Marx-Engels | Lenin | Stalin | Home Page
Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931–1936Source ; "Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931–1936 Moscow" (ROSSPEN), 2001
1931 - September
Stalin to Kaganovich September 1, 1931Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 76. L. 50. Handwritten text.
Kaganovich.
School and OGIZ can be published. I agree about Argentina 1 . Stalin. Nr 29/sh. 1.IX.31
_______________________________
1On July 31, 1931, the Argentine police arrested employees of the Soviet organization Yuzhamtorg in Buenos Aires. After the end of the investigation, the police handed over to the Argentine government a report in which accusations were made against Yuzhamtorg that it allegedly “led communist propaganda in a covert form” and pursued a policy of dumping. On August 20, 1931, the Argentine government deprived Yuzhamtorg of the rights of a legal entity (DVP, vol. XIV, pp. 807, 808). On September 3, 1931, the PB discussed this issue and decided to “transfer the Center for Trade with South American Countries to Uruguay[...] In order to preserve the possibility of returning to Argentina, take measures to formally preserve Yuzhamtorg, for which, if necessary , to raise in the Supreme Court of Argentina a lawsuit to declare the decree on the liquidation of Yuzhamtorg illegal ”(RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 10. L. 182-183).Kaganovich to Stalin [September 3, 1931]
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 739. L. 65–67. Autograph.
Encryption.
Stalin .
Upon receipt of your letter, 1 requested from the NKID all the data on Poland. They don't have any serious content. I send reviews of foreign press, including Polish ones, by post. Today we listened to the message of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, adopted the following resolution:
"1. Propose to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, through its representatives abroad, to probe how government circles, mainly in France and especially in Poland, react to the TASS report of August 27 and 28 and to Comrade Litvinov's interview.
2. Propose to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to submit to the PB by September 10 a detailed report on the situation that has arisen and on our possible and necessary steps on our part” 2 .
It is clear that the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs was in a hurry, did not take into account the seriousness of the issue, now it is necessary to decide what to do next. Please communicate your instructions by the 10th of IX.
To be continued.
No. 1208.
__________________________
1 In the upper left corner of Kaganovich's litter: "Beginning of September 1931".
2 The resolution was adopted by the PB on September 3, 1931 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 10. L. 183).
Kaganovich to Stalin [September 3, 1931]Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 101. L. 14. Typewritten text with corrections by the author. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 739. L. 68. Autograph.
We received from Mezhlauk, Ozersky a message about the first meeting with a group of industrialists led by Marleo, the essence is that the French tried in every possible way to find out what orders and how much. Our stated that for the first year, approximately in the amount of 300 to 600 mil. francs. The French put forward the Wangier scheme on the question of credits - an office is organized to collect our receipts for oil with the immediate transfer of the amounts at our direction, and only in case of non-payment of the bill on time will the office have the right to turn the next oil payments due to us to pay the bills. According to them, this scheme has been tested by the French and is temporary for a period of 6-18 months 1. Franzpra cannot give a guarantee or credit without settling the issue of debts. Ours replied that the Vanger scheme could not serve as a basis, that we could not link the oil contract with the agreement on orders. The French agreed to think again and asked for the text of the Italian agreement. As regards the negotiations in France, we decided for the time being to confine ourselves to the following resolution: "Instruct Comrade Pyatakov and Comrade Dvolaytsky to work out by September 5 a directive for negotiations with individual industrialists on specific orders . " So far no general directives have been given to our negotiators, because tomorrow we should get a message about a new conversation 3 .
___________________________
1 The project, put forward by the director of Petrofin, Vanger during negotiations between V. Mezhlauk and A. Ozersky and representatives of French industrialists, provided for the guarantee of Soviet payments on loans received from French industrialists with foreign exchange earnings from the export of Soviet oil to France. The Soviet side rejected this project, since it meant the transfer of Soviet export proceeds under the security (DVP. T. XIV. P. 817).
2 The resolution was adopted by the PB on September 3, 1931 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 10. L. 183).
3 The draft of the encryption signed by Kaganovich has minor discrepancies (Ibid. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 739. L. 68).
Kaganovich to Stalin on September 3 [1931]Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 739. L. 69–75. Autograph.
3/IX
Hello Comrade Stalin! I have received your letter of 30/VIII. Sent you a cipher about Poland and France.
1) Now I am sending you some materials, including Krestinsky's note. The note is of a legal and formal-logical nature; it does not have any analysis of the actual state of affairs. To all appearances, we are dealing here with a deeply thought-out and coordinated maneuver by Poland, and you are absolutely right when you point out the seriousness and importance of this matter. The Poles probably had a number of goals here: to intimidate the Germans and to give the French, at least to reactionary circles, grounds for breaking the treaty with us. In Tanya 1an article has already appeared, which emphasizes that without Poland, France cannot conclude a pact. In addition, Poland acted as a peacemaker. None of the serious people, of course, will believe her, but there are still many petty-bourgeois fools. Our diplomats, however, proceeded only from the need to calm the Germans, and, as you foresaw in your letter, they succumbed to the howl [so | of the [called] public opinion and jumped out hastily, without probing anything. Now the question is what to do next? We discussed the issue today, our decision, you know, it will only prepare, but the main thing is to decide whether we should go ahead and propose negotiations on the pact, point out to them that what Patek handed over is not any serious proposal. That is why we have refuted the rumors and talks, but now we are seriously proposing negotiations on such and such a basis.
2) About France: I am sending you the last cipher of Mezhlauk. It looks like they are being led by the nose. Instead of disrupting their united front and starting conversations with individual industrialists about specific real orders, ours continue to wait for the second and third conversations. Tomorrow we may receive new data that we will send to you. Here we have instructed to prepare a plan for specific orders.
3) I am sending you a letter from Karakhan about Japan. It seems that they in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs are being smart about something, although I conveyed to him your opinion on Troyanovsky's proposal in a timely manner. We have not raised this issue at the PB yet, we will wait for instructions from you.
4) I am sending you a letter from Stomonyakov about the Conciliation Commission. As if one could accept his proposals, I ask you to telegraph your opinion. We will postpone the 5th and wait until the 7th.
5) About cast iron pipes, we have canceled the order now. The situation is really difficult with pipes (i.e. without pipes), but you are right that you need to be as careful as possible with the currency and bring in more internal resources, which is why we delayed the order 6. As for the general situation with the currency, it is very tense, but when we drew up the September plan, it turned out that there was almost nothing to cut, since the main amount of expenses is payments that cannot be reduced, with the exception of non-ferrous metals (cable, etc. .). Here we discussed how to practically ensure the implementation of the PB directive that in the first half of 1932 there would be no payments of more than 250-260 million [million] rubles. It turns out, according to the calculation, that we already have debts payable, 232 mil. no 4th quarter and no non-trading expenses, so you're a thousand times right that we need to tighten our grip on new orders right now.
6) I will send you our proposals for transport as soon as they are ready. We will try to have them ready tomorrow, today we had a commission where we had to put the question firmly again, as we did then at the conference. The fact is that we seem to have felt in relation to wagons what we then felt in relation to steam locomotives, we were looking for a way out on the same tracks. The cars are destroyed, there is no owner, not a single road is responsible for the car, so we are looking for ways to eliminate the depersonalization of the car. The railroad workers are smiling and laughing - they say this cannot be done, but tomorrow we will meet again and I hope we will work out proposals. I will write to you in detail in my next letter.
I'll end with this. Greetings Comrade Molotov.
Shake your hand. Your L. Kaganovich.
PS I have just received the requested text of the document handed over by Patek, I am sending it to you.
L. Kaganovich.
______________________
1 So in the text.
Stalin, Molotov to Kaganovich, Rudzutak, Ordzhonikidze [September 3, 1931]Archive: RGASPI F. 82. Op. 2. D. 1424. L. 61–62. Stalin's autograph.
Kaganovich, Rudzutak, Ordzhonikidze.
Today we received the decision of the Foreign Exchange Commission approved by the Politburo on additional imports of steel worth five million rubles. We consider this decision to be a circumvention of the July decision of the Politburo, where the final metal import program for 1931 was established. The same doubts are caused by another decision of the currency commission on additional imports of wagon axles and wheels. If an annulment of the July decision of the Politburo is required, it must be said openly and directly, without resorting to detours. We ask you to suspend the implementation of these resolutions of the currency commission and postpone the issue until the arrival of Molotov and Stalin, who took part in the development of the July decision of the Politburo. Waiting for an answer 1 . Stalin, Molotov 2 .
___________________________
1 See the introduction to the section for details.
2 At the end of the letter, the secretary's note: "3/IX - 31 Sochi."
Stalin to Kaganovich September 4 [1931]Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 99. L. 16–19. Autograph.
4/IX
Hello, Comrade Kaganovich!
I received your letter.
1) I think that the tractors of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture will have to be used in every possible way for the timber industry for the winter period. If you have a serious talk with Yakovlev, I think he will not object .
2) I do not understand how the PB could agree with the proposals of the Supreme Economic Council for the additional import of wagon axles and wheels and high-quality] steel. Both proposals represent a direct circumvention of the July decision of the Central Committee (adopted in the presence of Sergo, Pyatakov, Bron, Molotov, Stalin) on the final metal import program for 1931. As far as I understand, you and Rudzutaka were simply deceived. It is not good and disgusting if we begin to deceive each other. We have already sent a corresponding telegram to PB2 .
3) I strongly object to the decision of the PB to replace the export of butter and eggs with other types of export products. This is nonsense from the point of view of the current conjuncture. You are pressing hard on the export of grain in every possible way, when pennies are paid for bread , and you want to hold back and eliminate the export of butter and eggs, which are a more profitable export commodity. Where is the point? Wouldn't it be better to hold back the export of bread and increase the export of butter, or, in extreme cases, increase both if you really want to earn currency, and not play export 3 .
4) The Politburo decided, as can be seen from the protocol, to release 18 mil. poods of grain to enhance livestock procurement 4 . This, perhaps, is not bad. But it is strange that of these 18 mil. pounds 6 mil. poods (1/3!) swore to the "reserve" of NKsnab . What is this "reserve" of NKsnab? What was it for? Why such boundless trust in NKsnab and equally boundless distrust in the state, which actually should be the only custodian of such large reserves? How did the state deserve such distrust on the part of the NKsnab? How could you allow this debauchery? Couldn't this "NKsnab reserve" be transferred to the reserve of the State (SNK of the USSR) so that it could be spent only with the permission of the PB or SNK? 5
5) Do not ask about health. If you wish me good health, have maximum vigilance and do not let yourself be fooled by the heroes of departmentalism.
Best wishes. I. Stalin.
6) The decision of the PB to issue the Order of Lenin to various persons makes a bad impression . It was too easy to give orders. If this continues, the order will be vulgarized, and its issuance will be deprived of any moral force. Under no circumstances should this be allowed! Tell Postyshev not to succumb to the pressure of the nobles-bureaucrats who are seeking orders for their fellow bureaucrats .
7) I have not read the resolutions on wages for metal and coal. Tell Postyshev that I vote for them by confidence .
I. St.
PS T. Kaganovich!
1) Request to wait until my arrival with the production of new appointments for Rukhimovich, Quiring and other NPCs .
Don't you think that Postnikov, Rukhimovich's closest friend and co-bureaucrat, should also be removed or, more correctly, transferred to one of the roads (say, to the MVB instead of Polyudov)?
2) Sheboldaev visited me and asked me to give him 5 outside workers (local workers, that is, the old North Caucasian workers settled down there and are no longer suitable). I think we should satisfy him. It would be possible to give him Queering for a krayplan, for example.
I. St.
______________________________
On September 5, 1931, a resolution of the Central Committee on logging and logging was adopted, which noted that “party, Soviet and economic organizations do not pay due attention to this matter. As a result, the removal of timber and firewood[...] for the period from July 1 to August 20 amounted to only 17.4% of the plan for the third quarter.” The People's Commissariat of Agriculture was instructed to allocate 500 caterpillar tractors and 1 thousand wheeled tractors for the removal of timber for the period from December 15 to February 15 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 846. L. 31-34).
2 See the introduction to the section for details.
3 On August 30, 1931, the PB, considering the export-import and foreign exchange plan for September, instructed a specially created commission "to develop the question of the possibility of replacing the export of butter, eggs, poultry and cod with other types of export products for the same amount" (Ibid. F 17. Inv. 162. D. 10. L. 176). On September 8, 1931, the PB decided "not to allow changes in the established export plan for butter, eggs and berries" for September (Ibid. D. 11. L. 3).
4 The decision of the collegium of the People's Commissariat of Supply on the organization of a new cattle procurement campaign, about which Stalin writes, was approved by the PB on August 30, 1931 (Ibid. Op. 3. D. 845. L. 15-23).
5 After Stalin's letter on September 8, 1931, the PB, in an amendment to the resolution of August 30, decided to consider the reserve of grain for meat procurement in the amount of 6 million pounds not as a reserve of the People's Commissariat of Supply, but as a reserve of the Council of People's Commissars, the expenditure of which should be made according to the resolutions of the PB (Ibid. D. 847 L. 7). On October 19, 1931, the inviolable fund (nepfond) and the mobilization fund (mobfund) were declared the funds of the STO (Ibid. Op. 162. D. 11. L. 24). On October 19, 1931, the NEPFund and the MobFund were transferred to the Committee of Reserves under the STO (GA RF. F. R-5446. Op. 57. D. 16. L. 53).
6Postyshev headed the PB commission for awards, which considered petitions from various departments and local authorities for awarding orders of the USSR. On August 24, 1931, Postyshev sent for approval to the PB the next protocol of the commission meeting, which contained a proposal to award 44 people with the Order of Lenin and 18 with the Order of the Red Banner of Labor. The award was mainly given to employees of industrial enterprises (GA RF. F. R-3316. Op. 64. D. 1128. L. 47). On August 25, 1931, the PB approved this list of awards (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 844. L. 1). Despite the criticism of Stalin, the commission continued to work actively in the future. The flow of requests for awards was so great that on January 29, 1933, Postyshev turned to Yenukidze, Secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, with the following request: “I am sending you all the materials of the commission on awards. For the reason that, that I can’t do this every day now, I ask you to instruct your apparatus to consider and prepare materials for their subsequent consideration by the commission ”(GA RF. F. R-3316. Op. 65. D. 73. L. 9). By October 1935, over 16,000 people were awarded orders of the USSR (Ibid. D. 144. L. 5).
