Bolshevik Leaders correspondence

Bolshevik leadership Correspondence. 1912-1927
Collection of documents 1996.
Compiled by: A.V.Kvashonkin, L.P.Kosheleva, L.A.Rogovaya, O.V.Khlevnyuk.

No. 101

K. E. Voroshilov — G. K. Ordzhonikidze

September 4, 1920

Mother of God (near Hrubezhov) 4/IX-20

Hello, dear friend, Grigory Konstantinovich!

First of all, I thank you with all my heart for the memory of our, and to this day still, glorious army, which, despite all the difficulties, beats the pans. We have repeatedly intended to send you letters and delegations, but the continuous and cruel battles with accursed dark Poland prevent everything.

I use the last expression quite deliberately. We expected uprisings and revolution from the Polish workers and peasants, but what we got was chauvinism and stupid hatred of the “Russians”. Of course, if we managed to get to Lodz-Petrokov and the Dombrowski district, the situation would change dramatically [would], but so far the situation is rather unimportant. Our army, I can honestly testify, has fulfilled and is fulfilling its revolutionary duty. We exterminated a fair amount of Poles. Some prisoners were taken up to 20 thousand [thousand]. In general, more than 20 thousand [thousands] were cut down and destroyed. You may be struck and surprised by the large number of exterminated lords in relation to the prisoners, but this should not be surprised, because the "lords" fight brutally and inflict great damage on us. The bitterness of the fighters can be brought to the maximum by the stubbornness of the Poles, and in such cases our guys cut mercilessly. Our losses on the Belopolska front are also enormous. We lost almost all of our command staff, military commissars and up to 10 thousand fighters, about the same number of horses. There are no refills anywhere. The tasks facing the army are still enormous. You can ask the question - why are our losses so great, because the Cavalry was famous for its invulnerability. Yes, dear Grigory Konstantinovich, that was in the Don and Kuban. Here, in swamps, forests, rivers and mountains, completely dug up and intertwined with endless rows of barbed wire, cavalry cannot be used at all. And only our army, with its iron endurance and incredible adaptability, could not only fight under these conditions, but also win, force impregnable rivers and take fortified forts and cities. From the moment of our appearance here, the White Poles gave the order not to get involved in their cavalry in a fight with us and force us to fight with the infantry or, as they wrote, "break against the infantry." Indeed, for three months of uninterrupted fighting, the gentlemen evaded giving us a cavalry battle, and only once in Brody (2-3 / VIII) did the gentlemen try their luck by throwing three regiments of cavalry at us, but the attempt was unsuccessful, because despite due to the extreme exhaustion of our units, the Polish cavalry was destroyed instantly. The Polish infantry fights stubbornly and skillfully. The explanation for this is the well-formed units of the green youth of the village and abundantly saturated with reliable command staff of the bourgeoisie and specialists. Cases of Poles defecting to our ranks are very, very rare. despite the extreme exhaustion of our units, the Polish cavalry was destroyed instantly. The Polish infantry fights stubbornly and skillfully. The explanation for this is the well-formed units of the green youth of the village and abundantly saturated with reliable command staff of the bourgeoisie and specialists. Cases of Poles defecting to our ranks are very, very rare.

During these three months, the army had dozens of general battles in which the pans tried to destroy our army. On the entire Western Front, our army is the most powerful magnet, attracting huge forces of the enemy. The cavalry suffered greatly, but its fighting spirit and desire to fight are still strong, and only physical exhaustion can undermine its heroic spirit.

The trouble, dear Sergo, is that in the center they know little about our army and do not sufficiently appreciate its invaluable service to the Soviet power and the revolution. The army is still poorly dressed and often goes hungry. I never for a moment forgot your promise to give the army cloaks. Dear comrade, if this could be done, you would render the army a true boon, and an invaluable service to the republic, since the fighting efficiency and morale of the army would rise to a significant extent. If the center could supply us with at least canvas cloaks, that would be wonderful, and I would not allow myself to disturb you and tear you away from your direct and most important affairs, but you yourself know that this task is beyond the power of the center, and without it I foresee that we will lose the army, because it is already raining for days on end, and the soldiers spend 15-17 or even more hours on horseback in the pouring rain. All this will soon get worse. The gentlemen, emboldened by the successes in the northern sector, will, of course, not give us rest, and are now exerting all their strength to put an end to our army, which they hate so much and for which they have to tear off their forces so much. I have no doubt that you, if it is in your power, will do everything to help this time the army, which is still so needed by the Workers' and Peasants' Republic. If it is impossible to get a large number of cloaks, then do the best you can, something is better than nothing. We have not yet received the daggers, but we know that the Baku proletarians, led by you, showed us their attention, and this moved us to tears. We always remember you as our best friend and comrade and as the most sensitive and most devoted revolutionary,

With all my proletarian soul I wish you success and happiness. Say hello and best wishes to your wife.

I embrace and firmly shake your hand.

With communist greetings

Yours K. Voroshilov.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 8. D. 201. L. 3-4. Autograph.

No. 102

L. M. Karakhan - Central Committee of the RCP

September 9, 1920

In the Central Committee of the RCP.

The recent events in Persia: the collapse of the "Soviet" Government in Gilan, the retreat from Resht and the threat of being driven out by the armed Anglo-Persian forces and[h] Persia in the face of the indifference and hostility of the Persians - raise the general question of our policy in Persia for the next period 1 . The situation in Gilan is portrayed as follows: due to political mistakes and political indiscretions, the cause of the revolution in the Gilan province (Anzeli and Resht) has been severely compromised. The revolutionary government did not have time to secure the sympathy of the population and, above all, the peasantry, the participation in the revolution of Russians, Armenians and Georgians (as foreigners) and their management as in a conquered country very quickly armed the entire population against us, weakened the hostile attitude towards the British, and trade circles even threw to the British.

Losing Persia now and leaving it to the British would now be a serious blow to us both internationally (as a sign of our weakness) and especially for England, this would be an indicator that we have nothing to fear in the East, because we can do nothing and resolutely retreat at the slightest failure.

