Bolshevik Leaders correspondence

Bolshevik leadership Correspondence. 1912-1927
Collection of documents 1996.
Compiled by: A.V.Kvashonkin, L.P.Kosheleva, L.A.Rogovaya, O.V.Khlevnyuk.

No. 84

Telegram of L. D. Trotsky to I. V. Stalin, V. I. Lenin, S. S. Kamenev

July 3, 1920

ON A DIRECT WIRE.

TO STALIN, copy TO LENIN, copy TO Glavkom 1 .

The scoundrel Lloyd George again spoke of the inviolability of Wrangel's Crimean refuge. It is quite obvious that the only way out of the situation is such a crushing onslaught, in which we will break into the Crimea on the shoulders of Wrangel without stopping and immediately spread along the Crimean coast with serious artillery in our hands. In the event of an attempt by the British to bombard the cities, it is necessary to sink at least one ship. The whole task is to prepare and ensure the continuity of our onslaught to Sevastopol. Now that things are going well on the Polish front , we can, without weakening the Polish front, temporarily concentrate our attention and forces on carrying out the operation against Wrangel. Please let me know your thoughts. July 3, 20

Pre-revolutionary military council TROTSKY.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. On. 1. D. 2433. L. 88. Typewritten text.

Notes:

1 In the upper left corner - a note: "Sklyansky"; over the text - Sklyansky's autograph: "Sk".

2 We are talking about the Southwestern Front, whose troops in the summer and autumn of 1920 operated in two strategic directions - the western (against Poland) and the Crimean (against Wrangel). In the western direction, after the Kyiv operation successfully carried out in May-June 1920, the troops of the front went on the offensive, inflicted a number of defeats on the Polish troops and reached Lublin and Lvov in August.

No. 85

G. V. Chicherin to N. N. Krestinsky

July 5, 1920

July 5 20

Tov. Krestinsky.

Copy.

Dear comrade,

It is extremely necessary to urgently raise the question of our representation in Persia in the Central Committee of the Party. Tov. Raskolnikov 1indicates that at the head of the Persian Soviet movement are people who are absolutely deprived of any experience in practical political life. It is imperative that they have with them comrades with political experience, capable of giving them all the necessary instructions. Mirza Kuchuk himself is accustomed to partisan life and his worldview does not extend further, but he accepts the advice of more experienced comrades, especially those representing Soviet Russia, with the greatest willingness and readiness. He carried out everything that Raskolnikov told him with the greatest accuracy. After the departure of the latter, there was no one left in Persia who could play this role. Not even real political experts. Tov. Raskolnikov recommends that Comrade. Mdivani, whom comrade Stalin warmly recommended on other occasions. He does not have a global political outlook, he is a Caucasian figure, but he knows the Middle East perfectly and, in the opinion of Comrade. Raskolnikov, for this role, he is perfect. With him as an expert or adviser, we would propose to send comrade. Broido. The latter's explanations showed that the accusations directed against him by us should have been directed against the Turkcommission itself. His personal qualities are not such that he could be entrusted with an uncontrolled responsible role, but if there is Comrade in Persia. Mdivani, then with him the remarkable knowledge and abilities of comrade. Broido [could] be used to great advantage With him as an expert or adviser, we would propose to send comrade. Broido. The latter's explanations showed that the accusations directed against him by us should have been directed against the Turkcommission itself. His personal qualities are not such that he could be entrusted with an uncontrolled responsible role, but if there is Comrade in Persia. Mdivani, then with him the remarkable knowledge and abilities of comrade. Broido [could] be used to great advantage With him as an expert or adviser, we would propose to send comrade. Broido. The latter's explanations showed that the accusations directed against him by us should have been directed against the Turkcommission itself. His personal qualities are not such that he could be entrusted with an uncontrolled responsible role, but if there is Comrade in Persia. Mdivani, then with him the remarkable knowledge and abilities of comrade. Broido [could] be used to great advantage2 .

