Formation of the USSR (1917-1924)

Formation of the USSR (1917-1924)

October 6 Commission

On October 6, 1922, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), which took place from October 5 to 8, approved the report of the commission "on the question of relations between the RSFSR and the independent republics" with a minor amendment and decided to consider it as a directive of the Central Committee. Lenin, for health reasons, participated only in its meetings on October 5, on October 6, when the question of creating a union of republics was discussed, he did not attend. In order to develop an appropriate Soviet bill on the basis of the directive of the Plenum and its subsequent passage through the Congress of Soviets, but with its preliminary submission for approval by the Central Committee, it was decided to create a new commission. I. V. Stalin, L. B. Kamenev, G. L. Pyatakov, A. I. Rykov, G. V. Chicherin, M. I. Kalinin and representatives of Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Belarus were delegated to it. The same commission was entrusted with the task of preparing and carrying out relevant resolutions through the CECs of the independent republics. Members of the commission from these republics were: from Ukraine - Kh. G. Rakovsky, from Belarus - AG. Chervyakov, from Azerbaijan - M. D. Huseynov and from Georgia - M. G. Tskhakaya. In addition, T. V. Sapronov and A. S. Yenukidze, as well as the People’s Commissar of Justice of the RSFSR, D. I. Kursky, were included in the commission from the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.[one]

On the same day, October 6, 1922, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) adopted a special resolution "On the Relations of the RSFSR with the Independent Soviet Socialist Republics." This resolution literally repeated the draft resolution of the commission at the beginning of October of the same year. [2] In general, the decision of the Plenum was of decisive importance, since it confirmed the principles of the new state laid down by Lenin. After the decision of the Plenum, it became clear that there was no turning back. The republics were still called independent, and the relationship between them had to be built on the basis of equality. However, at the same time, on October 6, V. Ilenin, who, due to ill health, could not attend the meetings of the Plenum, wrote a short but extremely informative note to L. B. Kamenev. Literally, the following was written:

"T. Kamenev! Great Russian chauvinism I declare a fight not for life, but for death. As soon as I get rid of the damned tooth, eat it with all healthy teeth. We must absolutely insist that the Russian Ukrainian Georgian, in turn, preside in the allied Central Executive Committee, etc. Absolutely!” [3]

In the then difficult conditions, Lenin saw the main danger in great-power chauvinism. This danger alarmed him greatly. Indeed, if the destruction of the formal independence of the republics were announced, then in just five years the union of Soviet republics promised in 1917 would be abolished. It turned out that the Bolsheviks deceived the peoples of Russia, and this very fact could be actively used against the Soviet power by both its internal and external opponents. Lenin was well aware of this and in every possible way restrained the impulses of the then super-centralizers. Three weeks later, October 27, 1922 Lenin, in an interview with the Observer and the Manchester Guardian, once again dwelled on the importance of the skillful regulation of national relations in the Land of Soviets and saw the only right thing to be the maximum satisfaction of the interests of nations in order to exclude any conflicts on this basis. Among other things, he then said: “Our experience has created in us an unshakable conviction that only tremendous attention to the interests of various nations eliminates the fear of any conflicts, eliminates mutual distrust ...”[4]

The decisions of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) of October 6, 1922 were sent to all republican communist parties, were discussed there and, in the main, supported. In Ukraine, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine took place on October 16–17. It discussed the above-mentioned decisions of the Plenum on October 6 and adopted for implementation. In the resolution proposed by Rakovsky, the scheme of the union treaty was considered as a major step forward, fully consistent with the Party Program, and a directive was given to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine in the further development of this scheme to ensure the interests of Ukraine in various allied bodies. [5]

Of all the independent Soviet republics, the most difficult situation then developed in Georgia. An acute conflict arose between the Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the RCP (b), headed by G. K. Ordzhonikidze, and the group of P. G. Mdivani in the Communist Party of Georgia. Mdivani and his supporters were the majority in the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia. They demanded that Georgia join the USSR not through the Transcaucasian federation, but directly. In this regard, K. Tsintsadze, S. Todria, V. Dumbadze, Sh. Eliava, F. Makharadze, S. Kavtaradze, P. Sabashvili came to Lenin by direct wire and sent a sharp note. It is noteworthy that among them was Eliava, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia who did not agree with the majority at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party.

