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Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931–19361932 June
On June 1, 1932, the Politburo decided to grant Stalin a month and a half leave . However, as follows from the register of visitors to Stalin's Kremlin office, he did not receive anyone from May 29 to August 27, 1932, i.e. absent from Moscow for almost three months 2 . It was one of the leader's longest vacations, which also began two months earlier than vacations in previous years.
Note:
1 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 12. L. 156.
Kaganovich to Stalin June 2 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 99. L. 78–79. Autograph.
Hello, Comrade Kaganovich!
1) Since the decision on the plan for the third quarter for the People's Commissariat for Heavy Industry has already been taken, it is not worth changing it now, so as not to create confusion among business executives and not give them reason to assume a policy of curtailing construction.
2) As for Voroshilov's project on aviation, I have already sent you a cipher. In my opinion, we can confine ourselves to Voroshilov's draft for the time being, with the amendments set out in my encryption.
3) I read materials about negotiations with the Anglo-American oilmen. The ideas of Weitzer and Ozersky are correct. If negotiations are resumed, it would be good to limit the term of the treaty to five or six years.
Greetings! I. Stalin.
29/VI 32
Stalin to Kaganovich June 4, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 129–130. Autograph.
Kaganovich, Molotov.
First. I read the last conversation with Lancaster. Lancaster's schemes are unacceptable. We can agree to partially satisfy the claims of a private bank only if we receive a large loan. This is our main premise. Without such a combination, the agreement is excluded. Therefore, we must stand firm on the basis of our scheme proposed to Lancaster on June 27th. It is possible, in extreme cases, to increase our orders in America to 30 percent of the loan, and in the event of recognition of the USSR, up to 35 percent.
Second. The decision center of the conference of secretaries should be the organization of grain procurements with the obligatory fulfillment of the plan by 100 percent. The main blow must be directed against the Ukrainian demobilizers. Kaganovich, as secretary of the Central Committee, and Molotov, as chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, should go to the Ukrainian conference.
Third. Instruct the People's Commissariat of Agriculture or Gosplan to give an official announcement or an interview that we have good prospects for the harvest, and the harvest will be better than last year. This will have an effect on Lancaster.
Stalin.
No. 40.
1/VII. 32 year 1
_____________________________
1 Number and date entered
Stalin to the members of the Politburo June 4, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 136. Certified typewritten copy.
Strictly secret.
Copy.
Cipher.
Sochi, Comrade Stalin.
We outline the following distribution of tractors arriving for harvesting and the autumn sowing campaign by mid-September:
Ukraine - 5000
CCHO - 1250
Ural - 1100
North [northern] Caucasus - 1100
Western Siberia - 900
Lower Volga - 700
Middle Volga - 680
Middle Asia - 600
Kazakhstan - 500
DVK - 500
Bashkiria - 350
Eastern Siberia - 350
Moscow - 300
Western — 270 Nizhny Novgorod — 260
Belarus - 215
Leningradskaya - 220
Ivanovskaya - 200
Tataria - 200
ZSFSR - 180
Crimea - 120
Northern - 40
Please let us know your opinion 1 . No. 28/1171/sh.
1.VII.32
Kaganovich, Molotov, Yakovlev.Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 135. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
In. No. 29
Tov. Stalin.
I inform you for your information that on June 29 Wang was received by Kozlovsky and informed him that Nankinpra intended to conclude a non-aggression pact with the USSR, which should mean the simultaneous restoration of normal diplomatic relations. Wang would like to talk about the procedure for signing the pact and restoring relations.
Kozlovsky replied that, in his opinion, he would not object to the immediate restoration of relations without any conditions, after which the pact would come as a natural result of the restoration of relations.
Wang announced that he would immediately telegraph to Nanking about the opinion expressed by Kozlovsky and that he was sure that Nanking would give this opinion the most serious attention. Wang hopes to receive instructions one of these days and will ask for a new appointment.
When asked about the procedure, Kozlovsky replied that Nanking himself would be able to find the necessary ways in such cases to contact us about restoring relations. Wang expressed his satisfaction with the explanation given to him. In conclusion, Wang tried to clarify our position on Manchuguo, Kozlovsky avoided talking about this topic 1 . No. 29.
Kaganovich.
1/VII-32
Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Ordzhonikidze to Stalin on June 4, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 740. L. 87–90. Autograph.
1/VII
Hello Comrade Stalin!
Finally, today, after four revisions, projects on harvesting and grain procurement campaigns have come out. We have just reviewed and are sending you by plane”, so as not to waste time. The document about the harvest will have to be published, and about the grain procurements sent to the regional committees, regional committees and district committees. We ask you to give your amendments and sign them. In the resolution on grain procurements, we not only took full account of, but also included entire paragraphs from your letter. I don't know if you had in mind bringing this letter to the secretaries, but we did it, and it was of great importance in turning minds. At the beginning, the meeting revealed an unwillingness to admit mistakes and, in essence, to reveal one's own shortcomings. Business proposals were decent, but the criticism is clearly insufficient. I had to help them in this, especially to put pressure on the Ukrainians and point out that the Central Committee demands from them to stop repeating in a combed form the conversations of not the best part of the village, that we will not give bread, that they must decisively put an end to the capitulatory moods regarding grain procurements and prevent further sourness and impoverishment of the Ukrainian organization. I had to criticize others who showed little criticism, but I must tell you that the benefit of the meeting is exceptionally great. Your letter arrived in the best possible way - both on time and to the point, firmly and clearly saying what needs to be done. Everyone noted that the prospects for the harvest are satisfactory, and in some areas above average. Apparently, the harvest should be larger than last year. This did not prevent some from raising the question of reducing the plan, especially the Ukrainians distinguished themselves. The majority, especially Vareikis, Sheboddaev, not to mention the Muscovites, supported the plans, in particular supported your proposal for a surcharge - insurance of 4-5%. There was great pressure to allow individual districts and even collective farms to sell grain after they had fulfilled the grain procurement plan, but we did not agree to this. On the contrary, we emphasized that now the matter of grain procurements is even more difficult in connection with trade, and that our task is to finish grain procurements as soon as possible, so that it would be easier to develop the grain trade. Well, I'll end this now. so that it would be easier to develop the trade in bread. Well, I'll end this now. so that it would be easier to develop the trade in bread. Well, I'll end this now.
Today there was a PB, but I will write additionally tomorrow, otherwise the plane will fly off soon.
Greetings to you. Your L. Kaganovich.
Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov, Voroshilov, Ordzhonikidze June 5, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558 Op. 11. D. 77. L. 14. Autograph.
Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU. Poskrebyshev. For Kaganovich 1 .
Our newspapers have taken the wrong tone with regard to the new German government. They scold and vilify the latter. This is a false position, calculated to be "revolutionary", but in fact beneficial to those who seek a break between the USSR and Germany. This error must be corrected 2 .
Stalin.
No. 7
21.25
5/VI.32 2
________________
1 The addressee was entered by S. Chechulin.
2 Number, time and date entered by the secretary. Sent in code from Sochi on the same day at 23:00. 12 min. (RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 13).
Stalin to the members of the Politburo June 5, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 17. Autograph.
For Kaganovich and other members of the PB.
I have just read the telegram from Ryabovol and Rabinovich dated May 28 on the terms of the agreement with the oilmen in New York and the ten-point response from Rozengolts dated June 2. The question is very important. Rosengolz's answer seems to me too harsh and perhaps somewhat captious. It would be good to request the text of the latest draft agreement. I consider the agreement desirable, and Rozengolts's chicanery can frustrate it. What is the opinion of the Central Committee? 1
Stalin.
#8
11.30
5/VI-32 2
_______________________
1In May 1932, at the First International Petroleum Conference in New York, the British and American oil campaigns suggested that the USSR renounce independent actions on the world oil markets. In return, they pledged to buy from the USSR 5 million tons of oil annually (the size of Soviet oil exports in 1931) at a certain price for 10 years. At that time no agreement was reached. Negotiations continued in New York. On June 1, 1932, the PB instructed the Soviet delegation to put forward counterproposals at the talks (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 12. L. 152, 157–158), which led to their termination. On June 8, having considered Stalin’s telegram (see document No. 107), the PB decided: “In change of the previous decision of the Politburo of June 1 on negotiations directives[...], it is considered possible to enter into negotiations with the oilmen on the basis of proposals made by the oilmen[ ... ] Propose to the NKVTorg to outline ways for probing the possibility of resuming negotiations with the oilmen and report on the planned measures to the Central Committee within two days ”(Ibid. L. 172). Despite these efforts, no agreement was reached with Western oil companies (Journal of European Economic History. Vol. 17. 1988. P. 660).
2 Number, time and date entered by the secretary. Sent in cipher June 6 at 1 o'clock. 59 min. (Ibid. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 16).
Stalin to Kaganovich June 5, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 99. L. 54–56. Autograph.
5/VI 32
Hello, Comrade Kaganovich!
Your letter of 2/VI received.
1) Comrade Pyatakov's business trip to Germany is the correct measure.
2) The decision of the Far East Commission on a categorical ban on shooting without the permission of Moscow (i.e. SNK and the Central Committee) is absolutely correct. It is clear that such questions and "incidents", which are fraught with the danger of "unexpectedly" unleashing a war, should be decided in all details exclusively by Moscow. I advise you to stick to this line to the end and not to succumb (under no circumstances!) to Comrade Blucher's cries.
3) How is the situation with consumer goods? How many goods have already been sent to the village, when was it sent, or when is it supposed to be sent, which goods? Pay special attention to consumer goods. Tell Lyubimov, Sergo, that the fate of the bond depends on the development of consumer goods, that decisions on consumer goods are subject to unconditional and precise implementation on time. Do not let Zelensky and the cooperators sleep and be sympathetic. You, together with Postyshev, must always sit over the soul of Zelensky and the cooperators and force them to establish live Soviet trade with the countryside . This is the point now.
4) Force Pravda to publish daily reports on the production of AMO and Avtozavod. This is the only real means to pull up both these plants and the NKTYAZH, which does not supply them with metal. Once again: make Pravda (I think that Mekhlis has a unit with the NKTyazh apparatus) give daily reports about AMO and Avtozavod.
Hey! I. Stalin.
Stalin to Kaganovich June 5, 1932
Stalin to Kaganovich June 5, 1932
Kaganovich to Stalin June 6, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 18. Certified typewritten copy.
Strictly secret .
Copy .
Cipher .
Sochi. Stalin.
Yesterday I summoned [to] the Central Committee Mekhlis, Popov, Troisky, Doletsky and Stetsky. Gave them instructions regarding the new German government in the spirit of your telegram. Today I will point them out even more categorically, in the future I will carefully follow.
No. 3/949/sh.
Kaganovich.
6.VI.32
Kaganovich to Stalin June 6, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 19. Certified typewritten copy.
Strictly secret .
Copy .
Cipher
Sochi. Stalin.
On June 1, the Politburo agreed with Rosengolz's reply to Rabinovich's telegram. On June 3, after the presentation of new proposals to the Anglo-American group, the Anglo-Americans broke off the negotiations. On the 8th, the question was raised at the PB whether we should give a press release on our behalf, I think that there is no need to hurry, since there is a telegram indicating that there is talk among the Anglo-American oil workers about the possibility of resuming negotiations. In any case, let's be very careful now. In all further decisions we will take into account your telegram.
No. 4/950/sh.
Kaganovich.
6.VI.32
Kaganovich to Stalin June 6, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 20. Certified typewritten copy.
Strictly secret .
Copy .
Cipher .
Sochi. Stalin.
Your assessment of Yaroslavsky's article is absolutely correct, tomorrow we will summon the Pravdists and adopt a condemning resolution. It seems to me that Yaroslavsky should be freed from Pravda. The other day the Tsekakists 1 also wanted to publish their decree on the Ivanovo-Voznesensk affairs, I delayed it, and there will be no publication.
No. 5/951/sh.
Kaganovich.
6.VI.32
_______________________
1 Heads of the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.
Kaganovich to Stalin June 6 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 740. L. 13–21. Autograph.
6/VI
Hello, Dear Comrade Stalin!
Today I received your three ciphers and a letter, I hasten to write to you today, both on these questions and on others.
1) About Mongolia. Judging by the telegrams now being received, the situation there is better than Okhtin reported, Tsetserlik remained in our hands. Ulaanbaatar is not in immediate danger now. However, we issued a directive that, just in case, Okhtin would clear the embassy of secret documents, in accordance with your instructions. Eliava left on the 4th, we sent him your telegram on an airplane for review (with immediate return), we gave him instructions to speed up political measures.
You are correct in your letter about the nomination of new people, tomorrow we will prepare an additional directive for Eliava and Okhtin both on updating and announcing to the public about the mistakes made, and so on. If you do not take these measures and start by sending troops, this means worsening the situation, so the PB fully accepted your directive - do not send troops. Airplanes are designed as expected. Today Okhtin sent a telegram that in Ulaanbaatar they are forming a regiment of 600 people from Soviet citizens, mostly countrymen, i.e. members of our party, I think they should be banned from this business. Yesterday we sent him a sharp telegram in response to his stupidest message. He reports that a certain Muntsuk, a Mongol communist who graduated from the KUTV, came from Inner Mongolia, reports to him about an uprising prepared there among the troops, that only cartridges are needed, etc. He himself—Okhtin—adds on his own behalf that such an uprising would be very useful, and so on. We believe that this is a provocation, that this Muntsuk himself must be a provocateur. They suggested that he immediately arrest this Muntsuk and deliver him to us.1 , he himself was pointed out to unacceptable gullibility. Apparently, he fell into a complete panic.
2) We received a message that the commander of the Japanese flotilla for the protection of the Japanese fishing trades, Captain Kawose, sent a rather impudent letter to the commander of our patrol vessels with threats that if ours did not provide normal fishing, he would be forced to take appropriate measures himself. A proposal was made at the PB to send a note, we made a more cautious decision: since today, on the 6th, Karakhan was supposed to have a meeting with Hirota, we instructed him to draw Hirota's attention to the unacceptable speech of this captain and limit ourselves to this 2 .
3) Dirksen came to Grinko about the Druzag concession in the North Caucasus. Along the way, they started talking about changes in Germany. Dirksen stated that he believes that there will be no changes in relation to us, he expressed satisfaction with the restraint of our press, apparently he, in the 1st, is not particularly pleased with the changes himself, in the 2nd, he probably compares with the American , partly by the English and French press, which behaves rather harshly, but your telegram quite correctly points out the need for unconditional restraint and the prevention of loudness. Today I had a repeated telephone conversation with the comrades] editors and gave them strict instructions in this spirit. I am sending you a note from Radek about his conversations with Dirksen3—doesn't he take too much at face value everything he was told there?
4) Things were not over with Lancaster. The first conversation ended in nothing, he did not make any statements, but listened most of all, but yesterday we received from the representative of Amtorg (in Moscow) Andreychin (by the way, he is not particularly trustworthy) [message] about Lancaster's conversation with him. From this conversation it is clear that Lancaster is achieving something and quite persistently. We decided that Mezhlauk should meet with him again and listen to him, without entering into a discussion of issues and without making any promises. I am sending you both letters 4 and I will write to you about the results of the new conversation between Mezhlauk. In view of the fact that there may be something serious here, I ask you to let us know how we should proceed?
5) In negotiations with the oilmen, apparently, they slipped up, overdid it. Rabinovich reports that as soon as our new conditions were announced to them, they announced that their conditions were final and they are now taking them back and interrupting the negotiations. Now the Daily Mail 5 and other newspapers have launched a campaign against us. Sokolnikov proposes that we come out with his message in the press, but if we enter into a polemic with them, this may disrupt the possible resumption of negotiations, or it is necessary to make a report that gives a clue to the resumption of negotiations, but this is too early, it is better to wait. This question is on the 8th in the PB, if there is no answer from you to the telegram, we will postpone the question. Maybe instruct someone new to start talking again? (maybe Weitzer or others).
6) About consumer goods. Let's press hard, now after your letter I will work even harder, next time I will write to you about the results of our work in material terms, and not in resolutions. Right now I don't have exact numbers. In any case, the return of goods to the market in May, especially in the second half, is much higher than in April and in the first half of May. But up to now we have nevertheless leaned heavily on the promotion of goods to the market in general, and now we must take up the promotion of goods to the countryside .
7) You know the numbers about sowing, if it weren’t for Ukraine, we would go 3 million hectares higher than last year, we pressed on the Urals, they are far behind, they sent them an abusive telegram 6 , the North Caucasus is also 400 tons behind last year [ ys]. ha, but we haven't sent them anything yet. In view of the hail , Nizhny Novgorod had to be given 700 tons of millet for reseeding hail-damaged crops, and additional grain for Ukraine to supply 1 million [million] 600 thousand [thousand]. poods 7 . We refuse all the rest to their telegrams.
8) As for Eisenstein, I will take appropriate measures. It is necessary to cut down the “philanthropists” who liberalize at the expense of the interests of the state.
9) About Yaroslavsky's article, I told Mekhlis the next day after its publication that it would not do. You are absolutely right that this is a disgrace. It seems to me that it would be better to free Yaroslavsky from Pravda, otherwise he combines this with the Tsekakist practice and the result is not what is needed.
Well, I'll end with this.
I shake my hand tightly. Your L. Kaganovich.
________________
On June 5, 1932, the PB decided to send a telegram to Okhtin on behalf of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs: “We consider Puntsuk's message a provocation. We consider your gullibility unacceptable. Immediately arrest Puntsuk and send him to Moscow” (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 12. L. 175). On August 19, the PB again considered the issue of Puntsuk and decided to bring Puntsuk to Moscow. The OGPU and the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs were instructed to find out his identity (Ibid. D. 13. L. 77).
The 2nd PB instructed Karakhan, when meeting with Hirota, to pay attention to the inadmissibility of the speeches of the commander of the 3rd Japanese flotilla (Ibid. D. 12. L. 175).
3 The note is missing.
4 No letters.
5 The Dail Mail is a British conservative right-wing newspaper with an extremely anti-Soviet orientation.
On June 5, 1932, the PB approved a telegram to the leadership of the Sverdlovsk regional committee and the regional executive committee signed by Kaganovich and Molotov, in which the state of sowing in the region was called “threatening” (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 887. L. 28) .
On June 2, 1932, the PB decided to release 150,000 poods of oats each from the state fund to the Nizhny Novgorod Territory and the Moscow Region, and 90,000 poods to the Leningrad Region (Ibid. Op. 162. D. 12. L. 174). On June 5, 1932, the PB decided to increase the plan for the delivery of grain to Ukraine in excess of the previously approved 6.5 million poods by 1.6 million poods due to export from Central Asia (Ibid. L. 175).
Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin June 7, 1932
Kaganovich to Stalin June 7 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 29. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
In. No. 6.
Tov. Stalin.
