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  STALIN AND THE RED ARMY

  K.E. VOROSHILOV

FOREIGN LANGUAGES PUBLISHING HOUSE . MOSCOW 1939
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PERM and PETROGRAD

At the end of 1918 a catastrophic situation arose on the Eastern Front, especially on the sector held by the Third Army, which was compelled to surrender Perm. Caught in a semi-circle by the enemy, this army was completely demoralized by the end of November. Six months of unrelieved fighting, with no reliable reserves to speak of, an insecure rear, and utter disorganization of supplies (the'Twenty-Ninth Division repelled the enemy's attacks for five days literally without a crust of bread), at thirty-five degrees below zero weather, coupled with the ( more than four hundred kilometres), and an incompetent staff, had in­capacitated the Third Army from withstanding the onslaught of the supe· Tior forces of the enemy.

To complete the discouraging picture there .must be added wholesale treason by the commanding staff, composed of former tsarist officers, and the surrender of entire regiments, a ,result of the poor class selection of the replacements, and utterly incompetent commanders. Under these conditions the Third Army had completely collapsed, and was retreating in disorder. In twenty days it had fallen back 300 kilometres, losing 18,000 men, scores of field guns, hundreds of machine 1guns, etc. 'The enemy :was making rapid headway, creating .a real threat to Vyatka and to the entire Eastern Front.

These events made it imperative for the Central Committee .to ascer­tain the .causes of the catastrophe and immediately restore order among the units of the Third Army. Who should be sent to carry 􀁄ut this extremely difficult task? Lenin wired to the Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic:
"A number of communications have been received from Party organizations around Perm reporting the catastrophic condi­tion of the army and drunkenness. I thought of sending Stalin. I am afraid Smilga will be lenient with . . . , who, it is said, also drinks and is incapable of restoring order."
The Central Committee adopted the following decision:
"To appoint a Party investigating commission consisting of two members of the .Central Committee, Dzerzhinsky and 'Stalin, to thoroughly investigate the causes of the surrender of Perm and the recent defeats on the Ural front, and to fully ascertain all attendant circumstances. The Central Committee authorizes the commission to take all measures necessary to effect the rapid restoration of both Party and Soviet work in the entire district of the Third and Second Armies." (Sverdlov's telegram No. 00079.)
This decision seemingly limited it:he functions of Comrades Stalin and Dzerzhinsky to "investigate the causes of the surrender of Perm and the recent defeats on the Ural front." But Comrade Stalin transferred the centre of gravity of this "Party investigation" work to the taking of effective measures to remedy the situation, consolidate the front, etc. In the very first telegram to Lenin, dated January 5, 1919, on the results of the commission's work, Stalin does not say a single word about "the .causes of the catastrophe," hut promptly poses the question of what must be done to save the army. Here is the telegram:
Comrade Lenin, Chairman of the Council of Defence.
Investigation begun. Shall ,repo1t progress as investigation proceeds. Meanwhile we consider it necessary to inform you of one ,mgent need of the Third Army. Of the Third Army ( over 30,000 men) there remain only about 11,000 weary and battered soldiers, who can barely withstand the onslaught of the enemy. The units despatched by the Commander-in-Chief are unreliable, in part even hostile to us, ·and require a thorough sifting. In order to save the remnants of the Third :Army and prevent ,a rapid advance of the enemy to Vyatka ;( acco;ding to all ,reports from the commanding staff of the front and the Third Army, this is a very real danger) it is absolutely essential to rush at least three thoroughly reliable regiments from Russia and place them at the disposal of the army commander. We urgently request you to exert pressure on the appropriate military bodies to this end. We repeat that unless such measures are taken Vyatka is threatened with the fate of Perm. Such i·s the general opinion of the comrades on the spot, and all the facts at our disposal lead us to endorse it.

STALIN, DZERZHINSKY

January 5, 1919, Vyatka.
And only on January 13, 1919, did Comrade Stalin together with Comrade Dzerzhinsky send a brief preliminary ,report on "the causes of the catastrophe," whi.ch were summarized as follows: exhaustion and weariness of the army when the enemy ,launched its offensive; our lack of reserves at that time; isolation of the staff headquarters from the army; mismanagement on the part of the Army Commander; criminal methods of directing operations at the front on the part of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, which paralysed the Command of the front with its contradictory orders and made it utterly impossible for the latter to come to the prompt aid of the Third Army; unreliability of the reinforce­ments sent up from the rear, to be explained by the use of the old methods of recruiting; and complete instability of the rear, to be explained by the utter helplessness and incompetence 'of the local Soviet and Party organi­zations.

