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Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931–19361935 October
Stalin's vacation in 1935 was again long: in the journal of visits to Stalin's office, a pass was recorded from August 10 to November 2. However, the nature of Stalin's correspondence with Kaganovich (as well as with other members of the Soviet leadership) changed during this period. Instead of letters, Stalin and Kaganovich exchanged mainly strictly businesslike and short ciphered telegrams and telephone messages. One of the reasons for this, as already mentioned, was the change in the situation in the highest echelons of power after the assassination of Kirov on December 1, 1934. Stalin took less and less into account the opinion of his associates, gradually strengthening the system of personal power, free from some restrictions of "collective leadership". Secondly, a reliable telephone connection was established between Moscow and the south.
Kaganovich, Molotov, Mikoyan to Stalin October 1, 1935Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 90. L. 119. Certified typewritten copy.
Copy .
Owls. Secret .
Cipher .
Sochi. Stalin.
On the question of the attitude towards the 36th division and Ma-Jun-In, the NKID together with Apresov, believing that our attitude should not be changed, make the following proposal:
“a) With the assistance of Ma-Jun-Ying, seek the departure to the USSR of the most hostile to the Xinjiang government division commanders, including Ma-Hu-Shan, Bai-Ji-Li, and others, and also satisfy the request of the Ma-Shen-Kui group for trip to Ma-Jun-In and allow a return return to Hotan. Also allow 1-2 Dungan commanders from Ma-Jun-In's encirclement to leave the USSR for Khotan. The personal candidacies of the NKVD should be coordinated with the NKID.
b) Without waiting for the conclusion of peace between the 36th division and the Xinjiang government, consider it expedient to immediately establish trade relations with the 36th division. Instruct the NKVT to coordinate specific measures in pursuance of this resolution with the NKID.
We consider this proposal acceptable. Please let us know your opinion 1 . No. 1556/sh.
Kaganovich. Molotov. Mikoyan.
1/X-35 g.
_____________________
1 We are talking about the struggle in Xinjiang between the provincial government, which was supported by the USSR, and the military formations of the Dungan people, led by the general brothers Ma, in particular, the 36th division (commander Ma Hongshan, chief of staff Bai Jili) (See Essays on the history of the Russian foreign intelligence, vol. 3, 1933–1941, Moscow, 1993, pp. 216–218).
Molotov, Kaganovich to Stalin October 1, 1935Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 90. L. 120. Certified typewritten copy.
Copy .
Owls. Secret .
Cipher.
Sochi. Tov. Stalin.
As of January 1, there will be foreign currency balances in the accounts of the State Bank abroad in the amount of 30-32 million rubles. Given that the Bank does not need these currency balances for payments, and also that our balances abroad are in fluctuating currencies, which can lead to losses in the event of a decrease in these currencies, the State Bank proposes to purchase gold abroad - in England in the amount of 20-25 million rubles at the expense of this currency with the import of this gold into the USSR.
We consider the proposal of the State Bank acceptable. Please let us know your opinion. HP 1557/sh.
Molotov. Kaganovich.
1/X-35 g.
Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin October 2, 1935Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 90. L. 133. Certified typewritten copy.
Owls. Secret .
Copy .
Cipher.
Sochi. Stalin.
We have not yet issued a resolution on the uniform for the NKVD. Please let us know your opinion 1 . No. 1567/sh.
Kaganovich. Molotov.
2/X-35
Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov October 2, 1935Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 90. L. 116–118. Autograph.
Kaganovich. Molotov .
Your 123 don't mind. Your 124 is questionable. Anyway, the purchased gold will then have to be sold - is it worth buying. Wouldn't it be better to buy tin, nickel, copper, rubber, the necessary models of machines and machine tools for the amount of available currency?
Troyanovsky's conversation with a businessman from the USA is interesting, but the trouble is that Troyanovsky's encryption is, as always, vague, and it is not known whether the proposed loan deal is connected with our debt to America, or not. If it is not connected, the deal could be accepted as an ordinary five-year loan deal, if it is only actually connected, but does not formally bind us, one might think. But, I repeat, the trouble is that the encryption is not clear .
Stalin.
No. 82
2/X-35 2
______________________
1 We are talking about Troyanovsky's encryption from Washington, which was sent to Stalin by Dvinsky on October 1, 1935: “Today I had a very big businessman from New York and Boston. He asked me on behalf of a number of large firms why I could not negotiate with the State Department on loans, trade and debt. This issue is of concern to many, since its failure to resolve it causes irritation, creates ground for the exchange of harsh notes, it pops up in the election campaign, the president is in a stupid position. It is not known how this will all end. I did not want to get involved in the discussion and inform about the conversation with the State Department. I recommended contacting the State Department. I only said that for America we are talking about several tens of millions, for us - about hundreds of millions, and maybe more. He told me that he had already a few days ago a meeting with representatives of the largest firms, the banks are deliberately excluded, since they have their own special interests. He was instructed to talk to me. They want to come up with a plan, discuss it first in a relatively small circle, then involve most of the powerful firms, and then press the president to accept the plan. I said that we proposed our plan and are ready to carry it out now. He says that this plan, apparently, is not viable, something more practical is needed. A two-hour conversation led him to the next idea regarding the development of trade. We do not sign any agreement, we do not assume any obligations. We start negotiations with individual firms on the basis of competition for different orders. We agree on conditions, prices and loans with the companies we have chosen, for example, for 5 years with the right to prolong our bills for another 5 years, maybe we pay something in cash, maybe we pay nothing in cash. The loan will cost us 4-5% per year. If the conditions are not suitable, we may not buy from these companies or this product. We can make a few transactions first and develop trade gradually. General prerequisites - both parties are interested in the development of trade. When asked what will happen to Johnson's bill, the answer is as follows. If American firms get credit from the bank, then Johnson's bill has nothing to do with it. In addition, firms, if necessary, will agree to give something themselves to cover debts, for example, 1-2 percent of the transaction, in order to save Roosevelt's face. I said it would affect prices. He argued that not at all, because 1-2 percent of the price does not amount to anything, only a little less profit. If prices seem high, we may not buy. You don't need to know anything about this firm-bank deal. It doesn't concern you at all. You pay only 4-5 percent for the loan. You do not risk anything and do not assume any obligation, you do not pay any debts. We won't even talk about them. I asked how long this scheme is valid. He said forever, but you can agree on a deadline. In general, I could not be encouraging about this idea and said that it raises many doubts. In the coming days there will be a meeting of representatives of General Electric, United Style, Baldwin, Lewison, Bendix and a couple of high-profile lawyers, and then there will be a wider discussion. I must either immediately, under a plausible pretext, cool this public, or for the time being, say nothing clearly, which means indirect encouragement, because if the matter develops and is approved by the president, our negative answer in the future may put us in a difficult position - the odium of failure falls on us. I ask for urgent instructions in order to take the necessary measures or speak on my own behalf. September 27, 1935 Troyanovsky (Ibid. L. 97–99).