Reports received from Persia, in particular, from comrade. Eliavs, show that the possible lines of our Persian policy could be:

1) The forces existing in Anzali are reinforced by an expeditionary force of 8-10 thousand people, which ensures that we completely occupy Tehran, overthrow the Shah's government and are completely sufficient for further struggle and the complete expulsion of the British from Persia. A non-communist, but Soviet-type government is being formed in Tehran, with the involvement of national-democratic elements in it. The policy of this government would base its calculations on the peasantry, while at the same time not affecting the interests (for the time being) of commercial capital. In order to carry out such a plan, Comrade Eliava is prepared and has the necessary and numerous employees.

2) We are leaving Persia, militarily securing Anzali behind us. We enter into relations with the Tehran Shah government (with which we have not interrupted relations and are in correspondence until the last days), send our diplomatic mission to Tehran and conclude a friendly agreement with the Shah government, pursuing agitation and propaganda goals (renunciation of royal treaties, concessions, privileges and the return of looted lands and property).

An ambassador from the Shah's government is already on his way to us; he is on the road to Moscow, in Turkestan, and, apparently, has the task of establishing friendly relations with us on behalf of the frightened Shah government. Our embassy in Tehran would have as its task, on the one hand, the organization, formation and material support of the national-democratic anti-British elements, and on the other hand, the communists, and thus would be doing work calculated for a comparatively long period.

The Central Committee must decide which of the two paths to take. Politically, the first line is now necessary, for it has an immediate effect and strikes England with a blow which, in the event of a change in England's policy, will have the most beneficial effect on the mood of Lloyd George and Curzon and will prove that we are a serious and immediate danger to England and that we put our aggression in the East, in direct dependence on England's policy towards us: we answer blows with blows.

The solution of the problem depends entirely on our military resources. Moreover, our entry into Persia cannot be considered in isolation, it will be a continuation of the Polish-Wrangel front both in the sense that something will have to be snatched from there, and because success in Persia will determine the measure of pressure from England and Poland and its allies, and , thus, can alleviate our position on the Polish front.

In the event that the Central Committee approves the first path, it is necessary to create a commission from the Comintern, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the Central Committee of the RCP to develop a plan of action and develop appropriate instructions for Eliava 2 .

L. Karakhan.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. On. 2. D. 208. L. 1. Typewritten text, signature - autograph.

Notes:

On July 19, 1920, Kuchuk Khan resigned from the government and left Rasht. Established on July 31, 1920, the government of Eskhanollah Khan, largely under the influence of Soviet advisers, began to pursue a leftist policy that alienated wide sections of the local population: it requisitioned the property of small landowners, merchants, artisans, and campaigned against the Koran and the clergy. In one of the October (1920) telegrams to Stalin, Ordzhonikidze, in particular, reported: “ [...] [In] Persia there is no revolution. Or occupation or withdrawal [...]” (RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 12. D. 12. L. 1).

On September 20, 1920, the Plenum of the Central Committee decided: “Give a directive to the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to adhere to the second of the lines proposed by him, i.e., negotiations with the Shah’s government, ensuring Anzali against the British will certainly be behind us” (Izvestiya of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 3. P. 164).

No. 103

JV Stalin to the Presidium of the IX Party Conference

September 23 [1920]

Comrade Stalin's statement 1 .

Certain passages in yesterday's speeches by comrades Trotsky and Lenin 2 could give comrade comrades the conference a reason to suspect me of misrepresenting the facts. In the interest of truth, I must state the following:

1) Comrade Trotsky's statement that I portrayed the state of our fronts in a rosy light does not correspond to reality. I was, it seems, the only member of the Central Committee who ridiculed the current slogan about the "march on Warsaw" and openly warned comrades in the press against being carried away by successes, against underestimating the Polish forces. It is enough to read my articles in Pravda.

2) Comrade Trotsky's statement that my calculations about the capture of Lvov were not justified contradicts the facts. In mid-August, our troops approached Lvov at a distance of 8 versts and they probably would have taken Lvov, but they did not take it because the high command deliberately refused to take Lvov and at the moment when our troops were 8 versts from Lvov, the command transferred Budyonny from the Lvov region to the Zapfront for the latter's assistance. What does Stalin's calculations have to do with it?

3) Comrade Lenin's statement that I am partial to the Western Front, that the strategy did not fail the Central Committee, does not correspond to reality. No one denied that the Central Committee had a telegram from the command about the capture of Warsaw on August 16th. The point is not that Warsaw was not taken on August 16 - this is a small matter - but the point is that the Western Front was, it turns out, in front of a catastrophe due to the fatigue of the soldiers, due to the lack of rears, and the command did not know this, did not notice . If the command had warned the Central Committee about the actual state of the front, the Central Committee would doubtless have renounced the offensive war temporarily, as it is doing now. The fact that Warsaw was not taken on August 16 is, I repeat, a small matter, but the fact that this was followed by an unprecedented catastrophe, which took 100,000 prisoners and 200 guns from us, is already a big oversight by the command, which cannot be ignored. That is why I demanded in the Central Committee the appointment of a commission3 , which, having found out the causes of the disaster, would insure us against a new defeat. C. Lenin, apparently, spares the command, but I think that it is necessary to spare the cause, and not the command.

23/9

I. Stalin.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 5570. L. 2. Autograph.

Notes:

1 In a somewhat revised form, this statement of Stalin was delivered by him on the morning of September 23 at the third meeting of the IX Conference of the RCP(b). For the text of Stalin's speech, see: The Ninth Conference of the RCP(b). protocols. M., 1972. S. 82.

