[12 July 1925]
Rostov 7/12
Com. Molotov,
I would like you to show this letter to the seven after you have read it.
1) The fellows from Rostov were here to see me. It turns out thatthe gross yield of the harvest this year is approximately 500 million poods2 [1.8 tons], that is, close to the record number in 1914 (I'm speaking about Yugovost). There is a surplus of about 270300 million poods. In the view of our Rostov friends, our export offices (in Yugovost) could raise 150170 million poods. Thus 150170 million poods could be shipped abroad from the Yugovost region. Not bad. We should take this fact into account.
2) It is apparent from the newspapers that the USSR economicagencies have already designated a program to construct new factories. I'm afraid that they'll start building in the border regions without taking into account a number of unfavorable factors involved, and then if we miss the moment, it will be impossible to correct mistakes. For example, they want to build new factories in Peter3 and Rostov; this is not expedient. In designing the construction program, I think that two considerations should be taken into account in addition to the principle of the factories' proximity to raw materials and fuel: the link with the countryside and the geographic-strategic position of the new factories' location. Our basic interior is: the Urals, the Volga region, the Black Earth south (Tambov, Voronezh, Kursk, Orel, etc.). These are exactly the areas (if you don't count the Urals) that are suffering from a lack of industry. Meanwhile, these are the areas that represent the most convenient rearguard for us in the event of military complications. Therefore, these are precisely the areas where industrial construction should be developed. In that respect, Peter is completely unsuitable. There will be pressure from the locals, of course, but that has to be overcome. This issue is so important for us that it ought to be placed on the agenda of the Central Committee plenum, if that is what is required to overcome local pressure. It would be good to know the opinion of the seven on this.
Regards,4
J. Stalin
P.S. I'm leaving for Sochi today.
1. In the upper right-hand corner there is a notation by Molotov:
"1925 = ?" In the upper left-hand corner there is a comment by Bukharin, "I agree absolutely with everything. N.B.," under which are the signed initials "J.R.'' [Ya. E. Rudzutak] and "Yaros" [Ye. M. Yaroslavskii].
2. A pood is 36 pounds avoirdupoisTrans.
3. Leningrad, now known as St. PetersburgTrans.
4. At the close of nearly every letter, Stalin wrote Zhmu ruku or Krepko zhmu ruku (I shake your hand, or I shake your hand firmly). These words have been rendered as "Regards" and "Warm regards" throughout the textTrans.
[20 July 1925]
7/20/25
Com. Molotov,
In issue no. 159 (15 July) of Ekonomicheskaia zhizn' [Economic life], I read a notice, "Examination of the Dnepr Construction Project" [Dneprostroi], 1 from which it is evident that the party (and the Supreme Economic Council) may be dragged bit by bit into the Dneprostroi matter, requiring up to 200 million rubles, if we do not take preventive measures in time. Com. Dzerzhinsky has published, it turns out, an "order" according to which Com. Trotsky has been requested to submit a technical and financial plan for the construction "by mid-October," so that "the necessary loans for the preparatory operations can still be included in the budget for 192526.'' The amount of 30,000 rubles has been released to Com. Trotsky for the preparation of the plan. The notice contains a few small reservations on the need for caution and so on. But since 30,000 rubles have already been released and a deadline for submission of the plan has been set, the project is beginning to take on a practicaland therefore seriousnature.
I do not think that we can afford to take on Dneprostroi either this year or next year given our financial situation. Only the other day we rejected the plan for the petroleum factory in the Transcaucasus,2 although it is more realistic at present and a fourth of the cost. On what grounds must we accept the Dneprostroi plan, which is less realistic for the present and four times as expensive? Do we really have so much money? Is the Donbass (the region where Dneprostroi is to be located) really suffering such a fuel shortageor is not the opposite the case? Why is there such haste with Dneprostroi?
We need, in the first place, new equipment for our worn-out factories and plants. Has that need really been satisfied?
We need, furthermore, to expand our agricultural machinery factories, because we are still forced to purchase abroad the most elementary agricultural tools for tens of millions of rubles.
We need, then, to build at least one tractor manufacturing plant, a new and large factory, because without one or more such factories, we cannot develop further.
We need, finally, to organize copper foundries, to develop lead production, to improve our military industry, because without that they will beat us with their bare hands.
Are those needs really all satisfied yet?
How can we, who suffer from a shortage of capital, forget all that?
