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Bolshevik leadership Correspondence. 1912-1927
Collection of documents 1996.
Compiled by: A.V.Kvashonkin, L.P.Kosheleva, L.A.Rogovaya, O.V.Khlevnyuk.
L. P. Serebryakov, I. V. Stalin - Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b)
November 12, 1919
In the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP.
Statement
In view of the completely abnormal relations that have developed between the Headquarters (the Small Revolutionary Council of the Republic) and the Southern Front, which sometimes manifest themselves, on the one hand, in the direct hatred of Commander-in-Chief 1 and Gusev for Komandyuzh 2 , on the other, in complete indifference to the needs of the Southern Front 3 , we consider our duty to declare the need either to change the entire composition of the Revolutionary Soviet, or to change the headquarters or, if the latter is considered untimely, to replace Gusev, who, according to our information, is the main instigator against the southern front.
Members of the Central Committee and the Revolutionary Military Council
L. Serebryakov.
Stalin 4 .
November 12th day 1919
Serpukhov.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 5450. L. 2. Typewritten text. Signatures are autographs.
Notes:
1 Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the republic. Commander-in-Chief S. S. Kamenev.
2 A. I. Egorov.
3 The offensive of the troops of the Southern Front, which began on October 11, 1919, was suspended in early November 1919 under the onslaught of the White armies. On November 12, 1919, in addition to the one given here, members of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front, Stalin, Yegorov and Serebryakov, sent another telegram to the Commander-in-Chief, in which, explaining the withdrawal of units of the 8th Army and the failure of Budyonny's cavalry corps near Voronezh by a lack of military formations, they demanded that two divisions (From the History of the Civil War in the USSR. T. 2. S. 555-556).
4In addition to this statement, Stalin sent his own telegram threatening resignation. On November 14, 1919, the issue was considered at a meeting of the Politburo. The adopted resolution stated: “[...]. a) Instruct comrade Lenin to send comrade Smilga a ciphered telegram with a request about one possible, in the opinion of the Politburo, movement, b) Instruct comrade Trotsky to convey to Commander-in-Chief Kamenev on behalf of the government a political and economic directive on the need to capture Kursk and advance to Kharkov and Donbass and on the distribution of reinforcements withdrawn from the eastern and Turkestan fronts between the southern and southeastern fronts in accordance with this directive [...] Offer Vladimir Ilyich to personally talk with the Commander-in-Chief on the content of this directive, c) Inform comrade. Stalin
No. 61
A. A. Ioffe - Central Committee of the RCP (b), V. I. Lenin
December 15, 1919
Secret.
In the Central Committee of the RCP.
copy of V.I. Lenin.
Dear comrades,
According to our unwritten constitution, all elections to the central Soviet and party institutions are made according to lists actually drawn up by the Central Committee of the RCP.
Over the past year (approximately since the death of Ya. M. Sverdlov) I have not appeared in any of these lists. When my name was not put on the list of the Central Committee at the 8th Party Congress, after I had been invariably elected to all the Central Committees since the creation of the RCP, rumors spread in wide party circles (many comrades told me personally about this) that the Central Committee was dissatisfied my Berlin work 1 , and therefore did not put me on his list. Individual members of the Central Committee, in conversation, explained this simply by forgetfulness in view of my absence from the Congress, which absence itself was the result of the Central Committee forbidding me to leave Vilna.
In the list of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the new convocation that has now been published, my name again does not exist, despite the fact that I was a member of all the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, starting from the time of Kerensky. There can be no explanation for forgetfulness in this case, for I was a delegate to the Congress of Soviets, unanimously elected by the Petrograd Soviet. Nor can this be explained by the decision to create a new All-Russian Central Executive Committee from representatives from the localities, mainly workers and peasants, because, firstly, almost all members of the former All-Russian Central Executive Committee were re-elected from the Petrograd delegates, and, secondly, many of the Moscow comrades are re-elected, according to at least as many as I belong to the working class and in any case have much less connection with the provinces, as they have never left Moscow.
If we add to this that, when sending me to Petrograd to organize a worker-socialist inspection, the Orgburo of the Central Committee, apparently, was very unwilling to appoint me even to such an insignificant post as a member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat of State , 2 which was necessary for purely practical reasons, and then, finally, having appointed, I did not pass this through the Council of People's Commissars, so formally I was not a member of the Collegium by the day of my departure for Yuryev - if we take all this into account, then the impression is no longer an accident, but the premeditation of such an attitude towards me .
It is absolutely impossible to think of any other explanation for this attitude than the dissatisfaction of the Central Committee of the last convocation with my work as a whole or in certain respects.
On the other hand, during the entire period of the revolution since my return from Siberia, doing extremely responsible and (I dare to say) the most difficult work, I cannot continue it without having confidence that the supreme organ of our party, and at the same time our government , it is completely, unconditionally and completely satisfied.
The assumption that the very fact that I was constantly entrusted with the most responsible work excludes the possibility of dissatisfaction with it undoubtedly disappears, because from the time of my stay in the Central Committee I remember very well how often the latter, having a very negative attitude towards the activities of individual comrades (I do not want to name names), nevertheless, he left them at the same job and leaves them to this day.
I allow myself to affirm that the post-Brest period of our policy was carried out to a large extent by me, and that now, having worked for more than a year in the field of the Workers' Socialist Inspectorate, I have done the same in articles, in speeches, and in practice, and do a great deal of independent work. So, in the interests of the fruitful fulfillment of my duties in the future, I subjectively need confidence in the full satisfaction of the Central Committee with my work in the past and present.
I do not have this confidence at the present time and, on the contrary, there are seriously justified impressions of just the opposite.
Having worked for almost 20 years in the ranks of our party and almost 10 of them in its central institutions, I consider myself entitled in the most resolute manner to demand from the Central Committee, and, above all, from the recognized leader of all our work, Vladimir Ilyich, a direct answer, which precisely explains the above attitude towards me and whether the Central Committee is really dissatisfied with my work, and if so, with what exactly.
I consider it necessary to add that an unsubscribe like an answer that it was decided in [o] the All-Russian Central Executive Committee not to elect members of the Collegiums cannot be a direct answer to my question, which is of extreme importance for me and for all my future work .
With communist greetings, A. Ioffe
PS This issue in the present conditions is also acquiring a topical and very specific meaning, because the mandate given to me to conduct peace negotiations 4 and sign a truce and peace is issued in the name of a "member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee." If, in fact, I am no longer such, then the mandate loses its validity, which cannot be unknown to Estonians and our other opponents, who read our newspapers in the same way. In this case, I will be forced to ask for my recall and replacement by another comrade.
15/HI. 1919
Yuriev
RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 205. L. 2-3. Typewritten text. Signature - autograph.
Notes:
1 Since April 1918, Ioffe was the Soviet plenipotentiary in Germany and, as he wrote in his autobiography, took an active part in the preparation of the German revolution. Three days before the uprising (November 6, 1918), he was expelled from Germany along with the embassy (Figures of the USSR and the revolutionary movement in Russia. Encyclopedic Dictionary GRANAT. M., 1989. S. 423).
2 People's Commissariat of State Control.
3 December 20, 1920 the issue was considered in the Politburo. The adopted decision stated: “To instruct Comrade Krestinsky to write a letter to Comrade Ioffe explaining the method of compiling a new Central Executive Committee and indicating that he still enjoys the full political confidence of the Central Committee” (RTsKhIDNI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 49. L. 1).
4 In December 1918, Ioffe was appointed chairman of the Soviet delegation for peace negotiations with Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Poland, which is why he left for Yuriev.
Telegram of L. D. Trotsky to I. V. Stalin
January 9, 1920
Adopted 9/1-20
THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL OF THE SOUTHERN FRONT TO STALIN.
By direct wire, immediately transfer personally to Stalin.
An extensive telegram was received from Makhno motivating his refusal to submit to command and join the Polish front .
First. Tell us what you know about Makhno's army, its combat composition in relation to ammunition and sources of replenishment.
Second. Do you think it possible to immediately begin encirclement and complete military liquidation of Makhno.
Third. In any case, I think it is necessary to immediately open the widest campaign, branding Makhno for refusing to obey the order and defend the right-bank Ukraine from the Polish lords as a simple robber and deserter.
Fourth. At the same time, it is probably possible to disarm his artillery base, sending there under the guise of anarchists a completely reliable audience. Since the Makhnovists almost completely do not take security measures, it is probably possible to destroy his stocks of cartridges.
January 9, 1920
TROTSKY.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 5458. L. 3v. Handwritten text.
Notes:
1 . See Document #63.
No. 63
Telegram from I. V. Stalin to L. D. Trotsky
[January 9, 1920]
Moscow is the Kremlin for Trotsky. Submit personally.
First. According to unverified information, Makhno's corps consists of no more than a thousand sabers and two thousand infantry 1 . Second, the encirclement of Makhno, begun a few days ago, will end on the ninth. The order to attack the Poles 2 was deliberately given in order to obtain extra material against Makhno in order to corrupt his associates, among whom disagreements reign. Your advice on a broad campaign is being carried out by the Revolutionary Military Councils and the Revolutionary Committee of the Ukraine 3 .
Stalin.
RTSHIDNI; F. 558. On. 1. D. 5458. L. 3. Autograph.
Notes:
On January 10, 1920, in an additional telegram to Trotsky, Stalin clarified the data on the number of Makhno’s detachments: “[...] In all Makhno’s detachments in the Kherson, Yekaterinoslav, Poltava regions, there are about twenty thousand bayonets - sabers, of which two-thirds are former Red Army soldiers who fell to Makhno in the difficult moments of the Red Army, and now gravitating towards us, the remaining third are more or less loyal [...] ”(RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 5458. L. 5-8).
2On January 8, 1920, in accordance with the order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front, the command of the 14th Army issued an order, which, in particular, said: “The good army has been defeated, parts of it are fleeing from the punishing hand of the Red Army. The valiant units of the 14th and neighboring Red armies are approaching the sea [...] At the same time, the Poles [in] the area of Mozyr and Korosten, having concentrated forces pushed by the Entente, are pushing the units of the Red Army [and] achieved temporary success. In order to put an end to the further advance of the Poles and deliver a decisive blow to them, according to the instructions received from the center, the Revolutionary Military Council of the 14th Army orders the head of all armed detachments, Makhno, to immediately, upon receipt of this order, proceed along the route Alexandria-Cherkasy-Borispol-Brovary-Chernigov-Gomel, where, having concentrated, go to the disposal of the RVS of the 12th Army [...] ”(Civil War in Ukraine. Vol. 2. P. 635). Makhno and his commanders refused to carry out this order, which was telegraphed to Trotsky (see Document No. 62).
3On January 9, 1920, the Military Revolutionary Committee of Ukraine adopted and published a resolution declaring Makhno and his detachments illegal. “[...] The military command [...] suggested that the Makhnovists oppose the Poles and thereby support the Red Army and liberate our villages and cities from the yoke of the Polish landlords, and the workers from the slavery of the capitalists. But Makhno did not submit to the will of the Red Army, refused to oppose the Poles, declaring war on our liberator, the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. Thus, Makhno and his group sold the Ukrainian people to the Polish lords, like Grigoriev, Petlyura and other traitors to the Ukrainian people. Therefore, the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee decides: 1. Makhno and his group are outlawed as deserters and traitors. 2. All who support and shelter these traitors of the Ukrainian people will be mercilessly exterminated [...
No. 64
S. M. Budyonny to V. I. Lenin
February 1, 1920
Stanitsa Bagaevskaya R[ostov] Don.
February 1, 1920.
Dear Leader Vladimir Ilyich!
Forgive me for writing this letter to you. I really want to see you personally and bow before you as the Great Leader of all the poor Peasants and Workers. But the affairs of Front 1 and the Denikin gang prevent me from doing this. I must inform you Comrade. Lenin that the cavalry army is going through a difficult time, once upon a time they didn’t beat my cavalry like the whites beat now, but they beat it because the commander of the front set the cavalry Army in such conditions that it could die completely. I am ashamed to tell you this, but I love the cavalry Army, but I love the Revolution even more, and the Revolution still needs cavalry. Front commander comrade. Shorin first put the cavalry in the swamp of the Don and forced the river [river] to cross the Don, the enemy took advantage of this and almost destroyed the entire cavalry, and when I was the Revolutionary Council 2demanded to change the direction of the cavalry army comrade. Shorin left the infantry army entrusted to me; he handed over two infantry divisions to the 8th Army, and the cavalry army was thrown alone against the enemy and for the second time was badly dented. For all my command, there were no such sad phenomena. And as soon as Shorin received the right to dispose of the army entrusted to me, misfortune fell. Back on October 26, 1919, when I was under Comrade. Shorin 3he gave me a task that was harmful to us and useful to the enemy, then I told him about it by telegraph and he must have been offended and remembered, but now all this is reflected in our common revolutionary cause. And now I also received the task, but today the enemy has been defeated and will move forward 60 miles, and the neighboring armies stand in place according to the order and thereby enable the enemy to withdraw their units from the front and throw them against the cavalry army. This is an obvious transgression. I ask you to pay your attention to this and protect the red cavalry Army and other armies needlessly perishing from such an assault command.
I firmly shake your hand
From comrade hello
Commander of the 1st Cavalry Budyonny*
RTSKHIDNI. F. 2. On. 1. D. 12767. L. 1-2. Autograph.
Notes:
1We are talking about the Caucasian Front, formed by the Decree of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic of January 16, 1920 on the basis of the South-Eastern Front. The task of the front was to complete the liquidation of the North Caucasian grouping of Denikin's troops. The headquarters of the Caucasian Front was located successively in Millerovo and Rostov-on-Don. Shorin was the commander of the front from January 16 to January 23, 1920. From January 24 to February 3, the former chief of staff, Afanasyev, temporarily served as commander. On February 4, 1919, Tukhachevsky became commander. All these movements were the result of the struggle of groups within the command of the Caucasian and Southwestern fronts. The actions of the 1st Cavalry Army drew criticism from Shorin, a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian Front V. Trifonov, and the commander of the 8th Army, Sokolnikov. Budyonny and a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 1st Cavalry Army Voroshilov appealed to Stalin, a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southwestern Front, who supported them. This confrontation largely explained the transfer of Shorin to the post of assistant to the Commander-in-Chief. During the period of "interregnum", when the former deputy Shorina Afanasyev temporarily commanded the front, the leadership of the 1st Cavalry Army decided to strengthen the "won positions". On February 2, 1920, Voroshilov, Budyonny and Shchadenko sent a telegram to Trotsky, Lenin, Stalin and Kalinin - a report in which they qualified the actions of Shorin, Trifonov and Sokolnikov as a "partisan raid" "on the young, but certainly still badly needed by the Soviet Republic, Cavalry". “The cavalry,” they wrote, “can still render an indispensable service to the cause of the communist revolution, and for this alone it deserves a comradely and careful attitude on the part of higher-ranking persons and institutions. Revolutionary Military Council of the Cavalry, Considering the severity of the responsibility that lies on him, he considers it his duty to bring to the attention of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic that in the current situation his work is unthinkable and fruitless, and therefore we ask you to relieve us of our duties as members of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Cavalry by appointing deputies. We ask you to inform us of further instructions [...]” (RTSKHIDNI, F. 5. On. 1. D. 2435. L. 4-5). On February 3, along with the appointment of Tukhachevsky as commander of the front, Ordzhonikidze, close to Stalin, was introduced into the RVS of the front. On. 1. D. 2435. L. 4-5).
2 This refers to the RVS of the 1st Cavalry Army.
3 In October 1919, the 1st Cavalry Army was part of the South-Eastern Front, commanded by the same Shorin. At this time, the troops of the front were fighting on the Khoper River, in the area of the villages of Ust-Medveditskaya, Ilovlinskaya and the city of Kamyshin.
No. 65
Telegram from J. X. Peters, Yu. V. Lomonosov to V. I. Lenin, L. D. Trotsky, L. B. Krasin, Central Committee of the RCP(b)
February 12, 1920
FROM ROSTOV, NOTE.
12/11-1920 8 a.m. 45 min.
Cipher
MOSCOW TO LENIN, TROTSKY, THE CC RCP AND KRASIN 1 .
It is necessary to immediately put an end to the conflict between the Eighth and Cavalry Armies, which threatens armed clashes. Budennov's army is decomposing every day: robberies, drunkenness, presence of suspicious women in the headquarters, according to rumors, there were cases of murder of the most conscious comrades. Budyonny ceases to reckon with anyone. The atrocities he perpetrates on the railway[s] are absolutely unbelievable: continuous seizures of fuel, steam locomotives, cars of emergency trains, plunder of trophy property. Each section is followed by a tail of wagons filled with women and loot. According to Comrade Mironov, the number of such cars is about 120 per division.
PETERS. LOMONOSOV.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. On. 1. D. 2435. L. 6. Typewritten text.
Notes:
1 At the top of the telegram is a note: "Copy sent to Sklyansky."
No. 66
Telegram to G. K. Ordzhonikidze V. I. Lenin
February 17, 1920
February 17, 1920, 8 p.m. Station [station] Millerovo. Only yesterday we arrived in Millerovo, having been on the road for 9 days. The Budyonny order to transfer their units from the Rostov region to the Velikoknyazheskaya region was carried out unquestioningly. While advancing, he deviated slightly to the right of the indicated line of attack, which he explained by the need to get [forage]. Tukhachevsky and I believe that the cries of decay in the sense of loss of combat capability are unfounded 1. Drunkenness and robbery are an old phenomenon among them. At night we go with Smilga to the front and upon arrival we will report in detail. During the month of our inactivity, the enemy has greatly intensified. At the moment, our armies are advancing. On the right flank (section of the 8th and 9th armies) - unsuccessfully, the main direction - the section of the 10th [army] of Budyonny - satisfactory. Tomorrow, the day after tomorrow are decisive days. The 8th and 9th [armies] are badly battered, partly by the inept leadership of the commanders, partly [due to] the organizational mistakes made by Shorin, who did not take sufficiently energetic measures to replenish the division in a timely manner. Both commanders will be replaced 2 . Mobilization has been announced on the sector of the Caucasian [Kazakh] front. Dumenko will be removed from the hull 3. The weakness of the general command is explained by the former isolation of the front headquarters from the army, I hope this will not happen now.
Ordzhonikidze 4 .
RTSHIDNI; F. 85. Op. 8. D. 3. L. 1-3. Autograph.
Notes:
1 This telegram was a response to a telegram from Lenin to Smilga and Ordzhonikidze dated February 17, 1920, which expressed concern about the state of the troops of the Caucasian Front, “the complete disintegration of Budyonny”, “the weakness of the general command, strife between the armies” (Lenin V. I. PSS. T. 51. S. 134).
2 We are talking about the commander of the 8th Sokolnikov and the temporarily acting commander of the 9th Dushkevich. Dushkevich March 1, 1920 was replaced by Uborevich. The 8th Army was disbanded in March 1920, its troops were transferred to the 9th and 10th armies.
3 In February 1920, Dumenko, on a false charge of murdering the military commissar of the corps, Mikeladze (similar to the charges against Mironov), was arrested and sentenced to death. In one of the telegrams to Stalin, Ordzhonikidze reported: “Dumenko and his headquarters have been arrested. Smilga thinks of organizing a Mironov comedy. Charge: murder of the corps commissar, banditry, preparation of a rebellion!
(RTsDIDNI. F. 85. Op. 8. D. 4. L. 1). May 11, 1920 Dumenko was shot.
4 At the end of the telegram there is a note: “Deciphered in the secretariat of the Deputy Pre-Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic on February 19, 1920 at 2:30 am.”
No. 67
Telegram from Ya. G. Doletsky, I. S. Unshlikht to V. I. Lenin
March 15, 1920
C. Secret.
Adopted 15/111 1920 5.50.
Moscow Kremlin, TO LENIN, copy NACHREGISTRUPR 1 .
Smolensk, March 14, 1920. I am reporting the official opinion of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Poland from the beginning of February regarding peace negotiations: “Poland will not conclude peace 2 . Pilsudski is deceiving everyone. The higher bourgeois Polish spheres, together with the Entente, in defiance of the demands of the social-patriots, are preparing for the March or April offensive . A two-week break in railway traffic in January, despite the declared reason - fuel economy, was actually used to transfer technical parts, cars, guns, shells and military equipment from France.
Member of the Polish Bureau under the Central Committee of the RCP Doletsky.