2We are talking about the speech of Lenin and Trotsky at the IX All-Russian Conference of the RCP (b) on September 22, 1920. Speaking with the political report of the Central Committee, Lenin, referring to the question of Poland, in particular, said: “Where is now to look for a mistake? Perhaps a political mistake, perhaps a strategic one [...] There may be a mistake in the answer to Curzon's note on April 12, when they were told simply, don't give a damn about the League of Nations, let's go ahead. It goes without saying that we defined with the wrong definition [...] The Central Committee itself is unreasonably worried that we made a mistake and were defeated. But we do not undertake to correct this mistake, to appoint a commission. We need to resolve issues of current policy [...]” (RTSKHIDNI, F. 44. On. 1. D. 2. L. 27-28, 31).

Speaking in the debate on the report of the Central Committee, Stalin reacted painfully to this remark. “We have before us,” he said, “at that time there were several facts. The first is Curzon's note [...] the second [...] is the growing revolutionary movement in England and Germany [...] the third fact is the advance of our troops on the Southwestern and Western fronts. Thus, the prospect opened before us from all sides that if we accepted Curzon's proposal, we would thereby risk giving a respite to Poland and the entire international bourgeoisie [...] Undoubtedly, the first thing the Central Committee had to do was to check the state of our fronts. The Central Committee sent requests, and in mid-August a telegram was received that we were taking Warsaw on August 16. This message, coming from competent and responsible persons, served as that extra weight, which outweighed the opinion of the Central Committee in the direction of continuing the offensive war [...] I must declare that in such a situation our Central Committee would not be a revolutionary Central Committee if it adopted other policy. When it turned out that the Komfront made a mistake in its assessment of the front, that a member of the Front's Revolutionary Military Council made a mistake, that the Central Committee was in some way let down by strategy, it is ridiculous to say that "if only beans grew in your mouth." Beans never grow in the mouth. Any other policy of the Central Committee would be reactionary. Therefore, I think that his logic was absolutely correct [...]” (Ninth Conference of the RCP(b). Protocols. M., 1972. P. 60-61). In his closing remarks, Lenin said that Stalin went over the edge and came to the defense of the military leadership (RTSKHIDNI. F. 44. On. 1. D. 2. L. 131).

In turn, Trotsky, in his final speech on the report on martial law, accused Stalin. “Regarding intelligence,” he began his speech, “it’s absolutely right that our intelligence is not brilliant, especially undercover intelligence. It is based on the enthusiasm and devotion of the most excellent Party workers, who provide excellent political information, but who provide us with extremely insufficient and, in a military sense, illiterate military information. We received much more information about the complete disintegration, about the general panic that nothing would come of the attempt to strengthen the army (See document No. the period when we were approaching Warsaw [...] Now another objection. I ask, did you know that the living forces of the Polish army were not defeated. Comrades, I will allow myself to say that I was more skeptical than many other comrades, because it was on this question that I should have dwelled more than others, that is, whether the military forces of the Polish White Army were defeated or not. On this occasion, I had conversations with Comrade Stalin, and I said that one cannot be complacent with all sorts of reports that the forces of the Polish army were defeated, because the forces of the Polish army were not defeated, since we have too few prisoners compared to our successes and too little we captured of materiel. Tov. Stalin said: “No, you are mistaken. We have fewer prisoners than one would expect in accordance with our successes, but the Polish soldiers are afraid to surrender, they scatter through the forests. Desertion in Poland takes on the character of a huge phenomenon that is disintegrating Poland, and this is the main reason for our victories. What am I supposed to say that Comrade Stalin let me down and the Central Committee. Tov. Stalin was a member of one of the two Revolutionary Military Councils that beat white Poland. Tov. Stalin made a mistake and introduced this mistake to the Central Committee, which also entered as the main fact for determining the policy of the Central Committee. Tov. Stalin at the same time says that the Revolutionary Military Council of the Western Front has failed the Central Committee. I say that this is the assessment of the Central Committee. Tov. Stalin presented the matter in such a way that we had an ideally correct line, but the command let us down, saying that Warsaw would be occupied on such and such a date. This is not true. The Central Committee would be an extremely frivolous institution if it determined its policy by the fact that those comrades who talked about when Warsaw would be taken let us down, because the data they had were the same as ours ”(Ninth Conference of the RCP (b) Protocols, Moscow, 1972, pp. 76-77).
3 See Document No. 100.

No. 104

Telegram from S. I. Gusev to L. D. Trotsky

October 20 [1920]

Moscow Predrevvoensovetresp Comrade Trotsky.

The Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front receives reports from the localities about the atrocities of the passing units of the 1st Cavalry, expressed in terrorizing the government, robberies, pogroms, lawless requisitions, etc. 1. In confirmation, I quote from the telegram of the Kremenchug Gubnachtyl dated October 15: “Passing units of the 2nd and 4th divisions of the 1st Cavalry, passing through the Cherkasy district, terrorize the authorities, rob and shoot residents and even the families of employees in the ranks of the Red Army, all cattle are stolen, mobilization of horses is arranged, the last horse is taken from the peasant. With a cry of "beat the Jews and communists" they rush through the villages and villages, there are dead and many wounded, including many Soviet workers. The families of Red Army Soviet workers, Volvoenkoms, Pre-revolutionary Committees, Komnezamozheys are completely plundered and beaten to a pulp. There are also facts of the murder and execution of Jewish Soviet workers. The authorities and the population flee in panic, hiding in the forests and fields. The results of the atrocities are already affecting those villages

To investigate this, the Cherkasy district appointed a commission of representatives of the military registration and enlistment office, the executive committee and the Workers 'and Peasants' Inspectorate.

The 20th of October.

Member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front GUSEV 2

RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 2435. L. 12. Certified typewritten copy.

Notes:

oneComplaints about the 1st Cavalry Army were received quite regularly. Their number was so great that on September 19, 1920, Minin, a member of the RVS of the 1st Cavalry Army, sent a kind of protest letter to the Central Committee, in which, in particular, he wrote: “Until the last day, a number of communist workers, sometimes very respectable and well-deserved, heavy accusations are being leveled against the First Cavalry Army: this is an army predominantly gangster, hooligan, anti-Semitic, anti-communist, etc., in this army, they say, it is extremely difficult for a communist to work, and the workers, very outstanding, but non-Russian nationalities, while in this army, definitely risk their heads [...] Nevertheless, it can be categorically stated that in the 1st Cavalry there are no more shortcomings than in any of the other armies [...] ”(RTsKHIDNI. F 2. On. 1. D. 15461. L. 2-3).