7 The resolution on the restructuring of the wage system in metallurgy and the coal industry was approved by the PB on September 10, 1931. It was decided to publish it on behalf of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Supreme Council of National Economy and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 847. L .2). On September 20, after additional correspondence with Stalin (documents No. 60, 61), the PB decided to change this decision to publish the decision only on behalf of the Supreme Council of National Economy and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (Ibid. D. 849. L. I).
Stalin, Molotov - Kaganovich, Rudzutak [September 5, 1931]Archive: RGASPI F. 82. Op. 2. D. 1424. L. 63–65. Stalin's autograph.
Kaganovich, Rudzutak.
We must reject outright the Wanger principle and, in general, any idea of a security deposit on our part. Pyatakov's old agreement with the French loses all meaning in the present situation, when we have the best credit conditions in Germany, Italy and England. Either the French accept the Italo-German terms of the loan, or they can go to hell. If the French do not dare to guarantee credits, As a last concession, English conditions may be offered to them, where credits for us pass satisfactorily, but without the direct guarantee of the English.
As regards Poland, try to find out the real intentions of the Polpr and, if there is any serious lead, seize on it.
As regards Lena-Goldfields, we propose, as an extreme concession, to end the matter by promising to pay Lena, together with her creditors, a maximum of 8-10 million rubles with an installment plan of 6-7 years, so that the concessionaire gives a document renouncing all claims and completely liquidating the case .
Stalin, Molotov 2 .
________________________
1 This proposal by Stalin and Molotov was formalized by the PB decision of September 8, 1931 (F. 17. Op. 162. D. 11. L. 4).
2 On the last page of the letter there is a note: "5/IX - 31 Sochi".
Kaganovich, Rudzutak, Ordzhonikidze - to Stalin, Molotov September 6, 1931Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 76. L. 1. Handwritten text.
Encryption.
Stalin, Molotov.
They made an account of the remnants of the contingents of the Supreme Economic Council for ferrous metals. It was established, according to the data of the NKVneshtorg, disputed by the Supreme Economic Council, that it will be checked additionally that 147 million out of the total amount of 156 million rubles were spent; the balance of 9 million rubles consists of unused 5 million and 4 million savings due to lower prices. When deciding on the purchase of high-quality steels worth 5 million, the PB proceeded precisely from the possibility of purchasing not in excess, but at the expense of the contingents of the Supreme Economic Council for ferrous metals. The acuteness of the need for high-quality steel for the start-up and operation of automotive and tractor plants is undeniable. Orders for wagon axles and wheels come from the general contingents of the Supreme Council of National Economy for equipment (this will be required) ... 1 there will be an urgent need for the production of platforms. Today, the PB decided to delay the execution of both the first and second orders until your response.
Waiting for your urgent reply 2 .
Kaganovich, Rudzutak, Ordzhonikidze.
No. 1213/sh.
6.IX.31
_____________________
1 Refine the document.
2 See the introduction to the section for details.
Kaganovich to Stalin on September 6 [1931]Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 739. L. 76–87. Autograph.
6/IX
Hello Comrade Stalin!
1) Today we received your encryption about France. Your instructions fully coincide with the attitude of the members of the PB to the proposals of the French. Tomorrow we will convene the PB and issue a directive to our negotiators in accordance with your instructions 1 .
2) About Poland. A reconnaissance order has been issued. On the 10th we will hear Litvinov, we will not make any decisions, I will tell you everything we find out.
3) Yesterday at the PB they heard a report on grain procurements. From the beginning of grain procurements to September 1, only 373 mil. 834 thousand pounds, i.e. 23.7 [%] of the annual plan. Last year, 202 mil. pounds, which is 185% compared to last year. It is especially gratifying that the last sixth five-day period gives a sharp jump up. During this five-day period, about 78 mil. pounds. The Central Volga, Lower Volga, Bashrepublika, Siberia and the Urals are still lagging behind in terms of grain procurements. Harvesting of wheat and especially oats is going badly. This is what we noted in the decision of PB 2 . Since the situation with grain procurements 3 is not going badly so far, we have not taken any special decisions.
4) In close connection with the question of grain procurements, we had the question of the supply of commodities, but in view of the fact that no exact data were presented both on the available commodity fund and on its distribution, we appointed a special commission, which was instructed to find out everything within five days. position and submit specific proposals to the PB 4 .
5) We had a dispute on the preparation for the autumn season. Mikoyan proposed to cut the plan for the second half of the year. We rejected his proposal and approved a plan to mine 13 mil. centners 5 . At the same time, we adopted a resolution on subdividing Soyuzryba into Vostokryba (Khabarovsk), Sevryba (Leningrad) and Soyuzryba (Moscow). By the way, I can tell you that we have developed your proposal on the organization and development of fisheries in the Moscow Region. The Moscow Committee adopted a detailed resolution, which I am sending you just in case. The case turned out to be very big. We set ourselves the task of achieving, by the year 34, an annual receipt of 1 mil. 200 thousand pounds of fresh fish.
6) The situation with ferrous metallurgy is unimportant. We listened to the reports of the Supreme Economic Council, Myshkov and Ivanchenko. Inasmuch as the Supreme Council of National Economy revealed the shortcomings of the enterprises and outlined a number of practical measures, we approved these measures, but I must say that both Myshkov and Ivanchenko are not fully aware of the subjective shortcomings of economic management. There was also the issue of spinning off new construction projects from existing associations so that they would focus only on the operation of existing plants, but we removed the issue in order to ask you. Please let me know your opinion.
7) For the Kharkov Tractor and AMO, we have set firm deadlines for the opening and start-up of factories from October 1st. The question of imports was raised, but we removed it not without controversy.
8) I am sending you draft resolutions on railway and water transport. We postponed the question until September 10th or 15th. We developed the Decree on railway transport in battles with the NKPS. Along with the questions about the steam locomotive, the coupled ride, the question of the carriage is highlighted in particular. Cars are destroyed, the efficiency of their use falls. As a result, a significant part of the wagons is listed on paper and is not actually used for transportation. The car has no owner. Roads not only do not care about repairs, but they try to float a half-sick or sick car onto another road. With repair points in the places of exchange for wagons, it happened worse than with the depot, they were almost completely abolished. That is why we adopted a resolution on attaching the wagon fleet to the roads, making them responsible for the condition of the wagons. Of course, there is a difference here from a steam locomotive, the wagon has a much larger field for mileage and passes along different roads, but these difficulties can be eliminated: firstly, by establishing an appropriate system of calculation between roads and, secondly, by correctly setting up transportation planning and, in particular, expanding the practice of block trains. It seems to me that the elimination of the depersonalization of the wagon will force the NKPS and the roads to better plan transportation, prevent empty runs and fight for the efficient use of wagons and the actual implementation of self-financing.
Two sections are not included. In one section, Rukhimovich offered a list of those new construction projects that should be delayed due to a shortage of rails. We have postponed this issue. We instructed the service station to work on the issue in order to discuss the issue around the time of your arrival.
It seems to me that here Rukhimovich wants in advance to absolve himself of responsibility for the failure to fulfill the construction plan. The second section not included concerns imports. The sub-committee on capital construction and technical supply made a number of proposals for imports for the NKPS. We have now removed them. Antipov and the NKVneshtraders were instructed to carefully earn extra money in the sense of a decisive reduction. In any case, we will not put it on the PB now, but as soon as it is ready, I will send it to you. To counterbalance these hopes for imports, we have inserted a clause on the mobilization of all domestic transport resources. The same sections that have been developed seem to provide an answer to the most important questions of transport. I kindly ask you to send your opinion either by letter or telegram.
9) Similarly, we have postponed the question of a plan for the capital construction of nitrogen plants. Doubt took over whether the plan was not too big, whether we would not succeed in the same way as with the Gosplan metal projectors. I beg you to tell me your opinion, or you can completely postpone until your arrival 6 .
10) From the minutes of the PB you will see a decision on the issue raised by Gorky, on the publication of the history of factories and factories. The history and essence of the issue are as follows: on the eve of the PB, Gorky called me that he had a proposal to publish the history of factories and factories. He asked to discuss the issue and immediately asked if he could come to the PB. I answered yes. Gorky did not send the promised materials. During the discussion of the question in the PB, I had to come up with some objections to the directives given by Gorky, and in passing offended Bukharin as well. Firstly, the very idea of the publication is vague, not defined. Secondly, according to Gorky, it will be mainly the history of the plant in the technical sense. Moreover, this is precisely what serves as a justification for publishing this story in a scientific and technical publishing house. He proposed the following editorial: Averbakh, Alexandrov, Bukharin, Troysky, Gorky, Yenukidze, Zhiga, Vs. Ivanov, Krzhizhanovsky, Libedinsky, Leonov, Postyshev, Pyatakov, Sverdlov, Seifulina, Tikhonov, Troitsky, Chubar, Chumandrin, Shvernik. This list alone is a vivid illustration of the vagueness of this whole story, and the technicians are the least here. I pointed out that the tasks of this history should be defined more precisely, that it cannot be filled mainly with factory equipment, that it would rather be concrete material on the example of a factory for the history of the labor movement, the change in the face of psychology, the socio-economic situation and the life of workers. I emphasized that technical propaganda must not be understood in such a way as to tear it away from politics, that such a tendency exists, for example, in Comrade Bukharin, who, on the one hand, opens a new phase of our revolution, namely the "technical" revolution, on the other hand, when he connects with politics, it is inappropriate, as it was in his speech in Sokolniki. Yes, I also pointed out that in Bukharin's speech published in For Industrialization there are elements of "Bogdanovism". We approved Gorky's proposal and instructed the secretariat to formulate a resolution and draw up a wording; the proposed wording, of course, is not suitable7. It seems to me that here Bukharin is passing something of his own through Gorky. I learned that Gorky made this proposal to publish the history of factories and factories at the plenum of the RAPP, and it was as if he suggested to the Rappovites that Bukharin should be the editor of this publication. Incidentally, Bukharin also spoke at the plenum of the RAPP. Apparently, in general, contact is being established between Gorky and the Rappovites, and Bukharin somehow joins this contact. This pushed me even more to strike at Bukharin. He immediately wrote me a note in which he complains with “bitter” tears about the atmosphere of hostility, saying, “So you decided to beat me again, really,” he asks, “it’s all because of the soap (Sokolniki),” etc. He pretends not to understand that his current soap is the same as his bricks from the Economist's Notes. I am firmly convinced that he cannot be trusted, he is hostile to our line, the line of the Party.
11) At a closed meeting of the PB, we discussed the issue of importing steel and axles in connection with your telegram. We had to quarrel again, because Sergo demanded that we not suspend orders, but we defended that, regardless of sending us a telegram, suspend orders until the issue was clarified. The PB adopted this last one. As to the question on the merits, according to all the figures of the NKVneshtorg, the Supreme Council of National Economy still has 156 million in the contingent. Residues that make it possible to order steel within the contingents. When we adopted this resolution, I insisted that it be written not additionally, but within the limits of the contingents. In any case, we have now suspended the order. Well enough.
Goodbye. Shake your hand. Your L. Kaganovich.
Greetings Comrade Molotov.
_____________________________
On September 8, 1931, the PB considered the question "On France" and accepted the proposal of Stalin and Molotov (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 11. L. 6), set out in their telegram (see document No. 43) . At the same time, the PB proposed to negotiate with individual industrialists on specific orders, without signing contracts until a trade agreement was concluded. YL. Pyatakov, A.P. Rozengolts and N.N. Krestinsky were instructed to develop a draft text of the statement to the French industrialists (Ibid., L. 4).
On September 25, the PB adopted a resolution in which it proposed to the Narkomsnab and local party organizations to increase the procurement of wheat and oats (Ibid. Op. 3. D. 846. L/4).
3 In the draft letter - livestock.
4 The commission included: Postyshev, Mikoyan, R.S. Zemlyachka, R. YaLevin, Ya.A. Yakovlev, I.G. Eremin, I.A. Zelensky, L.N. Ibid. L. 5).
5 On September 5, the PB decided “not to change the annual production plan of the fishing industry”, instructing the STO to establish a catch production program for the second half of the year and enter it into the PB (Ibid., L. 4). On September 10, 1931, the PB approved the plan for catching fish in the second half of 1931, adopted by the STO on September 6, in the amount of 12 million centners (Ibid. D. 847. L. 11).
6 The question of the plan for the capital construction of nitrogen plants was repeatedly raised at meetings of the PB at the beginning of 1931. On October 15, 1931, after Stalin returned from vacation, the PB decided to transfer this issue for consideration to the STO (Ibid. D. 854. L. 9 ).
7On September 5, 1931, the PB approved Gorky's proposal to prepare an edition of the history of factories and factories (Ibid. D. 846. L. 2). After additional discussion (see documents No. 65, 66, 68, 71) on October 10, a decision was made to publish a series of collections “The History of Plants”. It said: “These collections should give a picture of the development of old and the emergence of new factories, their role in the country's economy, the position of workers before the revolution, the forms and methods of exploitation in old factories, the struggle of workers against entrepreneurs, living conditions, the emergence of revolutionary organizations and the role of each factory in the revolutionary movement, the role of the factory and the change in relations at the factory after the revolution, the change in the type of worker, shock work, socialist competition and the rise in production in recent years ”(Ibid. D. 853. L. 12). The editorial board proposed by Stalin was approved (see.
8 The work of N.I. Bukharin “Notes of an Economist (On the Beginning of a New Economic Year)” was first published in Pravda on September 30, 1928. The article criticized the course towards forced industrialization, which was advocated in the PB by Stalin’s group, and in particular it was said, that "from "future bricks" it is impossible to build "real" factories.
Kaganovich to Stalin on September 6 [1931]Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 739. L. 88–90. Autograph.
6/IX
Hello again, Comrade Stalin!
I have just received your letter of 4/IX.
1) On the question of orders for steel, the PB gave its consent, based on the total contingents of the Supreme Council of National Economy of 156 million, which have not yet been fully used. Of course, if we proceed from the figure of 1m[ln] 300t[ys] tons of metal, then this figure has already been exhausted and every new order goes beyond these contingents. Maybe we misunderstand here what contingents we are talking about. Probably, this is also affected by the fact that I was the least involved in currency issues and not quite aware of many of the previous installations, but I fight for the currency against departmentalism. Evidence of this is the fact that it was on the issues of currency and imports that I had repeated, sharp fights with Sergo.
2) On the replacement of the export of eggs and butter, the PB only instructed the commission to discuss the possibility of a replacement. Now they are making a proposal to replace it with sugar, cake, but we will discuss this on the 10th and reject this proposal, i.e. we will remain on the basis of the export plan, although the plan has already been overfulfilled in terms of oil, instead of 19 thousand [thousand] tons, 24 thousand [thousand] tons have already been exported (including September), but we will include an additional plan.
