from Stalin to Lenin

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 Bolshevik leadership Correspondence. 1912-1927
Collection of documents 1996.

Compiled by: A.V.Kvashonkin, L.P.Kosheleva, L.A.Rogovaya, O.V.Khlevnyuk.

Stalin Correspondences


J. V. Stalin - V. I. Lenin

October 3, 1918

3/X

Comrade Ilyich!

First of all, hello, and then let me tell you something about the affairs of our front and about Trotsky's orders .

Attached Document 2 will give you a picture of the extremely unpleasant conflict between the workers on the Southern Front and Trotsky. The fact is that Trotsky, generally speaking, cannot do without loud gestures. In Brest, he dealt a blow to the cause with his exorbitantly "leftist" gesture . On the question of the Czechoslovaks, he also damaged the cause with his noisy diplomatic gesture back in May 4 . Now he strikes again with his gesture of discipline, and all this Trotskyist discipline consists in fact in that the most prominent figures of the front contemplate the rear of military specialists from the camp of "non-party" counter-revolutionaries and do not prevent these latter from destroying the front (this is what Trotsky calls non-intervention in operational matters).

In general, the situation is such that Trotsky cannot sing without falsetto, act without loud gestures, and I would have nothing against gestures if the interests of the cause common to all of us did not suffer.

Therefore, I ask you in time, before it is too late, to appease Trotsky and put him in a framework, for I am afraid that Trotsky's extravagant orders, if they are repeated, placing the entire business of the front in the hands of deserving complete mistrust, the so-called military specialists from the bourgeoisie, will bring discord between the army and command staff and destroy the front completely. Our new army is being built thanks to the fact that next to the new soldiers, new revolutionary commanders are born. To impose on them notorious traitors like Sytin or Chernavin means to upset the entire front.

Not to mention that Trotsky, who just joined the party yesterday, is trying to teach me party discipline, obviously forgetting that party discipline is expressed not in formal orders, but, above all, in the class interests of the proletariat.

I am not a fan of noise and scandals, but I feel that if we do not immediately create a bridle for Trotsky, he will ruin our entire army for the sake of "left" and "red" discipline, from which the most disciplined comrades become sick. Therefore, it is necessary now, before it is too late, to curb Trotsky, calling him to order.

Shake your hand. Your Stalin.

Tsaritsyn, October 3rd, 1918.

 
RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 5413. L. 1-2. Typewritten text. The signature is an autograph.

Notes:

oneOn October 3, 1918, Stalin and Voroshilov sent two more telegrams to Moscow in addition to this letter. The first was addressed to Lenin, Sverdlov, Trotsky and Commander-in-Chief. In particular, it said: “On October 3, we received a telegraph order from Trotsky that was incomprehensible to us: “I order Stalin to immediately form the Revolutionary Council of the Southern Front on the basis of the non-interference of the commissars in operational affairs, to place the headquarters in Kozlov. Failure to comply with this order within 24 hours will force me to take severe measures. This order is incomprehensible, because the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front was formed on September 17 by the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and has been functioning as such since September 20. Read the resolution of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic [...] "(K. E. Voroshilov on the Tsaritsyn Front. Collection of documents. Stalingrad, 1941. P. 64). The second telegram was addressed to Lenin: “We have received Trotsky's telegraphic order, a copy of which and the reply to which you must have already received. We believe that this order, written by a man who has no idea about the Southern Front, threatens to hand over all the affairs of the front and the revolution in the South into the hands of General Sytin, a man not only not needed at the front, but also untrustworthy and, therefore, harmful . Of course, we do not agree to destroy the front for the sake of one unreliable general. Trotsky can hide behind a phrase about discipline, but everyone will understand that Trotsky is not the Military Revolutionary Council of the Republic, and Trotsky's order is not the order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. Orders only have any meaning if they are based on a calculation of forces and familiarity with the matter. To hand over the front into the hands of an untrustworthy person, as Trotsky does, means trampling on the elementary idea of ​​proletarian discipline and the interests of the revolution, the front. In view of this, we, as members of the Party, declare categorically that we consider the execution of Trotsky's orders criminal, and Trotsky's threats unworthy. It is necessary to discuss in the Central Committee of the party the question of the behavior of Trotsky, who treats the most prominent members of the party in order to please the traitors from military specialists and to the detriment of the interests of the front of the revolution. Raise the question of the inadmissibility of Trotsky's issuing individual orders that completely disregard the conditions of place and time and threaten the front with collapse. To reconsider the question of military specialists from the camp of non-party counter-revolutionaries. We propose that the PC of the Party discuss all these questions at a first-priority meeting, to which, in case of special need, we will send our representative. Member of the Central Committee of the Stalin Party. Party member Voroshilov. (Ibid., p. 65).

2 Not available.

3 See note 1 to document No. 10.

4 Probably, we are talking about a proposal to the soldiers of the Czechoslovak Corps, in case of impossibility of further advancement, to remain in the position of civilians in Russia. The proposal was made at the time of protracted negotiations on the possibility of exporting the hull on the ships of the Entente through Murmansk and Arkhangelsk in May 1918 (Trotsky L.D. How the revolution was armed. T. 1. M., 1924.

pp. 212-213; Kakurin N.E. How the revolution fought. T. 1. M., 1990. S. 194).
RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. On. 5. D. 56. L. 1. Certified typewritten copy.

Notes:

1 The telegram was sent from Tsaritsyn to three addresses: 1) to Arzamas, where the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic was located (to Deputy Trotsky - Sklyansky); 2) to Moscow - to Stalin; 3) to the headquarters of the Southern Front in Kozlov, where Trotsky arrived.

2On October 6, 1918, Stalin telegraphed Voroshilov from Moscow: “The Congress of Soviets opens in five minutes. I am going there, by the way, in order to discuss your note with the Central Committee. Receive an answer as soon as possible, then the opportunity is today. Stalin "(K. E. Voroshilov on the Tsaritsyn Front. G. 83). It is quite probable that between Stalin and Voroshilov there was an agreement that the latter would send an official telegram addressed to Stalin and Trotsky. Stalin knew the contents of the telegram in advance. Most likely, it was a copy of the note referred to in Stalin's telegram dated October 6, 1918. The Central Committee did not support Stalin's position, decided to replenish the RVS of the Southern Front with Mekhonoshin, Legrand and Okulov and transferred its base from Tsaritsyn to Kozlov. Sverdlov went to Kozlov to settle the conflict. Apparently, Voroshilov on October 7, 1918 did not yet know about Trotsky's telegram to Lenin dated October 4, 1918 (See note 2 to document No. 23) and was not familiar with the decision of the Central Committee. Subsequently, Voroshilov had to obey. (Litvin A. L., Polikarpov V. D., Spirin L. M. Civil war. Breaking old dogmas and stereotypes // Historians argue. M., 1989. P. 63). An important role in understanding the further development of the conflict, as well as Sverdlov’s position and role in its settlement, is played by the set of correspondence for the second half of December 1918 between Sverdlov, Lenin and Trotsky (The Trotsky papers. Vol. 1. P. 158-164) . 63). An important role in understanding the further development of the conflict, as well as Sverdlov’s position and role in its settlement, is played by the set of correspondence for the second half of December 1918 between Sverdlov, Lenin and Trotsky (The Trotsky papers. Vol. 1. P. 158-164) . 63). An important role in understanding the further development of the conflict, as well as the position and role in the settlement of Sverdlov, is played by the complex of correspondence for the second half of December 1918 between Sverdlov, Lenin and Trotsky (The Trotsky papers. Vol. 1. P. 158-164) .