2 At the top of the telegram there is a note: “Copy to Comrade LENIN. Trotsky". At the end of the telegram there is a note: "Copy sent to Comrade Lenin."

No. 105

Telegram from L. D. Trotsky to L. B. Kamenev and V. I. Lenin

October 23 [1920]

TO COMRADE LV BORISOVICH KAMENEV.

COPY TO COMRADE LENIN.

Contrary to your assurances, the Revolutionary Military Council of the First Cavalry is unforgivably capricious and late . If possible, go to them for some serious pressure. The only way to avoid serious conflicts in the future, which could have a serious impact on deeds, is to make Budyonny and Voroshilov understand that the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and the Central Committee of the Party will not tolerate any disorganizing and independent actions .

October 23

Trotsky

RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. On. 1. D. 2435. L. 14. Typewritten text.

Notes:

1 In October 1920, the 1st Cavalry Army was transferred from the South-Western to the Southern Front. On October 15, 1920, Front Commander Frunze ordered the troops of the front to prepare for an offensive and concentrate units in specific areas (From the history of the civil war in the USSR, vol. 3, pp. 410-411). The 1st Cavalry Army did not comply with the instructions and did not arrive in the designated area.

2On October 24, 1920, Lenin sent a telegram to the Revolutionary Military Council of the 1st Cavalry Army, in which he demanded "to apply the most heroic measures to accelerate the concentration of the 1st Cavalry" (Lenin V.I. PSS. T. 51. S. 315). On October 25, 1920, L. B. Kamenev telegraphed Lenin and Trotsky: “Your telegrams 973 and 977 have been received. All measures to accelerate the concentration of the 1st Cavalry will be taken. Together with Budyonny, Apostolovo arrived, where in a few hours a meeting will be held with the Komandyuzh and Komandarms 2 and 6 to work out final measures so as not to miss the enemy. If I find the conference useful, I will return to the 1st Konnaya to personally be present at the crossing. Apostolovo. 25/10 - 20" (From the history of the civil war in the USSR. T. 3. S. 418). From further correspondence it follows that after the October 26, 1920 meeting of army commanders, Kamenev returned to Moscow "because of the futility of further stay." On October 26, 1920, Budyonny and Voroshilov telegraphed Lenin and Trotsky about the adoption of emergency measures to speed up the concentration of the Cavalry (Ibid., p. 421).

No. 106

I. V. Kosior — G. K. Ordzhonikidze

November 13 [1920]

November 13

Grozny

Report

I present information by 10 pm on November 13 on the status of work on the eviction of the Cossacks from the villages of Yermolovskaya, Akan-Yurtovskaya, Samashinskaya, Mikhailovskaya and Kalinovskaya 1 :

1) Yermolovskaya - cleared of residents, work on collecting food is coming to an end.

2) Akan - Yurtovskaya - 1600 people were evicted, 1661 people remain for eviction.

3) Samashinskaya - 1018 people were evicted, 1900 people remain to be evicted.

4) Mikhailovskaya - 600 people were evicted, 2200 people remain to be evicted.

5) Kalinovskaya - evicted and handed over to receivers from the Terek Regional Land Survey Department.

In addition, 154 wagons of food were transported from the villages of Yermolovskaya, Akan-Yurt, Samashinskaya and Mikhailovskaya to Oprodkomarm in Grozny.

Work on the collection and export of food will continue for about 10 more days.

From the three villages where the eviction has not yet been completely completed, the families of the malicious white-greens and those who took part in the last uprising were evicted. Those who have not been evicted still make up a part of the population who are sympathetic to Soviet power: non-residents, families of Red Army soldiers, Soviet employees and communists.

The slow eviction is explained, as has already been indicated in the reports, by the poor supply of empty stock, which is supplied in the amount of one echelon per day 2 .

To date, 306 more wagons are required to evict people.

Commander of the Caucasian Labor [army] I. Kosior.

RTSKHIDNI. F.85. 0p. 11. D. 123. L. 15. Typewritten copy.

Notes:

oneIn order to attract the mountain population of the Caucasus to the side of the Soviet government, the Caucasus Bureau in mid-September 1920 decided to allocate the mountaineers with land that belonged to the Cossacks. On October 6, 1920, Ordzhonikidze, in a direct conversation with a member of the Kavburo Mirzabekyan, in particular, reported: “[...] the Politburo of the CEC approved the resolution of the Kavburo on allocating land to the highlanders, without stopping [before] evicting the villages. You will officially bring this to the attention of the regional committee, and [it is necessary] to immediately take appropriate measures to implement our decisions [...]” (RTsKhIDNI. F. 85. Op. 11. D. 131. L. 2). In the early days of October 1920, an uprising began in a number of villages of the Terek Cossacks. On October 23, 1920, the acting commander of the Caucasian Labor Army, Medvedev, issued an order, which, in particular, stated: “[... ] Despite the extremely great peacefulness shown by the Soviet Power in relation to the Cossacks, who stained themselves with a bloody struggle with the worker-peasant power, the Cossacks of the Teroblast - Terek and Sunzha lines repeatedly staged uprisings against the Soviet authorities, treacherously attacking separate parts of the Red [th] army , shelling passenger trains, spoiling the railway, bridges, etc. Suppressing these uprisings with an armed hand, the representatives of the Soviet power on the Terek were very humane even in relation to the rebel villages. The events of recent days - the uprising of the villages of Kalinovskaya on the Terek, Yermolovskaya, Zakan-Yurt (Romanovskaya), Samashkinskaya and Mikhailovskaya on the Sunzha - overflowed the cup of peace-loving long-suffering of the Soviet authorities. Member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian Front comrade. Ordzhonikidze ORDERED: first: to burn the village of Kalinovskaya; second: the village of Ermolovskaya, Zakan-Yurt (Romanovskaya), Samashkinskaya and Mikhailovskaya should be given to the poorest landless population and, first of all, to the mountain Chechens who were always devoted to the Soviet power, for which: the entire male population of the above villages from 18 to 50 years old should be loaded into trains and sent under escort to the North for heavy forced labor; old people, women and children to be evicted from the villages, allowing them to move to farms or villages in the North; horses, cows, sheep and other livestock, as well as suitable for the military. for the purpose of transferring the property to the Caucasian Labor Army - to its relevant bodies, and to distribute the horses according to the instructions of the Staff [...] ”(Ibid. L. 11). In a telegram to Lenin dated October 26, 1920, Stalin reported: “[...] Several Cossack villages were punished approximately [...] There is no doubt that the Kavburo and Ordzhonikidze led our line skillfully, connected the highlanders with the Soviet government, and the highlanders themselves satisfactorily passed the exam [...]” (Leninsky collection, vol. XXXIV, p. 373). On November 1, 1920, Vrachev, telegraphing Ordzhonikidze and Stalin that the eviction of the villages was proceeding successfully, reported: “[...] Today I had a meeting with Chechens - representatives of auls. The mood of the Chechens is excellent, they are happy to infinity and declare that our act is a great historical event for them. It would be highly desirable, after the Chechens have settled in, to convene a congress [with] your presence” (RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 11. D 123. L. 1-3).