3) About 18 mil. pud. to enhance livestock production. 6 mil. left not yet distributed, so that now not everything is distributed, but regulated depending on the progress of the blanks. Of course, we did not mean that the NKSnab would dispose of them itself, it was written unsuccessfully. It should be added that the NKSnab submit for approval by the Central Committee, or how do you propose to transfer the SNK with the approval of the Central Committee
4) You are absolutely right about the orders, it didn’t turn out well, we will be more vigilant. I am very sorry that our mistakes prevent you from recovering. We all need your health, the entire Party!
I wish you all the best. Your L. Kaganovich.
Stalin, Molotov to Kaganovich, Rudzutak, Ordzhonikidze [September 6, 1931]Archive: RGASPI F. 82. Op. 2. D. 1424. L. 66–73. Autograph of Stalin and Molotov.
Kaganovich, Rudzutak, Ordzhonikidze.
1. You did not answer the question: does the July decision of the Politburo on the final program of orders for metal in 1931 remain in force or is considered cancelled. It is clear to us that your decision to import metal worth 5 million rubles means giving new orders for metal in excess of the program that was established in July by the Politburo with the participation of Sergo, Pyatakov, Rozengolts, Bron, Mezhlauk. This means a disguised reversal of the July decision of the Politburo and a breakthrough in our foreign exchange front, to which we object.
2. The metal import program is set by the Politburo in tons, not in rubles. Both of your decisions about additional imports ignore the decision of the Politburo, expressed in tons. The amount of imports you mention at 156 million rubles is unknown to us and has not been approved by the Politburo. The replacement of the calculation of imports of metal in tons by the calculation in rubles is wrong, because it makes it easier to circumvent the July decision of the Politburo.
3. Savings of 4 million currency are the property of the state treasury, and not the Supreme Economic Council, which does not and should not have a treasury. We are against the anarcho-syndicalist view of the state, according to which the profits from savings go to the Supreme Council of National Economy, and the losses to the state. We believe that the state is superior to the Supreme Economic Council.
4. The unused 5 million cannot be used for metal imports, since the metal import program for 1931 remains in force and is scheduled by country. The question of the use of this money should be discussed especially, taking into account the interests of the state as a whole, and not just the Supreme Council of National Economy.
5. It should be remembered that our monetary position is desperate. It should not be forgotten that it will be even more difficult for us in the next two years due to the increasing reduction in our exports to Italy, Germany, England and America. It should also be remembered that North America, the current hegemon of the financial world and our main enemy, is making and will make every effort to undermine our monetary position. Do you consider this perspective? You can't act with your eyes closed. How do you think to deal with these difficulties? How do you think the decision of the Politburo on the accumulation of minimum foreign exchange reserves should be implemented?
6. We insist on the cancellation of both your decisions on orders for steel and wagon axles and wheels. In case of your disagreement, we propose to schedule a special meeting of the Politburo with a summons for both of us .
Stalin, Molotov 2 .
______________________________
1 See the introduction to the section for details.
2 There is a note on the document: “6.IX.31 Sochi”.
Stalin to Kaganovich September 7 [1931]Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 99. L. 21–23. Autograph.
Hello, Comrade Kaganovich!
1) Received Patek's draft and Karahan's "conversation" with Patek. I return both documents. Apparently, Karakhan behaved stupidly and indecently during the "conversation". Karakhan did not understand that after the story with the French (TASS refutation given on 1 1/2months ago) no state would dare to take the initiative on a non-aggression pact without getting "troubled" by the "opposition". Karakhan did not understand that the Poles were trying to start negotiations with us about the pact, but to start in such a way that formally the initiative did not come from them. Karakhan did not understand that in the end it is indifferent to us on whose initiative the negotiations take place, as long as the pact we need is signed. And so, instead of clinging to the occasion given by Patek and his project, Karahan foolishly pushed Patek away and ruined the deal. As regards the Patek project, it is no worse than the original French draft, which, as is well known, served as one of the bases for negotiations between us and the French .
It is clear to me that Karakhan and Litvinov made a gross mistake, the elimination of which requires a more or less long time.
By the way, why was Patek's project handed over to Karakhan, and not to Litvinov or Krestinsky? Be sure to investigate this matter and let me know, please.
2) Please find out what is equal to: a) the volume of industrial production (including the food industry) in August compared to July 31 , b) the volume of industrial production in August compared to August 30 , c ) the volume of industrial products (including food) for 8 months of this year in comparison with 8 months of last year - and let me know by telegraph.
Greetings I. Stalin.
7/IX
________________________
1 The non-aggression pact between the USSR and France, after long negotiations, was initialed on August 10, 1931 (DVP. T. XTV. pp. 452–454).
Stalin to Kaganovich September 8, 1931Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 76. L. 52. Autograph.
Kaganovich .
I read the draft of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs about the Soviet-German Conciliation Commission. We cannot promise the Germans a currency transfer for proceeds from personal movable property, and we cannot also transfer the balance of the currency amount through this line. I am against points 2 and 3 of the NKID. Otherwise, the Germans will suck millions of currency out of us. The Germans must be told that according to Soviet laws, emigration cannot be encouraged, and the abuse of the right to emigrate in order to suck currency out of the USSR is even less encouraged. Only in extreme cases, and then only in relation to the Germans, can one agree to the issuance of currency in the amount of one tenth of the proceeds from the sale of personal movable property.
Stalin.
Nr 31/sh.
9:45 a.m.
8/IX-31 1
____________________________
1 Date, number and time entered by the secretary.
Kaganovich to Stalin, Molotov September 8, 1931Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 76. L. 53. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
Sent from Moscow on September 8 at 20:35.
Received for decryption 8.IX. at 23:30
Stalin, Molotov.
I am announcing the decision of the Politburo on imports: "To cancel the decision of the Politburo of August 30 on the import of high-quality steel, wagon wheels and axles, by proposing to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade to suspend all negotiations on giving these orders."
Kaganovich.
No. 1250/sh.
Kaganovich, Postyshev to Stalin, Molotov September 8, 1931Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 76. L. 54. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
Dispatched from Moscow 8.IX. at 20:35. Received for interpretation on 9. IX at 0:45.
Stalin, Molotov.
Asatkin, the former chairman of the Far Eastern Executive Committee, is scheduled to be the trade representative to Japan. Please provide your opinion. Postyshev, Kaganovich. No. 1252/sh.
Kaganovich to Stalin, Molotov September 8 [1931]
Archive: RGASPI F. 558 Op. 11. D. 739. L. 91–95. Autograph.
8/IX
Hello tt. Stalin and Molotov!
Today we have convened an extraordinary meeting of the PB to resolve some issues, primarily the issue of imports. Although Sergo went to Nizhny for a couple of days, we decided not to wait for him and resolve the issue. The amended report from NKVneshtorg that I received today makes some changes to the figures reported in my previous letter. From the plan for the import of rolled metal established by the PB in 1931 in 1 m [ln] 300 thousand [thousand] tons worth 99 m [ln] 545 thousand [thousand] rubles. already purchased before September 1, 1 m[yln] 189 t[ys] tons worth 90 m[ys] 25 t[ys] For cast iron, 100 t[ys] tons were installed, 100 t[ys] 250 tons have already been purchased. The contingent for high-quality steel is set at 31 t[thousand] tons, 50 t[thousand] tons have already been ordered. The pipeline contingent was installed at 60,000 tons, and 69,000 tons have already been purchased. For ferroalloys, the contingent was 23 t[th] 657 t[t]; 31 t[th] tons were ordered. If we add up all the contingents together with the addition of the established 2 million [mln] 400 thousand [thousand] rubles. for Moscow, then the total amount is 156 million [mln] rubles, of which 149 million [million] 475 thousand [thousand] rubles were sold as of September 1, part of which was due to savings.
When we resolved this issue, these data were not available. Rosengoltz argued only about economy. He did not dispute that the VSNKh had free contingents. He was very pleased when I made a proposal to write down that this was at the expense of the contingents of the Supreme Council of National Economy. In a word, be that as it may, you are right that when solving such issues, you need to check it 10 times. Especially now, when the situation with the currency is really difficult.
After your encryption, we asked about the general use of all contingents. Of course, we did not receive exact data right away, but apparently the contingents are exceeded for a number of orders. According to preliminary data, the total contingent of 579 million. implemented for 389 million, and in the process of placement 312 million, i.е. at 122 mil. more, and NKTorg does not know about it for sure. Therefore, today we instructed Rudzutak, Roz[engolyg], Pyatakov to find out exactly whether the contingents were exceeded, and to give us accurate data on the entire course of implementation. Maybe there are some orders that can and should be removed.
We also discussed the question of exports. We left butter, eggs, berries completely, although Mikoyan of course objected, but we reduced the poultry and bacon, but added cake and sugar. Rozengolts was entirely for this, since he receives 75 wagonloads to fulfill the contracts for poultry, and he just needs cake and sugar. Mikoyan undertook to deliver the cake.
In Italy, we received a telegram from Kursky and, in general, information that our people there were shifting from one foot to the other and did not put before the Italian government those questions that we had entrusted to them, so we considered it necessary to give them instructions again .
About France: we issued directives in accordance with your proposal, at the same time instructing Pyatakov, Roz[engolets] and Krest[insky] to draw up, just in case, a draft statement of our negotiators to the French, as soon as it is ready, I will send you.
There was a big dispute about bread under warrant loans, we decided in favor of NKVneshtorg, we asked you.
I kindly ask you to communicate your opinion on the following issue: the situation of the Murmansk and Northern [northern] roads will be very difficult in terms of fuel. The way out was to send migrants there and part of the servicemen from the GPU, but at one time there was a decision to withdraw them from there. The OGPU is still against the premise 2 . How to be?
Well, I'll end with this.
Shake your hand. Your L. Kaganovich.
____________________________
On September 8, 1931, the PB decided to send a telegram to Soviet representatives at trade negotiations in Italy demanding that all export-related issues be raised with the Italian government (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 11. L. 3).
On August 20, 1931, considering the issue of the situation with fuel, the PB made a decision: “Consider it necessary to transfer the Murmansk, Northern and Perm railways to wood fuel. For this purpose, to provide the maximum possible number of labor from the services and special settlers ”(Ibid. Op. 3. D. 843. L. 3). On September 15, 1931, the PB confirmed its decision of August 20 and instructed the OPTU to ensure the implementation of this decision without removing the workforce from those jobs where they are carried out on the basis of special resolutions of the PB (Ibid. Op. 162. D. 11. L. 7).Stalin - Ordzhonikidze September 9, 1931
Archive: RGASPI. F. 81. Op. 3. D. 99. L. 27–28. Certified typewritten copy.
9/IX 31 Copy.
Hello Sergo!
Got a letter. Zina has arrived. He suggested that she move to Puzanovka, where it is much more spacious than on Zenzinovka, but she did not want to and stayed on Zenzinovka.
1) Finally, the PB canceled its decisions on additional imports of steel. This is very good. It is time to understand that we are facing a financial and monetary storm, which is organized by the United States against us and against which we, the Bolsheviks, are obliged to take the most ferocious measures. Should we be bankrupt in a year or two and thereby ruin all our economic plans, or should we prevent bankruptcy? Now we can finally hope that the Bolsheviks (more-she-vi-ki!) will try (p-t-t-t-t-t!) to take the first (first!) Step towards the implementation of the repeated decisions of the Party Congresses and the Party Central Committee on on the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves .
2) It is also clear that we, members of the Central Committee in particular, must not and cannot fool each other. There is nothing to prove that the proposal for additional imports of steel, etc. - without a direct and honest raising of the question of canceling the July decision of the PB - was an attempt to deceive the Central Committee (Kaganovich, Rudzutak, etc.). It is not difficult for the Pyatakovs to take the same non-Bolshevik path, since the Bolshevik law is not binding on them. The Bolsheviks cannot take such a path, unless, of course, they want to turn our Bolshevik Party into a conglomeration of departmental gangs. PB created clarity here too.
3) You say: give a way out, point out where to get steel, wagon axles and wheels, etc. I think that we will never find a way out and we will never have a sufficient quantity of steel, axles, wheels, etc., if we do not now reduce the import of these items to a minimum, if we do not organize the production of these items here right now , if we do not immediately put pressure on our own economic apparatus and force it to comply with the repeated decisions of the Central Committee on the organization of steel production on a large scale on our ownown factories. Why is the reconstruction of the Ural steel plants going sloppy to the point of disgrace? Why are military factories not used to the fullest to produce high-quality steels? Because the economic apparatus hopes for the stupidity and bungling of the Central Committee, the economic apparatus hopes that the Central Committee will give its consent to additional imports. The task is to eliminate this hope for the stupidity of the Central Committee. What is better: to press on the state currency cash desk, protecting the peace of the economic apparatus, or to press on the economic apparatus, protecting the interests of the state? I think the latter is better than the former.
Well, that's all for now. Do not scold me for being rude and, perhaps, for being too direct. However, you can scold as much as you like. Your I. Stalin.
Stalin, Molotov - Kaganovich September 9, 1931Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 76. L. 54. Autograph of Molotov.
Kaganovich .
We agree on the account of Asatkin 1 and grain warranting 2 . Stalin, Molotov. 20 o'clock No. 32/sh. 9/IX. 31 y. 3
___________________
1 The appointment of A.N. Asatkin as a trade representative to Japan was approved by a survey of PB members on September 12, 1931 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 848. L. 9).
On September 8, 1931, the PB confirmed the decision of the currency commission on the concentration of 560 thousand tons of grain in the ports for warranting. Rozengolts and Mikoyan had to establish such a procedure for storing grain in ports that would not cause additional costs associated with the movement of grain (Ibid. Op. 162. D. 11. L. 4).
3 Date, time and number entered by the secretary.
Stalin to Kaganovich September 9, 1931Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 99. L. 25–26. Autograph.
Hello, Comrade Kaganovich!
1) I am sending you a copy of my letter to Sergo about the import of steel and everything related to this matter. Sergo does not know that a copy has been sent to you - I did not tell him about this, sparing his pride (you know that he is stupidly proud). But you should be aware of this letter, which is of some interest from the point of view of the Central Committee and its economic policy.
2) You must have already received a copy of my telegram to Tiflis about Transcaucasian affairs. I am sending you some documents 1 which served as the basis for my telegram to Tiflis. I think that Polonsky made a big faux pas when he attacked the Zakkraykom and Yakovlev. This inconsistency needs to be corrected.