Member of the Revolutionary Military Council Unshlikht.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. On. 1. D. 2528. L. 28. Uncertified typewritten copy.
Notes:
1 At the end of the telegram there is a note: “Deciphered in the secretariat of the Deputy Pre-revolutionary Military Council of the Republic on March 15, 1920 by E. S[klyansky]”.
2 In early March 1920, the Polish government held a series of negotiations on joint action against Soviet Russia with representatives of the white movement and Finland. On March 5, 1920, Polish troops occupied Mozyr, Klinkovichi and Rogachev. The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR declared a note of protest, and the Ukrainian government again offered Poland peace talks. The possibility of the latter is discussed in the telegram (Documents and materials on the history of Soviet-Polish relations. M., 1965. Vol. 3. S. 562-563).
3 The leadership of the RSFSR knew about the impending offensive and took retaliatory steps. On March 11, 1920, Lenin telegraphed Unshlikht: “The Poles, apparently, will fight. We are doing everything possible to strengthen the defense. It is also necessary to intensify extremely agitation in the Polish language [...] ”(Lenin V.I. PSS. T. 51. P. 158). The doubts of Lenin and other party leaders about the outcome of the peace negotiations served as the basis for a telegram in response to Lenin by Unshlikht and Doletsky. The offensive of the Polish troops in the direction of Kyiv began on April 25, 1920.
No. 68
Telegram of L. D. Trotsky to I. V. Stalin
March 21 [1920]
Kharkov, Stalin by direct wire 1 ,
I send Tukhachevsky the following request:
After you have captured Novorossiysk and Grozny 2 , it is planned to take 3 rifle divisions and 3 cavalry divisions from you . Top-ups can only be given to you with the opening of navigation. Please answer, do you consider it possible under such conditions to immediately conduct an operation to capture and hold Baku? Take into account the possibilities of support for Azerbaijan by Georgia 4 .
20th of March.
I add to this: It is desirable to conclude a deal with Georgia, promising her full immunity and oil. I consider it possible to remove not 6 divisions, but 4 from the Caucasian Front for the Western Front.
Let me know your thoughts.
Moscow, March 21.
Trotsky, chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council.
I ask you to reply to this dispatch during the night, in any case not later than 11 a.m. on March 22.
Commissioner M. Grushin
RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 5481. L. 4-7. Original, telegraph form.
Notes:
1 On the initiative of Lenin, in February 1920, Stalin was entrusted with control over the transfer of reinforcements to the Caucasian front (Lenin V.I. PSS. T. 51. P. 335).
2 The order to attack Grozny was issued by the command of the Caucasian Front on March 12, 1920 (Directives of the Command of the Fronts of the Red Army. Vol. 2. P. 499). On March 23, 1920, Ordzhonikidze informed Stalin: “[...] The Kuban has been forced. Prokhladnaya was taken in the Grozny direction, in two days we will present Grozny and Mozdok [...] ”(RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 5482. L. 2).
On March 28, 1920, the delay in the capture of Grozny provoked an angry telegram from Lenin to members of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Front Smilga and Ordzhonikidze: “We desperately need oil, consider a manifesto to the population that we will slaughter everyone if they burn and spoil oil and oil fields and, on the contrary, give life everyone, if Maikop and especially Grozny are handed over intact [...]” (Ibid. F. 85. Op. 6/S. D. 15. L. 5; The Trotsky papers. Vol. 2. P. 80) . Grozny was taken by the Red Army in late March - early April 1920.
4 We are talking about the transfer of several units to the Western Front against Poland.
5 At that time, an operation was being prepared to Sovietize Azerbaijan and Georgia by the forces of the Caucasian Front. The first step was to capture the Baku oil fields. On March 17, 1920, Lenin telegraphed Ordzhonikidze: “It is extremely, extremely necessary for us to take Baku. Direct all your efforts towards this, and be sure to be purely diplomatic in your statements and make sure to the maximum that a firm local Soviet government is prepared. The same applies to Georgia, although I advise you to treat it even more carefully. Agree on the transfers with the Commander-in-Chief ”(Lenin V.I. PSS. T. 51. S. 163-164).
No. 69
Telegram from I. V. Stalin to L. D. Trotsky
March 20 [1920]
Moscow Pre - Revolutionary Military Council to Trotsky 1 .
Received encryption. The Caucasian Front has at least 25 rifle and 10 cavalry divisions, in my opinion, 6 divisions can be taken from there against the Poles, according to your assumption. The rest of the forces can safely hold the Baku region. Georgians are not dangerous if we promise neutrality.
Stalin.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 5481. L. 3. Handwritten text, with the words "The rest of the forces", editing, signature - autograph.
Notes:
1 In the upper left corner of the document there is an inscription: “Executed on 21/ПІ”.
No. 70
Telegram to G. K. Ordzhonikidze G. V. Chicherin
April 23, 1920
Rostov n / D [on].
April 23, 1920
I received your telegram only today, upon my arrival from Petrovsk . In general, we are already pursuing a policy here, but it is supported by quite impressive forces. I personally consider your answer to Azerbaijan to be quite appropriate 2 , but I would only ask you to delay it a little. You will receive an answer to the encryption today. The current situation in Baku is as follows: representatives of the Itgihadists 3 , socialists and other parties have left the government, so that Ussubbek's government 4 consists only of Musavatists 5 . The head of the national movement in Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, demands from Azerbaijan the passage of Soviet troops to the borders of Turkey in order to defend them from British attacks 6. The possibility of our bloodless entry into Baku and declaring it Soviet 7 is not ruled out . Narimanov is very much needed in Baku. I earnestly ask you to send it to us tomorrow. Tomorrow evening I'm leaving again for Petrovsk.
Ordzhonikidze.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 13. D. 6. L. 1. Certified typewritten copy.
Notes:
1 We are talking about the events connected with the completion of the Sovietization of the North Caucasus and the beginning of actions for the Sovietization of Azerbaijan and Georgia. In response to a message from Ordzhonikidze about measures being taken to strengthen Soviet power in Chechnya (Ordzhonikidze G.K. Selected articles and speeches. 1911-1937. M., 1939. S. 80), on March 15, 1920, Lenin telegraphed him about the allocation SNK 200 million rubles as assistance to the highlanders and said that Narimanov, sent at the request of Ordzhonikidze, would bring them to Petrovsk in connection with the upcoming actions in Azerbaijan (Lenin V. I. PSS. T. 51. P. 178).
2 In the autumn of 1919 - early 1920, the Soviet government repeatedly turned to the governments of Azerbaijan and Georgia with a proposal to conclude an agreement on joint military operations against Denikin's army, but each time it was refused. The strengthening of the positions of Soviet Russia in the North Caucasus and the threat of Sovietization forced the governments of Azerbaijan and Georgia in the spring of 1920 to send their representatives to Moscow to conclude agreements with Russia. However, in the changed conditions, Moscow dragged out the negotiations.
3 Ittihadists are members of the organization Ittihad (Ittihadi - Islam - "Unity of Islam"), a pan-Islamist party of Azerbaijan, founded in September 1917.
4 Refers to the government of Azerbaijan.
5 Members of the Musavat (Equality) party, founded in Baku in 1911. Remained in power during the entire period of the existence of the Republic of Azerbaijan in 1918-1920.
6 In the spring of 1920, the Caucasian Bureau of the RCP(b) concluded an agreement with the leader of the national movement of Turkey, Kemal, on joint actions against the British.
7 As early as April 21, 1920, on the basis of a report from the front headquarters on the concentration of troops for the operation to seize Baku, Ordzhonikidze and Tukhachevsky ordered an attack on Baku and the Sovietization of Azerbaijan (Directives of the Front Command of the Red Army. Vol. 3. P. 310). On April 23, 1920, Tukhachevsky and Ordzhonikidze sent a clarifying telegram to the commander of the 11th Army, in which they ordered "the ultimate task of the 11th Army is not to take possession of the Baku province, but to take possession of the entire territory of Azerbaijan" (See ibid.).
No. 71
Telegram to G. K. Ordzhonikidze, S. M. Kirov to V. I. Lenin
May 4, 1920
Moscow. Lenin 1 .
On April 26, our troops crossed the border of Azerbaijan, knowing that at midnight on April 28, the committee of Azerbaijani communists demanded from the government to transfer power to the committee of communists2. [Our armored trains were in Khachmaso at that time]. After a short meeting, the government handed over power to the communists, who formed the Azerbaijani3 and Baku Revolutionary Committees4, consisting exclusively [of] Muslims. An independent Socialist Soviet Azerbaijan Republic was proclaimed. The first act of the Revolutionary Committee was to appeal to Soviet Russia for armed assistance and to propose a military alliance. Our troops marched without any resistance. After the transfer of power to the communists, two hours later, our armored trains were in Baku, having an infantry battalion with them. The next day our cavalry and army headquarters arrived. The troops of Azerbaijan have completely gone over to our side. A very active role in favor of the revolution in Baku was played by Turkish askers and officers, a detachment of which prevented the government from fleeing Baku. The enthusiasm of the population, especially Muslims and workers, defies any description, can only be compared with the October in St. Petersburg, with the difference that there were no clashes. Everywhere is in order. Industries, the commercial fleet are completely intact. Oil product reserves are over 300 million poods, monthly production is 20 million poods. So far, one and a half million pounds have been sent to Astrakhan. The amount of export will depend on Astrakhan. The first of May in Baku gave an incomparable picture. Tens of thousands of workers and almost the entire population were on the streets. Our army caused rejoicing. In the evening a grandiose organized meeting of workers took place. In our person, Soviet Russia and its army were warmly greeted. A colossal impression was made by the awarding of the orders of the Red Banner to the Azerbaijani commissar for naval affairs and the Turkish communist, who occupied with a group of askers during the coup, which did not allow the government to flee *, as well as the presentation of the banner from the 11th army to the Baku workers. Our meeting about an ultimatum to the Armenian government to stop hostilities within the borders of Azerbaijan evoked delight. Every word in the name of Soviet Russia caused an explosion of enthusiasm. Organic work has not yet begun, the organization of power is underway. The political and military side of the matter has been ensured, and we will deal with it further in Azerbaijan. The situation with the establishment of the economy is very serious, not at all. It is necessary to send them immediately, otherwise our firm strengthening is impossible. It will be the same with Georgia as with Azerbaijan in the very near future8. Do not have any conversations with Georgia. We need your greetings to Azerbaijan and recognition of it in a general form9. We will carry out military-economic [and] economic unification with Soviet [Russian] Russia. Experience requires supplying us with the powers of the Council of People's Commissars for the entire Caucasus and beyond. Supply us by radio or send someone else, but immediately. Do not give such powers to Narimanov.
Ordzhonikidze, Kirov 10
RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 13. D. 12. L. 9-10. Photocopy. Typewritten text.
Notes:
1 The telegram was sent from Baku to Moscow. Ordzhonikidze sent the first telegram outlining the events that took place on the night of April 27-28, 1920 in Azerbaijan to Lenin on April 30, 1920. It read: “From 27 to 28 at two o’clock in the morning, power in Baku passed to the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee, declaring Azerbaijan Soviet Republic. At 4 o'clock in the morning the armored trains entered. Follow the Black Sea coast [...]” (The struggle for the victory of Soviet power in Azerbaijan. 1918-1920. Documents and materials. Baku, 1967. P. 477).
2 This refers to the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist Party of Bolsheviks, which was formed on the initiative of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on February 11, 1920 on the basis of the merger of the Baku organization of the RCP (b) and the local communist organizations "Gummet" and "Adalet". It was subordinate to the Caucasian Regional Committee of the RCP (b), headed by Ordzhonikidze.
3 This refers to the Provisional Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee, formed from members of the Azerbaijan Communist Party.
4 The Baku Revolutionary Committee was established on April 30, 1920.
On April 28, 1920, the Azrevkom telegraphed to the Russian government: “Unable to withstand the onslaught of the united bands of external and internal counter-revolution on our own [...] we propose [...] to enter into a fraternal alliance [...] and ask you to immediately provide a real help by sending detachments of the Red Army” (Essays on the history of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. Baku, 1963, pp. 327-328).
6 This refers to the 11th Army.
On May 1, 1920, relying on the strength of the Red Army, the Azerbaijani Soviet government presented an ultimatum to the government of Armenia, in which it declared the settlements of Zangezur and Nagorno-Karabakh (territories over which there had been a long-standing struggle between Azerbaijan and Armenia) part of Soviet Azerbaijan and demanded the withdrawal of Armenian troops. In the official response of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, sent to several addresses - Ordzhonikidze, Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee, Lenin, Chicherin on May 7, 1920, it was reported that there were no Armenian troops at the indicated points and it was proposed to send a neutral commission to Karabakh to clarify the true state of affairs (RTsKHIDNI. F 85. Inv. 13. D. 14. L. 1-6). In turn, the Armenian population of Zangezur and Karabakh made a decision at local congresses to refuse to obey the ultimatum. Representatives of the Karabakh community sent an alarming telegram to Ordzhonikidze, in which they persuaded him, in the interests of strengthening the prestige of Soviet power in Transcaucasia, not to send Soviet troops to the disputed territories (Ibid. D. 18. L. 1-3). On May 9, 1920, Ordzhonikidze received a telegram from Karakhan outlining Lenin's position, which, in particular, said: “We received a copy of the note from Azerbaijan and Armenia with an ultimatum. Ilyich instructed me to tell you that we should not hurry with our further expansion, firstly, in order to secure Azerbaijan, and, on the other hand [...] in view of the serious tasks on the Western Front and the need to be careful, considering our international situation. Indeed, Armenia is not of immediate interest to us [...]” (Ibid. Op. 17. D. 3. L. 1-4).
8 The operation to Sovietize Georgia was planned simultaneously with the development of the Sovietization plan for Azerbaijan. In mid-April 1920, an unsuccessful uprising against the authorities took place in Georgia, organized by local communists. The Georgian government crushed the uprising. Many of its members were imprisoned. On April 23, 1920, Ordzhonikidze, telegraphing Lenin and Chicherin about the arrests of Georgian communists, reported: “[...] the mood is everywhere for us, they are waiting for the arrival of Soviet troops [...]” (Ibid. Op. 15. D. 7 L. 1-3).
On May 5, 1920, Lenin sent a telegram to the government of Soviet Azerbaijan: “The Council of People's Commissars welcomes the liberation of the working masses of the independent Azerbaijan Republic [...]” (Lenin V.I. PSS. T. 41. P. 119).
10 There is a note on the telegram: “Deciphered in the secretariat of the Deputy Pre-revolutionary Military Council of the Republic on May 4, 1920. 4/V was sent to T. Lenin.”No. 72
Telegram to G. K. Ordzhonikidze V. I. Lenin, I. V. Stalin
May 4, 1920
C. SECRET
Moscow Kremlin to LENIN, STALIN.
Baku, May 4, 1920. I answer for the second time: events are unfolding in such a way that we hope to be in Tiflis no later than the twelfth, everything has been done for this. It will go brilliantly. Any other resolution of the issue will cause a terrible beating of the rebels.
Ordzhonikidze 2.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. On. 1. D. 2436. L. 34. Typewritten text.
Notes:
1 Already after the invasion of Azerbaijan, on May 3, 1920, in a telegram to Lenin and Stalin, Ordzhonikidze wrote: “[...] Events are developing in such a way that we hope to be in Tiflis no later than 15 [...]” (RTSKHIDNI. F. 5 On. 1. D. 2436. L. 33).
2 There is a note on the telegram: “Deciphered in the secretariat of the Deputy Pre-Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic on May 4, 1920. Sent to T. Lenin and Stalin. 4/V".No. 73
G. K. Ordzhonikidze - V. I. Lenin, I. V. Stalin
[later May 4, 1920]
Pass it on to Stalin. Ask the political controller. Ask the political controller immediately. Asks comrade. Ordzhonikidze.
Stay at the phone all the time, all the time of the conversation. Pass the note to Stalin and Lenin. It goes without saying that we carry out all the orders of the CEC1 [with] accuracy and, of course, there is no need to repeat them. Not a single Red Army soldier entered the territory of Georgia, not a single Azerbaijani soldier entered the territory of Georgia. On the contrary, on the same day as our troops entered Baku, the Georgian troops drove off the border guards of the Azerbaijanis near Poili, occupied the bridge over the Kura, formerly occupied by the Azerbaijanis. They [required] the Muslim village of Shikhli to surrender immediately, otherwise, [use] artillery fire against them. It amazes me how you believe the false statements of Gegechkori2. I repeat that [from] today not a single one of our Red Army soldiers has had time to approach the borders of Georgia. We all consider the salvation of the perishing Georgian Menshevik government an irreparable mistake, but it goes without saying that all your orders will be carried out by us very precisely and adamantly. The mood in Georgia is now unquestionably in our favor, according to stations, districts, Dusheti district, Lagodekhi, Abkhazia and almost the entire Kutaisi province are considered. With the approach of our troops to the borders, an uprising is inevitable here. In addition, our attitude [toward] Georgia will make the most disgusting impression on Muslims, especially if the former government of Musavat3 is ready to make peace with us on any conditions. In my opinion, if the international situation imposes this comedy on us, at least it is necessary to demand from them the declaration of Soviet power. The Mensheviks4 will agree to this, because they have no other way out. If [in] the units bordering on us an uprising begins, what should we do, support them or leave them to the mercy of fate. How to explain your silence about Azerbaijan. Here they are looking forward to what Moscow will say. In my opinion, in general terms, a greeting from you is necessary. Ordzhonikidze. What about Armenia? Ordzhonikidze. Political controller at the apparatus. Everybody. The note is intended only for Stalin.
Give Moscow to Stalin.Did mine and Kirov get a big note addressed to Lenin. If so, what about the powers?5 Everything will be done, but either keep in mind if you make peace with Armenia, it will be something terrible for the Muslims. We will not cross the borders, but only delay the world. One gets the impression that we, Christians, conquered Azerbaijan, left Georgia and Armenia aside. We had everything prepared: 9 would have crossed over and 11, on the 12th6 would have been in Tiflis. But nothing can be done. Keep in mind once given orders, you do not need to [repeat], I will carry it out, whatever my views may be. Greeting telegram7 not received, it must be repeated through the front. A copy in my name and then it will certainly reach them. I shake Sergo's hand: Tell Yenukidze that I fell from the car he sent and broke my leg.
Ordzhonikidze.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 15. D. 53. L. 1-2. Photocopy. Ticker-tape.
Notes:
1 In connection with the events on the Polish front and the close attention of the Western public to the events in Transcaucasia, the Bolshevik leadership was inclined to the possibility of concluding a temporary peace agreement with Georgia. On May 5, 1920, Lenin and Stalin telegraphed Ordzhonikidze: “[...] the Central Committee obliges you to withdraw units from the borders of Georgia to the border and refrain from attacking Georgia. After negotiations with Tiflis, it is clear that peace with Georgia is not ruled out [...]” (From the history of the Civil War in the USSR, vol. 3, p. 512). On May 7, 1920, a peace treaty was concluded between the RSFSR and Georgia in Moscow. Kirov was appointed plenipotentiary to Georgia. Georgia undertook to expel the White Guard units from its territory and legalize the position of the Georgian Communist Party.
2 The representative of the Menshevik government of Georgia, Gegechkori, repeatedly broadcast reports on the radio about the actions of the Red Army in Transcaucasia.
3 This refers to the overthrown Azerbaijani government.
4 We are talking about the government of the Georgian Democratic Republic. Formed in May 1918 by the Georgian National Council on a coalition basis, from March 1919 this government became practically one-party (out of 130 deputies of the Constituent Assembly, 109 were Mensheviks).
5 See Document No. 71.
6 In a personal telegram to Lenin and Stalin dated May 6, 1920, Ordzhonikidze and Kirov asked “not to worry” about Gegechkori radio messages (RTsKhIDNI. F. 85. Op. 2/S. D. 1. L. 9). In response, during direct negotiations by telegraph, Stalin stated: “[...] the situation is such that now we should not [should] hurry with Georgia in the sense of turning it into a Soviet one, anyway, in a few months, if the communists are legalized, it will become Soviet anyway [...] We are not worried about the false statements of Gegechkori, but telegrams from you and Smilga about the readiness to occupy Tiflis by May 12, which we consider absolutely incompatible with our policy [...] ”(Ibid. L .6-8).