2 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day sent in code from Sochi at 15:00. 27 min. (Ibid. L. 115).
Stalin to Kaganovich October 2, 1935Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 90. L. 122. Autograph.
Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Kaganovich.
Talk to Radek and send me the Swiss constitution urgently. Waiting for an answer.
Stalin.
No. 83.
2/X.35. 1
_____________________
1 Number and date entered by the secretary. Sent on the same day in code from Sochi at 21:00. 51 min. (Ibid. L. 121).
Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin October 3, 1935Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 90. L. 123–124. Certified typewritten copy.
Copy .
C. secret .
Cipher .
Stalin.
Today, on the basis of your instructions , 1 the following decision was adopted to reduce the grain purchase plan. Accept the offer Stalin to reduce the plan for grain purchases and establish the following plan:
1. In the North Caucasus, reduce by 5 million poods and establish 7 million poods;
2. In Western Siberia, reduce by 9 million poods and establish 9 million poods;
3. In Eastern Siberia, reduce by 2.5 million poods and set 4.5 million poods;
4. In Ukraine, reduce by 10 million poods and set 32 million poods;
5. For the Leningrad region, reduce the plan by 1 million poods and establish a procurement plan in the amount of 1.5 million poods;
6. In the Moscow Region, reduce by 1 million poods and establish 6 million poods;
7. In the Western region, reduce by 1 million poods, establish 3.5 million poods;
8. In the Krasnoyarsk Territory, reduce by 1 million poods and set 5 million poods;
9. In the Omsk region, reduce by 4 million poods and establish 9 million poods. For the rest of the regions and territories, plans have not yet been reduced, since no applications have been received from them.
For October we are drawing up a grain purchase plan of 100,000,000 poods, plus the remainder of the 45,000,000 poods not purchased in September, totaling 145,000,000 poods.
Please let us know your opinion. HP 1568/sh.
Kaganovich. Molotov.
3.X.35
_____________________
1 On the need to reduce the plan for grain purchases, Stalin also wrote to Molotov on September 26, 1935 (See: I.V. Stalin's Letters to V.M. Molotov. 1925–1936. Collection of documents. M., 1995. P. 254).
Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin October 3, 1935Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 90. L. 125. Certified typewritten copy.
Copy.
C. secret .
Cipher .
Tov. Stalin.
1) We agree with your proposal on the inexpediency of buying gold and the expediency of buying non-ferrous metals and rubber. We propose the following resolution:
“Instruct NKVneshtorg to find out the most favorable conditions for the purchase of tin, nickel, copper and rubber abroad for cash and urgently report to the Central Committee.”
2) About Troyanovsky's encryptions, we sent an inquiry to Troyanovsky in the spirit of your questions. When we get an answer, we will inform you 1 . No. 1569/sh.
Kaganovich. Molotov.
3.X.35
_____________________
1 On the same day, Troyanovsky replied to a request, his code was forwarded by Dvinsky to Stalin on October 5 (Ibid. L. 147-148).
Kaganovich to Stalin October 3, 1935Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 90. L. 126. Certified typewritten copy.
C. secret .
Cipher.
Copy .
Sochi. Stalin.
Received from Radek and am sending the Swiss constitution in the morning. No. 1570/sh.
Kaganovich.
3/X-35
Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov October 3, 1935Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 90. L. 128–129. Autograph.
Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b).
Kaganovich. Molotov .
From conversations with practitioners, I learned that grain purchases are often carried out not after the distribution of the incomes of collective farmers, but before their distribution and at the expense of workdays. Purchases of grain thus signify in a number of cases a reduction in wages in kind for workdays and look like grain deliveries. In this way our organizations facilitate their work, but this relief comes at the expense of the interests of our policy in the countryside and at the expense of the interests of this policy. This negative phenomenon was one of the reasons that I advised to reduce the plan of grain purchases that I myself proposed. It also follows from this that the center of gravity of purchases must be shifted to the end of October, November and December, when the incomes on the collective farms will have already been distributed and each collective farm household will sell the grain belonging to it to the state more or less voluntarily, on the principle of trade, and not apportionment. I suggest, therefore, that in October we confine ourselves to a plan of 100-120 mil. poods, including balances for September.
As for the form for the NKVD, I do not mind.
Stalin.
#84
3/X.35 1
_________________
1 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day sent in code from Sochi at 16:00. 30 minutes. (Ibid. L. 127).
Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov October 3, 1935Archive: RGASPI F. 558 Op. 11. D. 90. L. 130. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
From Sochi at 17-40 3.X. 1935
Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b). T. T. Kaganovich, Molotov.
The plan for the production of combines for 1936 I propose a minimum of 50 thousand units, not counting the northern combines. Keep in mind that every thousand combine harvesters save us at least 2 million poods of grain.
I have no objection to the project of the ranks and ranks of the command staff for the NKVD 1 .
Stalin 2 .
________________________
On October 4, 1935, the PB adopted a resolution “On military ranks, uniforms and insignia for the NKVD” (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 972. L. 9).
2 The file contains the encrypted text written down by Chechulin (Ibid. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 90. L. 131).
Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin October 3, 1935Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 90. L. 139. Certified typewritten copy.
Copy.
C. secret .
Cipher .
Stalin.
In accordance with your instructions, today we finally edited the resolution on the grain fund. We send it to you. Please let us know your opinion. No. 1572/sh.
Kaganovich. Molotov 1 .
________________________
1 The following is the text of the draft resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks “On the inviolable fund of grain forage” (Ibid. L. 139–141).
Kaganovich to Stalin October 3 [1935]Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 743. L. 48. Autograph.
3/X
T. Stalin.
1) Comrade Litvinov arrived today, gave a note about the assembly and raised the question of Comrade Potemkin's behavior during the discussion of the issue of sanctions. We sent you a code. I am sending you a note from Comrade Litvinov by plane.
2) In addition, I am sending you ciphers from Comrade Troyanovsky.
3) I am sending you, for your perusal, a note by Maisky and a note by Arkus about talk of a loan in England.
Hello.
L. Kaganovich.
Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov October 4, 1935Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 90. L. 135–138. Autograph.
Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Kaganovich. Molotov .
Details of the project on the non-profit fund of 350 mil. poods are incomprehensible to me, since he did not participate in the preparation of the draft, which makes it difficult to make specific amendments point by point. But I have some general thoughts.
Firstly, it is not clear whether this project cancels the old NEPFund and MobFund, or retains them, and if retains, then for what purposes.
Secondly, 60 mil would be better. poods from the NEP fund to be set aside for the west from Karelia to the south of Ukraine, deploying this bread in the front-line areas at the direction of the military specialist, another 60 mil. pounds - for the Far East with deployment at the direction of the military specialist, the rest is 260 mil. poods to be concentrated in the regions of Moscow, Kalinin, Kursk, Voronezh and Kharkov, from where it is easier to transfer grain to the front-line regions in the event of a war in the West, or to supply the industrial centers of Moscow, Leningrad, Donbass with bread in case of a large crop shortage.
Thirdly, as regards Uzbekistan, Transcaucasia and other regions requiring the importation of grain under any conditions, for them it is necessary to have mobile funds, or rather current stocks, which cannot be mixed with the absolutely inviolable fund now being formed 1 .
Stalin.
No. 86 and 87.
4/X-35 2
___________________
1 The Decree “On the inviolable fund of grain forage” was adopted by the PB on October 7, 1935 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 972. L. 15).
2 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day sent in code from Sochi at 2 o'clock. 51 min. (Ibid. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 90. L. 134).
Molotov, Kaganovich, Andreev to Stalin October 4, 1935Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 90. L. 143–144. Script. Typescript.
Encryption.
From Moscow on 4.X.35 at 2 o'clock. 27 min. In. No. 105.
Sochi. Tov. Stalin.
As a result of the outbreak of hostilities in Abyssinia, the Council of the League was convened on the morning of 5. A preliminary discussion of recommendations was supposed, the failure to comply with which should entail the application of sanctions. It is possible that the stage of recommendations after the outbreak of hostilities will be avoided, and the council will immediately begin to develop sanctions. According to the report of Litvinov, who arrived in Moscow, we propose to give Potemkin the following instructions in Geneva:
1). In the case of the recommendations of Italy and Abyssinia in the spirit of the previous proposals made by the "Committee of Five" to raise objections. Point out that the Council may not impose on a member of the League guardianship and restrictions on his political, administrative and economic independence. Abyssinia's consent to such a limitation cannot be considered voluntary under the present circumstances. In the case of putting recommendations to a vote, abstain from voting, citing a negative attitude towards recommendations of an imperialist nature and unwillingness at the same time to interfere with a possible peaceful resolution of the conflict with a negative vote.
2). Do not object to the application of economic sanctions, agreeing to the participation of the USSR in sanctions, provided that they are applied by other members of the League.
In Litvinov's opinion, England would not take any hostile action against Italy without the blessing of the Council of the League. And the Council's decision will not in the least depend on the position of the USSR. The Council needs unanimity on all issues. An abstention on the issue of sanctions would be construed as a refusal to participate in the sanctions, unless such participation is expressly agreed, in spite of the abstention in voting. Abstinence does not correspond, according to Litvinov, to our common position as a defender of collective security for the preservation of peace. For the same reasons, Litvinov proposes, when discussing the scope of economic sanctions, to support the most radical proposal, but to object to the severance of diplomatic relations.
Please let us know your opinion 1 . HP 139, 140.
Molotov. Kaganovich. Andreev.
____________________
1 On the same day in cipher from Sochi at 13:00. 05 min. Stalin agreed (Ibid. L. 142). The instructions to Potemkin were approved by the PB (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 18. L. 172–173) and on the same day were transmitted by Litvinov by telegram (DVP. T. XVIII. S. 523–524).
Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin October 5, 1935Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 90. L. 156. Certified typewritten copy.
C. secret .
Copy .
Cipher .
Tov. Stalin. Copy of Comrade Voroshilov.
In pursuance of the government decree of March 3, 1935, the NPO carried out the construction of a new stratospheric balloon "USSR-3". The stratospheric shell has a volume of 150,000 cubic meters. meters and is designed to lift the entire system with a total weight of about 4.5 tons to a height of at least 25,000 m. parachute, all persons in the crew are equipped with individual parachutes, the cockpit design provides it with a stable position in the air. For the same purposes of safety and attenuation of electrical phenomena, the shell is impregnated with calcium chloride before launch, and the shell itself will be filled with gas from intermediate gas holders. The crew includes: the commander of the stratospheric balloon Prokofiev and his assistants for scientific research, engineer Prilutsky and associate professor of the Air Academy, engineer Semenov. The leadership of the preparations for the launch is entrusted to Comrade Khripin. According to the weather conditions, the rise of the stratospheric balloon is planned for October 7–8.
We think it is necessary to ban the press release until the end of the flight.
Please let us know your opinion. No. 1588/sh.
Kaganovich. Molotov.
5.X.35
Kaganovich to Stalin [earlier October 9, 1935]Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 101. L. 73. Typewritten copy.
Comrade Stalin.
Today we received the following message by telephone from Rosenberg: “According to the assumptions of the Secretariat of the League of Nations, the plenary session of the Assembly, which opens on October 9th, will last at least 4 days. The British delegation even considers that it is possible that the meeting will last a whole week. The Assembly will be followed by a Coordination Committee, with an estimated membership of 25 members (all members of the council plus a number of states chosen by the Assembly). The first delegates of most countries arrived in Geneva to participate in the work of the Assembly and the Committee (in particular, France was represented by Laval, and England by Eden). In this connection, according to Rosenberg, certain bewilderment is being expressed in League circles at the absence of the head of the Soviet delegation. According to him,
We would think that Litvinov needed to go to Geneva urgently. Please let us know your opinion 1 .
____________________
1 Litvinov went to Geneva and participated in the meetings of the League of Nations in connection with the Italo-Abyssinian war.
Kaganovich to Stalin October 9 [1935]Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 743. L. 49–51. Autograph.
9/X
Hello, Dear Comrade Stalin!
1) Today Comrade Litvinov raised the question of directives to him in the further development of the discussion in Geneva of the Italo-Abyssinian war. He formulated his brief "theses" in 7 points. We objected to him, because we consider them wrong and contrary to the instructions that you gave. We suggested that he adhere to the directives already given to him on the basis of your telegrams. I send you his 7 points and ask for your opinion 1 .
