Bolshevik Leaders correspondence

Bolshevik leadership Correspondence. 1912-1927
Collection of documents 1996.
Compiled by: A.V.Kvashonkin, L.P.Kosheleva, L.A.Rogovaya, O.V.Khlevnyuk.

No. 14

Telegram from I. V. Stalin to G. V. Chicherin

[previously May 4, 1918]

Antonov, looking for a way out of the situation for himself and for his detachments, proposes that all Soviet deputies adjacent to the front be allowed to organize border guards. Set up white flags and disarm the Antonov detachments crossing the border. At the same time, he declares that if this is done, he will officially resign his powers, transferring [them] into the hands of the Central Committee of Ukraine, which, it seems, does not exist. In other words, to eliminate the war inside Ukraine in order to deprive the Germans of a reason to invade the Russian Federation. We all here think that Antonov's request should be respected. The said order must be sent out immediately in a categorical form. First of all, to the Voronezh Soviet of Deputies and Rostov, as well as to Sevastopol by radio. We think that such an order will speed up the cause of the armistice and facilitate our preparatory work for negotiations.1 . One interesting report: the planned attack on Korenevo, south of Lgov, did not take place. Our troops retreated a little 2 . They assure that the retreat is not disorderly and will soon be liquidated 3 .

RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 5401. L. 1. Typewritten text.

Notes:

On May 4, 1918, Antonov-Ovseenko applied to the Council of People's Commissars with a statement about the resignation of the powers of the Supreme Commander of the Southern Republics in connection with the retreat of Soviet troops outside Ukraine and their disarmament in accordance with the requirements of the Brest-Litovsk agreement. On the same day, he issued an order to the troops of Ukraine and the Donetsk Workers' Republic on the surrender of weapons to the military authorities of the RSFSR (RTsKhIDNI. F. 17. Op. 109. D. 12. L. 1; Civil War in Ukraine. 1918 - 1920. T. 1. Book 1. S. 134-136).

2 Obviously, we are talking about an unsuccessful attempt to advance in the Kursk direction. On May 4, in Korenevo (Kursk Front), representatives of Ukraine and Germany signed a truce with the RSFSR and negotiated the establishment of a demarcation line. On May 5, the Council of People's Commissars demanded that Antonov-Ovseenko conclude a similar agreement on the Ukrainian front and notify Moscow about it (Ibid., pp. 136-137).

3 Stalin's telegram from Kursk was received by Chicherin and forwarded to Trotsky on May 4, 1918. It follows from the cover letter that the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs supported the request contained in it and asked for an appropriate order to be issued (RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 5401. L. 2).

No. 15

Telegram to G. K. Ordzhonikidze to I. V. Stalin

May 5, 1918

Out of line. Petrograd. Smolny, Stalin.

Note from Kharkov. Adopted 5/V 1918.

Why are you silent, why don't you inform in detail. As with Ukraine, what are the borders, what is our attitude? Krylenko demands an end to hostilities in Ukraine. Skrypnik asks for Antonov. Tell us what we must do as representatives of the Council of People's Commissars. The case becomes hopeless if the Ukrainian Secretariat 1 is left to itself. Please don't put us in this position and tell us what and how 2 .

Ordzhonikidze.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. On. 6. D. 54. L. 1. Certified typewritten copy.

Notes:

1 The Secretariat of Ukraine (People's Secretariat) is the first Soviet government of Ukraine, formed in December 1917.

On May 5, 1918, in response to this request, Ordzhonikidze, at the initiative of Stalin, received a copy of the SNK telegram to Antonov-Ovseenko with a message about the establishment of a demarcation line on the Kursk Front (See note 2 to document No. 14).

No. 16

J. V. Stalin - V. I. Lenin, L. D. Trotsky

June 22, 1918

T[ovari] sch Lenin! T[ovari] Trotsky!

I write briefly: time is short, busy to disgrace.

1) The food business is getting better 1 , and if you send more colored textiles and money in small denominations (no more than 500 rubles), things will go better.

