To Anvelt

Bolshevik leadership Correspondence. 1912-1927
Collection of documents 1996.
Compiled by: A.V.Kvashonkin, L.P.Kosheleva, L.A.Rogovaya, O.V.Khlevnyuk.

Stalin Correspondences

No. 31

I. V. Stalin - I. Ya. Anvelt

[previously December 17, 1918]

T[owar] sch Anvelt!

Sorry for not having time to write in detail. I write about the essentials.

1) You should know that you have full support from our side. If you ever doubt this, it will be sinful.

2) In our Decree on the Independence of Estland 1 we somewhat bypassed the military and railway issues, since these issues are closely connected with the question of strategy, which (strategy) should be the same in the entire Baltic. We all think that you will only benefit from this. Of course, it is formally inconvenient if the Government does not have its own commander, but you can always appoint a military commissar (it seems that you are the head of the Estonian military forces), bearing in mind, however, that such an appointment should not violate the unity of strategy in all occupied [s] areas.

3) To force the agents of "Rost" 2 to write not "our troops occupied such and such", but "the troops of the Estonian Soviet Government liberated such and such". For my part, I will oblige the local "Rosta" to write only in the indicated way.

4) T[ovary] sch Sheffer will be the link between the Council of People's Commissars and you. Try to arrange it in such a way that all your appeals, etc., are handed over to him for the Council of People's Commissars. I, in turn, will supply you with information as well.

5) On the 17th, it seems, two new Soviet governments will appear, in Latvia and Lithuanian 3 .

Shake your hand.

Hello Comrade Pechenman, Kingisepp.

PS Tell me the date of your councils. Stalin.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 4574. L. 1. Autograph.

Notes:

1 Estonian Labor Commune - a Soviet republic on the territory of Estonia (the capital Narva), existed from November 1918 to June 1919. At the end of 1918, by a special decree, the Council of People's Commissars recognized the independence of this republic.

2 "Rosta" - Russian Telegraph Agency in 1918 - 1925

3 The Soviet government in Latvia was established on December 17, 1918 and lasted until August 1919. The Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic was proclaimed on December 15, 1918. August 1919

No. 32

I. I. Vatsetis - V. I. Lenin

[later December 24, 1918]

TO CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF DEFENSE LENIN 1 .

That case of mass surrender, which you mention in your telegram, took place on the southern front, in the 9th Army 2 . At that time, almost the entire 11th division surrendered, numbering about 10 thousand [cells] with 35 guns. On this occasion, I made appropriate instructions to the Commander of the Southern Front 3about the need to investigate and report on the causes of such a disaster. This report has now reached me. It can be seen from the content of the report that the Commander of the Southern Front, or rather the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front, as well as the 9th Army, explain such a rare case in recent times by the fact that the 11th division was completely unfit for combat and indicate the need to appoint an investigation to find out under what political conditions this division was formed. This case will be submitted to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic at the next meeting.

For my part, I can only note that if the Commander 9 4, as well as the Revolutionary Military Council of the 9th Army, it was known that this division was not combat-ready, then there was no need to drive it into battle. It was necessary to leave this division in reserve in Balashov, where I sent it, and subject it to thorough combat education, that is, to conduct further political work, as well as gradually draw parts of this division into a combat situation and create so-called combat discipline. I believe that this is the first duty of the revolutionary military councils at the fronts. It is by no means impossible to blame the Nizhny Novgorod Gubvoenkommissariat for sending an incompetent division to the front, because this division began to form in the month of August. I personally followed the work of the Nizhny Novgorod Military Commissariat on the formation of this division, I came to Nizhny Novgorod twice. In a relatively short time, the Nizhny Novgorod military commissariat managed to mobilize six regiments, assemble artillery, including heavy artillery, horses, and at the same time carried out political work, which achieved the establishment of conscious discipline and subordination of the masses. The training program was completed, however, at an accelerated pace, and it could not be otherwise, but, in addition to all this, this division also managed to undergo field maneuver training in full force. Nizhny Novgorod Military Commissariat comrade. Kraevsky, Kogan and the General Staff Lyubushkin at that time worked, literally exhausted, the period of August is memorable to all of us. They needed to form a division, they had to fortify Nizhny Novgorod, and at the same time fight the Commissariat of Food, which was supplying people with food and starving the horse train. I reviewed this division in Nizhny Novgorod, if I am not mistaken, on October 14, and the results of this review are set out in the order. True, the review consisted only in checking the combat soldering, since I was familiar with the maneuvering unit from a previous visit to Nizhny Novgorod, when I arranged a maneuver for the division in the field. At the review, I congratulated the people on the campaign, which was met with enthusiasm. So this division impressed me as a well-knit large military unit, which at that time did not exist in the Republic, with the exception of the Latvian rifle division, which was created by me. According to the report of the Gubvoenkommissariat, at the same time, the sad aspects of the life of the 11th division, connected with the departure to the front, were noted, namely: After the review, the Gubvoenkommissariat reported to me and to the member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, who was with me, comrade. Kobozev about that many Red Army soldiers of the 11th division going to the front leave their families in an extremely difficult situation. This division is formed almost exclusively from workers. Many people leave their families without means of subsistence, food at that time in Nizhny Novgorod was in an extremely difficult situation. As for the commissariat of social security, there was no such in Nizhny Novgorod. The Gubvoenkommissariat reported that many Red Army soldiers leaving for the war were in such a desperate situation that to go on a campaign without giving them emergency help would mean leaving their families to the mercy of starvation. In order to come to the aid of the Provincial Military Commissariat, we, with Comrade. Kobozev decided to issue one million rubles to the Provincial Military Commissariat for issuing to the families of Red Army soldiers leaving for the war. From all of the above, you can see that the formation, training, political education of this division was taken very seriously, as well as the opportunity to calmly part with the families of the Red Army soldiers leaving for the war. This event was extremely necessary in view of the fact that at that time there were absolutely no reserves on the southern front and the Cossacks threatened to interrupt communication with Saratov. Based on my experience in the old war, I can testify that the reasons for mass surrender are of two kinds: the first reason is moral, the second is caused by the catastrophic circumstances that have developed in the situation of the battle itself. This event was extremely necessary in view of the fact that at that time there were absolutely no reserves on the southern front and the Cossacks threatened to interrupt communication with Saratov. Based on my experience in the old war, I can testify that the reasons for mass surrender are of two kinds: the first reason is moral, the second is caused by the catastrophic circumstances that have developed in the situation of the battle itself. This event was extremely necessary in view of the fact that at that time there were absolutely no reserves on the southern front and the Cossacks threatened to interrupt communication with Saratov. Based on my experience in the old war, I can testify that the reasons for mass surrender are of two kinds: the first reason is moral, the second is caused by the catastrophic circumstances that have developed in the situation of the battle itself.

