to Stalin from Pyatakov

Bolshevik leadership Correspondence. 1912-1927
Collection of documents 1996.
Compiled by: A.V.Kvashonkin, L.P.Kosheleva, L.A.Rogovaya, O.V.Khlevnyuk.

Stalin Correspondences

G. L. Pyatakov to I. V. Stalin

November 1, 1923

T. Stalin 1 .

Dear comrade St[alin]! I am replying to your note and sharing some of my observations with you. From the text you will see why he delayed his letter so much.

1. Pro domo sua

The PB sent me with my full consent 2 . I have never refused and will never refuse any assignment that gives me the opportunity to apply my forces as a revolutionary. I will not hide - I had a very hard time here. The hopes that were pinned on me, to a large extent (it is difficult for me to admit this, but in order to dispel another illusion, I consider myself obliged to express this too), will not come true. Of course, I will be useful in outlining the general line, but as regards the concrete, everyday work in which Andrei[she] and I 3should take part, then here is my firmness, determination, clarity in the work, etc. definitely don't show up. The fact is that - as I now clearly see - the main prerequisite for these properties is necessarily: 1) complete knowledge of all concrete life, such knowledge that gives intuitive decisions before rational analysis and 2) knowledge of people, which allows you to translate political decisions into certain organizational and technical measures. Unfortunately, I do not have this prerequisite. As a result, at first I felt like a fish thrown ashore. Of course, since I am not completely deprived of the head apparatus, I gradually get used to the specific situation, but still even now (and three weeks have already passed) I feel quite helpless. Every time the question is "who will do it?" I have to wait for what others will say and take offers on faith - this is very painful. On the other hand, the language also binds me. Of course, I can talk, explain myself, etc., but when it comes to wordings, resolutions, political documents, etc., I myself can’t offer - I don’t speak the language so well.

However, I think that I still bring some benefit here. Not relying only on myself, I consulted with Andrei and he, too, was of the opinion that I was needed here. So we both think that I should be left here. I wrote about my difficulties so that you would not scold me in the future for having done little.

2. Household.

I was very well aware and I am aware that my departure will cause a whole series of negative phenomena in the apparatus. But I, for my part, took the following measures: 1) informed through Dzerzhinsky that, in my opinion , A.D.Ts. 5 should be appointed instead of A.I. e. with release from other work) 6 . 2) I wrote a note to you and A.D.Ts., in which I recommend that you talk to Yulip from time to time, who will truthfully inform you about what is happening there. 3) He asked Yulip to keep you and A.D.Ts. informed of all the affairs. What else could I do?

Then I move on to the local business.

Three main facts inspire me with the strongest anxiety:

1) Party.

2) Armament.

3) The working class.

1. Party.

a) The intra-Party crisis has acquired an unheard-of acuteness. This should be clear to you without much explanation. The Central Committee gave the slogan "to act," then (quite correctly) pulled back. Hamburg performed 7. For a whole week the Central Committee was in the net (moving from Dresden, lack of organization of the illegal apparatus, etc.). As a result, the opposition is furiously attacking the Central Committee. It got to the point that on October 31 the Berliners convened, without the knowledge of the Central Committee, a party conference not only of Berlin-Brandenburg, but also of Hamburg, Mecklenburg, Thuringia, etc., i.e., they actually convened a conference for a split. We banned this conference, but the very attempt to convene is characteristic. The opposition demands Brandler's resignation. 2 Berlin districts passed a resolution expelling Br[andler] from the Party. It got to the point that Comrade Shklovsky writes to us that Br[andler] should be removed from the Central Committee, because he is a dead man. A whole bunch of such facts could be cited. All of them testify to the deepest inner-party crisis.

The Party Council is meeting tomorrow, and I foresee that something scandalous will be played out at it.

Andrey and I are taking all measures at our disposal to strengthen the Central Committee without surgical measures. As a matter of fact, a number of "Lefts" should be thrown out of the Party, but this cannot be done now. By the way, these are not leftists at all, but opportunist talkers with leftist phrases. Facts: 1) At a conference of the Berliners with Andrei[ey] and with me, they brought forward the accusation of the Central Committee that it paid too much attention to the technical preparation of the [armed] in [the uprising]. Ruth said bluntly: “It is necessary to prepare for [an armed] insurrection not technically, but politically.” 2) The Berliners rebelled in every possible way against the protest strike. 3) The Berliners treat the issues of armament as secondary issues. 4) At the moment, they are not serious about the [armed] in [rebellion], preferring squabbles within the Party. That is my impression.

In a word, the position within the Party is extremely difficult.

This is aggravated by the fact that the Central Committee is weak, has really made a lot of mistakes, and by the fact that the Party's illegal apparatus is acting extremely badly.

II. Armament. Suffice it to say that we have: 11,000 rifles! 2000 revolvers and 1 1/2 hundreds of machine gun pistols. This is the most important task.