2) The situation with the war on the external, and especially on the internal front, is much worse. Specialists are dead and armchair people, completely unadapted to a civil war. Meanwhile, the Cossacks are not asleep and at one fine moment they can unite with the Orenburg Cossacks, tearing off the center from the grain south. I did not want to take on any military functions, but the district headquarters itself draws me into its affairs, and I feel that it is impossible otherwise, simply impossible otherwise. Now I see that it would be useful for the cause to have a direct formal authority for me to dismiss and appoint, for example, commissars for detachments, "headquarters", etc., to be sure to attend meetings of the district headquarters and in general to represent the central military authority in the south 2. Judge for yourselves, the specialist Kovalevsky was arrested the other day by some "commissar", and Snegirev, on his trip to the front, barely escaped arrest. Or else: Zedin is an honest and devoted man, like a military commissar, but another military commissar is an incorrigible drunkard and ugly wastes state money. And so on and so forth. It is necessary to correct all such defects in an instant, but who "should" do it? It is impossible for the center to figure it out right away, and the authorized representative of the center (military) is not here. Do you know that Petrov and his entire staff for some reason left for Moscow, and his "army", in view of this, completely decomposed and opened the way for the Cossacks? Do you know that the mobilization of the Cossacks, announced by us, played a cruel joke on us, arming several thousand Cossacks, who took artillery and other equipment from the headquarters,3 Do you know that the detachments of the so-called] Don Republic 4 (among which, by the way, only 2-3% of the Cossacks) wanted to seize the Tsaritsyno artillery and then blow up the local Soviet of Deputies? All these are issues that can only be resolved on the spot.

3) Negotiations with the Germans are opening on the Rostov front 5 .

4) I receive your encrypted telegrams, but you do not give the key to the cipher. Understand that this is inconsistent with nothing.

5) Why don't you inform me about the cases?

22. VI.

Stalin 6

RTSHIDNI; F. 558. On. 1. D. 5404. L. 3. Autograph.

Notes:

1 The letter was sent from Tsaritsyn to Moscow. On May 29, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars decided to send Stalin as the general head of the "food business" to the south of Russia. Its main tasks were to collect and organize the transportation of food to the center of the country.

2 In fact, Stalin interfered in the affairs of the front without additional permission. The headquarters of the North Caucasian Military District, located in Tsaritsyn, was commanded by the former general of the tsarist army, Snesarev. Immediately after arriving in Tsaritsyn, Stalin entered into an open conflict with Snesarev, partly because of the general negative attitude towards military experts, partly considering Snesarev to be Trotsky's protege. At the insistence of Stalin, on June 23, 1918, Snesarev ordered the unification of all the Red troops on the right bank of the Don (3rd and 5th armies) under the general command of Voroshilov.

3 In March-May 1918, the Don, Kuban-Black Sea and Terek Soviet republics were formed as part of the RSFSR. At the same time, the formation of red Cossack units and formations began. On May 30, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars appealed to the Cossacks of the Don and Kuban with an appeal to take up arms to defend Soviet power. The Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of May 31, 1918 ordered the Soviets of the Cossack regions to form the Cossack units of the Red Army. By decree of the Council of People's Commissars of June 11, 1918, mobilization was announced on the territory of the Siberian and Orenburg Cossack districts.

4 The Don Soviet Republic was formed in March 1918 (decree of the regional Military Revolutionary Committee of March 23, 1918) as part of the RSFSR on the territory of the Don Army Region and a number of districts of the Yekaterinoslav province after the liberation of the region from Kaledin's troops. Center - Rostov-on-Don. After the capture of Rostov-on-Don on May 8, 1918 by German troops and White Cossacks, the government of the Don Republic moved to Tsaritsyn, and then to the village of Velikoknyazheskaya, where it continued its activities until the end of June 1918. In September 1918, by a decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the Don Republic was liquidated .

5 Negotiations on the cessation of hostilities with the Germans on the Rostov (Don) front were launched on June 17, 1918. Ordzhonikidze was delegated by Commander-in-Chief Kalnin to conduct negotiations. Referring to the violation of the demarcation line by the troops of the Red Army, the German command continued the offensive. In the face of a shortage of food, equipment and weapons, the leadership of the front was looking for ways to negotiate.

6 On the letterhead: “RSFSR. General Head of the Food Business in the South of Russia”; on the outside of the envelope there is Stalin's inscription: “T[ovari]sha to Lenin. Personally. Secret. From Stalin” (RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 5404. L. 4).

No. 17

Telegram from J. V. Stalin to L. D. Trotsky and V. I. Lenin

July 11, 1918

TO TROTSKY, COPY TO LENIN 1

Since time is short, I write briefly and point by point.