On October 21, Lenin reacted to this note with a corresponding telegram, expressing surprise at its indecent tone. Lenin wrote that he was convinced that the resolutions of the plenum of the Central Committee would resolve differences and, among other things, condemned the abuse against Ordzhonikidze. Further, Lenin handed over the analysis of this conflict for resolution by the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP. [6] In this case, Lenin openly supported Ordzhonikidze, and the authors of the letter in literature, even modern literature, were dubbed "national deviationists." [7] What kind of people were these, the Georgian "national deviationists"?

Mdivani, who did not sign the telegram, had been a member of the Communist Party since 1903, actively participated in the revolutionary movement, and served in the Russian Red Army during the Civil War. From June 1921 he was chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of Georgia, and in 1922 he held the most important post of chairman of the Georgian Council of People's Commissars. K. M. Tsintsadze had been a member of the Communist Party since 1904; participant in the Batumi strike of 1901 and the December armed uprising in Moscow, later chairman of the Tiflis Revolutionary Committee. L. E. Dumbadze was a member of the Communist Party since 1900, and the already mentioned Sh. Z. Eliava was a member of the Communist Party since 1904, a participant in the revolution of 1905-07, a participant in the Civil War. Since 1921

F. I. Makharadze had been a member of the party since 1891. At the XII Congress of the RCP (b), which took place soon after, he was the most senior delegate in terms of party experience. Makharadze was an active participant in the revolution of 1905-07, since February 1921 he was the chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of Georgia, then the chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Georgian SSR. By the way, Makharadze was a participant in the April Conference of 1917, where he categorically opposed Transcaucasian nationalism, emphasizing: “We, honest workers, Bolshevik Social Democrats, thought and think that at present these aspirations cannot lead to good, and from the very beginning we opposed the nationalist and separatist aspirations, exposing the reactionary and counter-revolutionary nature of these latter.” [8]

S. I. Kavtaradze was a member of the party since 1903, carried out party work in the Transcaucasus and St. Petersburg, since 1912 he was a permanent employee of the editorial office of the Pravda newspaper. In 1921, he was chairman of the Revolutionary Committee in Batumi, and then became People's Commissar of Justice of Georgia and then chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Georgian SSR. P. A. Sabashvili, a member of the Communist Party since 1907, in 1922 was the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia.

That is, these were people who took an active part in the establishment of Soviet power in Georgia. F. I. Makharadze and P. G. Mdivani, who appear more often than others as “national deviationists,” were also members of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), which replaced the Caucasian Regional Committee of the RCP (b) in April 1920. This Caucasian bureau, which included 12 people, led the underground Bolshevik organizations in Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia even before the establishment of Soviet power there and played a big role in its establishment in Transcaucasia in 1920-21, most actively influencing the organization and carrying out uprisings in November 1920 in Armenia and in February 1921 in Georgia. The Caucasian bureau also played a significant role in the creation of the communist parties of the three Transcaucasian republics. In particular, it was the Caucasian Bureau in August 1920. approved the new composition of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia. In February 1922, at the 1st Congress of the Communist Organizations of Transcaucasia, this bureau was replaced by the elected Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the RCP (b).[nine]

Such are the "national deviationists" who signed the telegram, a really sharp telegram, all the more so since it was sent almost at three o'clock in the morning with an invitation to the telegraph apparatus of Kamenev, Bukharin and Yenukidze, with the subsequent transmission of its text to Lenin. However, the content of this telegram, which had a great resonance, requires its evaluation in essence. What was it about? It spoke of the support of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia for the decision of the Central Committee of the RCP on the issue of the Union of Republics, but expressed a desire to revise the provision on the Transcaucasian Federation, so that Georgia became part of the USSR on the same grounds as Ukraine and Belarus.

It was this point that became the basis for a most serious conflict, primarily between Ordzhonikidze, who headed the Transcaucasian regional committee of the party and the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party. Of course, the leaders of the Georgian Communist Party opposed the decision on the Transcaucasian Federation as part of the future union of republics, but in fact, they had the right to their opinion when discussing the future structure of the country. This project will be implemented in 1936, when the Transcaucasian Federation will be abolished, and Georgia, along with other republics, will become part of the USSR directly. This is what the leaders of the Georgian Central Committee wanted back in 1922. But such an opinion was considered untimely and, in general, a not so complicated issue degenerated into an extremely sharp conflict, which was reflected in the aforementioned telegram.

