Bolshevik Leaders correspondence

Bolshevik leadership Correspondence. 1912-1927
Collection of documents 1996.
Compiled by: A.V.Kvashonkin, L.P.Kosheleva, L.A.Rogovaya, O.V.Khlevnyuk.

No. 116

S. M. Kirov, G. K. Ordzhonikidze - Central Committee of the RCP (b)

January 2, 1921

Top secret.

To all members of the Central Committee of the RCP.

We present our brief considerations as to why we consider it necessary now to sovietize Menshevik Georgia.

First . After the Sovietization of Azerbaijan, we pointed out the need to Sovietize Georgia at the same time as the base of the counter-revolution in the Caucasus. The subsequent events in the Caucasus irrefutably proved this: the Georgian government transferred to the Crimea all the Denikinites who retreated to Georgia, all the uprisings in the North Caucasus and Azerbaijan proceeded with the direct participation of Georgia, in particular, the uprising against Soviet power in Dagestan that is currently taking place is proceeding under the leadership of Georgian agents - the headquarters of the rebels is located in Lagodekhi (in Georgia, Signakh [y] district [yezd]). All counter-revolutionary conspiracies discovered in the North Caucasus invariably open a connection with Georgia. In order to secure for us the Northern Caucasus (bread and oil), it is necessary to Sovietize Georgia.

Second . Supporting and organizing the uprisings in the Northern Caucasus and Azerbaijan in every possible way, the Georgian government hopes thereby to divert our attention from it and, not without success, provokes us in the eyes of the Muslims, strenuously inflating the actions of our troops in suppressing the uprisings, for example, the suppression of the uprising in Ganja , after which a certain cooling towards us was noticeable in Angora due to the intensified agitation of the Georgian press.

Third . Soviet Armenia, without Soviet Georgia, actually remains under Turkish influence much more than ours, due to the fact that the railway to Armenia goes through Georgia (from Naftlug). At present, Georgia does not let even bread into Armenia.

Fourth . Given the current situation, the Turks can easily create their own buffer in the Makino-Nakhichevan region, where they intend to create a special khanate, in whose hands the railway to Tabriz will be, which cuts us off from Persia and dismembers Armenia.

Fifth . The current situation in Transcaucasia compels us to keep significant military forces in Azerbaijan, which is very burdensome for the population and harmful for military units. This situation can take dangerous forms and create complications in Azerbaijan itself.

Sixth . The Sovietization of Georgia, our occupation of Batum wrests from the Entente the last base against us in the south.

Seventh . The Sovietization of Georgia is now also necessary because the Entente has not yet managed to organize the remnants of the Wrangel army and does not yet have sufficient forces to counteract us.

Eighth . There is no reason to hope for a decisive explosion within Georgia itself, which is proved by the entire course of events in Georgia. Georgia cannot be sovietized without our help.

Ninth . There are reasons for our intervention in Georgian affairs, this does not require an open attack on Georgia, it is possible to raise a movement in Abkhazia, in Adzharia, in the Borchali district, where there is ground for this. Turkey and Armenia can also help us in this respect, and such a situation is possible in which we will be the deliverers of Georgia, which is decaying and falling into anarchy.

In conclusion, it must be emphasized once again that without the Sovietization of the entire Transcaucasus, we will by no means feel firmly at home in the North [Northern] Caucasus and in Azerbaijan, and if now it is relatively calm in the Kuban and on the Terek, then this is only up to the first case, until the Cossacks have time to recover from those decisive blows that we inflicted on them, and the Georgian government will do everything to help the Cossacks and the highlanders in their actions against us.

The Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party has repeatedly presented its unanimous decisions on the need for the Sovietization of Georgia .

Members of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP Ordzhonikidze. Kirov.

Moscow,

2/1 - 21 years old.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. On. 15. D. 68. L. 1-6. Kirov's autograph.

Notes:

1 . On January 12, 1921, the Plenum of the Central Committee considered the appeal of the Caucasus Bureau and rejected the proposals put forward (RTSKHIDNI. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 55. L. 5).

No. 117

L. M. Karakhan - Central Committee of the RCP(b)

January 26 [1921]

In the Central Committee of the RCP.

In August 1920, we sent to Afghanistan the well-known Young Turk figure JEMAL PASHA (former minister and commander of the Turkish Army in Syria) with the purpose of reconnaissance and with the task of gaining confidence in the Afghan Emir 1 and obtaining from him a responsible military post.

At present, the Afghan emir has entrusted JEMAL PASH with the reorganization and command of the western army stationed on the border of India 2 . Dzhemal writes to me that the reorganization of the army is possible if the Afghan government is supplied with military equipment. Moreover, we have the opportunity to send a number of red military specialists to occupy responsible military positions in this army.

Attaching serious importance, on the one hand, to the introduction of our comrades into the Afghan army, and, on the other hand, to the creation of a combat-ready army standing against British India and being under some of our influence, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs proposes to take a decision to provide assistance with military supplies and to allocate a group of comrades for the Afghan army. army.

To characterize Jemal Pasha, we report that he is a Turkish nationalist, not infected with pan-Islamism, is a fierce "avenger" and enemy of the British, by whom he was sentenced to death in Constantinople in absentia.