III. The working class is by no means so unanimously active and does not at all follow the CP entirely. Suffice it to say, in cases where the S[social]-d[emocrats] are against it, significant sections of the working class do not come forward. Let's see how today's strike will go, against which the S[social]-d[emocrats] and A.D.G.V. have spoken out .

Of course, the craving for us is enormous. This is visible throughout. But this process has not yet reached the point where we can say: we are leading the working class. Therefore, we see as the main task a frenzied struggle for the working class, a complete break with the social democrats, frenzied persecution of the social democrats, etc. Many facts show that that within the social [social]-d[emocracy] there is a strong decomposition.

I think that 1) the exit of a large number of social [social]-d[emocrats] - workers from the Party and the transition to us and 2) a split in the social [social]-d[emocratic] p[arty] is inevitable. A few curious illustrative facts: five organizations of social [social]-d[emocrats] (Leipzig, Berlin, etc.) demanded the expulsion of Ebert from the Party; in which speeches against the Central Committee aroused stormy approval. Wurm said: we do not agree with the communists, but remember that the actions on the right are directed against you, and the actions on the left are for you; at this point, the report notes: "Brausender Beifall", i.e. "stormy approval." I don't have time to give you a number of similar facts. It is clear to me that the more furiously we attack the Social-Democrats, the sooner this process will proceed.

What do I want to say with this letter?

Here's what: we are sending you the general situation today with the next report (Andrei is writing it now). I consider myself obliged to add that our army has not yet been assembled to deliver a decisive blow . It's sad, but true. According to the general situation, I would now go into battle. The condition of the army forces me to take a different position: the preparation of an armed uprising, the preparation is not only technical (and technical as opposed to pseudo-lefts), but also political: party rallying, rallying the worker class, disorganization of the social [democratic] and disorganization of the Reichswehr.

Unfortunately, I did not have time to write about the latter. I will say briefly: the greatest delusion is that nothing can be done with the Reichswehr. Can be done. There are already concrete facts of small riots, we have connections, and so on. It is only necessary to strengthen this work many times over.

Well, I shake hands. Don't get angry at the long silence. I did not want to give you only rumors, and for this I had to get more comfortable with the situation.

This letter, although addressed to you, of course, can be sent to all members of the PB, with the exception of paragraphs 1 and 2, which are only for you.

Arvid 10 .

Berlin, 1.XI.1923

PS I am very worried about our intra-Party situation in the USSR. If you have mercy, write at least briefly what you thought up there and what you did. Did you call the meeting that we asked you to do? What was on it? I don't know anything for sure, and this torments me in the strongest way. Just for God's sake don't start a fight - otherwise everything will be lost 11 . If you fight, we will quit working here (this is not a threat, but a conclusion from the fact that under such conditions our work here is meaningless). Please write to me.

I also ask L. D. [Trotsky] about this

A[rvid].

PSS The scandal in the Central Committee is being played out. Because of this, Andr[ey] is unable to write a report. We are now going with him to a meeting with Br[andler], Ruth [Fischer] and Helm 12 . I read my letter to him, and he fully agreed with it. We ask you to give a copy to Zinoviev and Trotsky.

Ar[view].

RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 2. D. 137. L. 1-5. Typewritten text.

Notes:

1 At the top of the first sheet is Stalin's inscription: "Only to Trotsky, Zinoviev and Bukharin."

2 The decision to send Pyatakov to Germany was made by the Politburo on October 4, 1923 (Source. 1995. No. 5. P. 138).

3 Radek's pseudonym.

4 A. I. Rykov.

5 A. D. Tsyurupa.

6 This, apparently, is about the implementation of economic support for the German revolution. On September 13, 1923, the Politburo considered proposals to send 10 million poods of grain bread to Germany and entrusted the practical implementation of this action to Rudzutak, Rykov and Krasin (Ibid., pp. 128-129).

On October 23-25, 1923, an armed uprising of the communists took place in Hamburg, which was being prepared as part of an all-German uprising. On the eve of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany, the all-German strike was canceled, which was supposed to develop into an armed uprising, but this information accidentally did not reach Hamburg. The uprising in Hamburg was put down.

8 All-German Association of Trade Unions.

9 Stalin tacitly supported the ultra-lefts in the German Communist Party, who considered the decision to cancel the uprising a mistake. Pyatakov defended the correctness of this decision and once again tried to prove it to Stalin in his letter (See: Babichenko L.G. Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), Comintern and events in Germany in 1923. New archival materials / / Modern and recent history. 1994. No. 2. S. 125-157).

10 Pyatakov's pseudonym.

11 . In October 1923, a sharp struggle unfolded in the Politburo between Trotsky and the "troika" - Stalin, Zinoviev, Kamenev.

12 . Probably, we are talking about the Soviet military emissary in Germany, Skoblevsky.