The leaders of the Georgian Central Committee did not receive support from the center that day, and Stalin, in his telegram to Ordzhonikidze, among other things, even wrote: “We intend to put an end to the squabble in Georgia and thoroughly punish the Georgian Central Committee.” [10] But on the same day, October 21, at a meeting of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the KKE, a decision was made by a majority of votes that ran counter to the decision of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) of October 6. Actually, again it was about the entry of Georgia into the future USSR directly, and not through the Transcaucasian federation. There has already been a violation of the Charter of the Party, and the Presidium of the Zakkraykom decided to resign its powers to the entire Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia. This was an unprecedented event in the history of the party. The Central Committee of the Republican Communist Party resigns by decision of a higher body. By the way, on October 25, a group of leaders of the Georgian Communist Party, headed by F. Makharadze, sent another telegram to Lenin, where they apologized for the harsh tone of the first telegram, confirmed their agreement with the decision of the Plenum of the RCP (b) of October 6,[eleven]

The composition of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia changed after that, but the conflict did not end there. The struggle continued, and it came to assault. At one of the meetings, Ordzhonikidze struck a blow at the old member of the Communist Party A. Kabakhidze, which became the subject of a special investigation, sending a special commission to Georgia, approved at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on November 25, 1922, consisting of F. E. Dzerzhinsky, D. Z. Manuilsky, V. S. Mickevicius-Kapsukas.

Lenin, as noted in the literature, negatively assessed the assault of Ordzhonikidze and in the activities of the Dzerzhinsky Commission, as noted in the literature, he did not see "the due impartiality in the investigation of the" Georgian conflict ". [12] The whole story will be reflected at the meetings of the XII Congress of the Party, which will be discussed further ahead. For now, let us just note one important point. In early January 1923, the Central Committee of the RCP(b) received a letter from a large group of Georgian communists. A copy of this letter was intended for Lenin. This letter was signed by 426 people, of which 147 had pre-revolutionary party experience, and 107 people worked in the party from 1896 to 1905. and the rest, 279, since 1917. The authors of the letter opposed the decision of the Dzerzhinsky commission and called the unification of the Transcaucasian republics into the Transcaucasian Federation hasty. Among other things, this letter also noted the following: “... our party has become glorious, in addition to everything, because of its steely discipline. But those who confuse our Party discipline with the final depersonalization of the Party are gravely mistaken.[13]

A.P. Nenarokov, who drew attention to this letter and commented on it, excludes Lenin from acquaintance with him. But it was apparently impossible to hide the opinion of such a significant part of the Georgian communists, in fact, the core of the Georgian Communist Party. Rumors about this letter could reach Lenin, although his health deteriorated sharply. The letter itself is an indicator of the difficult situation in Georgia at that time, and without taking it into account it is difficult to understand the true background of the so-called "Georgian case" - one of the most serious problems that appeared on the way to the creation of the USSR. Without taking into account the real state of affairs in this Transcaucasian republic, all the work carried out there to formalize a union of republics turns out to be isolated from public opinion in Georgia, from the real socio-economic situation.

In the elections to the Constituent Assembly in November 1917, the Bolsheviks received 19.07% of the vote in Tiflis, while the Mensheviks were preferred by 31.4%, and the Socialist-Revolutionaries - 11.28%. [14] Nowhere, in no relatively large Russian city, did the Mensheviks receive such a high percentage of the vote at that time. In general, they received 2.3% of the votes in the Constituent Assembly, and out of 715 deputies from all over Russia, only 15 Mensheviks got there. [fifteen] Georgia, therefore, was a notable exception, and it was no coincidence that the Georgian Mensheviks played a leading role in the Georgian Democratic Republic, created in May 1918 after the collapse of the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic. Actually, in the Transcaucasian Republic, their role was also very noticeable, it is no coincidence that the Transcaucasian Seim - the highest body of this republic was headed by the Georgian Menshevik N. S. Chkheizde, and another Georgian Menshevik, A. I. Chkhenkeli, was at the head of the government. In the Georgian Democratic Republic, the Mensheviks were originally part of the coalition government, which, in addition to them, included representatives of the socialist-federalists and national democrats. Later, only the Mensheviks remained in the government. Their party in August 1918 numbered over 70 thousand people. people and was the most numerous in Georgia. In the Constituent Assembly, which performed the functions of parliament, there were 109 Menshevik deputies out of 130. The chairman of this assembly was one of the former leaders of the Menshevik Party of All Russia, N. S. Chkheidze, and the government of Georgia was then headed by N. Zhordania, also a Menshevik.

