic-social formations, they have expressed and still express different relations of production, in accordance with the prevailing form of ownership over the means of production. On the other hand, according to the type of ownership over the means of production, the sphere of operation of commodity and money relations has changed, too. Some of their features have disappeared and others have emerged in their place. For example, in the pre-capitalist formations, commodity relations did not extend over labour power. Later labour power was turned into a commodity and, finally, socialism totally precludes the

existence of the labour power as a commodity, along with some other things, such as the means of production.

As emerges from the study of the history of commodity production and the economic categories related to it, there is no ground whatsoever to take commodity production separately from the social formation in which it exists, and, what is more, there is no reason to assert that every kind of commodity production is identical with capitalist commodity production, as the modern revisionists do.

Both in theory and in the practice of our socialist construction it has been proven that commodity production, the relations of commodity production and money relations do not present themselves in the socialist economy with the same nature and the same features as in the conditions of dominance of capitalist private ownership over the means of production, but undergo a radical alteration. In order to make this difference clear, Stalin proved that in socialism there is commodity production of a special type. Precisely this thesis of Stalin's the Soviet revisionists do not accept, in order to give "the right of citizenship" to their bourgeois thesis to the effect that the socialist economy is allegedly a commodity production economy, a market economy. However it is known that the whole essence of the analysis Stalin makes in connection with commodity production in socialism in his work "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR" is summed up in the disclosure and explanation of the features that disappear or change radically and of those that are preserved in the conditions of the socialist economy.

What are the features of commodity production that are eliminated in the socialist economy? Of course, they are all those features which are connected with the capitalist relations of exploitation and express those relations, such as anarchy of production, spontaneity of the market, competition, the exploitation of man by

man, the transformation of commodities and money into capital, surplus value and profit, the price of the product, inflation, crises of overproduction, etc.

Which are those features of commodity production which remain in socialism and continue to develop on a new basis and in new socio-economic conditions? Naturally, only those features that are used to express the economic form of social relations among people in some of the phases of the process of social reproduction, such as value, cost, price, etc.

It is self-evident that commodity and money relations in socialism do not include the base of socialist production. Here the means of production and labour power are not commodities. Therefore, the uniting of the means of production with labour power, as a fundamental economic relation, is not carried out through the act of buying, but directly through the organization of the centralized and planned management of the economy, in the interest of the working people themselves, who are owners of the means of production and direct producers of material blessings at the same time. In this sense, Stalin stressed that in socialism, the sphere of extension of commodity production, of commodity and money relations, is limited, that it does not include in its content either production in general or the means of production. This thesis marks the dividing line between the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint and the revisionist viewpoint on commodity production in socialism. According to this thesis, commodity production in socialism is production of a special type which history has never known before.

Marx and Engels did not envisage commodity production in socialism, so they did not take up this question to "solve it. On this basis, prior to the October Revolution opinions were expressed to the effect that socialism is incompatible with commodity production, and it was accepted as an axiom in socialism. In the

period of war communism in the Soviet Union, efforts were made to do away with commodity and money relations. The expedience of that period provided convincing proof of the impossibility of the construction of socialism without using commodity production and the economic categories deriving from it. Basing himself on the experience of war communism, Lenin rejected the dogma of the incompatibility between socialism and commodity production. Lenin linked the elimination of commodity production and of gold as money with the triumph of communism on a world scale.

Proceeding from Lenin's teachings and the historical experience of the construction of socialism up to the end of the forties, Stalin summed up and formulated theoretically a series of questions related to the reasons for the preservation and necessity for the existence of commodity production in socialism, its new features as commodity production of a special type, and the use of commodity and money relations in the socialist economy. The experience of the construction and development of the socialist economy in our country, where Marxism-Leninism is implemented faithfully and in a creative spirit by our Party of Labour, show that Stalin's views on commodity production, which are based on Marxist-Leninist theory, were and still are correct.

The present-day process of world development as a whole is moving towards the overthrow of capitalism, towards the proletarian revolution and the triumph of communism. "The world is at a stage when the cause of the revolution and national liberation of the peoples is not just an aspiration and a future prospect, but a problem taken up for solution" (Enver Hoxha, Report at the 7th Congress of the PL A., p. 159, Engl. ed.).