At the same time Comrade Stalin drew up, and immediately carried out with his customary promptness and firmness, a whole series of practical measures for improving the fighting capacity of the Third Army.
"By January 15," we read in his report to the Council of Defence, "a force of twelve hundred men, reliable infantry and cavalry, were sent to the front; two days later two squadrons of cavalry were despatched. On the twentieth the Sixty-Second Regi­ment of the Third Brigade (having first been carefully sifted) was despatched. These units made it possible to check the enemy's advance, completely changed the morale of the Third Army, and began our offensive on Perm, which is so far proceeding success­fully. Behind the lines a thorough purging of Soviet and Party institutions is going on. Revolutionary committees have been organized in Vyatka and in the county towns. The formation of strong revolutionary organizations in the villages has· been begun and continues. All Party and Soviet work is being put on a new footing. The military control bodies have been purged and reor-ganized. The provincial Cheka has been sifted and reinforced with new Pa1ty workers. The congestion at the Vyatka railway junction is being reJieved . . ." and so forth.
As a result of all these measures not only was the enemy's further advance checked, but in January 1919 the Eastern F'ront launched an offensive and on the right flank U ralsk was taken.

This is how Comrade Stalin understood and carried out his task of "investigating the causes of the catastrophe." He investigated and estab­lished these causes and, right there and then, by his own efforts, elim­inated them and achieved the necessary improvement.

PETROGRAD


In the spring of 1919 the Whiteguard army of General Yudenich carrying out the task set by. Kolchak of "seizing Petrograd" and di_verting the revolutionary forces from the Eastern Front, with the help of Esthonian and Finnish White troops and the British fleet, sud­denly took the offensive and placed Petrograd in immediate danger. The seriousness of the situation was further accentuated by the fact that in Petrograd itself counter-revolutionary plots were discovered, the leaders of which turned out to be military experts serving in the staff headquarters of the Western Front, in the Seventh Army and the Kronstadt naval base.

While Yudenich advanced on Petrograd, Bulak-Balakhovich scored a number of successes in the direction of Pskov. Treason raised its head at the front. Several of our regiments went over to the side of the enemy; the entire garrisons of ,Fort Krassnaya Gorka and Fort Seraya Loshad came out openly against the Soviet power. Dismay seized the entire Seventh Army. The front began to waver; the enemy was nearing Petrograd. The situation had to be remedied immediately.

The Central Committee again chose Comrade Stalin for the job. In the space of three weeks Comrade Stalin succeeded in effecting a radical change for the better. Laxity and consternation among the troops were soon eliminated. The staffs were whipped into shape; mobilization'S of Petrograd workers and Communists were ca􀀭ried through in rapid succes­sion; enemies and traitors ,were mercilessly destroyed. Comrade Stalin intervened in the field operations of the military command. Here is what he telegraphed to Comrade Lenin:
"Following the capture of Fo1t Krassnaya Gorka, Fort Seraya Loshad has been captured. Their guns are in perfect order; the rapid [illegihlel of all forts and strongholds is under way. The naval experts assert that the capture of Krassnaya Gorka from the sea runs counter to all naval science. I can only deplore this so-called science. The swift capture of Gorka was due to the grossest interference in the operations by me, and by civilians generally, even to the point of countermanding orders on land and sea and imposing my own. I consider it my duty to declare that I shall continue to act in this way in future, despite all my rev­erence for science.--Stalin."
Within six days Comrade Stalin reported to Lenin:
"A change for the better has begun among our troops. For a week we have not had a single case of individual or group deser­tion to the enemy. Deserters are returning in thousands. Desertions to us from the enemy camp have become more frequent. In one week some four hundred men have come over to us, most of them armed. Our offensive began yesterday. Although prom­ised reserves have not yet come up, to have remained on this line any further was out of the question-we were too .near Petrograd. So far the offensive is developing successfully. The Whites are on the run. The line occ_upied today stretches from Kernovo via Voronino-Slepino to Kaskovo. We have taken prisoners and captured two or more field pieces, quick-firing guns, and cartridges. Enemy vessels have not shown up; evidently they are afraid of Krassnaya Gorka, which is now entirely ours.Urgently despatch two million rounds of cartridges to me for the Sixth division ....."
These two telegrams give a clear picture of the tremendous work carried through by Comrade Stalin in remedying the extremely dangerous situation that had arisen near Petrograd.