Today [at] a meeting of members of the Politburo, the following directives were outlined [to] the compilation of control figures for the third quarter:
“a) Give the State Planning Committee a directive, when drawing up the national economic plan for the third quarter, on the question of capital investment, to stay within the limits of the second quarter (6,800,000 rubles).
b) Predetermine in the third quarter a certain advantage of the NKPS in capital investments against the second quarter.
c) When drawing up the production program for the third quarter, take into account the interests of the harvesting campaign.
d) Propose to the Narkomtyazhprom, Narkomlegprom, Narkomsnab, Narkomzem and NKPS to develop measures to reduce the cost of construction and convene narrow special business meetings for this, and in a month to hear reports from the above-mentioned people's commissariats with agreed proposals from the RCT of the USSR.
e) To propose to all economic commissariats, within the appropriations of the third quarter, to allocate special funds, more than in the second quarter, for the needs of consumer goods and to report to the commission on consumer goods.
f) Gosplan should additionally consider the issue of expanding the production of consumer goods through industrial cooperation.
g) To allocate at least 70,000 tons of metal from the general fund of metal in the third quarter for the production of consumer goods.
Please let us know your opinion. We do not issue this decision until we receive your answer 1 .
HP 6.
Kaganovich, Molotov.
7/VI-32
______________________
1 Stalin agreed on June 8 (Ibid.). The resolution was formalized in the minutes of the meetings of the PB for June 7, 1932 (RGASPI - F. 17. Op. 3. D. 887. L. 9, 10).
Stalin to Kaganovich June 7, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 740. L. 22–29. Autograph.
7/VI
Hello Comrade Stalin!
1) We have just finished a meeting of PB members with people's commissars about the third quarter. We have not finalized our decision yet, we are sending it to you in code to get your opinion. The State Planning Commission put forward a reduction in capital work by 1 billion compared to the second quarter, but we spoke in favor of the size of the second quarter. Usually this Q3[quarter] is higher than Q2, but given both food resources and the inexpediency of overdoing it in terms of emissions, we agreed on the figure of Q2[artal], not lower and not higher. The situation is very bad with the regime of economy and the cost of construction. I emphasized that your instructions on this matter, given during the discussion of the second quarter, are being carried out very poorly. The most important and dangerous thing is that business executives care little about the ruble.
We also proposed to allocate part of the money for those enterprises that work for consumer goods. The Moscow kuspromcooperators in a conversation with me pointed out that if they were given a small amount of credit for some improvement of enterprises, they would be able to significantly increase their production. I promised them to do this, but the same support should be given to the Kustovopromkooperatsiya as a whole. I think, Comrade Stalin, that the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry and others should allocate part of their enterprises specifically for consumer goods, along with the use of all other enterprises.
2) We allocated a commission to work on the preparation of the harvesting campaign. As soon as the project is ready, I will immediately send it to you 1 .
3) Today we discussed the question of Yaroslavsky's article. The bureau of the editorial board was called. He himself, despite our speeches and explanations, did not understand his mistake, that with his article he helped the enemies. After discussion, we adopted the following resolution: “a) Recognize Comrade Yaroslavsky’s article as grossly erroneous, incorrect from the factual side and harmful politically, b) Point out to the editorial office of Pravda that it made a mistake by placing this article on the pages of Pravda ”, c) Release Comrade Yaroslavsky from work as a member of the editorial board of Pravda.
I think we did the right thing by freeing him from Pravda and Pravda from him. He mixed the functions of secretary of the Central Control Commission with the functions of a member of the editorial board, working in Pravda as a Central Control Commissioner, and in the Central Control Commission as a journalist. You are absolutely right that he does not know how to use the weapons of the newspaper, he did not understand his political mistake until the last minute.
4) I am sending you a note from the OPTU about the counter-revolutionary [revolutionary] grouping on the battleship Marat, material that deserves attention and requires our increased vigilance 2 .
5) A telegram was received from Slavutsky, in which he informs that Ohashi, on behalf of Manchzhugo, insists again on our recognition of the Manchurian government. This insistence is rather suspicious, as Ohashi himself belongs to a group of fascists. According to reports, Saito gave just the opposite directives to his representatives in Manchuria, he suggests that they not force this issue, because our recognition of Manchugo before they (the Japanese) do it themselves will complicate the situation. He directly proposes not to run ahead with the recognition of Manchuguo by the USSR. Ohashi reportedly received Saito's telegram after talking to Slavutsky, but he may raise the issue again. We have not discussed this issue yet, please write us how we should be. It seems that we do not need to hurry with this recognition.
Well, I'll end this now. Tomorrow, the 8th, we have another PB, after which I will write again.
Goodbye. Hello. Your L. Kaganovich.
_______________________
1 The commission included: Molotov (chairman), Kaganovich, Kalinin, Ordzhonikidze, Mikoyan, Yakovlev, V. Mezhlauk, Krinitsky (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 887. L. 9).
2 The note is missing.
Stalin to Kaganovich June 7, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 22, 23. Autograph.
Moscow. CC ON. Poskrebyshev
For Kaganovich.
First. As for the oilmen, I remain of my opinion. The Rosengolz directive is designed to disrupt the agreement. If it is proved that the agreement is beneficial to us, we need to change this directive. And the agreement is certainly beneficial to us.
Second. Rozengolyd's directive proceeds not from a calculation of forces, but from maximalist demands not backed up by force. This is not how agreements are made. The oil group is stronger than us economically. It can always interfere with our oil exports, it can bring down prices and drive us into big losses, even if we assume that we will have more and more junk oil for export. But the fact is that we will no longer have waste oil, and our export oil fund will decrease due to the colossal and ever-growing demand for oil products from the water and railway transport, the truck and automobile industries, the tractor and aviation industries.
Third. The Rozengolts directive does not take into account the power and share of the oilmen in the intervention. It does not take into account the fact that it is advantageous for us to more or less neutralize politically the Anglo-American oil group if we really want to keep the peace at least for the next two or three years.
Fourth. I'm afraid the case is already messed up. If it has not yet been spoiled, I advise, firstly, to resume negotiations at the first opportunity and work towards the conclusion of an agreement, and secondly, not to publish a statement, since a statement in the press may complicate the resumption of negotiations.
Stalin.
No. 9, 10
13.15
7/VI.32 1
___________________
1 Number, time and date entered by the secretary. On the same day sent in code from Sochi at 18:00. 51 min. (RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 21).Stalin to Kaganovich June 7, 1932
Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 99. L. 58–60. Autograph.
Hello, Comrade Kaganovich!
1) I finally managed to read Demyan Bedny's play “How the 14th Division Went to Paradise” (see “New World”). In my opinion, the play came out unimportant, mediocre, rude, reeks of a tavern spirit, replete with tavern witticisms. If it has an educational value, it is most likely negative.
We made a mistake by attaching the PB 1 stamp to this flat and non-artistic thing . This is a lesson for us. We will be careful in the future, especially with regard to the works of Demyan Bedny.
2) A new novel by Sholokhov, Virgin Soil Upturned, is being published in Novy Mir. An interesting thing! It can be seen that Sholokhov studied the collective farm business on the Don. Sholokhov, in my opinion, has a great artistic talent. In addition, he is a deeply conscientious writer: he writes about things that are well known to him. Not like "our" fidgety Babel, who now and then writes about things completely unknown to him (for example, "Horse Army").
3) Almost every day Pravda publishes two "cellars" (feuilletons) that talk about all sorts of trifles. Is it possible to force Pravda to throw out one "basement" and use the vacated space for the department (to start such a department!) " Letters from Workers and Collective Farmers ." Bureaucrats from Pravda replaced the letters of workers and collective farmers with letters from professional correspondents and " envoys ". But the bureaucrats must be curbed. Otherwise, Pravda runs the risk of completely breaking away from living people in factories and collective farms. Come on, try to rein in the bureaucrats from Pravda. Hey!
7/VI 32
I. Stalin.
PS Just received your letter of 6/VI. 1) Try to somehow resume negotiations with the oilmen. 2) It would be better for Yaroslavsky to be released from Pravda. 3) Okhtin , it seems to me, should be removed, having prepared this case, i.e. Okhtin's replacement - carefully.
Greetings! Stalin.
__________________
1 The production of D. Bedny's play "How the 14th Division Went to Paradise" was allowed by the PB on April 19, 1932 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 881. L. 8).
Kaganovich to Stalin June 8, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 26. Certified typewritten copy.
Strictly secret .
Copy .
Cipher .
Sochi. Stalin.
Today, the Politburo discussed Vareikis's proposals to stimulate the sowing and harvesting of beets. The gist of the proposals is basically as follows:
1) To double the quota for issuing sugar to collective farmers and individual farmers, bringing it up to 200 grams of sugar, 1 kilogram of molasses per centner of beets delivered.
2) Set the sale of sold beets at a rate of 20% of the cost.
3) To organize a network of deep-seated grain stations in the beet-growing regions.
4) Reimburse the harvesting and transportation of state farm beets in the amount of 30% of the cost.
The PB instructed the commissions (Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Vareikis, Yakovlev) to develop a draft PB decision within two days. In view of the importance of the issue, I inform you and ask you to let me know if you have any comments on this issue 1 .
No. 8/964/sh.
Kaganovich.
8.VI.32
_________________
1 This resolution was formalized in the minutes of the meetings of the PB on June 8, 1932 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 887. L. 6). After Stalin's telegram (document No. 110), the issue was worked out in the commission, and the draft submitted by it was approved on June 23. It provided for an increase in the issuance of sugar at the state price to collective farms and individual farms for each centner of beets handed over directly to sugar factories or procurement centers, etc. It was decided to draw up the resolution in the Soviet order and publish it in the press on behalf of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (Ibid. D. 889. L. 2, 26).
Stalin to Kaganovich June 9, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 33. Autograph.
For Kaganovich .
It is not clear from the telegram about beetroot why the harvesting of beetroot is purchased separately if it is decided that the return of beetroot in the amount of 20% will be purchased? Who needs this double merchandising? It is also not clear why Ukraine is silent, which gives one beet three times or four times more than the TsChO? In a two-day period, and even without Ukraine, such an issue cannot be resolved.
It is necessary to attract the Ukrainians, Odintsov, several heads of sugar trusts and give the commission a period of 5-6 days, or even more, so that a concrete and well-considered decision can be obtained.
Of course, I have no objection to stimulating the delivery and delivery of beets.
Stalin.
No. 12
14.20
9/VI.32 1
______________________
1 Number, time and date entered by the secretary. On the same day sent in code from Sochi at 18:00. 46 min. (RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 32).
Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov June 9, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 31. Autograph.
Moscow. PC ON Poskrebyshev.
For Kaganovich, Molotov.
It is necessary to raise immediately in the press a campaign about the richest prospects of the Sterlitamak, Ukhta and Emba oil. Over the course of a number of issues of Izvestia, it is necessary to shout about the richest deposits of oil in these regions and that with such rich prospects, most of the Grozny, Maikop and Baku oil will have to be turned for export.
It is necessary to arrange a series of interviews with geologists, especially with Gubkin, with Kosior and Ganshin, with a statement about unprecedented oil reserves in the eastern regions. It is quite possible that such a campaign will force the Anglo-American oilmen to resume negotiations and make concessions to us .
Stalin.
No. 13
9/VI.32 1
____________________
1 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day sent in code from Sochi at 18:00. 45 min. There is a note on the encryption: “In a circular member. PB comrades Voroshilov, Andreev, Mikoyan, Kalinin” and receipts from members of the PB on familiarization (RGASPI. F. 558. Op. I. D. 77. L. 30).
Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov June 9, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 47–48. Autograph.
For Kaganovich and Molotov .
Andreichin's note about his conversation with Lancaster deserves attention. This note, as well as the second conversation of Mezhlauk, testify to the fact that in America the matter of recognizing the USSR and granting us a loan or a loan is brewing or has already matured. Let Mezhlauk, Pyatakov and Kalmanovich make approximately the following statement to Lancaster: first, we agree, as an exception, to break the tradition justified by experience and go to loan negotiations without waiting for the official recognition of the USSR; second, let them give us a loan of one hundred to two hundred million rubles for eight years at seven percent; thirdly, let them add to this interest five per cent per annum in compensation for the claims of the bank, so that we have to pay annually no more than twelve per cent for the course of eight years, by which all the claims of the bank should be exhausted; fourth,
Do you think we can agree to such terms? I think you can 1 .
Stalin.
No. 14
11–10
9/VI. 32 year 2
______________________
1 See document M. 104. On June 10, the PB approved Stalin's proposals and instructed V.I. Mezhlauk, M.I. 162. D. 12. L. 183).
2 Number, time and date entered by the secretary. Sent in code from Sochi on June 10 at 3 o'clock. 56 min. (Ibid. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 46).
Kaganovich, Molotov, Ordzhonikidze to Stalin June 9, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 27. Certified typewritten copy.
Copy .
Owls, secret .
Cipher. Immediately.
Sochi. Stalin.
Weitzer and Pyatakov report that the Germans made some additional concessions on the issue of average loan terms, extending the terms by 0.6 months for the first group, by 0.5 months. on the second and 1.6 months on the third. However, on the main question of advance bills, the Germans are not making any concessions. Pyatakov and Weitzer informed the Germans that they did not have consent to the compromise reached, but would recommend that Moscow accept the latest proposals from the Germans. They promised to give a written answer on the 10th in the evening. Taking into account the political situation in Germany and the necessity of placing urgent orders in Germany in the absence of an agreement on worse terms, we consider it necessary to sign an agreement. Please let us know your opinion 1 .
No. 7/s - 977/sh.
Kaganovich, Molotov, Ordzhonikidze.
20.50
9.VI.32
______________________
On June 10, Stalin replied in code: “I don’t mind about Germany” (Ibid., L. 50). An agreement between the trade mission of the USSR in Germany, the NKTP of the USSR and representatives of German industry on the supply of goods from Germany to the USSR was signed on June 15, 1932 (DVP. T. XV. C 362–364).
Kaganovich to Stalin June 9 [1932]
Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich to Stalin [June 10, 1932]Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 740. L. 30–36. Autograph.
9/VI
Hello Comrade Stalin.
I have received your letter of 5/VI, I hasten to reply.
1) Pyatakov received a telegram today in which he reports that the Germans have made some concessions, but not as much as we wanted. However, given the situation, we apparently need to agree to these conditions. We are sending you a message now and waiting for your reply. Pyatakov has not yet passed on any other information of a political nature. Judging by all the reports, it is not so easy to push Germany against us, they have too many contradictions, today there was a message that even such a national socialist as Reventlov made a report stating that “Germany will not allow itself to be drawn into a speech against the USSR.
2) With regard to the Far East, we will firmly adhere to the directive that you have given, both in such a question as Blücher put it, and in other questions we will be strictly cautious. I can tell you that an agreement with the Japanese on fishing has been reached on the basis of the decisions made, even with some improvement for us, when the agreement is ready, I will send it to you. There is no particular news from Japan, only here they are constantly reporting the arrival of a representative of the Franco-Asiatic Bank in Manchuria and linking the question of a loan with the question of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Shouldn't this be published? It will not bring us harm, but it will expose some combinations. There is also information that the Nanjing government is intensively preparing for a speech on the establishment of normal diplomatic relations with us, but something is being feared for a long time.
3) Now I want to tell you in detail about consumer goods. Despite the fact that the people's commissars themselves and their closest deputies swear that they understand the seriousness of the situation and are trying to comply with the decision of the Central Committee, we observe great helplessness in practice. For example, they still did not have “an outline for the implementation of the program by quarters, as a result of which the II and III quarters of the they planned to be very easy, and the production of the main mass of goods with them by gravity remained in the fourth quarter. Now the commission has determined a plan for quarters, for example: for NKlegprom, we have determined for the 3rd quarter. 136 mil. against 53 in the II quarter, and in the IV quarter. gave a program of 97 mil. rub. But you rightly pointed out that this is not the point, first of all, but that the decision of the Central Committee on the withdrawal from non-market consumption for market consumption is carried out, and this is just being carried out very poorly, especially in relation to the countryside. We are now in my subcommittee listening to questions on individual products and associations. Some of the results of our pressure are evident, here are some figures. April has not yet made any progress in terms of a real increase in consumer goods on the market, on the contrary, the retail turnover amounted to only 97% of the March turnover, May has already made some progress. According to preliminary (incomplete) information, in May, industrial associations shipped to the wide market 10 most important goods per363 mil. ruble against 260 m[ln] in April, i.e. an increase of almost 40%, in particular, there is an increase in cotton fabrics, garments, cigarettes, fish, canned food, etc. But even more indicative is the increase in shipments to the general market in the ten days of May and the direct connection of shipments with pressure and the discovery of specific culprits. Thus, cotton [ato] paper [amount] fabrics were shipped for the first ten days of May by 9.1 mil. ruble, for the 2nd by 16.4 , for the 3rd by 33.8 . For shoes, 1250 t[ys] pairs were shipped in the 1st decade of May, 1743 t[s ] pairs in the 2nd decade , 2561 t[ s ] pairs in the 3rd decade] steam. But the main increase in consumer goods to the market should be in June and in the 3rd and 4th quarters, so you are absolutely right that you need to press all the way, what is called not to give life, especially since there is still a percentage of the fulfillment of quarters, the shipment plan for non -market consumers is higher than the % of shipments completed for the general market.
The situation is especially bad with the implementation of the PB directives on increasing the import of manufactured goods to the village by 604 million [million] rubles, unfortunately, until June there was no accurate accounting of the import to the village, since the goods that went through the bases and not planned goods were not taken into account - whether they go to the rural or urban trade network. Now we have established such reporting. According to the information now available, not only has nothing been shipped from the additional plan of 604 million, but the basic plan established for the countryside for 1932, 1,500 million, has not been carried out either. ruble (in industry selling prices]). According to the 10 manufactured goods (excluding cotton fabrics), for 2 months April-May, goods worth 598 million were shipped. rubles, of which 240 mil. rub. to the city, 152 commercial funds (i.e., also in the vast majority to the city) and 206mil. rub. to the village, but of these 206 mil. a significant part went through targeted deliveries (gold, furs, timber rafting, poutine, etc.) (by the way, all these goods were taken into account as deliveries to the village, now, from June 1, targeted deliveries are highlighted separately). Until now, the Tsentrosoyuz has not fought to obtain goods for the market, and especially for the countryside. The Tsentrosoyuz is completely cut off from the rural network. We are thinking of starting to pull out separate trade associations of Tsentrosoyuz on the commission. What can be done, if desired, for the village a lot, shows the example of the Moscow region: for three quarters - the IVth quarter. 31 years old, 1st, 2nd quarter In 1932, goods worth 14 million 153 thousand rubles were shipped to the village. (at sale prices), and now we ship goods worth 19.2 mil. rub. at selling prices, and at rural prices it will be 30 mil. rub., i.e. more than three blocks, rummaged and found, cut, of course, in some areas of the city We allocated another 7 mil. rub. for trade in bazaars with collective farms in the industrial cities of the region. Unfortunately, people's commissariats manage to turn more difficult than in the region. At the same time, it is necessary to press in every possible way on the implementation of the main production program, otherwise all the cuts will be smeared. I think something can be done.