3) The decision of the Supreme Council of National Economy on ferrous metallurgy, published in the press, makes a strange impression. An equally strange impression is produced by the statement in the editorial of Pravda that the resolution of the Supreme Council of National Economy was approved by the Central Committee . The same strange impression is produced by the decision of the People's Commissariat for Supply of Cattle, also approved by the Central Committee. Why was this innovation necessary? Why is all this approved by the Central Committee and not by the Council of People's Commissars? Why bypass and ignore SNK? Why do they want to make the Central Committee a participant in this unjustified ignorance? Secondly, what kind of manner is this to turn the PB into an organ for stamping the decisions of the Supreme Council of National Economy, the People's Commissariat for Economic Assistance, the People's Commissariat of Land, etc. Is it possible to stop these attempts to transform the Central Committee from a leading organ into an auxiliary organ?for individual commissariat needs.
Well, that's all for now. Shake your hand. 9/IX-31. I. Stalin.
_____________________________
1 Documents are not published. See RGASPI. F. 81. Op. 3. D. 99. L. 29–30.
2 The Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council on the work of the ferrous metallurgy was approved by the PB on September 5, 1931 (Ibid. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 846. L. 6, 17–23) and published in Pravda on September 8.
Kaganovich to Stalin on September 11 [1931]Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. P. D. 739. L. 96–105 Autograph.
11/IX
Hello, Dear Comrade Stalin.
A number of issues of the NKID were discussed at the PB yesterday.
1) About Poland. The People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs has so far proved powerless to carry out our instructions - to explore in more depth the real intentions of the Polish government. The note they sent is limited to general discussions, instead of a specific analysis of the facts and the situation in Poland. The People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs has made a proposal to come forward to us now with an official written response to the Patek maneuver. We did not accept this proposal. You are absolutely right in your assessment of the gross mistake made by the NKID, and that it will take a long time to correct it. Therefore, it is hardly advisable to speak now without an appropriate probing. Mie was postponed until the 20th, instructing the NKID to submit by September 16 (so that we could send you before the 20th for your review) a serious report, and then decide whether to speak or not. I found out why Patek turned to Karahan. They explain that Karakhan replaced Stomonyakov in the western department during his vacation.
2) We had to postpone the directives of the conciliation commission. Foaming at the mouth, the NKID members argued that it was impossible to reject their proposal, that this could cause a conflict. We had already rejected their offer, but then, for the sake of caution, we decided to postpone and request you again. I outlined the essence of their arguments in a telegram, so I won't repeat it now . They certainly exaggerate any threats. It seems to me that, in general, the NKID members are being too considerate towards Germany. They discovered this also on the question of Poland, when their main argument was the desire to calm German public opinion. They do not take into account that we do not currently have a situation that would force us to run ahead of Germany, rather, she needs us most of all now.
3) We listened to Rosengolz's report on the progress of placing our orders in England. Order placement is going well. It turned out that 80-90% of orders for Chelyabstroy can be placed in England. Rosengoltz proposed to approve all the events taking place there and speed up the placement of orders there. For the time being we have limited ourselves to taking Comrade Rozengolz's message into consideration. I am sending you his note and asking you, if you have any proposals, to let us know, then we would raise this question again on the 15th-20th.
4) There are no serious new materials on America, except that Bogdanov is still in Berlin because the American consul does not issue him a visa until he provides evidence that if he is sent from America , the USSR will take him back. Now it seems that it turns out that Bogdanov will receive a visa. We instructed Krestinsky and Rozengolyg to submit to the PB a report on the developing situation in America in relation to us, especially after we suspended our orders. At one time, after your telegram, we instructed to prepare the question of the possibility of canceling some orders, but it turned out that the refusal of orders would entail large losses in foreign currency, secondly, it would extremely complicate the situation, there would be a scandal, so we limited ourselves to taking note 2 .
5) We put aside a very important question to ask you, this is about Japan. The Japanese responded to the closing of the Chosen Bank, which caused them a loss of up to 4 million, with a sharp increase in duties on the timber we export, which, of course, will lead to large overpayments on our part 3. Rosengoltz made a proposal to take a number of measures that would force the Japanese to cancel these duties. He proposed: to reduce the import of goods from Japan (tea), to impose duties on green teas, to demand the abolition of the timber duty when concluding agreements on catching and selling crabs, to raise a press campaign not to conclude agreements on territorial waters until the Japanese abolish duties, etc. . Of course, such measures on our part can cause serious complications in our relations with Japan, which are already not particularly brilliant due to fisheries. We postponed the issue until the 20th and ask you to tell us your opinion.
6) The Austrians are pressing our exports. NKVneshtorg made a proposal to immediately suspend all orders. We decided to start with a formal warning to the Austrian government and industrialists that we would stop all orders if their policy did not change. After that, if there are no changes in the shortest possible time, we will stop orders 4 .
7) A rather “original” and, in our opinion, not entirely serious proposal was made by the NKID about Latvia. Since re-elections are coming in Latvia and there will be a struggle between right-wing and left-wing groups, then, in the opinion of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, we, on our part, must help the left come to power. To do this, he proposes that we come up with a note about the shortcomings of the trade agreement (which has been in force for the 4th year) and give a hint that we can no longer conclude a trade agreement with them. Thereby giving grounds for "leftist" groups to attack the government, and so on. In other words, the NKID proposes that we provide a "platform" for these groups. What is it for? What is the reason for us to dirty our hands? Therefore, we decided to remove the issue, and we will talk about the agreement when the time comes, regardless of the Latvian re-elections.
8) We have postponed the trade agreement with Afghanistan. It seems that the proposal of the NKID and the NKVT is acceptable. Please let me know your opinion. I am sending you a note from Karakhan.
9) The other day we sat in the currency commission on the currency plan for the 4th quarter. What we were offered turned out to be unsatisfactory. Net income 182 million, expenditure 178 million, savings 4 million, if we take into account non-trading expenses, then no accumulation is obtained.
In the export plan for the 4th quarter, the NKVT included the entire annual plan for grain exports, which is hardly acceptable. Rather, you can click on linen. During the final distribution of the plan for flax harvesting by regions, we added 20 thousand tons, i.e. 320,000. Last year, we prepared 180,000, so we can now provide more for both industry and export5. For butter, eggs, bacon, poultry, we accepted the proposal of the NKVT, although this is certainly not an easy thing. Mikoyan was very protesting, but you are absolutely right that it is necessary to go for it. In addition, we suggest clicking on different types of exports - light technical raw materials, salvage raw materials, rags, bristles, guts, etc. Lately, this business has clearly weakened. At one time, there were special state auctions on the ground, which were prepared. Now it is in the hands of NKSnab, and he has no time to deal with it. We think that it would be more correct to transfer this to the NKVneshtorg, restore state trades in the republics and regions, and subordinate them directly to Weitzer. In addition, it is necessary to really interest the places, if, for example, RIK were given even such a premium of 1-2 typewriters, in some places “fordik”, then he would break into a cake and help prepare both guts and bristles and so on. We have not yet looked at the import plan for the 4th quarter, we will have to cut it, but the difficulties are that the main amount of payments is payments already predetermined by previous orders. As soon as the plan is ready in draft, I will send it to you before approval in the PB. We are now either postponing or withdrawing all import proposals. Now the issue of importing materials and equipment for the NKPS is acute. Antipov's subcommittee, appointed by the PB commission, greatly reduced the applications of the NKPS, but still the amount remained substantial, 9 million. The situation in transport is serious, they should have been supported with something. Of course, once again shortening Antipov's proposals. I send you these proposals and ask you to give your advice. How - what to do?
The Chekists raised the issue of implementing the resolution already adopted by the PB on the purchase of patrol vessels. The conditions in Italy are such that you won’t have to pay anything until 1935, but we postponed it, firstly, because we are just pressing the Italian government with a statement about the refusal of orders, secondly, we need to get your opinion from you, we we are inclined to, after waiting a little, go to this order 6 .
The NKVT made a proposal to purchase 25 thousand tons of rubber for 8 mil. rubles with its delivery in the 2nd and 3rd quarters of 1932 The price of rubber has now fallen to 2d. a pound, which is 7% of the 1919 price and 4% of the 1925 price. We have postponed the matter in order to get your opinion either by letter or telegraph.
10) I sent Mezhlauk's letter to the PB members. Rozengolts asked for a five-day postponement, but on the 15th we are thinking of accepting Mezhlauk's proposals .
11) We approved Kartvelishvili as First Secretary of Georgia immediately upon receipt of your telegram 8 . This decision is appropriate, especially at this stage, until fresh people come forward. It is very good that you besieged Polonsky, otherwise he is too carried away. Transcaucasians are asking to postpone their report to the Organizing Bureau for 10-20 days. I think we could agree to postpone until October 6th or even October 16th.
12) The state of affairs with grain procurements is as follows: the first five-day period in September shows a rather sharp decline in rates. Against almost 80 mil. harvested in the last five days of August, in the first five days of September, 45 1 / 2mil. tons. A particularly sharp decrease is given by: the North Caucasus - 4.466 thousand pounds are harvested, and the previous one - 15.855 thousand pounds; Ukraine - 17.476 thousand pounds, and the previous one - 28.817 thousand pounds; TsChO - 5.487 thousand pounds, and the previous one - 8.052 thousand pounds; The lower [lower] Volga - 5.111 thousand pounds, and the previous one - 9.400 thousand pounds; The average Volga - 3.965 thousand pounds, and the previous five-day period - 4.604 thousand pounds. Harvesting is exceptionally bad in Siberia, the Urals, Kazakhstan: Eastern Siberia - 3.7% of the annual plan, Western Siberia - 4.6%, Kazakhstan - 5.3%, Urals - 2.7%. Although the total amount of preparations compared to last year is much larger - 176%, but apparently now the preparations will go more intensely and specific leadership will have to be strengthened. Apparently, it will be necessary to send representatives of the Central Committee to certain regions .
With this, I will finish on the affairs of the Central Committee and write to you separately, as secretary of the Moscow Committee, about Moscow affairs. Hello. L. Kaganovich.
_____________________________
1According to the convention on the conciliation procedure between the USSR and Germany, signed on January 25, 1929, a Conciliation Commission was created to resolve differences "arising in the interpretation of bilateral treaties." The regulation on the commission stated that it “is not permanent, but is formed separately for each session. It meets once a year, approximately in the middle of the year, for a regular session, the exact time of which is fixed each time by agreement of both Governments” (DVP. Vol. XII, pp. 44–47). On September 2, 1931, in connection with the upcoming opening in Berlin of the second session of the Soviet-German Conciliation Commission, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs B.S. Stomonyakov sent Stalin a note about German claims. The most acute was the issue of the export of currency by German citizens evicted from the USSR, who were selling their property. The Soviet authorities put up obstacles to the export of currency. The People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs offered to make concessions and allow the export of currency received for the sale of personal movable property (AP RF. F. 3. Op. 64. D. 660. L. 7-13). On September 8, 1931, Stalin sent Kaganovich a cipher in which he rejected these proposals. On September 10, Stomonyakov sent a new note to the PB, in which he pointed out the insignificance of the amounts to be transferred, and again offered to make concessions to the Germans. On the same day, the issue was considered at a meeting of the PB. It was decided: “To instruct the commission composed of Comrades. Kaganovich, Rudzutak, Stomonyakov and Rozengolts to draw up draft directives for those authorized to the conciliation commission, taking into account the exchange of opinions ”(RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 11. L. 1). On September 12, in a reply telegram, Stalin again rejected offers of concessions (see Document No. 57).
On September 10, 1931, on the basis of a report by Rozengolts and Ordzhonikidze, the PB again returned to the question of orders in America. The message of the People's Commissar of Foreign Trade was taken into account that "the concluded deals on orders already issued in America cannot be canceled" and that it is forbidden to issue new orders for America, in excess of those placed and executed on August 25 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op 162. D. 11. L. 2).
3 The activity of the Vladivostok branch of the Chosen Bank was terminated by the decision of the USSR NKF on December 13, 1930 (DVP, vol. XIII, pp. 721, 722).
4 On the letter opposite this paragraph, Stalin’s note is “No noise.”
5 In fact, in 1931/1932, 256 thousand tons of flax were harvested against 183 thousand tons in 1930/1931.
6 After Stalin’s answer (see Documents No. 65, 66), on December 1, the PB returned to the issue of purchasing patrol vessels and suggested that the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Trade “implement an order in Italy for two patrol vessels for the OGPU” (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. P. L. 71). On December 8, the PB revised its decision and authorized the purchase of three patrol vessels for the OGPU, provided that the previous currency limit was maintained (Ibid. L. 84).
7 V. Mezhlauk's letter was considered at the PB meeting on 20 September. It was decided to appoint M. Gurevich as a trade representative in France, A. Ozersky in England, and recall S. Bron to the USSR to work in the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade (Ibid. Op. 3. D. 849. L. 5).
On September 8 , 10, following a report by Kaganovich, the PB “agreed to the proposal of the Zakkraykom and the Central Committee of Georgia on the release of comrade Mamulia from the work of the secretary of the Central Committee of Georgia and the approval of comrade Kartvelishvili as the first secretary of the Central Committee of Georgia concurrently with the work of the secretary of the Zakkraykom” (Ibid. D. 847. L . four).
On September 9 , 10, the PB instructed the CT to outline the candidates authorized by the Central Committee to be sent to those areas in which there is a drop in grain procurements (Ibid., L. 1).
Kaganovich to Stalin [September 11, 1931]Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. P. D. 739. L. 106 - TsZ. Autograph.
Briefly I want to tell you Comrade Stalin about Moscow affairs.
The other day we checked the implementation of the decisions of the Central Committee on the Moscow municipal economy. In some sectors of the economy, significant progress has been made, while in others things are still going poorly. The work of available tram cars has certainly improved, but we are having a very hard time getting new additional cars and we are not yet implementing the program with the laying of new tracks, since the rail is not enough, it is bad with electrical substations, which cause the most accidents in winter. Now we are doing everything possible to put them in order by the winter.
The subway department has already begun to work. In the near future we will be able to enter the PB with proposals regarding the organization of work and the attraction of foreign aid. The project will take longer. Housing construction doesn't matter. Only 243 new houses should be built. Now we have 61 houses completed, 119 under construction, and 63 houses not yet started. When checking, it was revealed that in the areas where new factories are being built, housing construction is especially lagging behind, so now we are directing our main efforts precisely in these areas, in Proletarsky and Stalinsky, where it is especially difficult to find housing. By the end of the Ball Bearing and other factories, it is necessary to provide new workers with housing.