After the establishment of Soviet power in Georgia, despite the emigration of the leaders of the Georgian Mensheviks, the party continued to operate and announced its dissolution only in August 1923, continuing, however, underground activities later. In 1924 they managed to organize an anti-Bolshevik uprising in Georgia. [16] The Georgian National Democratic Party announced its dissolution in October 1923, and the Socialist-Federalist Party in November of the same year. In 1923, the party of Georgian Socialist-Revolutionaries, that is, the Georgian Socialist-Revolutionaries, also ceased to exist. [17] But in the second half of 1922 these parties were still operating legally and pursuing their own policies. They clearly opposed the Georgian Bolsheviks and tried to influence public opinion. In addition, the Georgian emigration was active, raising the issue of Georgia in international instances, primarily before the great powers, creating difficulties for the Soviet authorities in Georgia, and, in general, for the Soviet government in Moscow. [eighteen]

At that time, the Georgian Bolsheviks were still in the minority, and the parties opposing them actively used this. Members of these parties accused the Bolsheviks of lack of patriotism, of selling the interests of their homeland to the "Moscow occupiers" and spoke openly about the liquidation of Georgia's independence due to the betrayal of the same Bolsheviks. They, especially the Mensheviks, presented themselves as recreators of Georgian statehood. In studying the "Georgian case" it is by no means impossible not to see this situation and one cannot but take into account the seemingly unreasonable stubbornness of the Georgian Soviet leaders.

It would seem that after the October plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) the situation should have calmed down, but in Georgia, a complex political picture remained. In many ways, things turned out differently in Ukraine, where, as we could see, there was a kind of “Ukrainian affair”. Of course, there were problems there too. Some of the leaders of Ukraine in their own way understood the preservation of independence and put their idea into the understanding of Soviet sovereignty. Thus, in December 1922, the manager of the affairs of the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine, P. Solodub, made a number of statements, from which it followed that "the future union of republics will be nothing more than a confederation." [19] Moreover, formally, he had certain grounds for such a statement, if, of course, he renounced the role of the Communist Party and was guided by the letter of the documents being prepared then.

Meanwhile, work on the development of the basic documents of the future USSR continued. An important role in this regard was played by the meeting of the Commission of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on November 21, 1922. Stalin presided over this meeting, Chicherin, Kalinin, Pyatakov, Rakovsky, Kamenev were also present. The secretary was A. M. Nazaretyan, in 1922 a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, head of the bureau of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP (b). Of great interest are both the issues raised at this meeting and the results of voting on individual clauses of the treaty. The general agenda was as follows: "On the procedure for carrying out the question of the unification of the Soviet republics into the Union of Republics." That is to say, the very posing of the question gave the answer. It was about unification, not inclusion or merger. And in the operative part, it was decided, first of all,[twenty]

The term "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" had already acquired the right to exist, and it was used as a matter of course. The posing of the question of the need to develop a special text of the Constitution on the Union of Republics is also interesting. There were no objections to these formulations in the commission. Further, it was proposed that the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the independent republics hold the Fundamentals of the Constitution of the Union of Republics at the upcoming congresses of the Soviets of Transcaucasia, Ukraine, Belarus, and then, as a directive, special authorized delegations from these republics were to go to Moscow for the Congress of Soviets to conclude an appropriate agreement. The Central Committee of the national communist parties was also instructed to control the receipt by these authorized delegations of mandates to sign the Treaty on the USSR. At the same time, special resolutions were provided for by the congresses of the Soviets of the indicated republics, according to which the agreement concluded in Moscow was subject to ratification by the Central Executive Committees of the republics at their very first session after the congress. A special clause provided for the formation of the Transcaucasian Federation in the state order with the aim of creating the Transcaucasian Central Executive Committee and the Transcaucasian Council of People's Commissars as the executive body of the Transcaucasian Central Executive Committee at the upcoming Congress of Soviets of Transcaucasia.

A separate issue was the Regulations on the Commissariats of the Union Council of People's Commissars, etc. It was also decided to form a Subcommittee to draw up a draft of the foundations of the Constitution within a week, which would then be proposed to authorized delegations of independent republics and federations that are part of the Union of Republics. Moreover, they were recommended to take into account the exchange of opinions held in the Commission. This Subcommittee included Stalin, Chicherin, Kursky, Pyatakov, Kalinin, and the latter could be replaced by Sapronov. The subcommittee was entrusted with the development of a draft text of the Treaty on the Union of the Republics (Constitution) within two weeks.