4) Yesterday we discussed the issue of granting enterprises the right to sell products produced in excess of the plan, they did not take a decision, they instructed the people's commissars to work on the issue, and then report back. I beg you to write to what extent we can go here. Of course, we mustn’t explain our enterprises, but it seems to me that if we were to add an incentive to the Central Committee’s pressure on the shipment of goods to the market, allowing part of the production to be put on the market, then we would more easily and quickly increase the mass of commodities on the market. This is especially true for the handicraft industry. Having become more familiar with the kust-industrial cooperation, I see that they work even worse than the people's commissariat, in the sense of exceptional centralization, and we are now working on the organizational issues of the kust-promcooperation, starting with the artel. Seems, that it is necessary to create sectoral handicraft-cooperative associations instead of a comprehensive universal system, keep the associations of all handicraftsmen as a regulatory and organizational center, and transfer production management to branch ones. When we work out the issue, I will write to you.
At this PB, we discussed a draft decree, approved by the Council of People's Commissars, on the work of commercial cooperation in areas of complete collectivization, but since it does not resolve the issue as a whole, we decided to discuss at the next meeting the issue of the entire structure of handicraft cooperation, including this one. question 1 .
5) We listened to a number of transport issues at this PB. We especially focused on the question of the rolling stock. That the situation is difficult, you know from Blagonravov's note, but he wrote mainly about Ukraine, and on the whole the situation is even worse. The situation with the wagons is no less acute now than with the locomotive at the time of the meeting in the Central Committee. Despite this, there is some complacency in the apparatus of the NKPS, and they have not yet launched a fight against the depersonalization of the car, for its repair, for the organization of repair points, etc. in practice. At the PB and the NKPS, Rudzutak introduced several general points stating what was bad and that the matter should be corrected altogether. We did not accept these proposals and instructed Andreev to work out specific operational measures and submit them to the PB (where, when to organize repair points, how many and in what time to pass cars through inspection and repair, etc.2 .
6) We also heard about garden MTS (in order to fulfill your order). There have been proposals to create 30 MTS, but this will cover too few working areas. We accepted 100 districts and one of these days we will finalize 3 .
7) With sowing, it seems to me that we will certainly make it to last year's area. On June 5, 82,435,000 ha, or 80.5%, were sown, but there are areas in Siberia where very little has been sown, then vegetable gardens, flax, corn, and so on. still ahead. Of course, what is lost in wheat and oats cannot be returned, but this area will be blocked by other crops. The North Caucasus and the Lower Volga begin to lag far behind towards the end. Apparently, the Central Committee will have to send them a "welcome" telegram. I sent you a telegram about beets, I'm waiting for an answer.
8) We issued a directive in the spirit of your telegram regarding negotiations with the oil workers, canceled the previous decision and suggested to Rozengolyg to probe the possibility of resuming the negotiations. Judging by the telegrams, they will go to the resumption of negotiations.
9) Our Germans asked to postpone the ECCI plenum until August 15, in view of the events in Germany. Some in the ECCI Secretariat were against this (Manuilsky, Knorin). After discussing it at the PB, we came out in favor of satisfying the request of the comrades from the German Central Committee .
10) I wanted to write to you about the affairs of the Currency Commission, but I’ll put it off until the next letter, otherwise the letter dragged on anyway. I'll just let you know that yesterday we rejected the request of NKTyazhprom to exempt Soyuzlesgyazhprom from additional timber exports 5 .
11) I gave the corresponding instructions to Pravda. Well hello to you, comrade Stalin. Your L. Kaganovich.
____________________
On June 8, 1932, the PB decided to hear the report of the Kust-Industrial Cooperation at its meeting on June 16, putting this issue one of the first on the agenda (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 887. L. 6).
2On June 8, 1932, the PB discussed the issue “On the improvement of the rail car fleet. on the basis of the exchange of opinions, to instruct the NKPS (comrade Andreev), to develop an operational plan for the complete elimination of the depersonalization of cars and setting up the inspection and repair of cars at the proper height, including the organization of repair points (places of organization , quantity, completion dates, dispatch of members of the NKPS collegium to places for organizing repair points, etc.) ”(Ibid. D. 887. L. 2). On July 10, the PB approved a draft resolution submitted by A.A. Andreev, which stated that the Central Committee considers the progress in the implementation of the program for the production of freight cars at the factories to be completely unsatisfactory (fulfillment by 21%). The PB suggested that the NKTP immediately take measures to strengthen the work of the factories and ensure the specified program for the production of cars,
3 The issue "On garden MTS" was considered at a meeting of the PB on June 1, 1932. The PB instructed Ya.A. Yakovlev to submit a draft proposal. On June 8, the PB considered the project presented by Yakovlev and recognized the need to organize garden MTS around large industrial areas to ensure the supply of workers with vegetables. It was decided to organize at least 100 garden MTSs before October 1, 1932, 50 no later than September 1, and the rest by October 1. The commission, led by Postyshev, was instructed to determine the list of districts (Moscow, Leningrad, Tula, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Ural, Donbass, etc.), as well as to consider organizational issues (Ibid. D. 887. L. 3). The proposal of the commission was accepted on June 23, 1932 (Ibid. D. 889. L. 27)
4 PB adopted this decision on June 8, 1932 (Ibid. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 12. L. 171).
On June 8, 1932, the PB confirmed the decision to urgently export an additional 8,000 standards (Ibid.).
Stalin to Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich [June 10, 1932]Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 38–41. Handwritten text.
Tov. Stalin. 1
The situation in Mongolia has deteriorated sharply in recent days. On May 30, the entire garrison of Tsetserlik, consisting of 1,195 people with 500 rifles, rebelled, liquidated power, and released 400 arrested rebels. They were joined by posts outside the city consisting of 70 people. A detachment of 100 people from the Urga garrison was sent by car from Urga. There are 100 personnel left in Urga, whose loyalty cannot be fully relied upon, the rest of the variables are simply unreliable. The detachments suppressing the uprisings are extremely tired, and there is no reason to count on a quick liquidation of the uprising. In the Kosogolsky district, the uprising threatens to resume. The lamas from the rebellious regions have dispersed throughout eastern Mongolia for agitation, so one must expect outbreaks of rebellion in new regions, especially in the eastern regions. From a party organization of 4,000 people, 200-300 people can be assembled, and even then they are not very suitable for military affairs. Okhtin believes that without our help they will not be able to cope with the uprising with the available forces. The most dangerous situation is in Urga, which we may lose without prompt help from our side.
The Mongolian commission of Voroshilov, in connection with the situation that had arisen, adopted a number of decisions of an economic and military nature .
We ask for your opinion on the following two questions.
1. Transfer to Ulaanbaatar at the disposal of the Mongolian government 500 people of the Mongol-Buryat cavalry division, reinforced by our 300 people.
2. In addition, send one of our cavalry divisions, stationed in Troitsko-Savsk, consisting of 750 people to protect military property, government and other institutions.
_____________________
1 At the bottom of the litter: "Received 10.VI.32".
2 The Mongolian PB Commission was established on March 16, 1932 "to resolve all issues relating to Mongolia." It included Voroshilov, Karakhan, Postyshev, Eliava, later S.E. Chutskaev was included in it (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 12. L. 20).
Stalin to Kaganovich [earlier June 12, 1932]Archive: RGASPI F. 558 Op. 11. D. 77. L. 42–45. Autograph.
Moscow. CC ON.
Poskrebyshev.
For Molotov. Voroshilov. Kaganovich
First. I received a code letter about Mongolia. The last telegrams reported successes, so such an unexpected and sharp deterioration is incomprehensible. Either the telegrams about the successes were wrong and their authors misled us, or Okhtin's current report is not entirely correct and deliberately exaggerates in order to draw us into a risky business.
Second. The role of our military representative Comrade Shcheko is also incomprehensible. Where is he, what is he doing, what is his work and why does he not inform us? Who is in charge and who, according to the rule, should be in charge of operations against the rebels - Okhtin, the Chekists or Shcheko? Isn't it time for the Mongolian Commission of the Central Committee to look into this important issue? If Shcheko is no good, isn't it time to replace him with a more experienced military representative?
Third. I consider it risky to send our troops to Mongolia on the basis of information from Okhtin, a man inexperienced both politically and, especially, militarily. Mongolia and Buryat-Mongolia are not the same. A hasty and insufficiently prepared decision in this matter could unleash a conflict with Japan and provide a basis for a united front of Japan, China, and Mongolia against the USSR. It would be wrong to think that the events in Mongolia will remain a secret to the outside world. The Mongols themselves, the Chinese, the Japanese, and the European press will shout about them. We will be portrayed as occupiers fighting against the rebellious Mongolian people, and the Japanese and Chinese as liberators. I am afraid that the current situation in Mongolia may impose on our troops an uncharacteristic role of occupiers going against the majority of the population. It seems to me, that it is now too late to start with military suppression. The formula “first suppress, and then change the political course” is now inappropriate. The matter must begin with a change in political course. This act must be done by the Mongolian government. Only such an act can create a turning point, split the rebels and return the lost political base to the Mongolian government. After such a political step, it will not be difficult to isolate and suppress the extreme counter-revolutionaries. With this combination, the help of our well-camouflaged troops can be squandered at the same time and in an imperceptible way. split the rebels and return the lost political base to the Mongolian government. After such a political step, it will not be difficult to isolate and suppress the extreme counter-revolutionaries. With this combination, the help of our well-camouflaged troops can be squandered at the same time and in an imperceptible way. split the rebels and return the lost political base to the Mongolian government. After such a political step, it will not be difficult to isolate and suppress the extreme counter-revolutionaries. With this combination, the help of our well-camouflaged troops can be squandered at the same time and in an imperceptible way.
Fourth. I advise you to immediately and in the most secret manner take out of Mongolia to the USSR all and any documents, encryption, protocols, papers, testifying to the work of Soviet people and representatives of the USSR in Mongolia. This is absolutely necessary under all conditions.
Stalin.
Molotov, Kaganovich to Stalin June 12, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 100. L. 142–145. Autograph.
Hello, Comrade Kaganovich!
1) I received a letter from the 7th. We must not recognize de jure the Manchu[ur] state. By insisting on our recognition, the Japanese are counting on quarreling us with China or Manchuria: if we recognize Manchuria, we will quarrel with China; if we refuse to recognize, we will quarrel with the Manchu [ur] government. This is how the Japanese reason with their shallow, albeit cunning mind. But this game does not shine with great intelligence. If recognition is so necessary and reasonable, why are the Japanese themselves in no hurry to recognize their own brainchild? We must answer the Japanese that we are studying the issue of formal recognition, as well as the question of why the Japanese themselves are in no hurry to recognize the Manchu state. As for the study of questions, which study, unfortunately, is somewhat hampered by the vacation of members of the CEC session, without which the issue of recognition cannot be resolved, we will inform the Japanese about the results. This must be reported not only to Hayashi, but also - at the same time and without fail - to the Manchus themselves. In order to reassure the Japanese and the Manchus, we must simultaneously tell them that we have never rejected de jure recognition in principle , and we do not reject de jure recognition, but that in practice such questions cannot be resolved at one blow and need to be studied. That this is true is evident from the fact that we have agreed to receive consuls from the Manchurian government, have not allowed Lytton 1 to Ma, and are pursuing a line of strict neutrality etc. like this 2.
2) PB apparently does not take into account the great changes that have recently taken place in the international] world. The most important of these changes is that the influence of the USA began to decline both in China - in favor of Japan , and in Europe (especially after Von Papen came to power) - in favor of France . This is a very important circumstance. In this regard, the USA will seek ties with the USSR. And they are already looking for them. One of the proofs is the arrival of Lancaster, a representative of one of the strongest banks in America. Take note of this new circumstance.
Hello. I. Stalin. 3
____________________
1 Commission under the chairmanship of Lord Lytton (Great Britain), established by the Council of the League of Nations in December 1931, was charged "to make an examination on the spot and report to the Council on all circumstances which, affecting international relations, threaten to disturb the peace between China and Japan." In February-July 1932, the commission visited Japan, China, and Manchuria. The report of the commission, published on October 1, 1932, contained a plan for the "autonomy" of Manchuria, the recognition of Japan's "special interests" and the establishment of the principle of "open doors" (DVP. T. XV. C. 734-736).
2On June 16, 1932, the PB instructed M.M. Slavutsky to give Ohashi the following answer: “The Sovpra is currently studying the issue of formal recognition of Manchzhugo, and also, in connection with this, the fact of non-recognition of Manchzhugo by Japan. As for the study of the question, which study, unfortunately, is hampered by the fact that members of the CEC go on vacation in the summer, without which decisions on this issue cannot be made, we will report on the results. The Sovpra has never, in principle, rejected and does not reject the de jure recognition of Manchuguo, but in practice such issues are not resolved immediately. That this is so is evident from the attitude of the Sovpra towards Manchuguo. Manchuguo can judge this by the policy of the Council of Ministers on the Chinese Eastern Railway, by the fact of our consent to the appointment of Manchurian consuls in the USSR and by our line of strict neutrality, which found expression, in particular, in relation to the Council of Ministers to the Lytton Commission, who wanted to go to Ma through Soviet territory. Slavutsky was instructed to simultaneously communicate this answer directly to the Manchus, and A.A. Troyanovsky - to the Japanese government (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 12. L. 180, 186). See also Document No. 122.
3 On the first sheet of the litter: “I read. Voroshilov" and signed by Kalinin, Mikoyan, Rudzutak and Postyshev.
Stalin - Molotov, Kaganovich June 12, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 54. Original. Typescript.
Encryption. In. No. 9.
Tov. Stalin.
1) It is known from reliable sources known to you that Nanjing has decided to restore relations with us. Nanking decided to enter into negotiations with us on the conclusion of a non-aggression pact. Nanjing believes that the restoration of diplomatic relations will take place through the signing of a non-aggression pact. An official of the Chinese delegation, Wang, who remained in Moscow, was instructed to find out the opinion of the Soviet government in the manner of "personal opinion, secretly and unofficially." Obviously, in pursuance of this instruction, Wang applied to the NKID to the head of the Far Eastern Department, Kozlovsky, with a request for admission.
2) We believe that the decision of Nanjing is mainly determined by fears of our rapprochement with Manchuguo. Restoring relations, and even by signing a non-aggression pact, will aim to make it difficult for us to establish the relations we need with Manchuguo. You can be sure that the Chinese will directly include in the non-aggression pact any clauses that directly bind us in our Manchu policy.
3) We consider it expedient that now Kozlovsky evade a meeting with Van, and send Van to an employee of the department who will offer Van, if he has any requests, to make them in writing.
Please let us know your opinion. HP 9.
Molotov, Kaganovich.
12/VI-32
Stalin to Kaganovich June 12, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 54. Autograph.
Moscow. CC ON. Poskrebyshev.
For Molotov. Kaganovich .
As regards the Nankingers' proposal for a non-aggression pact, I agree with you. If Wang makes a written offer, send a copy by telegraph 1 .
Stalin.
No. 18.
12/VI
16–25 2
___________________________
On June 16, the PB accepted the proposals of Molotov and Kaganovich, formulated by them in a telegram to Stalin (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 12. L. 180). In addition to this decision, on June 29, 1932, the PB allowed B.I. Kozlovsky to tell Wang, if he raised the issue of the pact and recognition, that, in his opinion, the Soviet government “would not object to the immediate restoration of relations without any conditions, after why the non-aggression pact will come as a natural result of the restoration of relations” (Ibid. D. 13. L. 4).
2 Number, time and date entered by the secretary. On the same day sent in code from Sochi at 18:00. 50 min. (Ibid. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 53).
Stalin to Kaganovich [June 12, 1932]Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 57. Autograph.
Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU. Poskrebyshev.
For Kaganovich and other members of the PB.
I submit four proposals to the Politburo:
First, to oblige Pravda to print daily reports on the production of cars at the AMO and the Nizhny Novgorod Automobile Plant.
Secondly, to oblige Pravda to print daily reports on the production of tractors at the Stalingrad and Kharkov Tractor Plants and not be afraid that the Kharkov Tractor Plant, for obvious reasons, will at first produce less than a hundred pieces a day.
Thirdly, to oblige Pravda to systematically attack the management of our metallurgical plants, which, despite the commissioning of new gigantic furnaces, have still not been able to raise the production of pig iron to twenty thousand tons per day.
Fourth, to oblige Pravda to take under systematic fire the enterprises of Narkomles and Narkomsnab, which, despite the huge expenditures of state funds, are still marking time 1 .
Stalin.
#17
12/VI. 32
15–10 2
______________________
On June 13, 1932, the text of this telegram from Stalin was formalized as a decision of the PB (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 888. L. 12). Reports of the daily production of cars and tractors began to be published in Pravda on June 15.
2 Number, date and time entered by the secretary. On the same day sent in code from Sochi at 18:00. 50 min. (Ibid. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 56).
Kaganovich to Stalin June 12 [1932]Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 100. L. 120–124. Autograph.
Hello, Comrade Kaganovich !
1) Why aren't daily reports on AMO and Avtozavod published? Who do you spare, the bureaucrats? Are the interests of the bureaucrats superior to the interests of the cause? Lived up to such a shame ...
2) Why did the production of tractors at the Stalingrad Tractor Plant fall ? Received the Order of Lenin and calmed down? And the Central Committee can tolerate such disgrace!... 1
3) How is the situation with the implementation of the plan for the production of tanks, airplanes and engines for them, tank and anti-tank guns? May plan fulfilled or not? What are the prospects for the June plan?
4) When does he think of convening a plenum of the Central Committee? It would be good to convene by August 1-2.
5) I have just received your letter dated 9/VI. I answer:
a) Consumer goods. According to the decision of the Central Committee, we must have not only quarterly, but also monthly plans for deliveries for the market - this is, firstly, and then secondly, we must ship a certain percentage of the total amount of products for the market (and the countryside), and give only the rest non-market consumers 2 . Where did these decisions go? Why are they not fulfilled? If you really seek the truth, write to me - how much%% of all products in well-known industries is given to the market ( by months !), Or should be given to the market (by months!) and how much to non-market consumers. Come on, try it!
6) As for the Centrosoyuz, there is nothing to refer to its weakness: its weakness is a well-known thing. The PB Commission on Consumer Goods was set up in order for you and Postyshev to lead the Centrosoyuz . This is the purpose of the commission. From now on, the reference to the weakness of the Centrosoyuz will (should!) be regarded as the weakness of Kaganovich and Postyshev. The next task is to send a maximum of consumer goods to the grain, sugar (beet) and cotton regions in May, June and July, in the expectation that the goods will be in place already in July and August .. If this is not done, then the commission deserves to be buried alive. Well, that's all for now.
Hello. I. Stalin.
__________________________
1On April 23, 1932, on the initiative of Stalin, the PB decided to enter the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR with a proposal to award the Order of Lenin to the Stalingrad Tractor Plant (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 881. L. 1, 16). In May 1932, the production of tractors in the USSR fell to 1697 compared to 2997 in April and was not restored to its previous level for several months (although in total 28882 tractors were produced in 1932 compared to 17536 in 1931) (NT Dodge. Trends in Labor Productivity in the Soviet Tractor Industry: A Case Study in Industrial Development. Ph.D. dissertation. Harvard University, 1960. P. 608–614). On September 16, 1932, on the initiative of Stalin, the PB made a decision: “To propose to Comrade Ordzhonikidze to report to the Central Committee within 2 days what is happening at the STZ, why it is working abnormally and what needs to be done in order to in order to urgently establish normal production ”(RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 900. L. 2). In the newspaper "For Industrialization" (October 17, 1932), this fall was explained by the lack of metal and the need to repair worn-out equipment.