I think that aside from all sorts of other dangers, we face another serious dangerthe danger of squandering some of the kopecks we have managed to accumulate, of spending them for nothing, thoughtlessly, and thus of making our construction work more difficult. A month ago Com. Dzerzhinsky understood all this. And now apparently he's gotten carried away . . .
I very much urge you, Com. Molotov, to read this letter to Com. Dzerzhinsky. In view of the importance of the matter, read it to the seven and drop me a note to inform me of their opinion.
Regards,
J. Stalin
1. The reference is to the following short article from
Ekonomicheskaia zhizn' (Economic life), no. 159 (15 July 1925):
The chairman of the USSR Supreme Economic
Council, Com. F. Ye. Dzerzhinsky, has issued a special decree in connection with
the completion of the blueprint for the construction of a 
hydroelectric
power station on the Dnepr River (Dneprostroi) and
the need for a technical and economic appraisal of the project and for the
resolution of the basic issues involving its implementation.
The
decree indicates that owing to the very close connection between
the proposed hydro-electric construction project on the Dnepr and the proposals
for restructuring the whole economy of the southern region, it is necessary to
have an overall plan for technical and economic measures in this region and a
financial
plan for their implementation both during construction and after the station is opened for use.
The drafting of these plans is assigned to Com. L. D. Trotsky, member of the Supreme Economic Council presidium.
Com. Trotsky is assigned to organize an
appropriate interdepartmental conference to allow the plan to be coordinated
with the requests and needs of the Commissariat of Transport,
the Commissariat of Agriculture and other offices, and to draft this overall
economic, technical, and financial plan.
A report with a preliminary overall appraisal of
the project and an exhaustive economic, technical, and financial plan is to be
presented
to the presidium of the Supreme Economic Council in mid-October;
the necessary loans for the preparatory operations can still be included in the
budget for 19251926.
A credit of 30,000 rubles is allocated for the
project conferences. In addition, in light of the particular importance of
the
Dnepr Station for our entire economy, Com. Dzerzhinsky considers
it necessary to include prominent specialists from North America in the
appraisal of the project.
The Supreme Economic Council considers that it
can ask the government for the exceptionally large sums required for the Dnepr
construction project only if the mistakes of past construction
projects are taken into account and only if, after a comprehensive
review of world experience, it can be guaranteed that the proposed gigantic
works will be expedient, timely, and economical.
2. The Finance Commissariat's protest against the Council of Commissars' resolution on the petroleum pipelines was reviewed at the Politburo session of 8 July 1925. It was decided to suspend the construction of the Baku-Batum gas pipeline and to review the matter once again the following year (RTsKhIDNI f. 17, op. 3, d. 510, l. 5).
[27 July 1925]
Com. Molotov, 1
A week ago I sent to you a letter protesting against the plan for the immediate launching of electrification at the Dnepr rapids. I still don't have an answer. Did my letter get lost en route, or did you receive it? Drop me a line about what happened to the letter if you don't mind.
Best regards,
J. Stalin
1. In the upper right-hand corner is Molotov's notation: "July 1925"
[28 July 1925]
Sochi 7/28/25
Com. Molotov,
We have to think about [who will run] the party's Organizational and Assignment Department.1 It seems Gei isn't right for the job. He's young, little known, without much of a record, and he won't be authoritative. Ask anyonethey'll tell you. Krinitskii isn't right eitheror actually he is even less appropriate than Gei (for the same reasons). Is it perhaps time to take on [S. V.] Kosior and send Gei to Siberia? Perhaps we could take on Shvernik or Yanson? Just by himself, Bauman wouldn't be big enough, would he? I think he won't be adequate. Really, appointing someone for this department is a nut we've got to crack before the Congress.
The2 other day I read in the newspapers that the textile syndicate evidently decided not to expand production very much in the coming year because of the shortage of raw materials, mainly cotton from Turkestan. If that is true and if the reason really has to do with the raw materials, then the syndicate's decision, in my view, is profoundly mistaken. It would be much more profitable for us to purchase more raw materials in America (by the way, American cotton is cheap right now) and process it here in our country than to purchase textiles from abroad. It is more profitable in all respects. This is a serious matter, worthy of attention. The syndicate's inertia is understandable: it doesn't feel like expanding production since expansion means more headacheswhy bring on unnecessary headaches if the syndicate is doing fine without them? This ruinous inertia that arises from its monopoly position has to be overcome no matter what. Speak to Dzerzhinsky about it; show him my letter3 and ask him to put pressure on the syndicate. I repeat, this is a serious question that merits attention. Either we resolve it properly in the interests of the state, the workers, and the unemployed, who could be placed in jobs if manufacturing were expanded, or, if we don't resolve it correctly, aside from everything else, we will lose tens of millions on this to foreign textile mill owners.
