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 On the activities of Lenin in 1917-1922

DIGEST OF ARTICLES, MOSCOW 1958
 

N.A. Kulikova
ACTIVITIES OF THE COUNCIL OF LABOR AND DEFENSE DURING THE SECOND PEACEBREAK
(February - April 1920)

The Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union revealed serious shortcomings in the coverage of the history of the party and especially noted the poor development of questions on the history of the civil war. Studies of this period unsatisfactorily revealed the historical role of the masses, the Communist Party, the Soviet state, V.I. new socialist society.

Among the issues that have not received a deep reflection in the detailed scientific works, also includes the activities of V. I. Lenin in the Council of Labor and Defense.

How important it is to work out this question can be seen from the statements of the direct participants in the civil war.

S.I. Gusev in his book “The Civil War and the Red Army” pointed out that “it would be desirable for the STO to publish the most significant materials relating to the organization of defense and participation in the work of the STO comrade. Lenin" 1 .

The outstanding commander of the period of the civil war, M. V. Frunze, at a meeting of political workers (of the Red Army in November 1924, noting the importance of the Council of Labor and Defense, pointed out: “The experience of the civil war suggests that if we, in the person of the Council of Labor and Defense, did not have body that would cover all aspects of our Soviet life, then we would hardly emerge victorious from this battle, before which we were confronted by the outcome of our revolution .

The role of the Council of Defense and the Council of Labor and Defense and the leading activities of V. I. Lenin in SRT were covered by individual historians in our press. However, all the few published articles and dissertations defended on this topic cannot exhaust this problem in any way. The activities of the SRT of the period of 1920 are the most poorly covered. In addition to the thesis by V. S. Muromtseva on the topic: "The role of the Council of Labor and Defense in the implementation of the decisions of the Communist Party on issues of economic construction in 1920", defended at the Institute of National Economy named after G. V. Plekhanov in 1954, other works no. A significant drawback of this work is the weak use of archival materials. But this is not the author's fault, since many documents and materials on a number of issues on this topic were inaccessible to researchers for a long time.

The historical indications of the XX Party Congress and the decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the archives opened up the possibility for researchers to thoroughly use new documents, in particular, 130 of the TsGAOR archive fund, 19 and 2 of the archive of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. These funds help to reveal more deeply the leading and guiding role of the Communist Party on specific questions of the state's economic policy; trace the many-sided activity of V. I. Lenin as the head of the Council of Labor and Defense; to highlight the participation in the work of the SRT of V. I. Lenin's associates and to show in more detail all aspects of the activities of the SRT in restoring the national economy in the days of the second peaceful respite and to clarify its role as the most important economic body in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

* * *

The Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense, reorganized at the beginning of 1920 into the Council of Labor and Defense, was established by a special resolution of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of November 30, 1918. By a decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the Defense Council was given full power in the matter of mobilizing the country's forces and means in the interests of defense.

"The Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense," wrote Pravda, "organized under the chairmanship of a seasoned fighter, the best of the best, Comrade Lenin, must centralize and by all means organize the areas necessary to repulse the rapists: railways, food, military factories" 3 .

At first, the Defense Council considered and resolved only those issues that directly or indirectly related to the defense of the country, but as economic tasks grew along with defense tasks, the Defense Council began to transfer the center of gravity of its work to the area of ​​resolving economic issues of the national economy. The reorganization of the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense into the Council of Labor and Defense was caused by the changed internal and external situation in the country and the tasks that confronted the national economy in the new conditions of peaceful respite.

The year 1920 was met by the working people of the Soviet Republic under the conditions of decisive victories on the fronts of the civil war. The Red Army in fierce battles defeated the main forces of the internal and external counter-revolution and the Soviet state won a peaceful respite, which began in the second half of February 1920.

The historic victories of the Soviet people over the forces of counter-revolution immeasurably strengthened the internal and external position of the Soviet Republic. The political position of the Soviet state was strengthened. As a result of the liberation of a number of economically important regions of the country - the Urals, Siberia, Ukraine, the North Caucasus, a significant part of Turkestan - the economic situation became more stable. Access was gained to Donetsk coal, Baku oil, Siberian and Ukrainian bread, and Turkestan cotton.

The victory of the working class and working peasantry over internal and external enemies raised the prestige of the Soviet state in the eyes of the working people of the capitalist countries and the peoples of the colonies and semi-colonies. The working class, the working people of the whole world demanded an end to the war waged by the imperialists against the country of the Soviets. The revolutionary upsurge continued to grow in the capitalist countries. The capitalists were afraid, V. I. Lenin pointed out, that the sparks of our fire would fly to their roofs. The armies of the Entente were decomposing, the soldiers increasingly came out in support of the Soviets. Already during its second campaign, the Entente did not dare to send its soldiers to the territory of Soviet Russia. V. I. Lenin noted that one of the major achievements of the Soviet state in the international arena was that "we took away its soldiers from the Entente."

Simultaneously with the political crisis in the capitalist world, the economic crisis was growing. The war severely disrupted the economic and financial life of most European states, caused colossal military debts and huge budget deficits, an unrestrained fall in the currency, a huge need for raw materials, fuel, food, etc.

The United States of America, which emerged from the imperialist war economically stronger, tried to bring the rest of the capitalist world under its influence; this policy of the United States strengthened the desire of the European countries to weaken their dependence on the American imperialists. This also led to the desire of European countries to resume economic and trade ties with Russia.

On January 16, 1920, the Supreme Council of the Entente countries announced the intention of these states to establish trade relations with Soviet Russia. This was a major defeat for world capitalism, a serious breach made in the land of the interventionists. In February 1920, a peace treaty was signed between the Soviet Republic and Estonia, which marked the beginning of the settlement of relations with neighboring countries - Latvia, Lithuania and others.

The change in the internal and international situation of the Soviet Republic facilitated its transition from war to peaceful construction. However, it was clear to the Communist Party and the Soviet government that the respite won could not last long, that the Entente imperialists would try to organize new attacks against the Soviet state. As early as January 1920, V. I. Lenin warned of the possibility of an offensive by bourgeois-landlord Poland, which dreamed of creating a great power at the expense of Soviet Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania and a number of regions of the RSFSR. Danger also threatened from the White Guard hordes settled in the Crimea.

Taking into account the situation that had developed by the beginning of 1920, the party and the government took measures to maximize the use of a peaceful respite, both to further strengthen the Red Army, increase the defense capability of the Soviet country, and to restore the national economy, destroyed by war and foreign intervention.

By the beginning of 1920, famine and epidemics raged to the country. The population experienced a huge shortage of food and essential goods. The fuel and food crisis, as well as the lack of raw materials, led to the fact that many factories and plants were closed, some of the workers went to the countryside, and the process of dispersion of the working class intensified. The difficulties were exacerbated by the presence of a fierce class struggle, which manifested itself in various spheres and forms: civil war, the use of bourgeois specialists, the organization of new forms of labor.

The Communist Party and the Soviet government did not hide the complexity of the tasks facing the people. The political report of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) to the 9th Party Congress stated: "The Central Committee believed that it would be a crime against the proletariat to conceal the entire danger of the situation, or at least partially downplay it..." 4 . The Central Committee of the RCP (b) considered it necessary to explain the real situation to the working people, to bring to their consciousness that ruin and famine are no less dangerous than the offensive of counter-revolution, and that victory on the economic front requires no less perseverance and perseverance, unity and discipline, self-sacrifice and endurance than on the military front.

Highlighting the task of reviving the country's economy, the party already at the end of 1919 at the VIII party conference pointed out the need to concentrate the main efforts of the Soviet state on the restoration of the economy and identified some urgent tasks in the main sectors of the economy. However, at that time only separate instructions were given on the most pressing issues of economic life. The program for the restoration of the national economy found a deep and comprehensive substantiation only in the decisions of the Ninth Party Congress.

V. I. Lenin, in a letter to party organizations about the preparations for the IXth Congress, wrote: "The central point of the order of the day at the upcoming Congress is, in accordance with the peculiarities of the historical moment being experienced, the question of economic construction ..." 5 . It, Lenin pointed out, should become the main issue of the Party Congress, because the main issue of all Soviet construction in Russia is the transition from the struggle on the bloody front to the fight on the bloodless front, on the front of labor and war against devastation for the restoration, improvement and development of the entire national economy of Russia. .

The IX Congress of the RCP (b) took place in Moscow from March 29 to April 5, 1920.

In its resolution "On the Immediate Tasks of Economic Development," the congress noted that the main condition for the country's economic revival is the unswerving implementation of a unified economic plan calculated for the next historical epoch. The economic plan included the following main tasks: improvement of the state of transport, delivery and formation of the necessary stocks of grain, fuel, raw materials; deployment of mechanical engineering for the needs of transport, fuel extraction, as well as for the production of consumer products.

V. I. Lenin considered the electrification of the country, the provision of a modern technical base for the national economy, as the basis of a single economic plan. The plan for the electrification of the country began to be developed by the best scientists of the country already in the conditions of a peaceful respite. In order to successfully carry out the outlined plans for the economic revival of the country, it was necessary to create an agency that could begin the implementation of planned principles in the national economy. According to V. I. Lenin, the Council of Defense, reorganized into the Council of Labor and Defense, should have become such a body. The question of reorganizing the Council of Defense was discussed in the Central Committee of the Party long before the IX Party Congress in connection with the tasks of uniting the economic commissariats. The Central Committee exposed the mistakes of Rykov, who did not believe in the possibility of organizing a planned economy under these difficult conditions; although he advocated the unification of the economic commissariats, he belittled the importance of the leading center of this great work. He believed that unification should take place in one or another commissariat, “and it doesn’t matter,” Rykov said at the IX Congress, “whether they are united around the Supreme Economic Council, Narkomprod, Narkomzem, etc.”6. V. I. Lenin, exposing Rykov’s mistakes, pointed out at this congress that “an attempt by the Higher Economic Council to settle in some separate bloc of economic commissariats outside the Council of Defense and the Council of People’s Commissars was not noticed by the Central Committee and caused a negative attitude. Now the Council of Defense has been renamed the Council of Labor and Defense.
In those conditions when the Soviet state did not yet have trained personnel, when the majority of scientists were infected with bourgeois prejudices, V.I. Lenin put forward the task of enhancing the role of the Council of Labor and Defense, and then the role of the State Planning Commission, which was created under the STO by decree of the Council of People's Commissars of February 22 1921.

Work on the organization of the national economy in the conditions of a short-term peaceful respite had to be carried out in the presence of war communism. The IX Party Congress, while developing directives for the economic revival of the country, demanded even greater centralization in the use of forces and resources of the country in 1920. This found its expression in the nationalization of a huge number of enterprises, including small ones (with up to 5 workers with a mechanical engine and up to 10 without it); further elimination of monetary and tax relations and the development of state monopolies and allocations; naturalization of forms and methods of remuneration; strengthening the principle of universal labor conscription as a way to find and organize labor and create labor armies. These forms of strengthening the policy of war communism, in connection with the acute economic crisis,

But if the policy of war communism reached its peak in 1920, at the same time this year was the year when this policy, caused by the war and devastation, began to come into conflict with all the tasks that had arisen of reviving and further developing the country's economy. During the period of the second peaceful respite, this contradiction had an acute effect, especially in the implementation of the organization of management of various branches of the economy. In this regard, the 9th Party Congress introduced a number of changes in the field of industrial management organization. The main change went along the line of strengthening democratic centralism, which provided the opportunity to combine centralized state management of the economy and the concentration of production with the manifestation of initiative and initiative by local governments. On this basis, all nationalized enterprises were divided into three groups. The first group of enterprises was under the direct control of the Supreme Economic Council. These enterprises were supplied from the center. The second group of enterprises was under the control of local authorities of the provincial councils of the national economy, which supplied them with fuel, raw materials, and finances.

In relation to this group of enterprises, the central authorities retained the right to regulate, that is, to issue instructions that guided local authorities in managing enterprises. The products obtained at the enterprises of the second group went to the distribution of the central bodies of the Supreme Economic Council. And, finally, the third group included enterprises of local importance, which were completely subordinate to local authorities.