2 In addition to the shortage of wagons, Kosior in a telegram to Ordzhonikidze of November 5, 1920, also mentioned the lack of accurate data on the evicted people and the need, in connection with this, to carry out a household census as the reasons for the slowdown in the eviction of the villages. In addition, he complained about the lack of the required number of people: “[...] to carry out the tasks assigned to me (defense of the site and fight against gangs, protection of the evicted villages from Chechen robberies and raids of bandits, eviction of the villages) [...] I I don’t even have half of the people I need for the most modest needs [...]”

3 (Ibid. L. 4-5). In a telegram dated November 6, 1920, Kosior informed Ordzhonikidze that the command of the Caucasian Front forbade the removal of those resettled by rail and that he had received an order to send them by horse-drawn transport. “[...] About 9 thousand are subject to eviction,” he wrote, “of which over one and a half thousand families are counter-revolutionary and about a thousand Soviet. If all this is evicted in marching order, it will take a very long time, since the carts are stolen by units and the horses are taken by bands. In addition, there is no escort, and while following, the evacuees will be attacked [...]” (Ibid. L. 6-7).

No. 107

Telegram to G. K. Ordzhonikidze to I. V. Stalin

November 22 [1920]

Stalin.

The radio cannot be received before morning, the Moscow-Tashkent work interferes.

From the words of Kasyan, Bekzadyan, Nuridzhanyan, I report the following: during the advance of the Turks on Alexandropol 1 , the Dashnaks left the city, our comrades who remained [in] the city released the arrested comrades from prison and organized the Revolutionary Committee, issued an appeal. The detachment of Sepuh (Dashnak), having learned about this, moved and again occupied Alexandropol. The revolutionary committee, having no military force, with red banners moved towards the Kemalists, who were 20 versts away.

There is almost no army. The Dashnaks admit that their agitation about the Bolshevik-Kemalist alliance caused the mood not to fight against Kemal, since he is an ally of the Bolsheviks. split among all parties. Menshevik-internationalists openly [in] the press are in favor of Soviet power. On the border of Kazakh, Armenian units come up in masses even [with] officers and ask how they should be. There is no massacre in the area of Turkish occupation. Venizelos resigned, replaced by Gunaris 2 . In Athens, the communists staged a big demonstration. We all think that it is no longer possible to delay, we will wait until the morning 3 .

22/XI

RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 14. D. 30. L. 2-3. Autograph.

Notes:

1 In order to use the Turkish troops in the Sovietization of Armenia, the Caucasus Bureau conducted secret negotiations with the leader of the Turkish national liberation movement, Kemal. For possible assistance, he was promised military assistance against the British occupying forces. After the Sevres (1920) peace treaty, which was humiliating for Turkey, a number of territories of Turkey were ceded to Armenia, in June 1920 the troops of Turkey and Armenia converged on the border. On October 30, 1920, Turkish troops occupied Kars, launched an attack on Alexandropol and soon launched an attack on Erivan. “[...] If Alexandropol is taken,” Stalin informed Chicherin on November 8, 1920, “I consider the most likely combination of maximum demands [...] in any case, we will have to act according to the situation. It all depends what position will the Turks take in connection with the negotiations with the Entente [...]” (RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 1992. L. 1-7). “[...] We consider it absolutely necessary,” Stalin and Ordzhonikidze telegraphed to Lenin and Chicherin on the same day, “the immediate dispatch of authorized persons to Turkey to Kemal with the aim of reconnaissance and informing Moscow as a matter of urgency [...]” (Ibid. D. 5575. L. 1-11). Armenia's appeal to the Western powers for help was not crowned with success. On November 13, 1920, in response to a request for mediation in negotiations with Turkey, addressed to Soviet Russia, the Armenian government received a telegram from Chicherin with a notice of consent and sending for this purpose to the Mdivani combat area (the Great October Socialist Revolution and the victory of Soviet power in Armenia. S. 422). In a telegram to Lenin dated November 15, 1920, Stalin,

2 We are talking about the change of heads of government of Greece. On November 4, 1920, Venizelos (Liberal Party) was replaced by Rallis (People's Party). Gunaris, also one of the leaders of the People's Party, became head of government only in March 1921. Ordzhonikidze raised this topic in connection with the events of the Greco-Turkish war waged by the government of Venizelos and opposed by Gunaris. In the struggle against the war, the People's Party at that time was supported by the Communist Party of Greece.

3 We are talking about the proposed entry of Soviet troops into the territory of Armenia.

No. 108

Telegram to G. K. Ordzhonikidze V. I. Lenin, I. V. Stalin

November 29, 1920

Moscow - the Kremlin to Lenin. Stalin.