On February 10, 1932, the PB proposed drawing up a plan for the distribution of consumer goods for 1932 so that the share of the free market would be at least 80% of the gross output of these goods (Ibid. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 872. L .6). In the future, the issue of drawing up plans for the supply of consumer goods and the distribution of goods between the free market and state consumers was repeatedly considered by the PB.
On May 8, 1932, the PB, at Stalin's suggestion, formed a commission to verify the implementation of decisions of the central institutions on consumer goods, which included Molotov, Stalin, Kaganovich, Postyshev, Rudzutak and Yagoda (Ibid. D. 883. L. 1).
Kaganovich to Stalin June 13, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 740. L. 37–42. Autograph.
12/V1
Hello Comrade Stalin!
Received your letter of the 7th yesterday and just received your follow-up letter today.
1) Tomorrow I will acquaint all members of the PB with your proposals on the issue of recognizing the Manchurian government and we will accept a directive to our diplomatic representatives in accordance with your instructions. It is absolutely indisputable that it is not expedient for us now to go further than what we have already done. The only question that can arise is that since we know that Saito is not particularly sympathetic to our recognition of Manchugo, should we not, before our answer to Ohashi and the Manchus, ask Troyanovsky in a conversation with Saito how he views this matter. If necessary, we will request you tomorrow in encryption to receive a telegraphic answer. In connection with this question, I wanted to ask your opinion on how we should deal with Znamensky? I remember you once said that it was inconvenient to remove him now, but Karakhan, when he made a proposal to remove Znamensky, cites serious facts, for example: Znamensky, despite the categorical prohibition to meet with Wellington-Ku, especially with Lytton, met with Wellington-Ku, with Lytton and members of his commission. Apparently, he wants to “create” some kind of “high” policy there, but he does not know how to conduct even a simple policy. Wouldn't it be better to take it off? This may also be useful diplomatically. We postponed Karakhan's proposal to remove it. Please tell me your opinion. We postponed Karakhan's proposal to remove it. Please tell me your opinion. We postponed Karakhan's proposal to remove it. Please tell me your opinion.
2) We inquired about Nanking yesterday by telegraph. The fact that they start with the question of a non-aggression pact without resuming diplomatic relations is hardly acceptable to us, especially since they will certainly demand the inclusion of a clause on Manchuria in the non-aggression pact. Then, as we know, they instructed a member of the Maud de Gouy delegation to sound out the mood and attitude towards their possible proposal in a private and secret manner. All this does not make a serious impression. It is possible that the Nanjing people here reflect the mood in America, but this is not yet known. In any case, it seems that we do not need to rush.
3) About America. I must admit that your reproach is correct. We really underestimated the significance of Lancaster's arrival and the general trend that is growing in America. This is especially evident in the light of the analysis of the change in the position of America which you gave in your letter. A number of new facts show that in America, of course, "the case for the recognition of the USSR is brewing or is already ripe." I am sending you a note from Radek and Andreichin about their conversations with Bulit, a rather prominent political figure in America, and the engineer Pop 1. The notes are very interesting and show that the same question of recognizing the USSR is being raised more and more realistically from different sides. Today we received a message that Cooper is organizing a trip to the USSR for 8 big business people (we don't know the names yet). Of course, we will now take into account all these circumstances, arrange a meeting for Lancaster with Kalmanovich, Pyatakov and Mezhlauk, your instructions will be the basis of conversations. But now the question is, is this enough? Shouldn't something be probed in America itself? Looking forward to your advice on this.
4) About oil. We organized coverage in Izvestia and Pravda. Neither Gubkin nor the other big ones were in Moscow, we contacted them and managed to get an exposition of Gubkin's speech at the Academy of Sciences. It turned out not bad, of course, today we already got an interview with Gubkin from Novo-Sibirsk, but we delayed printing for a day or two so as not to feed only Gubkin. Tomorrow, depending on how the incorres respond to these reports, we will issue a corresponding message to the foreign press through InoTASS. We must assume that the conference will take place soon.
5) I am sending you letters from Chubar and Petrovsky. Chubar's letter has a more businesslike and self-critical character; it does not contain such rottenness as there is in Petrovsky's letter. Petrovsky, from the very first lines, begins to shift the blame on the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, declaring that he "understood the need to fulfill the directives of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on grain procurements," as if they could not deliver all of them to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in a timely and honest manner. questions. He (Petrovsky) argues with those who tell the truth, that they were cut off from the village and did not know the state of affairs, but then he must admit that they hid the truth from the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and only then began to speak when the Central Committee from Moscow pointed out to them flagrant disgrace. In practice, his letter boils down to, firstly, preparing the ground for the abandonment of grain procurements this year, which is completely unacceptable, and secondly, Both he and Chubar raise the question of helping with bread for food needs. In this regard, they will have to be partially assisted, the only question is the size. I ask you to write your thoughts on this matter?2 Kosior does not write anything.
6) There is no new sowing yet, the report will be on the 14th, but, judging by some data, about 6 million hectares can be expected from this five-day period. In connection with the final calculation of the sown area, the question arises of amendments to the sowing of individual farmers. Last year and the year before last, additional corrections were expressed at 10–15%. This year we have the same facts that the individual farmer hides some of his crops. There are even such facts that the individual farmer sows at night in order to avoid counting his crops. I think that just like last year, it is possible to make an adjustment for the individual sector by the same 10-15%, which will be about 2 million hectares. I ask you to write your opinion.
7) To replace Okhtin, we will look for a candidate 3 . As soon as we find it, we'll let you know.
8) I gave appropriate instructions to Pravda, in a day or two we will issue this department of letters from workers and collective farmers, it will be wonderful.
9) As for the assessment of Demyanova's Fish Soup, I completely agree with you. I read both the new and the old thing, he made the new one even more rude and careless. In order to be a popular, proletarian writer, one does not at all require adapting to the negative aspects of our masses, as Demyan Bedny did. I am directly surprised how Voroshilov could be delighted with this thing, especially since Demyan has a lot of ambiguities in the play. Sholokhov, unfortunately, did not read.
Well, I'll end with this. How are you resting? How is your health? All the best, hello! Your L. Kaganovich.
_____________________
1 The note is missing.
2 No letters.
3 The new plenipotentiary in Mongolia, S.E. Chutskaev, was approved by the PB only on August 15, 1933 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 928. L. 5).
Kaganovich to Stalin June 13, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 58. Certified typewritten copy.
Strictly secret .
Copy .
Cipher.
Sochi - Stalin.
1) We have received your response telegram about the proposals of the Nanjing people, we will make an appropriate decision.
2) According to your second telegram today, the PB poll accepted your four proposals on assignments for Pravda. I will follow up on their implementation.
3) Your proposal for a department for letters from workers and collective farmers was also formalized by a resolution of the secretariat, proposing to Pravda to reduce the printing of feuilletons 1 . No. 10/s - 989/sh.
13/VI - 32 Kaganovich.
___________________
1 On June 13, 1932, CT accepted Stalin's proposal to organize in Pravda a department for letters from workers and collective farmers, reducing to a minimum the number of feuilletons printed on the pages of Pravda (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 114. D. 302. L . 13).Kaganovich to Stalin June 13, 1932
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 59. Certified typewritten copy.
Top secret.
Copy.
Cipher .
Sochi. Stalin.
Today, inkors describe new oil fields in detail. “Lions, Kincaid, Chamberlin emphasize the size of the new deposits and their favorable geographic location and note Ganshin's statement that the products of Baku and Grozny will be freed for export. Kincaid notes the importance in case of war of deposits located in the depths of the country and not under attack.
Today we are sending detailed information from TASS abroad. No. 11/s — 990/sh.
Kaganovich.
13/VI-32
Kaganovich to Stalin June 14 [1932]Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 740. L. 43–52. Autograph.
14/VI
Hello Comrade Stalin.
First of all, I want to inform you about the work on the currency.
1) The work of our commission proceeds along two lines, firstly, to ensure the fulfillment of the 1932 plan and, secondly, to develop the question and measures to ensure an exit in 1933.
As regards the first task, we examined the question of ensuring the export of timber according to the 1932 plan and took a number of operational measures 1 . We examined the question of the work of the gold industry and adopted a number of operational measures, especially to ensure both technical and food supplies.
Tomorrow we are gathering all suppliers to the Central Committee, i.e. economic organizations that are obliged to fulfill orders and contracts with the gold industry in order to convince people of the need for a serious attitude to the supply of the gold industry (of course, without disclosing unnecessary facts and figures) 2 .
Along the line of the 2nd task, i.e. 1933, the subcommittees are still working on the issue. Here, in the first place, it is necessary to reduce and partially delay the plan for imports in 1932, but the Rudzutak commission, instead of directly working on the reduction, limited itself to instructing Ordzhonikidze and Rozengolts to come to an agreement !! And, of course, they would have to wait a long time until they agreed. Therefore, in connection with the report of my subcommittee on the balance of payments, it was necessary to set limits in figures in order to make it easier for Rudzutak to cut imports. We decided: “To propose to Comrade Rudzutak's commission that payments in 1932 be limited to no more than 67 mil. (already established by the PB), including payments under the entire additional import plan for all special resolutions, including the purchase of bread for the DVK, and payments under the import] plan of 1932, falling on 1933, do not exceed 85 mil.
Of course, there were some disputes and “compliments”, but we insisted, and it was accepted.
From the attached tables of calculations of our debts and payments sent to you, you will see the main figures, we have carefully checked them and established them accurately, although even before them you accurately determined our deficit and difficulties.
Proceeding from the calculations of payments, we set the task for the subcommittees to develop and determine an export plan that would ensure foreign exchange earnings in 1933 of at least 620 mil. ruble, and in the 1st half of the year at least 290 mil. ruble Of course, these figures are compiled with some reserve, especially since Rozengolts still has some reserve for postponing payments and saving 40 million, but these last 40 million reserves than with a deficit, so far this is only a task for the subcommittees, and we will still consider specific plans.
2) In your letter I received today, you ask why reports are not printed. Now this case is already screwed up, and reports will be. The Pravdists explain that they were not published by the fact that the Avtozavod did not produce cars, but engines for combines, and the AMO produced intermittently, but they could successfully print both about the engines and about the intermittently produced trucks of the Stalin plant. Yesterday I had a very big conversation, if one can only call it a conversation, with Mekhlis and Popov, I scolded them both for not publishing reports and for their incorrect attitude towards the proposal to organize a department for letters from workers and collective farmers. They wrote in the form of a report to the Central Committee what they were doing to carry out this resolution, and in this report, at the beginning, they devote a whole page to the fact that they have printed letters up to now, both separately and in the presentation, etc., t .e. they wrote a clear lie. Using the live issues of Pravda as examples, I proved to them that they were replacing the letters of the workers and collective farmers with feuilletons by Ryklin, Agranovsky, Vasilkovsky and Koltsov. I ended up having a strong quarrel with Mekhlis and Popov, in general, I think that you would rather be complaining about me for no mercy than for mercy. In any case, I will consider your remark.
3) About the Stalingrad plant: it is now producing engines for combines, they produced 622 engines in the first ten days of June and 418 tractors, but this is below the program and you are right that the plant needs to be tightened up. Now they are going to put the plant on vacation from June 15, I doubted the expediency of starting it up now, but Sergo said that he agreed with you on this issue.
4) On the production of tanks, airplanes and engines for them, guns, etc. I will write to you in detail in my next letter. I received your letter in the evening and could not get exact information. Now I can say that according to the information I have, the program is running well.
5) About consumer goods: for the last two days I have almost sat on these questions, we were mainly considering the specific distribution of funds for the third quarter. We have now finished with cotton fabrics, what we have adopted is entirely consistent with your instructions in your last letter. We abruptly turned the goods to the village. It is already very late now, but next time I will write to you in detail with figures for industries, especially for cotton products.
6) I am sending you three documents received from Balitsky 3 .
7) Loan campaign is developing well 4 . Moscow has completed 100% today, the mood of the workers is not bad, in most factories the subscription is on the rise. At the Podolsk plant, one old worker spoke like this: “Here,” he says, “they are arguing here whether it is possible to win or not, but I’ll ask you, I have 2 sons, both are already engineers, that I won or not. Of course I already won." These words express the full force of the conviction of the proletarians in the rightness of our cause, of our measures.
Well, I'll end with this. Shake your hand. Your L. Kaganovich.
PS 1) Over the last five days, 5 million [million] 300 [thous. ha] total 87 million | million] 717 thousand [thousand], less than last year for the same period by 1 million [mln] 900 thousand [thousand]. MTS almost finished sowing. Now we need to press on technical and horticultural crops.
2) The places are pushing hard on the question of bread, we refuse the vast majority. Chubar also came for bread, we have not decided anything yet, we have given only 50 thousand [thousand | pounds. They are asking for 1.5 million, of course we have no way to give them that much, but we will have to help, especially for the sugar beet regions. I beg you to let me know your opinion on this matter, how much you can give them.
Now we are preparing the issue of ensuring the successful implementation of the harvesting campaign.
Hello. L. Kaganovich.
_______________________
1 On June 16, the PB approved a decision on the implementation of the export plan for logging in 1932 and adopted a resolution submitted by the PB commission on foreign exchange reserves (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 888. L. 1, 18–22).
On June 16, the PB considered a package of issues related to the work of the gold industry and approved the corresponding resolution (Ibid. L. 10, 38–46).
3 Documents missing.
On May 16, 1932, the PB approved the issuance of a new mass loan for 1932 for a total of 3,200 million rubles. (Ibid. Op. 3. D. 884. L. 5).
Stalin to Kaganovich June 15, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 99. L. 62–63. Autograph.
15/VI 32
Hello, Comrade Kaganovich!
Letter dated 12/VI received.
1) A formal recall of Znamensky is inappropriate. He must be summoned (immediately) for a personal report , talk to him in detail, and then resolve the issue one way or another .
2) Of all the conversations, "negotiations", "messages" and "statements" about Soviet-American relations, the most interesting phenomenon must be considered the appearance of Lancaster, his desire to clarify the terms of the loan and the procedure for repaying the bank's claims. Let Mezhlauk, Pyatakov and Kalmanovich talk to him in detail.
As for Pop, Bulit and others, you also need to be affectionate with them (remember the Ukrainian: “be affectionate”!) And attentive. The reference of these gentlemen to the "Comintern" must be dismissed by reference to such facts as the existence of diplomatic relations with France, Germany, England, Japan, telling them about the feeling of annoyance that the Soviet people experience when they see that the Germans, the British, the French , the Japanese have long understood the difference between the Comintern and the Soviet government, and the Americans have not yet matured to such an understanding.
I think that our people should not be sent to the USA for the time being to “probe”.
3) As for the noise about oil, you did well. Be sure to add to the new sources of oil in the East named in Pravda one more source - Yakutia. I am sending you a corresponding message from the Organizing Department of the Central Committee about oil in Yakutia. I think that Starovatov's instructions are not without foundation . In addition to the noise about oil, it seems to me that oil in Yakutia (and there is oil there) is a direct boon for us, a valuable find. Pay serious attention to this matter 2 .
4) They did not like the letters of Chubar and Petrovsky. The first breeds "self-criticism" - in order to get new millions of poods of grain from Moscow, the second plays the saint who sacrificed himself to the "directive of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party" - in order to achieve a reduction in the grain procurement plan . Neither is acceptable. Chubar is mistaken if he thinks that self-criticism is needed not to mobilize the forces and means of Ukraine, but to receive “help” from outside. In my opinion, Ukraine has been given more than it should. There is no need to give more bread and nowhere. The worst thing about this case is Kosior's silence. How to explain this silence. Does he know about Chubar-Petrovsky's letters? 3
5) I think that no corrections should be made to the sowing reports on the line of individuals. That will be better . If you and Molotov insist on amendments, then they can be given as a last resort, but not in the amount of 10-15%, but a maximum of 5-8% .
Greetings! I. Stalin.
__________________________
1 In 1930–1932 The Central Control Commission conducted an investigation in connection with a collective statement received by a group of communists working in Mukden. In November 1932 A.A. Znamensky returned to Moscow. At the beginning of 1933, the Central Control Commission issued a severe reprimand to Znamensky, forbidding him to work abroad.
2 June 12, 1932 Pravda published the material “Sterlitamak is a new world oil region. The vast majority of oil products of Baku, Grozny, Maikop - for export", which reported on the opening of a new "richest oil base" in Bashkiria and the possibility in connection with this to send reserves of southern regions (Azerbaijan, the North Caucasus), located close to ports, export. In the following days, messages about the forced development of new deposits were published almost every day. After Stalin's letter, on June 20, Pravda published an editorial, where they reported new addresses of deposits, including Yakut oil. On June 21, Pravda published an extensive article “Oil in Yakutia”.
On June 16, 1932, the PB considered the application of V.Ya. 70,000 poods of grain for sugar beet state farms for food needs and 230,000 poods of bread for collective farms in sugar beet regions of Ukraine for food needs (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 12. L. 180–181). On June 17, 1932, the PB of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine decided: “Send the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks vols. Kaganovich and Molotov the following telegram:
“Chubar, on behalf of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, filed a petition [for] the release of food aid to Ukraine for regions that are [in] a difficult situation. We urgently ask for another 600,000 poods [of bread] in addition to the 220,000 additional food aid allocated for beet processing, as well as additional food aid.” On June 21, a telegram signed by Stalin and Molotov was sent to the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine and the government of the republic about the need to ensure "by all means" the plan for grain deliveries in July-September. On June 23, in response to a telegram from S.V. Kosior on assistance, the PB adopted a resolution: “To be limited to the already adopted decisions of the Central Committee and not to produce additional delivery of bread to Ukraine” (Famine of 1932–1933 for Ukraine Kyiv. 1990, pp. 183, 186– 187, 190).
4 On June 21, 1932, Pravda published a summary of the NKZ on the progress of sowing spring crops on June 15, 1932. It indicated that the sowing of individual farmers made up 74.2% of the plan, while in the collective farms it was 93.2%.
Kaganovich to Stalin June 16 [1932]Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 740. L. 53–63. Autograph.
16/VI
Hello, dear Comrade Stalin!
1) First of all, I give you a report on consumer goods. I must preliminarily note that the lack of attention to this issue was also expressed in the fact that the accounting was set up ugly and it took a lot of pressure to obtain more or less tolerable data on 12 manufactured goods. I'll start with a) cotton fabrics. (We have specially considered this issue with particular specificity.)
The program presented by the People's Commissariat of Light Industry for the third quarter amounted to 311 million rubles against 336 million [million rubles] in the second quarter (all in selling prices). We believe that every effort should be made to mobilize cotton and cotton resources in order to prevent reductions. The issue of an exchange operation with foreign cotton is also being discussed, but we have not finally resolved the issue, we will ask you.
