from Stalin to Lenin

Bolshevik leadership Correspondence. 1912-1927
Collection of documents 1996.
Compiled by: A.V.Kvashonkin, L.P.Kosheleva, L.A.Rogovaya, O.V.Khlevnyuk.

Stalin Correspondences

Telegram from J. V. Stalin to V. I. Lenin

[August 12, 1920]

Lenin.

First, I would like to greet you and myself with victory, but I must confess that I do not believe in Lloyd George's statement, transmitted by Kamenev .

Secondly, our current blow to Wrangel cannot be crushing, since, due to the unmanagement of the headquarters, the northern divisions were transferred to the Crimean front slowly at long intervals, and we were forced to bring them into battle in parts, without waiting for the arrival of the rest of the troops, for example, a brigade Volunteers have not yet been brought up in their entirety, since the field headquarters for some reason set the standard for transporting one echelon per day, and there are twenty-three echelons in total in the brigade. My impression is that the Commander-in-Chief and the brothers are sabotaging the work of organizing the victory over Wrangel, in any case, they do not show a tenth of the desire to win, which they undoubtedly showed in the fight against Poland. In addition, the Commander-in-Chief refuses to provide cavalry 2 . In view of this, our present attack on Wrangel cannot be considered decisive.

Stalin.

RTSHIDNI; F. 558. On. 1. D. 1940. L. 1-3. Autograph.

Notes:

1 The telegram was a reply to Lenin's telegram of August 11, 1920: Kamenev's dispatch has just been received. England was afraid of the general strike, and Lloyd George announced that he was advising Poland to accept our armistice terms, including disarmament, and the transfer of weapons to the workers, and land, and so on. Our victory is great and will be the most complete if we finish off Wrangel. Here we take all measures. Go ahead and take the whole Crimea with the current blow at all costs. Everything now depends on it. The Poles are pulling and did not arrive on time. For us, this is archivally beneficial ”(Lenin V.I. PSS. T. 51. S. 254-255).

On August 12, 1920, Stalin and Yegorov sent a memorandum to S. S. Kamenev with a proposal to withdraw the 1st Cavalry Army to the reserve of the Southwestern Front "in case of Romania's intervention." On August 13, 1920, Kamenev issued a directive on the inclusion of the 1st Cavalry Army, along with the 12th Army, into the Western Front. (From the history of the Civil War in the USSR. Vol. 3, pp. 350, 351). Stalin's telegram to the Commander-in-Chief dated August 13, 1920, in particular, stated:

[...] Your latest directive [...] unnecessarily overturns the established grouping of forces in the area of these armies, already on the offensive; this directive should have been given either three days ago, when the cavalry was in reserve, or later, after the cavalry took the Lvov region [...] In view of this, I refuse to sign the corresponding order of Yugozap in development of your directive [...] ”(RTsKhIDNI F. 558. On. 1. D. 4137. L. 1). On August 14, 1920, in a telegram to Lenin, Stalin again complained about the Commander-in-Chief and asked for a definite decision of the Central Committee regarding the Wrangel Front (Ibid. D. 5567. L. 2).

On August 19, 1920, at a meeting of the Politburo, on the report of Trotsky and Stalin on the military situation on the Polish and Wrangel fronts, it was decided to withdraw the 6th division of the 1st Cavalry Army to the Wrangel front. True, in the event that a protest motivated by military considerations followed from S. S. Kamenev, the issue was subject to revision in the Politburo (Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 3. P. 160).

No. 100

I. V. Stalin - Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b)

[August 30, 1920]

TO THE POLITBURO OF THE CC 1 .

I propose that the Central Committee form a commission of three [persons] (through the Defense Soviet) to examine the conditions of our July offensive and August retreat on the Western Front . Give the commission a two-week deadline. I propose Comrade Serebryakov as chairman of the commission (if the Central Committee does not have a better candidate ) .

I. STALIN.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 5213. L. 1. Typewritten copy.

Notes:

1 In the upper left corner of the telegram, a note: “Ex. PB item 21 No. 40 І/IX-20”, below: “30/VІІІ”.

2 In mid-August 1920, the Polish army went on the offensive and, building on success, by the end of the month pushed the Soviet troops back to the borders of Poland.

3 On the same day, August 30, 1920, Stalin submitted a statement to the Politburo, in which he connected the failures on the Polish front with the mistakes of the country's top military leadership. In particular, he called the lack of serious combat reserves the main drawback of military policy and proposed adopting a “program for the formation of combat reserves of the Republic” (Stalin I. V. Works. Vol. 4. P. 348-350). Stalin's proposal was considered at a meeting of the Politburo on September 1, 1920. The adopted resolution stated: "to take into account Trotsky's message that the military department is taking measures in the spirit of Comrade Stalin's proposal [...]" (Izvestiya of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 3. S. 162).

2 We are talking about the Crimean sector of the Southwestern Front.

3 This refers to military formations that were subject to internment from Georgia in accordance with the Soviet-Georgian agreement of May 7, 1920.