In the context of this general and unceasing trend towards the revolutionary transformation of the world, the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union and the other countries ruled by the revisionists represents a zigzag, a violation of the universal laws of

development of human society, which cannot abolish the operation of these laws. Therefore, Marxism-Leninism sees it and describes it as a temporary, passing phenomenon, which will be wiped from the face of the earth with violence, by means of the proletarian revolution.

The revisionist "theories" of restored capitalism have to do not only with the economy, but with all fields of social life, with an offensive against the entire Marxist-Leninist theory and the practice of scientific socialism. Therefore, the task our Party has laid down before us of deepening our knowledge of the roots of Khrushchevite revisionism and its variants and increasing our criticism and struggle against it and any kind of opportunism, new and old, is a many-sided task. It must include knowledge and criticism of, and struggle against, the fundamental theses which have to do with the ideological preparation for the restoration of capitalism, with the degeneration of the relations of production and the superstructure, with the new exploiting class that is emerging and the class struggle, with the political organization of society and the socio-economic relations which are established by the modern revisionists.

Now that the communists and all the working people of our country have in their hands the broad, thorough, general analyses that the Party and comrade Enver Hoxha have made of the causes and ways of the complete restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union and the other revisionist countries, they are armed to fight even better and with greater success against the whole bourgeois-revisionist ideology and the pressures it exerts on our society and our socialist construction. It is only by means of thorough knowledge and criticism of, and struggle against, the bourgeois-revisionist ideology on all fronts that the purity of Marxism-Leninism can be defended on all the issues of the theory and practice of scientific socialism, that the construction of true

socialism can be carried forward in all fields, and that the forms and practices of capitalism, no matter how specific and disguised, can be exposed and the road closed to them.

“a large organization of wreckers, consisting of bourgeois experts, was discovered in the Shakhty district of the Donetz Coal Basin. The Shakhty wreckers were closely connected with the former mine owners—Russian and foreign capitalists—and with a foreign military espionage service. Their aim was to disrupt the development of Socialist industry and to facilitate the restoration of capitalism in the U.S.S.R. The wreckers had deliberately mismanaged the mines in order to reduce the output of coal, spoiled machinery and ventilation apparatus, caused roof-falls and explosions, and set fire to pits, plants and power-stations. The wreckers had deliberately obstructed the improvement of the workers' conditions and had infringed the Soviet labour protection laws.” HISTORY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION (BOLSHEVIKS)

Lenin

Speech at A Plenary Session of The Moscow Soviet

November 20, 1922

Collected Works, 1965, Volume 33, pages 435-443

(Stormy applause. "The Internationale" is sung.) Comrades, I regret very much and apologise that I have been unable to come to your session earlier. As far as I know you intended a few weeks ago to give me an opportunity of attending the Moscow Soviet. I could not come because after my illness, from December onwards, I was incapacitated, to use the professional term, for quite a long time, and because of this reduced ability to work had to postpone my present address from week to week. A very considerable portion of my work which, as you will remember, I had first piled on Comrade Tsyurupa, and then on Comrade Rykov, I also had to pile additionally on Comrade Kamenev. And I must say that, to employ a simile I have already used, he was suddenly burdened with two loads. Though, to continue the simile, it should be said that the horse has proved to be an exceptionally capable and zealous one. (Applause.) All the same, however, nobody is supposed to drag two loads, and I am now waiting impatiently for Comrades Tsyurupa and Rykov to return, and we shall divide up the work at least a little more fairly. As for myself, in view of my reduced ability to work it takes me much more time to look into matters than I should like.

In December 1921, when I had to stop working altogether, it was the year's end. We were affecting the transition to the New Economic Policy, and it turned out already then that, although we had embarked upon this transition in the beginning of 1921, it was quite a difficult, I would say a very difficult, transition. We have now been affecting this transition for more than eighteen months, and one would think that it was time the majority took up new

places and disposed themselves according to the new conditions, particularly those of the New Economic Policy.