In addition, there must be a person on our territory in charge of unofficial assistance to the Persian Soviet movement. Officially, our troops and fleet have been withdrawn from Persia and we cannot officially provide any assistance to the Persian movement. But volunteers are sent there privately and weapons are sent in private trade .and the independent Republic of Azerbaijan is also free in its relations with the Persian movement. There must be a certain person directing these unofficial actions, giving instructions to the Azerbaijani volunteers, etc. The head of our naval forces in the Caspian Sea cannot be such a person. The Commander of the Naval Forces of the Republic has already made a report to the Commander-in-Chief in the sense of eliminating the relevant points from the instruction to the Chief of our Naval Forces in the Caspian Sea. So, for these tasks there must be a special person. The Caspian fleet will not be subordinated to him; but since it will be a question of policy towards Persia, this person will also give directives to the Caspian fleet. Comorsi 4by agreement with Com. Raskolnikov recommends for this role comrade. Ordzhonikidze. Indeed, there is currently no more suitable one in the Caucasus 5 .

On all points it is urgent to obtain the decision of the Central Committee.

With communist greetings Chicherin

RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 314. L. 15-16. Typewritten text. The signature is an autograph.

Notes:

1 In May - June 1920, Raskolnikov, as commander of the Volga-Caspian military flotilla, took part in hostilities in Iran.

On July 7, 1920, the Politburo decided: “To instruct the Orgburo to consider the issue of appointing Comrade Mdivani to the post of diplomatic representative to Persia or replacing him with another candidate. Tov. Leave Broido in Moscow to work [...] on training workers for Turkestan” (RTSKHIDNI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 94. L. 1). On July 18, 1920, a telegram from Mirza Kuchuk was addressed to Lenin: “The revolution in Persia needs experienced and devoted revolutionaries. It is also necessary to know the peculiarities of Persia [...] I ask you to send comrades for work as far as possible, and, first of all, I ask you to send Commissar Commissar from Baku. Mdivani [...] he was here recently, we understood each other very well [...]” (Ibid. Op. 112. D. 53. L. 42). The Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee granted this request (Ibid. L. 5).

3 The amount of this assistance can be judged from Ordzhonikidze’s telegram to Deputy Chairman of the RVSR Sklyansky dated July 9, 1920: “[...] I report: for the maintenance of troops in Persia and party work, the monthly need of 500,000 fogs is equal to 1,200,000 Russian gold currency. I ask for 10 million gold currency for six months [...]” (Ibid. Op. 109. D. 15. L. 79).

4 Commander of the naval forces of the Republic.

On July 7, 1920, the Politburo decided to entrust Ordzhonikidze with providing assistance to the “new Persian government” (Ibid. Op. 3. D. 94. L. 1).

No. 86

Telegram from J. V. Stalin to V. I. Lenin

July 13, 1920

Moscow — Kremlin, Lenin 1

The Polish armies are completely falling apart, the Poles have lost communications, control, Polish orders, instead of getting to the address, more and more often fall into our hands, in a word, the Poles are experiencing a collapse from which they will not soon recover. This circumstance is obviously well known to Curzon, who is now trying to save the Poles with his proposal for an armistice .. The same circumstance should explain the proposal about Wrangel, for with the defeat of Poland, Wrangel loses its importance, and the British lose the Crimea. You are absolutely right when you say that they want to wrest victory from our hands. I propose: first, in a reply note about Poland, do not give a definite answer, emphasize in general terms the peacefulness of Russia and say that if Poland really wants peace, she could appeal to Russia directly. This gives a gain in time. Secondly, about Wrangel, it is necessary, firstly, to emphasize that Curzon's mediation between Wrangel and the Soviet [Russian] government, once already taking place, did not justify itself, and secondly, to point out that the Crimea has not yet been torn away from Russia, and Wrangel is Russian general,with which Russia itself can establish this or that mode, just as it generally arranges its internal affairs on its own 3 , that all internal issues, including the Crimean issue, Russia will resolve independently 4 . I think that imperialism has never been as weak as it is now, at the moment of the defeat of Poland, and we have never been as strong as we are now, therefore, the firmer we behave, the better it will be both for Russia and for the international revolution. Report Politburo decision 5 .

Stalin 6

RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 1815. L. 2-5. Autograph.