Warm regards,
J. Stalin
1. The Organizational and Assignment Department of the CentralCommittee (Orgraspred) was formed in 1924. It was a component of the Central Committee Secretariat with the following tasks: establishing and strengthening ties with local party bodies; instructing, registering, selecting, and assigning party cadres [trained staff] both to central as well as to local bodies; mobilizing, transferring, and nominating party officials; and performing specific assignments from the party's Orgburo and Central Committee Secretariat.
2. The text from here to the end is marked in red pencil.
3. Molotov sent the following letter to Dzerzhinsky on 7 August1925 (RTsKhIDNI f. 82, op. 1, d. 141):
Com.
Dzerzhinsky, I'm sending you two letters from Com. Stalin
(in the second one from 28 July, I ask you to note the part marked in red
pencil). Since I have learned that you are still running the affairs of the
Supreme Economic Council, even from your sickbed (of course this is not good,
and in the near future I will have a serious conversation with you about a
vacation), I ask you to conduct an inquiry regarding Stalin's questions. I
myself am completely in agreement with him. I do not doubt that you are also. I
will expect from you reports on
both Dneprostroi and the Textile Syndicate. Stalin has peppered me with questions about the status of these matters. I wish you a genuine recovery and a vacation soon! Regards! V. Molotov.
August 7. P.S. I ask you to return the attached letters from Com.
Stalin. V.M.
[July 1925]
Com. Molotov, 1
The Labor Defense Council matter, of course, is not going well. Dzerzhinsky is upset,2 he's overtired, but there's no smoke without fire, of course. In fact the Politburo itself is in an awkward position because it has been torn away from economic affairs. Take a look at Ekonomicheskaia zhizn' [Economic life] and you'll see that our funds are being allocated by Smilga and by Strumilin plus Groman, while the Politburo . . . the Politburo is changing from a directing body into a court of appeals, into something like a "council of elders." It's sometimes even worse than that: not Gosplan but Gosplan "sections" and their specialists are in charge. It's clear why Dzerzhinsky is unhappy. And work cannot help but suffer from that. I don't see any other alternative but to restructure the Labor
Defense Council's membership and bring in Politburo members.3
Greetings,
Yours, Stalin
1. In the upper right-hand corner is Molotov's notation: "1926=?"In fact the letter was written in July 1925.
2. On 25 July 1925, Stalin sent Dzerzhinsky the following letter(RTsKhIDNI f. 558, op. 1, d. 5272):
Sochi. 25 July. Dear Feliks, I learned about
your letter of resignation from Molotov. I urge you not to do this. There is no
basis for it: 1) the work is going well; 2) there is support within the Central
Committee; 3) we'll reorganize the Labor Defense Council so that individual commissars cannot
form blocs to the detriment of state interests; 4) we'll put Gosplan and its
sections in their place. Hang on for a month or two more, and we'll fix things
up right. Best regards, Yours, Stalin. P.S.
How is your health?
3. On 15 October 1925, at a Politburo session, Stalin raised theissue "On the work of the Politburo and mutual relations among the central institutions." It was decided that in order to improve the work of the central institutions of the USSR (Council of Commissars, Labor Defense Council, Central Executive Committee presidium, Gosplan, etc.) and to establish complete coordination among them, as well as to ensure the Politburo's leadership of their work, two days a month would be set aside for special sessions of the Politburo on issues of state and, particularly, of economic organization. A Politburo commission for improving and coordinating the work of the central institutions of the Union was established at the meeting (ibid., f. 17, op. 3, d. 523, l. 4).