From what has been said, it is clear what an enormous role the Supreme Council of the National Economy, the central body for the management and regulation of industry, played. The Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council was a member of the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Labor and Defense. In order to develop the local initiative, provincial councils of the national economy were created, their governing body, the presidium, was appointed by the local body of Soviet power in agreement with the provincial trade union bodies and approved by the Supreme Council of National Economy. These were local economic bodies, the emergence of which was due to the fact that the central offices that existed under the Supreme Council of National Economy created a strong isolation of individual enterprises from each other.

The IX Congress of the Party, taking into account V. I. Lenin’s instructions on the need to fully take into account not only local characteristics, but also the unhindered development of local initiative, initiative, decided: “... while maintaining and developing vertical centralism along the line of central offices, combine it with horizontal along the line of economic regions, where enterprises of different branches of industry and different economic significance are forced to eat the same sources of local raw materials, vehicles, labor, etc. 8 .

Along with granting greater independence to local economic organizations, the task was to increase the direct economic interest of the local population in the results of industrial activity.

The congress considered one-man management in industry and transport to be one of the means of strengthening socialist enterprises. Exposing the opportunist group of "democratic centralism", which argued that one-man management in production is incompatible with proletarian democracy, the 9th Congress adopted Lenin's instructions on this issue. The congress resolution stated: “... a necessary condition for improving economic organization and increasing production is the actual implementation from top to bottom of the repeatedly proclaimed principle of the exact responsibility of a certain person for a certain work. Collegiality, since it takes place in the process of discussion or decision, must certainly give way to individuality in the process of execution” 9 .

These historic decisions of the Ninth Party Congress reveal all the wisdom of the Party's policy and show that the Party, taking into account the specific conditions of the situation, sought to subordinate the administrative apparatus to the tasks of the political moment.

All these measures taken by the party and the government in the field of reorganizing the Council of Labor and Defense and in the field of industrial management were aimed at solving the economic problems that confronted the country in the conditions of a peaceful respite.

Starting to solve the problems of economic construction, the Communist Party and the Soviet government, in these difficult conditions of ruin and famine, focused their attention on three main problems, the solution of which rested on the further development of the entire national economy of the country. These were: the struggle for the restoration of transport, the elimination of the fuel crisis, the improvement of the food situation.

All the main activities of the Council of Labor and Defense, headed by V. I. Lenin, were devoted to the resolution of these issues in the conditions of a short-term peaceful respite. These issues were primarily considered in SRT. In the period from February to April 1920 (inclusive) at 18 meetings of the Council of Labor and Defense, over 80 questions were raised about the work of transport; about 80 questions about fuel were resolved at 19 meetings; 50 food items were considered in 16 sessions.

* * *

The resolution of the main economic issues in the conditions of a peaceful respite in 1920 rested primarily on the work of transport, the situation of which was extremely difficult.

As a result of the imperialist and civil wars, transport was in a catastrophic state: 3,672 bridges, 1,700 kilometers of railway lines, about 3,000 turnouts, 400 water reservoirs and water-lifting structures were destroyed. By the spring of 1920, the percentage of faulty, "sick" steam locomotives reached 64.8 percent. On the southern roads, which suffered the most from the management of the White Guards, the number of defective steam locomotives reached 85 percent. By the beginning of 1920, the freight turnover of railways reached 30 percent, while transportation by waterways amounted to only 9.4 percent. pre-war.

The political report of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) to the 9th Party Congress stated: “The paralysis of transport would threaten to destroy us despite all the victories of the Red Army. That is why the Central Committee considered and still considers it necessary to intensify all efforts to combat transport disruption...” 10 .

Transport has become the main sector of the labor front. The attention of the party, the government and the whole country was first of all drawn to this section.

“We have [a lot of grain,” V. I. Lenin pointed out then, “now we have coal, oil. The whole thing is now transport. The railways are out of order. We need to restore transport. Then we will deliver grain, coal and oil to the factories, let’s bring salt, then the restoration of industry will begin, the hunger of factory and railway workers will end” 11 .

V. I. Lenin outlined a specific program (the revival of railway transport, which was approved by the Central Committee of the RCP (b) and the Council of Defense. This program was outlined by him in letters and in speeches at congresses and workers' meetings. Lenin's documents such as " Letter to the members of the Defense Council "and" Draft Decree of the Defense Council on Transport ". On the initiative of V. I. Lenin, on February 2, 1920, an emergency meeting of the Defense Council was convened, for discussion of which a draft decree on transport was prepared by V. I. Lenin This resolution pointed out the need to strengthen the leading role of the party in transport and to attract the broad working masses to restore it, to improve the organization of transport management;raising labor productivity in order to increase the number of rolling stock, transportation, and the development of communication lines.

The question of strengthening the leading role of the Communists on. transport was especially acute during this period, since the repeated mobilization of the communists for the needs of the front led to the fact that the primary party organizations and the influence of the party on the railways weakened. If in the Red Army the Communists at the beginning of 1920 accounted for 10 percent, then on the railways the Communists hardly made up 2 percent of all workers.

In all cases when the existence of the Soviet Republic was in danger, the Party sent the best communist proletarians to the most responsible sectors. The Central Committee of the RCP (b) carried out a number of mobilizations of communists for work in transport by recalling part of the party members from the Regional Army and transferring them from other jobs.

On January 12, 1920, the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) decided: “To second from the army to the disposal of the Main Political Way about 500 qualified political workers and about 100 fully responsible political comrades from among those mobilized for political work in Ukraine” 12 .

In January 1920, the Central Committee of the RCP (b) issued a decision on the return of all those who had anything to do with the Commissariat of Communications from the army and Soviet institutions.

At the suggestion of V. I. Lenin, on February 2, 1920, the Defense Council decided to second three-quarters of the responsible workers to transport for two months (except for the Commissariat of Food and the Military).

On February 29, V. I. Lenin wrote to the Revolutionary Military Council of the South-Western Front: “The Central Committee confirms its decision on the need to send responsible political workers from the army of the South-Western Front to work on transport. The Central Committee considers the transfer from the army to the railroad to be the main guarantee of saving the transport” 13 .

In March 1920, the Central Committee of the RCP (b) issued a circular letter to all party organizations, to all party members: “On the mobilization of 5,000 communists” for work in transport.

“... We are facing a new party mobilization,” the letter said, “but this time not for the external, but for the internal front. It is necessary at all costs to revive our transport within the next few months.

And for this, the Central Committee announces a new mobilization of 5,000 party members for work on transport .

The Ninth Party Congress, discussing questions of transport in connection with organizational questions and the report "On the Immediate Tasks of Economic Construction," reminded the local Party organizations of their duty in relation to railway transport and passed a decision to mobilize 10 per cent of the congress delegates for transport. The congress also obliged the party organizations to carry out the order of the Central Committee on the mobilization of 5,000 communists for transport within the next two weeks.

The party paid serious attention to strengthening its influence in the trade unions of transport and strengthening them. At a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on March 20, 1920, local party organizations in the railway transport were asked to strengthen the proletarian-communist part in the trade union leadership and strongly oppose the penetration of trade unionists and other hostile elements into the leadership of trade union organizations .

By decision of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) in February 1920, the main political department of railways was created on the railways. The Glavpolitputem was given the task of helping to strengthen the trade union of railroad workers. As a temporary organ of the Communist Party and Soviet power, the Glavpolitput was supposed to ensure the organized influence of experienced communists on the work of transport and at the same time help the trade union establish iron discipline in its organization and become a real instrument for raising railway transport. After the completion of this task, the Glavpolitput was supposed to be included in the professional organization of the railway proletariat and other institutions of the People's Commissariat.

Simultaneously with the Glavpolitputem, political departments were created in each major railway junction, headed by the head, under whom meetings were formed from representatives of local communist organizations. Local party organizations were obliged to assist the political departments of the roads in their work by sending to them the most experienced and devoted to the revolution workers.

On February 22, 1920, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) considered the issue of water transport. It was decided to form a political secretariat under the Glavvode (the so-called political departments in water transport) with the task of distributing political workers. In addition, it was decided to send the largest possible number of sailors of the Military Baltic Flotilla to work in the Glavvod 16 .

As a result of the activities of the Central Committee of the Party, the activities of local Party organizations and political departments, the number of Communists on the railways grew rapidly. If by the 7th Congress of Soviets (December 1919) there were 10,023 party members and 6,276 sympathizers in railway transport, then by May 1, 1920, there were 18,000 party members and 7,447 sympathizers. This increase was achieved not only by mobilizing communists for transport, but also by drawing new members into the party from the most advanced railway workers.

In connection with the mobilization of communists for transport, the Central Committee of the RCP(b) confronted the transport workers with the question of the correct use of mobilized communists. On February 25, 1920, Pravda wrote in the article “Communists in depots and nodes” that responsible workers assigned to transport “should not be salted in the offices, but sent to the battlefield itself.”

The mobilization of communists for transport made it possible to strengthen the administrative apparatus, political agencies and grass-roots party cells with experienced cadres, people of great will and initiative, who led the struggle of the railway workers for the rise of work on the railways.

But party mobilizations alone could not resolve the crisis with personnel in the railway sector. It was necessary to attract the broad non-party masses of railway specialists to work in transport. This task was to be solved by the Council of Labor and Defense. As early as January 30, 1920, the Council of Defense, on the basis of the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of January 29, 1920, "On the procedure for universal labor service," adopted a resolution declaring widespread labor mobilization of persons aged 18 to 50 who had worked on the railways for the last 10 years in positions locomotive drivers, assistant drivers and stokers of all classes and categories, railway boilermen, foremen and fitters of the depot and chief foremen, as well as foremen of various specialties.

People's Commissar of Railways L. B. Krasin submitted for discussion by the Council of Defense a project on the mobilization of engineers and technicians of railways. On February 27, the Defense Council decided to announce the mobilization of all communications technicians and engineers of various profiles under the age of 55 years. The Council of Defense also adopted a decision on the return to transport of skilled workers and employees who worked in other institutions and organizations.

In order to use specialists - railway workers who were in the Red Army, the Defense Council adopted a number of resolutions. On January 23, 1920, at a meeting of the Defense Council, it was decided to use all the forces and means of the reserve army of the republic to improve railway transport in the area of ​​the Moscow-Kazan railway. In view of the extremely difficult situation on the South-Eastern Railway, at the suggestion of G.K. Ordzhonikidze, it was decided in the Defense Council to use the forces of the 2nd Army of the Republic to restore transport. Based on the directives of the Council of Defense, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic issued a decision on February 17, 1920, which obliged all military commanders to urgently second all railway workers from the Red Army units, headquarters, military institutions, departments and institutions.

The implementation of these decrees ensured the return of 7,494 former railway workers from the Red Army by April 17, 1920, and in total, 57,895 people were returned to rail transport by December 1920 and 11,121 people to water transport.

The Central Committee of the RCP (b) and the Soviet government paid great attention to improving the organization of management in the railways. Particular attention was paid to the strengthening of unity of command and military discipline on the railways and the further centralization of transport management. At the suggestion of V. I. Lenin, on January 16, 1920, the Defense Council abolished the Special Committee for the implementation of martial law and instead created the transport department of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, whose task was to wage an uncompromising fight against the malicious counter-revolution, sabotage and speculation on iron roads, systematically inform the relevant authorities of the NKPS about the state of transport, etc.

In order to combat abuse and In March-April 1920, revolutionary tribunals were organized by gross violations of order in transport. On March 20, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) considered the question of revolutionary railway tribunals and proposed that the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee approve the position of the Defense Council on railway tribunals .

In order to better organize the work of transport in April 1920, the Main Transport Commission was created under the Council of Labor and Defense, subordinate to the chairman of the Council of Labor and Defense. Her task included the development of a production plan for transport and the adoption of the necessary measures for its implementation. The resolution of the personnel problem and the improvement of the administrative apparatus contributed to the revival of work in transport.

In the struggle to increase transport, the main attention was paid to increasing the rolling stock, transportation, to the construction and repair of lines.