This information has been verified by us through various sources. He belongs to that group of Englishmen who are ready to fight against Kemal and any other national government that will make peace with England 3 . If the proposal is accepted, it is necessary to oblige the NKID and the Revolutionary Military Council to agree on the implementation of the decision in a short time.

Deputy People's Commissar L. Karakhan.

26/1

RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 208. L. 7-8. Typewritten text. Signature - autograph.

Notes:

1 Amanullah Khan.

2 In the conditions of an unsuccessful war for itself, England, according to the Rawalpinda (1919) treaty, was forced to first recognize the independence of Afghanistan. In March 1920, the government of Amanullah Khan proposed to England to establish equal relations. England's refusal of this proposal was the reason for the continuation of the war. Covert British intervention in the regions of Afghanistan bordering British India continued until the end of 1921.

3 At the end of 1920 - beginning of 1921, the Kemal government repeatedly tried to reach an agreement with England on a peaceful settlement of disputed issues. These attempts caused a negative reaction from the Bolshevik politicians, who saw in Kemal, up to a certain point, an ally. As early as October 10, 1920, in a telegram to the Plenipotentiary of the RSFSR in Georgia, Sheinman, Chicherin wrote: “By all indications, an attempt at reconciliation between the Entente and the Kemalists is not getting better. England refuses the required concessions, and the Kemalists once again strengthen their Soviet orientation [...] This does not save us from the possibility of a more serious danger from this side in the future [...] ”(Documents of Foreign Policy of the USSR. Vol. 3. C 374).

No. 118

Telegram of L. D. Trotsky, S. S. Kamenev, P. P. Lebedev to the RVS of the Caucasian Front

January 27, 1921

U[top] secret ON A DIRECT WIRE,

REVVOENSKOVET OF THE CAUCASUS FRONT.

1. If the Soviet republic were forced against its will to give a military rebuff to the provocative policy of Georgia, do you think that you have sufficient forces and means at your disposal for this operation, taking into account the occupation of the territory, etc.? one

2. The same question, in the case of a simultaneous speech by Turkey and Georgia.

3. Do you think the morale of the troops ensures success?

4. What requirements would you present to the center, firmly mindful of the real situation of transport? In particular, what demands would you make on the supply of food for the maintenance of the army and Soviet institutions in Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia in the event of the occupation of the latter?

5. At the same time, our diplomacy is trying to achieve by peaceful pressure the fulfillment by Georgia of its obligations, in particular, the non-intervention of Georgia with hostile goals against us in the affairs of other Caucasian peoples 2 . You are invited to discuss and develop the demands that our diplomacy could present to the Georgian government regarding its non-support of the uprising in Dagestan, Chechnya, etc. Along with the demands, it is necessary to develop organizational forms of control over their implementation (commissions, etc.).

6. On both of these major issues, your opinion is expected as soon as possible.

January 27, 1921

Pre-revolutionary military council Trotsky.

Commander Kamenev.

Chief of the Field Staff Lebedev.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. On. 1. D. 2436. L. 48. Certified typewritten copy.

Notes:

oneOn January 26, 1921, the question of Georgia was discussed in the Politburo. In the adopted decision, in particular, it was said: “1. To instruct the NKID to delay the break with Georgia by systematically collecting accurate material about its violation of the treaty and more urgently demanding the passage of supplies to Armenia. 2. Ask the Caucasian Front about how prepared our available military forces are in the event of an immediate or close war with Georgia and entrust the formulation of this request with an indication of the extreme insolence of Georgia to a commission from comrades Trotsky, Chicherin and Stalin. 3. Give a directive to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and the Cavalry Front to prepare in case a war with Georgia is necessary [...] Propose to the Cavalry Front to develop the question of those real guarantees [...

2 This refers to the articles of the Soviet-Georgian peace treaty of May 7, 1920.

No. 119

G. K. Ordzhonikidze - Central Committee of the RCP (b), V. I. Lenin, L. D. Trotsky, I. V. Stalin

February 6, 1921

Central Committee of the RCP, copy to Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin.

6/II 21

Again and again I bring to your attention that the situation in the Caucasus with the approach of spring is becoming more and more formidable, so formidable that I begin to doubt whether we will keep Baku behind us. The accumulation of a large number of troops, or rather eaters, is a heavy burden on the population. From meat preparations, the population literally groans and curses everything and everything - the Soviet government, the Red Army, and the Russians. Heavy underwater duty deprives the peasants of the opportunity to sow the fields, and therefore all our talk about the landlords' land, etc., remains an empty phrase - the peasants are not only unable to plow the landlords' land, but even their patches.

