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 Bolshevik leadership Correspondence. 1912-1927
Collection of documents 1996.
Compiled by: A.V.Kvashonkin, L.P.Kosheleva, L.A.Rogovaya, O.V.Khlevnyuk.

Stalin Correspondences

Telegram from J. V. Stalin to V. I. Lenin

August 4 [1920]

Moscow. Only to Lenin, hastily .

Lozovaya, 4/8.

I report for orientation the following data on the Crimean Front: the first, at the front and [in] the immediate rear, the enemy had thirty-six thousand bayonets and fourteen thousand sabers by July 30, of which eighteen thousand bayonets and eight thousand sabers were put into battle; we have forty thousand bayonets and six thousand sabers at the front and [in] the immediate rear, of which only ten thousand bayonets and five thousand sabers are brought into battle (the rest are being brought up and concentrated); this is what explains our present failures; thus, the nearest reserve of the enemy is six thousand sabers and eighteen thousand bayonets, our nearest reserve is one thousand sabers and thirty thousand bayonets; obviously, if we are good with infantry in terms of reserves, then it is very bad with cavalry, because the enemy outnumbers us in cavalry by more than twice. Second. Just got your questions 1We do not need a division of fronts, but a strengthening of the Crimean sector, the transfer of all Western armies to the Western Front without breaking Yugozap's front-line apparatus, I have already stated my considerations in a telegram addressed to Krestinsky 2 ; I have no deputy, the Central Committee can find one within two weeks; The Commander-in-Chief fails from the very beginning of the Crimean operation, because he (not only him) does not underestimate the Wrangel danger and is always late with the fulfillment of his promises exactly as much as Wrangel needs, there are a lot of examples, writing about them is an empty occupation; As for our diplomacy, I will keep silent about it, it would be better to talk about it later when we meet. Third. You must already know that we took Kovel, Lutsk and Bugach.

Fourth. Just sent me your request about the prospects on the fronts in anticipation of the plenum of the Central Committee 3. I don’t know why you actually need my opinion, therefore I am not able to convey to you the conclusion you demand and I confine myself to reporting bare facts without coverage: Budyonny’s hitch is temporary, the enemy threw the Lvov, Lutsk and Galician groups on Budyonny in order to save Lvov, Budyonny assures that he will defeat the enemy (he has already taken a large number of prisoners), but Lvov will obviously be taken with some delay. In a word, Budyonny's hitch does not mean a turning point in favor of the enemy. As for Wrangel, although we are now weak for the reasons stated above, we still hold the enemy back; not later than in a week we will put into play thirty thousand fresh bayonets and, according to all information, we will create an advantage on our side, we will move Wrangel from his position, and our position will improve every day, for the belated parts will fit. Of course, war is a game and it is impossible to take everything into account, but since it can be foreseen at all, Wrangel's chances must necessarily fall. The general outlook on the fronts, in my opinion, is this: Poland is relaxed and in need of a respite, in view of which we must lay down conditions that make it impossible for bourgeois Poland to recover. Wrangel will be shot down [in] the next few days, and if the Commander-in-Chief sends us cavalry, Wrangel will be completely eliminated by the beginning of autumn.

Stalin.

RTSHIDNI; F. 558. On. 1. D. 5556. L. 3-6. Autograph.

Notes:

On August 3, 1920, Lenin sent a telegram to Stalin, in which he raised questions: about the division of fronts, about Stalin's deputy, about the position of the Commander-in-Chief, about the activities of the NKID (Lenin V.I. PSS. T. 51. P. 248).

2 We are talking about Stalin's telegram dated August 4, 1920, in which it was proposed to combine forces in the Western direction, transferring the troops of the 2nd, 1st Cavalry and 14th armies to the Western Front so that the rest of the forces of the Southwestern Front were directed against Wrangel. On August 5, 1920, Stalin's proposal was considered by the Politburo. The adopted decision stated: “To approve the option proposed by Stalin, adopted by the RVSR” (Izvestiya of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 2, pp. 121, 123).

3 This refers to Lenin’s telegram to Stalin dated August 4, 1920, in which Lenin asked to send “an opinion on the nature of the hitches at Budyonny and on the Wrangel front, as well as on our military prospects on both of these fronts” in connection with the upcoming plenum of the Central Committee ( Lenin, V. I. PSS, vol. 51, p. 249). At the plenum of the Central Committee on August 5, 1920, the question of the situation on the Wrangel front and in the Kuban was considered. The decision was made: “To recognize that the Kuban-Wrangel front must go ahead of the western front and therefore the Orgburo and the People’s Commissariat of War must take the most energetic measures to send military forces and communists to this front” (Izvestiya of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 2. S. 12b).