2) Today we exchanged views on the question of French credits. Litvinov proposes not to reject the proposals of the French, including the Zeligman bank. NKVneshtorg, on the contrary, proposes to reject and go only to negotiations if a group of large banks is organized. We are leaning towards Litvinov's proposal because we think the big banks will participate. They are not performing now, but are releasing the Zeligmans in order to maintain their principled position on debts. I am sending you both notes and asking for your opinion.
3) Tov. Litvinov raised the issue of rejecting the proposals of the Persian government to annul Article 6 of the Soviet-Persian Treaty of 1921.
We agree with him. I am sending you a note asking for your opinion 2 .
4) Today we reviewed the plan for the distribution of tractors and vehicles for the fourth quarter. I send you this distribution and ask for your opinion 3 .
5) Regarding my trip to the eastern roads, if you consider it possible, I would leave on the 15th of October, vol. Andreev and Zhdanov are already here 4 , if not, then it will be in November. Please let me know your opinion 5 .
While all. Hearty greetings! Your L. Kaganovich.
___________________
1 The note is missing. On October 15, the following directive was given to Litvinov in Geneva: “Carry out an independent Soviet line in the spirit of your last speech in Geneva and avoid everything that can be interpreted as subordinating our line to the position of England. Do not be more zealous in sanctions than other countries, and maintain contact with France as much as possible” (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 18. L. 178).
2 The note is missing. On October 20, 1935, the PB accepted the Iranian government's proposal to remove Article 6 from the Soviet-Iranian treaty of 1921 (Ibid., L. 180). The article allowed the introduction of Soviet troops into Persia "in the event that third countries attempt to carry out an aggressive policy on the territory of Persia or turn the territory of Persia into a base for military actions against Russia, if this threatens the borders of the Russian Soviet the Federal Socialist Republic or its allied powers [...]” (DVP. Vol. XVIII, pp. 538–539).
3 The plan for the distribution of motor vehicles and tractors for the fourth quarter of 1935 was approved by the PB on October 21, 1935 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 972. L. 41, 138–146).
On August 9, 1935, Andreev was granted leave from August 15 for a month and a half (Ibid. D. 970. L. 28); On September 5, 1935, Zhdanov was granted leave from September 7 for a month (Ibid. D. 971. L. 12).
On September 4, 1935, Kaganovich reported in a letter to Ordzhonikidze: “I didn’t go to Siberia, the owner said:“ When Sergo arrives, you will go. Only on January 4, 1936, the PB allowed Kaganovich to leave on January 7 for the Siberian and Far Eastern railways (Stalin's Politburo in the 30s. Collection of documents. M., 1995. P. 146–147).
Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov October 13, 1935Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 769. L. 171. Autograph; F. 81. Op. 3. D. 101. L. 69. Typewritten copy; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 743. L. 52. Typewritten copy.
Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b) vols. Kaganovich, Molotov.
The directive given by you to Sangursky and Deribas 1 is, in my opinion, incorrect, since it will lead to the fact that the Japanese will freely occupy our sector where the battle took place, take away the Japanese corpses and then say that the Japanese were killed on the territory of Manchuria, accusing us in violation of the borders, in the transition to Manchurian territory. It would have been better to issue a directive to immediately occupy this sector of ours with our troops, take away the corpses of the Japanese and secure material evidence for ourselves. But now you cannot correct the directive, since it has already been sent by you to the place.
I also don't like the part of the directive where you give the Japanese the opportunity to roam freely on our territory, 3 kilometers deep from the Manchurian-Soviet border. Have you thought about the position our border guards, and maybe the fortified areas, will end up in? How to explain such generosity towards the Japanese scoundrels?
The note to Hirote and the TASS 2 report were apparently drawn up too hastily and sloppily, but there is nothing to be done - there is probably no way to make corrections while away. We'll have to leave them in the form in which you handed over to Sochi.
Stalin 3 .
______________________
On October 12, 1935, the PB instructed Ya.B. Gamarnik and G.G. Yagoda to give an order to T.D. Deribas and M.V. Sangursky “under no circumstances should the armed clashes be expanded in connection with the incident near Novo-Alekseevka. In the event of a new attack by the Japanese detachment, do not engage in battle within 3 kilometers from our border, and only after the Japanese advance beyond 3 kilometers, give a worthy rebuff, but in no case allowing our units to cross the border ”(RGASPI. F. 17. Inventory 162. D. 18. L. 176).
2 A note dated October 12, 1935, handed to Hirota, spoke of the attack on October 6 on the Soviet border detachment by a Manchu detachment under the command of a Japanese officer and of new incursions into Soviet territory in the following days (DVP. T. XVIII. S. 526-527 ). The TASS report about the violations of the border by the Japanese-Manchurian detachments and about the protests announced in connection with this to the Japanese government was published in the newspapers on October 13.
3 There is a note on the document: “Telephone message received by Comrade Dvinsky at 4:50 am on October 13, 1935.”
Kaganovich to Stalin [after October 13, 1935]Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 101. L. 64. Typewritten copy.
Tov. Stalin!
We outlined the composition of groups for checking party documents in the East Siberian and Far Eastern regions.
In the Far Eastern Territory: group leader Alekseev (member of the Central Committee, chairman of the Leningrad Regional Trade Union Council), Genkin (member of the CCP), Pugachevsky (secretary of the Gorky city committee of the CPSU (b)), Kovalev (editor of the newspaper "Working Moscow"), Strup (secretary of the Zaporozhye city committee of the Communist Party ( b) U), Nikitin (instructor of the ORPO of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks).
In the East Siberian Territory: the head of the Bauman group, Shustin (member of the CPC), Evgeniev (deputy head of the Transport Department of the Central Committee), Nikitin (head of the Pravda party department), Ivushkin (secretary of the Veliko Lutsk district committee), Shabalin (instructor ORPO Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks).
It would be possible to additionally include in each group one Chekist and a military worker, connected with the verification of party documents with the ORPO Central Committee.
In the event that Bauman or Alekseev cannot be sent, Comrade Knorin can be sent as leader of one of the groups.
Please let us know your opinion 1 .
_______________________
On October 13, 1935, the PB recognized the need to create two groups to monitor the progress of checking party documents in the East Siberian and Far Eastern regions. The ORPO was instructed to urgently submit candidates (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 972. L. 29).
Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin October 20, 1935Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 92. L. 37. Original. Typescript.
Telegram.
From Moscow 20 / X - 35 at 20 o'clock. 40 min.
Sochi. Tov. Stalin. We are sending you a draft text of a telegram from Khabarovsk about material evidence found at the scene of the collision, which we intend to publish if the Japanese press publishes anything else on this issue.