7 See note 9 to document No. 71.No. 74
Telegram to G. K. Ordzhonikidze V. I. Lenin, I. V. Stalin
May 8, 1920
I consider Comrade to be the best candidate. Kirov, Mdivani's second candidacy. Pre-Control Commission - Kavtaradze. The members of the commission were Dumbadze and Tsintsadze 1 . Lenin's telegram made a tremendous impression 2. Today, the operational, administrative, organizational subordination of the Azerbaijani army to our command has been made. A big shortage of workers for the Economic Council. I have just received, by direct wire from Vladikavkaz, excerpts from a letter from the secretary of the regional committee, Nazaretyan. “On May 2, on the basis of the indignation of the soldiers who did not want to go to the front, there was an attempt to seize power in Tiflis, but unsuccessfully. On our side, one was killed, two were wounded and three were arrested. Governor-General Sulakvelidze shot them last night. Sandro Makharadze, who led the operation, escaped. The government introduces a state of siege today. The work is now very difficult, but the mood of the masses and parts of the troops is growing daily. A coup is expected. In Batum, the British command is making concessions. The overwhelming majority of the Batumi workers are behind us. On April 30, General Lyakhov was killed by three young men. Gubeli was arrested for this, but at the demand of the workers the British command released him, and on the first of May, in an English car, he was taken directly from prison to the meeting, and the next day he came to us.
Report it to the center. In Abkhazia, the performance is expected by May 10. It pushes through Northern Svaneti to the Gori district, this completely disperses the forces of the government. Mikha Tskhakaya was again arrested in Kutais. All Tiflis prisoners were transferred to Kutais. On May 1, our speakers attracted a large mass of listeners, 4 trucks, decorated with our slogans and posters, went to Golovinsky. They were attacked by units of a special detachment and the police. 55 people were beaten to a pulp, wounded and arrested. Official information about the execution of 12 communists. Throughout Armenia, with the announcement of Soviet power in Baku, there was a solemn and joyful mood among the masses. In Erivan and Alexandropol, all Dashnak party premises were destroyed. The portraits of the leaders are torn and burned” 3 .
Ordzhonikidze.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 85 Op. 13. D. 17. L. 2-3. Uncertified typewritten copy.
Notes:
1 We are talking about the formation of the governing bodies of the Georgian Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Ordzhonikidze sent the first telegram on this issue to Lenin on May 7, 1920 (RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 13. D. 17. L. 1). The provisional Central Committee of the CP(b)G was formed on May 20, 1920.
2 See note 9 to document No. 71.
3 This information by Nazaretyan, reported by Ordzhonikidze to Lenin and Stalin, with the exception of the part concerning Abkhazia, is outdated. Perhaps the purpose of the message was a kind of pressure on Lenin to speed up the process of Sovietization of Georgia.
No. 75
Telegram from G. V. Chicherin to G. K. Ordzhonikidze
May 11, 1920
Tov. Ordzhonikidze.
Our policy is world politics, and is not limited to the Caucasus alone. In all your messages you absolutely ignore our world interests. By actions arising from local interests, you can terribly damage our world relations. With regard to England, we must not speed up the process, our peace with Georgia will have the greatest effect in England, complicating the policy of the Churchill group, this will increase our prestige throughout the world. A barrier is useful to us at the moment. You must at all costs keep your comrades from adventures that could harm us terribly. The question of these or those gorges recedes before the main world ones, but the gorges you listed are not given to Georgia at all. You are mistaken. The border was determined by the Revolutionary Military Council for relations with the Caucasus Front 1. The local Georgians confirm that the Zakatalsky district belongs to Georgia 2 , however, due to your protest, we put pressure on the Georgian troops not to enter there. In all disputable questions, the final decision will be in our hands, but you, for your part, will facilitate our task by preventing adventures.
May 11, 1920
Chicherin.
Transmitted 12/1-4 o'clock. 30 minutes.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 2/S. D. 4. L. 4. Typewritten copy.
Notes:
1 We are talking about the border between the RSFSR and Georgia, established in accordance with the peace treaty of May 7, 1920.
2The long-standing conflict between Azerbaijan and Georgia over the Zagatala district was used by the Soviet authorities of Azerbaijan and the representatives of the Caucasian Regional Committee of the RCP (b) who stood behind them as a pretext for the rapid sovietization of Georgia by force. In a telegram dated May 10, 1920, Ordzhonikidze, Kirov and Smilga assured Lenin that the Zagatala district transferred to Georgia under the May 7 agreement "is undeniably Azerbaijani and Muslim territory", reported that with the "blessing" of Moscow, Georgia launched an offensive against this district and threatened with an Azerbaijani-Georgian war (RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 2 / S. D. 1. L. 4). On May 11, 1920, Smilga gave the command of the 11th Army an order not to withdraw “units of the 11th Army that had entered the Zakatala District [...] until the border between Georgia and Azerbaijan was established [...]” (Ibid. F. 5. On. 1. D. 2436. L. 35). In an attempt to defuse tensions, the RSFSR government acted as a mediator in the Azerbaijani-Georgian-Armenian negotiations on borders and disputed territories.
No. 76
Telegram to G. K. Ordzhonikidze to L. M. Karakhan, V. I. Lenin, I. V. Stalin
May 24, 1920
Moscow - the Kremlin, Karakhan. Copy to Lenin and Stalin.
Armenia can be blown up, but as I pointed out, this will cost very large food difficulties. I do not think that the Dashnaks 1 would agree to let our troops and weapons through to Turkey. In any case, the fact that you propose to openly declare to Armenia the demand to let us through to the borders of Turkey would cause indignation among the Armenian masses. For the time being, we will occupy the Nakhichevan-Ordubat-Dzhulfa 2 region , and we will see from there. Today we received a letter from Kamil Pasha, in which he asks for help and offers an alliance 3. There is also a letter for Camila. Through our comrades, the Armenians propose, under our chairmanship, to resolve all disputes between Armenians and Turks in the region of Turkish Armenia. If an agreement is reached on this issue, Armenia will provide an opportunity for free communication with Turkey. There are no regular Turkish forces on the Armenian border, there are headquarters and armed local people around them. Once again, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the Georgians have sheltered the Musavatist government in Tiflis and they are operating from there. It is necessary that Kamil openly speak out against Nuri Pasha, who is provoking here 4 . He disappeared. In an hour I am leaving for Anzeli with Raskolnikov.
24/5 20 10 hours Baku.
Ordzhonikidze.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. On. 3/S. D. 1. L. 2-6. Autograph.
Notes:
1 Dashnaks are members of the Armenian bourgeois-nationalist party "Dashnaktsutyun" ("Union"), which arose in 1890 in Tiflis. From May 1918 to November 1920 the ruling party of the Armenian Republic.
2 Disputed territories on the border between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
3 The appeal of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey to the government of the RSFSR with a request to establish diplomatic relations and military assistance was considered by the Bolshevik leadership of Russia in the context of a possible pretext for the relatively bloodless sovietization of Armenia and Georgia if the latter agree to let troops pass to the borders of Turkey. On May 23, 1920, Ordzhonikidze sent another telegram addressed to Lenin, Stalin and Chicherin, which, in particular, said: “[...] I consider any assistance to the Turks through Armenia under the Dashnak government more than doubtful. Its Sovietization is possible, but it is associated with great food difficulties [...]” (RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. On. 1. D. 2436. L. 39).
4 The commander of the Turkish troops in the Caucasus, Nuri Pasha, was one of the leaders of the anti-Soviet rebellion organized by the Musavatists in Ganja (Azerbaijan), which began on May 26, 1920. The 11th Army suppressed the rebellion.
No. 77
Telegram from L. D. Trotsky to F. F. Raskolnikov
May 26 [1920]
Komflot Raskolnikov.
I report the main policy directives in Persia 1 : “First, no military intervention under the Russian flag. No Russian expeditionary corps. An all-out emphasis on our non-interference with a direct reference to Moscow's demands to remove Russian troops and the Red Navy from Anzeli, so as not to arouse suspicion of an attempt to capture. Second, to provide all possible assistance to Kuchuk Khan and the people's liberation movement of Persia in general with instructors, volunteers, money, etc., handing over the territory we now occupy into the hands of Kuchuk Khan 2. Thirdly, if the participation of military courts is necessary for the success of the further struggle of Kuchuk Khan, leave them under the flag of the Republic of Azerbaijan and provide assistance to Kuchuk Khan on its behalf. Fourth, secretly help and leave a broad Soviet ... organization in Persia. Fifth, we need to make ruling England understand that we ... are not going to it in Persia, in general in the east and are ready to give real guarantees of our non-intervention. Notify immediately of receipt of this telegram. 26 of May. Trotsky 3 .
RTSKHIDNI. F. 17. Op. 109. D. 100. L. 5. Certified typewritten copy.
Notes:
1 Apparently, this telegram was a response to a request from Ordzhonikidze, sent by him on behalf of the party and military leadership of Transcaucasia on May 23, 1920: “[...] Give us precise instructions on what policy to follow in Persia. Ardabil is occupied by Muslim units. Without much difficulty we can blow up the entire Persian Azerbaijan south of Tabriz. My opinion: with the help of Kuchuk Khan and the Persian communists, start a struggle for Soviet power and expel the British. This will make a tremendous impression on the entire Middle East. Everything will be done from the outside as it should [...]” (RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. On. 1. D. 2436. L. 39). On May 25, 1920, the question of Persia was considered in the context of a discussion of the line of Eastern policy as a whole in the Politburo. The decision made, in particular, stated: “To approve in general the policy of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, which intends to support the liberation movement of the peoples of the East, a) Make Comrade Raskolnikov responsible for providing the necessary assistance to Kuchuk Khan with property, instructors, etc. the power of the last Anzeli and other points of Persia, which are in our hands, to remove the fleet from these points, declaring that this is done by order of the Soviet government, in view of the latter’s complete unwillingness to interfere in the internal affairs of Persia. To leave in Anzeli some part of the courts under the guise of a police service, but under the Azerbaijani flag in the amount necessary for constant assistance to Kuchuk Khan [...]” (Ibid. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 83. L. 1) .
2 On May 18, 1920, the combined forces of the rebels led by Kuchuk Khan and the Red Army expelled the British from Anzali, where the first Soviet Persian government was proclaimed. The new government asked the governments of the RSFSR and Soviet Azerbaijan to establish diplomatic relations and conclude a military treaty. The text of the appeal was set out in Raskolnikov's telegram to Lenin, Trotsky, Chicherin, Nemitz dated May 18, 1920 (Ibid. Op. 109. D. 100. L. 1-2).
3 The telegram was sent from Moscow, presumably to Baku, and then handed over to the commander of the Caspian flotilla, Raskolnikov and Ordzhonikidze, who left for Anzeli.
No. 78
Telegram from F. F. Raskolnikov to L. D. Trotsky, V. I. Lenin, G. V. Chicherin
June 7, 1920
Accepted: 6/VI-1920
Only tov. Lenin1.
Moscow tov. Trotsky, a copy to Lenin, a copy to Chicherin. Through Politkont, through his personal responsibility for urgent transfer to the address.Just arrived from Rasht. On the night of June 4-5, a provisional revolutionary government of Persia2 was formed in Rasht, consisting of the chairman of the provisional revolutionary government and administration and military commissar - Comrade Mirza Kuchuk, the commissar of finance - Mirza Magomed Ali - Bazarl, the commissar of trade - Mirza Abul Kazum Reza Zadeh, the Commissioner of Justice - Mahmud Agha, the Commissioner of Posts and Telegraph - Nasrullah, the Commissioner of Public Education - Khoja Magomed Jofar, the Commissioner of National Economy and Agriculture - Mirza Magomed Ali Khan Khummi. All members of the provisional revolutionary government are old associates of Comrade. Mirza Kuchuk and Participants of the First Persian Revolution3. Along with the provisional revolutionary government, a revolutionary military council was formed with the following composition: Yehsakhulla ... Samkh Muzafet Zadeh. Two other members of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Persian Republic were elected our Russian comrades, the communists Kozhanov [and] Abukov. Despite the strenuous requests of Comrade. Mirza Kuchuk and his associates on the entry of our comrades into the Revolutionary Military Council, I stated that they would provide the fullest assistance, but they would not temporarily enter the Revolutionary Military Council. I ask for your instructions as to whether comrades Kozhanov and Abukov, for whose political preparedness I can absolutely vouch for, join the Revolutionary Military Council of the Persian Republic, or this should not be done. Perhaps you will allow them to enter the Revolutionary Military Council of Persia by completely transferring to the Persian service and formally breaking with Soviet Russia4. The Provisional Revolutionary Government of Persia, at a meeting of which I was present, conveyed to me that at the forefront of its activities it puts the implementation of socialism on the basis of the principles of comrade. Lenin. At present, Comrade Mirza Kuchuk considers it expedient to put forward only one slogan: "Down with the British." After the occupation of Tehran, when the need to support the khans at first would be fully used, he announced the transfer of land to the people. The Provisional Revolutionary Government of Persia told me that, in view of their inexperience in public affairs, they are asking for both our constant instructions and assistance by seconding specialists to the Persian service. First of all, specialists on Soviet construction and income tax issues are needed. I ask you to inform me whether it is possible to count on sending relevant specialists and all kinds of instructors from the center, or whether it will be necessary to deploy on our own. Today, June 6, the provisional revolutionary government will openly announce its existence in a solemn manifesto to the Persian people. As soon as I receive this manifesto, I will hand it over to you. At the same time, Mirza Kuchuk draws up a secret note addressed to Comrade Lenin.
The entire population of Reshta, without distinction of class, met Mirza Kuchuk with unprecedented enthusiasm. At a rally in front of a crowd of thousands, Mirza Kuchuk announced his alliance with the Russian Bolsheviks and, as a sign of this alliance, kissed our representatives to the stormy applause of the crowd. According to your instructions, the expeditionary corps was disbanded by me. Yielding to the urgent requests of Comrade. Mirza Kuchuk, our first landing detachment of the flotilla and the cavalry battalion of military commanders entered the city of Rasht as volunteers in the Persian service and receiving maintenance and allowances from the Persian Revolutionary Government. In view of the strength of the military-political situation in Anzali, our cruisers and destroyers left Anzali for Baku. The British hastily retreat. Rasht was abandoned by them without a fight as soon as they, through their excellent espionage, learned about the impending attack on Rasht by the troops of Mirza Kuchuk. They burned uniforms and part of the food, not being able to evacuate from Rasht. Now, according to available information, a hasty evacuation of Qazvin is underway, and the British are retreating not to Tehran, but to Baghdad. The mood of the Hindu troops5 is resolutely against a war with the Bolsheviks. To us in Anzeli and to Comrade. Mirza Kuchuk defected a total of 20 Hindus, whom we received extremely cordially and surrounded with great attention. The Indian defectors say that our first shot will be the signal for the Indians to put the British officers on bayonets. The British command took into account the unreliability of the Hindu troops and, when the Hindu troops retreated, armored cars followed. The official organ of the government in the Sukub de Oula, Iran,6 published in Tehran, is full of articles welcoming friendship with the Soviet government of Russia. According to the same newspaper, the Persian Shah arrived in Tehran on June 3 after a long trip abroad. The chief of staff of the Persian Cossacks division, Captain Kondratiev, came to me and, on behalf of the chief of the division, Staroselsky, declared that the Russian command of the Persian Cossacks division would obey the orders of the Russian government, and since that is the Soviet government at present, he came to me to introduce himself and receive further instructions. I explained the situation to him and recommended to the head of the division, remaining aloof himself, to use all his influence to ensure that the interim government had a painless, bloodless entry into Tehran. In addition, I categorically forbade the recruitment of former officers of the volunteer army for service in the division. Kondratiev with these instructions has now left for Tehran. The division of the Persian Cossacks numbers from eight to nine thousand Cossacks and, being the only real force, actually holds Tehran in its hands. The one and a half thousand Persian Cossacks remaining in Rasht under the command of the Russian officer Bulazell declared [about] their loyalty to Comrade. Mirza Kuchuk. Less reliable was the gendarmerie, which, already during our stay in Rasht, was about to leave the city at night, but was detained. In addition to instructors and volunteer detachments, we have already placed at the disposal of comrade. Mirza Kuchuk mountain battery and communications service battalion. One of these days armored cars, airplanes, rifles and machine guns will be sent from Baku. Along with the support of Mirza Kuchuk, we are taking measures to organize cells of the Persian Communist Party Adalet8. This business is developing poorly due to the lack of proper Persian workers. Two Persian communists, who had gone through the Baku school of class struggle, came with us to Anzali, comrades Dzhevat Zade and Agayev. But, due to their tactlessness, one had to be sent to Baku, and the other left, putting him under the supervision of Comrade Abukov. The Adalet party is not very popular, while for Comrade. Mirza Kuchuk, who also professes communist views, but is not a member of the party, is followed by the entire population. Mirza Kuchuk impressed me as a revolutionary who certainly deserves trust, and I believe that our entire stake should be placed on him9. 6/VI 1920. Raskolnikov.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 17. On. 109. D. 100. L. 3-4. Typewritten text.
Notes:
1 On the first page of the telegram is the stamp of the Secretariat of the Pre-revolutionary Military Council of the Republic.
2The first composition of the revolutionary government was formed in May 1920 (See note 2 to document No. 77), but, officially, its composition was named only after the liberation from the British of Rasht, the central city of Gilan, a region of Iran on the southwestern coast of the Caspian Sea . The main goal of armed assistance to the Iranian rebels was the sovietization of the country, as can be seen from subsequent correspondence. However, speaking with an official report at a meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR on June 17, 1920, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Chicherin said: “[...] We touched the Persian masses when the remnants of Denikin's fleet were escaping in Anzeli. We made a landing only to finish off these remnants of Denikin's fleet, and we have already cleared Anzali. Our troops and fleet left Persian territory and Persian waters [...]” (Documents of foreign policy of the USSR. M., 1958. V.2. pp. 658-659).
3 This refers to the Iranian national liberation revolution of 1905-1911.
4 On June 8, 1920, the Politburo decided: “The Central Committee sees no way to prevent or prohibit comrades Abukov and Kozhanov, since they renounce the citizenship of the RSFSR, go over to the citizenship of Persia” (RTSKHIDNI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 86. L. 3).
5 We are talking about Hindu units as part of the occupying British corps.
6 This refers to the printed edition of the Shah's government.
7 Persian Cossacks are elite government units organized in Iran with the assistance of military representatives of the Russian army in tsarist times.
8 We are talking about the Iranian Social Democratic Party Adalat. In June 1920, at the congress of the Adalat party in Anzali, a decision was made to rename the party into the Iranian Communist Party (ICP). After the first congress, the party entered the Comintern.
9 The bet on Kuchuk Khan did not materialize. On June 22, 1920, Ordzhonikidze telegraphed Trotsky to his inquiry on this matter: “[...] Kuchuk Khan has no units of his own. In that part of Persia where he is, there is no broad active revolutionary movement, there is only hatred for the British. The departure of the British from Rasht was caused by our demand in Anzali. Without our help at first it is difficult to move things forward. Sending Russian units there is by no means expedient. Today we are sending Azerbaijani Muslim units [...] We are forming a Persian regiment [...]” (Ibid. F. 85. Op. 17. D. 8. L. 1-2).
No. 79
Telegram from G. V. Chicherin to G. K. Ordzhonikidze
JUNE 19, 1920
June 19, 1920 By direct wire, immediately transfer to Rostov-on-Don for immediate transfer to Baku under the personal responsibility of the politkont in Rostov.
Tov. Ordzhonikidze. Send to Baku or Vladikavkaz and hand over at the location.
The policy of peace and compromise with bourgeois Georgia, Dashnak Armenia and Turkish nationalists was dictated by the Central Committee of the party for reasons of common policy and must be pursued unswervingly. Keep comrades from actions that go against her. Our representatives - Kirov in Tiflis and Legrand in Erivan - will carry it out, counteract the frauds of the governments, and protect the communists. We should not bombard the Ossetians: on the contrary, we should keep them, protecting them from repressions. If a counter-revolutionary center has been created in the Zakatala district, this is contrary to the agreement 1. Kirov will liquidate it, but we must not send new troops there. Karabakh, Zangezur, Shusha, Nakhichevan, Julfa should not join either Armenia or Azerbaijan, but should be under the Russian occupation authorities with the creation of local soviets, because any other solution would frustrate our policy of peace, required by the general provision 2 . We are counting on you. We send a representative to Baku to carry out the policy established by the Central Committee of the Party.