But the main thing is the use of cotton fabrics. In this regard, we have taken drastic measures. First of all, with regard to the remaining 15 days of the 2nd quarter, we proposed to ship everything to the village until the quarterly plan of 64 million rubles is shipped, i.e. to shipped for April-May 15 mil. give for 15 days of June for 49 mil. ruble cotton] paper (important] fabrics, in addition, at least 50%, that is, at least 15 million rubles, should be shipped from commercial funds to the village in June.
For the third quarter, we have set the following plan for the use of cotton fabrics: for off-market consumption - 129. mil. rub. in the III quarter against 177 in the II quarter; of these 129 mil. R. 87 mil. R. (We consciously decided to reduce the clothing industry from 120 million rubles in the second quarter to 87 million rubles in the third quarter in order to move more manufactory to the countryside). Of these, for special orders of the military department, instead of 18 m.r. in the II quarter. - 12 m. in the III quarter; industrial consumption instead of 10 m in the II quarter, 8 m in the III quarter, etc. To the market 206 m. in the III quarter. against 159 meters in the II quarter; Of these 206 m., 170 m. 82% of the total market fund and 50.6% of the total commodity fund.
In order to achieve a sharp turnaround, in July we decided to send the entire market fund for cotton fabrics only to the countryside, which would amount to 57 million rubles.
Last night we reviewed the entire distribution plan for all the other 11 items, and as a result, we determined the following plan.
b) Threads - from 20 mil. ruble for off-market consumption 4.5 mil. rub. in the III quarter. against 9 mil. in the II quarter; to the market - 15 m. vs. 11 m. rub. in the II quarter. From 15 m. - to the village 9.9 m.
c) Woolen fabrics - plan for commercial production 105 m. in the III quarter. against 77.8 m. rub. in the II quarter; of which - for non-traditional consumption (including the main one - the clothing industry) 56.7 m.r. in the III quarter. against 72.8 m. in the II quarter; on the market 48.3 m. in the III quarter. against 5 m.r. in the II quarter. , and from 48.3 m. - 37.8 m. to the village, i.e. 87% of the market output goes to the countryside.
d) Shawls - a plan for marketable products in the III quarter. 22.4 m. against 19.2 m. in the II quarter; of them, nothing is used for off-market consumption, and almost all (with the exception of 1 mil. for targeted delivery) goes to the countryside.
e) Garments - a plan for marketable products in the III quarter. 306 m against 357 m. in the II quarter; of which - for non-traditional consumption 6.6 m.r. in the III quarter. against 7.5 m. in the II quarter; for a market 300 m.r. in the III quarter, of which 129 m. to the countryside (the reduction in the clothing industry due to the reduction in the supply of cotton fabrics has not yet been precisely established).
f) Footwear - plan for marketable products 219 m. in the III quarter. against 169 m. in the II quarter; of which - for off-market consumption 13.9 million rubles. in the III quarter; to the market 206 rub. in the III quarter. against 157.1 m. in the II quarter. Of these, 109 million rubles for the village, i.e. 50% of the total commercial output and 69% of the market.
g) Rubber shoes (overshoes) - marketable output plan 78.7 m. against 55.7 m. rub. in the nth quarter; of which - for off-market consumption 4.7 m.r. in Sh-m sq. against 6 m. in the II quarter; to the market 74 m. in Sh-m sq. against 49.7 m. in N-m sq. Of these, 29 m.
h) Makhorka - plan for marketable products 27.4 m. against 30.9 m. in the 1st quarter; of which we don’t give anything for off-market consumption, 58% for the village - 16 mil. rub.
i) Laundry soap - plan 31 m. against 38 m. in the 1st quarter; of which 28 m. rub. for the market, and 14 m. rub. for the village, i.e. 50% market output.
j ) Toilet soap - plan for production in the 3rd quarter. 7 m. against 22 m. in N-m sq. (not enough fat); of which - nothing for non-traditional consumption, and 2 million rubles for the village.
k) Knitwear - a plan of commercial products 145.8 m. in Sh sq. against 112.9 m. rub. in the 1st quarter; of which - for non-traditional consumption 5.5 m.r. in Sh-m sq. against 7.1 million rubles in I-m sq.; to the market 140.3 m. in the Sh-m sq., of which 62.3 m.
l ) Cigarettes - plan for marketable products 199.2 m. in Sh sq. against 174 m. in the 1st quarter; of which - for non-traditional consumption 1 m. rub., for the market 198 m. rub. against 173.8 m. in the II quarter. Of these, 61.1 m.
Of this total marketable output of about 1.5 billion rubles, the non-market fund is 226.9 m.r.
From the market fund in 1m [bln] 300 million rubles. 340 million is a commercial fund, of which 130 million rubles. goes to the village, 176 million rubles. to the city, and the remaining 33 million rubles. for designated purposes (timber, gold, furs, poutine). In addition to these commercial, 500 million rubles are spent on the village. goods against shipped in the II quarter. RUB 192 million In addition, 117 million rubles goes to the countryside for special purposes (cotton, beets, tobacco). Here we had disputes over the reduction of these target deliveries, and this figure was obtained as a result of the reduction.
Thus, in comparison with the plan of the II quarter. we have an increase in the market as a whole by 18%, and compared with the actual shipment of the 1st quarter. by 62% . In the village (together with commercial ones), we have an increase compared to the II quarter. by 162%, and compared to the actual shipment 3.5 times more.
Unfortunately, for a number of other goods, we could not examine specifically because there is not even an accurate account, so far they have not even been in the field of distribution. These are such goods as: metal products, silicates, haberdashery, wooden products, furriery and leather products, etc. Even for such large goods as salt, kerosene, matches, etc. there is no exact accounting and use plan.
We gave the task to urgently draw up at least an approximate plan so that the interests of the village could be ensured.
In addition, there is still the distribution of such foodstuffs as herrings, confectionery, vegetable oil, sugar, etc.
For these goods, we will have to consider a plan in the coming days and provide an increase for the village. But the most important thing, Comrade Stalin, is to ensure the fulfillment of this plan - what you are constantly emphasizing is that these goods really get to the countryside no later than July-August and, finally, that these goods be sent to the regional bases and districts valid for collective farmers and peasants. Postyshev is now taking on this task specifically. We are now sending 50 major workers to the regions and bases to check on the spot and ensure the implementation of our decisions. We have now divided all the work of the subcommission into groups of goods, attracted a number of new people and will push this matter forward, but I must tell you frankly, Comrade Stalin, that I did not expect to meet such slowness and even helplessness of the Soviet apparatus in carrying out such an important political directive of the Central Committee. People are sitting in people's commissariats, a special Committee of Funds has been created, it has a number of responsible workers, but there is no real case to take and turn around. Therefore, what the existing bodies should have done, the Central Committee has to do. It would be necessary to think about improving the work of these organs1 .
2) Now on the question of how things stand with regard to the implementation of the program for airplanes, tanks, engines, etc. The entire aircraft program for five months is 1000 pieces. Completed 957, i.e. 96%. For May, the program was 264, 225 pieces were completed, i.e. 85%. In five months, 426 scouts were produced against the plan of 400, i.e. 106%. The fulfillment of the June plan will be no worse than the May one. May program 90, 100 completed. The situation is worse with fighters. The program for five months is 116 aircraft, and 58 have been completed, i.e. 50%. Program for May 46, completed on 22. They explain that the new designs have not yet taken root in production, but this needs to be checked, which I will do in the coming days. For TB-3, a five-month program of 30 aircraft has been completed. 31 were produced, but, unfortunately, only 5 pieces were handed over. 26 finished aircraft cannot be handed over due to poor design of the radiator (it leaks) and due to lack of weapons. Little was done with weapons, although at one time both the Tyazhprom and the military denied this at the Defense Commission, when this issue was raised. Now, for the production of weapons (bomb racks, etc.), the Moscow Aviation Plant No. 20 is attached.
The motors are doing better. In 5 months, 1970 engines were produced against the 1777 program, i.e. 111%. The May program was completed by 97% - 398 engines, against the 410 plan. The new M-34 engine is almost ready to start mass production in July. This is good, it will only be necessary to ensure that mass production really goes.
For tanks , the situation is worse. Tank T-26 - May program 200 units, 69 completed. Christie - program 120, 30 completed - although not a single one has been delivered yet. May plan 250 for tankettes, 109 pieces were completed, while the Nizhny Novgorod plant did not produce a single machine. The mass production of armor and a number of other parts, such as magneto, etc., has not yet been established. Apparently, it will be necessary to hear a report in the Defense Commission. As for the production of tank and anti-tank guns , according to the incomplete information I have, out of the 37-mm guns produced so far, 200 pieces were produced in 5 months out of a program of 1000.
The 45 mm guns currently in service have not yet been released, and are expected to be released only in July.
I am sending you a note by Agranov 2 about the experimental work of Kurchevsky, in this note the inattentive attitude of the military department and the trust is revealed. Since I am not familiar enough with this case, I cannot judge how correct this note is in everything, but it deserves to be specially discussed on this issue at the Defense Commission, despite the fact that not everyone will like it.
3) We called comrades from the localities to the commission on beets . They made exaggerated demands on us. We cut them down. Developed a short, business resolution. According to the statement of all comrades from the field, it will be of great importance for stimulating the processing and harvesting of sugar beets. I am sending you this resolution 3 . I beg you, if you do not have major amendments, to communicate your opinion by telegraph in order to publish it as soon as possible.
4) As a result of the work of the commission on the harvesting campaign, we have so far adopted one part of the resolution on the material support of the harvesting campaign 4 , but in addition to this, a draft resolution of the Central Committee or the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars on the organization of the harvesting campaign 5 is now being worked out . Since this document will be of great importance, we will send it to you before acceptance. This year's harvest campaign will be especially difficult, especially in Ukraine. Unfortunately, Ukraine is not yet preparing for it at all, and there we are facing the danger of premature, spontaneous and unorganized harvesting and plundering of grain from the fields. We spoke to Chubar about this, but the point, of course, is not in Chubar, but in the timely mobilization of the entire organization, and Kosior is silent.
5) We discussed the question of the plenum of the Central Committee. The convocation of the plenum was scheduled for August 5. The order of the day was not finally established, we decided to consult with you. We have the following questions: 1) reports by the people's commissariats of light, heavy, timber, supply industries and the Central Union on expanding the production of consumer goods and on the development of Soviet collective farm trade, 2) a report by the People's Commissariat of Forests, 3) on ferrous metallurgy, 4) The questions were called the report of grain state farms and 5) on the grain procurement campaign. Of these 5 questions, three questions should be selected. I ask you to communicate your opinion either by telegraph or by letter.
6) At the PB we had a controversial question about the Petrovsky Plant: to build it or not. The PB found it necessary] to build 6 .
7) I am sending you a statement by a group of communist engineers from the Nizhny Novgorod Automobile Plant, in which they lay the foundation for the need to replace Dybets. Whether it is expedient, I doubt 7 .
8) We had another peculiar controversial issue at the PB, about the school of the Central Executive Committee. The People's Commissariat of Defense decided to reorganize this school, in essence, into a retraining school for command personnel, close to the military academy. Tov. Voroshilov at the PB even predetermined the need to connect with the military academy. We doubted the expediency of this reorganization, because then the meaning of the school in the Kremlin as a military force carrying guard duty, etc., is lost, because the new composition of students of a higher type will not be able and will not perform these functions. They will be just military students, and although they will be more verified personnel, there will be more communication with them from the outside world than at the current school, and so on.
Tov. Voroshilov said that the order had already been given to them. However, we postponed the issue until the next meeting, instructing the RVS to send out an additional certificate. Please let me know your thoughts on this matter. Well, this will end, otherwise it dragged on. Best wishes.
Your L. Kaganovich.
______________________
1 In March 1932, the Committee on Prices under the STO was transformed into the Committee for Commodity Funds and Trade Regulation under the STO, it included Molotov (chairman), Mikoyan, Kviring E.I., Khloplyankin M.I. and others. The tasks of the Committee were: determination of commodity funds for the urban and rural markets, for export, as well as for other designated purposes and approval, upon presentation by the People's Commissariat of Supply, of plans for the distribution of commodity funds among trading systems; verification of the fulfillment of established plans by departments and trading organizations, etc. (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 877. L. 5; D. 878. L. 23).
2 Ya.SAgranov's note is missing.
On June 8, 1932, the PB heard the question "On the stimulation of beet crops." The commission, under the leadership of Kaganovich, was instructed to submit a draft proposal within two days (Ibid. D. 887. L. 6).
4 The commission for the harvesting campaign, chaired by Molotov, was established by decision of the PB on June 7, 1932 (Ibid. D. 887. L. 9). On June 16, 1932, the PB adopted a resolution “On the material supply of the 1932 harvesting campaign.” (Ibid. D. 888. L. 8, 23).
5 The issue of the harvesting campaign was to be considered at the meeting of the PB on June 23, 1932, but was postponed to June 28. Then the PB decided to discuss the issue of the harvesting campaign at a meeting on grain procurements (Ibid. D. 890. L. 8).
6 At a PB meeting on June 16, 1932, it was decided to build a Petrovsky plant with a capacity of 60,000 tons of cast iron (Ibid. D. 888. L. 2).
7 The decision on the Nizhny Novgorod Automobile Plant was taken by the PB on September 20, 1932 after Stalin returned from vacation. S.S. Dybets was relieved of his duties as director of the plant. The PB ordered N.I. Ezhov, N.M. Antselovich and A.A. Zhdanov to work out on the spot all the necessary measures to improve the food situation of the workers of the plant and report to the Central Committee as a matter of urgency (Ibid. D. 901. L. 6)
Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin June 16, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 62. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
In. No. 13.
Tov. Stalin.
Tov. Molotov received Cooper's next telegram today. Molotov, Kremlin. I learned that the relevant official circles are discussing my proposal, transmitted through Bogdanov, to organize a delegation of eight prominent American businessmen to study the possibilities of trade between the United States and the Soviet Union. If this delegation is not given freedom of action and the opportunity to meet with the leaders of Soviet trade and industry, the whole point of the delegation will be lost. I have been actively engaged in finding ways to create a favorable attitude in our country and I think that sending a delegation is the best way to achieve this goal. In the event that I do not receive confirmation soon that you wholeheartedly welcome this project, I will cease my efforts in this direction, despite my conviction that a successful visit by the delegation would greatly improve relations, to the great benefit of both countries. Please telegraph me your very final wishes on the above question before the 21st of this month. Cooper."
We decided to give a positive answer through Bogdanov.
Tell us your opinion 1 . HP 12.
Kaganovich, Molotov.
16/VI-32
____________________
On June 17, Stalin replied: “I have no objection to Cooper’s account” (Ibid.).
Molotov, Kaganovich to Stalin June 16, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 65. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
In. No. 12.
Tov. Stalin.
In view of the shortage of cotton, the People's Commissariat of Light Industry presented a project for the production of cotton fabrics in the third quarter, less than in the second quarter, by 25 million rubles.
We consider it impossible to reduce, we have issued a directive to mobilize domestic cotton resources. However, for the output in the third quarter in the amount of the second quarter it is necessary to import four million rubles worth of cotton.
We consider it possible now to purchase four million worth of cotton in order to export our cotton for the same amount in the fourth quarter. Please let us know your opinion 1 . HP13.
Molotov, Kaganovich.
16/VI-32
___________________________
On June 16, 1932, the PB considered the question "On additional imports of raw materials for light industry." The issue was referred to the Currency Commission for permission (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 12. L. 179).
Stalin - Molotov, Kaganovich June 17, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77 L. 65, 65v. Autograph.
Molotov, Kaganovich.
It's not about the total amount of cotton production in the third quarter, but about the distribution of finished products in favor of the market and to the detriment of non-market consumers. Try to distribute fabrics in the third quarter in such a way that the market gets no less than in the second quarter, and the problem will be solved without importing cotton. I repeat, it's not about the size of the products, but about the distribution. Whoever is afraid of offending non-market consumers will never solve the problems of consumer goods. I am strongly against the import of cotton. I consider the policy of importing cotton under the present currency conditions adventurism.
Stalin.
No. 20.
17/VI.32
12–40 1 .
______________________
1 Number, date and time entered by the secretary.
Kaganovich to Stalin June 17 [1932]Archive: RGASPI F. 558 Op. 11. D. 740. L. 64–68. Autograph; RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 120. L. 43–44. Handwritten text with Kaganovich's notes.
17/VI
Hello Comrade Stalin.
In the evening, during a meeting of members of the PB, I received your letter dated 15/VI. I am answering the points of the letter and will additionally report on the issues that we discussed today.
1) We will do as you advise about Znamensky.
2) About the Yakutsk oil, immediately after receiving the letter, he called Mekhlis and gave him the appropriate instructions.
3) We will decide on amendments to the sowing in a couple of days, when the final results of sowing become clear.
4) Regarding the letter of Chubar and Petrovsky, I fully agree with your characterization.
5) Approved now the control figures for the third quarter. I had to go a little beyond 6 m[billion] 800 [million] to 7 billion 50 [million]. We had sharp disputes about appropriations for NKTyazhprom. The State Planning Commission submitted a proposal to cut more than 200 million rubles compared to the second quarter, adding 150 million to the NKPS. We decided to add 150 million [million] rubles to the Narkomtyazhprom to the outlines of the State Planning Commission, and 85 million [million], which were not given to the NKTyazhprom to the level of capital construction in the second quarter, to be given to the NKPS. In vain, of course, Sergo sharpened the issue, because even with these appropriations, 83% of the annual plan is obtained in 3 quarters, not a single people's commissariat, of course, has such a fulfillment.
6) We were listening to Rabinovich and Ryabovol, who had just arrived from America. In addition to their telegrams, they reported that the oil group, in fact, in addition to the clause establishing the annual export rate at 4 million [million] tons, made some reservations that actually gave the oilmen an excuse to further reduce this export amount. Rabinovich and Ryabovol believe that a significant reason for the termination of the conference in New York is the lack of final agreement between the Standard and Shell on issues related to the settlement of the oil market. As regards further prospects for the talks, they said that when they said goodbye to our delegates, the representatives of the oil groups said that they would consider it desirable to meet again in Europe, where they were leaving in the near future. Rabinovich and Ryabovol consider it expedient to go abroad to Europe to meet with Standard and Shell representatives at the end of June or at the beginning of July. We made no decision, instructing them to write a detailed note. Send them, no doubt, will have to. I'll send you a note as soon as it's ready.
7) I am sending you a message from Mezhlauk about the conversation with Lancaster, which has already taken place on the basis of your instructions adopted by the PB. Mezhlauk believes that Lancaster did not expect such specific business proposals and their announcement made an exceptionally good impression on him. You are absolutely right that this is the most serious manifestation of the mood that has matured in America towards recognition of us. We instructed Mezhlauk, Kalmanovich and Pyatakov to continue talking with them. They will keep us up to date on the matter, about which we will inform you.