By decision of the Council of Labor and Defense, factories and workshops that worked for transport were allocated to a special group. Fuel and other materials for these factories and workshops were transported out of turn, and all cargo and transportation, by decree of the Council of Defense of February 20, 1920, which were directly related to the repair of rolling stock, were equated in their urgency to military operational 18 .

During the restoration of the rolling stock, there was an acute shortage of spare parts. In this regard, the Council of Defense, at the direction of V. I. Lenin, decided to form an Interdepartmental Commission to develop a plan for the coordinated work of the Supreme Council of National Economy, the People's Commissariat of Economy, the Central Committee of Metalworkers, the Main Committee of Labor for the mass production of spare parts, the utmost assistance to transport plants, and also to introduce the greatest simplicity in organization of this production and elimination of any parallelism 19 .

The restoration of the destroyed transport required not only the deployment of existing factories, but also the creation of a number of new factories serving the needs of transport.

On March 1, 1920, L. B. Krasin submitted to the Council of Defense a memorandum “On the construction of the Moscow and Samara plants for the repair of rolling stock.” This note pointed out that the work of the railway workshops even before the war did not satisfy the needs of the railways in the repair of rolling stock. The war and evacuation completely destroyed the repair economy, the repair of steam locomotives lagged behind the pace of wear. The most in need of repair facilities were the Moscow and Samara regions. In this regard, L. B. Krasin pointed out, the NKPS began the construction of two repair plants, one for the Moscow region at the Lyublino station of the Moscow-Kursk road, the second for the Samara region at the Bezymyanka station of the Samara-Zlatoust road. But the construction, he wrote, is going slowly because of the lack of material resources, raw materials, food. L. B.

Before discussing this issue, V. I. Lenin instructed the secretariat of the Council of Defense to request by March 24, 1920, an opinion on the proposal of L. B. Krasin from the Supreme Economic Council, the Military Department, the Commissariat of Food and the Workers 'and Peasants' Inspectorate. All the requested departments recognized the construction of repair plants as essential. On the basis of this, on April 14, 1920, the Council of Labor and Defense issued a resolution on the construction of the Moscow (at the Lyublino station) and Samara (at the Bezymyanka station) railway repair plants as military-urgent facilities.

Along with the repair of the rolling stock, measures were taken to collect locomotives and wagons that were broken during the fighting or abandoned by the enemy during the retreat. In some places, such as, for example, on the Ryazan-Ural railway. etc., in Siberia, in the Ukraine, hundreds of steam locomotives and thousands of wagons have accumulated. At the direction of the Council of Defense and the People's Commissariat of Railways, the identified rolling stock was sent to factories for repairs. Many serviceable steam locomotives and wagons were received by the Soviet state from areas liberated from enemies. So, on December 20, 1920, V. I. Lenin telegraphed to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Eastern Front and the commissioners of the railways of the East:

"... To take the most urgent, emergency measures to immediately send to Samara and further to the center of at least two hundred steam locomotives, using them to advance military and food block trains" 20 . According to the People's Commissariat, by mid-April 1920, 124 steam locomotives were sent from Siberia to the West. 60 steam locomotives were transferred to the southern roads from the Ryazan-Ural and South-Eastern roads.

The Communist Party, the Soviet government, and personally V. I. Lenin attached great importance to the implementation of the principle of responsibility of everyone for their work, which contributed to raising labor productivity. At the direction of V. I. Lenin, a minimum load on the train was set in transport, each individual locomotive was handed over to a certain team of drivers, which was fully responsible for it. Engineers received remuneration for each hour of operation of the locomotive in excess of the period set for it by the technical commission. A timetable and a direct route service for freight trains were introduced, passenger and suburban trains were canceled and replaced with trailers of passenger cars (no more than 3-5) for freight trains ..

The number of emergency trains of the RVSR, Commander-in-Chief, commanders of the fronts was reduced, and wagons with cargo or passengers were attached to all such trains.

An important measure for raising labor productivity in transport was the widespread introduction of material incentives. On February 26, 1920, the Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution on bonuses for work on the railways, in which it noted the need to pay for the work of workers and employees in transport at tariff rates that exceed the current norms, but no more than twice.

On March 2, 1920, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) considered the decision of the bureau of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions faction to change the tariff system and tariff zones and instructed the People's Commissariat of Labor and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions to begin implementing the bonus system.

Based on the instructions of the party and the government, the People's Commissariat of Labor and Social Security developed a temporary regulation on the forms of remuneration, which provided for separate rates and bonuses for urgent work and other forms of encouragement for high productive work.

The Council of Defense repeatedly made decisions on the issuance of bonuses in bread for the repair of steam locomotives and wagons.

On February 20, 1920, the Defense Council adopted a resolution to encourage plants and factories that would show initiative in the repair of rolling stock. This resolution stated: “To issue bonuses to non-railroad workers repairing steam locomotives in such a way that 50% of the bread brought on the repaired routes is received by the workers of those factories and organizations that have repaired this route. The remaining 50% is distributed by the Commissariat of Food according to the greatest need” 21 .

The compilation of block food trains by enterprises of various provinces, which were in dire need of bread and food, from steam locomotives and wagons repaired by them, was a temporary measure caused, on the one hand, by the transport crisis, and on the other hand, by the difficult food situation. The need for this measure was also dictated by low labor productivity, which fell sharply, in particular, on the railways, as well as in other areas of the country's economy, due to the non-provision of bread rations, lack of clothing and other circumstances.

The measures taken by the Party and the Soviet government have yielded positive results. So, in the Moscow province, as Pravda reported on March 10, 1920, work on the formation of block trains was carried out most vigorously at the Serpukhov Manufactory. The workers of the manufactory repaired a steam locomotive and a train of 40 wagons. Prokhorovskaya Trekhgornaya manufactory also repaired 30 wagons.

The implementation of the principle of material interest made it possible to increase the productivity of transport repair work. For three months (February-April), productivity increased at the Putilov plant by 17 percent, at the Obukhovsky plant by 25 percent, at Izhevsk plant by 30 percent, and at the Baltic plant by 44 percent. In addition, the material situation of many workers has improved, and in particular the supply of food and fuel.

Under the leadership of the party, a struggle was going on in transport to strengthen socialist discipline. V. I. Lenin, in a speech on February 5, 1920, at the conference of railway workers of the Moscow junction, called on all railway workers to strengthen the iron proletarian discipline, like military discipline. In response to V. I. Lenin's call for solidarity among the ranks of the working class, the conference adopted a resolution calling on all workers and all railroad workers to exert every effort to strengthen transport. The appeal of the railway workers of Moscow found a warm response and support from hundreds of thousands of railway workers of the Soviet Republic. On March 30, 1920, the railway workers of the Kushva station, the Perm railway, adopted a resolution at a general meeting in which they wrote:

"The district production union declares a merciless struggle against speculation, selfishness and slovenliness, from whomever they come, with the inclusion of traitors to the revolution on the black board and exclusion from the members of the union" 22 .

In order to develop the creative initiative of the masses in the fight against disruption in transport, on January 16, 1920, the Central Committee of the RCP (b) addressed a letter to all provincial and district committees of the party, political departments of fronts, armies, district and district departments of railways, in which he called on them to turn declared in December 1919 "week of the front" in the "week of the front and transport". The appeal of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) was supported by a broad mass of communists and non-party people. Local party organizations created special commissions to better prepare and conduct the "week". In January 1920, under the leadership of local party organizations, a “week of the front and transport” was held everywhere, which took on especially large proportions in Moscow and the Moscow province. The Petrograd proletariat spent the "week" with great enthusiasm, always setting an example with its labor heroism. Sundays were organized in most districts of Petrograd. In Yaroslavl, during the “week of the front and transport”, especially intensive work was carried out to repair steam locomotives and wagons in the workshops of the Northern Railway. In Kazan, 1,050 Red Army men took part in transport work. Everywhere young people, led by the Komsomol, took an active part in the "week of the front and transport". At the beginning of February 1920, the Central Committee of the Komsomol appealed to all Komsomol organizations with an appeal to raise the proletarian youth to heroic labor. Everywhere young people, led by the Komsomol, took an active part in the "week of the front and transport". At the beginning of February 1920, the Central Committee of the Komsomol appealed to all Komsomol organizations with an appeal to raise the proletarian youth to heroic labor. Everywhere young people, led by the Komsomol, took an active part in the "week of the front and transport". At the beginning of February 1920, the Central Committee of the Komsomol appealed to all Komsomol organizations with an appeal to raise the proletarian youth to heroic labor.

Subbotniks played an important role in attracting the working masses to the restoration of transport. The initiative for subbotniks was laid by the communists of the Moscow-Kazan railway, who on May 10, 1919 decided to work in a revolutionary way. This initiative of the railroad workers found its development in the labor upsurge that swept the working masses at the beginning of 1920, especially during the May Days.

By decree of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) and the Council of People's Commissars, it was decided to turn the celebration of the first of May 1920 into an all-Russian subbotnik. Thorough preparations were made for the All-Russian subbotnik. The commission, chaired by F. E. Dzerzhinsky, developed a plan for holding a subbotnik. According to this plan, it was planned to carry out such works as laying or building bridges, narrow gauge railways, dams, dams, laying a track and other works.

The first of May really turned into a grandiose holiday of labor. A “week of the labor front” was announced across the country. From the Kremlin to the distant aul, work was in full swing everywhere. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin personally took part in the May Day subbotnik.

74,851 people took part in the subbotnik at the Moscow railway junction. During the subbotnik, 67 locomotives, 213 wagons, 20 tanks were released from repair, repair of 29 locomotives and 27 wagons was started.

“There is no power in the world,” Pravda wrote on May 29, 1920, regarding the May Day subbotnik in Moscow, “that would, at one call, bring 400,000 people to free work in the city alone. Let the enemies of Soviet power remember this well.

In Petrograd, 165,000 people took part in the May Day subbotnik. Petrograd railroad workers repaired 19 steam locomotives and 75 wagons requiring medium repairs, 56 locomotives and 113 current wagons, 8 capital wagons and 776 periodic inspection wagons.

Labor armies also took an active part in the "week of the front and transport" and in the All-Russian subbotnik. As of April 1, 1920, only parts of the first labor army repaired 187 steam locomotives, 273 wagons, and manufactured 1071 spare parts.

The measures taken by the Communist Party and the Soviet government, supported by broad sections of the working people, have yielded results. The state of the locomotive and wagon fleet by the end of the peaceful respite began to noticeably improve. So, if in January 1920 258 steam locomotives were out of repair, then in February - already 396, in March - 529, in April - 633, in May - 789. The output of cars from January to October 1920 increased by 757 percent.

The Council of Labor and Defense paid much attention to the restoration of railways, bridges and water pumps, badly damaged during the First World War and during the years of the civil war and intervention.

The largest work had to be carried out to restore bridges in the areas where the front passed. A lot of work was underway to restore bridges across the Volga, Dniester, Kama, Belaya, etc. The Defense Council resolved questions about recognizing these works as military urgent, about providing workers employed at these construction sites with Red Army rations.

There is no need to emphasize how important the restoration of bridges, and especially large ones, was. So, for example, the destruction of a bridge on the Belaya River near Ufa led to the interruption of the connection between this route and Siberia. The workers who restored this bridge wrote to V. I. Lenin:

“For us, the workers who create all the value on the globe, the destruction of the black reaction is not terrible. With faith in our creative and holy proletarian cause, we swear to move towards the intended goal - to communism ... Now there are no barriers to delivering bread from Red Siberia to the hungry proletarian center of bread .

The heroic work of the workers on the construction of this bridge was highly appreciated by V. I. Lenin. In response to this letter from the workers, he wrote:

“Convey to all the workers, employees of the Ufa station and the construction of the Velsky bridge congratulations on the successful completion of the difficult and important work for the Soviet Republic, the restoration of the bridge and the gratitude of the Council of Workers 'and Peasants' Defense for the early completion of the bridge, which greatly facilitates the situation of the Revolutionary centers of the Republic and the supply of the Red Army » 24 .