June 19, 1920
Chicherin.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 2/S. D. 4. L. 5. Certified typewritten copy.
Notes:
1 This refers to the Soviet-Georgian agreement of May 7, 1920.
2These are disputed territories. On May 22, 1920, in a telegram to Lenin, Stalin and Chicherin, Ordzhonikidze insisted on bringing troops into the disputed territories: “I think that the regions of Shusha, Nakhichevan, Orduban and Julfa will be occupied without resistance from the Armenians [...]” (Great October Socialist revolution and the victory of Soviet power in Armenia, p. 346). Nevertheless, the issue of disputed territories was resolved in Moscow with representatives of the Armenian government. On May 25, 1920, the Politburo decided to “continue negotiations with the government of Armenia without taking the initiative of immediate Sovietization with the help of Russian troops [...]” (RTsKhIDNI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 83. L. 1 ). Not wanting to allow a positive result for the Armenians, Ordzhonikidze in a telegram dated June 19, 1920 addressed to Chicherin wrote: “[...] Azerbaijan claims Karabakh, Zangezur, Nakhichevan and Sharuro-Daralagez district. Soviet power was proclaimed in Karabakh and Zangezur, and the above-mentioned territories consider themselves part of the Azerbaijan Soviet Republic. Nakhichevan has been in the hands of the Muslim rebels for several months [...]” (Ibid. F. 85. Op. 13. D. 32. L. 3).
No. 80
G. V. Chicherin - Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b)
June 22, 1920
22/VI 1920.
In the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP.
The indiscipline of the Baku comrades] and the blatant contradiction between their actions and the political line established by the Central Committee make it necessary to take measures to curb them. Such a measure should be the appointment from here of an authoritative comrade, not connected with the Caucasian group of leaders, with authority from the Council of People's Commissars, as a representative in Baku. While the Central Committee decided to pursue a line of compromise with the bourgeois governments of Georgia and Armenia, to tear the ground out from under the feet of the Entente by diplomatic means and rejected the Sovietization of Armenia, considering it untimely to divert more of our forces in this direction, the Baku comrades, by their actions, disrupt compromises , reject the conclusion of an agreement with Armenia demanded by the Central Committee, promote uprisings 1, insist on the annexation to Azerbaijan of those disputed territories that it was decided to occupy with our forces and the annexation of which to Azerbaijan would make an agreement with Armenia completely impossible. All this combative policy of the Baku comrades is fundamentally contrary to the line already established by the Central Committee. The disruption of the latter can only be avoided if an authoritative representative of the center systematically restrains local comrades. The best thing would be the appointment in Baku of our representative comrade. Sokolnikov. If this is not possible, we see no other candidate than Comrade. Salkinda 2 .
At the same time, we must finally accelerate the implementation of our plans in Turkey. It is impossible to procrastinate and drag out the matter as we are dragging it out. The conjuncture will be missed, all hope for us will disappear. Comrade Eliava stayed here because of consideration of the question of Turkestan 3 . We must hasten to put an end to this matter. Tov. Eliava must immediately go to Turkey 4 . What is supposed to be sent there can be sent following 5 . The main thing is that he immediately begin his political activities there.
People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs Georgy Chicherin.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 314. L. 10. Typewritten text. Signature - autograph.
Notes:
1We are talking about the uprisings that took place in May - early June 1920. In the first days of May, uprisings organized by local communists with the support of the Caucasian Regional Committee of the RCP (b) took place in Alexandropol, Erivan, Kars, Sorokamysh, Bayazet-Kazakh and other settlements Armenia. On May 10, the Military Revolutionary Committee of Armenia, formed in Alexandropol, declared Armenia to be Soviet. However, the Armenian government managed to suppress the uprising by May 14. Many of its organizers were arrested. . On May 23, 1920, a new uprising with the creation of the Revolutionary Committee and the announcement of Soviet power was organized in the Caravanserai district of Armenia (RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 3 / S. D. 1. L. 1; The Great October Socialist Revolution and the victory of Soviet power in Armenia. pp. 350-351). On June 11, 1920, Ordzhonikidze ordered the commander of the 11th Army to provide military assistance to the Armenian rebels of the Kazakh district (Ibid., p. 365).
On June 22, the question "On the policy in the Caucasus" was considered in the Politburo. It was decided: “To propose to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs [c]to formulate exactly the instructions [...] to the most responsible workers in the East on the basis of the Politburo resolutions that have been available so far and the conclusions arising from them. Oblige the military department to submit this instruction, after the approval of the Politburo, to the leadership of all responsible military workers with a warning that they undertake to strictly comply with these instructions in all their actions. Give the same instructions to all members of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee. Instruct the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to send instructions to comrades Kirov and Legrand ”(RTsKhIDNI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 90. L. 4). On the proposal of the NKID, the “Instruction to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian Front” was discussed and approved at a meeting of the Politburo on July 7, 1920 (Ibid. D. 94. L. 2). With reference to the existing treaties and agreements between the RSFSR and the republics of Transcaucasia, the instruction, in particular, stated: “[...] One should definitely refrain from attempts to provoke an uprising against the government of Georgia, Armenia and Turkey. It is necessary to explain to those elements in these republics who are striving for a revolution that, for general political reasons, in view of both the world conjuncture and our military situation, they should not at present proceed with the realization of their goal [...] Since our military situation does not allow the occupation of the Russian parts of Karabakh, the Zangezur district, Nakhichevan, Julfa, Sharuro and the Daralagez district, the Russian military authorities should limit themselves to occupying those areas disputed between Armenia and Azerbaijan that are now occupied by them [...] with the elimination of interference by the troops of one or another neighboring republics, as it was already decided by the Russian government and handed over to the Soviet authorities in the Caucasus [...]” (Ibid. L. 7-8). At the same meeting, the Politburo considered the proposal of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to appoint Axelrod as a representative in Baku. The adopted decision said: “Reject, in view of the decision already taken place on Comrade Sergo” (Ibid., L. 2).
3 A set of questions on Turkestan was considered by the Politburo on June 29, 1920 (RTSKHIDNI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 92. L. 4-7).
4 See note 1 to document No. 83.
5 This refers to helping the Turkish rebels with money and weapons (See Document No. 83).No. 81
G. V. Chicherin - Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b)
June 22, 1920
22/VI 1920
TO THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP
The main question arising from the reports of the Galician communists who arrived here is whether it is possible for us to take under our protection and include Eastern Galicia within the limits of our power. After Baku, this is the most important source of oil in Europe. There, English, American and French capitals are fighting each other over the possession of oil. If we are strong enough to extend our power so far, we will dictate terms to England. If, on the contrary, we intercept over the edge, we will only achieve that England will go berserk, send Krasin, etc. This is a pure question of power. A year ago we did not go there, because Denikin was in the rear. Now the situation is different. But the decision can only be taken by an instance that surveys all our forces.
According to the Galician communists, Eastern Galicia has outlived the illusions of nationalism and is ripe for Sovietism. An uprising in the rear of the Poles would be a huge plus. But we can go to assist such an uprising and to promote the Sovietization of Galicia only if we decide in one form or another to extend the sphere of our power there.
The Galician communists assert that Eastern Galicia wishes to become part of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic and is only waiting for our call. Some skepticism is never misplaced. Perhaps an immediate action in the spirit of the annexation of Galicia would be imprudent. We cannot guarantee that we will not push away some elements. Better to go at a slower pace. It is entirely expedient to create a Galician Revolutionary Committee to carry out Soviet policy in Galicia, organize uprisings there, concentrate Galician units on the Galician front and prepare for a future merger with Ukraine. The members of the Revolutionary Committee were designated by the Galician communists. They will discuss the details of this plan with Comrade. Rakovsky. One thing that must be done now is to decide whether we can extend our scope of action so far at all .
NARKOMINDEL Georgy Chicherin
RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 314. L. 11. Typewritten text. Signature - autograph.
Notes:
1 On June 22, 1920, the Politburo considered Chicherin's note. The decision on this issue stated: “Approve the proposal of comrade. Chicherin on a cautious policy protecting the independence of Eastern Galicia” (RTSKHIDNI, F. 17, Op. 3, D. 90, L. 4).
No. 82
F. E. Dzerzhinsky - V. I. Lenin
June 26, 1920
26/VI-1920
Kharkov
Dear Vladimir Ilyich!
I hasten to answer that I did not obey only the letter of the order of the Central Committee 1 , I am not at the dacha, but I am intensively treated with hydrotherapy. Doctors found only nervous fatigue, and everything else is in perfect order, including the lungs. And I am being treated diligently - wanting to work more.
The internal situation here is generally going uphill. It can be said with confidence that if the Center tirelessly pushes and sends workers, then Ukraine will soon become honest, Soviet. The villagers are tired of gangs and yearn for solid power. Every honest worker of ours sent to the provinces finds ground, and the results are already visible. Only these workers are terribly few. Local communists are some kind of noobs, they live in petty interests. I didn’t notice any rudeness, and I didn’t hear any complaints either. In the area of my specialty - there is a bountiful harvest 2. All, one might say, the average Ukrainian intelligentsia are Petliurists. A huge hindrance in the struggle [is] the absence of Chekists - Ukrainians. I have no luck with Makhno. It was possible to deal with him soon, having cavalry. I didn't have it. Only now I manage to put together a regiment from the squadrons that I managed to beg. I hope to put this regiment into action in a week.
I would like the Central Committee to decide how long I should stay here. My stay here increases the pace of the work of the Cheka, and it seems to me that a further stay is necessary. But from Moscow, Comrade Ksenofontov and others in the Cheka and the Main Committee of Labor complain that I have spent too much time in the Ukraine and work there is suffering from this. It's hard for me to decide. I'm thinking of staying here for another two weeks, then returning to Moscow for a week, and then coming back here. I will wait for the decision of the Central Committee *.
Hello F. Dzerzhinsky.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 2. On. 1. D. 14505. L. 1. Autograph.
Notes:
1 We are talking about prescribing Dzerzhinsky a course of treatment in connection with extreme nervous and physical overwork.
2 In April 1920, Dzerzhinsky was sent to Ukraine to lead the fight against banditry. In May-July 1920, he was head of the rear of the Southwestern Front.
3 The underlining in the last paragraph was made by Lenin. At the request of Lenin, Krestinsky sent a telephone message to Dzerzhinsky on July 4, 1920, in which, in particular, he said: “In response to your letter to Vladimir Ilyich dated 26/VІ on the question of the length of your stay in Ukraine, I inform you: We are waiting for you in Moscow for the plenum, i.e. . not later than July 15; you will probably have to stay here for two weeks (the plenum, the International, the meeting of the Komtrudov), then you can return to Ukraine ”(RTsKhIDNI. F. 2. On. 1. D. 14505. L. 2).
No. 83
G. V. Chicherin - Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b)
June 28, 1920
June 28, 1920
In the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP.
By a resolution of the Politburo, it was decided to provide assistance with weapons and gold to the government of Mustafa-Kemal in Turkey, and at the same time Comrade Eliava was appointed ambassador to Turkey .
By another resolution of the Central Committee, it was decided to provide assistance to Afghanistan with gold and military equipment 2 . With regard to Persia, it was decided to provide assistance with equipment and instructors (Kozhanov and Abukov) 3 .
All these resolutions (and others) show that our policy in the east is determined, if not by direct assistance by the armed forces against the Entente, then in any case by assistance in arms and gold.
On the basis of these resolutions of the Central Committee, we made corresponding statements and promises that must be implemented.
We have been feeding Afghanistan with promises for more than six months. To delay their implementation any longer would mean to frustrate our entire policy in Afghanistan. It is necessary to immediately send there the promised military equipment (the list was once sanctioned by the Politburo), if we do not want to lose Afghanistan and turn it from a friendly state into a hostile state.
Turkey must be given the promised assistance with weapons immediately, because delay, after the promises made, will force Mustafa Kemal to look at us as talkers and deceivers, and what is even more important, revolutionary Turkey can be crushed, while the help, insignificant, from the point of view of even our weak resources, would be of great practical and moral importance.
But despite the decisions taken by the Politburo, we cannot get weapons.
A policy that decides today and does not carry out its decisions the next day, promises help today and does not give it tomorrow, discredits us and undermines (we feel it) our enormous authority and influence in the East.
We encounter opposition in our work in the East in other ways as well.
The Eastern Department of the Academy of the General Staff trains workers for the East, we asked the War Department and the Central Committee to give us 23 people for Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, India and the Far East; after three weeks of trouble, almost all of our 23 candidates are sent to the western front, most of them knowing eastern languages and more than half of them Muslims. This is being done at a time when there are Russian general staff officers of the 1st course who have not studied oriental languages and who have not been sent to the western front. This is a peculiar form of opposition to our Eastern policy. We asked the Central Committee to put at our disposal at least those of the General Staff who know Turkish, Persian and Hindu languages. Otherwise, we will not be able to send missions to Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan 4. And this will mean, not in words, but in deeds, the failure of the Persian Republic , 5 the probable failure of the revolutionary struggle in Turkey and the abandonment of our work in India.
We note that what we are asking is an insignificant, insignificant part of what is needed for the Western Front, but this insignificant thing in the east gives unexpected enormous results, and we think that our successes in the east are in general connection with victories in the west are of some importance, for which both military equipment and a grain of our manpower 6 should be spent .
NKID Georgy Chicherin.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 314. L. 12. Typewritten text. Signature - autograph.
Notes:
1 The decision to appoint Eliava as the diplomatic and military representative of the RSFSR under the Turkish national government of Kemal was made at a meeting of the Politburo on June 8, 1920. The protocol of the Politburo meeting does not contain a decision on material and military assistance to Turkey (RCKHIDNI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 86. L. 4).
On May 22, 1920, the Politburo adopted a decision “On Afghanistan”: “a) Suggest to Comrade Karakhan in further negotiations to try to achieve a reduction in the required, b) Be sure to set a longer deadline for the delivery of the required items, c) Establish exact forms of exchange” (Ibid. D. 81. L. 2).
3 See Note 4 to Document No. 78. The decision to provide equipment and instructors to the Persian rebel movement was taken at the suggestion of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs at a meeting of the Politburo on May 25, 1920 (Ibid. D. 83. L. 1).
On June 29, 1920, the Politburo adopted a resolution on this issue, which, in particular, stated: “Provide 14 non-Russian General Staff officers who know Eastern languages at the disposal of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs [...]” (Ibid. D. 92. L . 8).
5 We are talking about the Republic of Gilan on the territory of Iran, proclaimed on June 5, 1920. In July 1920, the united national liberation front in Gilan disintegrated.
On June 29, 1920, the Politburo adopted a decision “On Turkey and Afghanistan”: “Instruct Comrade Comrade Sklyansky and Karakhan to reach an agreement tomorrow on the issue of Turkey and Afghanistan” (Ibid.).
No. 84
Telegram of L. D. Trotsky to I. V. Stalin, V. I. Lenin, S. S. Kamenev
July 3, 1920
ON A DIRECT WIRE.
TO STALIN, copy TO LENIN, copy TO Glavkom 1 .
The scoundrel Lloyd George again spoke of the inviolability of Wrangel's Crimean refuge. It is quite obvious that the only way out is such a crushing onslaught, in which we will break into the Crimea on the shoulders of Wrangel without stopping and immediately spread along the Crimean coast with serious artillery in our hands. In the event of an attempt by the British to bombard the cities, it is necessary to sink at least one ship. The whole task is to prepare and ensure the continuity of our onslaught to Sevastopol. Now that things are going well on the Polish front , we can, without weakening the Polish front, temporarily concentrate our attention and forces on carrying out the operation against Wrangel. Please let me know your thoughts. July 3, 20
Pre-revolutionary military council TROTSKY.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. On. 1. D. 2433. L. 88. Typewritten text.
Notes:
1 In the upper left corner - a note: "Sklyansky"; over the text - Sklyansky's autograph: "Sk".
2 We are talking about the Southwestern Front, whose troops in the summer and autumn of 1920 operated in two strategic directions - the western (against Poland) and the Crimean (against Wrangel). In the western direction, after the Kyiv operation successfully carried out in May-June 1920, the troops of the front went on the offensive, inflicted a number of defeats on the Polish troops and reached Lublin and Lvov in August.
No. 85
G. V. Chicherin to N. N. Krestinsky
July 5, 1920
Tov. Krestinsky.
Copy.
Dear comrade,
It is extremely necessary to urgently raise the question of our representation in Persia in the Central Committee of the Party. Tov. Raskolnikov1 points out that at the head of the Persian Soviet movement are people who have absolutely no experience whatsoever in practical political life. It is imperative that they have with them comrades with political experience, capable of giving them all the necessary instructions. Mirza Kuchuk himself is accustomed to partisan life and his worldview does not extend further, but he accepts the advice of more experienced comrades, especially those representing Soviet Russia, with the greatest willingness and readiness. He carried out everything that Raskolnikov told him with the greatest accuracy. After the departure of the latter, there was no one left in Persia who could play this role. Not even real political experts. Tov. Raskolnikov recommends that Comrade. Mdivani, whom comrade Stalin warmly recommended on other occasions. He does not have a global political outlook, he is a Caucasian figure, but he knows the Middle East perfectly and, in the opinion of Comrade. Raskolnikov, for this role, he is perfect. With him as an expert or adviser, we would propose to send comrade. Broido. The latter's explanations showed that the accusations directed against him by us should have been directed against the Turkcommission itself. His personal qualities are not such that he could be entrusted with an uncontrolled responsible role, but if there is Comrade in Persia. Mdivani, then with him the remarkable knowledge and abilities of comrade. Broido [could] be used to great advantage2.
In addition, there must be a person on our territory in charge of unofficial assistance to the Persian Soviet movement. Officially, our troops and fleet have been withdrawn from Persia and we cannot officially provide any assistance to the Persian movement. But volunteers are sent there privately and weapons are sent in the form of private trade,3 and the independent Republic of Azerbaijan is also free in its relations with the Persian movement. There must be a certain person directing these unofficial actions, giving instructions to the Azerbaijani volunteers, etc. The head of our naval forces in the Caspian Sea cannot be such a person. The Commander of the Naval Forces of the Republic has already made a report to the Commander-in-Chief in the sense of eliminating the relevant points from the instruction to the Chief of our Naval Forces in the Caspian Sea. So, for these tasks there must be a special person. The Caspian fleet will not be subordinated to him; but since it will be a question of policy towards Persia, this person will also give directives to the Caspian fleet. Comorsi4 under agreement with Comrade. Raskolnikov recommends Comrade for this role. Ordzhonikidze. Indeed, there is currently no more suitable one in the Caucasus5.On all points it is urgent to obtain the decision of the Central Committee.
With communist greetings Chicherin
RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 314. L. 15-16. Typewritten text. The signature is an autograph.
Notes:
1 In May - June 1920, Raskolnikov, as commander of the Volga-Caspian military flotilla, took part in hostilities in Iran.
On July 7, 1920, the Politburo decided: “To instruct the Orgburo to consider the issue of appointing Comrade Mdivani to the post of diplomatic representative to Persia or replacing him with another candidate. Tov. Leave Broido in Moscow to work [...] on training workers for Turkestan” (RTSKHIDNI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 94. L. 1). On July 18, 1920, a telegram from Mirza Kuchuk was addressed to Lenin: “The revolution in Persia needs experienced and devoted revolutionaries. It is also necessary to know the peculiarities of Persia [...] I ask you to send comrades for work as far as possible, and, first of all, I ask you to send Commissar Commissar from Baku. Mdivani [...] he was here recently, we understood each other very well [...]” (Ibid. Op. 112. D. 53. L. 42). The Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee granted this request (Ibid. L. 5).
3 The amount of this assistance can be judged from Ordzhonikidze’s telegram to Deputy Chairman of the RVSR Sklyansky dated July 9, 1920: “[...] I report: for the maintenance of troops in Persia and party work, the monthly need of 500,000 fogs is equal to 1,200,000 Russian gold currency. I ask for 10 million gold currency for six months [...]” (Ibid. Op. 109. D. 15. L. 79).
4 Commander of the naval forces of the Republic.
On July 7, 1920, the Politburo decided to entrust Ordzhonikidze with providing assistance to the “new Persian government” (Ibid. Op. 3. D. 94. L. 1).
