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Bolshevik leadership Correspondence. 1912-1927
Collection of documents 1996.
Compiled by: A.V.Kvashonkin, L.P.Kosheleva, L.A.Rogovaya, O.V.Khlevnyuk.
No. 42
Telegram from G. L. Pyatakov of the Central Committee of the RCP(b), V. I. Lenin, Ya. M. Sverdlov, L. D. Trotsky, I. V. Stalin
[January 20] 1919
Moscow, Kremlin, Central Committee of the RCP.
Copy: Lenin, Sverdlov, Trotsky, Stalin.
Over the past few days, I have repeatedly tried to talk to you by wire, but failed, I sent telegrams by couriers in various ways to bring to your attention about the disgrace that is happening here. I use the call me comrade. Chicherin, in order to once again convey the facts, which you yourself must judge. First, the intrigue of Artem's group 1came to a direct fight with the army in the field; secondly, the struggle with the command reached the point that I was required to publish a decree on the appointment of Rukhimovich as Commander-in-Chief, Voroshilov, Mezhlauk as members of the Revolutionary Military Council, despite the written order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, this was strictly forbidden, I refused, considering the government had no right to cancel the orders of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. Finding fault with this, the majority decided to remove me without even asking for the approval of the Central Committee of the RCP. It was decided by a majority - three against one with three abstentions, of those who abstained, Averin filed a protest against illegal actions to appoint Artem as Chairman 2. Then the newspapers published a government decree on the appointment of Rukhimovich as Commander-in-Chief, not even just a commander, Voroshilov, Mezhlauk as members of the Revolutionary Military Council, signed by Chairman of the Government Pyatakov, although I did not sign such a decree and I do not consider it possible to sign as illegal, because separatism in military affairs is a crime , my refutation that I did not sign [s] in the resolution was not published, moreover, order No. 1 was sent signed by Voroshilov, Rukhimovich, Mezhlauk on taking up duties, to which the Government's decree on their appointment to the Revolutionary Military Council was sent with the appointment of Rukhimovich Commander-in-Chief mention*, the original was signed by Chairman of the Government Pyatakov. I immediately sent out a circular telegram for signatures: mine, Zatonsky and the Commander of the Kharkov group3 with a refutation of the fact that I signed the decree and the message [that] the command remains the same. Such independent and disorganizing action of the Artemtsev brought the greatest confusion to the army, since their order No. 1 penetrated the army, and we were forced to refute it just as widely. You understand, the army cannot but be disorganized by such separate and unauthorized actions against the center of the current majority of the Government, two members of the majority of Mezhlauk and Magidov have not yet been approved by the Central Committee of the RCP. - I consider it necessary to inform, I attract those responsible for the abuse of my signature to the court of the Revolutionary Tribunal. The nature of the motivation: The Central Committee of the RCP does not exist, and we must act independently 4 .
Pyatakov.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 17. Op. 109. D. 12. L. 74. Certified typewritten copy.
Notes:
oneWith the support of Stalin, members of the Provisional Government Voroshilov, Artyom (Sergeev), as well as V.I. Mezhlauk and Rukhimovich began a struggle with Trotsky and the chairman of the government, who supported him, Pyatakov, for appointments to military posts. Reporting on January 10, 1919, in a telegram to Sverdlov about Okulov’s departure to Moscow with a report on Voroshilov’s work, Trotsky wrote: “I didn’t find Ukrainians in Kursk. Therefore, there were no negotiations. I declare categorically that the Tsaritsyn line, which led to the complete disintegration of the Tsaritsyn Army, cannot be tolerated in Ukraine. The only way out was to appoint Podvoisky as military commissar, Antonov as commander, and Glagolev as Chief of Staff. The last two appointments were made by us (the order to appoint Antonov-Ovseenko commander of the Ukrainian Front was announced on January 13, 1919 - Comp.). But it is necessary to maintain the authority of the Central Committee, because among the Ukrainians the collapse, the struggle of cliques for the lack of responsible and authoritative leaders [...] The line of Stalin, Voroshilov and Rukhimovich means the death of the whole cause [...] ”(RTSKHIDNI. F. 17. Op 109, D. 12, L. 72; The Trotsky papers, Vol. 1, P. 247-248). In a telegram dated January 11, 1918 to Lenin, Trotsky, agreeing with the need for a compromise, once again insisted: “[...] I consider Stalin’s patronage of the Tsaritsyno current a most dangerous ulcer, worse than any betrayal and betrayal of military specialists [...] Rukhimovich is pseudonym Voroshilov [...] Rukhimovich is not alone, they tenaciously cling to each other, raising ignorance into a principle [...] Let them appoint Artyom, but not Voroshilov and not Rukhimovich [...] ”(RTSKHIDNI. F. 17. 109, file 12, sheet 73; The Trotsky papers, vol 1, pp. 248-250).
On January 16, 1919, the issue of Ukraine was considered at a meeting of the Central Committee of the RCP (b). The Central Committee decided to appoint Rakovsky as chairman of the Ukrainian government and instructed him to "implement the complete removal of Voroshilov and Rukhimovich from military work [...] not to insist on leaving Antonov if the Ukrainians demand his removal, but to agree with them on another candidate [... ]” (News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 6. P. 173). As a result of the compromise, Antonov-Ovseenko became the commander of the Ukrainian Front, and Podvoisky became the People's Commissar for Military Affairs of the Ukrainian government. Voroshilov took the post of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, Artem (Sergeev) - People's Commissar of Soviet Propaganda, Zatonsky - People's Commissar of Education, Magidov - People's Commissar of Labor. V. I. Mezhlauk became Deputy People's Commissar for Military Affairs. Pyatakov, replaced by Rakovsky, did not enter the government.
2 Probably, this is a decree of the government of Ukraine "On the organization of military affairs", adopted on January 15, 1919 and published signed by Pyatakov. The decree was about the creation of a military department under the government of Ukraine with the subordination of all military commissariats operating on the territory of Ukraine to it. Artem (Sergeev) was appointed head of the department (Civil War in Ukraine. T. 1. Book 1. P. 554).
3 Aussem.
4 Apparently, this refers to the Artyom-Voroshilov group's references to the need to make independent decisions in connection with the isolation from the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party in the conditions of hostilities.
No. 43
Telegram of V. I. Mezhlauk to X. G. Rakovsky, V. I. Lenin, I. V. Stalin
February 9, 1919
Moscow Kremlin, Lenin.
From Kharkov 9/2 18 out of turn received 9/2-19
Poltava. To the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Rakovsky at the location, copy Moscow Kremlin Lenin Stalin 1 .
The position of the front deteriorated sharply, Slavyansk was hit by a direct blow. The organization [in] the rear of a combat-ready army to replace the decomposing units, heroic measures are needed. It is necessary to return Voroshilov and Rukhimovich to military work. I consider it absolutely necessary to appoint Voroshilov a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the UkrFront, in accordance with Trotsky's original proposal, in order to give him the opportunity for organized work. If the left needs compensation, we agree to be included in the Revolutionary Military Council as much as they need. Rukhimovich should be handed over to the Department of Military Procurement, since Comrade. Pyatakov is absent and does not deal with this department, it is in complete disarray. Before it is too late, we must take, I repeat, heroic emergency measures. We are working in full contact with Comrade Skachko. I look forward to a prompt response to raise the issue tomorrow in the government.
People's Commissariat of War Mezhlauk
RTSKHIDNI. F. 2. On. 1. D. 8587. L. 1. Typewritten copy.
Notes:
1 In the upper left corner there is a note by Lenin: “Sklyansky” and a clerical note: “10/2 sent”.
No. 44
D. Yu. Gopner to G. V. Chicherin and V. I. Lenin
March 22, 1919
Narkomindel comrade. Chicherin.
a copy of the Presovnarkom comrade. Lenin.
Gopner's fifth note.
Ekaterinoslav, March 22, 1919
At one of the meetings of the Ukrainian government, which I attended during my stay in Kharkov, Khmelnitsky and Voroshilov, as well as the chairman of the Revolutionary Tribunal invited to the meeting of the Government, painted a sad picture of the activities of the All-Ukrainian Extraordinary Commission. The reason for raising this question was the decision of the revolutionary tribunal to petition the government to mitigate the fate of two employees of the Extraordinary Committee, who were sentenced by the tribunal to death for a number of crimes ex officio. The Tribunal could not apply to the defendants any other measure of punishment as the death penalty. However, for the participants in the trial of the employees of the Extraordinary Commission, it was clear that these people should not be executed, since they are victims of the desperately criminal atmosphere that prevails in the Extraordinary Commission. These third-rate characters allowed themselves to hide a certain amount of state money, were guilty of petty bribery and petty extortion, while in the institution in which these "switchmen" worked, everything was thoroughly saturated with criminality, hooliganism, utter arbitrariness and irresponsibility of experienced villains. The application of the Tribunal should naturally have been granted by the government without examining the question on its merits, for the government cannot turn into a court in every such case, but, on the contrary, has every reason to trust the sensitivity of the revolutionary Tribunal. In this sense, the proposal was made by Voroshilov. Without objecting in principle to Voroshilov's proposal, the majority of the members of the Government considered it quite timely to hear in passing the People's Commissariat of Justice and the Chairman of the Revolutionary Tribunal about the order in the Extraordinary Committee. It was then that the meeting was presented with the most outrageous picture of the dictatorship of this officially subordinate institution - a picture of its complete disregard for all laws and orders of the Government.
For a long time the People's Commissariat of Justice Khmelnytsky tried in vain to obtain information from the Extraordinary Committee about those imprisoned and about those executed by order of the Cheka. When, after the greatest exertion of his influence and repeated unsuccessful demands to provide materials and threats against the leaders of the Cheka, Khmelnitsky finally managed to get the “cases” about those arrested for viewing, it turned out that more than 50% of the “cases” about persons who had long been in custody , concluded in the folder only an arrest order. Neither Khmelnytsky nor the leaders of the Cheka themselves managed to establish the motives for the arrest of the overwhelming majority of prisoners by any means. Extremely tenaciously keeps everyone who falls into her hands, and only in very rare cases are cases transferred to the Tribunal, and after the fact the information she gives about the executed is far from complete.
Arguing by the need for the merciless extermination of agents of power caught in crime, only Quiring objected to mitigating the fate of convicted emergency workers. All other members of the government, agreeing with the arguments of Khmelnitsky, Voroshilov and the Chairman of the Tribunal and considering that the responsibility for the atmosphere of arbitrariness, violence and criminality created in the Cheka falls equally on the leaders of the Cheka, and indirectly on the entire Government, voted for a replacement for the convicts executions for years of community service.