It is unlikely that the plan for the repair of houses will be completely fulfilled, but we have already covered the repair of 5,500 houses, more than 2,000 houses have already been completed. The quality of the painting turned out to be unimportant on a number of houses. This was discovered after the first rain, so we are now repainting some houses. By 70 percent, we have already repaired boilers and heating systems in houses.
We press on the fuel with might and main. Of the 2 million cubic meters of firewood to be imported for 1/X, 1 mil. 870 t[s]. About 700 thousand [thousand] of this firewood were burned during the summer period, so you were absolutely right when you pointed out that it was impossible to calm down and that it was necessary to lean in every possible way on further harvesting and transportation. I am firmly convinced that last year's history will not repeat itself - Moscow will be with firewood.
Our water trust is not working well, only 9 1/2 km of the 54 km [meters] of the expansion of the water supply network have been laid - It turned out that the lack of water in the city center was the result of not only a general lack of water, but also improper regulation of water supply, intercepted water and sent through a system of valves to other parts of the city. This fact and others indicate, it seems to me, that sabotage is still preserved in this trust, on the one hand, and the stupidity of our communists, on the other. We are taking measures to complete the Rublyovskaya dam in order to bring the water supply to 33 mil. buckets. It is only necessary to increase the capacity of the filtration station. Now we are finishing the direct 6th water conduit and we will lead it straight to the city center so that we can no longer combine it so as to leave the center without water.
Not bad, I would say good, the situation is with the road business. The plan, approved by the Central Committee, is estimated at 575 thousand [thousand] square meters. meters, including the improvement of 455 t[ys. sq. meters]. To date, we have the following performance: 230 thousand for asphalt, 100 thousand for paving stones. The city executive committees add here 140 thousand square meters. meters of new asphalt sidewalks and believe that the plan is overfulfilled. At the beginning, we suggested counting the sidewalks, but now we told them that the plan should be counted without sidewalks, so, even if we count without sidewalks, we have already completed the plan by 75%, and together with the cobblestones, 81% of the fulfillment of the task of the Central Committee ( 466 t [th] square meters). We set them the task of overfulfilling the plan, completing the entire Teatralnaya, Sovetskaya, Lubyanskaya, Noginskaya and Arbatskaya squares by the end of the season so that the tram tracks would also be laid with paving stones, or, as a last resort, try to asphalt, because there are not enough paving stones. We have difficulties with paving stones and bitumen. Today I asked Kirov for a total of 20 thousand square meters. meters of paving stones, but so far he gave a vague answer. Here is a brief about the urban economy, is there anything else to add, firstly, that the work on the removal of the Iberian Gate has already been completed1 turned out great! And secondly, as you and I agreed, we are breaking down Okhotny Ryad, this symbol of old merchant Moscow, and we will build a hotel in its place.
We had a plenum of the Moscow city committee, where we discussed issues of supply and the work of cooperation. Badaev had to sweat, the people strongly criticized. We outlined a number of measures to strengthen cooperation.
Catering trusts are already working, but the results of their work are not yet felt in the canteens.
We are doing well in terms of grain procurement and flax. Bread was prepared for August 178% of the monthly plan and 23% of the annual plan. The pulling on the flax is already over. Now the spreading of flax and other work begins. Harvesting will begin in two or three weeks, by the way, we think that here we will have to apply a different form of payment to collective farmers for processing flax, not so much as workdays, but to pay directly to each collective farm woman who will process it. Otherwise, we can get a lot of straw, but not processed flax.
By sowing. The winter wedge is sown to 75 percent, but on the other hand, things are going very badly with the autumn plowing, and now we must do everything in our power to fulfill the plan for the fall.
A very difficult task is the harvesting and transportation of vegetables, so far the situation here is bad, and “God” sent a decent amount of vegetables, we must cope. With collectivization, the situation is such that it is necessary to keep the places from excessive enthusiasm. We already have 47%. The mood among the peasants is not bad, the mood in the city is good. The youth demonstration on the day of the MYUD went very well, and I sent you my greetings.
There were re-elections of party cells with a very active party mass, in some places there were attempts by right-wing and Trotskyist elements, but of course they did not receive any hint of success. Well, that's the end of the Moscow affairs. Greetings Comrade Molotov. All the best. Yours L. Kaganovich 2 .
______________________
On June 30, 1931, the PB decided: “a) Demolish the former Iberian Chapel (Resurrection Gates) to open the way for demonstrations” (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 10. L. 100).
2 In the upper right corner of Kaganovich's litter: "September 11–12, 1931 (see letter dated September 11, 1931)" (Ibid. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 739. L. 106).
Stalin to Kaganovich September 12, 1931Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 76. L. 60. Autograph.
Poskrebyshev for Kaganovich .
We have already moved away from Article 5 of the agreement, since we excluded the proceeds from real estate. Why it is impossible to go further, referring to the lack of currency and the unwillingness to encourage eviction due to the lack of workers and the absence of unemployment in the USSR. It's not about 10,000 citizens, but about having to pay millions of foreign currency every year. We care about the loss of millions of currency, not the total number of German citizens. Moreover, the figure of 10,000 is clearly underestimated and arbitrary. A conflict on such a question is not at all dangerous for us, especially after placing our orders in Germany. We must fight for every ruble of the currency. I insist on my own, and then decide as you know.
I do not object to the use of settlers and servicemen on the Murmansk and Northern railways.
Stalin.
12.30
#35
12/IX. 31 year 1
__________________________
1 Date, number and time entered by the secretary.
Stalin, Molotov - Kaganovich, Kalinin, Khalatov September 12, 1931Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 76. L. 61. Autograph of Molotov.
Kaganovich, Kalinin, Khalatov.
The question of Sinclair's request, connected with Eisenstein, we ask you to postpone until our arrival. Don't give an answer to Sinclair yet, and don't send any money.
Stalin, Molotov.
15 o'clock
12/IX-31
No. 36 2
______________________
1 Date, time and number entered by the secretary.
Stalin to Kaganovich [September 12, 1931]Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 100. L. 112–113. Autograph.
Hello, Comrade Kaganovich!
I received your letter.
1) Your arguments to justify the PB decision to import steel do not stand up to scrutiny. It is not a matter of counting the “debt” of the state to the Vesenkhovites 1 in money , but that instead of calculating in tons (accepted in the PB), they imposed a calculation in money on you and ... 2 confused the so-called foreign exchange commission, the so-called ] foreign trade, etc. At least two conclusions inevitably follow from this whole story with imports: 1) the currency commission is manure, not a state] organization, and Rudzutak is a worthy chairman of this manure; 2) The People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade does not protect the interests of the state, the benefits from it, like from a goat of milk, and, in general, it rots in the bud.
2) I am sending you a clipping from Izvestia about the criminally ugly attitude of our economic agencies towards imported metal. The Supreme Council of National Economy is trying to rob the state currency office due to the import of metal, and the metal already imported for Chelyabstroy turns out to be ownerless, as a result of which they squander and sell it almost at auction. Criminals and bastards! I propose: a) put a note in Izvestia for discussion by the PB; b) to oblige Pravda (which now writes all sorts of nonsense) to check the case and write an editorial about the hooligan attitude of the "communists" to the imported property of the state; c) be sure to bring the perpetrators to justice and punish them.
3) The American writer Sinclair sent, it turns out, a letter to Khalatov, and then to Kalinin, where he asks for support for some enterprise started by Sinclair and Eisenstein (a well-known "our" filmmaker who fled the USSR, a Trotskyist, if not worse). Apparently Eisenstein wants to cheat us through Sinclair. The matter is generally not clean. I propose: a) to postpone the question until my arrival; b) propose to Khalatov and Kalinin not to reply to Sinclair until the issue as a whole has been decided in the Central Committee .
Hello. I. Stalin.
_______________________
1 This refers to the leaders of the Supreme Economic Council.
2 So in the document.
3The famous Soviet film director S. Eisenstein left for the USA in the summer of 1929 and returned to the USSR in the spring of 1932. In 1930-1931. he worked in Mexico on the film "Vivat, Mexico!", relying on the financial assistance of the American socialist writer E. Sinclair and his wife. In the 3rd issue of the journal "Foreign Literature" for 1931, an exclusively critical article by I. Anisimov about the film was published. On August 10, 1931, the PB considered “Sinclair’s letter about giving him 25 thousand dollars for Eisenstein’s work in the field of cinema” and decided to transfer the issue for permission to CT (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 841. L. 3) . On August 16, apparently at the request of Kaganovich, AB.Khalatov informed him: "Upton Sinclair wrote to me about paying him an author's fee in order to finance the work of the Soviet film director Eisenstein in America." On August 17, the issue was considered by the OB. It instructed A.I. Stetsky to talk with the Soyuzkino board about Eisenstein's return to the USSR and decided not to give Sinclair an answer for the time being (Ibid. Op. 114. D. 252. L. 39–40). On August 20, the PB approved this decision of the OB (Ibid. Op. 162. D. 10. L. 166).
In a letter dated October 26, 1931, Sinclair informed Stalin that he financed a Mexican film and asked for one of those arrested in the USSR. By this point, the financial resources that Sinclair had originally had had been greatly overspent. On November 21, Stalin sent Sinclair a telegram (in English). After refusing to release the prisoner requested by Sinclair, Stalin added: “Eisenstein has lost the confidence of his comrades in the Soviet Union. He is considered a deserter who broke with his country. I'm afraid people here will soon lose interest in him. I am very sorry, but all these statements are a fact. I wish you well and fulfill your plan to visit us. Hello. Stalin." This telegram was not mentioned publicly by Sinclair or in the Soviet press. It was published in 1965. A photocopy of the telegram is given in the book: M.Seton. Sergei M. Eisenstein: A Biography. London, 1978. P. 517.
On December 4, 1931, the PB adopted the decision "On Eisenstein":
"1. Making Comrade Rozengolts aware that he dissolved Amtorg does not control him and gives him the opportunity to engage in philanthropy and patronage at the expense of state funds, gives him the opportunity to spend 25 thousand dollars in favor of Eisenstein, who deserted from the USSR, instead of forcing Amtorg to engage in trade.
2. To announce a severe reprimand to Comrade Bogdanov for unauthorized spending of people's money (25 thousand dollars) for the patronage of Eisenstein, who had deserted from the USSR, warning him that his slightest attempt to violate discipline in the future and allow waste of state funds would lead to his expulsion from the party.
3. To oblige comrades Rozengolts and Bogdanov to immediately liquidate the case with Eisenstein ”(RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 864. L. 9). On April 8, 1934, the PB returned to this issue and decided: “In view of the new circumstances that have come to light, cancel the Politburo’s decision of December 4, 1931 on Comrade Bogdanov in the Eisenstein case” (Ibid. D. 943. L. 26).
Sinclair, after disputes with Eisenstein, denied him financial assistance. Eisenstein returned to Moscow. Sinclair refused to give Eisenstein the Mexican film footage. In 1932, Eisenstein was seriously depressed as a result of these events (see: H. Lovgren's article in the book: Eisenstein Rediscovered, ed. I. Christie and R. Taylor. London, New York, 1993. P. 126).
Kaganovich, Postyshev to Stalin September 13, 1931
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 76. L. 65. Original. Typescript.
S. secret.
Encryption.
Sent on 13.IX - 31 at 23 o'clock. 38 min.
Received for decryption 14.IX - 31 at 8 o'clock. 30 minutes.
In. No. 66/sh.
Tov. Stalin.
There is a proposal to publish a resolution on wages for metallurgy and coal from the Central Committee, the Supreme Council of National Economy and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. Please let us know your opinion.
HP 1291.
Kaganovich, Postyshev. 14/IX - 31
Stalin to Kaganovich, Postyshev September 14, 1931Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 76. L. 65, 65v. Autograph.
Can be published on behalf of the Supreme Economic Council and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. If you consider it necessary to sign the Central Committee, then you will have to publish it on behalf of the Central Committee and Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, without the signature of the Supreme Economic Council and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. In the latter case, please send the text for viewing.
Stalin.
#39
10.45
14/IX-31 1
_______________________
1 Number, date and time entered by the secretary.
Stalin to Kaganovich, Yagoda September 14, 1931Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 76. L. 64. Autograph.
Kaganovich, copy to Yagoda.
I consider it premature to transfer the design bureaus of the OPTU to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Economic Council . Stalin.
#38
10.45
14/IX - 31 2
_______________________
On August 30, 1931, the PB considered, at the suggestion of Ordzhonikidze and Akulov, the question "On design bureaus." The decision was postponed, the PB instructed Ordzhonikidze and Akulov to make an agreed proposal (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 10. L. 175). After Stalin's telegram on September 20, 1931, the PB decided (to leave the design bureaus at the OPTU (Ibid. Op.. 3. D. 849. L. 3). VSNKh according to the list agreed between Akulov and Ordzhonikidze (Ibid. Op. 162. D. P. L. 10).
2 Number, time and date entered by the secretary.
Stalin to Kaganovich September 14, 1931Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 99. L. 32–33. Autograph.
Hello, Comrade Kaganovich!
I have received your letter of 11/IX. I answer questions.
1) With Japan, you need to be careful. One must stand firm and unshakable in one's positions, but tactics must be more lethal, more prudent. Rosengoltz wants to act in one fell swoop. It doesn't fit right now. The time has not yet come for the offensive 1 .
2) Orders in Austria, if the latter balks, can be stopped, but this must be done without noise in a businesslike manner, without new decrees, without demonstrative publications 2 .
3) I can’t say anything about the trade agreement with Afghanistan, because did not have time to read the materials 3 . I think that you can not rush into this matter.
4) The import plan for the 4th quarter should be reduced as much as possible. No need to succumb to screams and hysteria - nothing will come of it without thorough surgery. As regards exports, it is necessary to press on flax, oil, cake, etc. You can no longer press on the bread, because. we have to sell it "for free", while inside the country we really need it.
5) Rubber can be imported as required by the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade 4 .
6) The report of the Transcaucasians to the Organizing Bureau can be postponed until October 16 5 .
7) Lean on the urban economy of Moscow (firewood, housing, road and street construction, etc.).
Everybody. Greetings I. Stalin. 14/IX-31.
________________________
On September 10, at the PB meeting, issues of trade relations with Japan and negotiations with Japan on fishing issues were considered. It was decided to postpone the issue of trade relations with Japan and ask for Stalin's opinion (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 11. L. 1). This issue was absent from the agenda of the PB meeting on September 20. An agreement on fishing matters was signed on August 13, 1932 (DVP. Vol. XV. P. 469-471).