It is not only impossible to reduce the number of troops, but, on the contrary, it is necessary to increase it, because for me there is no doubt that the work of the Georgian Mensheviks in the spring will bear corresponding fruits. Georgia finally turned into the headquarters of the world counter-revolution in the Middle East. The French are operating here (see Sheinman's letter), the British are operating here, Kazim Bey, the representative of the Angora government, is operating here. Millions of gold are thrown into the mountains, predatory gangs are created in the border zone with us, attacking our border posts, there were cases of removal of posts, which was officially reported to the Georgian government through Sheinman. Georgia has become so insolent after the last note of Chicherin, who so thoughtlessly set a three-day deadline, without supporting it with anything, that now poor Sheinman is sitting in Tiflis, no one talks to him and no one considers him. Throwing ultimatum notes in order to remain spat on, I do not understand what higher policy requires this. Sheinman is sitting in Tiflis and absolutely thoroughly insists on recalling him, which must be done. The prestige of Russia has fallen so much that our Plenipotentiary Representative is being spoken to through the head of the special detachment, Kedia.

You say, give the facts. They will be given by the Georgians with the first rays of the spring sun.

I consider it absolutely necessary to once again emphasize the mortal danger approaching the Baku region, which can only be averted by the immediate concentration of sufficient forces for the Sovietization of Georgia .

RTSHIDNI; F. 85. Op. 15. D. 72. L. 1-6. Autograph.

Notes:

1 The Politburo discussed Ordzhonikidze's telegram and decided to approve the response proposed by Lenin to this telegram, which determined in detail the line of conduct of the Bolsheviks in Georgia (V. I. Lenin. Biographical Chronicle. T. 10. P. 87).

No. 120

I. V. Stalin - G. K. Ordzhonikidze

February 16, 1921

Baku. Note by Comrade Ordzhonikidze 1 .

From your message, which, unfortunately, we did not receive in full (distortion), we conclude that the Armenian Government is waging war with Georgia, protecting the rebels 2 . It is desirable to have from you an exact confirmation of this [th] for the notification of Europe, as well as confirmation of the formation of the Georgian Revolutionary Committee in connection with the uprising inside Georgia 3 , are the rumors about the atrocities of the Georgians against the Tatar rebels of the Sayugly Soguthulahi station area and others true 4. Also tell us whether you have taken measures so that the Russian commanders, commanders and brigade commanders do not allow interpretations about our campaign against Georgia and about the opening of hostilities on the part of the Russian [Russian] Soviet social [ialist] federal republic] , spoke precisely and clearly about the protection of the insurgents by the local authorities. Finally, it is necessary that you notify the press in Baku about the break in communication with (distortion)*, inform through Rostov (distortion)* day. It's time (distortion) * do not send anything, do not forget the Anbazi, who are also revolting and near which the ninth army is stationed 5 , if you can win over the left Georgian Mensheviks by concessions, as was the case in Armenia with the Dashnaks 6 , promise [those] concessions, amnesty, etc. Stalin. 16/11 21

RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 1966. L. 1-4. Handwritten text.

Notes:

1 On the letterhead: "RSFSR Secretary of the Member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian Front."

2We are talking about disputed territories in Borchala and part of Akhalkalaki counties. On the night of February 11-12, 1921, under the leadership of the Communists, an armed uprising began in the part of these districts occupied by Georgian troops, coordinated with the leadership of the 11th Army. On February 15, 1921, Lenin sent a telegram to the RVS of the 11th Army: “The Central Committee considers the operations of the RVS 11 as local protection of the insurgents of the neutral zone from the extermination that threatens them from the White Guards. Consider this political character of your operation in all your public speeches. Of course, we expect from the RVS 11 energetic and quick actions that do not stop before taking Tiflis, if this is necessary for military reasons to really protect the neutral zone from a new attack. We expect, that our warnings have been taken seriously by you. Notify daily” (Lenin V.I. PSS. T. 52. S. 71).

3 We are talking about uprisings in Eastern Georgia. On February 14, 1921, Lenin asked Sklyansky to “cipher with extreme caution” and personally send a telegram to Smilga, a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian Front, with the following content: that all members of RVS 11, after serious consideration of all the data, vouch for the success [...]. We demand an immediate answer by direct wire signed by all members of RVS 11, as well as by Smilga, Gittis, Trifonov and Frumkin. Until we reply to the telegrams of all these people, do nothing decisively” (Ibid.).

On February 16, 1921, Lenin received a telegram on behalf of the Revolutionary Committee of Georgia, which, in particular, stated: “[...] the last uprising of the popular masses turned out to be victorious. The forces of European reaction are rushing to the aid of the Georgian government. Only a united red socialist army can resist the onslaught of the united black army. We hope, we are sure that the country not only of the great proletarian revolution, but also of great material opportunities will not leave us in an unequal struggle and will come to the aid of the newborn Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia [...] Long live the Red Army ”(From the history of the civil war in USSR, vol. 3, p. 520).

4 Ordzhonikidze’s message addressed to Stalin dated February 17, 1921, in the section entitled “Saloglakh-Poyly”, in particular, stated: “[...] The peasants of the Georgian villages bordering Azerbaijan, having learned about the atrocities committed by the Georgian Borchali district, they decided to lend a helping hand to the Borchalins and also raised an uprising against the hated government of the Mensheviks of Georgia [...] ”(Struggle for the Victory of Soviet Power in Georgia. P. 660).

5 We are talking about the Black Sea coast of Georgia, where the 9th Army conducted military operations against the Georgian troops.

6 See note 2 to document No. 109.