Things are no better in Yekaterinoslav. Armed from head to toe, people on behalf of the Cheka, the Commandant's Office of the city, the criminal investigation police and other institutions carry out searches, arrests, plant counterfeit money, ask for bribes, blackmail with these bribes, imprisoning those who gave this bribe, so that in the end finally free a person from fear of death for a tenfold or doubled bribe. At the head of the Extraordinary Commission is Valyavka, an old party worker, a stubborn, stupid and cruel man. Hot-tempered, arrogant, devoid of calmness, he never listens to his interlocutors, but only speaks or, rather, shouts. Having the most elementary political development, he is illegible, intoxicated by his omnipotence and only longs for "destruction". I was present twice at his reception and was impressed
Yesterday, two people arrested under the Cheka were shot, but even before that, a report was placed in the newspaper that their sentence had been carried out. Rakovsky, back in Kharkov, and later here in Yekaterinoslav, told me about arrests in Yekaterinoslav in general and, in particular, about the arrest of anarchists in connection with the closure of the Nabat newspaper.. Pointing out the inadmissibility of senseless arrests, Rakovsky told Valyavka that if there was no criminal offense behind the arrested anarchists, or active action, or resistance to Soviet power, and if these anarchists were ideological elements that had nothing to do with bandits, then they should be released. Meanwhile, to this day, there are 15 anarchists among those arrested, some of whom collaborated and distributed the Nabat newspaper, while others were detained for trying to get a meeting with the arrested, allowed by the Executive Committee and the Committee of the Communist Party; others for handing over provisions to the arrested, in which nothing reprehensible was found.
Together with Valyavka, I visited the provincial prison and had a detailed conversation with one of the arrested anarchists, Kabase, known to me personally and well known to all Soviet workers in Yekaterinoslav. Behind him, as well as for his other comrades, there are invaluable services during their underground activities under Hetman and Petliura. These comrades are active and self-sacrificing revolutionaries who mercilessly fought against the slightest manifestations of banditry and were once sentenced to death by the bandits "for treason." Our conversation took place in the presence of Valyavka, since he did not want to leave me alone with Kabase. I carried out a formal interrogation on him, going into all sorts of details that could clarify even the slightest attitude of those arrested towards banditry or support for the Left Socialist-Revolutionary adventures. Kabas gave exhaustive answers and Valyavka, who was present, not being able to object anything, all the time shook in the air the resolution of the Gulyai-Polye congress of volost soviets and insurgent revolutionary committees, signed by Father Makhno and others. This resolution, representing an example of the most moderate Soviet opposition and completely unlike the openly hostile articles of the Mensheviks, subscribes to the entire policy of the Soviet government and only speaks out against appointees, commissar powers and against "agreement with the imperialists", however, this resolution has nothing to do with those arrested in Yekaterinoslav does not have. All the fuss caught fire because of No. 11 "Nabat", which I am sending you. representing an example of the most moderate Soviet opposition and completely unlike the openly hostile articles of the Mensheviks, subscribes to the entire policy of the Soviet government and only speaks out against appointees, commissar powers and against “agreement with the imperialists”, however, this resolution has nothing to do with those arrested in Yekaterinoslav. All the fuss caught fire because of No. 11 "Nabat", which I am sending you. representing an example of the most moderate Soviet opposition and completely unlike the openly hostile articles of the Mensheviks, subscribes to the entire policy of the Soviet government and only speaks out against appointees, commissar powers and against "agreement with the imperialists", however, this resolution has nothing to do with those arrested in Yekaterinoslav. All the fuss caught fire because of No. 11 "Nabat", which I am sending you.
In Valyavka's office, in the presence of myself, Mashitsky, and Litvinov, to my question about the arrested anarchists, Valyavka replied that Sverdlov 2 had been killed in Moscow , and Dzerzhinsky 3 had been arrested.and that he, Valyavka, would shoot all the anarchists and Left Socialist-Revolutionaries sitting in Yekaterinoslav. Of course, he did not give any explanation about these ridiculous rumors. The Provincial Commissar of Justice and almost all members of the Yekaterinoslav Committee of the Communist Party said that they were taking measures against Valyavka's arbitrariness, but so far neither their demands, nor my exhortations, nor Rakovsky's suggestions have led to anything. The streets of Ekaterinoslav are freely roamed by Menshevik activists who shot us in the back during our last year's retreat, and selfless revolutionaries continue to languish in prison, being at the complete uncontrolled disposal of Valyavka. Today, at a meeting of the Committee of the Yekaterinoslav CP(b)U, the issue of the activities of the Extraordinary Commission and its chairman was again raised.
March 23
Yesterday the CP(b)U Committee considered the question of the activities of the Extraordinary Committee in a closed session. After listening to a whole series of statements, the Committee decided to release all ideological anarchists and their friends who had been caught as a result of the extraordinary zeal of the Cheka. Dissatisfaction with the activities of the Chairman of the Cheka will probably have other consequences. In Ekaterinoslav, what had already taken place in other re-occupied areas was repeated: the population, enthusiastically welcoming our troops, impatiently waiting for the onset of favorable changes with the organization of Soviet power, to our greatest misfortune, sees only the activity of the Extraordinary Commission, which, obviously, is designed to disappoint the exhausted population inspired by hopes and pour water on the mill of the counter-revolution and the Mensheviks, who, by the way, have quite a lot of influence in the local factories. I state that the local Cheka did absolutely nothing to combat the counter-revolution and to identify its agents. During my tours of the re-occupied regions, I came to the conclusion, completely unexpected for me, that the Cheka, hastily created in these areas, are completely unsuited to the struggle against the counter-revolution and, perhaps unwittingly, serve as its ferment, its outpost.
Gopner
RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. On. 1. D. 2159. L. 35-38. Uncertified typewritten copy.
Notes:
1 Newspaper of the Anarchist Confederation.
2 Sverdlov was not killed. Returning in March 1919 from Ukraine to Moscow, he fell ill and died on March 16.
3 This refers to the arrest of Dzerzhinsky during the Left SR rebellion in early July 1918.
No. 45
G. S. Moroz to F. E. Dzerzhinsky
April 15, 1919
TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE VChK TOV. DZERZHINSKY 1
The situation in Byelorussia and Lithuania, due to a number of reasons, is extremely unsettled in the counter-revolutionary sense.
Anti-Soviet agitation is being conducted quite openly.
The spies of the Polish White Guards infiltrate the Red Army and disorganize it.
Thanks to the completely open speculation of all kinds of marauders, shopkeepers, etc., the prices of all kinds of consumption are rising by leaps and bounds.
Banditry and open robberies are a very frequent phenomenon in Minsk, Vilna, and other provinces. A firm hand is needed, which would take up the eradication of the listed evil. Such a Cheka may be like ours, meanwhile the Bel[orussian]-Lithuanian government by an insignificant majority decided to abolish not only county, but also provincial Chekas throughout its territory .
The authorities subordinated to them, like the Minsk Revolutionary Committee 3 , the Minsk Party Committee, being obliged to comply with the decision of the Belarusian-Lithuanian Government, abolished the Provincial Cheka and the Uezdchek, but at the same time they consider such a decision to be wrong, and the rights and functions of the Cheka were unofficially granted to the Investigative Commissions and Revolutionary Tribunals, which is extremely abnormal and violates the general scheme of organization of Soviet organs.
Proceeding from all this, I propose, for the purpose of the necessary struggle against counter-revolution throughout the entire territory of the RSFSR and for the purpose of unitedly building the bodies intended for this purpose, which are in charge of the Cheka, to apply to the Central Executive Committee of Byelorussia and Lithuania, indicating that in the matter of combating counter-revolution they should be guided and act on the instructions of the Cheka and in full contact and agreement with the local provincial and district centers.
I believe that "independence" will not suffer from this, because the fight against counter-revolution requires a centralized and well-organized apparatus.
G. Frost.
April 15, 1919
RTSKHIDNI. F. 77. Op. 66. D. 65. L. 23 a. Typewritten copy.
Notes:
1 The letter was sent from the territory of the Lithuanian-Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic to Moscow.
2On February 27, 1919, the creation of the Lithuanian-Belarusian Socialist Soviet Republic (Litbela) was proclaimed in Vilna. The republic included the Minsk, Vilna provinces, parts of the Kovno, Grodno and Suwalki provinces. Mickevicius-Kapsukas became Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. After the formation of Litbel, the Chekas that existed in Belarus were disbanded. As a measure against the White Guard speeches, the united Central Committee of the CP (b) LiB introduced the institution of hostages (The struggle for Soviet power in Belarus. Collection of documents and materials in two volumes. Minsk, 1971. T. 2. S. 91-92). Moroz attached an accompanying note to Dzerzhinsky to this letter: “[... ] Through the Central Committee, indicate the Central Executive Committee of Belarus and Lithuania on the need to grant the right to the Cheka to organize a gubchek and uyezdchek on the territory of Lithuania and Belarus at its discretion [...] ”(RTsKhIDNI. F. 17. Op. 66. D. 65. L. 23) . On April 20, 1919, the Organizing Bureau considered Dzerzhinsky's request about the abnormal situation of the Cheka in Lithuania and Belarus. The adopted decision stated: “To inform Minsk about the need for the existence of the Provincial Chekas with their subordination to the Cheka” (Ibid. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 3. L. 27).
3 In April 1919, the White Poles occupied a significant part of the Lithuanian-Belarusian Republic. On April 8, 1919, the republic was declared under martial law. At the same time, the Litbel Defense Council and the Minsk Military Revolutionary Committee were created.
No. 46
I. I. Vatsetis - V. I. Lenin
April 18, 1919
April 18, 1919 Gor. Serpukhov.
Chairman of the Council of Defense LENIN.
REPORT 1
There is not enough command staff. Although the courses existing in the Republic provide a significant contingent for replenishing the command staff, nevertheless, constant uninterrupted battles at the front incapacitate the command staff in huge numbers. The death rate of command personnel is huge, almost twice as high as among the Red Army. This is due to the fact that we completely deviated from the rule, which was adhered to in all armies, where it was desirable to carry the fight to a victorious end, namely, we deviated from the rule of protecting the command staff. On the contrary, due to the prevailing incorrect view of the role of command personnel in battles, command personnel everywhere and everywhere, following in the forefront of the fighters, and very often in front, are the first to die. This is reflected especially unfavorably on the outcome of the battle,
The staffs lack experienced workers with military scientific training. We lack more than 70 percent of the general staff in full-time positions, and the percentage of understaffing at the front reaches 82. Thus, the whole burden of work that requires military scientific training and knowledge of a specialty falls on 15-35 percent of available workers at headquarters, why and it turns out that the people of the general staff are overloaded with work, especially at the front, leading them to extreme overwork and a significant percentage of morbidity among these first-class workers. In general, I must testify that the persons of the General Staff, being the leaders of operations, perform their work in the highest degree conscientiously, honestly and with much [with] more energy than was done and required by the conditions of service of the old imperial army. These persons of the general staff do their hard work without grumbling, without complaining, even refusing any personal life, why extreme overwork made these people nervous and extremely susceptible to all sorts of tactless tricks and injustices addressed to them. Tactlessness in relation to the persons of the General Staff is noticed on the part of those commissars who are assigned to them, the selection of which is not always given due attention.2 . Among the commissars, unfortunately, there are few intelligent people who are able to understand the mood and the environment over which they have to control, and control often turns into importunate pestering. Such commissars are a great evil in practical and specialized work, but, unfortunately, there are many such commissars.
