from Stalin to Lenin

Bolshevik leadership Correspondence. 1912-1927
Collection of documents 1996.
Compiled by: A.V.Kvashonkin, L.P.Kosheleva, L.A.Rogovaya, O.V.Khlevnyuk.

Stalin Correspondences

Telegram from J. V. Stalin to V. I. Lenin

July 24 [1920]

Moscow - the Kremlin, only to Lenin.

Kharkiv 24/7 1

First, the situation on the Budyonny front is good. The enemy, apparently, set the goal of exhausting the parts of Budyonny, because instead of the split parts of the enemy, new ones appear every time, and climb on Budyonny like flies. This circumstance somewhat slows down our progress 2. Yesterday we ordered Budyonny to break through the front and occupy Lvov before the thirtieth of July, it is possible that this operation will succeed. Secondly, we are preparing an offensive on the Crimean front, which can be launched no earlier than August 5-10. If the enemy does not warn our advance, the operation must succeed for sure. We take guarantee measures. Thirdly, I convey my opinion in response to your note No. 371. Now that we have the Comintern, a defeated Poland, and a more or less tolerable Red Army, when, on the other hand, the Entente is seeking a respite in favor of Poland in order to reorganize, rearm Polish army, create cavalry and then strike again, perhaps in alliance with other states - at such a moment and with such prospects, it would be a sin not to encourage a revolution in Italy. I have to admit that we have already entered a period of direct struggle against the Entente, that the policy of tacking has already lost its predominant importance, that we can now and must pursue a policy of offensive (not to be confused with a policy of rushing in) if we want to retain the initiative in foreign affairs, which we won recently. Therefore, on the order of the day of the Comintern, the question of organizing an uprising in Italy and in such states that have not yet grown strong, such as Hungary, the Czech Republic (Romania will have to be defeated) must be put on the agenda. Three hundred thousand lumpen in Germany, even if they really existed in nature, of course, do not and cannot change things. In short: it is necessary to weigh anchor and set off on the road before imperialism has managed to get its disordered cart in the slightest degree in order, and it can still somehow fix it for a certain period, and he himself did not go over to a decisive offensive. Fourth, the telephone conversation did not work out, because someone is listening on the line, interfering. I will report daily on the situation at the front by note.

Stalin.

RTSHIDNI; F. 558. On. 1. D. 5551. L. 3-4. Autograph.

Notes:

1 The text of the telegram is written on the inside cover of the Kommunist magazine, an organ of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U, No. 1.

2 On July 25, 1920, Stalin sent a telegram to Voroshilov and Budyonny: “[...] The actions of your cavalry over the past week are striking in their non-cavalry character: until now, you usually acted in whole divisions, bypassed the enemy, hit him with horse masses; now you are acting in a strange way in separate brigades, tearing off squadrons from one division and attaching to another, crushing the cavalry masses into small parts and depriving them of specifically cavalry power, in a word, you are acting like bad inexperienced infantry, as a result of which enemy infantry often bypasses you, enters you rear. I repeat, you didn't have this before. This conversion of cavalry into infantry began, according to my guess, from the time the General Staff infantrymen appeared in your field headquarters. If my guesses are correct, I ask you not to succumb in the future to the influence of infantrymen of the General Staff, inexperienced in the cavalry, and to return to the old tactics of operations by whole divisions. If I am mistaken, please let me know your opinion” (RTSKHIDNI, F. 558. On. 1. D. 5552. L. 2-5).