8) At the request of comrades from the Comintern, we talked with them today on the question of the situation in Germany. I am sending you a draft letter from the KKE, from which you will see a line emerging in the bowels of the ECCI. Today, this line has been emphasized even more sharply. They promised today to write a short note with their proposals, which I will send you additionally. We briefly exchanged views. We all got the impression that the comrades from the ECCI are in a hurry, they are not quite right in posing the question, especially on the question of the general strike. It is possible and necessary to fight on the basis of a united front from below, but not to give it the wrong direction 1. One of the main reasons why we should come out now with the slogan of a "general strike" is the fear that the Social-Democrats will seize the initiative, but it is not good for us to chase after the Social-Democrats. . The Social Democrats will not go on a real revolutionary strike, they may take certain steps to intimidate the bourgeoisie in order to bargain for more, while for us Bolsheviks a general strike is connected with the development of revolutionary battles, linking the struggle for current issues with the struggle for the implementation of broader fundamental tasks of the proletariat. Has that moment come? The members of the PB, exchanging opinions, seemed to agree that we do not have such a moment now.
We have not made any decisions. We will be waiting for your thoughts on this matter.
Hello to you. Your L. Kaganovich.
____________________
1 Further, in the copy preserved in the Kaganovich fund, the following phrase was crossed out: “Firstly, to bring this united front higher to the social democratic elite, which has betrayed and will betray the working class at any moment, up to reconciliation with the restoration of monarchies.”
Stalin to Kaganovich June 18, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 68 Autograph.
Cipher.
For Kaganovich .
I managed to get acquainted with the situation within the leadership of the Lower Volga. The pre-krai executive committee and Pshenitsyn are to blame for the squabble. Both must be called to order and obliged to work together with Bird. Otherwise, you will have to remove both and replace them with others. The bird needs to be fully supported. In my opinion, this is the only correct solution to question 1 .
Stalin.
#21
18/VI. 32 year 2
_______________________
1 By the decisions of the PB of July 1, 1932, K.F. Pshenitsyn and January 16, 1933, the chairman of the regional executive committee, N.K. Kozlov were recalled to the disposal of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 890. L. 16; D. 913. L. 26).
2 Number and date entered by the secretary.
Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov June 18, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 99. L. 65–68. Autograph; RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 740. L. 69–72. Script. Typescript. The signature is an autograph.
For Kaganovich . Kaganovich and Molotov (for PB members) .
I kindly ask you to pay attention to the following circumstance.
As you remember, in connection with [the] resolutions of the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars on the reduction of the grain procurement plan , the 1st places turned to the Central Committee with a request to allow them to bring the grain procurement plan to the village . We refused the places, telling them that the reduction in the plan should be used for the time being only to stimulate the sowing work . It is now clear to everyone that we were right in focusing the workers' attention on the sowing work.
But we were right not only in this respect. We were also right in that we did not allow the localities to mechanically distribute the grain procurement plan for the districts and villages (collective farms) according to the "principle" of equalization and thereby undermine both grain procurement work and the economic situation of the collective farms . The main mistake of our grain procurement work in the past year, especially in the Ukraine and the Urals, is that the grain procurement plan was laid out for districts and collective farms and was carried out not in an organized manner, but spontaneously, according to the “principle” of leveling , was carried out mechanically , without taking into accountsituation in each individual district , without taking into account the situation in each individual collective farm. As a result of this mechanically egalitarian attitude to the matter, a glaring incongruity resulted, due to which in Ukraine, despite a good harvest, a number of productive regions found themselves in a state of ruin and famine ., and in the Urals, the regional committee deprived itself of the opportunity to provide assistance to lean areas at the expense of the productive areas of the region. Not to mention the fact that a number of first secretaries (Ukraine, the Urals, partly the Nizhny Novgorod Territory) were carried away by the giants of industry and did not pay due attention to agriculture, forgetting that without a systematic rise in agriculture, we cannot have a rise in industry. This, by the way, showed the isolation of the secretaries from the village. The results of these mistakes are now affecting the sowing business, especially in the Ukraine, and several tens of thousands of Ukrainian collective farmers are still traveling all over the European part of the USSR and corrupting our collective farms with their complaints and whining.
What needs to be done in order not to repeat the mistakes of the past year?
The plan must be brought to the attention of the district and the collective farm, but it must be carried through not mechanically and on an equal footing, but taking into account the peculiarities of each district, each collective farm. Since, given the state of our organizations, we cannot have an absolutely accurate account of these features, we must allow a surcharge of 4-5% to the plan in order to create the possibility of covering up the inevitable errors in accounting and to carry out the plan itself at all costs .
I suggest:
1) To convene, no later than June 26-27, a meeting of secretaries and executive committees (presidiums of people's commissars) of Ukraine, the North (Northern) Caucasus, the Central Chernobyl region, the Lower Volga, the Middle Volga, Nizhny Novgorod, Moscow, Tatarstan, Bashkiria, the Urals, Kazakhstan, Western Siberia, Western Region , Belarus on the organization of grain procurements and the unconditional fulfillment of the grain procurement plan.
2) To criticize at the conference the mistakes of our grain procurement practice in the past year and outline ways of organizing grain procurements, bringing the plan to the districts and collective farms and taking into account the situation of each district, each collective farm.
3) Responsibility for the state of agriculture (krai, region, republic) and for the successes and shortcomings of this year's grain procurements shall be placed personally on the first secretaries of the North [Northern] Caucasus, Ukraine, Central Chernobyl region, Lower Volga, Middle Volga, Moscow region, Western region, Belarus , Tatarstan, Bashkiria, the Nizhny Novgorod Territory, the Urals, Kazakhstan, Western Siberia, Eastern Siberia, the Far East, which in no way should, of course, release the respective pre-executive committees and presovnarkoms from responsibility.
4) Send the appropriate decisions of the Central Committee to the bureaus of regional committees, regional committees, and national Central Committees .
I. Stalin. 18/VI.32
_____________________________
1 We are talking about the decision of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee "On the plan for grain procurements from the harvest of 1932 and the development of collective-farm grain trade" dated May 6, 1932.
2 On June 21, 1932, the PB decided to convene on June 28, 1932 a meeting of secretaries and chairmen of the executive committees of Ukraine, the North Caucasus, the Central Black Earth Region, the Lower and Middle Volga, Nizhny Novgorod, Moscow, Tataria, Bashkiria, the Urals, Kazakhstan, Western Siberia , Western region, Belarus on the organization of grain procurements and the implementation of the established grain procurement plan (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 889. L. 16). On June 28, the PB decided not to make a general report at the meeting, but to instruct Molotov, at the opening of the meeting, to point out its tasks, read out Stalin's letter, emphasizing that Stalin's proposals were accepted by the PB and should form the basis of the decision on grain procurements. At the same meeting, the question of the harvesting campaign and the distribution of the crop was to be discussed (Ibid. D. 890. L. 8).
Stalin to Kaganovich [earlier June 19, 1932]Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 100. L. 152. Autograph.
Tov. Kaganovich!
Pay attention to the American inventor Barlow (see attached telegram from Skvirsky 1 ). No need to tinker, but you should directly allow him to come to the USSR, and if this business requires some expenses, it’s not a big deal. It is possible that Barlow could be a good idea. Talk to Voroshilov - he knows this business. So, open up that noose that our bureaucrats have tied around the Barlow case.
Hello. I. Stalin
PS You ask about my health. My health is not going to get better anytime soon. General weakness, real overwork - they are only now showing. I think I'm starting to get better, but in fact it turns out that the amendment is still far away. There are no rheumatic phenomena (disappeared somewhere), but the general weakness has not yet departed. I'm not having a bad time.
I.St.
_____________________
Kaganovich to Stalin June 19 [1932]Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 740. L. 73–75. Autograph.
19/VI
Hello Comrade Stalin!
1) I am sending you a note from Comrade Pyatnitsky about German affairs. In this note they formulate much softer than they formulated at our conference, especially on the question of the general strike.
2) I am sending you a new note about the conversation with Lancaster 1 . Although he told our people that it was difficult for him to communicate with America, but, apparently, he asks for them, so he travels from conversation to conversation to gain time. While he answers with a big request.
3) A telegram was sent to Bogdanov about Barlow and 2 thousand [thousand] rubles. for Barlow's drive to us. I will be following the progress of this case. It really deserves serious attention.
4) For the cotton, we got a good deal from you. Now we have stopped talking about imports and will focus on cottonine as an additional source and on the correct use of the manufactory produced.
5) 92 m[ln] ha were sown on the 15th. Collective farms served by MTS (35 million [m] ha) and state farms (10 m [m] 472 thousand [thousand]) have completely finished sowing. Of the regions, except for the Crimea, Azerbaijan, the Middle Volga and Dagestan, the sowing of the North Caucasus and the Moscow region completed the sowing in the last 5 days. The Urals pulled up, but stalled in Western Siberia and Kazakhstan. Nevertheless, I think that we will take last year's square. Well, I'll end with this.
Improve your health, because it is clear that you are very overworked, and, unfortunately, we have not learned how to unload you and how to protect your health.
Hello to you. Your L. Kaganovich.
PS Comrade Molotov is sending you a draft commission on revolutionary legality. This is not exactly what you wanted, but it was born very slowly, and we have already settled on this last option. There was also a proposal to say in the Central Committee resolution that there are communists who underestimate the revolutionary law at the present stage, referring to the new conditions, the 2nd five-year plan and the prospect of a classless society, but Comrade Molotov objected to this, and the point was withdrawn 2 .
L. Kaganovich.
____________________________
1 The note is missing.
2 In a letter to Molotov, Stalin positively assessed the draft resolution. The PB approved the resolution of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR "On revolutionary legality" on July 25, 1932. For more details, see: Letters from I.V. Stalin to V.M. Molotov. 1925–1936 M, 1995. S. 243–245.
Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin June 19, 1932Archive: RGASPI, F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 76. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
In. No. 14.
Tov. Stalin.
Troyanovsky reports that among the Japanese there is a mood to make a pact with us, stipulating, in order to avoid claims from China, the conclusion of a pact "in view of the resolution of the main issues." Troyanovsky is afraid that such a reservation might complicate the conclusion of pacts with us by other states. Troyanovsky 20 will have a conversation on this issue and asks for our consent to such a reservation.
This is apparently about the inclusion of such a phrase in the introductory part of the pact.
We believe that if the conclusion of the pact could be frustrated by such a reservation, then we can agree to such a reservation. Please let us know your opinion. HP 14.
Kaganovich, Molotov.
19/VI - 32
Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov June 20, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 70. Autograph.
For Kaganovich, Molotov.
Today you will receive my letter proposing to convene a meeting of regional secretaries for June 26 on the organization of grain procurements. If the conference is convened and the questions of grain procurements are resolved, then the plenum of the Central Committee can perhaps be postponed until the end of September .
Stalin.
No. 22.
20/VI. 32
11–40 1
______________________
1 Number, date and time entered by the secretary.
Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin June 20, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 72–73. Script. Typescript.
Encryption. In. No. 15.
Tov. Stalin.
1) A Japanese ship with our cargo and passengers crashed off the coast of Kamchatka. In a general panic, Gusakov, an agent of our coast guard, began shooting to restore order and wounded the Japanese stoker on the steamer chartered by us. Gusakov has been arrested, [in] Petropavlovsk an investigation is underway.
2) The Japanese consul in Petropavlovsk filed a written protest demanding: a) Arrest and punishment of the shooter; b) Reservation for the victims of the right to compensation for material and mental losses; c) Expressions of regret by the Soviet authorities.
In addition, the Japanese consul, without formal connection [with] the incident, warned our agent about the expected entry of a Japanese destroyer into Petropavlovsk.
3) Since the consul's request is to go beyond the limits of the functions assigned to him, and since it is undesirable that every Japanese consul should allow himself to make a policy, as in China, we propose to instruct our diplomatic agent in a calm form to verbally declare to the consul that he (the agent) is not authorized to negotiate on issues that can only be the subject of diplomatic negotiations between governments and that he informed Moscow of all the circumstances of this case.
As a matter of personal information, instruct the agent to inform the consul that the case has been referred to the court, which will clarify all the circumstances of the case, the degree of guilt and the penalty for the shooter.
4) On the destroyer, instruct Troyanovsky and Karakhan to remind the Japanese that in the USSR, as in every country, there is a procedure for the entry of military ships into friendly ports. Consent for the entry of warships [sought by the government] 1 through diplomatic channels.
Therefore, we cannot regard the warning of the consul as the fulfillment of these rules and we hope that proper instructions will be given to the Japanese naval command in order to avoid misunderstandings.
Please let us know your opinion. HP 15.
Kaganovich, Molotov.
20/VI-32
_______________________
1 The fragment is inserted from the text of the certified copy of the telegram (Ibid. L. 74).
Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov June 20 [1932]Archive: RGASPI F. 558 Op. 11. D. 77. L. 73, 73v. Autograph.
For Kaganovich and Molotov.
On HP 15. It would be better to express to the Japanese government through Karakhan Hirota the regret of the Soviet authorities about what happened and to report on the trial of Gusakov, stating at the same time that we consider the threats of the yapconsul at the expense of the destroyer to be impudence, unacceptable in relations between "friendly" powers 1 .
Stalin.
No. 23.
20/VI
23–30 2
_______________________
1 On June 21, 1932, the PB instructed Karakhan to tell the Japanese ambassador “that the NKID agent in Kamchatka expressed regret to the Japanese consul about the wounding of the Japanese sailor on the Genzan-Maru and informed him about the trial of the shooter Gusakov”, and also “to pay attention to unacceptable threat from the yapconsul about the entry of a destroyer into Petropavlovsk ”(RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 12. L. 194).
2 Number, date and time entered by the secretary. June 21 sent in code from Sochi at 3 o'clock. 05 min. (Ibid. F. 558. Op. 11 . D. 77. L. 75).
Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov June 20, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 76, 76v. Autograph.
For Kaganovich and Molotov.
On HP 14. I agree with you about the pact with the Japanese. The Japanese need a clause to the pact so that people cannot think that they are signing the pact under our pressure for more than six months. If the Japanese really agree to the pact, it is probably because they want to upset our negotiations with the Chinese about the pact, in which the Japanese apparently seriously believe. Therefore, we should not break off negotiations with the Chinese, but on the contrary, we should continue and drag them out in order to frighten the Japanese with the prospect of our rapprochement with the Chinese and thereby force them to hurry up with signing a pact with the USSR 1 .
No. 24.
20/VI.32
23–30 2
____________________
On June 21, 1932, the PB decided: “a) Inform Comrade Troyanovsky that if the Japanese really want to conclude a pact, we do not object to the reservation he made, b) Continue and drag out conversations with the Chinese without interrupting them” (RGASPI. F. 17. Inventory 162. D. 12. L. 194).
2 Number, date and time entered by the secretary.
Stalin to Kaganovich, Postyshev, Ordzhonikidze June 20, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 99. L. 69–70. Autograph.
Kaganovich. Postyshtev. Ordzhonikidze.
Well, dear friends, squabble again. I am talking about Beria and Orakhelashvili, enclosing two letters from Orakhelashvili: one addressed to me, the other addressed to Ordzhonikidze 1 .
My opinion: for all the angularity in the "actions" of Beria, Orakhelashvili is still wrong in this matter. Orakhelashvili's request must be denied. If Orakhelashvili does not agree with the decision of the Central Committee of Georgia, he can appeal to the Zakkraykom, and finally to the Central Committee of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. And there is no need for him to leave. I'm afraid that Orakhelashvili has self-esteem in the foreground (they pecked at "his" people), and not the interests of the cause and positive work. Everyone says that positive work is going well in Georgia, the mood of the peasants has become good. And this is the main thing at work.
Hello. I. Stalin.
20/VI.32
_____________________
1 No letters.
Stalin to Kaganovich, Mikoyan June 21, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 79. Autograph.
For Kaganovich and Mikoyan.
I read the beet project. It is necessary to discard the first point on the reduction in the delivery of bread and the third paragraph of the second point on the bonus. The rest is acceptable. The project does not include a clause on the delivery of beets to the stations. This is a shortcoming of the project.
Stalin 1 .
No. 25.
21/VI.32 2
_____________________________
1 The answer is written on the draft resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "On beets." The first point, which Stalin proposed to remove, was the following: “1) for collective farms and individual farms in which sugar beet occupies at least 15% of the sown area, reduce the delivery of bread to 1–1.5 centners per hectare, and for farms where sugar beet occupies from 5 to 15% of the total sown area, reduce the delivery of bread to 1.5–2 centners per hectare, depending on the crop. The third paragraph of the second paragraph was as follows: “For collective farms and individual farmers who have exceeded the plan for the delivery of beets, to establish in the form of a bonus an additional issue at the state price of 3 kilograms of sugar for each centner of beets delivered in excess of the plan.”
On June 23, the PB approved a draft resolution on beets (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 889. L. 2, 26).
2 Number and date entered by the secretary.
Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov June 21, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 81, 81v. Autograph.
For Kaganovich. Molotov.
I read a conversation with Lancaster. In my opinion, we should try to turn the received credit, which Lancaster considers a credit for servicing our orders in America, in fact, to turn it into a loan that is as free from obligations as possible. In this connection, we must tell Lancaster that if we receive 50 million dollars for 8 years from 7% per annum plus 5% additional, we can use a maximum of 5-7% of the loan amount for orders in America. This, of course, will not please him. But then we need to tell him that we could use 15-20 percent of the loan amount for orders in America if we get $100 million for a period of 10 years and with the obligatory reduction of the additional percentage from five to three. We must stand firm on this and see how Lancaster reacts. It is now clear that Lancaster's main concern is the size of orders in America.
Stalin.
No. 26.
21/VI. 32 year 1
__________________
1 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day sent in code from Sochi at 16:00. 55 min. (RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 80).
Stalin to Kaganovich [after June 21, 1932]Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 100. L. 126–128. Autograph.
Hello, Comrade Kaganovich !
1) On account of Germany and the general strike, I agree with you 1 .
2) We need to insist on the second proposal scheme for Lancaster (100 million dollars, 10 years term, 3% ( not_5% ) additional, 15-20% of orders from 100 million dollars). This scheme works for us. It is also beneficial to Lancaster, as it gives him orders for 40 mil. rub., instead of 5-7 mil. rub. according to the first scheme, and raises the amount of his claims to 60 mil. rub. (instead of 40 million rubles.according to the first scheme). As a last resort, you can go for an increase in orders up to 25% of the loan amount, in no case deviating from the other conditions of the second scheme. I think that Lancaster will be forced to agree to this scheme, since the main issue for Lancaster (and his bank) is to attract large orders for the closing factories in America and revitalize the industry, save the factories from collapse.
3) Please do not worry about my health. Send more requests, I will be happy to answer.
4) Are you convening a meeting of secretaries on the organization of grain procurements? If the meeting takes place, the plenum can be successfully postponed, because the main issue of the plenum—grain procurement—will already be resolved.
Hey! I. Stalin.
PS It seems to me that the Narkomtyazh was given a lot of money for the 3rd quarter. I should have given less. They choke on money. I. St.
______________________
1 We are talking about the call of the Communist Party of Germany to the working Social Democrats and all members of the trade unions to organize "mass proletarian demonstrations and a mass political strike."
Stalin to Kaganovich June 22 [1932]Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 83–85. Autograph.
Moscow. CC ON. Poskrebyshev.
For Kaganovich .