An equally strong impression on the staff members is made by the unfair attitude and distrust towards the general staff group in general. To this day, to our extreme regret, phrases insulting the people of the General Staff are retained both in the press and in the speeches of meeting speakers before a huge crowd of people. Reproaches of venality, reproaches of counter-revolutionism, reproaches of sabotage are pouring in from all sides, meanwhile I can testify that the former officers of the general staff, who are now in the service of the Soviet Republic, do not deserve such an unfair treatment of them. As I said above, the attitude of the general staff to the Soviet government is quite loyal and it does not even seem possible to me that among the people of the general staff who remained in the Soviet service, the desire to see a monarchy again in Russia would prevail, as they are often accused of this. In general, it was believed that the Russian General Staff was the most liberal, always going towards any progress and deviation to the left, and even under the old regime, the General Staff was under a great sign of suspicion of being revolutionary. Undoubtedly, among the [officers] of the General Staff there were convinced monarchists who did not sympathize with the revolution, but they have long been on the side of our opponents. At their expense, in no case can reproaches be sent to those workers of the General Staff who serve us faithfully and with devotion. and even under the old regime the General Staff was under a great sign of suspicion of being revolutionary. Undoubtedly, among the [officers] of the General Staff there were convinced monarchists who did not sympathize with the revolution, but they have long been on the side of our opponents. At their expense, in no case can reproaches be sent to those workers of the General Staff who serve us faithfully and with devotion. and even under the old regime the General Staff was under a great sign of suspicion of being revolutionary. Undoubtedly, among the [officers] of the General Staff there were convinced monarchists who did not sympathize with the revolution, but they have long been on the side of our opponents. At their expense, in no case can reproaches be sent to those workers of the General Staff who serve us faithfully and with devotion.
Meanwhile, many injustices and insults are being done to the General Staff. I will be right if I say frankly that every commissar appointed to supervise the activities of some section of the headquarters has his hidden desire to catch some person of the General Staff in counter-revolutionary and treasonous behavior; the result is not control, but importunate pestering. Why such an inclination of political commissars was created is completely strange, since the gendarmes of the old regime suffered from such [and] manners, whose promotion was to a large extent dependent on how many conspiracies against the autocratic system could be uncovered.
Recently, everyone has been especially worried about the sudden and completely incomprehensible arrest of [officer] of the General Staff Teodori. who is known to all as a faithful and conscientious worker for the Soviet government in a very responsible post. Arrested on the orders of Comrade Kedrov and, despite the fact that all the charges against him have disappeared, Teodori continues to be under arrest, which is reflected in the personal regime of Comrade Kedrov.
For my part, I can say that Teodori undoubtedly rendered great services to us, especially in the summer of 1918, when rebellions were in full swing inside the country, which had to be suppressed by orders from Operod, where Teodori was a military instructor, as well as when we needed to fight against the Czechoslovak corps.
This last period is well known to me, and I am well aware of the enormous services Teodori rendered when he was in the position of military instructor of Operod, headed by Comrade Aralov.
The Supreme Military Council, which was at the head of the then military apparatus, turned out to be completely unsuitable for vigorous and practical work, and all the duties that lay on this council were performed by Operod 3 , and as part of Operod, Theodori. I can testify that the services that Theodori rendered to our success on the Volga at that time were enormous. It was only thanks to his ebullient nature and devotion that we managed to organize and pull out the necessary reserves from the country, direct and monitor their movement, supply, and keep in military discipline on the ground, the apparatus that directed the places of formation and dispatch of troops to the Eastern Front. These merits should not be forgotten.
Teodori was considered one of the most capable persons of the General Staff and is known to everyone as a person devoted to Soviet power, which is why his sudden arrest made a stunning impression on the entire General Staff. This impression has been strengthened in recent days by the fact that no charges are brought against Theodori, and that there are not even any. Persistent rumors are circulating that Comrade Kedrov's assistant, Enduk, has expressed himself that there is no accusation against Teodori, that an accusation must be created.
The other day Comrade Selivachev was also arrested, who was to be the commander of the Eastern Front. Selivachev was known to me even before the war, and was never a monarchist, on the contrary, under the monarchy he was among the persecuted.
Both of these arrests, taken together, create the impression that there is confusion in the center and that there, not relying on the General Staff of the Red Army, they are taking hostages in advance, which, apparently, are Teodori and Selivachev. Against Teodori's arrest, there are a lot of protests from his comrades, who know him from school and through the Soviet service as an honest and dedicated person 4 .
For my part, I express my desire to reconsider the reasons for Teodori's arrest as soon as possible, and in view of the fact that all the charges have disappeared, I ask you to release Teodori from arrest so that he can be called to the service.
As for Comrade Kedrov, who arbitrarily, without observing the orders established by the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, ordered the arrest of Teodori, I ask you to open an investigation into Kedrov's actions and bring him to justice if he is the sole culprit of the arrest. Comrade Kedrov is known to me by his very unsuccessful command of the 6th Army, during which he completely illegally, having no right to do so, ordered the arrest of the commander of the 2nd Army, Comrade Blokhin, and the entire headquarters of the 2nd Army, adding in a telegram that if necessary, then shoot. The 2nd Army was not subordinated to Kedrov. For this act, Kedrov was dismissed from the post of commander of the 6th Army. With this unlawful and thoughtless arrest of his, Kedrov completely defeated the administration of the 2nd Army, as a result of which the 2nd Army collapsed, and this was on difficult days, when the Czechoslovaks captured Kazan and threatened to advance to the center of the Republic. If at that time Kedrov treated such extremely important issues as arrest and execution so thoughtlessly, then it is likely that in this case it is also possible that the same features of action were embedded in the Theodori case.
Khrulev was recently arrested at the headquarters of the Eastern Front and, by the verdict of the Revolutionary Tribunal, was sentenced to five years' imprisonment at a time when the perpetrator of the crime escaped with only a reprimand.
At the headquarters of the Priuralsky District, without any reason, the entire composition of the general staff was arrested.
On April 1, at the headquarters of the 1st Army, by the sole decision of a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 1st Army, comrade. Kalnin, Wendenbaum, assistant chief of the radiotelegraph, was shot without trial or investigation.
All this once again emphasizes the personal regime that still exists among political workers, both in relation to the members of the General Staff, and in general to specialists.
In conclusion, I consider it my duty to report that the constant unfair and insulting treatment of the people of the General Staff who are in the service of the Soviet government, which they do not deserve, will not give the productivity of the work of these people, which is especially needed at the present time, when the struggle on all fronts reaches a crisis. Work cannot proceed calmly when every specialist, regardless of the position he holds and his services to the Republic, can always and only on the basis of personal relations be arrested. Such conditions of service, which do not guarantee against unreasonable arrest, at a time when work requires special stress, bring only harm. The work of specialists in the management and creation of the army can be productive and calm only if
I also ask you to take into account that as a result of temporary setbacks on the Eastern Front, many fall into an alarmist mood, as a result of which an elevated nervous mood is created that is very harmful to the cause. This is noticed among the commissars and is undoubtedly passed on to staff members as well.
During my visit to the Eastern Front, I experienced the complete suppression of the spirit of the general staff working on the Eastern Front. Here, undoubtedly, it is necessary to draw a certain line, beyond which it is unacceptable to pull the string of suspicion and mockery of the persons of the General Staff from anyone in the name of our final victory over our numerous enemies.
If this is not done, then with our first-class staff workers, driven to despair by constant chicanery and personal regime, the same thing may happen that happened to our Brest delegation, driven to the highest degree of despair by gradually increasing demands.
I am extremely concerned that the same should not happen to those who are at the head of the most responsible workers in the headquarters if some measures of restraint in relation to them are not taken and put into practice in the shortest possible time.
In order to create normal working conditions, it is necessary to guarantee to all members of the General Staff serving in the Red Army full inviolability of freedom, allowing arrests only upon presentation of specific charges and only with the knowledge of their immediate superiors.
In addition, I consider it necessary to reconsider the case of the General Staff of Khrulev, as wrongly convicted and to bring to justice comrade. Kalnin, who shot Wendenbaum without trial or investigation, because such arbitrariness drops the prestige of the Soviet government.
Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Republic
General Staff Vatsetis.
18/IV 1919
Serpukhov.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 17. On. 109. D. 41. L. 6-10. Typewritten text.
Notes:
1 On the letterhead: “RSFSR. COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF ALL ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC". Sent from Serpukhov to Moscow.
2The issue of party policy in relation to military specialists was discussed at the VIII Congress of the RSDLP (b) on March 18 - 23, 1919. In connection with the unsuccessful actions of the Red Army on the Eastern Front in the spring of 1919, the country's party leadership demanded regular reports from the High Command with an analysis of the reasons for the failures . On April 17 and 18, 1919, Vatsetis sent two detailed reports on the situation on the fronts to the RVS. A detailed summary of the state of the front dated April 17, 1919 ended with the conclusion that the main reason for the instability of the Red Army units, and, consequently, its failures, was the inexperience of a significant part of the available command staff in a different state of affairs in Kolchak's army "[...] With all this, - wrote the Commander-in-Chief, - it should be noted that that the friction between military specialists and politicians that arose during this period (especially in the 5th Army) and continues to flare up in places and now on the basis of resolving various issues [/ ..] ”(Commander-in-Chief of all Armed Forces Republic I. I. Vatsetis, p. 242). As is known, some members of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic (Stalin and others) spoke out against the use of military specialists from the former tsarist army in the military leadership of the country. Meanwhile, out of 20 front commanders during the war years, 17 were military specialists - career officers, the proportion of career officers in other command positions was just as high (Kavtaradze A. G. Military specialists in the service of the Republic of Soviets. 1917-1920. M., 1988. S. 207-212). which arose during this period (especially in the 5th army) and continue to flare up in places and now on the basis of resolving various issues [/ ..] ”(Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Republic I. I. Vatsetis. P. 242). As is known, some members of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic (Stalin and others) spoke out against the use of military specialists from the former tsarist army in the military leadership of the country. Meanwhile, out of 20 front commanders during the war years, 17 were military specialists - career officers, the proportion of career officers in other command positions was just as high (Kavtaradze A. G. Military specialists in the service of the Republic of Soviets. 1917-1920. M., 1988. S. 207-212). which arose during this period (especially in the 5th Army) and continue to flare up in places at the present time on the basis of resolving various issues [/ ..] ”(Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Republic I. I. Vatsetis. P. 242). As is known, some members of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic (Stalin and others) spoke out against the use of military specialists from the former tsarist army in the military leadership of the country. Meanwhile, out of 20 front commanders during the war years, 17 were military specialists - career officers, the proportion of career officers in other command positions was just as high (Kavtaradze A. G. Military specialists in the service of the Republic of Soviets. 1917-1920. M., 1988. S. 207-212). ]” (Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Republic I. I. Vatsetis, p. 242). As is known, some members of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic (Stalin and others) spoke out against the use of military specialists from the former tsarist army in the military leadership of the country. Meanwhile, out of 20 front commanders during the war years, 17 were military specialists - career officers, the proportion of career officers in other command positions was just as high (Kavtaradze A. G. Military specialists in the service of the Republic of Soviets. 1917-1920. M., 1988. S. 207-212). ]” (Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Republic I. I. Vatsetis, p. 242). As is known, some members of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic (Stalin and others) spoke out against the use of military specialists from the former tsarist army in the military leadership of the country. Meanwhile, out of 20 front commanders during the war years, 17 were military specialists - career officers, the proportion of career officers in other command positions was just as high (Kavtaradze A. G. Military specialists in the service of the Republic of Soviets. 1917-1920. M., 1988. S. 207-212).