As to foreign policy, we had the fewest changes in that field. We pursued the line that we had adopted earlier, and I think I can say with a clear conscience that we pursued it quite consistently and with enormous success. There is no need, I think, to deal with that in detail; the capture of Vladivostok, the ensuing demonstration and the declaration of federation which you read in the press[2]the other day have proved and shown with the utmost clarity that no changes are necessary in this respect. The road we are on is absolutely clearly and well defined and has ensured us success in face of all the countries of the world, although some of them are still prepared to declare that they refuse to sit at one table with us. Nevertheless, economic relations, followed by diplomatic relations, are improving, must improve, and certainly will improve. Every country which resists this risk being late, and, perhaps in some quite substantial things, its risks being at a disadvantage. All of us see this now, and not only from the press, from the newspapers. I think that in their trips abroad comrades are also finding the changes very great. In that respect, to use an old simile, we have not changed to other trains, or to other conveyances.

But as regards our home policy, the change we made in the spring of 1921, which was necessitated by such extremely powerful and convincing circumstances that no debates or disagreements arose among us about it—that change continues to cause us some difficulties, great difficulties, I would say. Not because we have any doubts about the need for the turn—no doubts exist in that respect—not because we have any doubts as to whether the test of our New Economic Policy has yielded the successes we expected. No doubts exist on that score—I can say this quite definitely—

either in the ranks of our Party or in the ranks of the huge mass of non-Party workers and peasants.

In this sense the problem presents no difficulties. The difficulties we have stem from our being faced with a task whose solution very often requires the services of new people, extraordinary measures and extraordinary methods. Doubts still exist among us as to whether this or that is correct. There are changes in one direction or another. And it should be said that both will continue for quite a long time. "The New Economic Policy!" A strange title. It was called a New Economic Policy because it turned things back. We are now retreating, going back, as it were; but we are doing so in order, after first retreating, to take a running start and make a bigger leap forward. It was on this condition alone that we retreated in pursuing our New Economic Policy. Where and how we must now regroup, adapt and reorganise in order to start a most stubborn offensive after our retreat, we do not yet know. To carry out all these operations properly we need, as the proverb says, to look not ten but a hundred times before we leap. We must do so in order to cope with the incredible difficulties we encounter in dealing with all our tasks and problems. You know perfectly well what sacrifices have been made to achieve what has been achieved; you know how long the Civil War has dragged on and what effort it has cost. Well now, the capture of Vladivostok has shown all of us (though Vladivostok is a long way off, it is after all one of our own towns) (prolonged applause) everybody's desire to join us, to join in our achievements. The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic now stretches from here to there. This desire has rid us both of our civil enemies and of the foreign enemies who attacked us. I am referring to Japan.

We have won quite a definite diplomatic position, recognised by the whole world. All of you see it. You see its results, but how much time we needed to get it! We have now won the recognition

of our rights by our enemies both in economic and in commercial policy. This is proved by the conclusion of trade agreements.

We can see why we, who eighteen months ago took the path of the so-called New Economic Policy, are finding it so incredibly difficult to advance along that path. We live in a country devastated so severely by war, knocked out of anything like the normal course of life, in a country that has suffered and endured so much, that willy-nilly we are beginning all our calculations with a very, very small percentage—the pre-war percentage. We apply this yardstick to the conditions of our life, we sometimes do so very impatiently, heatedly, and always end up with the conviction that the difficulties are vast. The task we have set ourselves in this field seems all the more vast because we are comparing it with the state of affairs in any ordinary bourgeois country. We have set ourselves this task because we understood that it was no use expecting the wealthy powers to give us the assistance usually forthcoming under such circumstances.[3] After the Civil War we have been subjected to very nearly a boycott, that is, we have been told that the economic ties that are customary and normal in the capitalist world will not be maintained in our case.