Such is the main content of the meeting of the Commission on November 21, 1922. The voting on the main points of the future Constitution of the Union of Republics is also interesting. There were seven such items in total. Of these, there was a unanimous vote on five points. These are the points about the Congress of Soviets of the Union of Republics as the supreme body of the Union; on proportional representation in the composition of the Congress of Soviets and the Central Executive Committee of the Union while ensuring the interests of the minority; on the creation of the institution of several chairmen of the Union Central Executive Committee, with their chairmanship in turn; about the undesirability, as a rule, of combining the most important posts in the governing bodies of the Union and the republics and federations that are part of the Union, and about the need to establish a body of supreme judicial control and the institution of the Supreme Court under the Union government.

There was no unanimity on the point about the transformation of the autonomous people's commissariats (of justice, education, internal affairs, agriculture, public health and social security) into united people's commissariats. Only Chicherin and Kamenev voted in favor, while Stalin, Kalinin, Rakovsky and Pyatakov voted against. Interestingly, on this point, Stalin and Rakovsky were at one with each other, and the proposal was rejected. And on one more point, Rakovsky was already the only one who was in favor, and the rest were against. It was about changing point 5 of the resolution of the Plenum of the Central Committee in the spirit of non-subordination of the people's commissariats: finance, food, national economy, labor and inspection of individual republics to the corresponding people's commissariats of the Union of Republics. [21]

Draws attention to the composition of the Commission at this meeting. Almost all were representatives of the center. The suburbs were represented only by Nazaretyan and, of course, by Rakovsky, who left for Berlin on the same day, even before the end of the meeting. The subcommittee for the development of the foundations of the Constitution, in general, is composed of representatives of the center alone. A letter from Rakovsky from Berlin dated November 25, 1922, to D. Z. Lebed, at that time secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, has been preserved and relatively recently published, where he spoke in some detail about this meeting. He notes the absence of representatives of the national republics, who, according to him, could not come, and especially dwells on his position on the relationship between the bodies of the center and the outskirts, noting his polemic with Chicherin. Rakovsky also reported that he had submitted a written proposal regarding the use of the language,[22]

The Commission, at its meeting on November 21, once again demonstrated the decisive role of the Communist Party in preparing the creation of the USSR, both in solving major problems and various details, the number of which was quite significant. However, was undoubtedly made a big step forward in realizing the main goal. Still, the issues were resolved very difficult, since a new type of state was being created, and there were no such precedents in world practice. In general, a large amount of work was carried out. In parallel, various supporting documents were being prepared. Thus, on the eve of the meeting of the Subcommission, three drafts of the foundations of the Constitution of the USSR are drawn up. Two of them were prepared by the head of the economic and legal department of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, and one was prepared by the People's Commissar of Justice D. I. Kursky. Sabanin's projects were presented to the meeting of the Subcommittee by G.V. Chicherin, of course, approved them. Sabanin's first draft is dated November 14th. The wording about the capital of the Union is curious there. It was written there: "Moscow is chosen as the capital of the Union (until it is replaced by another city)."[23]

It is not entirely clear whether this was only the initiative of Sabanin himself or, indeed, the project of transferring the capital to another city was discussed. By the way, at the meeting of the Sub-Commission, where the draft theses on the Union Constitution were discussed, and it was said there about the projects of Chicherin and Kursky, this point of Sabanin's draft regarding the capital of the Union was repeated verbatim. In all likelihood, one should see some kind of diplomacy here - the desire not to impose the central city of the Union, as if demonstrating their respect for the outskirts. At the meeting of the Sub-Commission on November 25, however, only representatives of the center, with the exception of Secretary Nazaretyan, were also present - Kalinin, Kursky, Pyatakov, Stalin, Sapronov and Chicherin, who was the chairman of this Sub-Commission.

After an article-by-article discussion of the draft theses, which, as a rule, were adopted unanimously, on the same day the Subcommittee adopted the test of the draft itself. It is called "The main points of the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (RSFSR, Ukraine, Belarus, Transcaucasian Federation"). In the very first paragraph, the unification of these republics into one union state was announced, and each of the republics was left with the right to freely secede from the Union. Further, the structure of the supreme bodies of the Union, executive bodies, etc. was stipulated. A single union state was established for all citizens of the Union, and as for the capital, as it was written there, “the city is elected the capital of the Union. Moscow".