Notes:

oneThe telegram was sent from Kharkov (headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southwestern Front) to Moscow and is a response to Lenin's telegram sent to Stalin on July 12 or 13, 1920: “[...] A note has been received from Curzon. Curzon proposes an armistice with Poland on the condition that the Polish army withdraw behind the line assigned to it by the peace conference last year [...] Everything to the east remains with us. Our army must withdraw 50 kilometers east of this line. A conference of representatives of Soviet Russia, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland will be held in London [...] Representatives of Eastern Galicia will be admitted there [...] We are invited to conclude a truce with Wrangel under the condition of Wrangel's removal to the Crimea. Wrangel goes to London to discuss the fate of his army, but not as a member of the conference. We are given a week to respond [...] I ask Stalin: 1) speed up the order for a frenzied intensification of the offensive; 2) inform me of his, Stalin's, opinion. I personally think that this is a complete scam for the sake of annexing Crimea [...]” (Lenin V.I. PSS. T. 51. S. 237-238). On July 13, 1920, Trotsky sent a telegram similar in content to Chicherin, Lenin, Krestinsky, Stalin and Kalinin (The Trotsky papers. Vol. 2. P. 228-230).

2 In a note to the Soviet government dated July 11, 1920, Curzon demanded to stop the advance of the Red Army beyond the Grodno-Yalovka-Nemirov-Brest-Litovsk-Dorogusk-Ustilug line, established in December 1919 by the Supreme Council of the Entente as the eastern border of Poland and recognized by Poland only in connection with the unfavorable course of hostilities for her. This line was called the Curzon Line.

3 Text in italics crossed out by Stalin's hand.

On July 14, 1920, Stalin, in furtherance of this thought, telegraphed Lenin: “[...] Curzon's note speaks of a conference in London with the representation of Russia. My opinion is that if we ever have negotiations with Poland, they should be conducted in Russia, because to arrange negotiations in London, appointing Krasin as your representative, means placing the matter under the tutelage of England. Keep in mind that our ciphers in London are deciphered by the British, for there is no cipher that would not be deciphered” (RTSKHIDNI, F. 558. On. 1. D. 1818, fol. 1).

On July 16, 1920, the plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) decided to reject the mediation of England in the negotiations between the RSFSR and Poland and continue the offensive of the troops of the Western Front on the territory of Poland. On July 17, 1920, a corresponding note was sent to Curzon (Documents of Foreign Policy of the USSR, vol. 3, pp. 47-53). On the same day, Lenin informed Stalin and Smilga about this (Lenin V.I. PSS. T. 51. P. 240).

6 On the reverse side there is a note: “13-14. VII 1920". In addition, a typewritten copy of the same telegram has been preserved, dated sending - 13/VIІ-1920 at 23:30 and receiving in Moscow - 14/VIІ-1920 at 0:35. On the copy there is a note: “Deciphered in SNK 14 / VTI-1920, 2 hours 28 minutes.”

No. 87

I. S. Unshlikht to V. I. Lenin

July 15, 1920

(Personally) To Comrade LENIN 1 .

July 15, 1920

In response to your letter 2 : I) we declare in the most solemn form to the workers and peasants of Poland that we do not encroach on the integrity of Poland within its ethnographic borders, we are ready to recognize this border, if this corresponds to the desire of the working masses, even to the east line indicated by the Entente 3 . 2) If only our military resources allow it, we will continue the war until the complete defeat of the Polish White Army and the fall of the bourgeois government. 3) The Red Army continues the offensive to the border indicated by the Entente. If before this moment we do not agree with the Entente on terms guaranteeing a longer respite 4or, if there is no uprising of the working masses of Poland, we continue the offensive on the territory of Poland, arm the Polish workers and farm laborers, create a provisional military revolutionary committee and solemnly proclaim the destruction of landowner property and the nationalization of factories. Our further stay in Poland is determined by the will of the workers and peasants. 4) We consider a Soviet coup in Poland with the withdrawal of our troops to its borders in the near future quite likely with the resistance of the western regions of Poland "Poznan", which can be broken by a coup in Germany. It is difficult to determine the date of the uprising in Poland, and to a large extent it depends on the coordination of our actions on the territory of Poland and the Polish Communist Party.

With com. hello Unslicht.

Fully agree with the answer: Doletsky, S. Budkevich, V. E. Budkevich.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. On. 1. D. 2528. L. 31. Typewritten text. Signature - autograph.

Notes:

1 The letter was sent, presumably, from Minsk, where the RVS of the Western Front was located at that time, to Moscow. On the letterhead: “RSFSR. REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL OF THE REPUBLIC. Member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Western Front.