3 The Supreme Military Council, the body of strategic leadership of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Republic (the High Command of the Red Army), was formed by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars in early March 1918. Initially, it consisted of a military leader and two political commissars. The Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of March 19, 1918 introduced the positions of chairman of the Air Force, which became the people's commissar for military affairs, members of the council and two deputies.
The positions of political commissars were abolished. On May 14, 1918, organizational and operational departments (departments) were created under the Air Force. On the basis of the decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of September 2, 1918, by order of the Revolutionary Military Council of September 6, 1918, the Air Force was abolished.
4 On April 17 or 18, Lenin, having read the telephone message of representatives of the graduates of the Academy of the General Staff (class of 1917) from Serpukhov with a repeated request to sort out the Teodori case, made a note on it: “Sklyansky for a review” (V. I. Lenin. Biographical chronicle. T. 7. S. 97).
No. 47
G. S. Moroz - Central Committee of the RCP(b)
April 22, 1919
In the Central Committee of the RCP.
Having traveled around a number of cities and towns in the western region, now Great Russia 1 and Lithuania, I consider it my duty to bring to the attention of the Central Committee the need to take a number of measures, dictated by the current moment, in the name of preserving and consolidating the October gains.
These measures concern only the area of preventing counter-revolution.
The entire Western Territory is currently saturated with the poison of anti-Semitism. It's downright hard to breathe when you enter the Smolensk, Minsk, Mogilev, Vitebsk provinces. Every now and then in cars, at stations, in canteens, at bazaars, even in clubs, you hear: “Jews are everywhere, Jews are destroying Russia, the Soviet government would be nothing if it weren’t for the Jews,” etc. It is clear that all this, on the one hand , is a consequence of the age-old introduction of anti-Semitism by classes hostile to the proletariat and, on the other hand, the last stake of these same classes in the struggle against Soviet power and, finally, the last, "Soviet" anti-Semitism, based on the economic conditions of life of the Jews, but which the latter, according to for a number of reasons, they did not single out a class of proletarians that was especially noticeable to others, and therefore for many elements, even those who are friendly towards them, the concept of a Jew is associated with the concept of "bourgeois", "shopkeeper" or simply "speculator". In a word, everything taken together is widely used by our enemies to incite irresponsible elements, both in the countryside and in the cities, against Soviet power.
The latest events in GOMEL, RECHITSA, BORISOV 2 and other cities have shown this to us. First of all, “beat the Jews”, and then “save Russia”.
The same is happening in Ukraine.
How to knock the weapon of anti-Semitism out of the hands of conscious pogromists.
First of all, of course, agitation and propaganda. I must say that almost nothing is being done in this regard. It is necessary to publish popular pamphlets, organize talks, put on theaters in cities about Jewish life, and many other things that would open up a picture of the life of the Jews in general and its poor in particular. Second: in view of the anxiety of the moment in the pogrom attitude in the cities of the former "Pale of Settlement", officially remove the Jews from responsible "commissar" posts, replacing them with comrades from the inner provinces. The Jewish comrades should be transferred to work in the inner provinces, which are less infected with anti-Semitism.
Third: it is that it is necessary to infuse communist Jews into the ranks of the red army as direct soldiers. To this day, there are no ordinary Jewish communists in the Red Army. This is explained simply by the fact that most of them, as the best workers of the region in which they are located, are employed in Soviet institutions as employees, but at the present time it would be quite possible to replace [them] with non-communists and non-Jews.
The mobilization of Jewish communists must be entrusted to the local Party Committees, explaining to the latter the need for this.
And, finally, the fourth, concerning the economic life of the Jews, which gives rise to anti-Semitism.
Not wanting to expand on the impact of the Revolution on the economic foundations of Jewry, I want to note that in recent times, Jewry has been a declassed mass, forced to take on petty speculation, bagging, etc., etc., nourishing, as Soviet anti-Semitism shows *.
In this area, it is necessary to help the existing Jewish commissariat 3 and other bodies, so to speak, to colonize the Jewish working masses. It is necessary to allocate land to the Jews by organizing them into agricultural communes. This is not a utopia, but a living necessity.
In every possible way it is necessary to promote the hiring of Jews to work in factories, on railways as switchmen, conductors, etc. This work, as I have already indicated, will be taken up by the Jewish Commissariat.
I think that this report will not cause any accusations against me. I find it necessary to note that I myself am a Jew, who has worked and is working all the time among the Jewish proletariat, with whom I have close ties. As much as I would not like to write about all of the above, but devotion to the Revolution prompts me to do so 4 .
Member of the Board of the Cheka G. Moroz.
April 1919
RTSKHIDNI. F. 17. Op. 66. D. 65. L. 27. Typewritten text. Signature - autograph.
Notes:
1 With the beginning of the Polish-German offensive against Belarus and Lithuania in April 1919, part of the territories not yet occupied were declared to be part of the RSFSR.
2We are talking about a number of anti-Soviet speeches in March-April 1919, held under the slogans of the Constituent Assembly and resulted in Jewish pogroms. During the formation of local Soviet authorities in these areas, most administrative positions were taken by representatives of the traditionally strong Jewish socialist parties here - the Bund, Poalei Zion and the United Jewish Socialist Party. In conditions of extreme political instability, the aggravation of the food and housing situation, the spearhead of the anti-Soviet uprising that had begun was directed against the leaders of the Jewish nationality. In Gomel, during the pogrom on March 24-28, 1919, according to the report of the instructor of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the RSFSR, 10 senior officials were killed (The struggle for Soviet power in Belarus. S. 83-85).
3 In November 1917, along with others, a Jewish commissariat was created as part of the People's Commissariat for Nationalities. Among the tasks of the commissariats were: informing the Soviet authorities about the needs of a given nationality, informing the nationalities about the steps and activities of the Soviet authorities, satisfying the cultural and educational needs of the masses of a given nationality through the Soviet authorities, and preparing appropriate draft decrees.
4On April 26, 1919, the issue of propaganda work in connection with the outbreak of anti-Semitism was considered at a meeting of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b). On the same day, the Central Committee sent a letter to the provincial party committees about the need to combat anti-Semitism. In particular, the letter stated: “The Central Committee of the RCP(b) decided that our central party organs would place a number of leading and agitational articles on this issue [...] and use them as material for broad agitation, which must be raised immediately” ( News of the Central Committee of the CPSU, 1989, No. 12, p. 154). On April 28, 1919, the Politburo considered the question of the formation of red Jewish units and decided: “To allow the formation of Jewish battalions on a general basis so that they are national battalions in mixed regiments [...]” (RTSKHIDNI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. L. 2). On May 11, the question was again heard in the Orgburo. After listening to a report on the situation of the Jews in the western region and the proposals set out in it “on the need to take measures to attract the Jewish masses to agriculture, on allowing the formation of Jewish units, on the need for the Organizing Bureau to take into account the national composition of the population when appointing comrades,” the Orgburo decided to recognize these measures desirable (Ibid. Op. 112. D. L. 25). On June 2, 1920, the issue of combating anti-Semitism was considered at a joint meeting of the Politburo and the Orgburo. As a result of the discussion, it was decided to “instruct Kamenev [...] to draw up a plan of measures for the party and the Soviet government to combat anti-Semitism” (Ibid. Op. 3. D. 11. L. 4). on the admission of the formation of Jewish units, on the need for the Orgburo to take into account the national composition of the population when appointing comrades, ”the Orgburo decided to recognize these measures as desirable (Ibid. Op. 112. D. L. 25). On June 2, 1920, the issue of combating anti-Semitism was considered at a joint meeting of the Politburo and the Orgburo. As a result of the discussion, it was decided to “instruct Kamenev [...] to draw up a plan of measures for the party and the Soviet government to combat anti-Semitism” (Ibid. Op. 3. D. 11. L. 4). on the admission of the formation of Jewish units, on the need for the Orgburo to take into account the national composition of the population when appointing comrades, ”the Orgburo decided to recognize these measures as desirable (Ibid. Op. 112. D. L. 25). On June 2, 1920, the issue of combating anti-Semitism was considered at a joint meeting of the Politburo and the Orgburo. As a result of the discussion, it was decided to “instruct Kamenev [...] to draw up a plan of measures for the party and the Soviet government to combat anti-Semitism” (Ibid. Op. 3. D. 11. L. 4).
No. 48
A. G. Beloborodov - N. N. Krestinsky
May 3, 1919
Station [station] "Log" of the South [go] -V [eastern] railroad [road].
May 3, 1919
Nikolai Nikolaevich!
The fulfillment of my main task - the speedy liquidation of the Veshenskaya adventure - will probably drag on for a very long time 1 . In the ciphered telegram, I indicated in general terms the reasons for the slow elimination; I consider it inconvenient to expand here in detail, because the letter may get lost. The help from the Orel [th] Cheka, which they counted on, turned out to be a poof: instead of the promised 400 people, 141 [th] people were put in the wagons, and here ... 45 people [s] came here!
Sloppiness is outrageous, and unusual! This was reported to the headquarters of the VChK corps.
I have already left for 11 days, and only managed to visit the headquarters of one group of troops - the reason: too slow progress along the railroad. We drove tolerably to Povorino, and then we do from 60 to 100 miles per day. The roads have been destroyed and the "comrades" of the railway workers are sabotaging beyond measure.
In conclusion, the Central [Directorate] of Military [Messages] was so kind that they did not give me a wagon, and I had to fit in the wagon received by the Cheka team, so it’s absolutely impossible to study or talk with the public .
In general, it must be said that the work of neither the Donbureau 2 nor the central commissariats is noticeable. The “commissars” sent from the Donbureau to the villages and farmsteads are sitting, waiting for instructions and orders from the department of the Civil [an] Administration 3 , and the delegates of the central commissariats I don’t know where they have gone! I strongly suspect that they are in Kozlov!
Tov. I propose to send Myasnikov for political work among the expeditionary forces. There, in this part, the situation is extremely weak. The newspaper Krasnoarmeyets, published in the IXth Army, is not suitable for the Red Army men - it writes "smart" articles on international topics, and even then in cloth language, there are also few workers there.
It would be good if we could take two or three dozen communist workers and send them directly to the expeditionary forces, supplying a fair amount of "Poor" 4, (the success of which is very, very strong here). It is necessary to pay the most serious attention to the expeditionary forces for the following reasons. Firstly, thanks to the enemy’s quasi-Soviet agitation, there is confusion in the heads of the Red Army men, dissatisfaction with the Communists begins to sprout strong sprouts in the mass, and secondly, the presence of Communists at the front would show the Red Army men that they (the Communists) not only know how to “commissar » in the villages. I am agitating about this because I read in the only newspaper after Moscow, received yesterday, that Petrograd has mobilized several thousand to be sent to the Don. Maybe you can sort this out somehow? Only people are needed with character and strong nerves. For this operation, this condition is mandatory.
Since during the several days of my stay here I orientated myself in the situation, the line taken by V.I. is quite correct, although some comrades, including Comrade. Sok[olnikov], they look at the matter, it seems, somewhat differently. Although I didn’t speak to him, I feel this line.
In general, it must be said that whoever is needed has not yet been taken into iron here - very Russian good nature is rushing from all corners!
Mrachkovsky really needs to be here, he knows how to do what needs to be done in such cases. If he had taken the Bobylev brothers with him (if this is possible under the terms of the front of the III army), then at first it would be enough.