Many glorious pages have been written in the history of the country by bridge builders, workers, labor army members, and the working peasantry. Along with the heroic work to restore the bridges, the consciousness of the heroes-workers also grew. (The commissar at the construction of the Kamsky bridge wrote that, despite the difficulties experienced due to lack of equipment, difficult working conditions, etc., the workers, thanks to their high consciousness, worked selflessly at 39 ° below zero, which made it possible to shorten the bridge restoration time. In a short period of time, the number of members party cell on the construction of the bridge increased by more than 10 times.

Thanks to the heroic efforts of the workers, the bridge across the Kama was completed before the deadline set by the Defense Councils. Workers and Red Army soldiers worked voluntarily without a break in two shifts, and riveters and drillers worked 20 hours a day.

Member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee Em. Yaroslavsky, sent to this construction site, wrote on February 18, 1920 to V. I. Lenin:

“Today, traffic (on) the restored Kamsky Bridge is open ... I testify to the extraordinary energy of those who worked on the construction of the bridge.

Despite (in) poor nutrition, lack of warm clothes, shoes, working in a through wind, we completed the work ahead of schedule ... I am glad to inform you of these news, which are of great importance (for) the whole of Labor Russia. Restoration of the Kama bridge serves as a guarantee of victory over the devastation of transport” 25 .

On February 27, 1920, the Defense Council, noting in a resolution the exceptional energy and discipline of all the personnel of workers and employees who restored the bridge 2 months ahead of schedule, decided to award all workers with a two-month salary.

In March 1920, a month ahead of schedule, the bridge over the Kama near Sarapul was restored. V. I. Lenin wrote to the builders that this was new proof of what the proletariat could achieve with its organization, energy and discipline in labor.

The construction of railway branches was launched: Alexandrov - Gai - Emba, Aleshino - Volgansky, Izhorskaya, etc. The construction of these branches was supposed to economically revive the areas adjacent to them. The construction of the Alexandrov-Gai-Emba railway and the conversion of the narrow-gauge line Krasny Kut-Aleksandrov-Gai to a broad-gauge line, by decision of the Defense Council of December 24, 1919, were declared military urgent works. The need for them was dictated by the need for Emba oil. The construction of the Aleshino-Volginsky section was associated with the development of coal mines in the area of ​​the city of Borovsha.

V. I. Lenin personally followed the construction of important railway lines, gave detailed instructions. On January 17, 1920, signed by V. I. Lenin, a telegram was sent to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Turkestan, South-Eastern Front, a copy to the People's Commissariat of Transport, the Supreme Economic Council, the Committee of State Constructions and the State Control, in which specific instructions were given on the construction of the Alexandrov-Gai-Emba line.

The telegram spoke about the organization of reliable protection of the material intended for construction, about supplying the construction site with a labor force in the amount of up to 6,000 mobilized workers, about the need to provide them with warm clothes and shoes, provide them with tents, camp kitchens, and food. For the rapid transportation of materials, it was proposed to reduce the military movement and urgently release 50 four- or five-ton trucks and 20 cars, etc., for the needs of construction, etc. V. I. Lenin paid great attention to the issue of coordinating the work of individual departments and institutions.

The telegram emphasized that for the successful completion of work on the construction of the Krasny Kut-Aleksandrov-Gai-Emba line, mutual interdepartmental strife, friction, red tape must be completely excluded and all actions hindering the success of the work must be considered as a betrayal of the Republic 26 .

The telegram was sent as an indication of the Council of Defense and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. This telegram was personalized by V. I. Lenin: “I ask Comrade Frunze, in accordance with the instructions of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, to develop revolutionary energy” in order to maximize the construction of the road and the export of oil. Notify me of receipt” 27 .

The Council of Labor and Defense paid great attention to the repair of tracks, and above all in the main directions. The labor armies took a wide part in the repair and construction of the railway. So, for example, from February to July 1, 1920, 6630 versts of the railway track were repaired only by the labor armies.

Of great importance for transport was the fight against snow drifts and melt water. By decision of the Council of People's Commissars, the Extraordinary Commission of the Snegaput was created under the chairmanship of F. E. Dzerzhinsky. The Council of Defense adopted a resolution "On the organization of artels of permanent workers for especially urgent work on the railways." All workers of these artels were exempted from conscription for military service, they were not involved in other types of labor service. The total number of permanent workers on the entire railway network reached 76,500 people. In addition, the question was raised about the need to use the local population to fight snow drifts.

In April 1920, mobilization was announced to combat the erosion of the railway track and other structures. All work on the organization of these duties was carried out by the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, and after the formation of the Labor Committees, this work was concentrated in them. A large role in the implementation of mass labor duties belonged to the village councils. They kept a record of the labor force, monitored the implementation of the decisions of the Soviet government, carried out the correct distribution and use of those involved in labor service in transport.

The main burden of these works fell on the shoulders of the peasantry, and the peasants showed their devotion and loyalty to the Soviet government, taking an active part in the struggle for the restoration of transport. According to the Moscow Council, from January 21 to January 30, 1920, 818,142 people were mobilized to clear snow on the railways and 5,107 people worked on unloading.

The activities of the Communist Party and the Soviet government to restore transport, supported by the working masses, began to affect the improvement of its work. This made it possible to improve the supply of large industrial centers with raw materials and foodstuffs, and to increase the transportation of goods important for the country. In April 1920, there was a turning point in the direction of improving the work of the railways. In April 1920, the loading plan on all roads was completed by 85 percent, in May - by 194 percent.

Workers of the Moscow-Kazan railway achieved great success. By order of the NKPS No. 890, this road was closed. hay on a red board. The Defense Council noted that in February, the supply of wagons for loading on the Moscow-Kazan Railway was increased, the demurrage of wagons decreased, the number of wagons with food delivered to Moscow increased by 20 percent, the transfer of firewood to the neighboring road was increased by 25 percent, the absenteeism of workers was reduced, the production of locomotives.

“This is our first victory,” the resolution says, “on the bloodless front and in its most difficult place — in transport.

Evaluating this exemplary work on merit, the Council of the Workers 'and Peasants' Defense announces to the workers, employees, administration and commissars of the Moscow-Kazan railroad. your gratitude” 28 .

Thus, thanks to the measures of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, as well as the measures taken by the Council of Labor and Defense and carried out with revolutionary determination, as a result of the labor activity of the working class, the peasantry and the soldiers of the Red Army, a radical improvement in the situation in transport began. This made it possible to improve the supply of food to the country, enterprises - raw materials and fuel, and when the third campaign of the Entente began, to ensure the maintenance of active armies.

* * *

The restoration of economic life during the period of peaceful respite also largely depended on how quickly the fuel crisis in the country would be eliminated. A catastrophic situation with fuel was created in 1918-1919, when the main sources of fuel were seized by the interventionists and the White Guards: the Donetsk coal basin and the Baku oil region. Before the war, these areas met 80 percent of the country's total fuel needs. The sharp decline in coal and oil production during the years of the civil war and intervention brought to the fore the use of wood fuel. Thus, if in 1914 wood accounted for only 13.5 percent of fuel, coal - 65 percent, oil - 20 percent, peat - 1.5 percent, then since 1917 the consumption of firewood has increased to 23 percent, and to 1920 accounted for 90 percent of the fuel consumed.

The program for eliminating the fuel crisis was developed by the party and the government under the direct supervision of V. I. Lenin. VI Lenin noted in his report at the 7th All-Russian Congress of Soviets that recently "a whole series of meetings of the Council of Defense and the Council of People's Commissars was devoted entirely to working out measures to overcome the fuel crisis" 29 .

On November 13, 1919, the Central Committee of the RCP (b) published a circular letter to party organizations - "To fight the fuel crisis." The letter was written by V. I. Lenin. The liquidation of the fuel crisis, the letter pointed out, is the most important immediate task of the Party, the government and the entire Soviet people, which can be solved only through the creative enthusiasm of the working masses themselves.

An increase in the production of one of the main types of fuel - coal, depended on the restoration of the economy of such regions as the Donbass, the Urals, Kuzbass, and the improvement of the work of the Moscow coal basin. The Urals and Siberia were the scene of a fierce struggle for two years. During their retreat, Kolchak's bands caused enormous destruction. “The mining Urals, on which we set our hopes,” wrote A. A. Andreev, “was essentially dead” 30 .

For the urgent restoration of coal mining in the liberated coal basins of the Urals and Siberia, it was necessary to solve the problem of labor, engineering and technical personnel, and eliminate the acute shortage of technical means. Repeated surveys of the Urals showed the lack of supply of labor in the mines, a high turnover of workers, a lack of technical leaders, major shortcomings in the supply of food, clothing, housing, etc. to the workers.

On January 9, 1920, the Council of Defense discussed the issue of improving the food supply for the Ural and Perm workers. It was decided to supply the workers with the necessary amount of food, warm clothing and footwear. V. I. Lenin demanded that the military authorities at all costs supply all the workers of the South Ural factories, mines, and mines with the necessary amount of food. For the implementation of this decree, wrote V. I. Lenin, all the military and railway authorities are responsible.

The Council of Labor and Defense adopted a broad program to combat the housing crisis in the Urals and the Kuznetsk basin. It was pointed out that the right to live and receive rations in mining settlements can be used, except for the person personally working in the mines, only his close relatives. Due to the lack of housing, as a temporary measure, it was allowed to reduce the established norm of living space to 1 cubic meter. fathoms per person. The local executive committees were asked about the density of the population living in towns and villages located near mines and mines. Local executive committees were given the right to municipalize private buildings located on the mine territory. The boards of the mines were obliged to use all the buildings located on their territory.

The measures taken by the Party and the government to combat the food and housing crisis were of great importance for improving the conditions of workers and employees and were one of the incentives for increasing labor productivity. Labor discipline grew stronger in mines and factories, and the responsibility of workers for production grew.

In order to eliminate the crisis in the labor force, the Council of Labor and Defense decided to extend the validity of its decisions of March 17, April 7, June 27 and August 1, 1919 31 to the workers and employees of the Urals.

A major role in the revival of the economy of the Urals was played by the First Labor Army, formed from the 3rd Army, which was the initiator of the creation of labor armies.

In early January 1920, the Revolutionary Military Council of the 3rd Army wrote to V. I. Lenin:

“In order to restore and organize the economy as soon as possible throughout the Urals (in Yekaterinburg, Chelyabinsk, Tobolsk provinces), Revsovarm offers three:

To turn all the forces and means of the Red Army to the restoration of transport and the organization of the economy in the above area.

Rename the Red Army of the Eastern Front into the 1st Revolutionary Labor Army...” 32 .

V. I. Lenin, having received this telegram, raised the issue for discussion by the Central Committee of the Party and the Council of People's Commissars. In a letter to A. D. Tsyurupa, V. I. Lenin pointed out in this connection that the question raised by the Revolutionary Military Council of the 3rd Army was of the utmost importance. In a telegram to the Revolutionary Military Council of the 3rd Army, V. I. Lenin reported:

“I fully approve your proposals. I welcome the initiative, I am submitting the question to the Council of People's Commissars. Begin to act in the strictest coordination with the civil authorities, devoting all your efforts to collecting all surplus food and restoring transport .

On January 13, the Council of People's Commissars discussed the question of transforming the 3rd Army into the First Revolutionary Labor Army. To determine the methods and methods for the expedient use of the 3rd Army, a commission was created under the chairmanship of V. I. Lenin.

In development of the decision of the Council of People's Commissars, on January 15, 1920, the Defense Council adopted a new decision - "On the First Revolutionary Labor Army", which indicated that the 3rd Army was used for labor purposes as a single organization, without destroying and crushing its apparatus, under the name of the First revolutionary army of the pond. The employment of the army was of a temporary nature and was determined by special decrees of the Council of Defense, depending both on the “military situation and on the work that the army could perform.

The resolution outlined the work program of the labor army.

The decision of the Council of Defense on the formation of the Council of the First Army of Labor was approved at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on January 17 and 18, 1920.

The First Labor Army, created in the Urals, played a big role in revitalizing the economic life of this region. The Council of the Labor Army, which, in the conditions of a peaceful respite, acquired the significance of a regional economic and political center, drew up plans for the development of individual sectors of the national economy, primarily the fuel industry.