Over eighteen months have passed since we undertook the New Economic Policy, and even a longer period has passed since we concluded our first international treaty. Nonetheless, this boycott of us by all the bourgeoisie and all governments continues to be felt. We could not count on anything else when we adopted the new economic conditions; yet we had no doubt that we had to make the change and achieve success single-handed. The further we go, the clearer it becomes that any aid that may be rendered to us, that will be rendered to us by the capitalist powers, will, far from eliminating this condition, in all likelihood and in the overwhelming majority of cases intensify it, accentuate it still further. “Single-handed” —we told ourselves. “Single-handed” —

we are told by almost every capitalist country with which we have concluded any deals, with which we have undertaken any engagements, with which we have begun any negotiations. And that is where the special difficulty lies. We must realise this difficulty. We have built up our own political system in more than three years of work, incredibly hard work that was incredibly full of heroism. In the position in which we were till now we had no time to see whether we would smash something needlessly, no time to see whether there would be many sacrifices, because there were sacrifices enough, because the struggle which we then began (you know this perfectly well and there is no need to dwell on it) was a life-and-death struggle against the old social system, against which we fought to forge for ourselves a right to existence, to peaceful development. And we have won it. It is not we who say this, it is not the testimony of witnesses who may be accused of being partial to us. It is the testimony of witnesses who are in the camp of our enemies and who are naturally partial—not in our favour, however, but against us. These witnesses were in Denikin's camp. They directed the occupation. And we know that their partiality cost us very dear, cost us colossal destruction. We suffered all sorts of losses on their account, and lost values of all kinds, including the greatest of all values—human lives—on an incredibly large scale. Now we must scrutinise our tasks most carefully and understand that the main task will be not to give up our previous gains. We shall not give up a single one of our old gains. (Applause.) Yet we are also faced with an entirely new task; the old may prove a downright obstacle. To understand this task is most difficult. Yet it must be understood, so that we may learn how to work when, so to speak, it is necessary to turn ourselves inside out. I think, comrades, that these words and slogans are understandable, because for nearly a year, during my enforced absence, you have had in practice, handling the jobs on hand, to speak and think of this in various ways and on hundreds of

occasions, and I am confident that your reflections on that score can only lead to one conclusion, namely, that today we must display still more of the flexibility which we employed till now in the Civil War.

We must not abandon the old. The series of concessions that adapt us to the capitalist powers is a series of concessions that enables them to make contact with us, ensures them a profit which is sometimes bigger, perhaps, than it should be. At the same time, we are conceding but a little part of the means of production, which are held almost entirely by our state. The other day the papers discussed the concession proposed by the Englishman Urquhart, who has hitherto been against us almost throughout the Civil War. He used to say: "We shall achieve our aim in the Civil War against Russia, against the Russia that has dared to deprive us of this and of that." And after all that we had to enter into negotiations with him. We did not refuse them, we undertook them with the greatest joy, but we said: "Beg your pardon, but we shall not give up what we have won. Our Russia is so big, our economic potentialities are so numerous, and we feel justified in not rejecting your kind proposal, but we shall discuss it soberly, like businessmen." True, nothing came of our first talk, because we could not agree to his proposal for political reasons. We had to reject it. So long as the British did not entertain the possibility of our participating in the negotiations on the Straits, the Dardanelles, we had to reject it, but right after doing so we had to start examining the matter in substance. We discussed whether or not it was of advantage to us, whether we would profit from concluding this concession agreement, and if so, under what circumstances it would be profitable. We had to talk about the price. That, comrades, is what shows you clearly how much our present approach to problems should differ from our former approach. Formerly the Communist said: "I give my life", and it seemed very simple to him, although it was not always so simple. Now, however, we Communists face

quite another task. We must now take all things into account, and each of you must learn to be prudent. We must calculate how, in the capitalist environment, we can ensure our existence, how we can profit by our enemies, who, of course, will bargain, who have never forgotten how to bargain and will bargain at our expense. We are not forgetting that either, and do not in the least imagine commercial people anywhere turning into lambs and, having turned into lambs, offering us blessings of all sorts for nothing. That does not happen, and we do not expect it, but count on the fact that we, who are accustomed to putting up a fight, will find a way out and prove capable of trading, and profiting, and emerging safely from difficult economic situations. That is a very difficult task. That is the task we are working on now. I should like us to realise clearly how great is the abyss between the old and the new tasks. However great the abyss may be, we learned to manoeuvre during the war, and we must understand that the manoeuvre we now have to perform, in the midst of which we now are, is the most difficult one. But then it seems to be our last manoeuvre. We must test our strength in this field and prove that we have learned more than just the lessons of yesterday and do not just keep repeating the fundamentals. Nothing of the kind. We have begun to relearn and shall relearn in such a way that we shall achieve definite and obvious success. And it is for the sake of this relearning, I think, that we must again firmly promise one another that under the name of the New Economic Policy we have turned back, but turned back in such a way as to surrender nothing of the new, and yet to give the capitalists such advantages as will compel any state, however hostile to us, to establish contacts and to deal with us. Comrade Krasin, who has had many talks with Urquhart, the head and backbone of the whole intervention, said that Urquhart, after all his attempts to foist the old system on us at all costs, throughout Russia, seated himself at the same table with him, with Krasin, and began asking: "What's the price? How much? For how many