By the time I finished, it was already dark, but there were no candles.
Regards, A. Beloborodov.
PS Now we have received a message that there was a crash along the way and it is unlikely that we will get to Tsaritsyno soon.
A. B.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 17. Op. 109. D. 54. L. 1-2. Autograph.
Notes:
oneWe are talking about the uprising of the Cossacks of the Upper Don (the villages of Yelanskaya, Veshenekaya, Migulinskaya, etc.) that began on the night of March 11, 1919, in the rear of the Soviet troops of the Southern Front. The bulk of the rebels (30 thousand people) were middle-class Cossacks, brought to this point by the food and punitive policy. The headquarters of the rebels was in the village of Veshenskaya. In early April, the 204th Serdobsky consolidated regiment of the Red Army (380 people) went over to the side of the rebels. Denikin's troops provided assistance to the rebels with weapons. The command of the Southern Front allocated 13,800 infantry and 2,500 cavalry to suppress the uprising. On April 22, 1919, the issue was discussed at a meeting of the Orgburo. Having considered the resolution of the Don Bureau and Syrtsov's proposals on carrying out terror against the Cossacks, on the settlement of Cossack farms by immigrants from Central Russia, on the mobilization and arming of the peasants of the Millerovsky district, the Orgburo decided to approve the proposed measures (See for more details: Genis VL Decossackization in Soviet Russia // Questions of History. 1994. No. 1. P. 49-50). Beloborodov was entrusted with negotiating with the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front on the creation of a civilian administration on the Don. Lenin kept this question under constant control. In telegrams to Sokolnikov (RVS of the Southern Front) on April 20 and 24, 1919, he was indignant at slow actions in suppressing the uprising (Lenin V. I. PSS. T. 50. S. 283, 289-290). On May 6, 1919, in a telegram to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front, he wrote: “Today I saw the news that the suppression was not moving forward. It is necessary to take the most energetic measures and uproot this slowness [...] A delay with an uprising is intolerable [...]” (Ibid., p. 306). However, the uprising was not crushed. On May 24, 1919, Denikin's troops broke through the front of the Soviet troops near Millerovo, and on June 8, 1919, the insurgent Cossacks joined the White Army.
On May 4, 1919, the Central Committee of the RCP(b) approved Beloborodov as chairman of the Don Revolutionary Committee. Beloborodov was appointed authorized representative of the Council of Defense on the Southern Front for the quickest elimination of the Cossack uprising on the Don. On May 2, 1919, Beloborodov telegraphed Lenin about his departure to the headquarters of the 9th Army of the Southern Front. On May 6, 1919, Lenin gave Beloborodov a telegram expressing extreme surprise at the lack of information in the correspondence “about the progress of the assigned [...] case” and demanding to answer in more detail (Ibid., p. 307). Apparently, in addition to telegraphic correspondence with Lenin, Beloborodov maintained contact with him through the secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) Krestinsky.
2 The Don Bureau of the RCP(b) was established by decision of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) in September 1918 in Kursk to manage underground work and the partisan movement in the rear of the White Guard troops (in the Donbass, on the Don, Kuban, North Caucasus). At the end of 1918 - beginning of 1919, the Donbureau was located in Kozlov, its branches operated in Tsaritsyn, Kharkov, Balashov.
3 After the liberation from the White Guards in January-March 1919 of the northern and eastern districts of the Don region, the Donburo created the Department of Civil Administration under the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front. The task of the Department was to restore Soviet and party organs in the liberated territories.
4 "Poor" - a newspaper for peasants, published by the Central Committee of the RCP (b), Moscow, 1918-1931.
No. 49
A. G. Beloborodov - N. N. Krestinsky
May 6, 1919
station [station] Ilavlya, May 6, 1919
Nikolai Nikolaevich!
We sat for three whole days at this accursed station, and it is not known when we will move on.
I would like to add a lot to what I already wrote in the letter dated May 3, but the post office for Moscow is leaving soon, and I am in a hurry.
I consider it the greatest naivety, criminal frivolity that the struggle against the Don counter-revolution was carried out through revolutionary tribunals. The tribunals tried (!) the defectors and obvious counter-revolutionaries captured by us, some of them (very small) were shot, some were sent to forced labor (punishment, you think), and a part, and, it seems, a significant one, were released and released in peace.
This naivety must be put to rest, and the sooner the better. It is necessary to organize Chekas and, as soon as possible, put an end to the tribunal verbiage.
The basic rule of conduct during the massacre of counter-revolutionaries: the captured are not judged, but massacres are carried out with them.
An authoritative decision is needed in this spirit for the Don, and I insist on this in the strongest terms. In addition, comrades should be sent here] larger than Comrade. Smirnov, sent by Comrade. Dzerzhinsky.
While all.
With regards, A. Beloborodov.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 17. Op. 109. D. 54. L. 3. Autograph.
No. 50
Telegram from L. B. Kamenev to V. I. Lenin
May 10, 1919
From Yekaterinoslav from KAMENEV 1 .
I have now received your telegram in my cipher 2 , everything will be done, the road Yekaterinoslav, Znamenka, Kiev is cut off by Grigoriev's gangs 3 . My information and reports from Kyiv give a picture of Grigoriev's complete uprising. From Pyatikhatka they report: seventeen echelons will move in the direction of Yekaterinoslav; Grigoriev, who yesterday postponed his meeting with me in Znamenka, today refuses to talk. He tries to communicate with Makhno. Exploration is being done. The information is being verified. Perhaps an exaggeration, after a personal meeting with Makhno, a visit to Gulyai-Pole, I believe that Makhno will not dare to support Grigoriev now. The ground for performance there is quite prepared. Makhno does not produce either bread or coal, and probably will not produce it, although he personally promised me, he swore allegiance 4. The mobilization of workers in Yekaterinoslav, Bakhmut, Mariupol and Aleksandrovsk is in full swing . No money, no weapons. Now I am leaving for Kyiv with a firm decision to bring troops and weapons here. Mezhlauk and the commander of the second 6 were given precise instructions. I haven't received anything from Trotsky yet, we must see each other . Let him ask the Kremlin for my location upon arrival.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 2. On. 1. D. 9696. L. 1. Handwritten text.
Notes:
1 A telegram was sent from Yekaterinoslav to Moscow. It was received and read by Lenin on the same day. (V. I. Lenin. Biographical chronicle T. 7 S. 182). At the top is a note: "Received 10/V". Nearby is Lenin's note - "Return".
2On May 7, 8 and 9, 1919, Lenin telegraphed Kamenev, Commissioner of the Council of Defense on the Southern Front. In a telegram dated May 7, Lenin wrote about the need to transfer reinforcements to the lost Lugansk and the speedy liberation of Donbass, suggested temporarily, before the capture of Rostov, "to be diplomatic" with the troops Makhno and lay responsibility for them on Antonov-Ovseenko (Lenin V.I. PSS. T. 50. P. 307). In a telegram dated May 8, 1919 to the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine on behalf of the Central Committee, where Kamenev is listed among the addressees, Lenin officially duplicated the information of the first telegram (Ibid. T. 38. P. 378). On May 9, 1919, Lenin and Stalin sent a long telegram to Kyiv with a directive to the “Commissioner of the Council of Defense” (From the history of the civil war in the USSR, vol. 2, p. 386), and a little later, Lenin personally asked Kamenev to receive this directive (V I. Lenin. Biographical chronicle. T. 7. S. 179) and briefly duplicated its content to Kamenev’s secretary: “Kamenev must devote himself entirely to hastening the sending of troops to the Donets Basin and mobilizing the workers of all large cities for this purpose, and then wait for Trotsky [...]” (Lenin V. I. PSS, vol. 50, p. 308). Obviously, we are talking about these telegrams. At the beginning of the directive for May 9, 1919, Lenin issued an order to Kamenev's secretary: "I ask you to communicate with Kyiv, where Rakovsky has 2 or more telegrams for Kamenev" (Ibid., p. 485). We are talking about these telegrams. At the beginning of the directive for May 9, 1919, Lenin issued an order to Kamenev's secretary: "I ask you to communicate with Kyiv, where Rakovsky has 2 or more telegrams for Kamenev" (Ibid., p. 485). We are talking about these telegrams. At the beginning of the directive for May 9, 1919, Lenin issued an order to Kamenev's secretary: "I ask you to communicate with Kyiv, where Rakovsky has 2 or more telegrams for Kamenev" (Ibid., p. 485).
3On May 7, 1919, the commander of the 6th Ukrainian consolidated division, Grigoriev, refused to comply with the order of the Soviet command to move the division from the Elisavetgrad region to Bessarabia and, having enlisted the support of Makhno, with the support of the local population, raised a rebellion in the rear of the Red Army, which opposed the troops of General Denikin in the Donbass. Grigoriev had 20 thousand people, 50 guns, 700 machine guns, 6 armored trains. The slogans of the rebels: “Power to the Soviets of the people of Ukraine without communists”, “Ukraine for Ukrainians”, “Free trade in bread”, etc. The rebels captured Cherkassy, Uman, Kremenchug, Yekaterinoslav, Elisavetgrad, and later Kherson, Nikolaev and other cities. On May 9, the Grigorievites shot more than 30 Soviet and party workers in Yekaterinoslav. At an extraordinary meeting of the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense of the Ukrainian SSR on May 10, 1919
4 In certain periods, based on the situation, Makhno entered into temporary agreements with the command of the Red Army.
5 We are talking about the mobilization of workers into the Red Army in a number of regions of Ukraine, carried out by decision of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) in May 1919 in connection with the events in the Donbass.
6 Apparently, this refers to Skachko, Commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Army.
On May 12, 1919, Trotsky telegraphed from Kozlov to Rakovsky and Podvoisky about his intention to be in Kharkov in two or three days. Promising to inform about the day of arrival, he demanded the arrival in Kharkov of Podvoisky, Antonov, Mezhlauk, Ioffe and Kamenev (RTsKhIDNI. F. 17. Op. 109. D. 12. L. 16). On May 13, 1919, in a telegram to Lenin and Sklyansky, Trotsky announced that he was going to leave for Ukraine on May 14, 1919 (The Trotsky papers. Vol. 1. P. 416).