Regarding this meeting of the Subcommittee, there are noteworthy comments by its member G. L. Pyatakov, who outlined them in a letter to I. V. Stalin dated November 27, 1922. Pyatakov directly wrote about his disappointing conclusions, from the construction that could be obtained in the process of implementing the project . In his opinion, management becomes extremely cumbersome, as a new instance is introduced and the result, in his words, will be extra-dimensional red tape. He predicted an increase in the state apparatus, a shortage of qualified personnel for both the USSR People's Commissariats and the RSFSR People's Commissariats at the same time, an undoubted bypass of the RSFSR's own People's Commissariats and a direct appeal to the USSR People's Commissariats. Pyatakov foresaw a number of other difficulties. To resolve the issue of the correct construction of the apparatus, Pyatakov proposed creating a special commission of practitioners-organizers,[24]

Pyatakov, of course, had good reason to be worried, but the very posing of these questions in advance made it possible to build the future administrative system more rationally and with the least financial and organizational losses. The relationship between the people's commissariats of the USSR and the RSFSR gradually came to the fore, and Pyatakov was right when he wrote that the people's commissariats of the RSFSR would wither away.

In the meantime, not only the Subcommittee, but also the Commission of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) continued to work. On November 28, its new meeting followed. This time, the composition of those present has changed markedly. In addition to Stalin, Kamenev, Pyatakov, Manuilsky, Chervyakov, Huseynov, Tskhakaya, Ter-Gabrielyan, Sapronov and Kursky were also present. First of all, at this Commission it was decided to adopt a draft of the main points for building the USSR. Voting was carried out point by point and not without discussion. The result was not always unanimous. Surprising is Kamenev's proposal to retain the name of the RSFSR as the name of the union state, deleting the name "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics". But in this opinion only Sapronov supported him, all the others were against it, and Kamenev's proposal did not pass. The true idea of Kamenev is not entirely clear,

The proposal of S. M. Ter-Gabrielian, who came up with the initiative to abolish such people's commissariats as the people's commissariats of food, labor, finance, as well as the Supreme Council of National Economy and the RCI, did not pass. It is curious that, apparently, on the same day Kamenev wrote a note to Lenin, accompanying it with a draft of the main provisions of the USSR with his own comments. Kamenev, in particular, shared his doubts about certain questions of the competence of the Union and individual republics and the number of commissariats of federal significance and commissariats in the republics. He focused attention on the presence of three kinds of commissariats in the project. At the same time, Kamenev wrote: “Wouldn’t it be simpler to have a system in which both the Union Council of People’s Commissars and the National Council of People’s Commissars would include all people’s commissars, with the exception of the people’s commissars for military and foreign affairs,[25]

In accordance with the already established practice, on November 30, 1922, Stalin reported the results of the work of the Commission to the Politburo, which decided to adopt mainly the main points of the Constitution, with one amendment at the beginning of the 10th point regarding the approval of the unified state budget of the USSR. [26] However, a comparison of the draft approved by the Commission on November 25 with the draft approved by the Politburo on November 30 shows that there are more differences.

There were 16 points in the Politburo Draft, and only 14 in the Commission's draft. In point 6, the phrase "The chairmen of the Union Central Executive Committee perform their duties alternately" was added. [27] Paragraph 7 was somewhat edited. A new paragraph 8 on the Supreme Court and the State Political Administration was introduced into the draft Politburo, which was absent in the previous draft, which only spoke about the establishment of the institute of the Supreme Court and judicial control under the Central Executive Committee of the USSR. In turn, from the first draft, paragraph 9, which dealt with what is subject to the jurisdiction of the Union of Republics, in subparagraph "b", after the words "change in the external borders of the Union", the following phrase was removed - "as well as the borders included into the Union of Republics among themselves. In subparagraph “c”, where it was previously written about the admission of new republics to the Union, an important amendment was introduced and it began to sound as follows - “conclusion of agreements on the admission of new republics to the Union”. Consequently, the new republics were supposed not only to be included in the Union,

Some other amendments were made to the previous draft, but both of them provided for the abolition of the following people's commissariats in the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR and other republics: indel, Vneshtorg, communications, post and telegraphs, and for military and naval affairs. [28] Naturally, this begs the question, who made these amendments over the past two days? Maybe they were introduced by the method of questioning and the corresponding materials either have not been preserved or have not yet been found? Or maybe there was something else? Indeed, who else could amend the decision of the Commission established by the Plenum on October 6? Maybe secretaries of the Central Committee, but they had no such right. Therefore, the question that has arisen still needs clarification. The amendments, after all, were not cardinal, but there were many of them and it is impossible to ignore them as such, as well as the technology of their introduction.