On February 16, 1920, at a meeting of the Army Council, a commission was created to develop a plan to increase coal production. It was proposed to the commission: "To set before the party and trade union organizations the task of energetic work among the workers of coal mines in the direction of the need to introduce strict labor discipline, work order and increase labor productivity" 34 .

By order of the First Army Labor dated February 21, 1920, the Committee on Labor Service was created under the Army Council, which mobilized the local population mainly for the procurement of fuel. With the assistance of this committee, up to 90 percent of the means of transportation of the peasant population were mobilized in the order of horse-drawn duty. Much attention was paid to providing enterprises with skilled labor and engineering and technical personnel. By order of the Army Council dated March 23, 1920, a strict registration of all persons who had a technical education was carried out on the territory of the army. In total, 4454 people were mobilized with the help of local party organizations, as of April 14, 1920, 1963 people were sent to the factories of the Urals, 511 were sent to the coal mines.

In a telegram addressed to V. I. Lenin and F. E. Dzerzhinsky, the Council of the Labor Army and the Ural Regional Labor Committee telegraphed that the entire labor force attracted by them consists of three main groups: for free employment, for labor service and military units. 229,000 people were recruited for free employment, 341,000 people for labor service, and 156,000 people for military units.

Much work was carried out by local party organizations, creating conditions for the manifestation of the creative initiative of the masses. The heroism of the work of the Urals was manifested in the subbotnik organized on the initiative of the Communists in March 1920, in which about 10 thousand people participated. In April, 450,000 Ural residents took part in subbotniks in the Urals. During this month, coal production in the Urals was not only kept at the level of March production, but also (slightly increased. Thus, the newspaper Economic Life wrote on May 18, 1920 that “in April, coal production increased by 8% against March in the Kizelovsky district The order of Glavugol was 1,500 thousand pounds, the excess of the order was expressed in 12.8%.

In the Chelyabinsk region, 2,693 thousand poods were mined in April, against 2,147 thousand poods in March (an increase of 25.4%). The order of Glavugol was 1,700 thousand pounds, the excess of the order was expressed by 58.4%.

On May 7, 1920, the Council of Labor and Defense, having heard a message about coal mining in excess of the program in the Chelyabinsk mines, decided: "To express gratitude to the workers and employees of the Chelyabinsk mines and instruct the People's Commissariat for Food, together with the People's Commissariat of Labor, and the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council to give them a bonus" 35 .

Much attention was paid to the revival of the Donbass, which remained the country's main fuel base.

The theses of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U on issues of economic construction in 1920 stated: “The restoration of the Donbass, as a source of coal, metal and other basic materials, should become a combat mission for all state forces in priority over all other needs” 36 .

Donbass, after being liberated by the Red Army from Denikin's troops, was a ruin. Almost all mines and mines were rendered unusable, and the metallurgical and metalworking industries were destroyed. So, out of 65 blast furnaces that worked in the Donbass before the war, not one worked at the beginning of 1920.

With what it was necessary to start the restoration of Donbass?

In the Donbass, more than in the Urals, there was a shortage of labor, as well as a difficult situation with food. The civil war in the area was longer and more bitter. The production apparatus has almost completely disappeared.

Local leaders wrote to V.I. Lenin about the difficult situation in the Donbass.

“The situation in the Donets Basin and large industrial centers,” V. Kosior reported, “is very difficult. The best worker communists and even non-party ones at one time, when the Soviet troops left Ukraine, left with us and, of course, now not even a tenth has returned. Places are bled. I spoke with local comrades (Chubar and others), and everyone unanimously declares: without the transfer of forces from the armies from Russia, we will not be able to do anything. The mood of the workers is quite sympathetic to us, the Mensheviks are being thrown out .

Just as in the Urals, the labor army played an important role in the revival of the economic life of Donbass. At a meeting of the Politburo on January 17 and 18, 1920, the Central Committee of the RCP (b) instructed I. V. Stalin to develop a project for the organization of the Ukrainian Labor Army . On January 20, 1920, at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), a draft on the Council of the Ukrainian Labor Army was approved and I.V. Stalin was instructed to submit it to the Council of People's Commissars, and then, upon reaching an agreement with the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee, to publish this resolution on behalf of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR and the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee.

Based on these instructions of the Central Committee of the Party, on January 21, 1920, the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR, in agreement with the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee, adopted the regulation on the Ukrainian Labor Army.

The workers of Donbass warmly welcomed the creation of a labor army.

“We, the workers of the mines,” they wrote, “welcome the Ukrsovtrudarm in the person of its representatives, who came to us to help restore the productivity of the Donets Basin. In friendly work with the valiant Red Army, we will fight and achieve an increase in production (coal) and complete victory.

The area of ​​activity of the Ukrainian Labor Army coincided with the area of ​​the South-Western Front, and also included the Alexander-Grushevka coal district of the former Don region. At the disposal of the Ukrsovtrudarm were transferred military units - reserve or spare - in the amount of not less than an army. The main task that the government set for Ukrsovtrudarm was to restore the Donets Basin. The center of activity of the Ukrainian Labor Army, pointed out the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, “should be the Donets Basin” 39 .

The composition of the Council of the Ukrainian Labor Army included: Special Representative of the Council of Defense with the rights of chairman - Stalin; Deputy Commander of the Labor Army, representative of the RVS of the Southwestern Front - Berezin; a representative from the People's Commissariat for Food - Vladimirov; representative from the Supreme Economic Council - Chubar 40 .

Of the 68 meetings held by the Ukrainian Council of the Labor Army during 1920, 146 issues related to the restoration of the coal industry of Donbass were discussed at 53 meetings.

But no matter how important the labor army was in the revival of Donbass, without involving the broad working masses and the entire surrounding population in the cause, it alone could not achieve a radical change in the situation in industry and ensure its permanent work. In order to organize labor in the conditions of a severe crisis in the labor force, it was necessary to resort to emergency measures. In order to quickly restore the Donbass, the party and the Soviet government were forced to militarize the Donetsk coal industry.

The issue of militarization before the decision of the Council of Labor and Defense was widely discussed at the congress of miners, held in March 1920 in Kharkov. The worker delegates to the congress came out in favor of the militarization of the coal industry, thereby giving a rebuff to the Mensheviks, who spoke at the congress against the militarization of labor.

By decision of the Council of Labor and Defense of April 23, 1920, Donbass was declared a single economic and military-administrative unit. Throughout its territory, labor service was introduced for the male population from 18 to 45 years old, and technical specialists - up to 65 years old. Measures were taken to supply the workers with basic necessities and medicines. In order to better organize the management of the coal industry and bring the management closer to production, it was decided to move the Central Administration of the coal industry from Kharkov to the Donbass. Coal reserves were declared military property. The mining committee was instructed to strictly monitor the distribution of rolling stock. The distribution of coal was made the responsibility of Yugotop.

The Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR and the Council of Labor and Defense took a number of measures to resolve the issue with personnel. On March 28, the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine decided: "Consider entering a job or service in the coal industry in Donbass as equivalent to entering military service" 41 .

On April 16, 1920, the Council of Labor and Defense adopted a new resolution on the mobilization of qualified miners aged 38 to 50 to work in coal mines and bringing to justice those who evaded work in the coal industry.

Two months after the adoption of these resolutions, 1,466 qualified miners were seconded from the Red Army to the Donbass, of which 511 were miners. At the same time, work was carried out on the return of workers from other regions there.

From April 15 to November 1, 1920, 211 people were sent to Donbass. The number of workers there increased rapidly. Immediately after the liberation of Donbass, there were only 80,000 workers there, and by November 1, 1920, the number of miners had already increased to 129,611 people.

Decisive measures were taken in the Councils of People's Commissars of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR and the Council of Labor and Defense to improve the supply of workers in Donbass with bread, food and essential goods. Transportation of food cargo for the Donbass was equated to military operations. Travel for food on mine locomotives was allowed. Procurement and distribution of products were in the hands of the Food Committee of Donbass. He was allocated special counties for the procurement of food. By February 25, 1920, 154,000 poods of wheat and rye, over 20,000 poods of cereals, 6,000 poods of oats, 27,000 poods of salt, 2,000 poods of sugar and about 6,000 poods of meat were sent to the Donbas region. In addition, 15 wagons of sugar and 80 wagons of various grain cargoes arrived from Oprodkom-8.

On February 29, 1920, the Council of the Ukrainian Labor Army discussed the issue of supplying the workers of Donbass with uniforms and footwear, and it was decided to allocate from the stocks at the disposal of Chusosnabarm for the workers of Donbass 7,000 pairs of shoes, 6,000 overcoats, 21,000 shirts and tunics, 3 bloomers thousand, underwear shirts 2 thousand. In addition, Chusosnabarm was instructed to give for the workers of Donbass in March 20 thousand, in April 30 thousand, in May 30 thousand sets of uniforms, including shoes. The question was raised that the workshops of the Voenved in Lugansk and Taganrog should be adapted mainly for serving the Donbass.

Great work was carried out to improve the living and sanitary conditions of life for the workers of Donbass. Measures were taken to mitigate the housing crisis: by October 1920, 4,500 apartments for workers were built and repaired, including 2,500 apartments for singles and 300 hostel barracks.

The revival of party work played an important role in establishing the economic life of Donbass. To improve party-mass work in the first half of 1920, 153 responsible party workers were sent to the Donbass.

At the initiative of the Council of the Ukrainian Labor Army, with the permission of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), the Political Department of the Coal Industry was formed under the Central Administration of the Coal Industry with the functions of registering and distributing communists in the Donbass, leading party cells at enterprises, organizing broad mass agitation by convening non-party conferences of workers and peasants of Donbass and other responsibilities.

The political department did a great deal of work in organizing party cells, drawing the best cadres of miners into the party, and developing party educational and mass cultural work in the mines. For six months, the political department organized 120 party and 26 Komsomol cells, 20 literacy schools, 3 political literacy schools, 25 clubs and reading rooms, 17 cultural commissions, held 524 workers' meetings, 95 lectures, 11 performances and concerts, 37 film screenings, 82 interviews with workers, 18 subbotniks and Sundays, 123 working meetings. The publishing department prepared various brochures with a circulation of 10,800 copies, printed 8,575 slogans, 36,600 leaflets, 186 textbooks and 37,886 newspapers.

The activities of the party and the government to improve the economic life of the workers of Donbass and to revitalize the party political work contributed to the development of the creative initiative of the workers. They voluntarily worked in excess of the established working day, organized subbotniks and Sundays. In order to increase the extraction and export of coal, the miners, on their own initiative, decided to work at all mines on Saturdays and Sundays. The general meeting of workers and employees of the former mines of the Ditman brothers on February 13, 1920 decided "to take measures to strengthen the work of coal mining, regardless of the hours of work"; The miners of the Rychinsky mine assured the party and the Soviet government that they "will make every effort to restore industry and finally consolidate the gains of the revolution" 42 .

In March 1920, the chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, M. I. Kalinin, visiting Ukraine, noted the successes of Donbass, which was reported in the press.

On April 16, 1920, Pravda reported on the significant successes of the Donets Basin: “During March, 12 million poods of coal were loaded in the Donets Basin. On average, up to 400 wagons were loaded daily. During the whole month 11 million poods of coal were exported. Coal mining, scheduled for March, has almost been completed. For 20 days in the Donets Basin, coal loading has tripled. At the beginning of March, 100-110 wagons were loaded daily, now 395 wagons are being loaded daily.”

The restoration of the economy in one of the main economic regions of the country - in the Donbass, largely contributed to the elimination of the fuel crisis and some improvement in the overall economic situation of the country.

A large place in the country's supply of coal during the civil war was occupied by the Moscow Region basin. During the period of domination of the interventionists and the White Guards in the Urals, Ukraine, and the Caucasus, the Moscow Region basin was the only source of coal. Therefore, coal mining here increased significantly during the years of the civil war.

If in 1918 it was 23.4 million poods, and in 1919 - 24.2 million, then in 1920 it increased to 40 million poods.