No. 51
Telegram from G. E. Zinoviev to V. I. Lenin
[not earlier than May 14, 1919]
MOSCOW KREMLIN URGENT
Out of turn note on the wire
PRE-DEFENSE TO LENIN 1
In response to your request 2 we inform you: first, the evacuation of some factories and environs was ordered not by us, but by the highest military authority through Komzap 3 . The order was received on May 2 under No. 02768/2102. The Committee of Defense 4 , on the contrary, is skeptical about these steps, but did not interfere with them, not wanting to provoke the usual complaints from the military against the civilian authorities in such cases. Representatives of TsUSa 5 gave unreasonable orders that only created panic in the factories. The Defense Committee took steps to streamline. If you help us stop the evacuation, we will be very happy 6. Second. The order to sink the ships was not given by anyone, and there was no sinking. There is only a plan, worked out a year ago with Altvater, to do it in case of need at the last moment. Third. The number of workers mobilized for general education after the release of a number of categories reaches eight thousand. The exact figure by 12 o'clock on May 12 is 8375, and, with personnel, 9985. All of them are consolidated into three regiments and sent on May 15 to positions on assignments from the military command, and to that extent are used for defense needs. This mobilization took place by order signed by Vatsetis dated May 2 No. 2036 and Vseroglavshtab 7No. 234. At all the most important enterprises, work continues, especially at those that work for defense. Men's labor is replaced by women's. All work is being carried out in full agreement with Comrade Sudakov, Krasin's representative for supplying the army. Up to three thousand were mobilized through the unions and the party. Of these, six hundred of the very best were hurriedly sent to Kyiv yesterday at 12 midnight at Trotsky's request, a thousand were poured into marching companies, others are used in the same way. Mandatory mobilization by age gave only two thousand. All categories of mobilized are used according to the instructions of the All-Glavshtab, the Revolutionary Military Council and the Party Central Committee. Fourth. Special Commissioner 8until now he has been appointed only to the electrical society of 1886. The necessity of this step was motivated by me in a detailed letter dated May 9 to Rykov and through a special delegate who went to him. There, on the board, in the majority, there are former shareholders, whom Krasin, unfortunately, trusts too much. They are headed by Ulman and others, who have repeatedly created great difficulties for us. Lately negligence and sabotage have gone so far that for two weeks the station threatened to shut down every day. A lot depends on this station in St. Petersburg. The Council of Trade Unions especially insisted on the appointment of a commissioner for the society in 1886. The appointed commissar, an old tried and tested communist worker, straightened things out at once. Fifth. Of course, there was no indiscriminate appeal of citizens. General education, as can be seen from the above, mobilized by direct order from Moscow and Serpukhov. And there were no other mobilizations, except for those indicated. We are surprised at the question. To this we consider it necessary to add the following: of late, all supposedly offended saboteurs and people deprived of this or that illegal privilege go to Moscow to complain and find too indulgent listeners there. The extremely dubious elements expelled from Petrograd receive the highest appointments in Moscow in the People's Commissariat for Food and the like. This has become the talk of the town among the Petrograd workers and is extremely damaging to the cause. The work in Petrograd is now too hard for us, so we are compelled to declare: if you do not fully support the Committee of Defense and if you have any confidence in the information distorted by interested people, our group of comrades will not be able to continue to work.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. On. 1. D. 1021. L. 1-2. Typewritten text. Editing - Zinoviev's autograph.
Notes:
1 The telegram was sent from Petrograd to Moscow.
On May 13, 1919, the Council of Defense, chaired by Lenin, considered the issue of the right of the Revolutionary Military Councils to independently appoint evacuation and decided to instruct Lenin to sign "a draft resolution if it is agreed upon in the relevant departments" (V. I. Lenin. Biographical Chronicle. Vol. 7 pp. 191). On the same day, Lenin signed a resolution of the Council of Defense of the Republic on the abolition of the evacuation of Petrograd (Ibid., p. 194).
On May 14, 1919, Lenin sent a telegram to the Petrograd Defense Committee, in which, in particular, he requested: “In order to clarify the state of affairs [in] Petrograd, the Defense Council proposes to give an exhaustive answer: for what reasons it was decided to evacuate some factories of Petrograd and its environs, how and why permission was given to sink ships [...]” (Documents on the Heroic Defense of Petrograd in 1919, M., 1941, p. 14).
3 Komzap - Commander of the Western Front. The Western Front was formed on February 19, 1919 with the aim of uniting the actions of Soviet troops in the western and northwestern strategic directions. The front headquarters was successively located in Staraya Russa, Molodechno, Dvinsk, Smolensk, and Minsk.
4 In connection with the offensive of the White Finnish army that began in the second half of April 1919 and the capture of Olonets by it, on May 2, 1919, by the decision of the executive committee of the Petrograd Soviet, the Petrograd Defense Committee was created. Petrograd and the Petrograd province were declared under martial law. (From the history of civil war in the USSR. T. 2. S. 315-316).
5 The Central Supply Directorate is an organ of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic.
6 A draft reply to Zinoviev's telegram was prepared by Rykov. Lenin got acquainted with the project on May 15, 1919 and made an addition in which he critically assessed the position of Zinoviev, who did not take decisive measures to implement the decision of the Defense Council to prohibit mobilization (V. I. Lenin. Biographical chronicle. T. 7. P. 194) .
7 The All-Russian General Staff was one of the central bodies of military command in 1918-1921. He was in charge of the formation, organization, training of the Red Army, the development of all issues related to defense.
8 The position of special commissars at enterprises of strategic importance was introduced during the years of the civil war to control the activities of the administration.
No. 52
I. I. Vatsetis, S. I. Aralov - V. I. Lenin
May 15, 1919
May 15, 1919
Copy.
Gor. Serpukhov.
Secret.
Chairman of the Council of Defense of the RSFSR 1 .
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Telegrams 02769/2103, 2698/ob Nashtazap inform about the orders to mine and blow up the bridges in Petrograd: Liteiny, Okhtensky and Connecting railway and damage the draw parts of the bridges: Nikolaevsky, Palace and Troitsky.
At present, the following bridges have already been mined: Samsonievskiy, Grenadierskiy, Strogonovsky and Elaginskiy.
In addition, it is proposed to prepare for the explosion in Petrograd and the district all the storehouses of the Military and Naval Departments, as well as factories and workshops working for defense or adapted for this work, and all railway structures.
Explosions of bridges inside the city of Petrograd - Liteiny and Okhtensky and wooden ones: Samsonievsky, Grenadier, Stroganov and Elaginsky - seem to be inexpedient from a military point of view and can adversely affect the development of military operations of the army.
The retreating armies, in order to maintain their fighting efficiency, should be directed as far as possible past the city.
An army after unsuccessful battles, retreating through a large city, loses discipline, can quickly turn into a crowd of marauders and be relatively easily destroyed by the enemy.
Damage to bridges inside a large city to delay the enemy will hardly delay the latter for long, but will undoubtedly cause unnecessary suffering to the city dwellers, causing panic and the death of many civilians.
The restoration of bridges passing for the public, which are the Petrograd ones, is carried out extremely quickly, and the interruption of communications for the enemy will not even take a full day, introducing floating means that are absolutely impossible to destroy.
The destruction of the Petrograd railway bridge can be useful only when the explosion is carried out in time; if this condition is met, the retreating units can be put in a critical position when crossing to the right bank of the river. Not you*.
The transfer of rolling stock and evacuated materials along this bridge, as well as retreating units, requires that the bridge operate until the last Red Army soldier has crossed.
This bridge should be mined, but its blowing up should be postponed until all hopes of active struggle are dashed.
As for the explosion of almost all significant factories and workshops, this task, which is physically impossible, must be abandoned, as distracting the most active element of the army from the upcoming struggle; it is necessary to neutralize the factories only with ... * and evacuate the most necessary mechanisms in such a way that after the return of Petrograd it would be possible to quickly organize the production of factories.
The destruction of Petrograd by the Soviet troops will undoubtedly affect the mood of the country.
On the contrary, if active action is possible, even an insignificant part of the surviving property can be useful, as has now been seen in the area of the Western Front.
The most expedient measure should be recognized as a systematic and intensified evacuation of militarily valuable property 2 .
OPINION: Based on the foregoing, I would consider it necessary:
1) Give instructions to Kommandza about mining one Railway bridge across the river. the Neva and the railway bridges of the Finnish railway between Beloostrov and Petrograd, and explosions should be carried out only on special orders from the Commander 7 3 ;
2) The mining of the remaining Petrograd city bridges of plants and structures should be canceled as not meeting military requirements;
3) To take all measures for the immediate and systematic evacuation of militarily valuable property from the Petrogradsky District and the removal of machine tools and fittings from factories in order to render them harmless in case they are occupied by the enemy.
APPENDIX: Two copies of telegrams and a copy of intercourse No. 156-sec. with information. Map 2 versts in an inch.
Signed:
Commander-in-Chief of All Armed Forces of the Republic
VATSETIS.
Military Commissar, Member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic
ARALOV.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 17. Op. 109. D. 41. L. 15-16. Certified typewritten copy.
Notes:
1 On the letterhead: "Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Republic." On the reverse side of the last sheet is Sklyansky's autograph: "Sk".
On May 18, 1919, Lenin telegraphed the Revolutionary Military Council of the Western Front: “... The Defense Council decides: no general evacuation of Petrograd and the Petrogradsky district shall be announced or carried out. Immediately create a special commission to manage the export of the most necessary property from Petrograd and the Petrograd region (Lenin V.I. Military Correspondence. 1917-1920. M., 1943. P. 124-125).
3 Remezov.
No. 53
Telegram to L. D. Trotsky to X. G. Rakovsky, N. I. Podvoisky, V. A. Antonov-Ovseenko
May 28, 1919
ON A DIRECT WIRE.
Kyiv TO THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSIONER TO RAKOVSKY, TO THE PODVOISKY, TO THE COMFRONT TO ANTONOV.
1. Captured Grigorievites 1 can be used on other fronts only after leading them in masses beforehand through the tribunals, which, having punished the instigators, the ordinary mass can be conditionally sentenced to death, giving a two-month period for correction, while the conditionally punished should sew on any distinctive signs.
2. Has Bogunsky's brigade been assigned to the rear for cleaning?
3. What is the state of the ammunition plant in Nikolaev? Has a sufficiently responsible organizer been sent there, who exactly? Please remember that the issue of cartridges is of paramount importance to us.
4. It is necessary, in my opinion, to immediately begin a campaign against Makhno in the entire Ukrainian press, with the publication of the Gulyai-Pol resolutions and all the actions of Makhno and his associates against the Soviet regime 2 . Otherwise, the liquidation of the Makhnovshchina will not be understood.
5. Removing weapons from the hands of the population 3 is now the next priority task in Ukraine. Based on our experience, it is possible to approach the problem from different angles: a) to declare June the month of surrender, collection of rifles, machine guns and weapons in general. Starting from the 1st of July, finding an unseen rifle will be punished mercilessly, which must be announced everywhere; b) to issue a large cash prize for a presented rifle, also for indicating an unpresented rifle from another; c) special detachments are needed to collect rifles, which would carry out systematic round-ups, having previously found out through agents where the Grigorievites hide rifles; d) at the same time conduct a wide campaign in newspapers, posters, at rallies.
May 28th.
Pre-revolutionary military council TROTSKY.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 17. Op. 109. D. 12. L. 19. Certified typewritten copy.
Notes:
1 See note 3 to document No. 50.
2 In May 1919, Makhno's brigade was defeated by Denikin's troops and fled from the front to the Gulyai-Pole area. Makhno spoke out against Soviet power.
3 The insurgent elements of the detachments of Grigoriev and Makhno were armed local peasants, who, in case of failure, “dissolved” in the villages, and the leaders of the movement with small detachments left their pursuers in order to show up in a new place, quickly gather an army.
No. 54
Telegram of V. A. Antonov-Ovseenko to K. E. Voroshilov, V. I. Lenin, L. D. Trotsky, I. V. Stalin, X. G. Rakovsky
June 2, 1919
Owls. Secret.
From Kyiv 2/6.
Kharkov to Voroshilov, Moscow to Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Rakovsky 1 .