However, the work of the Commission on October 6 did not stop there. Its new, third meeting was held on 5 December. Members of the commission were present: Stalin, Kamenev, Huseynov, Ter-Gabrielyan and Parechin. Parechin is a new member of the commission, in all likelihood replacing someone, either Rykov or Kalinin. In addition, Yenukidze and Sapronov were present from the All-Russian Central Executive Committee - legal members of the commission, appointed after the October 6 Plenum. Vladimirsky was present from the NKVD, and Litvinov from the NKID, apparently replacing Chicherin. Stalin presided, and the duties of the secretary, as before, were performed by Nazarityan. Rakovsky, Tskhakaya and Chervyakov, that is, representatives of Ukraine, Georgia and Belarus, were not present. At the meeting on November 25, as is known, Chervyakov and Tskhakaya were present, but Rakovsky was absent.

At a meeting on December 5, the term for convening the Congress of Soviets of the Union was discussed, and it was decided, in order to save time and money, to consider it expedient to coincide with the first Congress of Soviets of the Union of Republics by the end of the Tenth Congress of the RSFSR. In this regard, it was decided to cancel the previous directive on the ratification by the CECs of the republics of the Treaty on the Union of Republics. Further, procedural issues were discussed about representation at the Congress of Soviets, the issue of the right of the Central Executive Committees of the republics to appeal against the decisions of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union to the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Union, the composition of the Central Executive Committee of the Union and its sessions, the unified budget of the Union, etc. It was also decided to form three subcommittees to develop the text of the Constitution of the Union with the declaration; electoral law for the Congress of Soviets of the Union and the regulation on the people's commissariats of the Union. First of all, it was decided to create a Subcommittee consisting of Kamenev, Stalin, Kursk, Vladimir, Yenukidze and Sapronova, who was instructed to develop within ten days the text of the Constitution of the Union of Republics with a declaration. It was decided to postpone the creation of other subcommittees for the time being.[29]

As you can see, this Subcommittee consisted only of representatives of the center, but, in fact, the Constitution only needed to be finalized, while the test of the declaration, a document of no small importance, had yet to be formulated. Both that and the other document, as well as the text of the Treaty, indeed, were prepared before December 18, 1922. The new draft Constitution was based on a draft approved by the Politburo on November 30, 1922. It became larger, including 26 paragraphs already. He also included a number of specific provisions, and also bears the stamp of stylistic and semantic refinement. So, the Congress of Soviets was supposed to be formed at the rate of one deputy for 25 thousand voters from city councils, and from provincial councils one deputy was to be elected from 125 thousand inhabitants (so in the text, not voters, but residents). In total, the Central Executive Committee of the USSR was supposed to elect 300 members,

The specific composition of the Presidium of the CEC was also stipulated, which was declared the highest authority of the Union in the period between sessions of the CEC. The numerical composition of the Presidium was to be 15 members, including the chairmen of the CEC from each republic. Otherwise, there were minor differences between the new draft Constitution and the draft approved by the Politburo. As for the drafts of the Treaty prepared by the Subcommission and the Declaration, they were discussed at the fourth meeting of the Commission, held on December 16, 1922. Compared to the previous meeting on December 5, its composition also underwent some changes. So, Kamenev was not present, but Rykov was present, again Rakovsky and Chervyakov were not present, but Kursky participated in the meeting.