No. 86
Telegram from J. V. Stalin to V. I. Lenin
July 13, 1920
Moscow — Kremlin, Lenin 1
The Polish armies are completely falling apart, the Poles have lost communications, control, Polish orders, instead of getting to the address, more and more often fall into our hands, in a word, the Poles are experiencing a collapse from which they will not soon recover. This circumstance is obviously well known to Curzon, who is now trying to save the Poles with his proposal for an armistice .. The same circumstance should explain the proposal about Wrangel, for with the defeat of Poland, Wrangel loses its importance, and the British lose the Crimea. You are absolutely right when you say that they want to wrest victory from our hands. I propose: first, in a reply note about Poland, do not give a definite answer, emphasize in general terms the peacefulness of Russia and say that if Poland really wants peace, she could appeal to Russia directly. This gives a gain in time. Secondly, about Wrangel, it is necessary, firstly, to emphasize that Curzon's mediation between Wrangel and the Soviet [Russian] government, once already taking place, did not justify itself, and secondly, to point out that the Crimea has not yet been torn away from Russia, and Wrangel is Russian general,with which Russia itself can establish this or that mode, just as it generally arranges its internal affairs on its own 3 , that all internal issues, including the Crimean issue, Russia will resolve independently 4 . I think that imperialism has never been as weak as it is now, at the moment of the defeat of Poland, and we have never been as strong as we are now, therefore the firmer we behave, the better it will be both for Russia and for the international revolution. Report the decision of the Politburo 5 .
Stalin 6
RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 1815. L. 2-5. Autograph.
Notes:
1The telegram was sent from Kharkov (headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southwestern Front) to Moscow and is a response to Lenin's telegram sent to Stalin on July 12 or 13, 1920: “[...] A note has been received from Curzon. Curzon proposes an armistice with Poland on the condition that the Polish army withdraw behind the line assigned to it by the peace conference last year [...] Everything to the east remains with us. Our army must withdraw 50 kilometers east of this line. A conference of representatives of Soviet Russia, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland will be held in London [...] Representatives of Eastern Galicia will be admitted there [...] We are invited to conclude a truce with Wrangel under the condition of Wrangel's removal to the Crimea. Wrangel goes to London to discuss the fate of his army, but not as a member of the conference. We are given a week to respond [...] I ask Stalin: 1) speed up the order for a frenzied intensification of the offensive; 2) inform me of his, Stalin's, opinion. I personally think that this is a complete scam for the sake of annexing Crimea [...]” (Lenin V.I. PSS. T. 51. S. 237-238). On July 13, 1920, Trotsky sent a telegram similar in content to Chicherin, Lenin, Krestinsky, Stalin and Kalinin (The Trotsky papers. Vol. 2. P. 228-230).
2 In a note to the Soviet government dated July 11, 1920, Curzon demanded to stop the advance of the Red Army beyond the Grodno-Yalovka-Nemirov-Brest-Litovsk-Dorogusk-Ustilug line, established in December 1919 by the Supreme Council of the Entente as the eastern border of Poland and recognized by Poland only in connection with the unfavorable course of hostilities for her. This line was called the Curzon Line.
3 Text in italics crossed out by Stalin's hand.
4 On July 14, 1920, Stalin, in furtherance of this idea, telegraphed Lenin: “[...] Curzon's note speaks of a conference in London with the representation of Russia. My opinion is that if we ever have negotiations with Poland, they should be conducted in Russia, because to arrange negotiations in London, appointing Krasin as your representative, means placing the matter under the tutelage of England. Keep in mind that our ciphers in London are deciphered by the British, because there is no cipher that would not be deciphered ”(RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 1818. L. 1).
On July 16, 1920, the plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) decided to reject the mediation of England in the negotiations between the RSFSR and Poland and continue the offensive of the troops of the Western Front on the territory of Poland. On July 17, 1920, a corresponding note was sent to Curzon (Documents of Foreign Policy of the USSR, vol. 3, pp. 47-53). On the same day, Lenin informed Stalin and Smilga about this (Lenin V.I. PSS. T. 51. P. 240).
6 On the reverse side there is a note: “13-14. VII 1920". In addition, a typewritten copy of the same telegram has been preserved, dated sending - 13/VIІ-1920 at 23:30 and receiving in Moscow - 14/VIІ-1920 at 0:35. There is a note on the copy: “Deciphered in SNK 14 / VTI-1920, 2 hours 28 minutes.”
No. 87
I. S. Unshlikht to V. I. Lenin
July 15, 1920
(Personally) To Comrade LENIN 1 .
July 15, 1920
In response to your letter 2 : I) we declare in the most solemn form to the workers and peasants of Poland that we do not encroach on the integrity of Poland within its ethnographic borders, we are ready to recognize this border, if this corresponds to the desire of the working masses, even to the east line indicated by the Entente 3 . 2) If only our military resources allow it, we will continue the war until the complete defeat of the Polish White Army and the fall of the bourgeois government. 3) The Red Army continues the offensive to the border indicated by the Entente. If before this moment we do not agree with the Entente on terms guaranteeing a longer respite 4or, if there is no uprising of the working masses of Poland, we continue the offensive on the territory of Poland, arm the Polish workers and farm laborers, create a provisional military revolutionary committee and solemnly proclaim the destruction of landlord property and the nationalization of factories. Our further stay in Poland is determined by the will of the workers and peasants. 4) We consider a Soviet coup in Poland with the withdrawal of our troops to its borders in the near future quite probable given the resistance of the western regions of Poland "Poznan", which can be broken by a coup in Germany. It is difficult to determine the date of the uprising in Poland, and to a large extent it depends on the coordination of our actions on the territory of Poland and the Communist Party of Poland.
With com. hello Unslicht.
Fully agree with the answer: Doletsky, S. Budkevich, V. E. Budkevich.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. On. 1. D. 2528. L. 31. Typewritten text. Signature - autograph.
Notes:
1 The letter was sent, presumably, from Minsk, where the RVS of the Western Front was located at that time, to Moscow. On the letterhead: “RSFSR. REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL OF THE REPUBLIC. Member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Western Front.
2 Between July 12 and 15, 1920, Lenin sent a telegram to the Defense Council of the Lithuanian-Belarusian Republic, of which Unshlikht was a member (V. I. Lenin. Biographical Chronicle. Vol. 7. P. 378). Maybe it's about her.
3 See note 2 to document No. 86.
4 In a telegram to Chicherin, sent on the same day, Unshlikht, detailing his and the members of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Western Front on Curzon’s peace proposals, in particular, wrote: “... The political [and] military situation requires the maximum development of our success , and therefore it is necessary to win in time. Our response to England must play an agitational role and draw the broad working masses of Europe into the struggle for peace. Simultaneously with these demands, our demands must be drawn up in such a way that they arouse serious objections on the part of the Entente and force it to demand a revision of our conditions, which is all we need to move forward [...] ”(RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. On. 1 D. 2528. L. 32).
No. 88
Telegram to G. K. Ordzhonikidze V. I. Lenin, G. V. Chicherin, I. V. Stalin
July 16, 1920
Through the political controller on a direct wire,
delivery time to inform.
Moscow Kremlin.
Lenin, Chicherin, Stalin.
Baku 16/VII-20
I consider it absolutely necessary to wait [with] peace [with] Armenia until the arrival of the representative of Azerbaijan, who is traveling according to the invitation of Comrade Chicherin 1 .
Peace with Armenia without the participation of Azerbaijan greatly unnerves the local comrades.
Massacres between Armenians and Tatars are inevitable in the Nakhichevan region. This can only be avoided by our advancement and occupation of the Nakhichevan region. We tried to carry out at least reconnaissance in this direction, but the statement of the RVSR about the insufficiency of our forces in this area *.
The political situation demands that a massacre be prevented in the Nakhichevan region, which is inevitable without our intervention. I think that we can continue to move for the purpose of reconnaissance. I'll get in touch with Chicherin today, and if he doesn't agree, we'll get our intelligence back. I repeat, reconnaissance is necessary 2 .
3. Oprodkomarm Comrade Eristov cannot get along with the Revolutionary Military Council. To the demand of the Revolutionary Military Council to form a divisional apparatus, he replies that he has the rights of an army commander and prescribes and proposes ... 3
RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 14. D. 5. L. 3-6. Autograph.
Notes:
1 We are talking about the negotiations between the RSFSR and Armenia on the settlement of the situation on the borders of Azerbaijan and Armenia. Disputable border issues were resolved for a long time without the participation of representatives of Azerbaijan, who hoped, together with representatives of the Caucasian Bureau of the RCP (b), to resolve them by force in their favor, and also use them as a pretext for further sovietization of the region. On July 8, 1920, Stalin telegraphed Ordzhonikidze: “[...] My opinion is that it is impossible to maneuver endlessly between the parties; it is necessary to support one of the parties definitely, in this case, of course, Azerbaijan and Turkey. I spoke with Lenin, he does not object [...]” (RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 3/S. D. 2. L. 11). Already on July 9, 1920, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia informed his representative in Georgia about the occupation of Zangezur by the Bolsheviks and demanded that this issue be raised before the Soviet plenipotentiary representative in Georgia, Kirov, and also to inform the head of the Armenian delegation in the RSFSR about what had happened (the Great October Socialist Revolution and the victory of Soviet power in Armenia, p. 372). This fact, combined with the invasion of the Soviet-Azerbaijani troops into Nakhichevan, served as a pretext for a new aggravation of the conflict. On July 22, 1920, Ordzhonikidze left for Moscow to resolve these and other issues of Eastern policy (RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 5 / S. D. 1. L. 1-3).
On July 19, 1920, Chicherin sent a telegram to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, in which, in particular, he stated: “[...] All the actions of Soviet Russia in the Caucasus are aimed at rendering friendly action to the further peaceful development of the Armenian people other neighboring peoples [...] Occupation by Russian parts of those areas that, in the process of struggle between neighboring peoples, have become disputed between Armenia and Azerbaijan, is aimed at preventing bloody conflicts that could have disastrous results for all participants and is calculated also on the creation of conditions that make possible a calm and impartial discussion of disputed territorial issues [...]” ((The Great October Socialist Revolution and the Victory of Soviet Power in Armenia, p. 373).
3 The end of the document is missing.No. 89
Telegram of I. V. Stalin to K. E. Voroshilov
July 22 [1920]
Revolutionary Military Council of the First Cavalry, Voroshilov.
Kharkiv 22/7 1
First, the Western Front is advancing successfully, the first line of the Polish defense - Neman - Shara - has already been broken [in] the Slonim area, if the Poles fail to stop us on the second line - Bug - Narew, then they will have to roll to the third line - Vistula - San. Now the Western Front is closer to Brest-Litovsk than the South[o]-Western Front. It is possible that in connection with this circumstance your army will have to abandon Brest and turn south. Second. You must know that we rejected the mediation of England, which proposed a truce with Poland, and expressed our consent if Poland herself turns to Russia without intermediaries 2 . You will understand that if Poland converts itself, we cannot refuse a truce, so it is necessary to hasten as much as possible in moving your army forward 3 .
Third. We are preparing reinforcement marches for you, the right of volunteer mobilization given to the Yugzap in the Don, Kuban, Northern Caucasus will be used in every possible way by the front to strengthen [primarily] your army.
Stalin.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 1841. L. 1-4. Autograph. The last paragraph is an autograph of an unknown person.
Notes:
1 A telegram was sent from Kharkov to the RVS of the 1st Cavalry Army.
2 See note 5 to document No. 86.
3 The idea of the need to speed up the offensive and occupy as much of the territory of Poland as possible before it applied for an armistice was expressed by Stalin in a telegram to the Politburo dated June 29, 1920 (RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 1777. L. 2).
No. 90
Telegram of I. V. Stalin to K. E. Voroshilov, S. M. Budyonny
JULY 23, 1920
First Cavalry. Voroshilov, Budyonny.
Decipher personally. Kharkiv 23/7 1
An offer of an armistice was received from Poland without the mediation of England, 2 with a request to give an answer no later than the thirtieth of July. Of course, you understand that we are forced to agree. Proceeding from this, the most impetuous offensive from you towards Lvov is required, and in general you need to try to get the maximum of what we can take 4 before the thirtieth 3 . This is the source of our latest directive on Lvov. The Central Committee of the Party asks you to make one more effort, maybe the last one, and then to rest.
Stalin.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D., 5547. L. 2. Autograph on a telegraph form.
Notes:
1 A telegram was sent from Kharkov to the RVS of the 1st Cavalry Army.
2 A radiogram from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland with a proposal for an armistice and the opening of peace negotiations was received on July 22, 1920.
3 The deadline set by the Polish side for responding to its proposals for an armistice and peace negotiations.
fourOn July 23, 1920, the question of negotiations with Poland and England was discussed in the Politburo. The adopted decision stated: “Instruct Comrade Chicherin to reply with a note [...] that we agree to send our representatives to meet with the Polish for negotiations on an armistice and peace and instruct our command to negotiate such a meeting [...]” (RTSKHIDNI. F. 17. List 3. D. 96. L. 2). On the same day, Stalin, Yegorov and Berzin sent a telegram to the RVS of the 12th, 14th armies and the 1st Cavalry army, in which, in particular, they ordered: “[...] [In] the event of the appearance of Polish parliamentarians of their must be taken by organizing measures of the strictest supervision and vigilance. It is necessary to take measures so that this message about the proposal of the Poles does not yet reach the attention of the Red Army. The acceptance of parliamentarians does not in the least contradict the fact that your progress has been accelerated. Vice versa, the situation obliges you to hit harder and rapidly continue the offensive without the slightest delay [...] ”(Ibid. F. 558. On. 1. D. 5548. L. 2-3). On July 24, 1920, in a telegram to the command of the Polish army, the commander of the troops of the Western Front, Tukhachevsky, explained the continuation of hostilities by the Soviet units by the difficulty of communication between them (Documents of Foreign Policy of the USSR, vol. 3, p. 65).
No. 91
Telegram from J. V. Stalin to V. I. Lenin
July 24 [1920]
Moscow - the Kremlin, only to Lenin.
Kharkiv 24/7 1
First, the situation on the Budyonny front is good. The enemy, apparently, set the goal of exhausting the parts of Budyonny, because instead of the split parts of the enemy, new ones appear every time, and climb on Budyonny like flies. This circumstance somewhat slows down our progress 2. Yesterday we ordered Budyonny to break through the front and occupy Lvov before the thirtieth of July, it is possible that this operation will succeed. Secondly, we are preparing an offensive on the Crimean front, which can be launched no earlier than August 5-10. If the enemy does not forestall our advance, the operation must succeed for sure. We take guarantee measures. Thirdly, I convey my opinion in response to your note No. 371. Now that we have the Comintern, a defeated Poland, and a more or less tolerable Red Army, when, on the other hand, the Entente is seeking a respite in favor of Poland in order to reorganize, rearm Polish army, create cavalry and then strike again, perhaps in alliance with other states - at such a moment and with such prospects, it would be a sin not to encourage the revolution in Italy. I have to admit that we have already entered a period of direct struggle against the Entente, that the policy of tacking has already lost its predominant importance, that we can now and must pursue a policy of offensive (not to be confused with a policy of rushing in) if we want to retain the initiative in foreign affairs, which we won recently. Therefore, the question of organizing an uprising in Italy and in such still weak states as Hungary, the Czech Republic (Romania will have to be defeated) must be put on the agenda of the Comintern. Three hundred thousand lumpens in Germany, even if they really existed in nature, of course, do not and cannot change things. In short: it is necessary to weigh anchor and set off on the road before imperialism has had time to get its disordered cart in the slightest degree in order, and it can still somehow fix it for a certain period, and he himself did not go on a decisive offensive. Fourth, the telephone conversation did not work out, because someone is listening on the line, interfering. I will report daily on the situation at the front by note.
Stalin.
RTSHIDNI; F. 558. On. 1. D. 5551. L. 3-4. Autograph.
Notes:
1 The text of the telegram is written on the inside cover of the Kommunist magazine, an organ of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U, No. 1.
2On July 25, 1920, Stalin sent a telegram to Voroshilov and Budyonny: “[...] The actions of your cavalry over the past week are striking in their non-cavalry character: until now, you usually acted in whole divisions, bypassed the enemy, hit him with horse masses; now you are acting in a strange way in separate brigades, tearing off squadrons from one division and attaching to another, crushing the cavalry masses into small parts and depriving them of specifically cavalry power, in a word, you are acting like bad inexperienced infantry, as a result of which enemy infantry often bypasses you, enters you rear. I repeat, you didn't have this before. This conversion of cavalry into infantry began, according to my guess, from the time the General Staff infantrymen appeared in your field headquarters. If my guesses are correct, I ask you not to succumb in the future to the influence of infantrymen of the General Staff, inexperienced in the cavalry, and to return to the old tactics of operations by whole divisions. If I am mistaken, please let me know your opinion” (RTSKHIDNI, F. 558. On. 1. D. 5552. L. 2-5).
No. 92
Telegram from I. V. Stalin to L. D. Trotsky
July 26 [1920]
Predrevsov[et] Trotsky,
copy of the Central Committee of the RCP.
Kharkov 26 July.
Another failure on the Wrangel Front is due to the belated approach of fresh divisions from the north, which can concentrate no earlier than August 10. Wrangel is obviously aware of the redeployment of divisions and is trying to warn us . Not a small role was played by the fact that Moscow does not pay due attention to the Crimean Front. In my opinion, the formation of a special Crimean Revolutionary Council will not be a plus. The whole question lies in the indicated circumstance, and not in the organization of a special Revolutionary Military Council for the Crimea. The last one is redundant in my opinion .
The loss of Orekhov and, even, Aleksandrovsk should have been expected in the event of Wrangel's attempt to warn us even if we were not ready. Now that Wrangel's strike has begun, our failures will probably continue for some period. I repeat, this is the question, not the formation of a new revolutionary council. That's why I find your suggestion 2 redundant .
Stalin.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 1868. L. 2-4. Autograph.
Notes:
1 Text in italics was crossed out by Stalin's hand and was not included in the text of the sent telegram.
2 In connection with the failures on the Polish and Wrangel fronts, the Central Committee of the RCP (b), at the suggestion of Trotsky, discussed the issue of separating the Crimean sector of the Southwestern Front into an independent Southern Front. Stalin was against this. The final decision on the division of the fronts was made at a meeting of the Politburo on August 2, 1920 (See: Lenin V. I. PSS. T. 51. P. 247).
No. 93
Telegram from I. V. Stalin to L. D. Trotsky
July 28, 1920
Trotsky.
We intend to issue and distribute the order for the total extermination of the Wrangel command staff at the time of our general offensive.
Stalin.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 1875. L. 1. Handwritten text on a telegraph form.
No. 94
Telegram from I. V. Stalin to S. M. Budyonny and K. E. Voroshilov
[July 29, 1920]
First Cavalry.
Budyonny, Voroshilov.
We succeeded in insisting that the terms of the armistice be handed over to the Poles by us on the 4th of August, and not on the 30th of July . So you have four more days at your disposal. In addition, before receiving a formal order from the front, you can beat the Poles regardless of the timing. All this I tell you quite formally. So, hit the Lions, now you have time.
Stalin.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 5549. L. 2-3. Autograph.
Notes:
1 . On July 27, 1920, the issue of peace negotiations with Poland was considered by the Politburo. The decision, in particular, stated: “To approve the plan for dividing the peace talks with Poland into two sessions, the second to coincide with the 4th of August so that Poland sends persons authorized to sign preliminary peace conditions to this session” ( RTSKHIDNI, F. 17, List 3, D. 97, L. 1).
No. 95
Telegram from J. V. Stalin to V. I. Lenin
July 29 [1920]
Moscow Kremlin.
Only Lenin.
Kharkiv 29/VII 1 .
Tough fighting continues along the entire Crimean front, Orekhovo and neighboring stations change hands. Advancing along the entire front, Wrangel thinks of frustrating our forthcoming offensive, or, in any case, provoking us to a premature, insufficiently prepared offensive. Character and endurance are required of us, Wrangel's possible partial successes and the possible loss of some points cannot be of serious importance. Therefore, while conducting an active defense, we decided to persevere in concentrating new forces for the main attack. In the end, Wrangel will achieve that, jumping and jumping on us, he will exhaust his strength and then find himself in the face of our fresh forces. Please inform me about our plans in connection with the Polish truce 2. Budyonny reports that due to the exhaustion of the cavalry, it will probably not be possible to take Lvov before the thirtieth .