If this division surrendered all at once during the same combat episode, then it means that it was moved into battle in a large mass, all at once. Since this corresponded to the situation, it is necessary to find out and, first of all, it is necessary to pay attention to whether this division surrendered in a defensive or offensive situation, how much the enemy was and how he acted, whether on foot or on horseback. In addition, it is necessary to take into account the steppe nature of the war in the area where the 11th Nizhny Novgorod division died.

As for our actions near the city of Perm, I ordered Perm not to surrender in any case. When the instability of the 3rd Army began to emerge, especially on its left flank, then ... on December I ordered to send one brigade of the 7th division from the Yaroslavl Military District to Perm to support the 3rd Army, in addition, to paralyze the enemy’s ability to send support from Yekaterinburg to those of its troops that are advancing on Perm, I ordered the Commander of the Eastern Front 5... on December, go on a decisive offensive in the direction of Ufa and further to the Chelyabinsk-Yekaterinburg front, that is, to the rear of those enemy forces that are operating from Yekaterinburg to Perm. Now, when the right flank of the 3rd Army cannot withstand the pressure of the enemy, I have indicated to the commander of the Eastern Front the need to send the entire 2nd Army to the aid of the 3rd Army. If necessary, I will order to transfer from the regiments being formed in the Volga District, those for which it will be possible to get weapons in the near future. There are more than ten thousand rifles at the Izhevsk plant, which are hastily sent in sufficient quantities to the 3rd Army. The dispatch of these rifles was late due to the following misunderstanding. In early December, the Commander of the Eastern Front reported to me that he had a squad from TsUS'a 6for twenty thousand rifles, but what about GAU 7they are not delivered to the front due to the lack of them in warehouses. It was just after the Izhevsk plant. I ordered the East Front Command to pay attention to the Izhevsk plant, create a proper order there with the help of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Front, under which the workers could begin intensive work and, if necessary, supply the workers with food so that they could work more intensively and allowed the Komvostfront, in order to cover the outfits for rifles made by the TsUS, use the Izhevsk plant for two weeks, that is, until December 17, and take all the rifles that will be manufactured within two weeks to arm the spare parts of the Eastern Front. This order was made by me personally to the Comvostfront in Arzamas, where he was summoned. But after how the plant began to function normally and the Eastern Front managed to get only 2000 rifles from the plant, the chairman of the emergency commission for supplying the army, comrade. Krasin forbade the further issuance of rifles to the eastern front, without notifying me that he was canceling my order. Only at the meeting in Arzamas Comrade. Krasin said that he canceled my order. When I pointed out Com. Krasin, that this could lead to a great misfortune on the Perm Front, he then only faced the fact of understanding what had happened, and he immediately gave the order to the Commissar of the Izhevsk Plant Simkov on the further release of rifles to the Eastern Front according to my order. Due to the above misunderstanding, 7-8 days were lost. Krasin forbade the further issuance of rifles to the eastern front, without notifying me that he was canceling my order. Only at the meeting in Arzamas Comrade. Krasin said that he canceled my order.When I pointed out Com. Krasin, that this could cause a great misfortune on the Perm Front, he then only faced the fact of understanding what had happened, and he immediately gave the order to the Commissar of the Izhevsk Plant Simkov on the further release of rifles to the Eastern Front according to my order. Due to the above misunderstanding, 7-8 days were lost. he then only faced the fact of clarifying to himself what had happened, and he immediately gave the order to the Commissar of the Izhevsk plant Simkov on the further issue of rifles to the Eastern Front in accordance with my order. Due to the above misunderstanding, 7-8 days were lost. he then only faced the fact of clarifying to himself what had happened, and he immediately gave the order to the Commissar of the Izhevsk plant Simkov on the further issue of rifles to the Eastern Front in accordance with my order. Due to the above misunderstanding, 7-8 days were lost.