The treaty and the Declaration presented by Stalin were discussed in separate paragraphs. Both documents were adopted with some amendments and voted unanimously. Since these documents differ little from those that will be adopted at the First Congress of Soviets of the USSR, we will return to them a little later. Two days later, on December 18, 1922, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) took place, at which the Commission, in fact, summed up its activities. Of the 26 members of the Central Committee, 22 were present, and of the 19 candidates, only 7. The absence of both Rakovsky and Manuilsky is noteworthy. But Ukraine was represented by Frunze, Petrovsky and Chubar. At their evening meeting, the members of the Plenum listened to Stalin's report on the draft Treaty with the Union Soviet Republics and decided to open the Union Congress before the end of the Congress of Soviets of the RSFSR. The Union Congress, according to this resolution, was to adopt the Declaration on the Formation of the USSR, elect the Central Executive Committee and develop the text of the Treaty. It was also decided to base the work of the Congress on drafting the text of the Treaty on the directive of the Plenum of the Central Committee of October 6, thereby making it clear that Lenin's proposals adopted on that day would be fundamental.

At this meeting of the Plenum, it was also envisaged to submit the text of the Treaty worked out by the Congress for approval by the sessions of the CECs of the contracting republics. Only after this approval, the test of the Treaty was to be put into effect and approved at the next session of the Union Central Executive Committee. The final approval of the text of the Treaty was to be received at the 2nd Congress of Soviets of the USSR. It was decided to postpone the elections of the Union Council of People's Commissars and the organization of people's commissariats until the session of the Union Central Executive Committee, which was appointed for April 1923. According to the decision of this Plenum, the chairmen of the Presidium of the Union Central Executive Committee chosen by the Central Executive Committee were to be chosen for this by the number of republics included in the Union.

The Plenum also set up a new commission charged with directing the work of the Union Congress and finalizing the texts of the Treaty and Declaration proposed to the Congress. The composition of this new commission included: Frunze, Kamenev, Stalin, Rykov, Ordzhonikidze, Kalinin, Sapronov, Sokolnikov, Petrovsky. The convocation of the commission was entrusted to Stalin, [30] that is, he, therefore, was its chairman. This is how the Commission ended its work on October 6, having completed the main preparatory work for the creation of the USSR. The new commission should already have carried out these plans.

[1] Ibid., p. 301–302, 494.

[2] The CPSU in resolutions ... V.2, M ... 1970, p. 401–402.

[3] Lenin V. I. Poly. coll. op. T.45, p. 214.

[4] Lenin V. I. Poly. coll. op. T. 45, p. 240.

[5] Melnichenko V. Decree. cit., p.58.

[6] Lenin V.I. Poli. coll. op. T. 54, p. 299–300.

[7] Sakharov V.A. Decree. cit., p.246.

[8] The Seventh (April) All-Russian Conference of the RSDLP (b), p.225.

[9] See: Ivanidze K. M. Glorious pages of struggle and victories. The history of the activities of the Caucasian Regional Committee of the RCP (b). 1917–1920 Tbilisi, 1975.

[10] Sakharov V.A. Decree. op., p. 248.

[11] Nenarokov A.P. On the unity of equals, p. 125.

[12] Lenin V.I. Selected works in four volumes. T. 4 Notes. M., 1988, p.539.

[13] Nenarokov A.P. Seventy years ago: the national question at the XII Congress of the RCP (b) // Domestic History. 1993, no. 6, p. 113–114.

[14] Menteshashvili A. The collapse of the Russian Empire and Transcaucasia // Russia in the XX century, p.234.

[15] The Great October Socialist Revolution. Encyclopedia. M., 1987, p. 549–550.

[16] See: Tsertsvadze M. V. The logical end of the ideological and organizational principles of the Georgian Mensheviks. Tbilisi, 1969.

[17] See: Dzhangveladze GA. Bankruptcy of anti-proletarian parties in Georgia. Tbilisi, 1981.

[18] See: See: Documents of foreign policy of the USSR, T. Z. July 1, 1920-March 18, 1921, M., 1959; T.4. March 19, 1921 - Dec 31 1921. M., 1960; T.5. Jan 1 1922-November 19, 1922. M., 1961.

[19] Political history of Russia-USSR-Russian Federation, p.296.

[20] Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, p. 304.

[21] Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, p. 304–305 (Abridged version - V. G.); Towards "Socialist Unitarianism", p. 91–92.

[22] On the way to “socialist unitarism”, p. 108.

[23] Ibid., p. 110.

[24] Ibid., p. 98–99.

[25] Ibid., p. 99–100.

[26] Creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, p. 305.

[27] Ibid., p. 306.

[28] On the way to “socialist unitarism”, p. 97–98, 100–101; Creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, p. 306–308.

[29] On the way to "socialist unitarism", p. 101–102.

[30] Ibid., p. 106.