First. If the plenum of the Central Committee meets at the beginning of August, the agenda can be limited to two questions, the question of grain procurements and the question of trade, meaning state, cooperative and collective farm trade, and it is clear that if a meeting of secretaries is convened at the end of this month and the issue is resolved there about grain procurements, then the convening of a plenum at the beginning of August no longer makes sense. If the plenum is postponed until September, three questions can be raised: the first is the reporting reports of the Tsentrosoyuz and Narkomsnab on the development of Soviet trade, the second is the reporting reports of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry, the People's Commissariat of Light Industry and the industrial cooperation on the expansion of the production of consumer goods, the third is the reporting report of the People's Commissariat for the Development of Ferrous Metallurgy 1 .
Second. Pravda should publish an editorial on the results of the spring sowing campaign. It should be emphasized in the article that the reports of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture documented the complete victory of collective farms and state farms in agriculture, since the share of the individual sector this year does not amount to 20 percent, while the share of collective farms and state farms exceeds 80 percent of the entire sown area. In the article, it is necessary to scold roughly and sharply all the lackeys of capitalism, the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Trotskyists, as well as right-wing deviationists, saying that the attempts of the enemies of the working people to return the USSR to the capitalist path have been finally defeated and scattered to dust, that the USSR has finally established itself on a new, socialist path, that the decisive victory of socialism in the USSR can be considered already accomplished.
Stalin.
No. 27, 28.
22/VI 2
_________________
The 1st Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks took place on September 28-October 2, 1932 and considered the following questions: the development of Soviet trade, the production of consumer goods, and ferrous metallurgy.
2 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day sent in code from Sochi at 21:00. 55 min. marked immediately (Ibid. L. 82).
Kaganovich to Stalin June 23 [1932]Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 740. L. 76–81. Autograph.
23/VI
Hello Comrade Stalin!
1) Today at the PB we decided to convene a plenum of the Central Committee at the end of September. The three questions you mentioned in the telegram were put on the order of the day. These are really the most important questions right now. We will consider the question of grain procurements in a business-like, concrete manner on the 28th of [his] month at a meeting of secretaries and chairmen! territories, regions and republics. We are currently preparing a draft resolution. I think that in this resolution it will be necessary to give a brief introductory part with an assessment of the results of sowing in the spirit of the 2nd paragraph of your telegram. This is especially important because, in addition to the outright lackeys of capitalism, we have near-right deviationist and near-Trotskyist elements, swamp frogs, croaking at the slightest difficulty, ready to rush to extremes, forgetting and not taking into account the real enormous achievements that this spring sowing has brought us. At the same time, the draft resolution will have to sharply criticize the shortcomings of the work of local organizations in the spirit of your letter, with emphasis on the examples of Ukraine, the Urals, and others. Then there will be a number of practical points that guarantee the successful completion of grain procurements, without allowing excesses. When the draft resolution is ready, we will send it to you, but I ask you, if you already have additional instructions, to send it by telegraph, so that we can have a more productive meeting on the 28th of c[his] month].
2) We did not adopt a resolution on harvesting today, we postponed it until the meeting. I am sending you a draft resolution, during the debate at the PB the issue of giving advances in grain to collective farmers was sharpened, firstly, whether to give out according to eaters or workdays, apparently, the latter is more correct, secondly, when and how much to give out, in part, especially for Ukraine, where there is a danger of plundering bread, will have to give it out first, but this part should be small, 60% a lot. We will discuss all these issues at a meeting with people from the field. It would be nice to get your idea, as it seems in Ukraine.
3) Kosior St arrived yesterday. on the occasion of the tank report. While he admits that they were out of touch with the districts, he does not seem to sense the gravity of their mismanagement. I warned him that at the meeting we would have to push them out as a "sample" of how not to work. He raises the question of creating now two more regions: Donbass and Chernihiv. As for the 1st, that is correct, because the Central Committee proposed this from the very beginning, and it is doubtful whether the 2nd should be created now, on the eve of grain procurements, reorganized, since they ask for an answer from the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, I kindly ask you to tell your opinion on this occasion.
4) Foreign Trade included in the export-import plan of the III quarter [artal] the export of 60 mil. pood[s] of grain and, in addition, delivery to ports in addition to 50 m[ln]. pood[s] for collateral and sale in October. He proposes to increase the annual plan for exports from the 1932 harvest to 4 million [million] tons. We have not yet resolved this issue. Of course, it is absolutely necessary to export immediately and we must rebuff the mood that has developed on the basis of some difficulties of the last couple of months that it is not necessary to export, but the question is how much to export in the third quarter], I think that the figure of Vneshtorg will have to be slightly reduced. Please let me know your opinion.
5) We have not yet adopted resolutions on the sale by enterprises of marketable products produced in excess of the plans established for them. The project proposed by Lyubimov is weak. I 'll have to work on the question, I'm sending it to you 1 .
6) We postponed the proposal to transfer Krasny Putilovets to the production of Buicks. The fact is that Yakovlev proves that the situation with motors for combines is bad both this year and next year, so we have allocated a commission, and in the meantime I hope to get your opinion on this issue, I know that you were in favor of it, but it seems not for this year.
7) Fighters, tanks, Kurchevsky and guns were discussed at the last meeting of the Defense Committee. I had to swear, especially about the tanks and Kurchevsky. We have to wait for the turning point in July.
8) On oil, we are sending Rabinovich and Ryabovol abroad to resume negotiations on the basis of the latest guidelines. I am sending you a note by Ryabovol-Rabinovich and Weitzer 2 .
9) Litvinov says nothing. Today there is a report that he delivered greetings to Hoover's address 3 . We will have to ask him what is being done there and why he did not ask before his speech , as soon as he gets into the circle of ministers and prime ministers, he loses his balance and forgets that we do not have bourgeois parliamentarism, but a Bolshevik leadership.
10) Troyanovsky does stupid things. Despite the prohibition, he is talking with Fujiwara about the Japanese buying out the Chinese Eastern Railway and the Japanese waiving Japanese fishing rights, etc., we are thinking of sending him a sharp telegram to stop these conversations.
11) A new squabble really ignites in Transcaucasia. You are certainly right that a healthy start, especially in business terms, is on the side of Beria, Orakhelashvili reflects the aching, non-business circles of the asset. But the matter did not end only with a letter from Orakhelashvili himself, Maria Orakhelashvili arrived here and submitted an official application to the Central Control Commission with a request to reconsider the issue of reprimanding her. Yaroslavsky forwarded the application to me. I think that the Central Control Commission should consider her application in the usual way, without blowing up this case and not encouraging further group struggle against the Georgian Central Committee 4 .
Well, I'll end with this. Greetings. Your L. Kaganovich.
PSM Gorky applied to the Central Committee with a request to allow Babel to go abroad for a short period of time. Despite the fact that I conveyed that we doubt the expediency of this, I receive calls from him every day. Apparently, Gorky accepts this with some poignancy. Knowing that in such cases you treat him with special sensitivity, I inform you about this and ask what to do. L. Kaganovich.
____________________
1The question of the right of enterprises that overfulfilled the production plan to sell their products on the market (in addition to centralized distribution) was repeatedly considered at meetings of the PB in June-August 1932: on June 8, the PB instructed Ordzhonikidze, Lyubimov and Mikoyan to submit a single draft proposal (RGASPI. F. 17. Inventory 3. D. 887. L. 7); On July 10, the draft submitted by I.Elyubimov was instructed to consider the same commission and submit an agreed proposal to the PB (Ibid. D. 891. L. 4); On July 23, the draft resolution submitted by the commission was submitted for additional development to the commission chaired by Lyubimov (Ibid. D. 893. L. 4); On August 8, the PB entrusted the development of a draft resolution to a commission chaired by Postyshev, suggesting that it “determine those industries that who should be granted the right to sell above-plan products” (Ibid. D. 895. L. 3). On October 16, 1932, the PB decided to remove this issue from discussion (Ibid. D. 903. L. 15).
2 The note is missing. See Document No. 99. On June 23, the PB allowed Rozengolts to send Rabinovich and Ryabovol on a mission in the coming days to resume negotiations on an oil agreement (Ibid. Op. 162. D. 12. L. 191).
3 On June 22, 1932, at a meeting of the General Commission of the Conference on the Reduction and Limitation of Arms, the proposals of US President Hoover on the reduction of armaments were announced. The Soviet delegation came out in support of the Hoover Plan (DVP, vol. XV, pp. 776, 777).
On June 21, the head of the Organizing Department of the Central Committee, Zh.I. Meyerzon, sent a note to the secretaries of the Central Committee, Stalin, Kaganovich, and Postyshev, “On the facts of group action in the Transcaucasian Party organization.” It said that on June 10, 1932, the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia examined the issue of the group work of Maria Orakhelashvili and others, “who, by spreading false rumors, tried to oppose the Central Committee of Georgia to the Zakkraykom and discredit individual leaders of the Central Committee and the Tiflis Committee (in particular, Comrade Beria )". Maria Orakhelashvili was reprimanded and relieved of her post. On June 23, 1932, Yaroslavsky sent a statement to M. Orakhelashvili Kaganovich (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 120. D. 82. L. 88, 117).
Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov, Ordzhonikidze June 24, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 99. L. 71–76. Autograph; RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 740. L. 82–83. Script. Typescript.
24/VI 32
Kaganovich, Molotov, Ordzhonikidze.
1) You gave too much money to the People's Commissariat of Heavy for capital construction in the 3rd quarter, and by doing so you created a threat of damage to the whole business, a threat to corrupt the workers of the People's Commissariat of Heavy. Why did you overturn your own decision to stay within Q2 totals? Don't you understand that by overfeeding the People's Commissariat for Capital Investments and thereby creating a cult of new construction , you are killing not only the cult, but even the simple , elementary desire of economic workers to rationally use ready - madeenterprises? Take Stalingrad and Kharkov Tractor, AMO and Avtozavod. Built and built them with great enthusiasm. And this, of course, is very good. And when it was necessary to set these factories in motion and use them rationally, people lost their enthusiasm, they preferred to hide in the bushes and, of course, let the country down in the most inadmissible way. Why are things like this happening to us? Because we have a cult of new construction (which is very good), but no cult of the rational use of finished factories (which is very bad and extremely dangerous). By overfeeding the People's Commissariat for Capital Investments, you are perpetuating this abnormal and dangerous situation in industry. I'm not talking about the fact that you create the threat of new food difficulties ...
2) I am strongly opposed to giving the Putilov factory 2 mil. 900 thousand rubles in hard currency for the reconstruction of the tractor shop into an automobile shop 2 . We already have a lot of debt abroad and we should someday learn to save on foreign currency. If we are unable now to provide machine tools of our own production for this work, if we wait a year, when we are able to provide these machine tools, why should we hurry? I'm not talking about the fact that it is not known whether we will have steel for 20 thousand Buicks. We do not have enough steel for tractor and automobile plants—what guarantee is there that in a year we will have enough steel for the existing plants and for the Pugilovsky automobile plant? No guarantees on this score are presented in Comrade Ordzhonikidze's note.
3) There is a decision in the PB that the People's Commissariat of Heavy Duty should submit a draft of specific measures to create a secure metallurgical base for the AMO, Avtozavod and the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant 3 . Where are these events and when will they be presented? Well, that's all for now.
Greetings to all of you! I. Stalin.
24/VI 32
__________________________________
On June 7, 1932, the PB adopted a decision on the national economic plan for July-September 1932. Gosplan was given a directive: “when drawing up the national economic plan for the third quarter on the issue of capital investment, stay within the limits of the second quarter (6.800 million rubles)” (RGASPI. F 17. Op. 3. D. 887. L. 9). However, on June 17, the PB, in an amendment to this resolution, determined the amount of capital work at 7.050 million rubles. (Ibid. D. 889. L. 13).
2 The issue of transferring the tractor department of Krasny Putilovets to the production of Buick-type cars was considered by the PB on June 23, 1932. The PB transferred further study of the issue to a specially created commission chaired by Ordzhonikidze (Ibid. D. 889. L. 3).
3 We are talking about the decision of the PB, which was adopted when considering the issue of the construction of the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant (Ibid. D. 885. L. 3).
Kaganovich to Stalin June 25, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 88. Certified typewritten copy.
Strictly secret .
Copy .
Cipher.
Sochi. Stalin
a) A meeting on grain procurements will be held on June 28, where we will discuss the issues of the harvesting campaign.
b) The Plenum of the Central Committee was scheduled for the end of September. The order of the day proposed by you is accepted.
No. 17/1103/sh.
Kaganovich.
25. VI. 32
Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin June 25, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. P. D. 77. L. 94–95. Script. Typescript.
Encryption.
In. No. 19.
Tov. Stalin.
Troyanovsky talks about all aspects of our relations with Japan with Fujiwara, a big businessman connected with the military. The planned negotiations with Yamamoto and Okura did not take place.
Fujiwara, as an irresponsible person, is apparently instructed to probe us on all issues. These talks have gone far and put us in an unequal position, for the Plenipotentiary Ambassador speaks from our side.
The main topic of conversation is the CER - Troyanovsky, contrary to the directives of the Central Committee, continues to talk with the Japanese about the possibility of compensating us for the CER by waiving Japanese fishing rights. Details in Troyanovsky's telegram, which you will receive on 26.
We consider it necessary to resolutely condemn Troyanovsky's behavior and suggest that he stop all talk about the possibility of compensating the CER by giving up fish to the Japanese; but that they must be given a more effective character, and for this they must be led by persons invested with appropriate powers; therefore, he (Troyanovsky) proposes that the Japanese government should authorize someone officially to negotiate, and that for his part he thinks it would be best if Fujiwara himself were such a person.
Report your opinion. HP 19.
Kaganovich, Molotov.
25/VI - 32
Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov June 26, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 95. Autograph.
Kaganovich, Molotov.
On HP 19. There is no need to condemn Troyanovsky for talking with the Japanese, since we ourselves entrusted him with sounding on the basis of certain concessions. You are right about compensation for the CER with fish, we did not give him such an order, and he breeds a gag. In all other respects I agree with you 1 .
Stalin.
No. 30.
26/VI. 32.
13–10 2
_________________
On June 28, 1932, the PB sent the following telegram to Troyanovsky: “Declare Fujiwara as your personal opinion that negotiations with him have clarified a lot, outlined various possibilities for resolving the issue of the CER, but that they need to be given a more effective character and for this they must be led by people invested with proper powers [...] We draw your attention to the fact that you continue to insist on your mistake about the possibility of compensation for the CER with fish, contrary to the instructions communicated to you. We suggest you to refrain from these talks about compensation by fish in the future” (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 13. L. 10).
2 Number, date and time entered by the secretary. On the same day sent in code from Sochi at 15:00. 10 minutes. (Ibid. L. 93).
Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin June 26, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 102. Original. Typescript.
Encryption. In. No. 21.
Tov. Stalin.
1) The American Colonel Popp, who had conversations with Radek, asks to be received by one of the official representatives of the government, Krestinsky or others. We propose to allow Mezhlauka, with the participation of Osinsky, Pyatakov, Radek and the Anglo-American assistant of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, to arrange breakfast for Popp. The question of receiving him by Krestinsky will be decided after this breakfast.
2) Popp asks if we are ready to accept an unofficial representative of America, we intend to give an answer in the spirit of your letter that we are ready to accept an official or semi-official representative in exchange for our corresponding representative in America.
3) Popp asks any of the Soviet leaders known to America to give a letter that we are not striving to make a revolution in America. This question must be dismissed as of no serious importance.
Please let us know your opinion 1 .
HP 21.
Kaganovich, Molotov. 26/VI-32
________________________
1 June 27 from Sochi at 13:00. 51 min. Stalin agreed (Ibid.). We are talking about the visit to the USSR of the president of one of the American corporations that had agreements with Soviet enterprises, Colonel F. Pope. On June 28, 1932, the PB allowed Mezhlauk, with the participation of Osinsky, Pyatakov, Radek and the Anglo-American assistant of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, to arrange breakfast for Pope and then decide on the issue of receiving him by Krestinsky. The PB allowed Pope to answer “that we are ready to accept an official or semi-official representative of America in exchange for our corresponding representative in America” (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 13. L. 3).
Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Ordzhonikidze to Stalin June 26, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 104. Certified typewritten copy.
Cipher .
Top secret.
Copy .
Sochi. Stalin.
Zaleski told Litvinov in Geneva the other day that Titulescu was ready to resume negotiations on the Soviet-Romanian pact. At the same time, Zaleski handed over the draft pact that he had already agreed with Titulescu. In this draft, in contrast to Zaleski's Berlin formulations, there is no reservation to the effect that the questions at issue between the USSR and Rumania 1 are not affected by the present pact.
Litvinov promised to discuss Zalesky's proposal and give an answer, but he immediately noted that Romania's refusal to mention the existence of disputable issues would prevent the conclusion of the pact and that Poland would then have to sign the pact without Romania.
Zaleski remained silent, did not declare that such a prospect was unacceptable to him.
According to a number of available information, Poland is ready to ratify the pact simultaneously with the Baltic states without Romania.
We believe that the Zaleski-Titulescu formulation is unacceptable and that on the question of Bessarabia it is necessary to maintain the same position.
Tell us your opinion 2 .
Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Ordzhonikidze.
26/VI-32
_____________________
1 This refers to the Bessarabian issue.
2 On the same day, Stalin agreed (RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 101). On June 28, the PB approved a telegram from M. M. Litvinov, which rejected the Romanian draft non-aggression pact, but accepted the proposal to resume negotiations with Romania. At the same time, the task was to avoid postponing the signing of a similar pact with Poland due to the position of Romania (Ibid. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 13. L. 3, 9; DVP. T. XV. C. 392). The non-aggression pact between the USSR and Poland was signed on July 25, 1932.
Kaganovich to Stalin June 26, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 106. Original. Typescript.
Telegram.
Series "G".
Tov. Stalin.
I report the text of Wang's letter addressed to Kozlovsky: “I have the honor to inform you that in order to consolidate friendship between China and the USSR, the Chinese government will make an important proposal to the government of the USSR. In view of this, I am turning to you, Mr. Kozlovsky, with a request to set a time for our urgent meeting. In anticipation of your reply, I ask you to accept the assurances of my best regards to you.
Kaganovich.
26/VI-32
Kaganovich to Stalin June 26 [1932]Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 740. L. 84–86. Autograph.
26/VI
Hello Comrade Stalin!
1) I received your last two letters, I took into account everything indicated: I handed over to the Comintern about Germany, gave appropriate instructions to Mezhlauk for the upcoming new meeting with Lancaster the other day, we have already decided on a plenum, we will take into account your point of view about Krasny Putilovets, here on the issue of appropriations for the capital construction of NKtyazhprom, today we tried to write a telegram to you three together, but it did not work out and we decided that each one would write it himself. We reduced the appropriations for NK Tyazhprom for the 3rd quarter against the 2nd quarter by 84 million, while the State Planning Commission proposed a reduction of 234 million for NK Tyazhprom. The volume of capital works established by the PB for the III quarter. 7 m[illiar]dov 50 mil. exceeds II quarter. at 156 mil. rubles, which went mainly to the NKPS.
The question arises: did you take into account that we reduced NKTyazhprom by 84 million, or did you think that we added to it. I interpreted that you proceeded from the fact that we have reduced, but given that they have achieved 83% of the annual plan, you considered it possible to raise the issue of reduction. How to be further? The question arose because we raised the question of practical conclusions from your letter. So we are waiting for a new additional clarification of the issue from you.