2 Between July 12 and 15, 1920, Lenin sent a telegram to the Defense Council of the Lithuanian-Belarusian Republic, of which Unshlikht was a member (V. I. Lenin. Biographical Chronicle. Vol. 7. P. 378). Maybe it's about her.

3 See note 2 to document No. 86.

4 In a telegram to Chicherin, sent on the same day, Unshlikht, detailing his and the members of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Western Front on Curzon’s peace proposals, in particular, wrote: “... The political [and] military situation requires the maximum development of our success , and therefore it is necessary to win in time. Our response to England must play an agitational role and draw the broad working masses of Europe into the struggle for peace. Simultaneously with these demands, our demands must be drawn up in such a way that they arouse serious objections on the part of the Entente and force it to demand a revision of our conditions, which is all we need to move forward [...] ”(RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. On. 1 D. 2528. L. 32).

No. 88

Telegram to G. K. Ordzhonikidze V. I. Lenin, G. V. Chicherin, I. V. Stalin

July 16, 1920

Through the political controller on a direct wire, delivery time to inform.

Moscow Kremlin.

Lenin, Chicherin, Stalin.

Baku 16/VII-20

I consider it absolutely necessary to wait [with] peace [with] Armenia until the arrival of the representative of Azerbaijan, who is traveling according to the invitation of Comrade Chicherin 1 .

Peace with Armenia without the participation of Azerbaijan greatly unnerves the local comrades.

Massacres between Armenians and Tatars are inevitable in the Nakhichevan region. This can only be avoided by our advancement and occupation of the Nakhichevan region. We tried to carry out at least reconnaissance in this direction, but the statement of the RVSR about the insufficiency of our forces in this area *.

The political situation demands that a massacre be prevented in the Nakhichevan region, which is inevitable without our intervention. I think that we can continue to move for the purpose of reconnaissance. I'll get in touch with Chicherin today, and if he doesn't agree, we'll get our intelligence back. I repeat, reconnaissance is necessary 2 .

3. Oprodkomarm Comrade Eristov cannot get along with the Revolutionary Military Council. To the demand of the Revolutionary Military Council to form a divisional apparatus, he replies that he has the rights of an army commander and prescribes and proposes ... 3

RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 14. D. 5. L. 3-6. Autograph.

Notes:

oneWe are talking about the negotiations between the RSFSR and Armenia on the settlement of the situation on the borders of Azerbaijan and Armenia. Disputable border issues were resolved for a long time without the participation of representatives of Azerbaijan, who hoped, together with representatives of the Caucasian Bureau of the RCP (b), to resolve them by force in their favor, and also use them as a pretext for further sovietization of the region. On July 8, 1920, Stalin telegraphed Ordzhonikidze: “[...] My opinion is that it is impossible to maneuver endlessly between the parties; it is necessary to support one of the parties definitely, in this case, of course, Azerbaijan and Turkey. I spoke with Lenin, he does not object [...]” (RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 3/S. D. 2. L. 11). As early as July 9, 1920 the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia informed his representative in Georgia about the occupation of Zangezur by the Bolsheviks and demanded that this issue be raised before the Soviet plenipotentiary representative in Georgia, Kirov, and also to inform the head of the Armenian delegation in the RSFSR about what had happened (the Great October Socialist Revolution and the victory of Soviet power in Armenia. P. 372 ). This fact, combined with the invasion of the Soviet-Azerbaijani troops in Nakhichevan, served as a pretext for a new aggravation of the conflict. On July 22, 1920, Ordzhonikidze left for Moscow to resolve these and other issues of Eastern policy (RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 5 / S. D. 1. L. 1-3). This fact, combined with the invasion of the Soviet-Azerbaijani troops in Nakhichevan, served as a pretext for a new aggravation of the conflict. On July 22, 1920, Ordzhonikidze left for Moscow to resolve these and other issues of Eastern policy (RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 5 / S. D. 1. L. 1-3). This fact, combined with the invasion of the Soviet-Azerbaijani troops in Nakhichevan, served as a pretext for a new aggravation of the conflict. On July 22, 1920, Ordzhonikidze left for Moscow to resolve these and other issues of Eastern policy (RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 5 / S. D. 1. L. 1-3).