[1 August 1925]
Sochi 8/1/25
Com. Molotov,
1) I was told that Manuilskii sent L'Humanité the first draft of Trotsky's article for publication, not accidently, but on purpose. If that's true, it's an outrage. If it's true, then we are dealing, not with a "mistake," as you wrote me, but with the policy of a few people who for some reason are not interested in publishing Trotsky's article in its final edited version. This is unquestionably the case. This matter cannot be left as it is. I propose raising the issue with the seven and condemning Manuilskii's intolerable action, since he has placed the Russian Communist Party and L'Humanité in a ridiculous position; in doing so, we must definitely find out who it was that instigated Manuilskii to take this malicious step. As background, let me tell you several necessary facts: a) the documents were given to Manuilskii at Manuilskii's written request (it should be in the Central Committee's files) and with the knowledge of the seven (Zinoviev raised the issue of giving Manuilskii the documents at [a meeting of] the seven); b) the documents were given before the final version of Trotsky's article was available; c) they were handed over to brief the top people of the Comintern and were not for publication (see, by the way, Manuilskii's request); d) the question of publishing the documents, specifically, of publishing my memo on Eastman's book, was discussed by the seven, and in fact we all had in mind publishing my memo after the final version of Trotsky's article was published; Manuilskii knew this; e) before Manuilskii's departure to Germany (in early July or late June) I asked
Manuilskii to return to the Secretariat of the Central Committee all documents. He agreed, but yet he did not return the documents and took them with him. Those are the facts. I urgently ask the seven to follow up on this matter and thus put an end to such dirty tricks in our party.
2) I do not agree with the seven regarding the publication of only Trotsky's article in its final version. First, Krupskaia's article 1 must be published as well. Second, it is quite possible to publish some documents (including my memo on Eastman's book) after Trotsky's article is published, in order to prove that Trotsky wrote the article only under pressure from the Russian Communist Party (otherwise Trotsky might appear as the savior of the party's prestige).
3) Report to me on the fate of Trotsky's and Krupskaia's articles onEastman: Were they published in England or not? I have asked for this three times and still do not have an answer.
4) I still don't have an answer from you to my letter about Dneprostroi. Give your answer verbally to Tovstukhahe'll write me.
5) I don't believe that Trotsky "didn't read" Eastman's article thatyou sent out to Politburo members. Trotsky is putting you on.
6) I read Trotsky's "answers" to the German delegation.2 I do not agree with everything in them. Does Pravda agree with them? This is a platform for Trotsky's group.
7) I am getting better. The Matsestinskii waters (near Sochi) aregood for curing sclerosis, reviving the nerves, dilating the heart, and curing sciatica, gout, and rheumatism. I should send my wife here.
Regards,
J. Stalin
1. Krupskaia's article, "Pis'mo v redaktsiiu Sunday Worker" (Letter to the editor of the Sunday Worker) was published in the journal Bolshevik, 1925, no. 16: 7173. [For an excerpt, see the appendix.]
2. In July and August 1925 a German workers' delegation visitedthe USSR. On 25 July, they met with Trotsky. Trotsky's answers to the delegation were published in Pravda on 29 July 1925.
[Later than 1 August 1925]
To the Seven:1
At one time, the seven decided to publish Trotsky's article and Krupskaia's letter about Eastman in the Russian press after they were printed in the foreign press. They should have already appeared abroad by now, but for some reason they have not been printed in our country, so I do not consider it superfluous to remind you of this. Their publication would be of great significance especially now when Manuilskii has contrived to shuffle the deck and thus has unwittingly raised the question of the authenticity of Trotsky's article. If it [Trotsky's article] were to be printed here, the question of its authenticity would be removed by itself. And that would be a plus for the party, and not only our party, but the foreign Communist parties, especially the Communist parties of England and America.
J. Stalin
1. In the upper right-hand corner is Molotov's notation: "1925=?"
[9 August 1925]
Sochi 8/9/25
Com. Molotov,
Read this letter to Bukharin.
I received your letter of 5 August.
1 Apparently, the appointment of Gei 1 occurred before you received my letter about the appointment of Shvernik or someone else as head of the Organizational and Assignment Department. We really did have an agreement about Gei, but later I changed my opinion, about which I informed you, but, unfortunately, too late. Well, let's see how Gei will behave. A decision that has been made twice is no longer worth changing.
2) Regarding Dneprostroi. I am a little worried because the projectsounds like hundreds of millions and people want to decide it at full tilt. Preventive measures should be taken before it is too late; moreover, you should try to prevent the interests of the cause from suffering and [you should] not hesitate even if Dzerzhinsky and Trotsky will be somewhat offended. The matter has to be decided by the seven.