On September 10, 1931, the PB considered the issue of trade negotiations with Austria and decided: “To propose to the plenipotentiary and trade representative in Austria to categorically declare to the Austrian government and Austrian industrialists that we will stop all orders in Austria if their policy towards our exports will not be changed ”(RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 11. L. 2.).
3 The issue of a trade agreement with Afghanistan was not considered at PB meetings until 1932. Trade between the USSR and Afghanistan in subsequent years was carried out mainly by the Sovafgantorg association and individual Afghan societies through the conclusion of trade contracts (DVP. T. XV. C. 796).
4 The issue of rubber was considered by the PB after returning from Stalin's vacation, on November 10, 1931. It was decided to form a commission to develop specific measures to rationalize the consumption of rubber, reduce its imports and eliminate the wasteful spending of rubber (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D 859. L. 1). The import plan for the fourth quarter of 1931 provided for a reduction in foreign currency expenditure on the import of rubber (Ibid. Op. 162. D. 11. L. 36).
5 The reports of the Zakkraykom, the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of Georgia and Armenia, after several postponements, were considered by the OB on October 19, 1931. The OB meeting with Stalin’s participation essentially turned into another showdown between the conflicting Transcaucasian leaders (see the transcript of the meeting: Ibid. Op. 114. D 265. L. 75 - 137). As a result of the discussion, a commission was set up under the chairmanship of Kaganovich to develop a draft decision (Ibid. L. 1). On October 31 (prepared and approved on the eve of the OB), the decision was approved by the PB. The resolution, in particular, stated that “among the leading cadres of both Transcaucasia and the republics, there is an unprincipled struggle of individuals for influence (elements of the “atamanism”), on the basis of which the selection of leading cadres and the placement of workers is carried out in a number of cases not on party, business grounds, but on the basis of adherence to one group or another” (Ibid. Op. 3. D. 857. L. 9, 12–19). On the same day, October 31, the PB made appropriate personnel decisions. L.I. Kartvelishvili was relieved of his duties as secretary of the Zakkraykom and appointed second secretary of the West Siberian regional committee. M.P. Orakhelashvili, the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Transcaucasia, was appointed the first secretary of the Zakkraykom, L.P. Beria, the chairman of the Transcaucasian vocational school, the third secretary, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Azerbaijan, V.I. Polonsky. Beria concurrently was also appointed first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia (Ibid. L. 9).
Kaganovich to Stalin on September 16 [1931]Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 739. L. 114–122. Autograph.
16/IX
Hello Comrade Stalin!
I received your last letter.
1) I'm not going to justify a decision that we've already reversed. You are right that our mistake lies primarily in the fact that we got confused in the calculations of contingents, instead of counting in tons, we counted in money. This is, firstly, and, secondly, we did not take into account the general situation with the currency, in the assessment of which we fully agree with you. I recall how you once said that some kind of special shake-up was needed in order to force business executives and others to put all their weight on domestic production and give up their hopes and hopes for imports. And this whole story with steel imports played this role of shaking. In any case, you gave us a good lesson, now, hopefully, there will be a more careful attitude to the currency.
I fully agree with you that the currency commission does not currently ensure this careful attitude to the currency, while the NKVneshtorg sees little things, but misses a lot in the main thing. In particular, NKVneshtorg does not guarantee us that the approved contingent will not actually be exceeded during the ordering process. Recently, we heard the first preliminary report on the results of checking the progress of the implementation of orders. It turned out that the information that already ordered more than it was supposed to according to the approved contingents, turned out to be incorrect. Specifications sent abroad for 300 mil. more than the contingents, it goes without saying that the specifications are not yet an order, but indicative material for the customer, but the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade has such a poor record of orders that customers may well go beyond the boundaries of the contingents. To date, there is no such serious danger, ordered for 390 mil. out of 560 mil. contingents (according to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade, a little less). In any case, there are still 150 million unordered. We wanted to look at the remaining orders on the merits, but, unfortunately, we have not yet found any data on what was ordered and what was not ordered (according to Pyatakov’s statement, they have materials on orders that he issued, but so far they have not given them to us either). Therefore, we instructed the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade and the Supreme Council of National Economy to provide us with accurate, not only general statistical, but specific data on what was ordered, so that we could, if necessary, cancel certain orders, i.e. go for a certain reduction in contingents. I ask you to let me know your opinion on whether it is possible to go for some reduction in the remaining unused contingents.
2) The issue of the clipping you sent from Izvestia about the criminal attitude towards imported metal was raised at the PB and a corresponding resolution was adopted. We instructed Roizenman, in five days I will inform you of the results.
3) Yesterday we rejected the proposal of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade to change the procedure for signing commercial and monetary obligations by trade missions. The restriction was adopted in connection with the betrayal of Savely Litvinov and Yerzikyan 1 . Now they have proposed expanding the circle of signers of bills of exchange, contracts, etc., as if we were already guaranteed against treason. In addition, the expansion of the circle of signers will create even more confusion in the accounting of orders and will make it even easier to order more than the contingents are supposed to 2 .
4) We rejected Zelensky's proposal to increase the differentiated] share of consumer cooperation. People have done very little to mobilize the internal resources of the co-operatives, and at the same time they want to increase fees from shareholders 3 . By the way, Comrade Molotov told me about the resolution on cooperation that you were expecting an answer from us to your amendments, but this resulted in a misunderstanding, since we were expecting amendments from you in the text of the draft resolution. We fully agree with your proposals (about prices, etc.). It would be possible to issue this resolution on behalf of the Implementation Commission. I ask you to inform me whether to publish it or to wait for your arrival.
5) We discussed the question of the progress of electrical construction. Despite the fact that the total amount of power put into operation is incomparably greater than last year, the course of electricity construction is not going well. The speakers stressed the need to import copper, we did not accept and pointed out the need for maximum mobilization of domestic resources. Let them look to see if copper is lying around in the same way as the steel for Chelyabtraktorostroy indicated in the Izvestia article. The speakers Krzhizhanovsky and Flaxerman blurred the difficulties and shortcomings of the construction, everything went too smoothly for them. But Sergo pointed out the issue of tension and the need to mobilize all forces to carry out the plan. We have allocated a commission to study the draft resolution 4 .
6) We heard a report on the progress of autumn sowing, although five mil. more hectares were sown than last year during the same time, but still we have only 43% fulfillment of the plan. Therefore, we have not yet praised the successes, but on the contrary, we have sharpened the topic of autumn plowing because the deal with the fall is still bad 5 .
7) In terms of grain procurements, the last decade shows a sharp, alarming decline in rates. The North Caucasus gave 18% of the monthly plan in ten days, Ukraine - 22%, especially badly in Western Siberia, in the Urals.
We sent Sulimov to the Lower Volga, Nikolaev to Bashkiria, Ilyin [to] the Urals, Khloplyankin (from NKSnab) to the Middle Volga 6 .
8. We are now leaning in every possible way on timber rafting. We adopted resolution 7 yesterday , we had a dispute about the introduction of labor conscription, they proposed to introduce it, but the PB rejected this proposal.
9) Kartvelishvili is bombarding everything regarding the secretary of the Zakkraykom instead of Yakovlev, but we will decide when you arrive.
10) The people of Kazakhstan protested the decision to join the eight state farms of Kazakhstan to the West Siberian Trust. Isaev arrived. In view of the special long-standing wariness of the Kazakhs towards Siberia, we, for reasons of national policy, half yielded to the Kazakhs, we decided to create a single Kazakh trust, but with the transfer of this trust to Petropavlovsk or a nearby region, since the bulk of state farms are located in this district 8 . Yakovlev agreed with this.
11) Things are bad with us with the Komakademiya, there is a collapse. At the Organizing Bureau, we found out that the Komacademy was powerless to fulfill at least a fraction of the tasks that you set for them at the conference of agrarians, although they had a lot of declarations and promises. It cannot be left in this state any longer; it must be strengthened in such a way as to bring it closer to the Central Committee. It would be possible to form a leading core of approximately the following comrades: leave Pokrovsky (chairman]), Pashukanis (deputy]), release Milyutin from the current comrades, he still does nothing, and include new ones: Stetsky deputy concurrently with Kultprop, members Presidium of Bubnov and Krinitsky and Secretary for Organizational and Administrative Affairs Comrade Roshal 9 . Please let me know your opinion.
12) Your reproach about the approval] of the decree on ferrous metal[allurgy] and livestock logging is correct, one could not approve. It turned out especially badly that Pravda printed it without asking anyone. But of course there was no intent to ignore the SNK.
Well, I'll end with this. Shake your hand. Your L. Kaganovich.
PS I have just received Litvinov's message about Poland, I am sending it to you. He certainly believes that he made a "great" diplomatic step with his rebuttal. By the 20th, please send by telegraph your instructions whether to postpone until your arrival, if we do not receive a telegram, we will postpone it until the 25th. I must tell you that from the conversation with Litvinov I became even more convinced of his peculiar "Germanophilism". We, he says, "are now dancing on the German foot," since there is nothing yet with the French. He does not understand that we cannot subordinate our diplomacy to one relationship with Germany, and in general, after his arrival from Geneva, he gives the impression of a person too narcissistic and confident in his "greatness", but this is "God" with him, the main thing in his mistake essence. Best wishes.
L. Kaganovich.
____________________________
1 We are talking about the abuses of Soviet officials related to foreign trade. The brother of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, SM Litvinov, who worked in the Soviet trade mission in Paris, was put on trial by the French authorities in 1930 for fraud. The Soviet trade representative in Finland, S.E. Erzikyants, refused to return to the USSR and was accused by the Soviet government of fraud and forgery (Genis V.L. Non-returners of the 1920s-early 1930s / / Questions of History. 2000. No. 1. P. 59–60).
On September 15, 1931, the PB rejected the proposal of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade to change the decision of the Council of People's Commissars of October 13, 1930 on the procedure for signing commercial and monetary obligations of trade missions (Ibid. Op. 3. D. 848. L. 4).
On September 15, 1931, the PB instructed a specially created commission to consider the directive of the Presidium of the Central Union of August 25, 1931 on special contributions to the cooperation of kulak-affluent elements. Zelensky was instructed to raise the issue of the financial situation of the Centrosoyuz in the STO (Ibid. L. 2).
4 Later, on October 2, 1931, when discussing the issue of the progress of electrical construction, the PB decided to remove the issue from the agenda (Ibid. D. 852. L. 9). Capital investments for electrification for 1931 were planned in the amount of 850 million rubles, but in reality they amounted to 550 million rubles. (Zaleski E. Planning for Economic Growth in the Soviet Union, 1918–1932. Chapel NSh. 1971. P. 365, 370).
5 At the meeting on September 15, the PB took note of Y.YAkovlev's report on the course of the autumn sowing campaign. The People's Commissariat of Agriculture, its local bodies and party organizations were instructed to mobilize all forces for the full implementation of the sowing plan, and especially for the fallow (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 848. L. 5).
On September 15, 1931, the PB decided: “a) In view of the backlog of grain procurements in the Urals, Lower Volga, Middle Volga and Bashkiria, which threatens the fulfillment of the entire annual procurement plan, to send to help local authorities in strengthening grain procurements as authorized by the Central Committee, comrade Sulimov - to the Lower Volga, comrade Nikolaev - to Bashkiria, comrade Ilyin - to the Urals and comrade Khloplyankin - to the Middle Volga, b) Reject the proposal of comrade Bergavinov to revise the grain procurement plan for the DVK ”(Ibid. D. 848. L . five).
7 The resolution adopted by the PB on timber rafting stated: “Due to the exceptional conditions created due to the delay, to agree with the proposal of Glavlesprom on the launch of 50% of all remaining unfused timber by self-rafting” (Ibid. L. 13).
On September 15, in connection with F.I. Goloshchekin’s protest against the inclusion of the northern grain state farms of Kazakhstan in the West Siberian Trust, the PB decided: “Include the northern state farms in the Kazakhstan Soyuzzernotrest with the transfer of its center from Alma-Ata to one of the northern grain regions of Kazakhstan” (Ibid. L .3).
9 In the autumn of 1931, the question of the Communist Academy was repeatedly considered at meetings of the OB and ST. On December 5, 1931, the OB basically approved the draft resolution on the structure and work of the Komakademiya, prepared by the Kaganovich commission, instructing the same commission to clarify the draft, and then submit it for approval by the PB (Ibid. Op. 114. D. 266. L. 2; D. 269. L. 1).
Kaganovich to Stalin September 18, 1931Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. P. D. 76. L. 69. Original. Typescript.
Owls. secret. Encryption.
Sent from Moscow 18. IX - 31 15-35 min. Received for deciphering on 18.IX-31 at 18-30 min.
Tov. Stalin.
1) Regulations on railway and water transport were mainly approved by the PB and are now being edited by the commission. Please let me know your thoughts. Is it possible to draw up now and print it in print.
2) Please let me know your thoughts on the history of factories and factories and on the composition of the editorial board. Gorky is waiting for a decision.
3) 20 we will discuss about patrol ships. I ask for your opinion.
HP 1311/sh.
Kaganovich.
18.IX - 31 19 hours. 25 min.
Stalin to Kaganovich September 18, 1931Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 76. L. 69. Autograph.
1) I have not read the resolutions on the NKPS and NKVOD, since they do not solve cases. I think that the point now is not in big resolutions, but in expelling from the transport those leaders who turned out to be incorrigible bureaucrats and replacing them with others not infected with bureaucracy and Menshevik skepticism. You can arrange it right now, you can postpone it until October - this can hardly affect the matter of transport.
2) The idea of publishing the history of factories and factories is good. The draft composition of the editorial board is not known to me.
3) If you can, postpone the question of patrol boats until my arrival. Stalin.
#43
20 o'clock 20 minutes.
18/IX. 31 year 1
____________________
1 Number, date and time entered by the secretary.
Stalin to Kaganovich September 19, 1931Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 99. L. 35–36. Autograph.
Hello, Comrade Kaganovich!
I consider transportation to be the most important issue in the coming months , first of all, railway transport.
The main threat to the national economy is now coming from transport , and it is transport that must first of all be treated.
Decree resolutions of the Central Committee will not save the case, although such resolutions are of no small importance. Why? Because as long as a gang of narcissistic and self-satisfied bureaucrats like Rukhimovich sits in the transport, mocking the decisions of the Central Committee in a Menshevik way and sowing corrupting skepticism all around, the decisions of the Central Committee will be shelved .