On July 19, 1920, Chicherin sent a telegram to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, in which, in particular, he stated: “[...] All the actions of Soviet Russia in the Caucasus are aimed at rendering friendly action to the further peaceful development of the Armenian people other neighboring peoples [...] The occupation by Russian parts of those areas that, in the process of struggle between neighboring peoples, became disputed between Armenia and Azerbaijan is aimed at preventing bloody conflicts that could have disastrous results for all participants and is calculated also on the creation of conditions that make possible a calm and impartial discussion of disputed territorial issues [...]” (The Great October Socialist Revolution and the Victory of Soviet Power in Armenia, p. 373).

3 The end of the document is missing.

No. 89

Telegram of I. V. Stalin to K. E. Voroshilov

July 22 [1920]

Revolutionary Military Council of the First Cavalry, Voroshilov.

Kharkiv 22/7 1

First, the Western Front is advancing successfully, the first line of the Polish defense - Neman - Shara - has already been broken [in] the Slonim area, if the Poles fail to stop us on the second line - Bug - Narew, then they will have to roll to the third line - Vistula - San. Now the Western Front is closer to Brest-Litovsk than the South[o]-Western [front]. It is possible that in connection with this circumstance your army will have to abandon Brest and turn south. Second. You must know that we rejected the mediation of England, which offered an armistice with Poland, and expressed our consent if Poland herself turned to Russia without intermediaries . You will understand that if Poland converts itself, we cannot refuse a truce, therefore it is necessary to hasten as much as possible in moving your army forward 3 .

Third. We are preparing reinforcement marches for you, the right of volunteer mobilization given to the Yugzap in the Don, Kuban, Northern Caucasus will be used in every possible way by the front to strengthen [primarily] your army.

Stalin.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 1841. L. 1-4. Autograph. The last paragraph is an autograph of an unknown person.

Notes:

1 A telegram was sent from Kharkov to the RVS of the 1st Cavalry Army.

2 See note 5 to document No. 86.

3 The idea of the need to speed up the offensive and occupy as much of the territory of Poland as possible before it applied with a proposal to conclude a truce was expressed by Stalin in a telegram to the Politburo dated June 29, 1920 (RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 1777. L. 2).

No. 90

Telegram of I. V. Stalin to K. E. Voroshilov, S. M. Budyonny

JULY 23, 1920

First Cavalry. Voroshilov, Budyonny.

Decipher personally. Kharkiv 23/7 1

An offer of an armistice was received from Poland without the mediation of England, 2 with a request to give an answer no later than the thirtieth of July. Of course, you understand that we are forced to agree. Proceeding from this, the most impetuous offensive from you towards Lvov is required, and in general you need to try to get the maximum of what we can take 4 before the thirtieth 3 . This is the source of our latest directive on Lvov. The Central Committee of the Party asks you to make one more effort, maybe the last one, and then to rest.

Stalin.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D., 5547. L. 2. Autograph on a telegraph form.

Notes:

1 A telegram was sent from Kharkov to the RVS of the 1st Cavalry Army.

2 A radiogram from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland with a proposal for an armistice and the opening of peace negotiations was received on July 22, 1920.

3 The deadline set by the Polish side for responding to its proposals for an armistice and peace negotiations.

4On July 23, 1920, the question of negotiations with Poland and England was discussed in the Politburo. The adopted decision stated: “Instruct Comrade Chicherin to reply with a note [...] that we agree to send our representatives to meet with the Polish for negotiations on an armistice and peace and instruct our command to negotiate such a meeting [...]” (RTSKHIDNI. F. 17. List 3. D. 96. L. 2). On the same day, Stalin, Yegorov and Berzin sent a telegram to the RVS of the 12th, 14th armies and the 1st Cavalry army, in which, in particular, they ordered: “[...] [In] the event of the appearance of Polish parliamentarians, their must be taken by organizing measures of the strictest supervision and vigilance. It is necessary to take measures so that this message about the proposal of the Poles does not yet reach the attention of the Red Army. The acceptance of parliamentarians does not in the least contradict the fact that your progress has been accelerated. Vice versa, the situation obliges you to hit harder and rapidly continue the offensive without the slightest delay [...]” (Ibid. F. 558. On. 1. D. 5548. L. 2-3). On July 24, 1920, in a telegram to the command of the Polish army, the commander of the troops of the Western Front, Tukhachevsky, explained the continuation of hostilities by the Soviet units by the difficulty of communication between them (Documents of Foreign Policy of the USSR, vol. 3, p. 65).