On January 2, 1920, at a meeting of the Defense Council, the question was "On raising productivity in the Moscow coal basin." The resolution noted that in view of the extreme severity of the fuel crisis experienced by the Republic, it was necessary to temporarily introduce overtime in underground work in the Moscow Region basin: two hours a day in excess of the usual six hours with a corresponding increase in coal mining rates and with payment for these two hours at a rate of one and a half.

The Supreme Transportation Council was instructed to take emergency measures to deliver from 300 to 400 wagons of timber from Bryansk and other nearby areas to the Moscow coal region every month. The Commissariat of Health was asked to pay serious attention to the improvement of sanitary conditions in the coal district near Moscow.

At a meeting of the Defense Council on February 20, 1920, a resolution was adopted on the formation of a special commission of representatives from Glavugol, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and the People's Commissariat for Food to develop a system of bonuses for increasing productivity in the Moscow Region basin.

All this contributed to the increase in coal production. So, in February 1920, 2,868,932 poods of coal were mined in the Moscow region, 2,022,000 poods of coal were exported. The number of workers was 13,080, of which 3,075 were miners. In March, production reached 3,497,397 poods, export - 2,484,124 poods; the number of workers was 13,912 people, of which 3,003 were miners.

The Soviet Republic experienced an exceptional need for oil. Until 1920, all oil regions were in the hands of enemies, and only at the beginning of 1920 did the Baku, Grozny, Maikop, and Emba oil regions reunite with Soviet Russia.

The Emba oil region was the first to be liberated. The White Guards, retreating under the blows of the Red Army, destroyed oil fields, destroyed oil reserves. S. M. Kirov in a telegram to V. I. Lenin reported on February 29, 1920 from Guryev: “The Whites, leaving, managed to burn from 50 to 60 thousand pounds of oil, released into the sea up to four hundred thousand pounds” 43 . The rapid offensive of the Red Army helped to save a large amount of oil products from destruction. S. M. Kirov also informed V. I. Lenin that the Red Army had saved: 13 million poods of oil, 12,000 poods of gasoline, 1 million poods of kerosene, and 300 poods of gasoline. During the liberation of Grozny in March 1920, the Soviet units managed to save about 200 million poods of oil, 15 million poods of gasoline and other products from destruction and plunder by the enemies.

In April 1920, Baku was liberated. V. I. Lenin, the day after the liberation of the city, said: "This means that we now have an economic base that can revive our entire industry" 44 .

After the liberation of these oil centers, the people's authorities were faced with the task of quickly transferring the oil produced in the liberated regions to the industrial centers of the country. Urgent measures were taken in the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Labor and Defense to resolve this problem. For the purpose of the timely export of oil products from the fishing areas and their delivery to places of consumption, by decision of the Council of Defense under the People's Commissariat of Railways, an Oil Committee was formed from representatives of the People's Commissariat of Civil Aviation, the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs, and the Supreme Council of National Economy. For the fastest transfer of oil to the central regions of the country, the forces of the Turkestan and Caucasian fronts were used. M. V. Frunze, S. M. Kirov, S. I. Gusev, and other leading party workers did a great deal of work in organizing the oil economy.

Direct control over the transportation of oil was concentrated in the Council of Labor and Defense. V. I. Lenin personally followed the progress of the oil routes and gave instructions on the best organization of this work. So, for example, in a telegram from the Revolutionary Military Council of the Turkestan and Caucasian fronts dated January 28, 1920, V. I. Lenin outlined a program for the export of oil from the Emba region, demanded that 4,000 Red Army soldiers and 2,500 carts be allocated and that the Red Army soldiers be supplied with food, and horses and camels with fodder.

To restore the oil industry in the Caucasus, the question arose of creating a Caucasian labor army. It was supposed to create the Kuban-Grozny army of labor, Kazan, Emba labor armies. However, due to the current international situation, only one Caucasian Labor Army was created, the area of ​​\u200b\u200bwhich covered the Stavropol, Kuban and Terek regions. The Caucasian Labor Army took an active part in loading and shipping oil. On April 14 and 16, the Labor and Defense Council heard a report on some of the results of the work of the oil export commission. Only from April 1 to April 20, 25 trains of oil were sent. A lot of work was carried out by the labor army in the collection and repair of tanks. In total, 1,311 empty tanks were repaired by the labor army and sent to different addresses.

In April 1920, plans for the export of oil products were drawn up and approved by the Council of Labor and Defense, and the issue of involving water transport in the export of oil was decided. The enormous importance of the question of exporting oil is evidenced by the fact that since April 1920 reports on the fulfillment of plans for exporting oil have been considered at every meeting of the Council of Labor and Defense. Special authorized service stations were appointed to manage the export of oil. At a meeting of the Council of Labor and Defense on April 17, the organization of the oil industry in the Grozny region was entrusted to Pylaev.

In order to establish contact in the work on the management of the oil regions between the Supreme Council of National Economy and the military command, the Council of Labor and Defense proposed that the Supreme Economic Council appoint Kosior as chairman of the Grozny Oil Administration.

V. I. Lenin was also personally involved in the selection of specialists in the oil industry. So, when Lenin received a letter from Penza that there was a wounded political commissar of the army Astriev, an oil specialist, V. I. Lenin requested a review about him from a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of National Economy Syromolotov, who summoned Astriev to Moscow.

On February 13, 1920, the Council of Defense offered Krasin to submit to Glavkoneft within ten days candidates who knew the oil business and who could be used to work in the oil industry. On May 26, 1920, the Council of Labor and Defense made a decision to register oil specialists.

Local party organizations showed great concern for strengthening the oil fields with personnel. In August 1920, a telegram from Grozny came to the Council of People's Commissars addressed to Lenin with a request to exempt 10 percent of the party members and 3 percent of the members of the trade workers' union from military service. V. I. Lenin sent a request to the Central Committee, from where they were informed that “by the decision of the Orgburo of 2.IX the mobilization of workers was canceled” 45 .

The Council of Labor and Defense paid serious attention to the mechanization of the oil regions of the Caucasus. So, for example, by a resolution of the Council of Labor and Defense on March 17, 1920, it was decided to build the Emba oil pipeline to Saratov, for which, on March 24, 1920, an advance payment of 300 million rubles was allocated. On April 7, a resolution was adopted on the construction of a telephone network in this area, the restoration of a radio station in the city of Guryev. The Council of Labor and Defense also passed a decision to repair the destroyed line of the Baku-Astrakhan oil pipeline.

To raise the economy of the oil regions of the Caucasus, the Council of Labor and Defense ordered the Glavvod to transfer 3 motor ships, 4 motor boats to the jurisdiction of Glavkoneft, allow navigation on motor ships in the Urals, and organize raids between Astrakhan and Guryev.

At the same time, the Party, the government and local bodies of Soviet power took the most resolute measures to establish oil production and processing. This great and strenuous work on the establishment of the oil economy already in the first half of 1920 gave tangible results. On June 6, 1920, Pravda reported that by May 25, 5.1 million poods of oil products had arrived, and by May 29, 8.7 million poods. In total, 146 million poods of cargo were transported to Astrakhan during the navigation period.

The increase in oil production and export contributed to the easing of the fuel crisis c. country, which in turn led to the revival of the entire economic life.

In 1920, as in previous years of the civil war, much attention was still paid to the procurement and delivery of firewood, which became the most important type of fuel during the war.

V. I. Lenin, speaking about the importance of logging for the elimination of the fuel crisis, at the VIII All-Russian Conference of the RCP (b) pointed out: “We cannot restore the coal industry even under the best conditions earlier than in a few years.

We need to save ourselves with firewood. To this end, we are throwing more and more Party forces into this work ... As long as we do not properly organize the coal industry, we can get by with firewood and provide industry with fuel. For this fundamental task, comrades, we must devote all our Party forces .

Every day telegrams from different parts of the republic came to Lenin's address with reports of a catastrophic situation with fuel.

Due to the lack of fuel, many factories stopped. On March 9, 1920, the workers of the Mytishchi plant wrote to V. I. Lenin:

“We, the workers of the Mytishchi plant, appeal to you with a request to pay attention (to) our plant. At a time when all the forces of the country are called upon by the Workers 'and Peasants' Government to fight the ruin of transport, our factory, specially adapted for the construction and repair of wagons and for the production of wagon spare parts, has been running out of fuel for three months now . V. I. Lenin sent a request to the Supreme Council of National Economy, from where they replied that the start-up of the plant was limited by a lack of fuel. On March 16, Glavtop told V. I. Lenin that the plant had been provided with 30 wagons of firewood, 8 wagons of coke and 12 wagons of coal. The plant was launched.

The forces of the Red Army were widely used for harvesting firewood. On December 10, 1919, at the direction of the Council of Defense, an order was issued by the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic on the creation of interdepartmental executive front, army and provincial fuel commissions. On December 19, 1919, the Defense Council discussed the issue of organizing a special meeting under the Revolutionary Military Council of the Western Front to intensify the work on the preparation of firewood. At the beginning of 1920, an executive interdepartmental commission for the procurement of fuel of the XII Army of the Southwestern Front was created, which was tasked with providing fuel for the railways of its region, where in early January 1920 railway traffic almost stopped. Thanks to the heroic work of the Red Army, by January 15, the crisis was eliminated.

At that time, logging was the most convenient type of work, which made it possible to use the forces of the labor armies. In December 1919 and January 1920, on average, about 50,000 Red Army soldiers worked daily on firewood. Many hundreds of fighters, commanders, political workers showed exceptional heroism in the procurement of fuel.

Of great importance for the preparation and removal of firewood was labor conscription, which was carried out by: 1) natural firewood conscription, 2) labor conscription for the preparation, loading and unloading of fuel, and 3) horse-drawn conscription. To fulfill the service, men who were not drafted into the army were mobilized, aged 35 to 50 years and women from 18 to 40 years old.

The report of the People's Commissariat of Labor and the Main Committee of Labor provides data on the conduct of mass labor and horse-drawn duties in logging from the beginning of 1920 to July 1, 1920.
 

Mobilized		Results of work in 36 provinces of the republic
People	horses	Harvested		Transported and fused
		Firewood cube. soot	timber material piece	Firewood cube. soot	timber material piece
5824182	4161859	9210766	4812745	7428697	12559146 48

 

These figures testify to the colossal work carried out by the entire population and especially the peasantry, which took an active part in horse-drawn and labor service.

The management of the procurement and removal of firewood was concentrated in the Main Forestry Committee, created under the Supreme Council of National Economy. The local bodies of Glavleskom were provincial forestry committees. The Council of Defense made extensive use of the principle of material interest in carrying out logging operations. Thanks to the use of premiums in kind (manufactory, salt, etc.), it was possible to attract a large number of peasants to logging. The Council of Defense monthly discussed a plan for supplying food and fodder to Glavlesky. On March 16, for example, on the initiative of V. I. Lenin, the Defense Council decided to release 600 wagons of oats and 225 wagons of bread to Glavleskoy during the month of March. In addition, the Commissariat of Food provided 275 wagons of oats and bread in the producing provinces directly to the local bodies of the Glavleskom.

For the uninterrupted supply of firewood to railway stations, factories and various institutions were involved in the removal of firewood from the forest.

Thus, under the leadership of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, under the leadership of the Council of Labor and Defense, the working class and the working peasantry, with the active participation and support of the Red Army, fought to eliminate the fuel crisis. Successes in this area contributed to the revival of factories and plants, the revival of transport, the improvement of the supply of the Red Army and the working people of the cities with bread and food.

* * *

A serious problem that the Communist Party and the Soviet state had to solve in the conditions of the second peaceful respite was the fight against the food crisis.

“The most important after the military front,” V. I. Lenin pointed out in July 1920, “the hungry front puts forward ... a whole series of new tasks, without the resolution of which it is impossible either to further strengthen the workers’ and peasants’ power, or to resolve the next, urgent tasks of economic construction » 49 .

The food crisis in the country was caused by the fact that the First World War, and then the civil war and intervention severely undermined agricultural production. During the war years, the sown area sharply decreased. Only in 13 provinces of Central Russia it decreased by 27 percent. A particularly large reduction in the cultivation of basic food crops occurred in Ukraine. Yields have declined significantly, and the number of livestock has greatly decreased. The difficult food situation was aggravated by a crop failure that in 1920 engulfed a number of regions of the country.