Baku 29/XI 20 14:00 30 minutes.

The decision of the Central Committee has just received 1 . The Armenian Revolutionary Committee, sent to the Kazakh region for preparatory work, having received a lot of sentences from the peasants of the Caravan Saray region, Dilijan, indicating that there was no power, the army fled, asking them to come, crossed the border on their own at night and continues to move to Delizhan, where the Soviet Union will probably be proclaimed. Armenia. In connection with [the] decision of the Central Committee, I don't know what to do, I'm afraid that Soviet power has already been declared 2 . I think that everything will pass without much difficulty 3 .

Ordzhonikidze.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 14. D. 33. L. 2. Autograph.

Notes:

On November 27, 1920, the Politburo adopted a resolution on the report of Stalin, the draft of which was prepared by Lenin. In particular, it said: “[...] Adopt the most conciliatory policy towards Georgia, Armenia, Turkey and Persia, i.e., aimed more at avoiding war. Do not set as your task a campaign either against Georgia, or against Armenia, or against Persia. The main task is to recognize the protection of Azerbaijan and the firm possession of the entire Caspian Sea [...]”. Ordzhonikidze was ordered to stay in Baku and take over the political leadership of the Azrevkom. Stalin was charged with the duty to negotiate with Chicherin and Ordzhonikidze on appropriate adjustments in foreign policy in the states bordering on the Caucasus (Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU, 1991, No. 8, p. 161).

2Relying on the support of Stalin in Moscow, Ordzhonikidze took the initiative in the forceful sovietization of Armenia. Simultaneously with the Armenian Revolutionary Committee formed by him, an “Armenian” regiment from units of the 11th Army was sent to Armenia. On November 29, 1920, having learned from Legrand's telegram about the capture of Caravanserai by the regiment, Ordzhonikidze telegraphed Legrand and Mdivani about the need to intensify negotiations with a group of Dashnaks who agreed to the Sovietization of the country if they were included in the Revolutionary Committee (RTsKhIDNI. F. 85. Op. 14. D. 33. L. 3). On the same day, in a conversation with a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian Front, Trifonov, Ordzhonikidze announced the advancement of the "Armenian" regiment and asked to take into account that there would be no information about the regiment in the official reports. Having also informed about the presence of the Revolutionary Committee in Alexandropol, Ordzhonikidze ended the conversation quite definitely: “[...

3 The phrase crossed out by Ordzhonikidze is highlighted.

No. 109

Recording of a direct wire conversation between A. M. Nazaretyan and G. K. Ordzhonikidze

[not earlier than November 30, 1920]

Rostov-on-Don.

At the apparatus of Comrade. Nazareth. Hello Sergo. I look forward to hearing from you the latest information. [With] your telegram Lenin read today 1 . On behalf of the Caucasian Bureau, you have been sent a welcome telegram to be forwarded to the Revolutionary Committee of Armenia.

Baku.

Hello. Today we had no connection with the Revolutionary Committee, we hope to get it in a while. Tonight, the general situation was as follows: the peasants of the Caravan Saray region and Delizhan [in] uprising, the Revolutionary Committee should be in Delizhan today or moved forward. So far, the case has been going on without a single shot being fired. In Erivan now the government of Dro 2 , which, as if, according to Legrand, is not averse to declaring Soviet power, but at the same time, for some reason, delays. I think he's cheating Legrand. Today [in] Baku there was a solemn meeting of the Council, at which Narimanov read the declaration of the Azerbaijani government 3with an indication that there are no more borders between Soviet Armenia and Azerbaijan, that from now on Zangezur and Nakhichevan are an integral part of Soviet Armenia. The Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh have the right to self-determination. The wealth of Azerbaijan - oil and kerosene - is the state of both union republics. The meeting passed with great enthusiasm. The same outfit of the Red Army and workers' rallies. Tomorrow the second group of comrades is leaving, carrying kerosene, textiles, etc. Spread all this properly in the newspapers.

Rostov-on-Don.

Bravo, Azerbaijanis. Let's start screaming [in] the press. Tomorrow I am convening a small meeting of communist-Armenians, where I will propose to immediately register all Armenian communists with experience in Soviet construction, and I will begin to send groups at your disposal. [In] case of need we will announce mobilization. I just spoke to Kirov, to whom I pass on all your messages, he is at the apparatus, complaining about the extremely acute situation [with] the supply of food to the arriving military units and the local garrison, they are now having a food meeting. The food commissar is working under arrest, the food apparatus is tightening up, but he considers the crisis inevitable, he asks to speak with Belenky and Frumkin, to make an order on the supply and procurement of the Svyatokrestovsky district. Frumkin is in Moscow now and will return in a week. Kirov says, that it is not calm [in] Chechnya, he asks to ask in Fronze * if you know anything. I have no more questions. Thanks for the news.

Baku.

The mobilization of communist Armenians must be carried out urgently. Second. Are you thinking of going to the Congress of Soviets? 4 If the situation does not interfere, I think to go. We agreed [with] the Stavropol, Kuban and we will all go together. No more questions, all the best. Hello Beloborodov.

Rostov-on-Don.

I really want to go to the congress, because I have not seen a single congress in three years. You guessed correctly, Petrenko was here, I told him that the Stavropol team would put you out. They willingly do it. I will agree with the Kuban people about myself, but the trouble is that Beloborodov must definitely go, Ilyich obliged him. Thus [in] Rostov there will be no one left. If Stasova had come , 5 it would have been easy to do one way or another. Let's make arrangements to go to the convention together. For now, nothing more. Goodbye.

Baku.

I will have a mandate from the people of Baku and from the army, so the Stavropol mandate will have to be abandoned. All the best, goodbye.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 14. D. 37. L. 1-2. Ticker-tape.

Notes:

1 In all likelihood, this is a telegram from Ordzhonikidze to Lenin and Stalin dated November 29, 1920 (See Document No. 108).