We must defeat this gang in order to save the railroad. transport. If you need my help in this matter, let me know. If you can do without my help - smash this gang before it's too late. New people who believe in our cause and who can successfully replace the bureaucrats can always be found in our Party if you look seriously.
Hello. I. Stalin
19/IX-31
Kaganovich, Postyshev to Stalin September 20, 1931Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 76. L. 73. Original. Typescript.
Owls. secret.
Encryption.
Sent from Moscow on 20. IX - 31 at 18-36 min.
Received for decryption 20.IX - 31, 21 hours.
Tov. Stalin.
The following composition of the editorial staff of the History of Plants is proposed: Gorky, Stetsky, Averbakh, Weinberg, Troysky, Gostev, Krzhizhanovsky, Pankratova, Mezhlauk, Mekhlis, Troitsky, Khalatov and writers: Zhiga, Vsevolod Ivanov, Libedinsky, Seifullina, Shaginyan, Shushkanov.
Please telegraph your opinion. No. 1319.
Kaganovich, Postyshev.
20.IX-31
21 o'clock 50 min. 1
_____________________________
1 Time and date of transcription.
Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin September 20, 1931Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 76. L. 74. Original. Typescript.
Owls. secret.
Encryption.
Dispatched from Moscow on September 21 - 31 at 0 o'clock. 39 min.
Received for decryption 21/IX - 31 at 4 o'clock.
In. No. 69/sh.
Tov. Stalin.
At the plenum of the League of Nations, the Italian government submitted a proposal to suspend the implementation of the new weapons program, at least for the duration of the disarmament conference. The proposal was answered in principle by the representatives of England, Germany and other states. A preliminary agreement between Italy and America is expected. NKID received an invitation to the commission of the League of Nations. Litvinov believes that a simple refusal, citing the shortness of time and formal reasons, creates the impression that we are evading the suspension of armaments and therefore proposes the following draft response:
“Thank you for your kind telegraph message about the decision of the third commission to invite the USSR to participate with an advisory vote in the discussion of questions on the temporary suspension of armaments. Leaving aside the other terms of the invitation, I shall confine myself to pointing out the shortness of the period which prevents the Council of Ministers from delegating a representative to Geneva. I consider it necessary, however, to note that the Soviet Government, always ready to support any proposal in the field of disarmament as a guarantee of world peace, would be ready to join the proposal of the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, provided that it be accepted in a mandatory form by all countries, spread to all types of armaments and the signatories of the undertaking will confirm that it in no way replaces or removes from the order of the day the question of disarmament or the reduction of armaments.
The answer must be given no later than tomorrow. Please let us know your opinion.
HP 1321.
Kaganovich, Molotov. 20.IX - 31
21.IX-31 13:00 10 minutes. 1
___________________________
1 Time and date of transcription.
Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin September 21, 1931Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 76. L. 72. Typewritten text.
S. secret.
Encryption.
Dispatched from Moscow on 21/IX-31 at [0J h. 39 min.
Received for decryption 21/IX - 31 at 4 o'clock. - m.
In. No. 68/sh.
Tov. Stalin.
Yesterday a conference was held on the main lines of the national economic plan for the fourth quarter. It is proposed to record the following in the minutes of the Politburo:
“a) to establish the financing of capital works in all the main branches of the national economy in such a way that the annual program for capital construction is carried out;
b) set the production plan for the main branches of industry not lower than the plan for the third quarter. Based on this, establish a transportation plan of 88.2 million tons;
c) to reduce the cost of production in the industry of the Supreme Economic Council by 9.5% and in the industry of the Narkomsnab by 11%. Oblige the Supreme Economic Council and Narkomsnab to achieve a decisive shift in cost reduction in the fourth quarter;
d) set the budget reserve at 800 million rubles;
e) instruct a commission composed of Rudzutak, Kalinin, Sulimov and Lomov to consider the question of the local and republican budgets of the RSFSR. Convocation of a commission for Rudzutak;
f) instruct a commission consisting of comrades Molotov, Andreev, Ordzhonikidze, Mikoyan, L. Kaganovich, Yakovlev, Lomov, Kviring and Levin (Narkomfin) to make the necessary calculations on the basis of the adopted guidelines. Convocation for Molotov. Please let us know your opinion 1 . HP 1320/sh.
Kaganovich, Molotov. 21/IX-31 11 a.m. - m.
__________________________
1 On the same day, Stalin agreed (Ibid.).
Stalin to Kaganovich, Postyshev September 21, 1931Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 76. L. 73, 73v. Autograph.
Kaganovich, Postyshev.
The composition of the editorial board of the "History of Plants" is not quite suitable. Khalatov is not a writer, not an editor, and does not know factories. Mekhlis should be replaced by Popov or both should be introduced. It is bad that there are no members of the Central Committee on the editorial board with the exception of Stetsky, and Krzhizhanovsky and Mezhlauk will be useless in the editorial office due to overload. It would be necessary to bring in one of the experts on old large enterprises such as the Putilov factory, Obukhov, Sormovo, Nobel and Rothschild in Baku, large mines and factories in the Donbass, factories in the Urals, factories of the textile industry. Tsikhon, Shvernik, and a few old professionals should have been brought in. Abel, who knows the old factories of Leningrad and Baku, would be very useful to Yenukidze. It would not hurt to introduce Kaganovich and Postyshev from among the members of the Central Committee .
Stalin.
No. 46.
21.IX.31
11.30 2 .
_____________________
1 Number, date and time entered by the secretary.
Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov September 21, 1931Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. P. D. 76. L. 74, 74v. Autograph.
I am making the following amendments to the draft response of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs: 1) after the words " ready to support any proposal in the field ", delete the words "disarmament as a guarantee of peace ", replacing them with the words "reduction of armaments";
2) after the words “ from the order of the day ” add the word “ main ”: 3) after the words “or abbreviations ” add the words “already existing ”; 4) put a comma after the word "arms" and add the words: "to be resolved as soon as possible " 1 .
Stalin.
#47
14.40
21/IX.31 2
______________________
On September 21, 1931, a telegram signed by M. M. Litvinov, taking into account Stalin's proposals, was sent to the chairman of the XII session of the Assembly of the League of Nations (DVP. Vol. XIV. P. 530).
2 Number, time and date entered by the secretary.
Kaganovich to Stalin on September 21 [1931]Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 739. L. 123–128. Autograph.
21/IX
Hello Comrade Stalin!
1) Yesterday we listened to the question of Poland. You must have received Litvinov's note. Litvinov proceeds entirely from his old position of the inexpediency and unprofitability of concluding a pact with Poland. We have recognized this position of his as incorrect. No decisions were taken on the merits, he was instructed to work on the issue within twenty days, and we will probably discuss it in your presence 1 .
2) Listened to the message about the Japanese-Chinese affairs. There were proposals, especially from Litvinov, to make an official request and to take a sharp tone in the press with regard to Japan.
Since we had extremely limited information at our disposal, we did not make any decisions. We proceeded from the premise that the situation required caution and restraint from us.
3) In the minutes you will read the decision not to terminate the contract for orders for tubular pipes in America. This is due to the fact that the refusal of this agreement would cause significant losses in foreign currency and would create serious complications for us, so we are forced to agree to keep the order 2 .
4) The note in Izvestia about metal imports turned out to be correct. T. Roizenman examined. We have adopted a corresponding resolution. The article in Pravda was delayed for a couple of days, because the first article given to me for review turned out to be unsuccessful, and now it is being rewritten 3 .
5) Yesterday they gave Popov a big scolding for his article dated the nineteenth month of [his] month] "On Some Peculiarities of the Present Stage." The article is certainly confused, it contains a number of formulations that incorrectly characterize the current stage, in particular, collective farms are incorrectly depicted and the danger of an offensive by capitalist elements is presented in a panic. At the end of the second section, the question of the victory of socialism in our country is incorrectly posed. Postyshev and I summoned Mekhlis and Popov, gave them appropriate instructions, and we adopted the following resolution in the Secretariat of the Central Committee: “To state that the general tone of Comrade Popov’s article is incorrect, that the article contains a number of incorrect formulations on the merits. Propose to the editors of Pravda and Comrade Popov to write a new article on the same topic in accordance with the oral instructions given. They should deliver the article tomorrow4 .
6) We are pressing in every possible way on the export of oil from Astrakhan. The export of oil from Astrakhan has intensified, but mostly to the nearest regions. Delivery upstairs to Nizhny, Rybinsk is not provided, and therefore we are pressing precisely on this side of transportation. They are trying in every possible way to return to the export of oil to Leningrad by a roundabout sea route, but we give a resolute rebuff.
7) I received your telegram and letter about railway transport. You are absolutely right that transport is the most important issue for the immediate future, and that from here we will endanger the national economy. The repeated experience of my work in the commission with the People's Commissariat of Passages, including Rukhimovich, showed that the main thing, of course, is in people, in the leadership of the people's commissariat. We worked out a number of necessary measures in the draft resolution, but we did not draw the conclusion from the fact that the adopted decisions of the Central Committee are not carried out by the NKPS and that the point is not only in the inability to carry them out, but in a bureaucratic and right-skeptical attitude towards the directives of the party, its line. I fully agree with you that it is necessary to defeat this group of people headed by Rukhimovich, who / can put us in a difficult position again. I have just received your letter, I have not yet thought about how to put this question, but I think that I will convene tomorrow a commission to edit the draft resolution, we recognize the work as unsatisfactory, since the decisions of the Central Committee are not implemented by the NKPS. On the 25th we will raise the issue of changing the leadership. The sooner the better for transport, for the country.
Goodbye. Shake your hand.
Your L. Kaganovich.
Greetings to Comrade Kirov. OK.
______________________________
On August 23, 1931, Patek, the Polish envoy to the USSR, handed a draft non-aggression pact to the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Karakhan. The leadership of the NKID was skeptical about the prospects for concluding such an agreement. In a recording of Karakhan’s conversation with Patek on August 23, Karakhan, in particular, reported: “Leaving, he (Patek - Comp.)remarked that he would still like to hope that his conversation would be a certain impetus that would advance the cause of the pact. I immediately remarked to him that I did not think that this could be an impetus and that it could move things forward, since what he conveyed to me did not conclude anything new, but was only a statement of what we could not agree on ”( DVP, T. XTV, pp. 441–444, 484–489). In connection with the fact that the Polish Telegraph Agency, and then the Gavas Agency, announced that Patek had handed over the draft pact, TASS reports were published in the Soviet press on August 27 and 28, which denied the fact of the resumption of negotiations. A similar statement was made on August 28 by Litvinov, who was in Berlin (Ibid., pp. 498–501). On August 30, the PB recognized as erroneous these speeches of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs "without first raising the issue in the Politburo" (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 10. L. 177). After Stalin's letter of August 30, the PB on September 3 instructed the NKID to study the situation. After Stalin's letter of September 7, on September 10, 1931, the PB instructed the NKID to submit by September 16 "a serious detailed report in writing on the question of how serious Poland's intentions are in negotiations on concluding a non-aggression pact with us, in connection with the general situation in Poland and with groups in government and public circles” (Ibid. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 11. L. 1). On September 20, after hearing the leaders of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, the PB rejected “comrade Litvinov's directive set out in a note dated 15. IX. to the Politburo of the Central Committee on Poland”, and “based on the previous decisions of the Politburo on the need to seek the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with Poland”, invited the NKID to submit their proposals on the necessary measures within two decades (Ibid. L. 9).
On September 20, 1931, the PB upheld the order for tubular pipes in the United States "due to the fact that its cancellation would entail a significant payment of a penalty" (Ibid. L. 11).
3On September 15, 1931, the PB considered the issue of an article in the Izvestiya newspaper dated September 9, "Imported metal is squandered." In the decision made, the deputy chairman of the Central Control Commission, Roizenman, was instructed to investigate the case of sending to the wrong address and misuse of high-quality imported metal ordered for the construction of the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant, find the perpetrators to bring them to justice, and report on the results of the PB no later than September 20. Pravda was instructed to publish an editorial about the ugly attitude towards imported metal and equipment (Ibid. Op. 3. D. 848. L. 7). On September 20, the PB heard Roizenman's report. The decision made a detailed statement of the circumstances of the case. The PB took note of Roizenman's message,
4 In the minutes of the CT meeting, the decision of September 20, 1931 regarding the article by N.N. Popov, about which Kaganovich writes, is absent. On September 21, the CT decided by a poll to grant Popov leave from September 20 to November 1, 1931. On September 21, the PB agreed with the decision of the CT (Ibid. F. 17. Op. 114. D. 260. L. 14; Op. 3. D. 850. L. 7).
Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin September 22, 1931Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 76. L. 76. Original. Typescript.
S. secret. Encryption.
Dispatched from Moscow on 22/IX-31 at 20:00. 50 min.
Received for deciphering on 22/IX-31 at 22:45.
Immediately.
Tov. Stalin.
The position of the Japanese performance is still not clear.
1) The positions of the powers are passive, with the exception of America, which for the time being, according to the information of the press, is going to take a stand, considering the Japanese action to be a violation not of the Kellogg Pact 1 but of the decisions of the Washington Conference of 1921 2 .
2) The Chinese raised the question in the League of Nations, which will consider the question in a few days.
3) The Japanese press is preparing the further movement of troops to the north under the pretext of protecting Japanese citizens.
4) The PB instructed Litvinov to call the Japanese ambassador to obtain information and explanations about the events in Manchuria and, in particular, about actions that hurt and could hurt the interests of the Chinese Eastern Railway 3 .
Please let us know your thoughts on our possible next steps and guidelines for printing.
No. 1327/sh. Kaganovich, Molotov.
22/IX-31 23h 45m
__________________________
1 The Kellogg Pact on the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy was signed in Paris on August 27, 1928 by 15 states, including Japan.
2 The Washington Conference on the Limitation of Naval Armaments, Pacific and Far Eastern Questions was held from November 12, 1921 to February 6, 1922. At the conference, agreements were signed on fleets, on Japan's renunciation of an "exclusive" position in China, etc.
3 Record of Litvinov's conversation with Hirota, Japanese Ambassador to the USSR, dated September 22, 1931, see DVP. T. XIV. pp. 531–533.
Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov September 23 [1931]Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 76. L. 76, 76v. Autograph.
Kaganovich. Molotov .
1) Most likely, Japan's intervention is carried out by agreement with all or some of the great powers on the basis of expanding and consolidating spheres of influence in China.
2) It is possible, but unlikely, that America will raise a serious storm in defense of Chansuelian 1 against Japan, because in the current situation it can secure "its share" in China without conflict with Japan, even with the consent of the Chinese themselves.