I did not know that Voroshilov's telegram No. 30 was sent not only to Ukrainian addresses. Having learned, I give you a forced answer. Voroshilov was the commander in a certain section of the internal front. At first he had great setbacks on it, corrected by successes in other areas where he did not command, near Cherkassy, Bobrinsky and, above all, near Elisavetgrad. He can attribute to himself alone the success of the struggle against Grigoriev only through a great misunderstanding. Then, the reports of his headquarters about the defeat of Grigoriev near Alexandria turned out to be false. His harsh judgments about our army are also exaggerated. Grigorievshchina was a test for us, and the test was passed by the army, despite the appalling conditions in which this army finds itself, half-bareed, half-dressed, politically ill-bred and still far from formalized. From the first [and] second division, not a single regiment joined Grigoriev, in the fifth only one squadron and one battalion joined him, from parts of the second army only a few hundred people passed to Grigoriev. Two regiments from Grigoriev's division remained with us. Voroshilov's statements, both in the field of his own successes and in relation to the behavior of our units, are shamefully exaggerated.2 .
June 2, 1919 at 10 a.m. 45 min.
Commander Antonov.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 17. Op. 109. D. 12. L. 75. Certified typewritten copy.
Notes:
1 The telegram was deciphered in the Secretariat of the Deputy Chairman of the RVSR and sent to Lenin, Stalin and Rakovsky on June 2, 1919.
2Since the responsibility for the aggravation of the situation in the Donbass and the connection of the rebel Cossacks with Denikin's troops in Moscow was placed on Podvoisky and Antonov-Ovseenko, Voroshilov's ambitions intensified. In an extensive telegram dated May 30, 1919, Lenin conveyed to Trotsky several messages from Mezhlauk and Melnichansky proposing to unite the 2nd, 8th and 13th armies under the general command of Voroshilov (The Trotsky papers. Vol. 1. P. 484-492 ). However, in a reply telegram to Lenin dated June 1, 1919, Trotsky spoke out against this plan “[...] The harassment of some Ukrainians to unite the second Ukrainian army, the thirteenth and eighth in the hands of Voroshilov is completely untenable,” Trotsky telegraphed, “... The idea of a military and food dictatorship is the result of the Donetsk independence, directed against Kyiv and the Southern Front. No doubt, that the implementation of this plan would only increase the chaos and finally kill the operational leadership [...]” On the same day, Lenin sent two telegrams addressed to Mezhlauk and Voroshilov. “It is necessary at all costs to immediately stop the meeting,” wrote Lenin, “to transfer all and any work to martial law, necessarily appointing individuals responsible for the performance of precisely defined work. Discipline must be military everywhere. Commander 2 and the Revolutionary Military Council 2 should ask their direct superiors, that is, Gittis, about everything, give up all schemes about special groups and similar attempts to covertly restore the Ukrainian Front. And there will be enough uniforms and weapons both in Ukraine and at Gittis. If you eliminate chaos, rallies and disputes about primacy, then you can get everything [...] ”(Lenin V.I. PSS. T. 50. S. 332-333). In another telegram, in particular, it was said: “The Politburo of the Central Committee met on June 1 and, in full agreement with Trotsky, resolutely rejects the plan of the Ukrainians to unite the 2nd, 8th and 13th armies, to create a special Donetsk unity. We demand that Voroshilov and Mezhlauk fulfill their immediate task - to create a strong Ukrainian army” (Ibid., p. 333).
No. 55
Telegram from X. G. Rakovsky to L. D. Trotsky, V. I. Lenin, Central Committee of the RCP(b)
June 10, 1919
SECRET
From Kyiv, Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine.
Voronezh, at the location of the Pre-Revolutionary Military Council to Trotsky, a copy of the Presovnarkom Comrade. Lenin, a copy of the Central Committee of the Moscow Kremlin Party 1 .
Semyonov has arrived and is already taking Antonov's cases . [In] contrast to the directives adopted by the Politburo, the 14th Army will not report directly to Vatsetis, but to the headquarters of the Western Army 3. We do not know the motives for this re-decision. The Politburo of Ukraine insists, if there are no important considerations, on the observance of the resolution of the RCP, but we consider it more essential that one local party worker chosen by the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic be appointed to the Revolutionary Military Council of the 14th Army. With the present combination, when both appointed members of the Revolutionary Military Council are unfamiliar with the conditions of local life, the 14th Army will be cut off from political work. Members of the Revolutionary Military Council of the UkrFront Savitsky and the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries handed me a protest that the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic had unified before the agreement of the respective Central Executive Committees 4 . I answer them that the measure of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic has a temporary business character until the issue is finally resolved by the relevant authorities.
June 10, 1919
Rakovsky.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 17. Op. 109. D. 12. L. 31. Typewritten text.
Notes:
1 The telegram was deciphered in the secretariat of the Deputy Chairman of the RVSR on June 22, 1919. In the upper right corner of the document there is an inscription: “Stasovoi”.
2 We are talking about the events connected with the abolition of the Ukrainian Front in accordance with the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) of June 1, 1919 on the military-economic union of the Soviet socialist republics. On the basis of this decision, a decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of June 1, 1919 was adopted on the unification of the military forces of Russia, Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania and Belarus. In accordance with this decree, the Revolutionary Military Council of the RSFSR issued a corresponding order on June 4, 1919. In the period from June 4 to June 16, 1919, the Ukrainian Front was liquidated, and its troops came under the control of the RVS and the High Command of the RSFSR Armed Forces (Civil War in Ukraine. Vol. 2, pp. 110-111, 122, 148-149). The 1st and 3rd Ukrainian armies were merged into the 12th and Semyonov took command of it.
The 3rd 14th Army was formed on June 4, 1919 on the basis of the unification of the former 2nd Army of the Ukrainian Front and the arriving reinforcement units. The command of the army was entrusted to Voroshilov. Mezhlauk was appointed a member of the Revolutionary Military Council, in addition to Voroshilov himself. The army was placed at the disposal of the Southern Front. (Ibid., pp. 122, 149).
4 See Document No. 56.
No. 56
Telegram from X. G. Vakovsky to V. I. Lenin and L. D. Trotsky
June 23, 1919
Moscow. [From] Kyiv, Council of People's Commissars 23/6.
Moscow Kremlin, Predsovnarkom Lenin. Ostrogozhsk and Trotsky on finding the Pre-revolutionary Military Council. Military, out of turn, lit[er] "A".
The Central Executive Committee of Ukraine at a meeting [on] Saturday 1 unanimously: the Communists, Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries, Left Socialist-Revolutionaries 2 , Left minorities, Communist Independents 3 , Bund 4 adopted a resolution on the abolition of the Ukrainian Front, ending as follows: “From now on, the Ukrainian Front merges with the front of all Soviet republics under one common command of the revolutionary council of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic. June 23, 1919. Presovnarkom of Ukraine Rakovsky.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 17. Op. 109. D. 12. L. 32. Uncertified typewritten copy.
Notes:
1 The meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the Ukrainian SSR with representatives of the Kiev Council of Trade Unions and Factory Committees on the issue of the liquidation of the Ukrainian Front and the unification of its forces under the unified command of the Revolutionary Military Council of the RSFSR took place on June 21, 1919. The adopted resolution began with the words: “The task entrusted [to] the command of the Special Front (Ukrainian Front - Comp.) [for] the liberation of the territory of Ukraine, now [in] its basis [with] complete success." Further, the resolution expressed gratitude to the command in the person of Antonov-Ovseenko and his employees (Civil War in Ukraine. Vol. 2. P. 165).
2 The Ukrainian Party of the Left SRs was founded in September 1918 as a result of the unification of Ukrainian Left SR organizations.
3 This refers to members of the Communist Party of Ukraine - supporters of independence.
4 General Jewish Workers Union in Lithuania, Poland and Russia, founded in Vilna in 1897.
No. 57
A. A. Ioffe - L. D. Trotsky, V. I. Lenin, Politburo of the Central Committee
June 30, 1919
PRE-REVIEW MILITARY COUNCIL TO L. D. TROTSKY.
Copies: TO V.I. LENIN, TO THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP.
Dear Lev Davidovich.
Yesterday's conversation with Comrade. Rakovsky, to which I added only a few words, left many ambiguities.
Apparently, nevertheless, you do not give yourself a clear account of the situation here. You reply that our proposals restore the old order, violating the decision of the Central Committee. Nothing like this. The Central Committee decided that in military (and other) respects Ukraine is subordinate to Russia 1 . This means that in the future there will be a limit to Podvoisky's projecting and the criminally frivolous aspirations of the Ukrainian government to Galicia 2and Romania, and that henceforth the Ukrainian People's Commissariat of War does only what Moscow orders it to do. This I welcome. But if the districts are directly subordinate to the fronts, but the People's Commissariat of War still remains, then confusion results. Who is mobilizing? Who forms the rear units, which it is time to finally form? Who, finally, should we, politicians, help, because the front demands one thing from us, and the People's Commissariat of War another? It is necessary either to destroy the People's Commissariat of War, by naming one of the Okrvoenkom of the People's Commissariat of War simply for the decorum, or it is necessary that the fronts and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic give their orders to the People's Commissariat of War, which is responsible for carrying them out and regarding which we know that he received such and such a task and we must help them realize.
The same with armies. The 14th army scattered its units so that they mixed with the units of the 12th. Semyonov reports that there are three authorities in the Poltava region: I) the Poltava Defense Council, 2) units of the 14th Army, 3) units of the 12th Army, and that in order to create order, one Yegorov must be appointed commander, subordinating everything to him. Chief of Staff Kostyaev answers him that for this he must communicate with the Southern Front and with the 14th Army, and there is no communication with the first for two days, meanwhile, time does not endure. Next, Voroshilov yells in panic to give him 3 rounds of ammunition, we exert all our strength and give something, the third day we find out that there are 20 million rounds of ammunition in Kremenchug, while according to Voroshilov’s statement, Ekaterinoslav was handed over due to their absence. The 14th army is supposed to supply the Southern Front, but it is not connected with it. We, therefore, propose to subordinate it to the 12th Army. True, this was done yesterday by order of the army, but we still offer political cover for Semyonov. After all, because the 12th, 13th and 14th armies have been created, their partisan mood has not yet changed and, on the contrary, I will say frankly, by appointing Voroshilov Commander, and Pyatakov and Bubnov to the Revolutionary Military Council, you repeated the mistake with Antonov and made it difficult to fight partisanism. Semyonov declares that they do not obey him, and we receive telegrams from his subordinates: "I have not obeyed the generals and will not obey." We receive panic telegrams that near Kharkov all former officers went over to the side of Denikin. Panic is created among the Red Army soldiers, who are already distributing some kind of wooden cartridges, declaring that this is how the tsarist generals force them to fight. What to do here? In the same situation, we in Smolny created military revolutionary committees, which, with their authority, covered the unpopular military4. As you remember, I myself chaired the October Military Revolutionary Committee, and we had no conflicts, we did not interfere in military affairs, but only gave our signature and thus created an atmosphere of trust around the military. The same we have proposed now here. I suggested creating such a cover from the Soviet Defense, the presidium of which is now composed of Rakovsky, Dzevaltovsky and myself. But Semyonov was afraid of cumbersomeness and asked for one person, then we suggested Rakovsky. I emphasize that Semyonov considers it impossible for him to work without this cover. Further, the constantly breaking out uprisings lead to the need not only to suppress them when they already exist, but to monitor their growth. Semyonov declares that this army is beyond its strength. We, therefore, propose that this be entrusted to the districts, and since this is a political matter,
Finally, the mobilization of workers. We receive an order to give at least 20,000 workers, and in the telegram I am personally responsible for carrying out this 5. After almost a fight, I achieve that everyone takes up this matter. I myself am going to Odessa, I work there for 3 weeks for 20 hours a day. The result of mobilization is not 20,000 [cells] but 30,000, and besides, we send everything that is possible; I managed to pump out at least 35 thousand from the Odessa District. You report that almost nothing came to the Southern Front. I don’t even understand what’s the matter, because with each echelon we send a group of communists from the Odessa district with members of the executive committee at the head, the workers themselves set up outposts and caught deserters. If the 14th Army intercepted what was coming from the area of its location, then we do not even know about it, and it is subordinate to the Southern Front. The same with cars: you report that you came without a magneto and generally unusable, but your receiver accepted here in perfect order, about which there is an act. If they stole it on the way, why are we to blame ...