Stalin.
RTSHIDNI; F. 558. On. 1. D. 1881. L. 2-3. Autograph.
Notes:
1 On the reverse side of the second page of the document is the date "29/VII-20". On the typewritten copy of the same telegram, preserved in the file, there is Sklyansky's autograph: "Sk" and a note: "t. Sent to Lenin” (RTSKHIDNI, F. 558. On. 1. D. 1881. L. 4).
2On July 29 or 30, 1920, Stalin sent a telegram to Lenin, in which he outlined his views on the requirements for Poland in the event of peace negotiations: “Demobilization of the army and the military industry, arming the workers as the main guarantee of peace, class, the main culprit of the war and vandal destruction during the war - I propose to put these three main points and the secondary points arising from them as the basis for negotiations [...] ”(RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 5553. L .2-3). On July 31, the Politburo approved the draft armistice agreement with Poland (Ibid. F. 17. Op 3. D. 99. L. 1, 4-9). Later, in the face of a retreat, on August 25, 1920, the Politburo decided to concede to the British and refuse to demand that the workers be armed (Ibid. D. 104. L. 2).
3 In response to the report of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 1st Cavalry of July 28, 1920 about the unsuccessful attempt to take Lvov due to the large concentrations of enemy forces, Yegorov and Stalin on July 29, 1920 gave Voroshilov and Budyonny a new order to capture Lvov: “[... ] Your answer about the impossibility of completing the task by the deadline - the capture of Lvov - is completely incomprehensible [...] ”(Directives of the command of the fronts of the Red Army. T. 3. M., 1974. P. 235).
No. 96
Telegram from J. V. Stalin to V. I. Lenin
July 31 [1920]
Moscow - the Kremlin, only to Lenin.
Kharkiv 31/7.
I already wrote that Commander- in-Chief 1 is coming to our front 2 . Today he writes that he is canceling the trip due to the situation on the Western Front. It seems to me that he was simply scared, intimidated by Wrangel's actions and does not want to connect himself with the fate of our operations against Wrangel, in which he apparently does not believe, although it is clear that such a connection remains, despite the cancellation of the trip. Wrangel continues frenzied attacks along the entire front, parts of Denikin 3 interned by Georgiaalready at Wrangel and are fighting with us at the front, in the Orekhov region, after fierce fighting, we lost six guns, in the Berdyansk region, the enemy is moving forward, took Verkhne-Tokmak, knocked out one of our armored trains. It can be said with certainty that the setbacks will continue until the concentration of our forces and the beginning of the strike, and the concentration of our forces is, as I already wrote, slowly, mainly because the Commander-in-Chief caught on late with the transfers, despite a number of warnings on my part. Tonight I'm leaving for the front with a comfront.
Stalin.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 1892. L. 3-5 Autograph.
Notes:
1 S.S. Kamenev. .
2 We are talking about the Crimean sector of the Southwestern Front.
3 This refers to military formations that were subject to internment from Georgia in accordance with the Soviet-Georgian agreement of May 7, 1920.
No. 97
Telegram from the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) to V. I. Lenin, L. D. Trotsky, N. N. Krestinsky, G. V. Chicherin
August 3 [1920]
Moscow Kremlin. Lenin, Trotsky, Krestinsky, Chicherin.
August 3rd
The Caucasian Bureau, having inquired about the decision of the Central Committee on the need to establish close ties with the Turkish revolutionary masses through Armenia 1 , while Sovietizing the latter, considers it its duty to indicate that the route of ties with Turkey should be established not through Armenia, but through Georgia, which it is more desirable to Sovietize for the following reasons :
the Sovietization of Georgia deprives the bases of the Terek and Kuban counter-revolutionaries and Wrangel's help to Georgia; 2) communication with Turkey is established by cabotage along the Black Sea coast, inaccessible to enemy ships; 3) Armenia, cut off from Europe, deprived of any help from England and America, will have to capitulate and surrender power to the Armenian communists, and this opens up a second path for Turkey; 4) according to the statement of the Komfront, for military-strategic reasons, Georgia is easier to conquer than Armenia. Taking the latter, the units are stretched out, having Georgia hostile to us on the flank, from which the possibility of a strike is not ruled out .
Caucasus Bureau.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 8. D. 23. L. 192-193. Handwritten text.
Notes:
On July 31, 1920, the Politburo accepted Chicherin's proposal on Armenia (RTSKHIDNI, F. 17, Op. 3, D. 99, L. 1).
2Following this telegram, Frumkin, a member of the board of the People’s Commissariat of Food and Beverage, in a telegram to the Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) Krestinsky, reported: “I consider it my duty to add to the telegram of the Caucasus Bureau about establishing contact with Kemal Pasha through Georgia, that under the present conditions the decision of the Caucasus Bureau is impracticable and harmful. The main task of this moment is to quickly eliminate Wrangel and the Kuban Troubles as a continuation of the Wrangel Front. Any task that deviates from this task is fatal. We run the risk of upsetting the economic front in the Sevkavkaz, which should work without interruption. My point of view is in full agreement with the Revolutionary Military Council of the Front (Caucasian Front - Comp.). Please inform Lenin [...]” (Ibid. Op. 109. D. 15. L. 96). In the answer of Krestinsky on behalf of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), sent on August 11, 1920 to two addresses - the Soviet Labor Army (Frumkin) and the Caucasus Bureau, it was reported: “The decision regarding Armenia was suspended by the CECA until the liquidation of Wrangel. The same applies to your proposal on Georgia [...]” (Ibid. L. 97). A day earlier, on August 10, 1920, the plenipotentiary of the RSFSR in Armenia telegraphed Chicherin about the conclusion of a peace treaty on behalf of the RSFSR with the government of Armenia (the Great October Socialist Revolution and the victory of Soviet power in Armenia. S. 384-385).
No. 98
Telegram from J. V. Stalin to V. I. Lenin
August 4 [1920]
Moscow. Only to Lenin, hastily .
Lozovaya, 4/8.
I report for orientation the following data on the Crimean Front: the first, at the front and [in] the immediate rear, the enemy had thirty-six thousand bayonets and fourteen thousand sabers by July 30, of which eighteen thousand bayonets and eight thousand sabers were put into battle; we have forty thousand bayonets and six thousand sabers at the front and [in] the immediate rear, of which only ten thousand bayonets and five thousand sabers are brought into battle (the rest are being brought up and concentrated); this is what explains our present failures; thus, the nearest reserve of the enemy is six thousand sabers and eighteen thousand bayonets, our nearest reserve is one thousand sabers and thirty thousand bayonets; obviously, if we are good with infantry in terms of reserves, then it is very bad with cavalry, because the enemy outnumbers us in cavalry by more than twice. Second. Just got your questions 1We do not need a division of fronts, but a strengthening of the Crimean sector, the transfer of all Western armies to the Western Front without breaking Yugozap's front-line apparatus, I have already outlined my considerations in a telegram addressed to Krestinsky 2 ; I have no deputy, the Central Committee can find one within two weeks; The commander-in-chief fails from the very beginning of the Crimean operation, because he (not only him) does not underestimate the Wrangel danger and is always late with the fulfillment of his promises exactly as much as Wrangel needs, there are a lot of examples, writing about them is an empty occupation; As for our diplomacy, I will keep silent about it, it would be better to talk about it later when we meet. Third. You must already know that we took Kovel, Lutsk and Bugach.
Fourth. Just sent me your request about the prospects on the fronts in anticipation of the plenum of the Central Committee 3. I don’t know why you actually need my opinion, therefore I am not able to convey to you the conclusion you demand and I confine myself to reporting bare facts without coverage: Budyonny’s hitch is temporary, the enemy threw the Lvov, Lutsk and Galician groups on Budyonny in order to save Lvov, Budyonny he assures that he will defeat the enemy (he has already taken a large number of prisoners), but Lvov will obviously be taken with some delay. In a word, Budyonny's hitch does not mean a turning point in favor of the enemy. As for Wrangel, although we are now weak for the reasons stated above, we still hold the enemy back; not later than in a week we will put into play thirty thousand fresh bayonets and, according to all information, we will create an advantage on our side, we will move Wrangel from his position, and our position will improve every day, for the belated parts will fit. Of course, war is a game and it is impossible to take everything into account, but since it can be foreseen at all, Wrangel's chances must necessarily fall. The general outlook on the fronts, in my opinion, is this: Poland is relaxed and in need of a respite, in view of which we must lay down conditions that make it impossible for bourgeois Poland to recover. Wrangel will be shot down [in] the next few days, and if the Commander-in-Chief sends us cavalry, Wrangel will be completely eliminated by the beginning of autumn.
Stalin.
RTSHIDNI; F. 558. On. 1. D. 5556. L. 3-6. Autograph.
Notes:
On August 3, 1920, Lenin sent a telegram to Stalin, in which he raised questions: about the division of fronts, about Stalin's deputy, about the position of the Commander-in-Chief, about the activities of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs (Lenin V. I. PSS. T. 51. P. 248).
2 We are talking about Stalin's telegram of August 4, 1920, in which it was proposed to combine forces in the Western direction, transferring the troops of the 2nd, 1st Cavalry and 14th armies to the Western Front so that the rest of the forces of the Southwestern Front were directed against Wrangel. On August 5, 1920, Stalin's proposal was considered by the Politburo. The adopted decision stated: “To approve the option proposed by Stalin, adopted by the RVSR” (Izvestiya of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 2, pp. 121, 123).
3 This refers to Lenin’s telegram to Stalin dated August 4, 1920, in which Lenin asked to send “an opinion on the nature of the hitches at Budyonny and on the Wrangel front, as well as on our military prospects on both of these fronts” in connection with the upcoming plenum of the Central Committee ( Lenin, V. I. PSS, vol. 51, p. 249). At the plenum of the Central Committee on August 5, 1920, the question of the situation on the Wrangel front and in the Kuban was considered. The decision was made: “To recognize that the Kuban-Wrangel front must go ahead of the western front and therefore the Orgburo and the People’s Commissariat of War must take the most energetic measures to send military forces and communists to this front” (Izvestiya of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 2. S. 12b).
No. 99
Telegram from J. V. Stalin to V. I. Lenin
[August 12, 1920]
Lenin.
First, I would like to greet you and myself with victory, but I must confess that I do not believe in Lloyd George's statement, transmitted by Kamenev .
Secondly, our current blow to Wrangel cannot be crushing, since, due to the unmanagement of the headquarters, the northern divisions were transferred to the Crimean front slowly at long intervals, and we were forced to bring them into battle in parts, without waiting for the arrival of the rest of the troops, for example, a brigade Volunteers have not yet been brought up in their entirety, since the field headquarters for some reason set the standard for transporting one echelon per day, and there are twenty-three echelons in total in the brigade. My impression is that the Commander-in-Chief and the brothers are sabotaging the work of organizing the victory over Wrangel, in any case, they do not show a tenth of the desire to win, which they undoubtedly showed in the fight against Poland. In addition, the Commander-in-Chief refuses to provide cavalry 2 . In view of this, our present attack on Wrangel cannot be considered decisive.
Stalin.
RTSHIDNI; F. 558. On. 1. D. 1940. L. 1-3. Autograph.
Notes:
1 The telegram was a reply to Lenin's telegram of August 11, 1920: Kamenev's dispatch has just been received. England was afraid of the general strike, and Lloyd George announced that he was advising Poland to accept our armistice terms, including disarmament, and the transfer of weapons to the workers, and land, and so on. Our victory is great and will be the most complete if we finish off Wrangel. Here we take all measures. Go ahead and take the whole Crimea with the current blow at all costs. Everything now depends on it. The Poles are pulling and did not arrive on time. For us, this is archivally beneficial ”(Lenin V.I. PSS. T. 51. S. 254-255).
On August 12, 1920, Stalin and Yegorov sent a memorandum to S. S. Kamenev with a proposal to withdraw the 1st Cavalry Army to the reserve of the Southwestern Front "in case of Romania's intervention." On August 13, 1920, Kamenev issued a directive on the inclusion of the 1st Cavalry Army, along with the 12th Army, into the Western Front. (From the history of the Civil War in the USSR. Vol. 3, pp. 350, 351). Stalin's telegram to the Commander-in-Chief dated August 13, 1920, in particular, stated:
[...] Your latest directive [...] unnecessarily overturns the established grouping of forces in the area of these armies, already on the offensive; this directive should have been given either three days ago, when the cavalry was in reserve, or later, after the cavalry took the Lvov region [...] In view of this, I refuse to sign the corresponding order of Yugozap in development of your directive [...] ”(RTsKhIDNI F. 558. On. 1. D. 4137. L. 1). On August 14, 1920, in a telegram to Lenin, Stalin again complained about the Commander-in-Chief and asked for a definite decision of the Central Committee regarding the Wrangel Front (Ibid. D. 5567. L. 2).
On August 19, 1920, at a meeting of the Politburo on the report of Trotsky and Stalin on the military situation on the Polish and Wrangel fronts, it was decided to withdraw the 6th division of the 1st Cavalry Army to the Wrangel front. True, in the event that a protest motivated by military considerations followed from S. S. Kamenev, the issue was subject to revision in the Politburo (Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 3. P. 160).
No. 100
I. V. Stalin - Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b)
[August 30, 1920]
TO THE POLITBURO OF THE CC 1 .
I propose that the Central Committee form a commission of three [persons] (through the Defense Soviet) to examine the conditions of our July offensive and August retreat on the Western Front . Give the commission a two-week deadline. I propose Comrade Serebryakov as chairman of the commission (if the Central Committee does not have a better candidate ) .
I. STALIN.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 5213. L. 1. Typewritten copy.
Notes:
1 In the upper left corner of the telegram, a note: “Ex. PB item 21 No. 40 І/IX-20”, below: “30/VІІІ”.
2 In mid-August 1920, the Polish army went on the offensive and, building on success, by the end of the month pushed the Soviet troops back to the borders of Poland.
3 On the same day, August 30, 1920, Stalin submitted a statement to the Politburo, in which he connected the failures on the Polish front with the mistakes of the country's top military leadership. In particular, he called the lack of serious combat reserves the main drawback of military policy and proposed adopting a “program for the formation of combat reserves of the Republic” (Stalin I. V. Works. Vol. 4. P. 348-350). Stalin's proposal was considered at a meeting of the Politburo on September 1, 1920. The adopted resolution stated: "to take into account Trotsky's message that the military department is taking measures in the spirit of Comrade Stalin's proposal [...]" (Izvestiya of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 3. S. 162).
No. 101
K. E. Voroshilov — G. K. Ordzhonikidze
September 4, 1920
Mother of God (near Hrubezhov) 4/IX-20
Hello, dear friend, Grigory Konstantinovich!
First of all, I thank you with all my heart for the memory of our, and to this day still, glorious army, which, despite all the difficulties, beats the pans. We have repeatedly intended to send you letters and delegations, but the continuous and fierce battles with accursed dark Poland prevent everything.
I use the last expression quite deliberately. We expected uprisings and revolution from the Polish workers and peasants, but what we got was chauvinism and stupid hatred of the “Russians”. Of course, if we managed to get to Lodz-Petrokov and the Dombrowski district, the situation would change dramatically [would], but so far the situation is rather unimportant. Our army, I can honestly testify, has fulfilled and is fulfilling its revolutionary duty. We exterminated a fair amount of Poles. Some prisoners were taken up to 20 thousand [thousand]. In general, more than 20 thousand [thousands] were cut down and destroyed. You may be struck and surprised by the large number of exterminated lords in relation to the prisoners, but this should not be surprised, because the "lords" fight brutally and inflict great damage on us. The bitterness of the fighters can be brought to the maximum by the stubbornness of the Poles, and in such cases our guys cut mercilessly. Our losses on the Belopolska front are also enormous. We lost almost all of our command staff, military commissars and up to 10 thousand fighters, about the same number of horses. There are no refills anywhere. The tasks facing the army are still enormous. You can ask the question - why are our losses so great, because the Cavalry was famous for its invulnerability. Yes, dear Grigory Konstantinovich, that was in the Don and Kuban. Here, in swamps, forests, rivers and mountains, completely dug up and intertwined with endless rows of barbed wire, cavalry cannot be used at all. And only our army, with its iron endurance and incredible adaptability, could not only fight under these conditions, but also win, force impregnable rivers and take fortified forts and cities. From the moment of our appearance here, the White Poles gave the order not to get involved in their cavalry in a fight with us and force us to fight with the infantry or, as they wrote, "break against the infantry." Indeed, for three months of uninterrupted fighting, the gentlemen evaded giving us a cavalry battle, and only once in Brody (2-3 / VIII) did the gentlemen try their luck by throwing three regiments of cavalry at us, but the attempt was unsuccessful, because despite due to the extreme exhaustion of our units, the Polish cavalry was destroyed instantly. The Polish infantry fights stubbornly and skillfully. The explanation for this is the well-formed units of the green youth of the village and abundantly saturated with reliable command staff of the bourgeoisie and specialists. Cases of Poles defecting to our ranks are very, very rare.
During these three months, the army had dozens of general battles in which the pans tried to destroy our army. On the entire Western Front, our army is the most powerful magnet, attracting huge forces of the enemy. The cavalry suffered greatly, but its fighting spirit and desire to fight are still strong, and only physical exhaustion can undermine its heroic spirit.
The trouble, dear Sergo, is that in the center they know little about our army and do not sufficiently appreciate its invaluable service to the Soviet power and the revolution. The army is still poorly dressed and often goes hungry. I never for a moment forgot your promise to give the army cloaks. Dear comrade, if this could be done, you would render the army a true boon, and an invaluable service to the republic, since the fighting efficiency and morale of the army would rise to a significant extent. If the center could supply us with at least canvas cloaks, that would be wonderful, and I would not allow myself to disturb you and tear you away from your direct and most important affairs, but you yourself know that this task is beyond the power of the center, and without it I foresee that we will lose the army, because it is already raining for days on end, and the soldiers spend 15-17 or even more hours on horseback in the pouring rain. All this will soon get worse. The gentlemen, emboldened by the successes in the northern sector, will, of course, not give us rest, and are now exerting all their strength to put an end to our army, which they hate so much and for which they have to tear off their forces so much. I have no doubt that you, if it is in your power, will do everything to help this time the army, which is still so needed by the Workers' and Peasants' Republic. If it is impossible to get a large number of cloaks, then do the best you can, something is better than nothing. We have not yet received the daggers, but we know that the Baku proletarians, led by you, showed us their attention, and this moved us to tears. We always remember you as our best friend and comrade and as the most sensitive and most devoted revolutionary, sensitively reacting to all the illnesses of our revolutionary combat life and subtly understanding all the complexity, importance and grandeur of the moment being lived through.With all my proletarian soul I wish you success and happiness. Say hello and best wishes to your wife.
I embrace and firmly shake your hand.
With communist greetings
Yours K. Voroshilov.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 8. D. 201. L. 3-4. Autograph.
No. 102
L. M. Karakhan - Central Committee of the RCP
September 9, 1920
In the Central Committee of the RCP.
The recent events in Persia: the collapse of the "Soviet" Government in Gilan, the retreat from Resht and the threat of being driven out by the armed Anglo-Persian forces and[h] Persia in the face of the indifference and hostility of the Persians - raise the general question of our policy in Persia for the next period 1 . The situation in Gilan is portrayed as follows: due to political mistakes and political indiscretions, the cause of the revolution in the Gilan province (Anzeli and Resht) has been severely compromised. The revolutionary government did not have time to secure the sympathy of the population and, above all, the peasantry, the participation in the revolution of Russians, Armenians and Georgians (as foreigners) and their management as in a conquered country very quickly armed the entire population against us, weakened the hostile attitude towards the British, and trading circles even threw to the British.
Losing Persia now and leaving it to the British would now be a serious blow to us both internationally (as a sign of our weakness) and especially for England, this would be an indicator that we in the East have nothing to fear, because we can do nothing and resolutely retreat at the slightest failure.
Reports received from Persia, in particular, from comrade. Eliavs, show that the possible lines of our Persian policy could be:
1) The forces existing in Anzali are reinforced by an expeditionary force of 8-10 thousand people, which ensures that we completely occupy Tehran, overthrow the Shah's government and are completely sufficient for further struggle and the complete expulsion of the British from Persia. A non-communist, but Soviet-type government is being formed in Tehran, with the involvement of national-democratic elements in it. The policy of this government would base its calculations on the peasantry, while at the same time not affecting the interests (for the time being) of commercial capital. In order to carry out such a plan, Comrade Eliava is prepared and has the necessary and numerous employees.