3) As for Manuilskii, there is some kind of misunderstanding here,if not blackmail. Once again I state that 1) I gave the documents to Manuilskii, with the knowledge of the seven, to enable him to brief the top officials of the Comintern, and not for publication; 2) I told Manuilskii about the publication abroad, along with the publication of the final text of Trotsky's article, of several other documentsexactly which documents would be (and could only be) decided by the seven; 3) I did not give and could not have given any directives to Manuilskii on the publication of Trotsky's unfinished draft article, since I stood for and continue to stand for the publication of Trotsky's article in its best and not its worst form; 4) I could not have given such a directive to Manuilskii at all, since I demanded from him before his departure abroad the return to the Central Committee of all documents (he agreed to this, but, for some reason, he did not do this). Ask Manuilskii why he didn't return the documents before his departure. 2
4) The printing of Krupskaia's letter was decided by the seven; thereview was assigned to me, Bukharin, Rykov, and Zinoviev. Bukharin, Rykov, and I reviewed it and approved it. Zinoviev was absent. People have a surprisingly short memory, especially Bukharin.
5) The seven decided to publish Trotsky's article and Krupskaia'sletter in the Russian press after their publication abroad, without opening, however, in any way a [public] discussion on this issue. It's possible that this decision has now been abrogated by the seven. That, of course, is their affair. But if it hasn't been abrogated, they should be published in our press. Can you report anything to me in this regard?
6) As for the publication of my memo on Eastman, we can talkabout that when I get back from vacation. There's no hurry.
7) Tell Bukharin that Pravda must comment on Trotsky's replies if it doesn't agree with them.
8) How's Frunze's health?
9) Kotovskii was killed under what circumstances! It's a pity, he was an outstanding person.4
Regards,
J. Stalin
Don't berate me for such a long letter.
1. The Politburo considered the decision to appoint Gei as head ofthe Organizational and Assignment Department of the Central Committee of the party on 27 July and 3 August 1925 (RTsKhIDNI f. 17, op. 3, d. 513, l. 6, and d. 514, l. 2).
2. A draft of Zinoviev's letter to Manuilskii dated 12 August 1925 has been preserved (ibid., f. 324, op. 1, d. 551, ll. 13133):
Com. Manuilskii. Because the mistake with the printing in L'Humanité of the first draft of Trotsky's statement in the form of a final draft is obviously becoming significant, I urge you to recollect in more detail:
1)Didn't I tell you that you had to start with the publication ofStalin's
letter (the first) and then provide excerpts with commentaries
for all the rest after some time?
How do you explain that Stalin's letter did not appear in L'Humanité and that the first draft was called final?
2)Didn't I tell you that there was no final draft of Trotsky'sstatement yet, since talks and correspondence with him were still continuing?
3)Didn't I send you to the Secretariat of the Central Committee to obtain all the documents?
4) Didn't I tell you that the decision of the comrades working on the matter was to reveal how Trotsky had arrived at the final draft, that is, that he was forced to renounce Eastman?
Didn't I tell you to print the draft itself (the
final one) of Trotsky's
statement with commentaries from L'Humanité and others
only after the final draft appeared in the British press?
Didn't I tell you at the same time of the
decision to publish a pamphlet
opposing Eastman in English by the British Communists
Gallacher and Pollitt?
3. Frunze died on the operating table on 27 October 1925; somepeople at the time blamed Stalin for his death (cf. Roy Medvedev, Let History Judge [New York, 1971], 48)U.S. Ed.
4. A draft of a short article by Stalin dedicated to the memory ofKotovskii has been preserved (RTsKhIDNI f. 558, op. 1, d. 2809):
I knew Com. Kotovskii as an exemplary party
comrade, an experienced military organizer, and a seasoned commander. I
especially remember him at the Polish front in 1920, when Com. Budenny broke
through to Zhitomir at the rear of the Polish army, while Kotovskii led his
cavalry brigade in desperately
heroic raids on the Poles' Kiev army. He was a threat
to the Poles, because he knew how to "pulverize" them like nobody else could, as
the Red Army soldiers used to say back then. The bravest among our most modest
commanders and the most modest among the bravethus I remember Com. Kotovskii.
Long live his memory and glory. J. Stalin.
[18 August 1925]
8/18
Com. Molotov, 1
The letter from Manuilskii is cowardly and conniving.
I stand entirely by my declaration on the swindling and dirty tricks, despite the dissatisfaction of some comrades.
