to Stalin from Krestinsky

Bolshevik leadership Correspondence. 1912-1927
Collection of documents 1996.
Compiled by: A.V.Kvashonkin, L.P.Kosheleva, L.A.Rogovaya, O.V.Khlevnyuk.

Stalin Correspondences

N. N. Krestinsky to I. V. Stalin, F. E. Dzerzhinsky, M. A. Trilisser, V. R. Menzhinsky

November 13, 1923

Tov. Stalin.

Copies of comrades Dzerzhinsky, Trilisser and Menzhinsky.

Dear Comrade!

I received a telegram from you on November 9th stating that MYASNIKOV should not be issued a visa until he submits a written application and considers this application in the Central Committee 1. On the 11th, a telegram arrived from Comrade Trilisser with a proposal to cancel Myasnikov's visa or to report exactly the day of his departure. On the 9th I telegraphed you that Myasnikov's visa had already been issued on November 3rd. Upon receipt of Comrade Trilisser's telegram, I tried to find out whether Myasnikov had already left. I found out that the visa had been issued to him on the 3rd, that he had received the passport with the visa from us on the 5th, that he had said goodbye to a number of familiar comrades at the same time, and that it was not known when he left or whether he left. This is the actual situation. If I establish that he has not left yet, I will try to find him and cancel the visa. If he has already left, then it is easier for you to find out at the border point when he passed. In addition, he was going to go straight to Moscow to an apartment with his family.

I turn now to the merits of the matter. In early September, I received from Comrade. Dzerzhinsky a letter with a request to persuade Myasnikov to return 2 and with an official decision of the GPU to cancel his expulsion. By the way, this was the only official message about Myasnikov, because I did not receive any message about his deportation.

I summoned Myasnikov to me, informed him of the possibility of returning. My message met with his own initiative, he decided to go, then raised the question of not being arrested, then said that he was going to open a campaign here against the Central Committee and, to some extent, against the Comintern, then he came and said that he was ready to go, not demanding no guarantees, leaving the Sovpra and the Central Committee themselves in Russia to decide whether he should be arrested or not. Such a decision by Myasnikov was entirely in favor of the comrade transferred to me. Dzerzhinsky decision of the Central Committee. I ordered that a visa be issued to him and contacted the Trade Representation about sending Myasnikov to Moscow. After all this has been done, when the apparatus of the Trade Representation is aware of his official secondment to Moscow, and he has his passport with a visa in his hands, it is extremely inconvenient to suddenly change the previous decision. Decision, which at one time was reported to Myasnikov as a decision taken on the own initiative of the Soviet authorities. In this case, there is nothing more to be done. If Myasnikov has not left, I will suspend his trip. If I left, I can't stop. But I would very much like to ask you in the future not to put the Plenipotentiary in such an uncomfortable position that it can be used both against the Plenipotentiary and against the Soviet in the most diverse press organs.

I do not understand the reasons for changing the original decision. Comrade Dzerzhinsky's letter was obviously written after Kuznetsov was arrested and the work of Working Group 3 was revealedand, in particular, Myasnikov in Russia and abroad. Obviously, the Central Committee then decided that Myasnikov could cause more trouble and harm abroad than in Russia. I think the same is true now. Now Myasnikov is leaving for Russia under the impression of a new aggravation of the proletarian struggle on an international scale, which began, first of all, in Germany. Under this impression, he will change direction or ease the tension of his struggle in Russia. If he stays here, then with the onset of a certain period of calm, he can return to his former mood and start sharp performances here on an international scale. Not to mention the fact that with the current crisis in the German Party, especially in the Berlin organization, and with Myasnikov’s connection with the left Berliners, his stay here is certainly more harmful than in Moscow4 .

With comradely greetings, N. Krestinsky.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 76. Op. 3. D. 162. L. 15-16. Typewritten text. The signature is an autograph.

Notes:

1 G. I. Myasnikov, an old Bolshevik, one of the leaders of the party organization of Motovilikha (Perm province), was arrested in May 1923 for sharp criticism of the party leadership and exiled to Berlin. In Berlin, he continued to be active and made contact with the "left" in the German Communist Party.

2On September 7, 1923, Dzerzhinsky sent the following letter to the Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Germany, Krestinsky: about the expulsion of Gavril Ivanovich MYASNIKOV abroad. I ask you, if possible, to personally call MYASNIKOV to your place and announce to him that the expulsion has been canceled and that he is allowed to return to the USSR. The expulsion was canceled due to the fact that Myasnikov's stay in Germany is undesirable, as a result of his developed anti-Party and anti-Soviet work and his establishment of contact with the left wing of the German Communist Party. The need for the indispensable return of MYASNIKOV to the USSR was recognized by the leading circles. Request to you: take all measures to ensure that Myasnikov leaves immediately back to Soviet Russia. From a conversation with you, Myasnikov should have the impression that the question of repressions against him has disappeared. Please notify me of the results you have achieved [...]” (RTSKHIDNI, F. 76, Op. 3, D. 162, L. 14).

3 After Myasnikov's arrest and expulsion, the OGPU crushed the "Working Group" - an organization of Myasnikov's supporters. More than 20 people were arrested.