Please provide your opinion.
Kaganovich, Molotov.
Telegram text draft.
Khabarovsk. 19/X (TASS). In addition to the telegram dated October 18, the TASS correspondent received information that at the site of the clash that took place on Soviet territory on October 12 between our border detachment and the Japanese-Manchurian detachment that attacked it, a lot of material evidence was collected, including Japanese shells, live ammunition, rifle butt plate shattered by a bullet, rifle handguard, Japanese ramrod from a carbine, one pair of white gloves, shoe wrap, four Japanese bandages, individual bag wrapper, aluminum flask and two stoppers for it, cap of an officer's flask, broken Japanese self-recording a pen, etc., some of these items were covered in blood.
______________________
1 Case No. 91, containing ciphers for the period from October 5 to October 20, was not received from the Administrative Office of the Russian Federation. See attachments No. 6, 7.
Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin October 21, 1935Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 92. L. 2. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
From Moscow 2I/X — 35 at 0:00. 30 minutes. In. No. 138.
Sochi. Tov. Stalin.
In connection with the fifteenth anniversary of the Kalmyk region, Vareikis proposes to transform it into the Kalmyk ASSR.
Please let us know your opinion 1 . HP 189.
Kaganovich, Molotov.
__________________
On 1 October 21, 1935, Stalin agreed in a cipher from Gagra at 12 noon. 25 min. (Ibid. L. 1), issued on the same day by decision of the PB (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 972. L. 41).
Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin October 21, 1935Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 92. L. 5–6. Script. Typescript.
Encryption.
From Moscow 2IX - 35 at 0 o'clock. 30 minutes. In. No. 139.
Sochi. Tov. Stalin.
Franzpra, through the Minister of Commerce of Bonnet, proposes to enter into negotiations with the banks on granting us a five-year loan of 1 billion francs at 6% per annum. According to this proposal, an agreement should be concluded between us and a group of banks, and the French government guarantees the credit provided by the banks in the amount of 80% without affecting the problem of old debts in the agreement. Since the big banks refused to participate in the loan deal, due to the unsettled issue of old debts, Bonnet recommends to us two banking houses of Dreyfus and Zelikman, which, according to Potemkin, agree for a five-year term and 6% per annum, including the cost of tax and guarantee. Potemkin considers these banking firms quite solid. Rosengoltz speaks out against entering into negotiations with these banking houses as secondary ones, considering that: 1) An agreement with secondary banks would be a step backwards in comparison with the terms of the Czechoslovak and German loan agreements. 2) It is impossible to sign agreements for a billion francs with banks whose capital is determined by only tens of millions of francs. 3) These secondary banking firms may default and will only try to play the role of intermediaries for a secret commission from supplier firms. Rozengolts proposes to continue negotiations on the condition that the French president organizes a banking group headed by one of the big banks, ready to provide us with a five-year financial loan. Litvinov, on the other hand, insists on entering into negotiations with these banks and on signing an agreement with them, because in this way we get the opportunity to lay a serious economic basis for our political relations with France.
For our part, we consider it possible to allow the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade to enter into negotiations with banking houses 1 .
Please let us know your opinion 2 . HP 190, 191.
Kaganovich, Molotov.
____________________
1 The encryption was compiled on the basis of letters from Krestinsky (Ibid. L. 15–17) and Rozengolts (Ibid. L. 20–21).
2 On the same day, Stalin agreed in a cipher from Gagra at 4 p.m. 45 min. (Ibid. L. 4). On the same day, the decision of the PB to enter into negotiations with French banks was formalized (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 18. L. 181).
Stalin, Voroshilov - Kaganovich, Molotov October 21, 1935Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 92. L. 32. Text - Voroshilov's autograph.
Moscow. Kaganovich, Molotov.
1) We propose to transfer Zudortrans to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs as one of the departments.
2) Comrade Yagoda forced the People's Commissar to submit to the Central Committee by December 1 a road construction plan for 1936 1 .
No. 111
21/X-35 2
__________________
1 According to the text of the letter of the litter: “For. I. Stalin. K. Voroshilov. October 23, 1935 issued by the decision of the PB (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 972. L. 42).
2 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day sent in code from Sochi at 0:00. 49 min. (Ibid. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 92. L. 31).
Kaganovich, Andreev to Stalin October 21, 1935Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 92. L. 41. Autograph.
Encryption.
From Moscow 21/X - 35 at 16 o'clock. 50 min. In. No. 140.
Sochi. Tov. Stalin.
In accordance with your instructions, we plan to send Shcherbakov, the head of the Cultural Education Department of the Central Committee, he is an employee of the Malenkov type, to the East Siberian Territory for verification, and Yakovlev Alexander from Saratov to the Far East.
Please let us know your opinion 1 . HP 192.
Kaganovich, Andreev.
__________________
1 Stalin agreed in a cipher from Sochi on October 22 at 12 noon. 56 min. (Ibid. L. 40). October 23 issued by the decision of the PB (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 972. L. 44). See also Document No. 717.
Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov October 21, 1935Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 92. L. 34–36. Autograph.
Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b).
Kaganovich. Molotov .
Your draft telegram from Khabarovsk about physical evidence against the Japanese who made their way to our territory near Novoalekseevka does not stand up to criticism. Such a telegram might cause laughter and would be an indication that we have no other valid evidence. The Japanese, on occasion, could concoct hundreds of such material "evidence" with mittens and Russian cartridge cases, saying that it was not they who attacked us, but we attacked them. The only hard evidence is Japanese corpses. But our glorious border guards safely missed the Japanese corpses, providing them to the Japanese. As you can see, after the shooting, our border guards safely retreated deep into our country, while the Japanese remained complete masters of our territory and carried Japanese corpses to Manzhchuria.
Stalin.
No. 112
21/X-35 1
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1 Number and date entered by the secretary. Sent in code from Sochi on October 22 at 0000 hours. 50 min. (Ibid. L. 33).
Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin October 23, 1935Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 92. L. 64. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
From Moscow 23 / X - 35 at 22 o'clock. 28 min. In. No. 143.
Sochi. Tov. Stalin.
The situation in the Odessa region turned out to be much worse than expected at the beginning, there is a reduced harvest not only in the southern, but also in a number of northern regions. The Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) U examined the issue on the spot and, together with the Odessa Regional Committee, ask:
1) To issue to the Odessa region a seed loan in the amount of 4,100,000 poods, a food loan of 3,400,000 poods, and a fodder loan of 2,500,000 poods, postponing the return of the 2,000,000,000 poods of the short-term seed loan of 1935 to the Odessa region.
