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Bolshevik leadership Correspondence. 1912-1927
Collection of documents 1996.
Compiled by: A.V.Kvashonkin, L.P.Kosheleva, L.A.Rogovaya, O.V.Khlevnyuk.
Stalin CorrespondencesTelegram from J. V. Stalin to L. D. Trotsky and V. I. Lenin
July 11, 1918
TO TROTSKY, COPY TO LENIN 1
Since time is short, I write briefly and point by point.
1. We all made a mistake when we announced a separate Cossack mobilization 2 : a) we were late in comparison with Krasnov, b) we did not have a revolutionary Cossack core capable of rallying the masses of Cossacks behind the Soviet government (“Don Soviet Government” 3 is a myth; at the insistence of the "non-residents" and the few Cossacks who remained behind us, this "government" declared itself dissolved yesterday). This, in fact, explains that the mobilization of the Cossacks announced by us benefited Krasnov: the mobilized Cossacks, having received weapons and cannons, went over to the side of Krasnov in thousands (they are the main image [as] Krasnov's "army").
2. People familiar with the matter unanimously assert that our support in the Don region is “out-of-towners” 4 and that we can only talk about “general” mobilization without singling out the Cossacks in a special curia. Only in this way can the Cossacks be used as a military force. The "Cossack Committee" 5 that exists in Moscow is out of touch with life and has no idea of the actual conditions on the ground.
3. A separate Cossack mobilization damaged us not only in the Don, but [in] the Kuban-Tersk regions. Having received weapons and obeying their old Yesauls, the Cossacks opened partial actions, began to blow up railways throughout the North [Northern] Caucasus. At the same time, there is reason to assert that not only Krasnov's agents, but also Anglo-French ones supply them with peroxylin.
4. The matter is complicated by the fact that the Headquarters of Sevkaokr6 turned out to be completely unsuitable for the conditions of the struggle against the counter-revolution. The point is not only that our “specialists” are psychologically incapable of a decisive war against the counter[revolution], but also that they, as “staff” workers, who can only “draw blueprints” and give plans for reformation, are absolutely indifferent to to operational actions, to the supply business, to controlling various army commanders and, in general, they feel like strangers, guests. The military commissars were unable to fill the gap. Zedin is not far off, poorly versed in the situation and goes with the flow. Anisimov is more conscious and mobile, but he is alone. And the military instructor and assistants are so indifferent to the matter that two days after the break of the Tikhoretskaya line, they, Snesarev with Zedin,
5. All this, as well as the fact that the food problem in the south (my sphere) rested on the military, forced me to intervene in the affairs of the headquarters. I'm not talking about the fact that the delegations of the fronts and district headquarters demanded that I intervene, in view of the obvious negligence of the headquarters of Sevkaokr, in supply matters. I sent to the headquarters (on the recommendation of local people) three comrades, of whom one, at my request, was appointed head of the military control department (Rukhimovich), two (Vadim and Parkhomenko) assistants. These comrades uncovered a number of unacceptable omissions, found large-caliber guns and armored vehicles, the existence of which Zedin denied and without which the front has been suffering for 2-3 weeks. Found set in motion. Then a common illness: the presence of many commanders and the inability (or unwillingness) of the Headquarters to subordinate them to one command. If not for this disease, there would be no road break. It is indifferent to look at this, when the front of Kalnin is cut off from supply points, and the North from the grain region, I consider myself wrong. I will correct these and many other shortcomings on the ground, I am taking a number of measures (and will take them) up to the removal of officials and commanders ruining the cause, despite formal difficulties, which I will break if necessary. At the same time, it is clear that I take full responsibility before all higher institutions.
6. Tsaritsyn turns into a base of equipment, weapons, military operations, etc. Such a sluggish military instructor as Snesarev will not be useful here 7 . Do you have any other candidates? The military commissars should be the soul of military affairs, leading specialists, but in Tsaritsyn it turns out the opposite. (Give Anisimov another comrade, better than Zedin).
7. Trifonov "reconciled" and became loyal, although, as a military commissar, he does not fit. We sent him to you as a pusher of military supplies, he seems to be suitable for this. Avtonomov is friends with the French and, according to general assurances, condones the Cossack gangs that blow up the railway. For some reason, the doors of headquarters are open to members of the French missions, and, according to comrades, the adventures of our Kuban against the Germans are the work of the French and the simpletons who believe them. I declare that if they (the French) fall into my clutches, I will not let them out.
8. Why the naval fighters living in Tsaritsyn are not used against the Czechoslovaks.
People's Commissar. Tsaritsyn, July 11, 1918.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 1812. L. 1-3. Typewritten text.
Notes:
1 A telegram was sent from Tsaritsyn to Moscow. An insignificant part of the telegram, from the words “The matter is complicated by [...]” to “[...] I take full responsibility before all higher institutions” with large denominations, was repeatedly published. (Documents on the history of the Civil War in the USSR. T. I. The first stage of the Civil War. M., 1940. S. 238-239; Voroshilov K. E. Stalin and the Armed Forces of the USSR. M., 1951. S. 14-19 ).
2 See note 3 to document No. 16.
3 See note 4 to document No. 16.
4 “Out-of-town” are not Cossacks who lived on Cossack lands.
5 The Cossack Committee is a governing body of the Cossack regions, formed by decree of the Council of People's Commissars of May 31, 1918.
6 The North Caucasian Military District was formed in May 1918 on the territory of the Don, Kuban, Terek and Dagestan regions. The headquarters was in Tsaritsyn. The district was disbanded in September 1918 after the creation of the Southern Front. Stalin was a member of the Military Council of the district, Snesarev was the military leader from May to September 1918.
On July 16, 1918, Stalin again complained to Lenin about Snesarev. Lenin received his telegram on July 17, 1918 and wrote on it that he considered it necessary to agree with Stalin (V. I. Lenin. Biographical chronicle. T. 5. October 1917 - July 1918. M., 1974. S. 645- 646).