2) We are leaving Persia, militarily securing Anzali behind us. We enter into relations with the Tehran Shah government (with which we have not interrupted relations and are in correspondence until the last days), send our diplomatic mission to Tehran and conclude a friendly agreement with the Shah government, pursuing agitation and propaganda goals (renunciation of royal treaties, concessions, privileges and the return of looted lands and property).
An ambassador from the Shah's government is already on his way to us; he is on the road to Moscow, in Turkestan, and, apparently, has the task of establishing friendly relations with us on behalf of the frightened Shah government. Our embassy in Tehran would have as its task, on the one hand, the organization, formation and material support of the national-democratic anti-British elements, and on the other hand, the communists, and thus would be doing work calculated for a comparatively long period.
The Central Committee must decide which of the two paths to take. Politically, the first line is now necessary, for it has an immediate effect and strikes England with a blow which, in the event of a change in England's policy, will have the most beneficial effect on the mood of Lloyd George and Curzon and will prove that we are a serious and immediate danger to England and that we put our aggression in the East, in direct dependence on England's policy towards us: we answer blows with blows.
The solution of the issue depends entirely on our military resources. Moreover, our entry into Persia cannot be considered in isolation, it will be a continuation of the Polish-Wrangel front both in the sense that we will have to snatch something from there, and because success in Persia will determine the measure of pressure from England and Poland and its allies, and , thus, can alleviate our position on the Polish front.
In the event that the Central Committee approves the first path, it is necessary to create a commission from the Comintern, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the Central Committee of the RCP to develop a plan of action and develop appropriate instructions for Eliava 2 .
L. Karakhan.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. On. 2. D. 208. L. 1. Typewritten text, signature - autograph.
Notes:
On July 19, 1920, Kuchuk Khan resigned from the government and left Rasht. Established on July 31, 1920, the government of Eskhanollah Khan, largely under the influence of Soviet advisers, began to pursue a leftist policy that alienated wide sections of the local population: it requisitioned the property of small landowners, merchants, artisans, and campaigned against the Koran and the clergy. In one of the October (1920) telegrams to Stalin, Ordzhonikidze, in particular, reported: “ [...] [In] Persia there is no revolution. Or occupation or withdrawal [...]” (RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 12. D. 12. L. 1).
On September 20, 1920, the Plenum of the Central Committee decided: “Give a directive to the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to adhere to the second of the lines proposed by him, i.e., negotiations with the Shah’s government, ensuring Anzali against the British will certainly be behind us” (Izvestiya of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 3. P. 164).
No. 103
JV Stalin to the Presidium of the IX Party Conference
September 23 [1920]
Comrade Stalin's statement 1 .
Certain passages in yesterday's speeches by comrades Trotsky and Lenin 2 could give comrade comrades the conference a reason to suspect me of misrepresenting the facts. In the interest of truth, I must state the following:
1) Comrade Trotsky's statement that I portrayed the state of our fronts in a rosy light does not correspond to reality. I was, it seems, the only member of the Central Committee who ridiculed the current slogan about the "march on Warsaw" and openly warned comrades in the press against being carried away by successes, against underestimating the Polish forces. It is enough to read my articles in Pravda.
2) Comrade Trotsky's statement that my calculations about the capture of Lvov were not justified contradicts the facts. In mid-August, our troops approached Lvov at a distance of 8 versts and they probably would have taken Lvov, but they did not take it because the high command deliberately refused to take Lvov and at the moment when our troops were 8 versts from Lvov, the command transferred Budyonny from the Lviv region to the Zapfront for the latter's assistance. What does Stalin's calculations have to do with it?
3) Comrade Lenin's statement that I am partial to the Western Front, that the strategy did not fail the Central Committee, does not correspond to reality. No one denied that the Central Committee had a telegram from the command about the capture of Warsaw on August 16th. The point is not that Warsaw was not taken on August 16 - this is a small matter - but the point is that the Western Front, it turns out, was in front of a catastrophe due to the fatigue of the soldiers, due to the lack of rears, and the command did not know this, did not notice . If the command had warned the Central Committee about the actual state of the front, the Central Committee would undoubtedly have renounced the offensive war temporarily, as it is doing now. The fact that Warsaw was not taken on August 16 is, I repeat, a small matter, but the fact that this was followed by an unprecedented catastrophe, which took 100,000 prisoners and 200 guns from us, is already a big oversight by the command, which cannot be ignored. That is why I demanded in the Central Committee the appointment of a commission3 , which, having found out the causes of the disaster, would insure us against a new defeat. T. Lenin, apparently, spares the command, but I think that it is necessary to spare the cause, and not the command.
23/9
I. Stalin.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 5570. L. 2. Autograph.
Notes:
1 In a somewhat revised form, this statement of Stalin was delivered by him on the morning of September 23 at the third meeting of the IX Conference of the RCP(b). For the text of Stalin's speech, see: The Ninth Conference of the RCP(b). protocols. M., 1972. S. 82.
2We are talking about the speech of Lenin and Trotsky at the IX All-Russian Conference of the RCP (b) on September 22, 1920. Speaking with the political report of the Central Committee, Lenin, referring to the question of Poland, in particular, said: “Where is now to look for a mistake? Perhaps a political mistake, perhaps a strategic one [...] There may be a mistake in the answer to Curzon's note on April 12, when they were told simply, don't give a damn about the League of Nations, let's go ahead. It goes without saying that we defined with the wrong definition [...] The Central Committee itself is unreasonably worried that we made a mistake and were defeated. But we do not undertake to correct this mistake, to appoint a commission. We need to resolve issues of current policy [...]” (RTSKHIDNI, F. 44. On. 1. D. 2. L. 27-28, 31). Speaking in the debate on the report of the Central Committee, Stalin reacted painfully to this remark. “We have before us,” he said, “at that time there were several facts. The first is Curzon's note [...] the second [...] is the growing revolutionary movement in England and Germany [...] the third fact is the advance of our troops on the Southwestern and Western fronts. Thus, the prospect opened before us from all sides that if we accepted Curzon's proposal, we would thereby risk giving a respite to Poland and the entire international bourgeoisie [...] Undoubtedly, the first thing the Central Committee had to do was to check the state of our fronts. The Central Committee sent requests, and in mid-August a telegram was received that we were taking Warsaw on August 16. This message, coming from competent and responsible persons, served as that extra weight, which outweighed the opinion of the Central Committee in the direction of continuing the offensive war [...] I must declare that in such a situation our Central Committee would not be a revolutionary Central Committee if it adopted other policy. When it turned out that the Komfront made a mistake in its assessment of the front, that a member of the Front's Revolutionary Military Council made a mistake, that the Central Committee was in some way let down by strategy, it is ridiculous to say that "if only beans grew in your mouth." Beans never grow in the mouth. Any other policy of the Central Committee would be reactionary. Therefore, I think that his logic was absolutely correct [...]” (Ninth Conference of the RCP(b). Protocols. M., 1972. P. 60-61). In his closing remarks, Lenin said that Stalin went over the edge and came to the defense of the military leadership (RTSKHIDNI. F. 44. On. 1. D. 2. L. 131).In turn, Trotsky, in his final speech on the report on martial law, accused Stalin. “Regarding intelligence,” he began his speech, “it’s absolutely right that our intelligence is not brilliant, especially undercover intelligence. It is based on the enthusiasm and devotion of the most excellent Party workers, who provide excellent political information, but who provide us with extremely insufficient and, in a military sense, illiterate military information. We received much more information about the complete disintegration, about the general panic that nothing would come of the attempt to strengthen the army (See document No. the period when we were approaching Warsaw [...] Now another objection. I ask, did you know that the living forces of the Polish army were not defeated. Comrades, I will allow myself to say that I was more skeptical than many other comrades, because it was on this question that I should have dwelled more than others, that is, whether the military forces of the Polish White Army were defeated or not. On this occasion, I had conversations with Comrade Stalin, and I said that one cannot be complacent with all sorts of reports that the forces of the Polish army were defeated, because the forces of the Polish army were not defeated, since we have too few prisoners compared to our successes and too little we captured of materiel. Tov. Stalin said: “No, you are mistaken. We have fewer prisoners than one would expect in accordance with our successes, but the Polish soldiers are afraid to surrender, they scatter through the forests. Desertion in Poland takes on the character of a huge phenomenon that is disintegrating Poland, and this is the main reason for our victories. What am I supposed to say that Comrade Stalin let me down and the Central Committee. Tov. Stalin was a member of one of the two Revolutionary Military Councils that beat white Poland. Tov. Stalin was mistaken and introduced this error to the Central Committee, which also entered as the main fact for determining the policy of the Central Committee. Tov. Stalin at the same time says that the Revolutionary Military Council of the Western Front has failed the Central Committee. I say that this is the assessment of the Central Committee. Tov. Stalin presented the matter in such a way that we had an ideally correct line, but the command let us down, saying that Warsaw would be occupied on such and such a date. This is not true. The Central Committee would be an extremely frivolous institution if it determined its policy by the fact that those comrades who talked about when Warsaw would be taken let us down, because the data they had were the same as ours ”(Ninth Conference of the RCP (b) Protocols, Moscow, 1972, pp. 76-77). These statements by Lenin and Trotsky served as the basis for Stalin to write a letter to the presidium of the conference and speech.
3 See Document No. 100.No. 104
Telegram from S. I. Gusev to L. D. Trotsky
October 20 [1920]
Moscow Predrevvoensovetresp Comrade Trotsky.
The Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front receives reports from the localities about the atrocities of the passing units of the 1st Cavalry, expressed in terrorizing the government, robberies, pogroms, lawless requisitions, etc. 1. In confirmation, I quote from the telegram of the Kremenchug Gubnachtyl dated October 15: “Passing units of the 2nd and 4th divisions of the 1st Cavalry, passing through the Cherkasy district, terrorize the authorities, rob and shoot residents and even the families of employees in the ranks of the Red Army, all cattle are stolen, mobilization of horses is arranged, the last horse is taken from the peasant. With a cry of "beat the Jews and communists" they rush through the villages and villages, there are dead and many wounded, including many Soviet workers. The families of Red Army Soviet workers, Volvoenkoms, Pre-revolutionary Committees, Komnezamozheys are completely plundered and beaten to a pulp. There are also facts of the murder and execution of Jewish Soviet workers. The authorities and the population flee in panic, hiding in the forests and fields. The results of the atrocities are already affecting those villages
To investigate this, the Cherkasy district appointed a commission of representatives of the military registration and enlistment office, the executive committee and the Workers 'and Peasants' Inspectorate.
The 20th of October.
Member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front GUSEV 2
RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 2435. L. 12. Certified typewritten copy.
Notes:
1Complaints about the 1st Cavalry Army were received quite regularly. Their number was so great that on September 19, 1920, Minin, a member of the RVS of the 1st Cavalry Army, sent a kind of protest letter to the Central Committee, in which, in particular, he wrote: “Until the last day, a number of communist workers, sometimes very respectable and well-deserved, heavy accusations are being leveled against the First Cavalry Army: this army is predominantly bandit, hooligan, anti-Semitic, anti-communist, etc., in this army, they say, it is extremely difficult for a communist to work, and the workers, very outstanding, but non-Russian nationalities, while in this army, definitely risk their heads [...] Nevertheless, it can be categorically stated that in the 1st Cavalry there are no more shortcomings than in any of the other armies [...] ”(RTsKHIDNI. F 2. On. 1. D. 15461. L. 2-3).
2 At the top of the telegram there is a note: “Copy to Comrade LENIN. Trotsky". At the end of the telegram there is a note: "Copy sent to Comrade Lenin."
No. 105
Telegram from L. D. Trotsky to L. B. Kamenev and V. I. Lenin
October 23 [1920]
TO COMRADE LV BORISOVICH KAMENEV.
COPY TO COMRADE LENIN.
Contrary to your assurances, the Revolutionary Military Council of the First Cavalry is unforgivably capricious and late . If possible, go to them for some serious pressure. The only way to avoid serious conflicts in the future, which could have a serious impact on deeds, is to make Budyonny and Voroshilov understand that the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and the Central Committee of the Party will not tolerate any disorganizing and independent actions .
October 23
Trotsky
RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. On. 1. D. 2435. L. 14. Typewritten text.
Notes:
1 In October 1920, the 1st Cavalry Army was transferred from the South-Western to the Southern Front. On October 15, 1920, Front Commander Frunze ordered the troops of the front to prepare for an offensive and concentrate units in specific sectors (From the history of the civil war in the USSR, vol. 3, pp. 410-411). The 1st Cavalry Army did not comply with the instructions and did not arrive in the designated area.
2On October 24, 1920, Lenin sent a telegram to the Revolutionary Military Council of the 1st Cavalry Army, in which he demanded "to apply the most heroic measures to accelerate the concentration of the 1st Cavalry" (Lenin V.I. PSS. T. 51. S. 315). On October 25, 1920, L. B. Kamenev telegraphed Lenin and Trotsky: “Your telegrams 973 and 977 have been received. All measures to accelerate the concentration of the 1st Cavalry will be taken. Together with Budyonny, Apostolovo arrived, where in a few hours a meeting will be held with the Komandyuzh and Komandarms 2 and 6 to work out final measures so as not to miss the enemy. If I find the conference useful, I will return to the 1st Konnaya to personally be present at the crossing. Apostolovo. 25/10 - 20" (From the history of the civil war in the USSR. T. 3. S. 418). From further correspondence it follows that after the October 26, 1920 meeting of army commanders, Kamenev returned to Moscow "because of the futility of further stay." On October 26, 1920, Budyonny and Voroshilov telegraphed Lenin and Trotsky about the adoption of emergency measures to speed up the concentration of the Cavalry (Ibid., p. 421).
No. 106
I. V. Kosior — G. K. Ordzhonikidze
November 13 [1920]
November 13
Grozny
Report
I present information by 10 pm on November 13 on the status of work on the eviction of the Cossacks from the villages of Yermolovskaya, Akan-Yurtovskaya, Samashinskaya, Mikhailovskaya and Kalinovskaya 1 :
1) Yermolovskaya - cleared of residents, work on collecting food is coming to an end.
2) Akan - Yurtovskaya - 1600 people were evicted, 1661 people remain for eviction.
3) Samashinskaya - 1018 people were evicted, 1900 people remain to be evicted.
4) Mikhailovskaya - 600 people were evicted, 2200 people remain to be evicted.
5) Kalinovskaya - evicted and handed over to receivers from the Terek Regional Land Survey Department.
In addition, 154 wagons of food were transported from the villages of Yermolovskaya, Akan-Yurt, Samashinskaya and Mikhailovskaya to Oprodkomarm in Grozny.
Work on the collection and export of food will continue for about 10 more days.
From the three villages where the eviction has not yet been completely completed, the families of the malicious white-greens and those who took part in the last uprising were evicted. Those who have not been evicted still make up a part of the population who are sympathetic to Soviet power: non-residents, families of Red Army soldiers, Soviet employees and communists.
The slow eviction is explained, as has already been indicated in the reports, by the poor supply of empty stock, which is supplied in the amount of one echelon per day 2 .
To date, 306 more wagons are required to evict people.
Commander of the Caucasian Labor [army] I. Kosior.
RTSKHIDNI. F.85. 0p. 11. D. 123. L. 15. Typewritten copy.
Notes:
1 In order to attract the mountainous population of the Caucasus to the side of the Soviet government, the Caucasus Bureau in mid-September 1920 decided to allocate the mountaineers with land that belonged to the Cossacks. On October 6, 1920, Ordzhonikidze, in a direct conversation with a member of the Kavburo Mirzabekyan, in particular, reported: “[...] the Politburo of the CEC approved the resolution of the Kavburo on allocating land to the highlanders, without stopping [before] evicting the villages. You will officially bring this to the attention of the regional committee, and [it is necessary] to immediately take appropriate measures to implement our decisions [...]” (RTsKhIDNI. F. 85. Op. 11. D. 131. L. 2). In the early days of October 1920, an uprising began in a number of villages of the Terek Cossacks. On October 23, 1920, the acting commander of the Caucasian Labor Army, Medvedev, issued an order, which, in particular, stated: the workers 'and peasants' government, the Cossacks of the Teroblast - the Terek and Sunzha lines repeatedly staged uprisings against the Soviet authorities, treacherously attacking individual parts of the Red Army, firing at passenger trains, damaging the railway, bridges, etc. Suppressing these uprisings with an armed hand, representatives of the Soviet power on the Terek were very humane even in relation to the rebellious villages. The events of recent days - the uprising of the villages of Kalinovskaya on the Terek, Yermolovskaya, Zakan-Yurt (Romanovskaya), Samashkinskaya and Mikhailovskaya on the Sunzha - overflowed the cup of peace-loving long-suffering of the Soviet authorities. Member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian Front comrade. Ordzhonikidze ORDERED: first: to burn the village of Kalinovskaya; second: to give the villages of Yermolovskaya, Zakan-Yurt (Romanovskaya), Samashkinskaya and Mikhailovskaya to the poorest landless population and, first of all, to the highland Chechens who have always been devoted to the Soviet power, for which: to load the entire male population of the above-mentioned villages from 18 to 50 years old into echelons and under to be sent by escort to the North for heavy forced labor; old people, women and children to be evicted from the villages, allowing them to move to farms or villages in the North; horses, cows, sheep and other livestock, as well as suitable for the military. for the purpose of transferring the property to the Caucasian Labor Army - to its relevant bodies, and to distribute the horses according to the instructions of the Staff [...] ”(Ibid. L. 11). In a telegram to Lenin dated October 26, 1920, Stalin reported: “[...] Several Cossack villages were punished approximately [...] There is no doubt that the Kavburo and Ordzhonikidze led our line skillfully, connected the mountaineers with the Soviet government, and the mountaineers themselves satisfactorily withstood exam [...]” (Leninsky collection. Vol. XXXIV. P. 373). On November 1, 1920, Vrachev, telegraphing Ordzhonikidze and Stalin that the eviction of the villages was proceeding successfully, reported: “[...] Today I had a meeting with Chechens - representatives of auls. The mood of the Chechens is excellent, they are happy to infinity and declare that our act is a great historical event for them. It would be highly desirable, after the Chechens have settled in, to convene a congress [with] your presence” (RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 11. D 123. L. 1-3).2 In addition to the lack of wagons, Kosior in a telegram to Ordzhonikidze of November 5, 1920, also mentioned the lack of accurate data on the evicted people and the need, in connection with this, to carry out a household census as reasons for the slowdown in the eviction of villages. In addition, he complained about the lack of the required number of people: “[...] to carry out the tasks assigned to me (defense of the site and fight against gangs, protection of the evicted villages from Chechen robberies and raids of bandits, eviction of the villages) [...] I I don’t even have half of the people I need for the most modest needs [...]”
3 (Ibid. L. 4-5). In a telegram dated November 6, 1920, Kosior informed Ordzhonikidze that the command of the Caucasian Front forbade the removal of those resettled by rail and that he had received an order to send them by horse-drawn transport. “[...] About 9 thousand are subject to eviction,” he wrote, “of which over one and a half thousand families are counter-revolutionary and about a thousand Soviet. If all this is evicted in marching order, it will take a very long time, since the carts are stolen by units and the horses are taken by gangs. In addition, there is no escort, and while following, the evacuees will be attacked [...]” (Ibid. L. 6-7).
No. 107
Telegram to G. K. Ordzhonikidze to I. V. Stalin
November 22 [1920]
Stalin.
The radio cannot be received before morning, the Moscow-Tashkent work interferes.
From the words of Kasyan, Bekzadyan, Nuridzhanyan, I report the following: during the advance of the Turks on Alexandropol 1 , the Dashnaks left the city, our comrades who remained [in] the city released the arrested comrades from prison and organized the Revolutionary Committee, issued an appeal. The detachment of Sepuh (Dashnak), having learned about this, moved and again occupied Alexandropol. The revolutionary committee, having no military force, with red banners moved towards the Kemalists, who were 20 versts away.