Here I must note that the situation at the fronts, in connection with the development of our strategic tasks and the absence of central warehouses of both weapons and food, sometimes requires my personal intervention in order to avoid bureaucratic delays, as was the case with sending weapons to parts of the fronts where an unexpected catastrophe arose. , as well as for supplying food to military units urgently transferred from one front to another. Such cases are rare, but they are inevitable, and the good of the cause requires them. In this case, I would think that if the chairman of the Extraordinary Commission for the Supply of the Army considered it necessary to cancel my order regarding the Izhevsk plant, he should notify me of this or ask me on the basis of what this was done, especially since there was already one case of a similar kind, but only from the quartermaster's area, when I was ordered to follow the Latvian regiments being transferred from the Eastern to the Western Front to send five wagons of flour and five wagons of fodder. And then the chairman of the Extraordinary Commission Comrade. Krasin found it possible to cancel this order of mine, the flour was unloaded in Moscow and used up for a completely different purpose, while the Latvian regiments went to Pskov without food. In order to get out of the disaster, emergency measures had to be taken to bake bread in Moscow and send it to Pskov for distribution to the shelves, and one can imagine the form in which this bread was delivered to the positions in frosty winter weather after it had lain for several days in wagons. And in this case, I did not receive from Comrade. Krasina notices that he cancels my order, and received only a copy of his telegram to the Central Control Commission to the effect that some persons, including the commander-in-chief, were arbitrarily making orders for food and fodder, and at the end of the telegram there was even a threat to complain to the Council of People's Commissars. In both of these cases, one and the same mutual misunderstanding of the roles of the Commander-in-Chief and the Extraordinary Chief of Supply of the Red Army shows through. My personal intervention in such cases is always due to extraordinary circumstances and in no case can I wear all the colors of the rainbow of bureaucracy. Those of my subordinates who in such cases receive orders from me are only obliged to bring this to the attention of the central supplying authorities, and in no case is it unacceptable that the latter can cancel them without even telling me anything about it. they arbitrarily make outfits for food and fodder, and at the end of the telegram there was even a threat to complain to the Council of People's Commissars.

As for the advance in the Orenburg direction, it is happening, but, unfortunately, not with the desired speed. The latter is explained by the fact that it was not possible to submit fresh reserves to strengthen operations in the Orenburg direction due to the lack of weapons.

In addition, the unexpected instability of our position near Perm has recently diverted all the attention of the eastern front to Perm, but at the present time I have no strategic reserves at my disposal ready for battle. In addition, all the forces that are only possible are currently drawn to the southern front.

Commander Vatsetis.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 17. On. 109. D. 41. L. 1-5. Certified typewritten copy.

Notes:

1 The letter was sent from Serpukhov to Moscow.

2On December 23, 1918, Lenin, in a telegram addressed to Vatsetis, asked on behalf of the Council of Defense about the reasons for the surrender of 15-30 guns by the Red Army units to the enemy in the area of the city of Balashov and asked to be notified of measures to bring to justice those responsible for this (Lenin V.I. PSS, vol. 50, p. 378). On December 24, 1918, in a report “regarding the request of the Defense Council,” Vatsetis reported: “The fact was indeed with the 11th division, about which a detailed report from the Southern Front followed only in mid-December [...] From the report of this front, addressed in a copy to you, it is seen that the reason for this incident, the Southern Front considers the political conditions in which the formation of the 11th division proceeded. Disagreeing with the point of view of the Southern Front, I will detail my opinion on the reasons for the surrender of units of the 11th division in addition [... ]” (Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Republic I. I. Vatsetis. Collection of documents. Riga, 1978. P. 151-152.). The published document, apparently, is the expression of Vatsetis's personal point of view on this issue.

3 The Southern Front was formed by order of the Revolutionary Military Council of September 11, 1918 in the zone between the Western Defense Area and the Eastern Front. The headquarters of the front at various times was located in Kozlov, Orel, Tula, Sergievsky, Serpukhov. The tasks of the Southern Front were: the protection of the demarcation line between Soviet Russia and Ukraine occupied by German troops, the fight against the White Cossack army of Krasnov on the Don and the White Guard troops of Denikin in the North Caucasus. From November 9, 1918 to January 24, 1919 Slaven was the commander of the front.

4 Knyagnitsky.

5 S. S. Kamenev.

6 The Central Supply Directorate, an organ of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, was established on June 1, 1918.

7 Main Artillery Directorate. From June 1918 it was subordinate to the Central Supply Department.