2 This refers to the government formed by a group of Dashnaks, which agreed to the Sovietization of the country on the condition that the Dashnaks were given seats in the Revolutionary Committee, and subsequently in the new Soviet government (RTsKhIDNI. F. 85. Op. 14. D. 31. L. 1).

3 For the declaration of the government of Azerbaijan in connection with the establishment of Soviet power in Armenia, see: The Great October Socialist Revolution and the Victory of Soviet Power in Armenia. S. 437.

4 VIII All-Russian Congress of Soviets was held in Moscow from December 22 to 29, 1920.

On November 27, 1920, the Politburo decided to satisfy the request of the Caucasus Bureau to transfer Stasova to Rostov-on-Don (RTsKhIDNI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 125. L. 2).

No. 110

Report on direct wire G. K. Ordzhonikidze to I. V. Stalin, V. I. Lenin, G. V. Chicherin

December 4, 1920

Moscow Kremlin 1 .

Hello Nadia 2 . Please convey the following to Stalin, Ilyich and Chicherin at once. Events in Armenia proceed without any complications. The Revolutionary Committee of Armenia is due to arrive [in] Erivan today. The population of Erivan enthusiastically greeted the proclamation of the Soviet power 3 . The entire army recognized the coup. Legrand insists on the introduction of Dro and Terteryan into the Revolutionary Committee. The Turks are very distrustful [of] the Armenian communists. The question of bringing Dro and Terteryan [to] the Revolutionary Committee will be decided upon the arrival of Kasyan in Erivan. It is possible that we will have to abandon the well-known solution 4 . We are already occupying Karaklis. On the 2nd of Khatisov signed a peace treaty with the Turks, I am giving you a copy now 5. From the message of Mdivani, which will also be transmitted immediately, it is clear to me that the Turks will climb Batum . Yesterday Alshibay came to see me, terribly alarmed, whom I reassured, although he hardly believed me. It is necessary to drive the Communist Armenians out of Moscow with might and main. Send Ter-Gabrielyan immediately. The Tiflis press states the failure of negotiations between Constantinople and Angora 7 . The legalization of the Communist Party in Angora is symptomatic.

Ordzhonikidze 8 .

RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 14. D. 33. L. 22-23. handwritten text; F. 2. On. 1. D. 16404. L. 1. Typewritten text.

Notes:

1 On December 2, 1920, Ordzhonikidze received a telegram from Legrand, Plenipotentiary of the RSFSR in Armenia, informing him of the declaration of Soviet power in Armenia. Legrand also reported: “... The security of the commanding staff of the army (Armenian - Comp.) is also guaranteed to the Dashnaks, [with] the exception of those directly responsible [for] the policy of the Ohanjanyan ministry. I issued an order [about] their arrest. The headquarters of our division is located [in] Delizhan. On behalf of the Russian Soviet government, I have announced: Russia recognizes unconditionally [in] the territory of the Soviet of Armenia the Erivan province, part of the Kars region, providing [in] military terms and the railroad line passing through Alexandropol to Erivan and Kazakh Karakis, Zangezur district, part of the Kazakh limit before agreement on August 10, and those parts of Tiflis, which were possessed by Armenia before the start of the Turkish offensive. The order [on] the release of the communists has been issued and is being carried out [in] execution. In case of hostile actions of the Turks, it is necessary to have sufficient military forces closer, is this taken into account [...] ”(RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 14. D. 33. L. 16).

2 Nadezhda Alliluyeva, on call.

3 of the Declaration of the Revolutionary Committee of Armenia on the proclamation of Armenia as a socialist Soviet Republic was promulgated on November 29, 1920 (The Great October Socialist Revolution and the Victory of Soviet Power in Armenia, pp. 431-434).

4 See note 2 to document No. 109.

5 Peace treaty concluded in Alexandropol by the Dashnak government of Armenia with Turkey on December 2, 1920 (The Great October Socialist Revolution and the victory of Soviet power in Armenia, pp. 438-441).

6 In a telegram to Sheinman, Plenipotentiary of the RSFSR in Georgia, dated December 10, 1920, Chicherin wrote: “[...] the transfer of Batum into the hands of the Turks is unacceptable. We must not leave our line of friendly policy towards the Kemalists, while at the same time keeping them from actions that are undesirable for us [...]” (Documents of Foreign Policy of the USSR, vol. 3, p. 374).

7 In Ankara (Angora) in April 1920 a revolutionary government (the Grand National Assembly of Turkey) was organized. In Istanbul (Constantinople near Ordzhonikidze) was the official government of Turkey.

8 Lenin's note on the note: "To the archive."

No. 111

Telegram from A. L. Sheinman to G. V. Chicherin, I. V. Stalin, G. K. Ordzhonikidze

December 6, 1920

Moscow.

Narkomindel Comrade Chicherin,

copy to Comrade Stalin.

Baku Comrade Ordzhonikidze.

Tiflis, December 6, 1920

The Georgian government, in connection with the Sovietization of Armenia, either came to an agreement with the Entente, or fell into a panic.

In any case, the attitude of the Georgian government towards us has changed dramatically.

One of my best employees has been arrested for several days now. Informed of this, Chicherin proposed arresting the employees of Makharadze 1 in Moscow. I agreed. [About] further I do not know.

Last night employees and secretaries of local communist newspapers were arrested. Last night, the Georgian police surrounded Legrand's train standing on the tracks, which could not proceed to Erivan due to damage to the track. The train is still under arrest, and entry into the cars, exit from them and the transition from one to another is prohibited. I consider it necessary to immediately, under some pretext, suspend the export of oil products to Georgia.

Second. - In Erivan, the staff of the Georgian embassy was arrested under house arrest.

Third. Arrest someone [from] the employees of the Georgian embassy [in] Baku.

Informing [about] the above to Chicherin, I propose that he present an ultimatum from our side with the demand: first, the immediate transfer of the entire Wrangel fleet to us.

The second is the immediate restoration of the railway line and communication with Armenia.

Third, the immediate release of the administratively arrested communists.