years?" (Applause.) This is still quite far from our concluding concession deals and thus entering into treaty relations that are perfectly precise and binding—from the viewpoint of bourgeois society—but we can already see that we are coming to it, have nearly come to it, but have not quite arrived. We must admit that, comrades, and not be swell-headed. We are still far from having fully achieved the things that will make us strong, self-reliant and calmly confident that no capitalist deals can frighten us, calmly confident that however difficult a deal may be we shall conclude it, we shall get to the bottom of it and settle it. That is why the work—both political and Party—that we have begun in this sphere must be continued, and that is why we must change from the old methods to entirely new ones.

We still have the old machinery, and our task now is to remould it along new lines. We cannot do so at once, but we must see to it that the Communists we have are properly placed. What we need is that they, the Communists, should control the machinery they are assigned to, and not, as so often happens with us, that the machinery should control them. We should make no secret of it and speak of it frankly. Such are the tasks and the difficulties that confront us—and that at a moment when we have set out on our practical path, when we must not approach socialism as if it were an icon painted in festive colours. We need to take the right direction, we need to see that everything is checked, that the masses, the entire population, check the path we follow and say: "Yes, this is better than the old system." That is the task we have set ourselves. Our Party, a little group of people in comparison with the country's total population, has tackled this job. This tiny nucleus has set itself the task of remaking everything, and it will do so. We have proved that this is no utopia but a cause which people live by. We have all seen this. This has already been done. We must remake things in such a way that the great majority of the masses, the peasants and workers, will say: "It is not you who

praise yourselves, but we. We say that you have achieved splendid results, after which no intelligent person will ever dream of returning to the old." We have not reached that point yet. That is why NEP remains the main, current, and all-embracing slogan of today. We shall not forget a single one of the slogans we learned yesterday. We can say that quite calmly, without the slightest hesitation, say it to anybody, and every step we take demonstrates it. But we still have to adapt ourselves to the New Economic Policy. We must know how to overcome, to reduce to a definite minimum all its negative features, which there is no need to enumerate and which you know perfectly well. We must know how to arrange everything shrewdly. Our legislation gives us every opportunity to do so. Shall we be able to get things going properly? That is still far from being settled. We are making a study of things. Every issue of our Party newspaper offers you a dozen articles which tell you that at such-and-such a factory, owned by so-and-so, the rental terms are such-and-such, whereas at another, where our Communist comrade is the manager, the terms are such-and-such. Does it yield a profit or not, does it pay its way or not? We have approached the very core of the everyday problems, and that is a tremendous achievement. Socialism is no longer a matter of the distant future, or an abstract picture, or an icon. Our opinion of icons is the same—a very bad one. We have brought socialism into everyday life and must here see how matters stand. That is the task of our day, the task of our epoch. Permit me to conclude by expressing confidence that difficult as this task may be, new as it may be compared with our previous task, and numerous as the difficulties may be that it entails, we shall all—not in a day, but in a few years—all of us together fulfil it whatever the cost, so that NEP Russia will become socialist Russia. (Stormy, prolonged applause.)



“We are living not merely in a State but in a system of States, and it is inconceivable that the Soviet Republic should continue to coexist for a long period side by side with imperialist States. Ultimately one or other must conquer” Lenin

“Only blockheads or masked enemies who with their boastfulness want to conceal their hostility and are striving to demobilize the people, can deny the danger of military intervention and attempts at restoration as long as the capitalist encirclement exists.” Stalin



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