Difficulties in procuring grain and provisions increased in connection with the intensification of the class struggle in the countryside. The kulaks fiercely fought against the food policy of the Soviet government, hid and destroyed bread and other food products.

The surplus appraisal, introduced by the Soviet government as a temporary measure caused by the war, weakened the interest of the peasantry in expanding the plowing. All this led to an acute food crisis.

The Communist Party and the Soviet government took a number of measures to improve the situation in agriculture.

To increase the sown area in 1920, on January 17, the Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution according to which all land suitable, but not used for sowing, was temporarily included in the land fund for state sowing. The harvest on these lands was to be placed at the disposal of the People's Commissariat for Food and was intended to supply factory workers. The management and conduct of these activities was entrusted to the Committee of the sown area under the People's Commissariat of Agriculture.

The Council of People's Commissars also discussed the issue of streamlining the redistribution of peasant lands. The resolution noted that frequent mismanaged redistributions impede the correct and intensive cultivation and fertilization of fields. The decree stated that they should be carried out only with the permission of local land authorities and only in cases where the total area of ​​land use changed, a multi-field crop rotation was introduced in order to destroy the small strip, or when the rural community wished to use part of the land for public cultivation. When redistribution is carried out, it is necessary to obtain the consent of 2/3 of the members of the land user society.

In order to preserve breeding stock and poultry, the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of January 27, 1920 required that breeding stock and poultry kept by individual citizens or collectives should not be subject to egalitarian distribution. The sale and purchase of such animals and birds was allowed only for breeding purposes and with the permission of the provincial land department. In those labor farms where there were pedigree cattle, the prepared fodder in the amount established by the norms of the People's Commissariat for Food was not subject to seizure.

To provide agronomic assistance to agriculture, by decision of the Council of Labor and Defense of April 7, 1920, the mobilization of agricultural specialists was announced in a number of provinces of the country. The decree of the Council of Labor and Defense, signed by V. I. Lenin, stated that any delay by enterprises and institutions of persons subject to mobilization would be prosecuted as harboring deserters, and the evasion of the mobilized themselves from appointment as desertion.

Despite the great difficulties in the country, the Soviet government paid great attention to the training of agricultural specialists. During this period, specialists were trained in 14 higher agricultural educational institutions with 13,600 students and in 366 technical schools and special secondary agricultural educational institutions with 24,994 students.

By decision of the Eighth Party Congress, the Soviet state deployed great assistance to the peasantry in supplying them with improved agricultural implements and seeds. Thus, in 1920, the Council of Labor and Defense repeatedly resolved the issue of supplying certain regions with seed material. Provincial food commissars were asked to bring all the seeds to their destination by the time the sowing campaign began. In March, the Council of People's Commissars took measures to provide peasant farms with seed potatoes, etc.

No matter how difficult it was during the years of the Civil War with the production of agricultural machinery, the Soviet state, to the extent possible, supplied the countryside with agricultural machinery and implements.

The Party and government paid great attention to supporting the new, socialist forms of agriculture—commune state farms and artels. But the party at the same time warned against the mistakes of some excessively zealous leaders who were carried away by the creation of collective forms of economy - communes, artels, sometimes violating the principle of voluntariness.

Of great importance in the fight against hunger was the food procurement policy of the state. The food policy pursued by the state was based on the class principle - defending the interests of the working masses of the peasantry and weakening the position of the kulaks in the countryside. This ensured support for the food policy of the Soviet government from the bulk of the poor and middle peasantry, which in turn contributed to an increase in the state's grain procurement.

Emphasizing this, V. I. Lenin on June 12, 1920, in a speech at the 2nd All-Russian Conference of Responsible Organizers for Work in the Countryside, said that “the harvesting of bread from August 1, 1917 gave 30 million, from August 1918 - 110 million ... From August 1, 1919 to this day, the number is over 150 million” 50 .

The state in 1920, in conditions of an acute shortage of food, had to supply food to millions of people. In 1920, 37,520,300 people received rations on cards. This did not include the Red Army, which by this time numbered over 5 million people. Thus, over 40 million people were on the state food supply. A bad harvest in 1920 made the struggle for grain even more intense.

The specific tasks facing the country in the field of food policy in 1920 were worked out at the VII Congress of Soviets and the IX Congress of the RCP (b) and were a further development of the main provisions of the party and government in this matter.

The resolution of the 7th Congress of Soviets on the report on food policy noted that the obligatory allowance established for bread in 1919 is the most expedient means for the state to get food surpluses into its own hands. At the direction of the congress, it was decided that the state allocation should be applied not only to bread and meat, but also to potatoes and, as needed, to other products.

In order to increase the republic's food resources and use them more correctly, the congress considered it necessary to strengthen Soviet organizations' control over the food authorities, to organize food communes and replace individual forms of nutrition with public ones.

The 7th Party Congress set before the Party and the people the task of collecting a food fund of several hundred million poods and distributing it in the form of food bases in the main areas where industry is concentrated. The congress demanded that the food policy be subordinated to the interests of the revival of industry and transport.

To put this program into practice, it was necessary to mobilize all the forces of the party and the working class. The Central Committee of the RCP (b) repeatedly addressed letters to local party organizations about the allocation of the most experienced party workers as chairmen of the regional food meetings. He obliged all provincial and district committees to mobilize for the entire duration of the food campaign at least 50 percent of the total number of communists in the province, including at least one communist for each volost.

At the direction of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), three party mobilizations for food work were carried out, which produced about a thousand talented organizers of food work in the countryside. A total of 9,130 ​​people were mobilized for work.

The working class played a decisive role in implementing the food policy of the party and government in 1920. As in the previous years of the civil war, in 1920 food detachments were created from the best workers, which helped to carry out surplus appropriations in the countryside, procured bread and other food, and fought for the strengthening and strengthening of Soviet power in the localities. According to far from complete data, during the three years of the civil war, 800 workers' food detachments were created in the amount of 20 thousand people.

Labor mobilization of the workforce during the period of sowing and harvesting campaigns, by decision of the Council of Labor and Defense, was carried out by state bodies together with trade unions. Special squads were created from the mobilized. Some of these squads in 1920, at the direction of the Council of People's Commissars, were sent to Siberia. In total, 19,768 workers were sent to Siberia in 1920, of which 20 percent were women.

Manpower was mobilized for fisheries as well. On March 12, 1920, the Defense Council decided to provide the Astrakhan fisheries with labor. The resolution read: “To announce the labor mobilization of 15,000 men aged 16-50 and 20,000 women aged 18-45 who are not employed in enterprises, institutions and Soviet farms to work in the fisheries.”

The leadership of all food work in the republic was concentrated in the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Labor and Defense. A great deal of work on the organization of the food business was carried out by special commissioners of the Council of Labor and Defense. The plenipotentiaries were instructed to organize, with the help of local food and railway authorities, the procurement and transportation of grain and other agricultural products.

On the initiative of V. I. Lenin, the Defense Council raised the question of the participation of the Red Army in food procurement. On February 8, 1920, V. I. Lenin telegraphed the Revolutionary Military Council of the Western Army, located in Kazan:

“Moscow, Petrograd, the armies of the Western Front and the Northern Front are on the eve of the cessation of the distribution of bread. The Council of Defense instructs the Revolutionary Military Council of Zaparma to make every effort to load grain along the Kazanovaya Road and send it according to the instructions of the Herod Organs . in harvesting and sending bread to the central regions of the country.

So the First Cavalry Army in January 1920 sent a train of food and fuel to the Moscow workers, and the 42nd Division a wagon of flour. The Red Army units that liberated Rostov-on-Don sent a train with 30,000 poods of food to Moscow in February.

The food policy pursued by the Communist Party and the Soviet government received support from the broad working masses of the peasantry.

The newspaper Bednota, for example, on March 9, 1920, reported that the population of the village of Krivtsova, Ryazan province, handed over 131 poods of rye, 193 poods of millet, 800 poods of potatoes to the People's Commissariat of Food for starving workers. At a meeting, the Cossacks of the village of Donetsk decided to send 2,000 poods of grain to the starving workers. There were many such examples.

In the Ukraine, at the initiative of the peasants, local newspapers published red lists of villages and hamlets that had completed the apportionment well, and black lists of those villages and villages in which either the implementation of the surplus appraisal had not begun at all or it had been completed by less than 15 percent by the deadline.

To alleviate the food crisis, the organization of suburban farms was of great importance. The Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of March 2, 1920 obliged the local Soviets to take all measures to organize suburban farms. The decree stated: "All free land around industrial centers should be used by city executive committees for vegetable gardens and dairy farms" 52 .

On May 27, 1920, when discussing the issue of grain resources, the Council of People's Commissars decided: "Instruct the Moscow and Petrograd Soviets to pay increased attention to the need to increase the receipt of garden products from near-capital areas this year" 53 .

V. I. Lenin personally (repeatedly asked the local executive committees of industrial cities about the amount of garden products received.

In 1920, 6,571 acres were occupied for vegetable gardens in Petrograd and its suburbs alone.

In grain procurement, despite the widespread implementation of surplus appraisal as the main form of grain procurement, the exchange of manufactured goods for agricultural products also played a certain role. By decree of August 1, 1919, each peasant received industrial goods only in strict accordance with the amount of agricultural products handed over.

Procurement of food was carried out according to state plans. “No independent preparations,” V. I. Lenin pointed out, by anyone, either at free or at fixed prices, will in any case be allowed. I invite all those striving to strengthen procurements to lead according to the general plan, on a united front, with the use of commodity exchange, in full agreement with the instructions of the center, under the general guidance and responsibility of the provincial food committee .

Laws persecuted speculation in bread and food products. Private trade was allowed in local markets only in those products that were not a state monopoly.

Thus, in the difficult conditions of the civil war, the Communist Party and the Soviet state successfully solved one of the complex problems of that time—the procurement of grain and food. In 1919 and early 1920, 180 million poods of grain collected in Central Russia, the Volga region and other regions were obtained through surplus appropriation and exchange for manufactured goods. The liberation of Ukraine, the Don, Siberia and the Caucasus at the beginning of 1920 significantly improved the country's food situation.

A very important problem that arose in connection with the state monopoly on bread and food was distribution. The question of organizing food distribution arose from the first days of Soviet power. In the resolutions of the Moscow and Petrograd Soviets (August 1918), in the order of the People's Commissariat for Food (October 1918), the idea of ​​a class ration was put forward.

The first paragraph of the resolution of the Presidium of the Food Department of the Moscow Soviet stated:

“Since September 1918, new ones have been introduced (bread and food cards based on the class division of the population of Moscow into 4 categories (class rations)” 55 .

The distribution of products was based on the general principle: "Who does not work, he does not eat." But the lack of food resources led to the fact that the application of this principle became insufficient. Life put forward the target principle of supply, which was developed by V. I. Lenin and found expression in a number of decisions of the central government.

In his notes on the decree on labor food rations, V. I. Lenin wrote:

“3) Make the main labor ration, that is, for the days worked.

4) Divide the labor ration into categories according to the ease or severity of labor ...

We will not feed those who do not work in Soviet enterprises or in Soviet institutions” 56 .

Thus, the distribution of bread and products was carried out according to the class-production principle. Bread and food were provided to the working people, and above all to the workers and their families, as well as to the Red Army and Navy. This policy led to the limitation of the influence of the defeated but not yet finished exploiting classes and to the strengthening of the socialist economic system. For the first time, the planned intervention of the Soviet state in the matter of supplying the population with bread and food began to be carried out on a large scale.

The Soviet government persistently put this class production principle into practice. On August 20, 1919, a decree was issued on rations for families of Red Army soldiers. "Armored" norms were established for factory workers of fuel organizations, special railway norms. On November 15, 1919, under the People's Commissariat for Food, a Commission on Workers' Supply was established, which revised all the norms. This commission was entrusted with the resolution of all questions about the procedure and norms for supplying workers and employees with food. The commission established "armored" rations. In December 1919, 642 thousand people were "booked" in nine industries. In January 1920, the commission submitted for approval by the Council of Defense two more new groups - printers and postal workers - a total of about 108 thousand people.

