From Ordzhonikidze

Bolshevik leadership Correspondence. 1912-1927
Collection of documents 1996.
Compiled by: A.V.Kvashonkin, L.P.Kosheleva, L.A.Rogovaya, O.V.Khlevnyuk.

Stalin Correspondences

Moscow Kremlin to LENIN, STALIN.

Baku, May 4, 1920. I answer 1 for the second time: events are unfolding in such a way that we hope to be in Tiflis no later than the twelfth, everything has been done for this. It will go brilliantly. Any other resolution of the issue will cause a terrible beating of the rebels.

Ordzhonikidze 2 .

RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. On. 1. D. 2436. L. 34. Typewritten text.

Notes:

1 Already after the invasion of Azerbaijan, on May 3, 1920, in a telegram to Lenin and Stalin, Ordzhonikidze wrote: “[...] Events are developing in such a way that we hope to be in Tiflis no later than 15 [...]” (RTSKHIDNI. F. 5 On. 1. D. 2436. L. 33).

2 There is a note on the telegram: “Deciphered in the secretariat of the Deputy Pre-Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic on May 4, 1920. Sent to T. Lenin and Stalin. 4/V".

G. K. Ordzhonikidze - V. I. Lenin, I. V. Stalin

[later May 4, 1920]

Pass it on to Stalin. Ask the political controller. Ask the political controller immediately. Asks comrade. Ordzhonikidze.

Stay at the phone all the time, all the time of the conversation. Pass the note to Stalin and Lenin. It goes without saying that we carry out all the orders of the Central Committee of the Central Committee 1 [with] accuracy and, of course, there is no need to repeat them. Not a single Red Army soldier entered the territory of Georgia, not a single Azerbaijani soldier entered the territory of Georgia. On the contrary, on the same day as our troops entered Baku, the Georgian troops drove off the border guards of the Azerbaijanis near Poili, occupied the bridge over the Kura, formerly occupied by the Azerbaijanis. They [required] the Muslim village of Shikhli to surrender immediately, otherwise, [use] artillery fire against them. It amazes me how you believe the false statements of Gegechkori 2. I repeat that [from] today not a single one of our Red Army soldiers has had time to approach the borders of Georgia. We all consider the salvation of the perishing Georgian Menshevik government an irreparable mistake, but it goes without saying that all your orders will be carried out by us very precisely and adamantly. The mood in Georgia is now unconditionally for us, according to stations, districts, Dusheti district, Lagodekhi, Abkhazia and almost the entire Kutaisi province are considered. With the approach of our troops to the borders, an uprising is inevitable here. In addition, our attitude [toward] Georgia will make the most disgusting impression on Muslims, especially if the former government of Musavat 3was ready to make peace with us on any terms. In my opinion, if the international situation imposes this comedy on us, at least it is necessary to demand from them the declaration of Soviet power. The Mensheviks4 will agree to this, because they have no other way out. If [in] the units bordering on us an uprising begins, what should we do, support them or leave them to the mercy of fate. How to explain your silence about Azerbaijan. Here they are looking forward to what Moscow will say. In my opinion, in general terms, a greeting from you is necessary. Ordzhonikidze. What about Armenia? Ordzhonikidze. Political controller at the apparatus. Everybody. The note is intended only for Stalin.

Give Moscow to Stalin.

Have my and Kirov received a big note addressed to Lenin. If so, what about powers? 5 Everything will be done, but either keep in mind if you make peace with Armenia, it will be something terrible for the Muslims. We will not cross the borders, but only delay the world. One gets the impression that we, Christians, conquered Azerbaijan, left Georgia and Armenia aside. Everything was prepared for us: 9 would go over and 11, on the 12th 6 would be in Tiflis. But nothing can be done. Keep in mind once given orders, you do not need to [repeat], I will carry it out, whatever my views may be. Welcome telegram 7not received, it must be repeated through the front. A copy in my name and then it will certainly reach them. I shake Sergo's hand: Tell Yenukidze that I fell from the car he sent and broke my leg.

Ordzhonikidze.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 15. D. 53. L. 1-2. Photocopy. Ticker-tape.

Notes:

1 In connection with the events on the Polish front and the close attention of the Western public to the events in Transcaucasia, the Bolshevik leadership was inclined to the possibility of concluding a temporary peace agreement with Georgia. On May 5, 1920, Lenin and Stalin telegraphed Ordzhonikidze: “[...] the Central Committee obliges you to withdraw units from the borders of Georgia to the border and refrain from attacking Georgia. After negotiations with Tiflis, it is clear that peace with Georgia is not ruled out [...]” (From the History of the Civil War in the USSR, vol. 3, p. 512). On May 7, 1920, a peace treaty was concluded between the RSFSR and Georgia in Moscow. Kirov was appointed plenipotentiary to Georgia. Georgia undertook to expel the White Guard units from its territory and legalize the position of the Georgian Communist Party.

2 The representative of the Menshevik government of Georgia, Gegechkori, repeatedly broadcast reports on the radio about the actions of the Red Army in Transcaucasia.

3 This refers to the overthrown Azerbaijani government.

4 We are talking about the government of the Georgian Democratic Republic. Formed in May 1918 by the Georgian National Council on a coalition basis, from March 1919 this government became practically one-party (out of 130 deputies of the Constituent Assembly, 109 were Mensheviks).

5 See Document No. 71.

6 In a personal telegram to Lenin and Stalin dated May 6, 1920, Ordzhonikidze and Kirov asked “not to worry” about Gegechkori radio messages (RTsKhIDNI. F. 85. Op. 2/S. D. 1. L. 9). In response, during direct negotiations by telegraph, Stalin stated: “[...] the situation is such that now we should not [should] hurry with Georgia in the sense of turning it into a Soviet one, anyway, in a few months, if the communists are legalized, it will become Soviet anyway [...] We are not worried about the false statements of Gegechkori, but telegrams from you and Smilga about the readiness to occupy Tiflis by May 12, which we consider absolutely incompatible with our policy [...] ”(Ibid. L .6-8).

7 See note 9 to document No. 71.