There is almost no army. The Dashnaks admit that their agitation for a Bolshevik-Kemalist alliance inspired the mood not to fight against Kemal, since he is an ally of the Bolsheviks. split among all parties. Menshevik-internationalists openly [in] the press are in favor of Soviet power. On the border of Kazakh, Armenian units come up in masses even [with] officers and ask how they should be. There is no massacre in the area of Turkish occupation. Venizelos resigned, replaced by Gunaris 2 . In Athens, the communists staged a big demonstration. We all think that it is no longer possible to delay, we will wait until the morning 3 .
22/XI
RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 14. D. 30. L. 2-3. Autograph.
Notes:
1 In order to use the Turkish troops in the Sovietization of Armenia, the Caucasian Bureau conducted secret negotiations with the leader of the Turkish national liberation movement, Kemal. For possible assistance, he was promised military assistance against the British occupying forces. After the Sevres (1920) peace treaty, which was humiliating for Turkey, a number of territories of Turkey were ceded to Armenia, in June 1920 the troops of Turkey and Armenia converged on the border. On October 30, 1920, Turkish troops occupied Kars, launched an attack on Alexandropol and soon launched an attack on Erivan. “[...] If Alexandropol is taken,” Stalin informed Chicherin on November 8, 1920, “I consider the most likely combination of maximum demands [...] in any case, we will have to act according to the situation. Everything depends on what position the Turks will take in connection with the negotiations with the Entente [...]” (RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 1992. L. 1-7). “[...] We consider it absolutely necessary,” Stalin and Ordzhonikidze telegraphed to Lenin and Chicherin on the same day, “the immediate dispatch of authorized persons to Turkey to Kemal with the aim of reconnaissance and informing Moscow as a matter of urgency [...]” (Ibid. D. 5575. L. 1-11). Armenia's appeal to the Western powers for help was not crowned with success. On November 13, 1920, in response to a request for mediation in negotiations with Turkey, addressed to Soviet Russia, the Armenian government received a telegram from Chicherin with a notice of consent and sending for this purpose to the Mdivani combat area (the Great October Socialist Revolution and the victory of Soviet power in Armenia. S. 422). In a telegram to Lenin dated November 15, 1920, Stalin, expressing doubts about Kemal’s position, in particular, wrote: “[...] It is possible that Armenia is already late, that is, Kemal eats it before we arrive [.. .]” (Ibid. D. 1999. L. 1).
2 We are talking about the change of heads of government of Greece. On November 4, 1920, Venizelos (Liberal Party) was replaced by Rallis (People's Party). Gunaris, also one of the leaders of the People's Party, became head of government only in March 1921. Ordzhonikidze raised this topic in connection with the events of the Greco-Turkish war waged by the government of Venizelos and opposed by Gunaris. In the struggle against the war, the People's Party at that time was supported by the Communist Party of Greece.
3 We are talking about the proposed entry of Soviet troops into the territory of Armenia.No. 108
Telegram to G. K. Ordzhonikidze V. I. Lenin, I. V. Stalin
November 29, 1920
Moscow - the Kremlin to Lenin. Stalin.
Baku 29/XI 20 14:00 30 minutes.
The decision of the Central Committee has just received 1 . The Armenian Revolutionary Committee, sent to the Kazakh region for preparatory work, having received a lot of sentences from the peasants of the Caravan Saray region, Dilijan, indicating that there was no power, the army fled, asking them to come, crossed the border on their own at night and continues to move to Delizhan, where the Soviet Union will probably be proclaimed. Armenia. In connection with [the] decision of the Central Committee, I don't know what to do, I'm afraid that Soviet power has already been declared 2 . I think that everything will pass without much difficulty 3 .
Ordzhonikidze.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 14. D. 33. L. 2. Autograph.
Notes:
On November 27, 1920, the Politburo adopted a resolution on the report of Stalin, the draft of which was prepared by Lenin. In particular, it said: “[...] Adopt the most conciliatory policy towards Georgia, Armenia, Turkey and Persia, i.e., aimed more at avoiding war. Do not set as your task a campaign either against Georgia, or against Armenia, or against Persia. The main task is to recognize the protection of Azerbaijan and the firm possession of the entire Caspian Sea [...]”. Ordzhonikidze was ordered to stay in Baku and take over the political leadership of the Azrevkom. Stalin was charged with the duty to negotiate with Chicherin and Ordzhonikidze on appropriate adjustments in foreign policy in the states bordering on the Caucasus (Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU, 1991, No. 8, p. 161).
2 Relying on the support of Stalin in Moscow, Ordzhonikidze took the initiative in the forceful sovietization of Armenia. Simultaneously with the Armenian Revolutionary Committee formed by him, an “Armenian” regiment from units of the 11th Army was sent to Armenia. On November 29, 1920, having learned from Legrand’s telegram about the capture of Caravanserai by the regiment, Ordzhonikidze telegraphed Legrand and Mdivani about the need to intensify negotiations with a group of Dashnaks who agreed to the Sovietization of the country if they were included in the Revolutionary Committee (RTsKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 14. D. 33. L. 3). On the same day, in a conversation with a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian Front, Trifonov, Ordzhonikidze announced the advancement of the "Armenian" regiment and asked to take into account that there would be no information about the regiment in the official reports. Having also announced the presence of the Revolutionary Committee in Alexandropol, Ordzhonikidze ended the conversation quite definitely: “[...] The Turks insist on bringing our troops into Armenia to establish Soviet power, considering this a guarantee of their rear [...] The situation becomes completely clear, not risky [ ...]” (Ibid. D. 34. L. 1-2).
3 The phrase crossed out by Ordzhonikidze is highlighted.
No. 109
Recording of a conversation on a direct wire between A. M. Nazaretyan and G. K. Ordzhonikidze
[not earlier than November 30, 1920]
Rostov-on-Don.
At the apparatus of Comrade. Nazareth. Hello Sergo. I look forward to hearing from you the latest information. [With] your telegram Lenin got acquainted today1. On behalf of the Caucasian Bureau, you have been sent a welcome telegram to be forwarded to the Revolutionary Committee of Armenia.
Baku.Hello. Today we had no connection with the Revolutionary Committee, we hope to get it in a while. Tonight, the general situation was as follows: the peasants of the Karavan Saray region and Delizhan [in] uprising, the Revolutionary Committee should be in Delizhan today or moved forward. So far, the case has been going on without a single shot being fired. In Erivan there is now the Dro2 government, which, as if, according to Legrand, is not averse to declaring Soviet power, but at the same time, for some reason, is delaying it. I think he's cheating Legrand. Today [in] Baku there was a solemn meeting of the Council, at which Narimanov read the declaration of the Azerbaijani government3 indicating that there are no more borders between Soviet Armenia and Azerbaijan, that from now on Zangezur and Nakhichevan are an integral part of Soviet Armenia. The Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh have the right to self-determination. The wealth of Azerbaijan - oil and kerosene - is the state of both union republics. The meeting passed with great enthusiasm. The same outfit of the Red Army and workers' rallies. Tomorrow the second group of comrades is leaving, carrying kerosene, textiles, etc. Spread all this properly in the newspapers.
Rostov-on-Don.
Bravo, Azerbaijanis. Let's start screaming [in] the press. Tomorrow I am convening a small meeting of communist-Armenians, where I will propose to immediately register all Armenian communists with experience in Soviet construction, and I will begin to send groups at your disposal. [In] case of need we will announce mobilization. I just spoke to Kirov, to whom I pass on all your messages, he is at the apparatus, complaining about the extremely acute situation [with] the supply of food to the arriving military units and the local garrison, they are now having a food meeting. The food commissar is working under arrest, the food apparatus is tightening up, but he considers the crisis inevitable, he asks to speak with Belenky and Frumkin, to make an order on the supply and procurement of the Svyatokrestovsky district. Frumkin is in Moscow now and will return in a week. Kirov reports that [in] Chechnya is not calm, asks to inquire in Fronze * if you know anything. I have no more questions. Thanks for the news.
Baku.
The mobilization of communist Armenians must be carried out urgently. Second. Are you thinking of going to the Congress of Soviets? 4 If the situation does not interfere, I think to go. We agreed [with] the Stavropol, Kuban and we will all go together. No more questions, all the best. Hello Beloborodov.
Rostov-on-Don.
I really want to go to the congress, because I have not seen a single congress in three years. You guessed correctly, Petrenko was here, I told him that the Stavropol team would put you out. They willingly do it. I will agree with the Kuban people about myself, but the trouble is that Beloborodov must definitely go, Ilyich obliged him. Thus [in] Rostov there will be no one left. If Stasova had come , 5 it would have been easy to do one way or another. Let's make arrangements to go to the convention together. For now, nothing more. Goodbye.
Baku.
I will have a mandate from the people of Baku and from the army, so the Stavropol mandate will have to be abandoned. All the best, goodbye.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 14. D. 37. L. 1-2. Ticker-tape.
Notes:
1 In all likelihood, this is a telegram from Ordzhonikidze to Lenin and Stalin dated November 29, 1920 (See Document No. 108).
2 This refers to the government formed by a group of Dashnaks, which agreed to the Sovietization of the country on the condition that the Dashnaks were given seats in the Revolutionary Committee, and subsequently in the new Soviet government (RTsKhIDNI. F. 85. Op. 14. D. 31. L. 1).
3 For the declaration of the government of Azerbaijan in connection with the establishment of Soviet power in Armenia, see: The Great October Socialist Revolution and the Victory of Soviet Power in Armenia. S. 437.
4 VIII All-Russian Congress of Soviets was held in Moscow from December 22 to 29, 1920.
On November 27, 1920, the Politburo decided to satisfy the request of the Caucasus Bureau to transfer Stasova to Rostov-on-Don (RTsKhIDNI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 125. L. 2).
No. 110
Report on direct wire G. K. Ordzhonikidze to I. V. Stalin, V. I. Lenin, G. V. Chicherin
December 4, 1920
Moscow Kremlin 1 .
Hello Nadia 2 . Please convey the following to Stalin, Ilyich and Chicherin at once. Events in Armenia proceed without any complications. The Revolutionary Committee of Armenia is due to arrive [in] Erivan today. The population of Erivan enthusiastically greeted the proclamation of the Soviet power 3 . The entire army recognized the coup. Legrand insists on the introduction of Dro and Terteryan into the Revolutionary Committee. The Turks are very distrustful [of] the Armenian communists. The question of bringing Dro and Terteryan [to] the Revolutionary Committee will be decided upon the arrival of Kasyan in Erivan. It is possible that we will have to abandon the well-known solution 4 . We are already occupying Karaklis. On the 2nd of Khatisov signed a peace treaty with the Turks, I am giving you a copy now 5. From the message of Mdivani, which will also be transmitted immediately, it is clear to me that the Turks will climb Batum . Yesterday Alshibay came to see me, terribly alarmed, whom I reassured, although he hardly believed me. It is necessary to drive the Communist Armenians out of Moscow with might and main. Send Ter-Gabrielyan immediately. The Tiflis press states the failure of negotiations between Constantinople and Angora 7 . The legalization of the Communist Party in Angora is symptomatic.
Ordzhonikidze 8 .
RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 14. D. 33. L. 22-23. handwritten text; F. 2. On. 1. D. 16404. L. 1. Typewritten text.
Notes:
1On December 2, 1920, Ordzhonikidze received a telegram from Legrand, Plenipotentiary of the RSFSR in Armenia, informing him of the declaration of Soviet power in Armenia. Legrand also reported: “... The command staff of the army (Armenian - Comp.) is guaranteed security, also Dashnaks, [with] the exception of those directly responsible [for] the policy of the Ohanjanyan ministry. I issued an order [about] their arrest. The headquarters of our division is located [in] Delizhan. On behalf of the Russian Soviet government, I announced: Russia recognizes unconditionally [in] the territory of the Soviet of Armenia the Erivan province, part of the Kars region, providing [in] military terms and the railroad line passing through Alexandropol to Erivan and Kazakh Karakis, Zangezur district, part of the Kazakh limit before agreement on August 10, and those parts of Tiflis, which were possessed by Armenia before the start of the Turkish offensive. The order [on] the release of the communists has been issued and is being carried out [in] execution. In case of hostile actions of the Turks, it is necessary to have sufficient military forces closer, is this taken into account [...] ”(RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 14. D. 33. L. 16).
2 Nadezhda Alliluyeva, on call.
3 of the Declaration of the Revolutionary Committee of Armenia on the proclamation of Armenia as a socialist Soviet Republic was promulgated on November 29, 1920 (The Great October Socialist Revolution and the Victory of Soviet Power in Armenia, pp. 431-434).
4 See note 2 to document No. 109.
5 Peace treaty concluded in Alexandropol by the Dashnak government of Armenia with Turkey on December 2, 1920 (The Great October Socialist Revolution and the victory of Soviet power in Armenia, pp. 438-441).
6 In a telegram to Sheinman, Plenipotentiary of the RSFSR in Georgia, dated December 10, 1920, Chicherin wrote: “[...] the transfer of Batum into the hands of the Turks is unacceptable. We must not leave our line of friendly policy towards the Kemalists, while at the same time keeping them from actions that are undesirable for us [...]” (Documents of Foreign Policy of the USSR, vol. 3, p. 374).
7 In Ankara (Angora) in April 1920 a revolutionary government (the Grand National Assembly of Turkey) was organized. In Istanbul (Constantinople near Ordzhonikidze) was the official government of Turkey.
8 Lenin's note on the note: "To the archive."
No. 111
Telegram from A. L. Sheinman to G. V. Chicherin, I. V. Stalin, G. K. Ordzhonikidze
December 6, 1920
Moscow.
Narkomindel Comrade Chicherin,
copy to Comrade Stalin.
Baku Comrade Ordzhonikidze.
Tiflis, December 6, 1920
The Georgian government, in connection with the Sovietization of Armenia, either came to an agreement with the Entente, or fell into a panic.
In any case, the attitude of the Georgian government towards us has changed dramatically.
One of my best employees has been arrested for several days now. Informed of this, Chicherin proposed arresting the employees of Makharadze 1 in Moscow. I agreed. [About] further I do not know.
Last night employees and secretaries of local communist newspapers were arrested. Last night, the Georgian police surrounded Legrand's train standing on the tracks, which could not proceed to Erivan due to damage to the track. The train is still under arrest, and entry into the cars, exit from them and the transition from one to another is prohibited. I consider it necessary to immediately, under some pretext, suspend the export of oil products to Georgia.
Second. - In Erivan, the staff of the Georgian embassy was arrested under house arrest.
Third. Arrest someone [from] the employees of the Georgian embassy [in] Baku.
Informing [about] the above to Chicherin, I propose that he present an ultimatum from our side with the demand: first, the immediate transfer of the entire Wrangel fleet to us.
The second is the immediate restoration of the railway line and communication with Armenia.
Third, the immediate release of the administratively arrested communists.
Fourth, the absolute cessation of their repressions against our employees, in addition, an ultimatum from Soviet Armenia [with] the demand to immediately leave the neutral zone occupied by Georgia in the Borchala district and the withdrawal of Georgian troops from Ardagan 2 .
Chicherin's decision [to] a large extent depends on your conclusion, which I ask you to tell me how the operation is going in the Zakatala district 3 . Confirm receipt.
Sheinman.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 17. D. 17. L. 6-10. Handwritten text, transcription.
Notes:
1 This refers to G. Makharadze, who at that time was the official representative of the Georgian government in Moscow.
2 The neutral zone in the Borchali district, disputed between Armenia and Georgia, was formed in accordance with the decision of the conference in Tiflis in January 1919 after the Armenian-Georgian conflict. In connection with the Turkish offensive against Armenia, Georgia sent its troops into the neutral zone and occupied the border Ardagan.
3 We are talking about the introduction of Soviet troops into the Zagatala region in order to create a springboard for the further Sovietization of Georgia. The proposal to send troops to this area was made by Stalin to Lenin in a telegram from Vladikavkaz dated November 16 or 17, 1920. Stalin suggested "[...] concentrate his troops in Zakatala and, using a convenient excuse, move around [to] Tiflis [ ...]" (RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. Op. 2. D. 25. L. 1-2).
No. 112
Telegram to G. K. Ordzhonikidze to I. V. Stalin
December 8, 1920
Moscow - the Kremlin, Stalin.
Baku, 8/XII-20
Georgians do not give transit for Armenia 1 and the last days have become terribly insolent. In my opinion, the question [about] Georgia in general is in the near future, moreover, then it will require more strength and more sacrifices. Is it impossible to guess. Sergo.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 15. D. 64. L. 1. Autograph.
Notes:
1 . We are talking about the transit of food, goods and weapons for Armenia through the territory of Georgia.
No. 113
Telegram to G. K. Ordzhonikidze to I. V. Stalin
[December 9, 1920]
Moscow Kremlin,
Stalin.
The grouping [of troops] on the Georgian border ends tomorrow. It is impossible to keep troops in such a state. Either we have to withdraw parts, or move, or rather guess. [In] the latter case, I hope we can handle it. Yours and Ilyich's opinion. I repeat that the Turks will drag us into this story anyway .
Sergo.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 15. D. 64. L. 3. Autograph.
Notes:
1 . We are talking about using the Georgian-Turkish military confrontation in the border areas for the Sovietization of Georgia. In a telegram from Transcaucasia to Chicherin and Lenin dated November 20, 1920, Stalin, reflecting on the options for the Sovietization of Georgia, wrote: “... In my opinion, one of the best combinations is a successful war between Turkey and Georgia, which will give Russia the opportunity to intervene as an intermediary and deliverer [...]” (RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 5584. L. 1).
No. 114
Telegram to G. K. Ordzhonikidze V. I. Lenin, I. V. Stalin
December 12, 1920
Moscow Kremlin,
Lenin, Stalin.
Baku, 12/XII-20
Georgia, with the help of the Entente, undoubtedly set out to provoke the mountaineers to an uprising: they throw gold, manufactory, military units, a large number of Georgian and mountaineer officers into the mountains, thanks to which the situation in Dagestan is somewhat complicated. The Georgians are grouping their forces in the region of Lagodekhi, from where the counter-revolution in Dagestan 1 feeds and everything possible is done to start an uprising in the Transcaucasian district. Everything, apparently, is based on the fact that the suppression of the uprising on our part will cause a howl among the Muslims and thereby scare the Kemalists away from us. It should be noted that the suppression of the Ganja uprising was very cleverly used in Anatolia, this was also discussed in the national assembly 2. The situation in Georgia itself is such that without much difficulty we will put an end to it: uprisings [in] Borchali district, Abkhazia, Adzharia, Dusheti district will be carried out 3 . Once again I bring all this to your attention and ask for instructions. Ordzhonikidze.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 15. D. 65. L. 1-2. Autograph.
Notes:
1 We are talking about an uprising against Soviet power in Nagorno-Dagestan in September 1920 - May 1921. The uprising took place under the slogans of pan-Islamism, the liquidation of the Soviet autonomy of Dagestan and the establishment of a Sharia monarchy. Among the organizers of the uprising were members of the Gorsky and Terek-Dagestan governments, which existed from November 1917 to September 1920. Among the rank-and-file participants in the uprising, the majority were dissatisfied with the Bolshevik policy of food requisitioning. The total number of participants in the uprising in the spring of 1921 was about 9.5 thousand people. The uprising was suppressed mainly by the forces of the 10th Terek-Dagestan Army in May 1921.
2 Anti-Soviet uprising in Ganja (Azerbaijan) in May 1920. Turkish officers took part in its organization. The vast majority of the rebels were Muslims. Harsh measures to suppress the uprising were discussed in the Kemal government in the context of Soviet policy towards Muslims.
3 We are talking about preparing uprisings against the Georgian government.
No. 115
Telegram to G. K. Ordzhonikidze V. I. Lenin
December 15, 1920
Moscow Kremlin
Lenin.
Baku, 15/XII-20
A meeting of the Caucasian Bureau consisting of Stasova, Narimanov, Mdivani, Ordzhonikidze in the presence of Eliava, Legrand, Stark, Dumbadze, Okudzhava, Commander Gekker and Mikhailov, a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 11th Army, unanimously decided to cross the border of Georgia at dawn. All prepared 1 . Ordzhonikidze.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 15. D. 66. L. 1. Autograph.
Notes:
On December 17, 1920, the Plenum of the Central Committee in its decision noted: "To confirm the decision of the Central Committee on the peaceful direction of the policy of the RSFSR in the Caucasus and to demand from the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the military department to take all measures that could ensure the success of this policy" (RTsKHIDNI. F. 17. Inventory 2. D. 46. L. 3).