from Stalin to Lenin

Bolshevik leadership Correspondence. 1912-1927
Collection of documents 1996.
Compiled by: A.V.Kvashonkin, L.P.Kosheleva, L.A.Rogovaya, O.V.Khlevnyuk.

Stalin Correspondences

Telegram from J. V. Stalin to V. I. Lenin

July 29 [1920]

Moscow Kremlin.

Only Lenin.

Kharkiv 29/VII 1 .

Tough fighting continues along the entire Crimean front, Orekhovo and neighboring stations change hands. Advancing along the entire front, Wrangel thinks of frustrating our forthcoming offensive, or, in any case, provoking us to a premature, insufficiently prepared offensive. Character and endurance are required of us, Wrangel's possible partial successes and the possible loss of some points cannot be of serious importance. Therefore, while conducting an active defense, we decided to persevere in concentrating new forces for the main attack. In the end, Wrangel will achieve that, jumping and jumping on us, he will exhaust his strength and then find himself in the face of our fresh forces. Please inform me about our plans in connection with the Polish truce 2. Budyonny reports that due to the exhaustion of the cavalry, it will probably not be possible to take Lvov before the thirtieth .

Stalin.

RTSHIDNI; F. 558. On. 1. D. 1881. L. 2-3. Autograph.

Notes:

1 On the reverse side of the second page of the document is the date "29/VII-20". On the typewritten copy of the same telegram, preserved in the file, there is Sklyansky's autograph: "Sk" and a note: "t. Sent to Lenin" (RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 1881. L. 4).

2On July 29 or 30, 1920, Stalin sent a telegram to Lenin, in which he outlined his views on the requirements for Poland in the event of peace negotiations: “Demobilization of the army and the military industry, arming the workers as the main guarantee of peace, class, the main culprit of the war and vandal destruction during the war - I propose to put these three main points and the secondary points arising from them as the basis for negotiations [...] ”(RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 5553. L .2-3). On July 31, the Politburo approved the draft armistice agreement with Poland (Ibid. F. 17. Op 3. D. 99. L. 1, 4-9). Later, in the face of a retreat, on August 25, 1920, the Politburo decided to yield to the British and refuse to demand that the workers be armed (Ibid. D. 104. L. 2).

3 In response to the report of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 1st Cavalry of July 28, 1920 about the unsuccessful attempt to take Lvov due to the large concentrations of enemy forces, Yegorov and Stalin on July 29, 1920 gave Voroshilov and Budyonny a new order to capture Lvov: “[... ] Your answer about the impossibility of completing the task by the deadline - the capture of Lvov - is completely incomprehensible [...] ”(Directives of the command of the fronts of the Red Army. T. 3. M., 1974. P. 235).