Bolshevik Leaders correspondence

Bolshevik leadership Correspondence. 1912-1927
Collection of documents 1996.
Compiled by: A.V.Kvashonkin, L.P.Kosheleva, L.A.Rogovaya, O.V.Khlevnyuk.

I. V. Stalin - G. V. Chicherin, V. I. Lenin

[later November 22, 1921]

Tov. CHICHERIN.

copy of LENIN.

I still remain of my opinion about the possibilities of our economic policy in the states of the East.

Of course, we will someday get out of the current devastation, and when we get out, then we can talk about economic combinations in these states. But after all, we are not talking about the “music of the future”, but about the practical politics of the present, when both in Turkey and Afghanistan we had to retreat before the millions of money of our opponents, and in Persia, despite all our efforts, we got ourselves an Anglophile government . For me, it is beyond doubt that we are not in a position to compete with enemies in the countries mentioned above, either in trade or in industry, as long as - 1) the exchange rate of the Russian ruble is falling, 2) we have no or almost no export fund, 3) our trade balance desperately passive, 4) we do not have enough gold to compensate for our economic shortcomings on the three previous points.

I must admit that I did not find any objections against such a (practical) posing of the question in your second letter .

Meanwhile, only with such a formulation of the question is it possible to build our practical policy for the coming years. All this, of course, under otherwise equal conditions, that is, on the condition that in international relations everything proceeds in the present, peaceful way, which, of course, cannot be vouched for.

I think that it would be more rational and practical to concentrate forces on the development of industry in those outskirts that border on the Eastern states mentioned above, namely, in Azerbaijan, Siberia, Turkestan, in the calculation that with the successful development of industry in these On the outskirts, we will be able to stretch first trade, and then industrial threads to these states, subject them to the economic influence of Russia. For example, one factory each (textile and leather) could be moved to Azerbaijan; two or three factories (textile or leather) to Turkestan; to draw a railway line, say, on a joint basis with the Mongols and the Far East, between Urga and the Siberian railway [road]. These events are not as far off the ground and not as fantastic as your plan to move factories to Turkey, since in this case you will have to operate not in a foreign state, but in your own, that is, in your own outskirts, where the Russian ruble is in circulation (hence, you won’t have to spend gold) and where the preparatory work for such undertakings has already been done (there are premises , the local bodies of the Soviet Government will enthusiastically support such undertakings, the Urga-Siberia highway facilitates the construction of the railway, etc.). I think that even this minimalist economic plan, which has only an indirect relation to the question you have raised, we will not be able to proceed in practice, in the present state of our economy, without much effort and without some damage to the economic undertakings of central Russia.

As for Latvia and Estonia, they should by no means be put on the same level as Turkey and Persia, because they (Latvia and Estonia), being an intermediate link between Russia and Europe and connecting us with the latter, are included in our arsenal as inevitable components elements necessary for the restoration of the Russian economy (for which we pay these states a certain transit tribute), which by no means can be said about Turkey and Persia.

I. Stalin.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. Op. 2. D. 34. L. 1. Typewritten text. Signature - autograph.

Notes:

1 See Document No. 138.