Of course, the point is not who is to blame, but how to do better. Therefore, we offer:
I. Or destroy the People's Commissariat of War, so that we know that he cannot make any demands on us, and we will receive all tasks from the Western Front.
Or to prescribe that the Western Front and the Southern Front give their tasks to the People's Commissariat of War, and we must assist him in every possible way. I think that the second is better, because since the post of the People's Commissariat of War should remain for the decorum, he will still interfere.
II. Once Dzevaltovsky has been appointed, then Podvoisky must be completely removed, for the latter, although he has gone to Odessa, cannot help but give orders, and the result is dual power.
III. In view of the cut off from the 14th army, it is necessary to subordinate it to the 12th, temporarily at least.
IV. It is necessary to create a political cover for the Revolutionary Military Council 12, because otherwise the entire local partisanship will not be subordinate to Semyonov.
Political cover can be created either by the recognition (formal, of course) of the Council of Defense as the supreme body also in operational terms, i.e., by affixing Semenov’s orders with the signatures of the Council of Defence, or by creating a Revolutionary Military Council 12 under the chairmanship of Rakovsky, i.e., by affixing orders with his signature. I believe that the first is better, because it is clearer, if the Defense Council assumes such functions and since there are three of us, then I would already guarantee that we will not interfere, but will only give our signature.
V. It is necessary, finally, that we also (at least the Defense Council) receive all assignments from the center and fronts in order to be able to render our assistance and influence. For example, if we knew that the echelons being sent were getting stuck somewhere, we would have accompanied them ourselves or come up with something else, but we would have taken measures.
VI. Finally, Voroshilov must be immediately removed, replacing him with a non-partisan.
VII. I only write about purely military matters. Here they insist that I go to Moscow, but I do not want to leave at such a hot time, and therefore I am writing to you. I hope you will agree that what is proposed in this situation is the only way out.
I firmly shake my hand.
A. Ioffe.
Kyiv 30/VІ [1]919
RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. On. 1. D. 1032. L. 3-4. Uncertified typewritten copy.
Notes:
1 See note 2 to document No. 55.
2The question of the advance of the troops of the Ukrainian Front to Galicia and Bukovina arose during this period at least twice: on April 21-22, 1919 in connection with the events in Soviet Hungary (Civil War in Ukraine. T. 2. S. 382; Lenin V. I. PSS. T. 50. S. 385-386) and April 18, 1919 in connection with the uprising of Galician peasants in the Kolomyya region against the Polish and Romanian authorities (Civil War in Ukraine. T. 2. S. 160) . Already in the first case, to the question of Vatsetis about the extent to which the occupation of Galicia and Bukovina was necessary, Lenin replied: “Advancement to part of Galicia and Bukovina is necessary for communication with Soviet Hungary. This task must be solved faster and more firmly, and beyond this task no occupation of Galicia and Bukovina is necessary [...] ”(Lenin V.I. PSS. T. 50. S. 385-386). Apparently
3 We are talking about telegrams from the Revolutionary Military Council of the 14th Army in the period from June 24 to June 30, 1919 with a request to send cartridges (Civil War in Ukraine. Vol. 2. P. 180).
4 We are talking about the events of October 1917, when Ioffe was a member of the Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee.
5 Ioffe writes about a telegram from Lenin, Trotsky, Krestinsky and Stalin dated May 9, 1919 to Kamenev, Ioffe and Rakovsky demanding that at least 20,000 workers be mobilized for the Southern Front within two weeks (The Trotsky papers. Vol. 1. P. 408-410).
No. 58
I. I. Reingold - Central Committee of the RCP(b)
July 6, 1919
TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY.
Reporting note.
on the question of our "Cossack policy" on the Don.
The difficult situation of our Southern Front 1 is an inevitable consequence of the short-sighted policy that was pursued on the Don in relation to the Cossacks.
First of all, it should be noted that since the October days our Cossack policy has generally been distinguished by a lack of stability and consistency. At first we flirted with the Cossacks, gave them autonomy and elective Soviet power, even agreed to the Don Republic 2, created the Military Cossack marching circle, issued a decree on the benefits of the Cossacks. Then, in connection with the successful advance of the Red Army to Rostov and Novocherkassk, we were dizzy from success and, feeling like winners, we challenged the Cossacks, starting their mass physical extermination. This was called decossackization; By this we hoped to improve the health of the Don, to make it, if not Soviet, then submissive and obedient to the Soviet Power. And this at a time when the Don was still far from in our hands, when not a single Soviet body on the Don had real forces yet, there were no garrisons strong enough to feel able to cope with the Cossacks and suppress that mass fermentation and cruel resistance, which the freedom-loving Cossacks inevitably had to put up with such decossackization 3.
Undoubtedly, our principled view of the Cossacks, as an element alien to communism and the Soviet idea, is correct.
The Cossacks, at least a huge part of them, will have to be exterminated sooner or later, simply physically destroyed, but this requires great tact, the greatest caution and all sorts of flirting with the Cossacks; we must not for a moment lose sight of the fact that we are dealing with a warlike people whose every stanitsa is an armed camp, every farmstead is a fortress. And the policy of mass extermination of them indiscriminately will lead to the fact that the Don and I will never cope, and, if we do, it will be after a long bloody and stubborn struggle. The experience of the Veshensky uprising showed that the Cossacks were extremely sensitive to the policy pursued towards them, and, once ignited, the fire of the uprising quickly engulfed tens of thousands of Cossacks. By the way, nothing contributed to the success of the uprising so much as those who got to them,4 . These theses in the hands of the Cossack officers served as the finest material for agitation against the Soviet Power, as it was clearly striving to destroy the Cossacks. Hence the strength and desperate stubbornness of the rebels, whom we did not defeat and who achieved their goal - to unite with the advancing Cossack army. And this was done by the same Veshentsy, who were the first to open the way for Soviet Power, the first to come over to our side. It is clear that we ourselves pushed them away from us and threw them into Denikin's arms. And we must avoid this in the future.
The Central Committee and our Party have always shown the greatest caution and sensitivity in the national question and the organization of the small nationalities. Sometimes even excessive. We created a number of national republics, proceeding from considerations both of an international character and of an internal one—the speedy elimination of all kinds of national prejudices and delusions within the framework of the Soviet organization. But in relation to the Cossacks, for some reason, we did not follow this line to the end, although it is here, in the life of the Cossacks and in their historical past, that the beginnings of independence, isolation, and their independent state life are laid. And with these everyday and other prejudices, with their caste isolation, one cannot fight and win only by measures of extermination. It is necessary to outline a whole system of measures that would secure us from armed uprisings, attempts by the counter-revolutionary rabble to revolt the Cossacks, but at the same time they would allow the entire old Cossack life to be destroyed by the hands of the Cossacks themselves. There is no need to talk about the Cossack poor, since the Cossacks are almost entirely prosperous and consist of kulaks and middle peasants. The middle peasants are the population of the northern Cossack districts, who are distinguished by their great sympathy for the Soviet government and who, with a cautious policy, can undoubtedly, if not be won over to the side of the Soviet government, then at least neutralized. Prosperous kulak elements populate the southern districts and are clearly counter-revolutionary. The northern Cossacks have relatively small allotments, while the southern Cossacks' allotments are very large. Therefore, on the basis of an appropriate agrarian policy, it is possible to introduce decomposition into the environment of the Don Cossacks, dividing it into two warring camps.
Secondly, a lot can be achieved by agitation and educational work, especially among the young Cossacks, who are much better disposed towards the Soviet government than the old people, who are the most inert and counter-revolutionary element.
Finally, on behalf of the Council of People's Commissars or the Central Committee, it is necessary to issue an appeal to the Cossacks 5 in a timely manner , confirming in it the previous decrees on the autonomy of the Don or even on its independence, and, in a timely manner, upon the next entry into the Don region, to form the Don Soviet Government from the so-called "Soviet Cossacks" and people from the Don. The significance of such an act will be enormous, for it will knock out all the ground from under the feet of all those who are dissatisfied with alien aliens to the Cossacks, which in fact were the revolutionary committees. A huge mistake was made that during the six months of domination on the Don, the existing revolutionary committees did not give the Cossacks the correct Soviet power. We would gain more from this than we would lose.
Only under the guise of the Soviet Don Government should we carry out the Red Terror on the Don against the Cossack counter-revolution, acting both with weapons, and with words, and with an agrarian and resettlement policy. Combining all these elements, we will achieve the “Sovietization” of the Don much faster and, moreover, with significantly fewer sacrifices.
6/VII 19
Member of the Donrevkom I. Reingold.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 106. L. 7. Typewritten text. Signature - autograph.
Notes:
1 In May 1919, Denikin's troops went on the offensive and forced the troops of the Southern Front to leave the Don region, Donbass, Kharkov, Belgorod, Balashov and Tsaritsyn. Denikin's army was stopped only in early August.
2 The Don Soviet Republic was proclaimed in March 1918.
3 By the spring of 1919, the Red Army occupied 3/4 of the Don region. Then began the policy of mass “decossackization” and the use of repressions against all those who participated in anti-Soviet speeches. On March 11, an uprising broke out in the village of Veshenskaya. In May, the White Cossack cavalry of General Secretev broke through the front of the Soviet 9th Army and in June joined the rebels.
On January 24, 1919, the Orgburo approved the Circular Letter of the Central Committee on the attitude towards the Cossacks, which, in particular, set the task of “carrying out mass terror against the wealthy Cossacks, exterminating them completely; to carry out merciless mass terror against all Cossacks in general who took any direct or indirect part in the fight against Soviet power ”(Izvestiya of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 6. P. 177-178).
On August 14, 1919, the joint appeal of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars to the labor Cossacks was published, and on September 30, 1919, the theses of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on work on the Don.
No. 59
G. L. Pyatakov to I. V. Stalin
October 13, 1919
His Excellency
Member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the South, T. I. Dzhugashvili-Stalin,
s[station] New. 1919, October 13 1 .
Your Excellency!
I dare to most humbly, most respectfully and most urgently ask you to give us Sergo. A couple of days of working together made me even more convinced that Sergo should be in the 13th Army.
Egorka Pyatakov.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 7. D. 52. L. 10. Carbon copy autograph.
Notes:
1 The note was sent from the station of the New Southern Railway to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front (Serpukhov), its text was written in the field book of Ordzhonikidze.