Fourth, an absolute cessation of their repressions against our employees, in addition, an ultimatum from Soviet Armenia [with] the demand to immediately leave the neutral zone occupied by Georgia in the Borchali district and the withdrawal of Georgian troops from Ardagan 2 .

Chicherin's decision [to] a large extent depends on your conclusion, which I ask you to tell me how the operation is going in the Zakatala district 3 . Confirm receipt.

Sheinman.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 17. D. 17. L. 6-10. Handwritten text, transcription.

Notes:

1 This refers to G. Makharadze, who at that time was the official representative of the Georgian government in Moscow.

2 The neutral zone in the Borchali district, disputed between Armenia and Georgia, was formed in accordance with the decision of the conference in Tiflis in January 1919 after the Armenian-Georgian conflict. In connection with the Turkish offensive against Armenia, Georgia sent its troops into the neutral zone and occupied the border Ardagan.

3 We are talking about the introduction of Soviet troops into the Zagatala region in order to create a springboard for the further Sovietization of Georgia. The proposal to send troops to this area was made by Stalin to Lenin in a telegram from Vladikavkaz dated November 16 or 17, 1920. Stalin suggested "[...] concentrate his troops in Zakatala and, using a convenient excuse, move around [to] Tiflis [ ...]" (RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. Op. 2. D. 25. L. 1-2).

No. 112

Telegram of G. K. Ordzhonikidze to I. V. Stalin

December 8, 1920

Moscow - the Kremlin, Stalin.

Baku, 8/XII-20

Georgians do not give transit for Armenia 1 and the last days have become terribly insolent. In my opinion, the question [about] Georgia in general is in the near future, moreover, then it will require more strength and more sacrifices. Is it impossible to guess. Sergo.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 15. D. 64. L. 1. Autograph.

Notes:

1 . We are talking about the transit of food, goods and weapons for Armenia through the territory of Georgia.

No. 113

Telegram to G. K. Ordzhonikidze to I. V. Stalin

[December 9, 1920]

Moscow Kremlin,

Stalin.

The grouping [of troops] on the Georgian border ends tomorrow. It is impossible to keep troops in such a state. Either we have to withdraw parts, or move, or rather guess. [In] the latter case, I hope we can handle it. Yours and Ilyich's opinion. I repeat that the Turks will drag us into this story anyway .

Sergo.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 15. D. 64. L. 3. Autograph.

Notes:

1 . We are talking about using the Georgian-Turkish military confrontation in the border areas for the Sovietization of Georgia. In a telegram from Transcaucasia to Chicherin and Lenin dated November 20, 1920, Stalin, reflecting on the options for the Sovietization of Georgia, wrote: “... In my opinion, one of the best combinations is a successful war between Turkey and Georgia, which will give Russia the opportunity to intervene as an intermediary and deliverer [...]” (RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 5584. L. 1).

No. 114

Telegram G. K. Ordzhonikidze V. I. Lenin, I. V. Stalin

December 12, 1920

Moscow Kremlin,

Lenin, Stalin.

Baku, 12/XII-20

Georgia, with the help of the Entente, undoubtedly set out to provoke the mountaineers to an uprising: they throw gold, manufactory, military units, a large number of Georgian and mountaineer officers into the mountains, thanks to which the situation in Dagestan is somewhat complicated. The Georgians are grouping their forces in the region of Lagodekhi, from where the counter-revolution in Dagestan 1 feeds and everything possible is done to start an uprising in the Transcaucasian district. Everything, apparently, is based on the fact that the suppression of the uprising on our part will cause a howl among the Muslims and thereby scare the Kemalists away from us. It should be noted that the suppression of the Ganja uprising was very cleverly used in Anatolia, this was also discussed in the national assembly 2. The situation in Georgia itself is such that without much difficulty we will put an end to it: uprisings [in] Borchali district, Abkhazia, Adzharia, Dusheti district will be carried out 3 . Once again I bring all this to your attention and ask for instructions. Ordzhonikidze.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 15. D. 65. L. 1-2. Autograph.

Notes:

1 We are talking about an uprising against Soviet power in Nagorno-Dagestan in September 1920 - May 1921. The uprising took place under the slogans of pan-Islamism, the liquidation of the Soviet autonomy of Dagestan and the establishment of a Sharia monarchy. Among the organizers of the uprising were members of the Gorsky and Terek-Dagestan governments that existed from November 1917 to September 1920. Among the rank-and-file participants in the uprising, the majority were dissatisfied with the Bolshevik policy of the surplus appraisal. The total number of participants in the uprising in the spring of 1921 was about 9.5 thousand people. The uprising was suppressed mainly by the forces of the 10th Terek-Dagestan Army in May 1921.

2 Anti-Soviet uprising in Ganja (Azerbaijan) in May 1920. Turkish officers took part in its organization. The overwhelming majority of the rebels were Muslims. Harsh measures to suppress the uprising were discussed in the Kemal government in the context of Soviet policy towards Muslims.

3 We are talking about preparing uprisings against the Georgian government.

No. 115

Telegram G. K. Ordzhonikidze V. I. Lenin

December 15, 1920

Moscow Kremlin

Lenin.

Baku, 15/XII-20

A meeting of the Caucasian Bureau consisting of Stasova, Narimanov, Mdivani, Ordzhonikidze in the presence of Eliava, Legrand, Stark, Dumbadze, Okudzhava, Commander Gekker and Mikhailov, a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 11th Army, unanimously decided to cross the border of Georgia at dawn. All prepared 1 . Ordzhonikidze.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 15. D. 66. L. 1. Autograph.

Notes:

On December 17, 1920, the Plenum of the Central Committee in its decision noted: "To confirm the decision of the Central Committee on the peaceful direction of the policy of the RSFSR in the Caucasus and to demand from the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the military department to take all measures that could ensure the success of this policy" (RTsKHIDNI. F. 17. Inventory 2. D. 46. L. 3).
Источник: https://leninism.su/revolution-and-civil-war/4197-bolshevistskoe-rukovodstvo-perepiska-19121927.html?start=5