Kamenev's declaration that Stalin's main aim in this affair was to get his own memo about Eastman publishedthis I consider dishonest. He is measuring others using his own yardstick . . .
You and Bukharin did the wrong thing by voting against the proposal on the documents concerning Eastman.2 You should not be barring the Central Committees of the foreign parties from receiving the documents about Eastman. Kamenev and Zinoviev want to establish the preconditions for making Trotsky's removal from the Central Committee necessary, but they will not succeed in this because they don't have supporting facts. In his answer to Eastman's book, Trotsky determined his fate, that is, he saved himself.
Regards,
J. Stalin
1. In the upper right-hand corner is Molotov's notation: "1925=?"
2. On 11 August 1925, Molotov sent Stalin a coded telegram (RTsKhIDNI f. 17, op. 1, d. 5389, l. 11):
By a poll of the absent members of the seven, a
vote was taken on the following proposal passed by the available members, with
Bukharin and Molotov voting against it: "In reply to the Comintern's
request, the Bolshevik delegation is permitted to transmit,
as confidential material, material from the Politburo on the question of
Eastman's book to the members of the central committees of foreign Communist
parties."
[August 1925]
Com. Molotov, 1
I received your letter of 20 August. I spoke with Bukharin today.
1) You are proposing an agenda of five questions for the plenum:2 1) Foreign Trade, 2) the trade unions; 3) the Comintern; 4) wages; 5) land reform in Central Asia. I do not object to such an agenda. It is important to prepare the question of wages (the planned increase of wages and so on). This item was raised by the seven, and Shmidt was assigned to prepare it apart from the Politburo. Put pressure on him. While the issue is being prepared, it should be run past the Politburo ahead of time. It would be good to add the issue of industrial construction, with a report by Feliks [Dzerzhinsky] or Piatakov. (Smilga should not stick his nose in this; he's a fake as an economic leader, and besides, this is not a question of the economy as a whole, but of industry.) If Feliks cannot give a report now, it can be tabled until the next plenum, but with the proviso that a firm guarantee must be given that not one factory of national significance will be built for this period without the Politburo's sanction.
2) Nothing should be formalized on the issue of the Ukrainian PoorPeasants' Committees. The decision of the Ukrainian Central
Committee on this issue coincides entirely with the decisions of the XIV Party Conference. It would be better to place a report of the rural conference on the agenda of the Central Committee plenum in the form of a separate issue and to describe in this report the Poor Peasants' Committees, other peasant committees, and so on. In fact, this will confirm the decision of the Ukrainian Central Committee. You should do the report. Without fail.3
3) The economic plan can be placed on the agenda of the next plenum, if it turns out to be necessary, giving the report not to Gosplan but to Rykov (Council of Commissars) or Kamenev (Labor Defense Council) with the involvement of the Central Control Commission.
4) We'll speak later about the agenda for the Congress.
5) If you have time, write more I will answer in detail (I have lots of time).
6) Bukharin says that you are now heavily overworked. I will try to be in Moscow on the 10th, or even earlier, in order to take off some of the load.
I'm healthy. I've made a fairly good recovery.
Regards,
Yours, J. Stalin
P.S. The theses on the trade unions are in general acceptable, but the individual formulations need reworking because they are weak and the individual formulations are insufficiently precise. They definitely have to be revised in the spirit of Andreev's well-known speech.
J. Stalin
1. In the upper right-hand corner is Molotov's notation: "8/1925=?"
2. The following questions were reviewed at the party plenum of310 October 1925: 1) On Foreign Trade (Kuibyshev and Krasin reporting). 2) On the work of the trade unions (Tomskii reporting). 3) On wages (Shmidt reporting). 4) On the Central Committee's meeting on the work in the countryside (Molotov reporting). 5) On the current issues in agricultural policy (Kamenev reporting). 6) On the situation in the foreign Communist parties (Zinoviev reporting). 7) On the agenda, venue, and deadline for convening the XIV Party Congress (Molotov reporting). 8) On the dissolution of the wages commission of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission.
3. The Conference on the Work in the Countryside, at which
Molotov spoke, approved the decision of the Ukrainian Central
Committee to reorganize the committees of poor villagers [komnezamy] into voluntary organizations to help improve the farms of the poor peasants and middle peasants. The task of ''unifying the peasantry to promote mutual aid and aid to those in need" was given to the "peasant committees" [krestkomy] (RTsKhIDNI f. 17, op. 2, d. 197, l. 57).