2) Reduce the plan for grain purchases by 2 million poods.
3) Release 15 thousand tons of sowing due to the overfulfillment of the hay delivery plan for Ukraine.
We consider it possible to comply with the request. Please let us know your opinion 1 . HP 193.
Kaganovich, Molotov.
__________________
On October 1 , 25, Stalin agreed in a code from Sochi at 2 p.m. 15 minutes. (Ibid. L. 63).
Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin October 23, 1935Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 92. L. 46–49. Script. Typescript.
Sochi. Tov. Stalin.
In connection with Stomonyakov's report on the statement of the representative of the Japanese Foreign Minister about the negotiations at the station. Manchuria The People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs proposes that this statement be published in Izvestia, followed by a commentary.
We consider this proposal acceptable and send you a draft of the comment we have reviewed.
Please let us know your opinion.
Kaganovich. Molotov.
Draft commentary on the statements of the representative of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the negotiations at Art. Manchuria.
Mr. representative of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, who made such a cheeky, to put it mildly, statement on the issue of the Mongol-Manchurian negotiations, first of all incorrectly sets out the position of the Mongolian delegation, known from the reports published in the Soviet press.
Wrong is his assertion that the Mongolian delegates "insist that diplomatic representatives should be present only at border points." It is known that the Mongolian delegation is only trying to ensure that the border commissioners, whose exchange is being negotiated, are located at the border points and supervise the work of the border commission, and not be sent to Ulan Bator and Xinjiang (Chanchun), which are very far from the border.
In connection with the established friendly relations between the USSR and Outer Mongolia, the representative of the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs hypocritically laments the "uncertainty of relations between Outer Mongolia and the USSR", contrasting them with "clear and definite relations between Japan and Manchukuo." Meanwhile, the nature and forms of relations between Japan and Manchukuo are indeed well known to everyone. The living personification of these relations is the bright figure of the Japanese Kanki, who leads the negotiations at the station. Manchuria and speaking to the Mongols on behalf of Manchukuo. It is no less well known, however, that the policy of the USSR is incompatible with colonial robbery and robbery, with the seizure of foreign territory, with the violation of foreign borders, and so on. etc. The USSR consistently and unswervingly fights for peace and is ready to render necessary assistance and assistance to the cause of peace, in accordance with the circumstances, and to firmly oppose the instigators of war. The Soviet government, and this must be known to the representative of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, quite clearly and distinctly in an official form at one time already outlined to the Japanese government its attitude towards the attempts of the Japanese military to seize Outer Mongolia. It is not appropriate for an official acting as an official representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to play innocence in such conditions and pretend that he - and therefore the department on behalf of which he acts - does not know how the USSR treats the aggression being prepared by the Japanese military in Manchuria against Mongolian People's Republic.
However, the fact that the representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs not only did not deny the fact of rude and open threats of war against the MPR from the “Manchu Kanki” deserves the most attention in this speech, but actually completely took the side of the latter, declaring that “the government of Manchukuo seeks to open doors of Outer Mongolia and other countries," and that it knocks on the doors of Mongolia just as Commodore Peri knocked on the doors of Japan 80 years ago. Japan's disinterested adherence to the policy of "open doors" for other countries is well known to the whole world from the example of the same Manchuria, under the flag of which the Japanese imperialists want to "open" Outer Mongolia. There is therefore no need to dwell on this question. The important thing is that, discarding all conventions, the representative of the Japanese Foreign Minister, with a boldness worthy of Mr. Kanki, declares that they are knocking with bayonets on the doors of Mongolia, just as they did and do in relation to Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Northern China and etc. It is absolutely clear that it was precisely for this operation that the demand of the Japanese military was put forward to send their representatives to various points in Mongolia under the guise of diplomatic representatives of Manchukuo. When the Mongolian government is in no hurry to accept ultimatum proposals to send such "diplomatic" representatives to it, proceeding from the fact that the Japanese-Manchurian side refuses to return the illegally and forcibly seized part of the Mongolian territory, and in view of the defiant and ultimatum form of these demands, incompatible with elementary norms of international communication and the prestige of a truly free country, the government of Manchukuo, on behalf of the Japanese military, threatens Mongolia with war, forgetting that it has not yet been recognized by anyone and yet, on the occasion of such general non-recognition, has not yet declared war on the whole world.
The statement of the representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs testifies that Messrs. Kanki and the military masters standing behind them are not acting alone and that they have recently begun to be supported by influential and even some official circles in Japan. This is evidence of the strengthening of the positions of the aggressive elements of the Japanese military and a manifestation of that "new course" of Japanese policy in the Far East, which the military, apparently, has imposed on its government and which is capable of creating new, very serious complications of an international character.
The Japanese military is increasingly losing its sense of reality and proportion. She is dizzy with successes, won and won without the slightest resistance in part of China. This also explains those who received a quick and decisive rebuff to the provocations that recently took place on the Soviet border. In such circumstances, statements such as those made by the representative of the Japanese Foreign Ministry may do a disservice to the cause of peace.
23.X.35 1
___________________
1 A ticker tape with the date of sending is pasted below: “24 / X - 35, 1 hour. 45 min."
Kaganovich to Stalin October 23, 1935Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 92. L. 62. Autograph.
Sochi. T. Stalin 1 .
In connection with the 15th anniversary of Kazakhstan, the central newspapers are asking for permission to print your enclosed article "Our Tasks in the East" (published in Pravda on March 2, 1919).
Please give permission for publication.
L. Kaganovich 2 .
___________________
1 Dated by the secretary's note at the bottom of the letter: "Sent 23/X - 35, 22-30" (Ibid.). Sent in cipher on October 24 at 12 noon. 40 min. (Ibid. L. 62).
2 What follows is a reprint of Stalin's article.
Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov October 24, 1935Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 92. L. 44–45. Autograph.
Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Kaganovich, Molotov.
1. The draft commentary on the Japanese statement on Outer Mongolia is the usual Stomonyakov porridge. The draft does not even explain that Manchuguo is essentially seeking official recognition from the MPR, while the MPR does not agree with this and prefers to confine itself to an exchange of border agents.
2. I propose not to reprint my old article "Our Tasks in the East" either in the metropolitan or in the provincial press. In general, I ask you to forbid the newspapers from reprinting my old articles without my consent.
Stalin.
No. 115
24/X-35 3
_____________________
1 Number and date entered by the secretary. Sent in code from Sochi on the same day at 20:00. 52 min. (Ibid. L. 43).
Stalin to Molotov, Kaganovich, Yagoda October 25, 1935Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. P. D. 92. L. 67–68. Autograph.
Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Molotov. Kaganovich. Yagoda .
From the circumstances of Guy's escape and his capture, it is clear that the Chekist part of the NKVD does not have a real leadership and is going through a process of decomposition. It is not clear on what basis Guy was sent to the isolation ward in a special compartment, and not in a prison car? Where is it heard that a person sentenced to a concentration camp was sent in a special compartment, and not in a prison car? What are these orders?
The version of escape through the window at full speed of the train is, in my opinion, unlikely. Most likely, the prisoner changed his clothes and went out to the station, missed by one of the escorts. Guy and his friends, it seems to me, have their own people in the check - they organized his escape.
Even more monstrous is the situation of Guy's capture. It turns out that in order to catch one brat, the NKVD mobilized 900 commanders of the border school, all NKVD employees, party members, Komsomol members, collective farmers and created a ring, probably of several thousand people with a radius of 100 kilometers. The question is, who needs a cheka and why does it exist at all, if it is forced every time and at every trifling occasion to resort to the help of the Komsomol, collective farmers and, in general, the entire population? Further, does the NKVD realize what an unfavorable noise such mobilizations create for the government? Finally, who gave the NKVD the right to arbitrarily mobilize party members, Komsomol members and collective farmers for their departmental needs? Isn't it time to ban the NKVD bodies like, if I may say so, mobilization?
It is important to note that all this mess would have been excluded if Guy had been sent in a prison car.
I think that the KGB unit of the NKVD is suffering from a serious illness. It's time for us to treat her.
Stalin 1 .
No. 117, 118.
25/X.35 2
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1 Stalin answers two telegrams from Yagoda:
“To the Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, comrade. Stalin. October 22 p. At 7 pm, by passenger train No. 64 in a special compartment from Moscow, Gai Bzhishkyan, Gai Dmitrievich, sentenced by the Special Meeting to 5 years in prison, was sent to the Yaroslavl prison. Guy was accompanied by a special convoy consisting of: E.P. Ryazanov, commissar of the operational department of the NKVD GUGB, a member of the CPSU (b) since 1932, an employee of the NKVD GUGB since 1923, and 2 Red Army soldiers of the 3rd regiment of the Separate Special Purpose Division of the NKVD - Vasiliev and Sereda (both members of the Komsomol). The convoy in Moscow was carefully briefed and warned of Guy's possible escape attempts. At 10:35 p.m. October 22, city, 3 kilometers behind the Berendeevo station of the Northern Railways (Ivanovo-Industrial Region), Guy escaped from custody. Upon receipt in Moscow of a message about the escape, a task force headed by the head of the Secret Political Department of the GUGB comrade went to the place. Molchanov and Deputy Head of the Operational Department of the GUGB Comrade. Volovich. According to Comrade. Molchanov, who interrogated the escorts, Guy escaped under the following circumstances: before reaching the Berendeevo station, Guy asked to go to the restroom, where he was taken out, accompanied by the escort and the commissar. The escort Vasiliev was stationed at the door of the dressing room, and Commissar Ryazanov was right there in the corridor. Taking advantage of the fact that the convoy remained in the corridor of the car, Guy broke the glass with his shoulder, knocked out the window frame and jumped out on the move of the train, with such speed that the guard did not have time to shoot. The train was stopped by the convoy 250 - 300 meters from the place of escape, but Guy was no longer found. Operational groups were thrown into the area of the Berendeyevo station, the area was cordoned off and barriers were organized, with the task of detaining Gai. Local communists and collective farm activists are involved in the search for Guy. In view of the fact that, according to the testimony of the escort, Guy jumped out of the window from a train moving at a speed of 40 kilometers per hour, no traces of blood were found either on the glass of the car, or on the window frame, or on the second tracks of the railway bed where he jumped out. We believe that he fled under different circumstances than the convoy shows. It can be assumed, given the circumstances of the case, that someone from the convoy assisted him in escaping. The convoy has been arrested. The investigation is underway. As a result of the measures taken, Guy should be detained in the near future. To the scene of the incident, but on my assignment, Comrade also left. Prokofiev and comrade Frinovsky. - People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR G. Yagoda. 23.X.35" (Ibid. L. 69-70).
“From Moscow 24 / X - 35 at 23 o'clock. 40 min. Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) comrade. Stalin. In addition to my telegram about the escape at the time of escorting Gai to the isolation ward and the notice of Gai's detention, I inform you that, in addition to those sent by me (Berendeevo station in the Ivanovo-Industrial Region), comrades Molchanov and Volovich with a group of operational workers, for a wide environment I threw out 900 commanders of the Higher Border School, headed by comrades Prokofiev and Frinovsky, in addition to all the NKVD employees with the task of organizing members of the CPSU (b), Komsomol members and collective farmers and forming a wide ring to ensure the detention of Guy. Also, all highways and country roads, approaches to Moscow were closed and the strictest control was established along the railway line and waterways. By 13 o'clock on October 24 with. the ring formed within a radius of 100 kilometers from the place of escape (from the commanders of the Higher Border School, employees of the NKVD, local members of the CPSU (b), the Komsomol and collective farmers) was compressed in the direction of the Berendeevo station. At that time, Demidov, Frinovsky and Volovich, an employee of the transport department of the GUGB, who were checking on the railway line, heard screams and noticed a man on horseback a kilometer away, calling them with gestures. T. T. Demidov, Frinovsky and Volovich quickly went to him. The caller turned out to be the collective farmer of the village of Davydov, Tolkov P. G., he informed his comrades who approached him that he had met a man who had come out of the forest, similar to the signs of the wanted man, the suspect is currently three kilometers away and is guarded by the teacher-director of the Davydov school Aleksandrov N. P., whom he, Tolkov, called to his aid, noticing a suspicious one. Tt. Demidov, Volovich and Frinovsky quickly went along with Comrade who reported. Tolkov to the location of the suspected, guarded teacher Alexandrov. Arriving at the place, they identified Guy in him and immediately, on my orders, they escorted Guy to Moscow. From the interviews carried out by Comrade Molchanov and myself as the commissar of the GUGB officer Ryazanov, the escorts Vasiliev and Sereda, and the captured Guy himself, the situation of his escape is preliminary drawn as follows: Guy was, at his request, the escort Vasilyev and the commissar Ryazanov was taken to the toilet in the car. Immediately after the departure of the train from the station. Berendeyevo, the escort Vasiliev, who was standing at the door to observe Guy, in violation of the rules of escort, allowed Guy to stand on the toilet seat to perform natural needs (and he was obliged to force Guy to sit on the toilet seat). Commissar Ryazanov also violated the rules of escort and did not personally observe Guy, but placed the indicated escort at the door of the restroom, while he himself remained in the corridor, guarding the exit from the car. Guy, having established the inattention of the escorts, used a convenient position for the jump and jumped from the toilet seat, breaking two windows, and jumped out of the train on the move. When falling, he badly hurt his left thigh and left leg, quickly disappeared from the embankment into the bushes and a small forest located next to the railroad track. Not being discovered after the train stopped by the jumping commissar Ryazanov and the escort Vasiliev, at night he hid through the swampy area in a nearby forest in front of the village of Davydov, standing 6-8 kilometers from the place of escape. This message was delayed in connection with checking the data on the escape and capture of Guy, for which I summoned comrades Prokofiev, Molchanov, Frinovsky, Volovich to Moscow and delivered the captured Guy. People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Yagoda” (Ibid. L. 68v., 67v.).