3) It is possible, and even probable, that the Japanese have consent to intervention from some influential militaristic groups in China, such as the Feng 2 or Yensishan 3 group or the old Mukden type Changzosyan 4 , or all of these groups together.
4) Our military intervention is, of course, out of the question, while diplomatic intervention is not expedient now, since it can only unite the imperialists, while it is to our advantage if they quarrel.
5) Of course, we should ask the Japanese to keep us informed, but at the same time we need to ask the Chinese, at least through Harbin.
6) We must conduct ourselves in the press in such a way that there is no doubt that we wholeheartedly oppose intervention. Let Pravda scold the Japanese occupiers with might and main, the League of Nations as an instrument of war, not peace, the Kellogg Pact as an instrument to justify the occupation, America as a supporter of the division of China. Let Pravda shout with might and main that the imperialist pacifists of Europe, America and Asia are dividing and enslaving China. Izvestia should follow the same line, but in a moderate and arch-cautious tone. A moderate tone is absolutely necessary for Izvestia.
7) The Comintern press and the Comintern in general should be especially sharpened.
8) That will be enough for now.
Stalin.
No. 49, 50.
23/IX.
1.40. five
_____________________
1 Zhang Xueliang.
2 Feng Yuxiang.
3 Yan Xishan.
4 Probably referring to Zhang Zuolin.
5 Number, time and date entered by the secretary.
Stalin to Kaganovich September 24, 1931Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 99. L. 38. Autograph.
Hello, Comrade Kaganovich!
Got a letter.
1) You are right that import articles will have to be revised and reduced . This is inevitable for many reasons (including the financial crisis in England, Germany, etc.) 1 .
2) They say that the square on the Arbat (where there used to be a church, in front of Kino) has not yet been covered with paving stones (or asphalt). It's a shame! One of the liveliest squares and full of holes! Press and force to end the area.
My health is definitely improving.
Well, that's all for now. Shake your hand. I. Stalin.
24/IX-31.
PS In the beginning of October I will be in Moscow. I. St.
______________________
1 On the same day, Stalin sent a similar letter to Molotov (Letters from I.V. Stalin to V.M. Molotov. 1925–1936, Moscow, 1995, p. 238). The issue of saving currency and reducing import items was considered several times by the PB in the autumn of 1931. On October 10, the PB prohibited the use of funds received from savings on import contingents for additional purchases (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 11. L. 25). On October 25, the PB considered the question of contingents of the Supreme Economic Council for imported equipment. “In view of the radically changed situation for foreign trade,” the adopted resolution said, “it is absolutely necessary to review the additional resolutions of the Politburo, STO and SNK on imports from the point of view of the maximum reduction in imports.” The commission, consisting of: Rudzutak, Ordzhonikidze, Rozengolts, Pyatakov and Kuibyshev, was instructed within two days to allocate those objects of orders and contingents "which are absolutely necessary." On the same day, the PB considered the issue of "the fabrications of the foreign press" about the insolvency of the USSR. An official denial of such reports was considered inappropriate. However, Izvestia was instructed to publish an article against rumors of insolvency (Ibid. L. 33). On November 1, 1931, the PB considered the proposals of the Rudzutak commission on the allocation of priority orders. The amount of orders for imported equipment in the IV quarter was set at 30 million rubles. In this regard, the Supreme Council of National Economy was instructed to "immediately issue directives to its bodies abroad to revise orders already placed but not confirmed, canceling orders for less needed objects in order to concentrate them on primary factories and construction" (Ibid. L. 40).
Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin September 25, 1931Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 76. L. 78. Original. Typescript.
Owls. secret.
Encryption.
Sent from Moscow on September 25 - 31 at 14-33 min.
Received for decryption 25.IX - 31 at 17 o'clock. 35 min.
In. No. 75/sh.
Tov. Stalin.
Today at a meeting of members of the Politburo (Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Molotov, Rudzutak, Ordzhonikidze, Kirov, Andreev, Postyshev) discussed the situation of the NKPS. Everyone agreed that the work of the NKPS was unsatisfactory. It was recognized as necessary to change the leadership, to release Rukhimovich, Kviring, others have not yet been determined, but we believe that another group of workers will have to be released.
The following comrades are outlined as possible candidates for the post of people's commissar: Andreev, Kaganovich Lazar, Kosior Stanislav.
Please let us know your opinion. HP 1332/sh.
Kaganovich, Molotov.
25.IX-31
Stalin, Kalinin - Kaganovich, Molotov September 25, 1931Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. ID 76. L. 78, 78v. The text is Stalin's autograph. Signatures are autographs.
Kaganovich, Molotov .
We are entirely for the candidacy of Andreev, since he knows transport and transport workers and is more suitable than others. We think that the final decision on the issue should be made in the presence of Rukhimovich, who will have to be called out of the trip. It would be good to make Blagonravov one of Andreev's deputies, completely freeing him from work at the TOGPU. No. 52.
Stalin, Kalinin.
25/IX-31
20.10 1 .
____________________________
1 Number, date and time entered by the secretary.
Kaganovich to Stalin on September 26 [1931]Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 739. L. 129–135. Autograph.
26/IX
Hello Comrade Stalin.
1) You already know from our telegram that we have already discussed the issue of the NKPS. Everyone agreed that it needed to be done. I showed my comrades only your telegram, in which you raised the question in general. We adopted the resolution communicated to you unanimously. You have made a choice regarding the nominated candidates, and the members of the PB were leaning towards this for the most part.
Rukhimovich was called today, and as soon as he arrives, we will raise the issue officially. About the general decree on transport - Andreev considers it very good and necessary. The commission for editing in the water part inserted a paragraph on the recognition of the work of the NKPS as unsatisfactory. While we have not yet formalized it, I personally am inclined to formalize this resolution, but I am waiting for your word. Now, after the organizational decision, it will already be full-blooded 1 .
2) According to the plan for the fourth quarter, we made a decision, we had to reduce the reserve from the estimated 800 million [rubles] to 585 million [million]. Added NKZemu 70 mil. [rub.], VSNKh 50, etc. 2 Molotov and I were instructed to edit a draft of a large politicized decision of the Council of People's Commissars for publication, following the example of the previous quarter. I have doubts whether such a decision is necessary. I beg you to tell me personally by telegraph your opinion.
3) With grain procurements, no matter what, the pace is falling. At the PB, it was proposed to convene a meeting of the secretaries of the regional committees for September 30th. But it would be hasty: firstly, preparations must be made for this conference, and secondly, since this conference will probably also affect other questions in the village, I thought it better to wait until your arrival. The PB accepted it, postponing the question of the conference, but we are sending telegrams to the regional committees on the strengthening of grain procurements.
4) We are sending you a message about a new fact of flogging collective farmers on the Lower Volga. It seems to me that this fact is of great political importance.
5) We discussed today at a special meeting of the PB the question of the grain forage balance and the supply of goods. Both questions had to be decided only by way of referral.
On the grain-forage balance, the State Planning Commission gave us worthless materials. We have established a general fund of grain for the distribution of 1 billion [billion] 450 million, we will decide on the rest of the fund in 1.5-2 months, when the picture becomes clearer. On the question of the supply of commodities, it turned out that although we have more goods than last year, less is received for supply and sale, because a huge mass of goods goes to special funds and to state] bodies (overalls, etc.). We instructed the service station to develop a series of measures and accepted your proposal for a price committee, price reductions in commercial stores, etc. 3
6) We have not adopted any special resolutions on China, we proceed from your telegram. Please read Demyan Bedny's poem in Izvestia of the 23rd, in my opinion, there is a direct attack on our policy, he talks about the events in England, about the Sino-Japanese conflict and ends with "Always ready to fight back, silent enigmatically Moscow "etc. It turns out that Litvinov, who demanded our active intervention in the PB, gave a visa for the publication of this poem by Demyan.
7) A very unpleasant impression is made by the fact that the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the German Party insisted on accepting Severing's conditions. Pyatnitsky said that in general there are other facts of this kind. We approved the proposal of the Comintern members to reject the proposal of the Secret (ariat) of the Central Committee of the KKE . Is this not some kind of sign of more serious processes in the German Party ?
8) AMO opens on October 1st, although they will start giving cars a little later, but in October they should give a solid amount. The Amovtsy (Likhachev) kept everything going, they wanted to delay the opening, so that later they could immediately start giving a full program with chic, but we put pressure and forced the opening on October 1st.
Well, I'll end with this. I'm glad you got your health back. I firmly shake my hand. Your L. Kaganovich.
——————————————
1 The resolution of the PB commission on railway transport, approved by the PB on October 5, 1931, dealt with a wide range of issues: the use and repair of steam locomotives and wagons, the organization of loading and unloading operations, capital construction and technical supply, wages and food security for railway workers. Separate sections of this resolution were supposed to be issued in the form of an order of the NKPS. The work of the NKPS in the resolution was recognized as “unsatisfactory” (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 852. L. 1, 14–24).
2 The resolution on the national economic plan for the fourth quarter was adopted by the PB on September 25, 1931 (Ibid. D. 850. L. 2–3).
On September 26, 1931, a meeting of the PB was convened, on the agenda of which there were two issues: on the grain forage balance and commodity supply and price policy. The question of the grain-forage balance was postponed. At the same time, the PB established a general fund to be distributed in the amount of 1,450 million poods of grain. When considering the issue of supplying goods, the PB accepted Stalin's proposals: to create a Price Committee under the Council of People's Commissars, to reduce prices in commercial stores by 30%, to establish fixed prices for baked bread, to work out the issue of entering the collective farms and state farms, as well as industrial associations on the market (Ibid. Inventory 162. D. 11. L. 16; Inv. 3. D. 851. L. 1).
On September 25, 1931, the PB decided: “Accept the following proposal of the Russian delegation to the ECCI: “After listening to a telegram from the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany with a proposal that the publishing house of communist [communist] newspapers, in order to resume the publication of 14 party newspapers, accept the conditions of Severing on the publication by the publishing house statements expressing regret over the publication of the manifesto to the British sailors by the Central Committee of the KKE and containing the obligation not to violate German laws in the future, the Political Commission decides to reject this proposal of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the KKE” (Ibid. Op. 162. D. 11. L. 12).
Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov September 26, 1931Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 76. L. 79, 80. Autograph.
Kaganovich, Molotov .
1) It would be necessary to convene a plenum of the Central Committee no later than the end of October and discuss at it approximately the following questions: a) the report of the NKPS on the implementation of the resolution of the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars on railway transport; b) the report of the NKSnab and Tsentrosoyuz on the implementation of the resolution of the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars on the development of Soviet trade and the improvement of the supply of workers; c) information from the secretaries of the republican and regional party organizations on the progress of grain procurement and measures to improve the latter. Co-reports from the RCT-CCC on the first two questions are desirable .
2) I protest against the publication in the newspaper For Industrialization of September 20 of an editorial that incorrectly explains the causes of the breakthrough in industry in February-March of this year. The editorial does not mention in a single word that one of the main reasons for the breakthrough in industry was the disorganized state of transport. This unacceptable distortion of the Party point of view must not be tolerated. I propose that the editors be held accountable and forced to correct this error in a new article, and that the Supreme Council of National Economy should follow their newspaper . No. 53/sh.
Stalin. 26/IX.31
16.30 3
______________________
On September 30, 1931, the PB approved these Stalin's proposals for a plenum of the Central Committee (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 851. L. 6).
2 On September 28, 1931, by a survey of members of the PB, it was decided to publish an editorial in the newspaper "For Industrialization" according to Stalin's telegram:
a) Consider that the editorial in the newspaper "For Industrialization" dated 20.X. unacceptably distorts the party point of view, misinterpreting the reasons for the breakthrough in industry in February-March of this year and not mentioning in a single word that one of the main reasons for the breakthrough in industry was the disorganized state of transport,
b) Propose to comrade Bogushevsky to write a new leading article, presenting it to comrade Ordzhonikidze for viewing” (Ibid. D. 851. L. 9).
3 Number, date and time entered by the secretary.
Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov, Voroshilov September 27, 1931Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 76. L. 81. Autograph.
Kaganovich, Molotov, Voroshilov .
The hue and cry in our press about the maneuvers of our troops is doing us harm. Can't they be stopped immediately? It is not clear where the bourgeois desire for hype and ostentatious brilliance comes from among the Bolsheviks. No. 54.
Stalin.
27/IX.31 1
__________________________
1 Number and date entered by the secretary.
Stalin to Kaganovich September 29, 1931
Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 99. L. 40. Autograph.
Hello, Comrade Kaganovich! I received your letter.
1) Please do not connect the fate of the Central Committee resolution on the NKPS with my return to Moscow. The main thing is the removal of Rukhimovich and K 0 from work in the NKPS, and this matter is already a foregone conclusion. The rest is unimportant, or not so important.
By the way. It would be good to remove also Polyudov (head of the Byelorussian railway). This is not a worker, but a swindler, an anti-party member, a toady, an ignoramus and a lazy person. He will destroy the militarily important road, if we do not replace it with another worker.
2) I have not read Demyan's poem and I am not going to read it, because I am sure that it is not worth reading. Also a fruit: it climbs into politics, but wiggles most of all precisely in politics. I am sure that he could write nonsense about Moscow - he has the audacity to do so. Firstly, the editor of Izvestia should be held accountable, and secondly, Demyan (and Litvinov). Why not actually hold them accountable? 1
Well bye then. Hey!
29/IX-31 I. Stalin
______________________
1 See Document No. 79. On October 5, 1931, the Secretariat of the Central Committee made a decision in which the editor-in-chief of Izvestia, I.M. , Demyan Bedny - on the "incorrectness and political fallacy" of the poem, Litvinov received a remark for having given a visa for the publication of the poem (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 114. D. 264. L. 11). For details, see the introduction to the section.
Stalin to Kaganovich September 30, 1931Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 76. L. 83. Autograph of S. Chechulin.
Cipher.
Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b). T. Kaganovich. There are no objections to the texts. I am amending the greeting of the AMO: Replace the word "fiery" with the word "hot" Bolshevik greetings 1 . Stalin.
No. 56.
30/IX 21–15
______________________
On September 28, 1931, the PB decided to send greetings for the opening of the AMO and the Kharkov Tractor Plant (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 851. L. 9). Greetings to the workers and administrative and technical staff of the Moscow Automobile Plant in connection with its commissioning was published in the newspapers on October 1, 1931. The last phrase of the greeting was formulated as follows: “Hot Bolshevik greetings to all builders of the first auto giant in the USSR - the AMO plant.