4Myasnikov returned to Moscow in early November 1923. On November 19, Dzerzhinsky addressed the Secretary of the Central Committee, Molotov, with the following letter: “I consider Myasnikov's stay at large to be especially dangerous. Firstly, this is incomprehensible to everyone and is an argument that the Central Committee is afraid of him or feels that it is wrong in relation to the “Workers' Group”, because Myasnikov has absolutely not changed his views and does not hide this. Then, Myasnikov, returning here and not finding what he came here for (negotiations and an agreement with the Central Committee), loses all ground and, being mentally unbalanced, can throw out irreparable things, as Ryazanov said at one time. Therefore, I think that Myasnikov should be arrested. Further decisions need to be made after his arrest. I think that it will be necessary to send him out so that it would be difficult for him to escape [...]” (Ibid. L. 17).

No. 176

I. V. Stalin - B. I. Magidov

November 22, 1923

22/XI-23

Dear comrade. MAGIDOV!

Your letter received. Thank you very much for it. You will see from issue 15 of the closed letter that the questions you raised helped me to formalize certain shortcomings in the practice of our Party. The receipt of your letter coincided with the appointment of the Politburo of the Central Committee of a special commission headed by Comrade Yaroslavsky to check the work of the Donbass 1 . As you can see, at this point you hit the mark. Your complaints about the lack of information from the center are absolutely correct. I hope that the 15th letter of the Central Committee will give you some satisfaction in this respect. The problem is that you can't write about everything. For example, the Central Committee decided not to inform party organizations of the resolutions of the Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission in October of this year regarding certain disagreements within the Politburo 2. These disagreements, in essence, are not great, they have already been resolved by the Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission in the spirit of the position of the majority of the Politburo, the misunderstandings themselves have completely or almost completely disappeared, for we continue to work in unison. Nevertheless, I have no right to send you the text of the corresponding resolution of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission in view of the prohibition on the part of these party authorities. There will be an all-Party conference in January, and we must see you then in Moscow, and I will be able to tell you orally about everything that happened. Thanks again for your letter. Please keep writing. Shake your hand.

I. Stalin.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 2565. L. 1. Typewritten text. The signature is an autograph.

Notes:

On November 10, 1923, the Politburo considered the question of the Donbass and decided to immediately send a commission there, chaired by Yaroslavsky, to examine the economic situation of the workers and the activities of local party, trade union and economic bodies (RTsKhIDNI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 391. L. 6-7).

2 We are talking about the decision “On the question of the internal party situation in connection with the letters of comrade. Trotsky" of the joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, which met on October 25-27, 1923 (News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 10. P. 188-189).

How can one explain that despite a number of recent circulars from the Central Committee of our Party about a resolute struggle against all kinds of banquets, offerings, about the termination of the issuance of bonuses, etc., remnants of bourgeois-petty-bourgeois traditions, only a few days ago Narkomfin sent to his subordinates in the form of a gold watch award. (Head of the Gubfin Department and his assistant, of course, to the communists).

Everyone knows this and emphasizes the duality and contradiction of our practice, for we ourselves issue circulars about taking away precious items from the Communists.

In general, circulars (about the same content as the fight against excesses) are still used to be viewed most of all as a political act (we have developed too much politicking and politicking), a non-committal center, and vice versa - very obliging periphery.

Meanwhile, the main burden in the fight against excesses, of course, will have to be overcome in the center (Moscow, Petrograd, Kharkov, and other metropolitan areas).

After the Twelfth Party Congress it was perfectly clear to us that the absence of Ilyich imposed on us an enormous collective responsibility.

We perfectly understood that there was no one to replace Ilyich personally.

But, unfortunately, we were not sufficiently and to a certain extent certain that an ideological and militant unity would be created in the Central Committee.

That is why we have attached and continue to attach actual importance to the question of the maximum unity of Party members.

First of all, it is necessary to seriously and for a long time raise the question of the indispensable practical implementation of inner-Party workers' democracy.

The mass of the party, the middle peasants of the party, has grown noticeably, matured, stands firmly on the Bolshevik positions and urgently demands confidence in itself from the leaders of the mass of the party, including from the members of the Central Committee.

What is needed is correct, timely, well in advance, undisguised information about everything that is being done in the Central Committee. It is possible less often, and only in the most exceptional cases, to resort to measures of an administrative nature and perhaps less often to resort to the use of administrative diligence.

It is necessary to avoid cases of cancellation by one person (no matter what high post and rank he occupies) of the decision of an elected body.

It is very useful that members of the Central Committee often travel to places and, especially, the presence of the latter at party conferences and plenums of the Gubernia Committee.

It is necessary to carry out firmly and resolutely (again in the Leninist way) the practical measures outlined in the circular on excesses.

It is necessary to categorically forbid all heads of departments to bring any precious gifts (Acceptable gift, in our opinion, is a good book that is already being used locally).

Tov. Stalin, if I decided to take your time, it is only because I am deeply convinced that, with the courage inherent in us Bolsheviks (we, Lenin's disciples), if we only delve deeper into the interests of the working class and the peasantry, we will create within ourselves atmosphere of mutual trust - we will certainly succeed this time as well in getting out of a very difficult situation with honor.

It goes without saying that there can be no question of any pessimism.

The sixth anniversary of October has shown what enormous strength and hope we can draw from the working class and the peasantry, and what selfless confidence the Communist Party enjoys among the working masses.

Waiting for your answer with communist greetings.

Secretary of the Poltava Provincial Committee: B. Magidov.

Poltava

November 10th. G.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 2565. L. 2-7. Typewritten text. The signature is an autograph.

Notes:

1 The report of the secretary of the Poltava provincial committee of the CP(b) U Magidov was considered by the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) on October 8, 1923 (RTsKhIDNI. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 486. L. 1).

2 Circular of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission on "Struggle against excesses and against the criminal use of official position by party members" (Ibid. D. 561. L. 56-56v.).