Message from Molchanov and Volovich to Yagoda dated October 23, 1935, see: Genrikh Yagoda. Collection of documents. Kazan, 1997, pp. 454–457.
2 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day sent in code from Sochi at 18:00. 24 min. (Ibid. L. 66).
Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin October 26, 1935Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 92. L. 75. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
From Moscow 26/X - 35 at 3 o'clock. In. No. 144.
Sochi. Tov. Stalin.
In accordance with your instructions and the decision of the Central Committee on the purchase of 25 million rubles, Rozengolts makes the following proposal: 5,000 tons of tin, 4,000 tons of nickel, 15,000 tons of copper, 10,000 tons of rubber, 4,000 tons of ferro-chromium, 1,300 tons of ferro-tungsten, 1,200 tons of ferro-molybdenum, ferro-titanium 100 tons, lead 3000 tons, antimony 500 tons, magnesium powder 250 tons, magnesium ingots 300 tons.
We support this proposal and ask for your opinion 1 . HP 196.
Kaganovich, Molotov 2 .
___________________
1 On the same day, Stalin agreed (Ibid.).
3 The file contains a draft resolution on the purchase by the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade of the Republic of Belarus of the goods listed in the letter in a top-secret order, the delivery of which was supposed to be “carried out on foreign steamers through the southern ports of the USSR”, and in case of obstacles “sent to Murmansk”. According to the text of the draft resolution, autographs: “For (with amendments on nickel, lead and rubber) Molotov. Per. L. Kaganovich. Molotov's amendment concerned a change in the quantitative indicators of the originally planned purchases of lead - 5,000 tons, nickel - 3,000 tons, rubber - 12,000 tons (Ibid. L. 77). A procurement plan was sent to Stalin, taking into account Molotov's corrections.
Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin October 26, 1935Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 92. L. 73. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
From Moscow 26/X — 35 at 20:00. 19 min. In. No. 145.
Sochi. Tov. Stalin.
In connection with the fifteenth anniversary of the 2nd Chernigov Cavalry Division, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine and the Vinnitsa Regional Committee appealed to the Central Committee and SNK with a request to award the division with the Order of Lenin.
We vote for the award. Please provide your opinion. HP 197.
Kaganovich, Molotov.
Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov October 26, 1935Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 92. L. 73. Autograph.
I do not know the Second Chernihiv Cavalry Division and cannot vote either for or against the award.
Stalin.
No. 120.
26/X-35 1
___________________________
1 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day sent in code from Sochi at 22:00. 41 min. (Ibid. L. 72).
Zhdanov, Kaganovich to Stalin October 27, 1935Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 92. L. 79. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
From Moscow 27A - 35 at 19 o'clock. 44 min. In. No. 146.
Sochi. Tov. Stalin.
We ask for your consent to the adoption of the following decision of the Central Committee: 1) Release comrade. Gyulling from the duties of chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Karelia, recalling him to the disposal of the Central Committee. 2) Approve the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Karelia comrade. Bushueva 1 . HP 198.
Zhdanov, Kaganovich.
___________________
1 Stalin agreed on October 28 in a cipher from Sochi at 12 noon. 05 min. (Ibid. L. 78). The PB decision was drawn up on October 29, 1935 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 972. L. 54).
Stalin to Molotov, Kaganovich, Andreev, Zhdanov, Tal October 29, 1935Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 92. L. 82. Autograph.
Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Molotov, Kaganovich, Andreev, Zhdanov, Tal.
I ask you to forbid the petty-bourgeois trash, who has penetrated our central and local press, to publish in the newspapers “interviews” with my mother and any other advertising rubbish, including portraits. Please save me from the annoying advertising hype of these scoundrels.
Stalin 1 .
No. 122
29/X.35 2
_______________________
1On October 21, 1935, Stalin received a telegram: “From Moscow on 21/X-35 Sochi. Tov. Stalin. On behalf of Kaganovich, I am sending for approval a press release from the correspondent Dorofeev about Comrade Stalin's visit to his mother. Poskrebyshev. "Mother. We came to visit the mother of Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin. Three days ago, October 17, Stalin was here. A son. Keke's 75-year-old mother is friendly and cheerful. She tells us about unforgettable moments. - Joy? she says. What joy did I experience, you ask? The whole world rejoices, looking at my son and our country. What should I experience as a mother? We sit down in a spacious bright room, in the middle of which is a round table covered with a white tablecloth. Bouquet of flowers. Sofa, bed, chairs. Above the bed are portraits of his son. Here he is with Lenin, here he is young, in the office. Came unexpectedly without warning. The door opened - this one - and in, I see - he. He kissed me for a long time and so did I. — How do you like our new Tiflis? I asked. - He said it was good. I remembered the past, how we lived then. I worked day jobs and raised my son. It was difficult. It was raining through the roof in a small dark house and it was damp. They ate badly.
But never, never do I remember my son treating me badly. Always care and love. Exemplary son! The whole day was fun. Iosif Vissarionovich joked and laughed a lot, and the meeting was joyful. We are saying good bye. New Tiflis rages, sparkles and blooms. And in the memory the words of the mother still sound: - I wish everyone such a son! Boris Dorofeev” (Ibid. L. 22–23). Stalin wrote according to the text of the telegram: “I do not presume to either affirm or deny. It's not my business. Stalin” (Ibid. L. 22). On October 23, 1935, this material was published in Pravda.
2 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day sent in code from Sochi at 14:00. 2 minutes. (Ibid. L. 81).