The final streamlining of the distribution of food products was expressed in the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of April 30, 1920. The decree set the task of giving the most satisfactory application of the principle of material interest in the struggle to increase labor productivity.

The idea of ​​the decree was to exclude non-labour elements from the circle of supplied non-labor elements and to increase the influence on labor productivity of that part of wages that went to buy food.

The entire working population was divided into three groups: group "A" included manual workers, group "B" - persons engaged in mental and office work in Soviet institutions and enterprises, and group "C" - persons employed in private enterprises, institutions and farms that do not exploit the labor of others.

Despite the enormous efforts of the Soviet state to provide the country with the necessary amount of food, it was not enough for a normal supply of the population. Low bread consumption rates (they ranged from 45 to 15 pounds per month) were often reduced to 1/3, and sometimes even 1/8 pound per day, plans for "armored" rations were often carried out by no more than 50 percent.

The table below shows the plan for the so-called armored rations and its actual implementation in 1920 57 .
 

Products	Scheduled to be issued (in poods)	Actually issued (in poods)
Flour	3309000	2079000
Meat fish	385 800	245500
Fats	611300	17300
Sugar	611300	29 800

These figures show how difficult the issue of supplying bread to the population was. Due to the lack of food, the population received less food even according to the established norms. In this regard, the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Labor and Defense often had to consider the adoption of emergency measures to supply food to individual cities, industrial regions, enterprises, as well as certain groups of workers and employees. So, at the direction of K. I. Lenin, a special commission was created under the Council of Defense to provide food for Moscow and Petrograd. At the meetings of the Defense Council on March 5, questions were considered about providing food for doctors - professors of Moscow University. On March 12, 1920, the Defense Council heard the report of the commission "On the situation with food in Moscow." The decree recorded the need to redistribute food from other regions for Moscow. In addition, this resolution instructed the Supreme Council for Transportation to revise the general transportation plan for the month of March in order to increase food and seed cargo at the expense of shipments from other departments.

On March 10, 1920, an emergency interdepartmental meeting was convened in the Defense Council under the chairmanship of V.I. Lenin on the food needs of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk province. The decree recorded the allocation of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk province in the coming difficult spring and summer months of at least 160,000 poods of grain per month. To create a seed fund, it was proposed to take out from the Kazan and Samara provinces at least 500 thousand pounds of seeds, from the Yaroslavl and Kostroma provinces up to 300 thousand pounds of potatoes.

The organization of public catering was of great importance in improving the supply of food to the population. On January 17, 1920, a decree of the Council of People's Commissars on free public catering was issued. Public catering was provided primarily to workers and employees of such large factory cities and districts as Petrograd and Moscow. In Moscow and Petrograd, up to 80,000 people were covered by public catering.

Control over the work of the bodies in charge of public catering was carried out by the Soviets and trade union organizations in the localities, and in the center - by the Central Committee of the RCP (b), the Council of Labor and Defense, and personally by V. I. Lenin. Taking care of providing the workers with food, as the secretary of the Council of People's Commissars S. B. Brichkina recalls, V. I. Lenin "personally asked for hours on the phone where this or that route with bread for the starving Moscow, Petrograd" 58 .

Public catering in the cities was introduced by decision of the Council of Labor and Defense. So, in the decision of the Council of Defense on the supply of food to the Ivanovo-Voznesensk workers, it was written:

"To extend to the Ivanovo-Voznesenskaya province the right to open free canteens, like Moscow and Petrograd, for persons engaged in useful work for the state" 59 .

Public catering for railway workers was organized through the Prodput. They covered about 550 thousand people.

Public catering was widespread locally. Its organizers were, first of all, factory committees. In 1920, 1.5 million people were covered by public catering in the provinces.

Hospitals, care homes, rest homes and sanatoriums were fully supplied by the state. Despite the huge difficulties with food in the summer of 1920, about 40 thousand people were treated and rested at the resorts.

The party, government, trade unions, Komsomol paid exceptional attention to the organization of children's nutrition. Caring for children has been at the forefront since the first days of the existence of the Soviet state. Already in 1917 and early 1918, a number of measures were taken to improve the nutrition of children, to combat homelessness and neglect. In September 1918, the Council of People's Commissars issued a special decree on the organization of baby food. The People's Commissariat for Food was asked to organize additional distribution of food for children. Children of the younger groups were given food on special children's cards. In addition to this additional ration, the children were entitled to a general ration. On May 17, 1919, the Council of People's Commissars issued a decree on free meals for children. Since that time, the children of the urban population received food for free. On September 25, 1919, in an explanation of the decree of May 17, the Council of People's Commissars pointed out that in the further organization of children's nutrition, the main attention should be paid to public catering. When organizing public children's meals, the class principle was not applied. The state helped all needy children, regardless of the social status of their parents.

“Millions of children,” said M.I. Kalinin, “we fed at the expense of the state in our lack of money.” Only in the institutions of the People's Commissariat of Health and the People's Commissariat of Education in 1920, 298,069 children were fed. There were up to 1.5 million children who used free food, and in total 7,667,769 children received one or another assistance from the state in nutrition.

At the suggestion of V. I. Lenin, the Council of Labor and Defense adopted a decree on increasing the number of children's institutions of a medical and educational nature and on seconding specialist teachers from the Red Army to organize this work.

The Red Army and the population of the grain regions provided great assistance to the starving children. On May 7, 1920, V. I. Lenin sent a letter to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Turkfront, in which he wrote:

“I ask you to convey my gratitude to the 30th Regiment of the Red Communards of the Turkestan Front for the pasta and flour that were sent by me, which I handed over to the children of the city of Moscow” 60 . Pravda reported in January 1920 that food agencies in Bugulma organized a "rusk week" in favor of the children of Petrograd. There were many such examples.

So in difficult conditions of devastation and famine, the party, the Soviet state and personally V. I. Lenin did everything possible to improve the life of the younger generation.

The heroic efforts of the Communist Party, the Soviet state and the great leader V. I. Lenin to organize all the forces and means of the country to fight hunger made it possible to create a food fund to supply the workers with the necessary minimum of food, to supply the army of many millions, which played a huge role in the fight against the White Poles and Wrangel in 1920.

The improvement in the country's food situation, along with the easing of the fuel crisis, led to some revival of industry and transport, and to an improvement in the entire national economy.

* * *

The Council of Labor and Defense played an exceptional role in mobilizing the country's forces and resources to restore the economy destroyed by the war in the conditions of a short-term peaceful respite in 1920.

Based on a sober consideration of the current situation, the reorganization of the Council of Labor and Defense carried out on the instructions of the Party under the direct leadership of V. I. Lenin made it possible to begin more systematic work to restore the country's economy. More systematic work was introduced in the work of transport and in the field of distribution of products, the deployment and use of labor was carried out more systematically. The Council of Labor and Defense, leading the economic people's commissariats, carried out the strictest centralization of production, supply and management of industry, providing it with raw materials, fuel, and financial resources.

For the first time in the history of the Soviet state, the implementation of a single economic plan began on a large scale through the Council of Labor and Defense, which was the main condition for the revival of the country. The STO was given the task of fighting to coordinate plans in various areas of the national economy, to speed up the implementation of these plans by local bodies - a task that the Council of Labor and Defense could undertake on a large scale only under the conditions of the new economic policy, after the victorious end of the civil war.

The successes achieved during the period of a short-term peaceful respite allowed the country to withstand a new serious test connected with the military attack of the White Poles on the Soviet Republic.

The heroic struggle of the Soviet people during the civil war to strengthen the country's economy was under the direct leadership of the Communist Party, its Central Committee, and personally V. I. Lenin.

Throughout their entire history of the struggle for socialism, the Communist Party and the Soviet state have been and are guided in their practical work by Lenin's behests, his legacy in all areas of the economic and political life of the country.

Notes :

1 S. I. Gusev. Civil War and the Red Army, Gosizdat, 1925, p. 207.

2 M. V. Frunze. Works, vol. II, 1926, p. 135

3 Pravda, December 3, 1918

4 “Ninth Congress of the RCP (b.). Protocols, Partizdat, 1934, p. 478.

5 V. I. Lenin. Works, vol. 30, p. 378.

6 “Ninth Congress of the RCP (b.). Protocols”, p. 137.

7 V. I. Lenin. Soch., vol. 30, p. 444.

8 "CPSU in resolutions and decisions...", part I, p. 481

9 Ibid., pp. 483-484.

10 "Reports of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) from the VIII to the X Congress." Ed. Central Committee of the RCP(b), 1921, pp. 20-21

11 V. I. Lenin. 0-4., vol. 30, p. 407.

12 Archive of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee of the CPSU, f. 17, on. 1, d. 16, l. sixteen.

13 "Lenin's collection" ХХХIV, p. 271.

14 Pravda, March 4, 1920

15 . Archive of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee of the CPSU. Minutes of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) of March 20, 1920

16 Archive of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee of the CPSU. Minutes of the meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) of February 28, 1920

17 Archive of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee of the CPSU. Minutes of the meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) dated March 20, 1920. The Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on revolutionary tribunals on the railways was published on March 18, 1920.

18 Ibid., f. 2, on. 1, unit ridge No. 12934.

19 Ibid., f. 19, d. 115, ll. 1 and 2. Minutes of the Defense Council.

20 "Leninsky collection" XXXIV, p. 245.

21 "Leninsky collection" XXXIV, p. 265.

22 Red Archive, vol. 5(96), 1939, p. 95.

23 TsGAOR, f. 130, op. 4, d. 611, l. 138, 139

24 Proletarian Revolution No. 1, 1940, p. 153.

25 TsGAOR, f. 1884, op. 3, d. 378, l. 21.

26 Archive of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee of the CPSU, f. 2, on. 1, d. No. 12507.

27 "Leninsky collection" XXXIV, p. 254.

28 "Leninsky collection" XXXIV, p. 276.

29 V. I. Lenin. Works, vol. 30, p. 205

30 Newspaper “Profdvizhenie” No. 4, 1919.

31 These decisions referred to the prohibition to leave work for persons employed in hard coal enterprises; those working at these enterprises were equated with military personnel; the question was raised about the return of miners, fit engineers from the army.

32 TsGAOR, f. 130, op. 4, d. 478, ll. 69-70.

33 "Lenin Collection" XXIV, pp. 33-34

34 TsGAKA, f. 164, d. 11, l. 1.

35 "Lenin's collection" XXXIV, p. 299

36 Archive of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee of the CPSU, f. 17, op. 8, d. 894.

37 Archive of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee of the CPSU, f. 2, on. 1, house No. 13427.

38 Ibid., Minutes of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) of January 17 and 18, 1920.

39 Decrees and resolutions of the session of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the 7th convocation, art. fourteen.

40 TsGAKA, f. 241, on. 1, d. 253, l. 15.

41 SU of the Ukrainian SSR No. 10, May 22, 1920

42 Proletarian Revolution, No. 3, 1940, p. 176.

43 TsGAOR, f. 130, op. 4, d 577, ll. 11-12.

44 V. I. Lenin. Op.. vol. 31, p. 100.

45 TsGAOR, f. 130, op. 4, d. 577, l. 70.

46 V. I. Lenin. Works, vol. 30, p. 163.

47 TsGAOR, f. 130. op. 4, d. 575, l. 77.

48 Included exports from harvests of previous years.

49 V. I. Lenin. Works, vol. 31, p. 157.

50 V. I. Lenin. Works, vol. 31, p. 154.

51 "Leninsky collection" XXXIV, p. 259.

52 SU dated March 6, 1920 No. 12, p. 79.

53 "Leninsky collection" XXXIV, p. 129.

54 "Leninsky collection" XXIV, pp. 131-132.

55 "Five Years of Soviet Power", 1922, p. 380.

56 "Leninsky collection" XXXV, pp. 118-121.

57 "Five Years of Soviet Power", p. 282.

58 Archive of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, under the Central Committee of the CPSU, f. 4, op 4, unit ridge 60 l. 17.

59 Ibid., f. 19, d. 103, l. 76. STO protocols.

60 "Leninsky collection" XXXIV, p. 300.