2) Today we sent you several telegrams on international issues, but I want to ask you about one more international issue. Shouldn't we give additional instructions to Litvinov in Geneva, in particular, in connection with the Hoover Declaration. We don't offer anything definitive here, but it seems that ours has been a bit muted now.
3) I am sending you Bogdanov's letter about America 1 , his conclusions are narrow, but the facts reported by him are very interesting and confirm the correctness of your analysis of the seriousness of America's urgent tendencies to recognize us and the significance of Lancaster's arrival.
4) I am sending you a small note received from Balitsky 2 . Although the note does not make a serious impression, it is possible that America is moving in different directions just to start a war.
5) I am sending you the material received from Comrade Voroshilov about accidents in the air fleet. Indeed, accidents have increased, especially outrageous is the collision of TB-1 3 and the destruction of two large aircraft. But my personal opinion is that this draft resolution does not go deep enough into the causes. It is necessary to carefully study the shortcomings of the system of training, control and behavior of the flight personnel, both command and private, and outline appropriate measures. The same draft, on the one hand, gives only general instructions, on the other hand, is only punitive in nature, moreover, should all reprimands, etc., be carried out from the Central Committee. The question will be 1st. Please communicate your comments to the PB either by letter or by telegraph.
6) The article was published in Pravda. They had to redo it several times and this one could have been done better, but we decided not to delay it any longer.
7) We will open the meeting on grain procurements on the 28th at 6 o'clock. We think it will be done in a businesslike way. A large number of People's Commissariat people are already applying for participation in the meeting. We are thinking not to let them in, to limit the circle as much as possible, otherwise the meeting will be turned into a parliament. We think that it would be better to develop a resolution during a meeting with the participation of people from the field.
8) Radek keeps asking that he be given the opportunity to receive materials from the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs (reviews, ciphers of plenipotentiary representatives, etc.) for orientation. How do you think? 4 It seems to me that one could agree to receive them through the secret department of the Central Committee, with the exception of especially secret materials. Well, I'll end with this.
Hello. Your L. Kaganovich.
________________________
1 The letter is missing.
2 The note is missing.
3 Heavy bomber TB-1, crew of 7 people, in serial production since 1929.
4 April 1, 1932, at the suggestion of Stalin, it was decided by the PB to organize an Information Bureau on International Affairs (BMI) under the Central Committee, headed by Radek (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 878. L. 5), in tasks which included: a summary of information on international affairs, extracting information from the foreign press, literature, other foreign sources, etc. (Ibid. Op. 162. D. 12. L. 143).
Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov [June 26, 1932]
Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov June 27, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 99. L. 81–87. Autograph.
Kaganovich. Molotov.
T. Sheboldaev poses a very urgent question in his note. He is right that the role of consumer cooperatives, both in the procurement of agricultural products and in the sale of goods to urban industry, especially in the countryside, should be increased (the "intermediary" role of cooperatives). It is possible that he is also right in that the cooperatives should be freed from procurement functions and that they should concentrate on procurements of a local , "decentralized" nature. It is only necessary to study the question of whether state procurement organizations will be able to cope with the procurement business without cooperation. Undoubtedly , Sheboldaev is right in that it is necessary to free consumer cooperatives from excessive taxes, “confiscations”, etc. requisitions.
But Sheboldaev, in my opinion, is wrong on the question of procurement prices (in the countryside) and sale prices (in the city) . I am afraid that if the co-operatives are allowed to procure foodstuffs in the countryside at free prices, then our procurements will be undermined in the bud. It is possible that someday it will be necessary to raise prices for state procurements. But this year there is nothing to think about it. It would be possible to declare state procurements with their low prices as a state tax , state duty . But this cannot be done without the abolition of direct taxes on the countryside. In addition, all the same - to do this procedure, even if after studying the issue it turns out to be correct -we can't this year. In any case, one thing is clear, namely: we cannot free the co-operatives from any control and regulation by the state along the line of prices. It is obvious that the cooperatives will have to conduct their procurements at state prices, and only after the end of state procurements (January 15, 1933) will it be allowed to procure — to buy at prices 5 per cent higher than state prices .
Comrade Sheboldaev is also wrong on the question of sales prices in the city. I have no objection to the sale by the cooperatives of urban goods in the countryside at average commercial or even commercial prices. But I am opposed to the sale prices in the city being increased by the cooperatives because of the "normal" profit. I am against it, as it will mean an increase in the price of bread and other agricultural products. We need Bolshevik cooperation as an intermediary organization between town and country, and cooperation with high profits .
It is clear that Comrade Sheboldaev should by no means be scolded for some of the extremes in his note. On the contrary, he should be praised for the open and timely posing of a completely overdue question. Moreover, most of the practical proposals of his note are quite correct 1 .
Well, that's all for now. Hey! I. Stalin.
PS I have just received your letter dated June 23, 32.
I answer.
1) We can confine ourselves to the establishment of yet another - Donbass - district in Ukraine 2 .
2) Regarding the export of grain, I propose to seriously reduce the Rosengolz plan (for the third quarter) 3 .
3) In my opinion, Babel is not worth spending hard currency on his trip abroad. I. St.
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On June 26, 1932, Stalin sent B.P. Sheboldaev the following telegram: “Rostov-on-Don. Regional Committee. Shebodtsaev. I received a note on cooperation and sent it to Moscow. The question is quite ripe and should be discussed in the Central Committee. Most of the practical proposals of the note are correct, only prices, both procurement and sales, raise doubts. Stalin. 26/VI. 32." (RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 89).
Sheboldaev's note with Stalin's marginal remarks has been preserved in an original copy of the PB protocols due to the fact that on July 10, 1932, the PB considered this note and instructed the consumer goods commission to develop a draft resolution (Ibid. 5 F. 17. Op. 163. D 948. L. 4–20).
On June 29, 1932, the PB permitted the organization of an oblast in the Donbass with the inclusion of 36 districts (Ibid. Op. 3. D. 890. L. 10).
On July 10, 1932, the PB decided to reduce the planned figure for grain exports in the third quarter and finally establish it on July 16 (Ibid. Op. 162. D. 13. L. 11). At a meeting of the PB on July 16, grain exports in the third quarter were set at 31.5 million poods (including legumes), 20 million poods for warrants and 10 million poods of carry-over, totaling 61.5 million poods (Ibid. L. 30 ). On October 20, 1932, the PB decided to reduce exports from the 1932 harvest from 165 to 150 million poods (Ibid. L. 133). Real exports were probably 1,594 thousand tons.
Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Ordzhonikidze to Stalin on June 27 [1932]Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 106. Autograph.
Kaganovich. Molotov .
Let Kozlovsky appoint a time for Van to meet. It doesn't hurt to publish a brief report to the press that Wang proposed a meeting with Kozlovsky and received consent to this.
Stalin.
#33
27/VI. 32 year 1
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1 Number and date entered by the secretary.
Stalin to Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Ordzhonikidze June 28, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 111v, 110v. Certified typewritten copy.
Encryption.
In. No. 23.
Tov. Stalin.
First. The Chinese delegate Yen in Geneva asked Litvinov, by way of sounding, whether the latter thought that the conclusion of the pact would amount to a restoration of relations or would pave the way for it. Litvinov considers the conclusion of a pact with Nanking desirable. He also considers it expedient to restore relations if Nanking does not put any conditions on Manchuria and gives us satisfaction for breaking off relations and raiding the embassy and consulate .
Second. Wang wrote a letter to Kozlovsky in Moscow, we are sending the text separately.
Third. We consider it necessary to send the following telegram to Litvinov: “We consider the conclusion of a pact before the restoration of relations unprofitable, because the Chinese, undoubtedly, want to bind our Manchu policy through the pact and in this way make the question of the restoration of relations conditional on our attitude towards Manchuria. In addition, it is not known to what extent their intentions are serious, whether they continue their usual [game]. Therefore, restraint should be exercised without forcing Ian's questions. However, if the Chinese made us a direct and unconditional official proposal to restore relations, you can express the hope that the Sovpra would consider carefully.
Fourth. As regards Wang's request, we consider it possible to allow Kozlovsky to receive it and declare to Wang that he is not authorized to conduct any negotiations and that if Wang has an order from his government, let him put it in writing and Kozlovsky undertakes to convey this to his superiors.
Please let us know your opinion. HP 23.
Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Ordzhonikidze.
27/VI 2
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1 June 23 M.M. Litvinov telegraphed from Geneva that on June 22 he was visited by the representative of China in the Council of the League of Nations, Yan Hoi-ching (Yen), and spoke of the possibility of concluding a non-aggression pact, the signing of which would mean the restoration of diplomatic relations or would pave the way for this (DVP. T XV, pp. 780–781).
2 The certified typewritten copy bears the date June 26 (RGASPI. F. 558. Op. I. D. 77. L. 112).
Postyshev, Kaganovich to Stalin June 28, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L 110–111. Autograph.
Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Ordzhonikidze.
HP 23.
I agree that restraint is needed with respect to Nanking, but the position of restraint must be carried out in such a way that the Nanking people will not be pushed back into the arms of Japan. This question, like the question of our relations with America, is directly related to the question of Japan's attack on the USSR. If Japan, thanks to our excessive restraint and rudeness towards the Chinese, gets the Nanjing people at her disposal and creates a united front with them, and receives neutrality from America, Japan's attack on the USSR will be accelerated and ensured. Therefore, restraint towards the Nankingers, as well as the Americans, should not turn into rudeness and repulsion, should not deprive them of the hope of the possibility of rapprochement. In this regard, one must be as polite and affectionate as possible to Van, listen carefully to him, and so on, and the directive for Litvinov must be softened by saying, that the USSR, according to Litvinov, would not object to the immediate restoration of relations without any conditions, after which the non-aggression pact would come as a natural result of the restoration of relations. This is first. Secondly, we must put pressure on Japan with the prospect of a rapprochement between the USSR and Nanking and America in order to force them to hurry up with the conclusion of a pact with the USSR. In this regard, we should give our press a brief report about Van's meeting with Kozlovsky 1 , and a few days after that, give a message to our or the German press about a banquet given in Moscow to the American Popp.
Stalin.
#34
28/VI. 32 year 2
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1 Stalin's proposals were implemented. On June 29, a corresponding telegram was sent to M. M. Litvinov about negotiations with Ian (DVP. Vol. XV. P. 392–393). On July 1, Izvestia published a report on the conversation between Wang Zengsi and B.I. Kozlovsky on the conclusion of a non-aggression pact and the restoration of diplomatic relations between the USSR and China. Diplomatic and consular relations between the USSR and China were restored in December 1932 (DVP. Vol. XV. P. 680).
2 Number and date entered by the secretary.
Stalin to Postyshev, Kaganovich June 28, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 114. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
In. No. 24.
Tov. Stalin.
By a resolution of the Politburo of June 23, the All-Union Resort Association was created. Kubiak's candidacy is nominated as the director of this association. Kubiak agrees.
Please let us know your opinion. HP 24.
Postyshev, Kaganovich.
28/VI-32
Kaganovich to Stalin June 28, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 114. Autograph.
The meaning of creating an all-Union association is not clear. Permission to abstain 1 . Stalin. No. 35. 28/VI.32 2
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1 On April 23, 1932, the PB approved a draft resolution “On Resorts”, which indicated shortcomings in the state of resorts. The PB instructed a commission consisting of Kaganovich, Postyshev and Yenukidze to develop and submit proposals for the reorganization of the resort business in the USSR (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 881. L. 12, 29–31). On June 23, 1932, the proposals of the commission were approved, and the All-Union Association of Resorts was formed to manage the activities of resort trusts. The OB was instructed to nominate a candidate for the chairman of the association (Ibid. D. 889. L. 9, 29, 30). On August 2, 1932, K.M. Shvedchikov was approved as the chairman of the board of the association (Ibid. D. 895. L. 15).
2 Number and date entered by the secretary.
Kaganovich to Stalin June 28 [1932]Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 118. Certified typewritten copy; F. 81. Op. 3. D. 101. L. 11. Typewritten copy.
Cipher.
Top secret .
Copy.
Stalin. Sochi.
Tonight we are opening a grain procurement meeting. The PB has just been exchanging views on the conduct of the meeting. Decided the following:
"1. Do not make a general report. Instruct Comrade Molotov, at the opening of the meeting, to indicate the tasks of the meeting, to read out the letter from Comrade. Stalin, saying that the proposals set out in the letter were accepted by the Politburo and should form the basis of the decision on grain procurements.
2. After reports from the field and debates, elect one or two commissions to develop practical measures.
3. At the same meeting, discuss the issue of the harvesting campaign and the distribution of the crop” 1 .
We will send the developed proposals to you before the final approval at the PB. I ask you to telegraph your opinion on the following questions:
1. The return of the loan is not included in the plan, but charged in excess of the grain procurement plan. How to be with a prodssudy?
2. When distributing the grain procurement plan between the collective-farm and individual sectors, do not give relief to the individual farmer. This is especially important in connection with exits from collective farms available in some areas.
3. Since the meeting will also discuss issues of harvesting, the question will arise, which I wrote about in the letter, about issuing advances to collective farmers in grain at the rate of worked workdays and about abolishing the restriction established last year on the distribution of grain to collective farmers who have more than a certain number of workdays, leaving this restriction is only for administrative staff. No. 25/1134/sh.
Kaganovich.
28.VI-32
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1 This decision of the PB was issued on June 28 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 890. L. 8).
Stalin to Kaganovich June 29, 1932Archive: RGASPI Personal archive of M.L. Kaganovich.
28/VI
Hello Comrade Stalin!
Yesterday Mezhlauk had a conversation with Lancaster, I wanted to send you a summary of the conversation by telegraph, but in view of the importance of the details, I decided to send you a detailed record, and we proposed to Mezhlauk to drag out the answer until July 2-3. It can be seen from everything that he came for reconnaissance, albeit a serious one. He connects directly and frankly the satisfaction of the bank's interests with recognition. We have not resolved the issue, but it seems to us that his proposals are unacceptable, we need to stick to the position you wrote about. I beg you, if the volume allows, to communicate your opinion by telegram.
2) I am sending you an interesting note by Menzhinsky 1 about the Stalingrad-Moscow oil pipeline, this is of interest to Moscow, but, firstly, why not Astrakhan? .
3) About the anniversary of K. Zetkina.
4) On the first meeting of the grain procurement meeting with the participation of comrades. from Ukraine.
5) Based on Sheboldaev's letter, we will work out the proposals.
Hello to you. Your L. Kaganovich.
_____________________________
1 The note is missing.
Stalin - Voroshilov, Kaganovich June 29, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 117. Autograph.
For Kaganovich.
First. Semsudu does not need to be included in the plan, it must be charged in excess of the plan and always in full. Only in the event of a clear crop failure in one area or another can the collection of part of the loan be postponed until the next year.
Second. The same should be done with regard to the loan.
Third. When harvesting, you can give the collective farmers a small advance payment of bread.
Fourth. When laying out the plan, no concessions should be given to the individual farmer.
Stalin.
#36
29/VI. 32 1
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1 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day sent in code from Sochi at 14:00. 32 min. (Ibid. L. 116).
Stalin to Kaganovich June 29, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 120. Autograph.
Voroshilov .
Copy. Kaganovich .
HP 26. The question of the quality of aircraft cannot be glossed over; it must be raised prominently along with the question of the internal shortcomings of aviation itself. It is necessary to hurry up with the creation of the institute of zamkomtrois or pomkomtrois—this will raise the share of aviation in the district and strengthen control over it. The institute of aviation special inspectors is absolutely necessary. Your draft is good, but it must be published in the name of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee, and not only the Central Committee. If you decide to come to Sochi, grab a relief ten-verst map of the Far East and a plan for creating bases on the coast for our military fleet.
Stalin 1 .
#37
29/VI. 32 year 2On June 21, 1932, Voroshilov wrote in a letter to Stalin: “Now I literally can’t find a place for myself due to accidents in the Air Force. Not a day goes by without information about accidents and even the gravest catastrophes with human casualties in one or another district. Suffice it to point out that only from 5/VI to 20/VI 11 planes were destroyed[...] and 30 (!!!) people died][...] and our, politically reliable, composition, but extremely young, little experienced (which is natural), and most importantly, truly undisciplined. Playful manners, flaunting their flight exploits[...], not meeting a fierce struggle from the authorities; the low authority of the young commanding staff, the poor work of political agencies and party organizations, these are the main sources of our misfortunes [...] I am thinking of expelling several “deserved”, but completely undisciplined air commanders who deliberately and often violate all orders and regulations of the Red Army ”(RGASPI. F. 74. Op. 2. D. 37. L. 49, 50; Soviet leadership. Correspondence. 1928-1941 M-, 1999. S. 177-178). In response, Stalin wrote to Voroshilov on June 24: “The most alarming thing is the accidents and death of our pilots. The death of aircraft is not so terrible (to hell with them!), As the death of living people, pilots. Living people are the most valuable and most important thing in all our business, especially in aviation. Shouldn’t we—among other things—create a special post of deputy commander for aviation under the commanders of the districts, making these deputies directly responsible for the state of the aviation business in the district, which, of course, should not relieve - not in the least! - commander from responsibility for aviation affairs in the district. I think it should” (Ibid. D. 38. L. 69, 70; Soviet leadership. S. 180–181). In response to this letter, Voroshilov sent a coded message to Stalin: “Sochi. Stalin. Got a letter. I fully agree with the assessment of aviation personnel, whose training and education I have always considered the most difficult task. In accidents, it is this ridiculous reckless destruction of the best people that torments me most of all. Yesterday they sent you my draft resolution of the Central Committee on accidents. It is wrapped up in a cool way regarding the establishment of aviation of the most severe discipline, which is necessary, first of all, to save living people. In order not to lubricate the internal shortcomings of aviation, he deliberately omitted the shortcomings of the industry - product quality, lack of communications on aircraft, lack of parachutes, braking wheels, special devices for aircraft stability in the air, etc. After your letter, the thought came - whether it is worth writing about this as strongly, although briefly, as about discipline. Regarding the aviation regiments, I think your idea is correct, especially considering the forthcoming organization of air corps and armies. Now we have the chief of the air forces of the district [with] his own headquarters - and it could be renamed the commander of the air force. I think that the creation of special inspectors directly in the air brigades and the strengthening of the air inspection by people will greatly facilitate the task of leading aviation. I'm waiting for an answer on the merits of the project. 28.VI - 32 K. Voroshilov ”(Ibid., F. 558. Op. 11. D. 77. L. 121).
On July 3, 1932, the PB approved the draft resolution of the Central Committee and Council of People's Commissars proposed by Voroshilov “On the accident rate in parts of the Red Army Air Force”, the final version was drawn up on July 5 (see document Ms 181). Among other measures, it implemented Stalin's proposal to introduce the post of assistant district commanders for the Air Force (Otechestvennye archives. 1995. No. 6. P. 32–39. Publication by V. N. Shepelev).
2 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day sent in code from Sochi at 16:00. 35 min. (RGASPI. F. 558. Op. P. D. 77. L. 119).