1. We all made a mistake when we announced a separate Cossack mobilization 2 : a) we were late in comparison with Krasnov, b) we did not have a revolutionary Cossack core capable of rallying the masses of Cossacks behind the Soviet government (“Don Soviet Government” 3 is a myth; at the insistence of the "non-residents" and the few Cossacks who remained behind us, this "government" declared itself dissolved yesterday). This, in fact, explains that the mobilization of the Cossacks announced by us benefited Krasnov: the mobilized Cossacks, having received weapons and cannons, went over to the side of Krasnov in thousands (they are the main image [as] Krasnov's "army").

2. People familiar with the matter unanimously assert that our support in the Don region is “out-of-towners” 4 and that we can only talk about “general” mobilization without singling out the Cossacks in a special curia. Only in this way can the Cossacks be used as a military force. The "Cossack Committee" 5 that exists in Moscow is out of touch with life and has no idea of the actual conditions on the ground.

3. A separate Cossack mobilization damaged us not only in the Don, but [in] the Kuban-Tersk regions. Having received weapons and obeying their old Yesauls, the Cossacks opened partial actions, began to blow up railways throughout the North [Northern] Caucasus. At the same time, there is reason to assert that not only Krasnov's agents, but also Anglo-French ones supply them with peroxylin.

4. The matter is complicated by the fact that the Headquarters of Sevkaokr6 turned out to be completely unsuitable for the conditions of the struggle against the counter-revolution. The point is not only that our “specialists” are psychologically incapable of a decisive war against the counter[revolution], but also that they, as “staff” workers, who can only “draw blueprints” and give plans for reformation, are absolutely indifferent to to operational actions, to the supply business, to controlling various army commanders and, in general, they feel like strangers, guests. The military commissars were unable to fill the gap. Zedin is not far off, poorly versed in the situation and goes with the flow. Anisimov is more conscious and mobile, but he is alone. And the military instructor and assistants are so indifferent to the matter that two days after the break of the Tikhoretskaya line, they, Snesarev with Zedin,

5. All this, as well as the fact that the food problem in the south (my sphere) rested on the military, forced me to intervene in the affairs of the headquarters. I'm not talking about the fact that the delegations of the fronts and district headquarters demanded that I intervene, in view of the obvious negligence of the headquarters of Sevkaokr, in supply matters. I sent to the headquarters (on the recommendation of local people) three comrades, of whom one, at my request, was appointed head of the military control department (Rukhimovich), two (Vadim and Parkhomenko) assistants. These comrades uncovered a number of unacceptable omissions, found large-caliber guns and armored vehicles, the existence of which Zedin denied and without which the front has been suffering for 2-3 weeks. Found set in motion. Then a common illness: the presence of many commanders and the inability (or unwillingness) of the Headquarters to subordinate them to one command. If not for this disease, there would be no road break. It is indifferent to look at this, when the front of Kalnin is cut off from supply points, and the North from the grain region, I consider myself wrong. I will correct these and many other shortcomings on the ground, I am taking a number of measures (and will take them) up to the removal of officials and commanders ruining the cause, despite formal difficulties, which I will break if necessary. At the same time, it is clear that I take full responsibility before all higher institutions.

6. Tsaritsyn turns into a base of equipment, weapons, military operations, etc. Such a sluggish military instructor as Snesarev will not be useful here 7 . Do you have any other candidates? The military commissars should be the soul of military affairs, leading specialists, but in Tsaritsyn it turns out the opposite. (Give Anisimov another comrade, better than Zedin).

7. Trifonov "reconciled" and became loyal, although, as a military commissar, he does not fit. We sent him to you as a pusher of military supplies, he seems to be suitable for this. Avtonomov is friends with the French and, according to general assurances, condones the Cossack gangs that blow up the railway. For some reason, the doors of headquarters are open to members of the French missions, and, according to comrades, the adventures of our Kuban against the Germans are the work of the French and the simpletons who believe them. I declare that if they (the French) fall into my clutches, I will not let them out.

8. Why the naval fighters living in Tsaritsyn are not used against the Czechoslovaks.

People's Commissar. Tsaritsyn, July 11, 1918.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 1812. L. 1-3. Typewritten text.

Notes:

1 A telegram was sent from Tsaritsyn to Moscow. An insignificant part of the telegram, from the words “The matter is complicated by [...]” to “[...] I take full responsibility before all higher institutions” with large denominations, was repeatedly published. (Documents on the history of the Civil War in the USSR. T. I. The first stage of the Civil War. M., 1940. S. 238-239; Voroshilov K. E. Stalin and the Armed Forces of the USSR. M., 1951. S. 14-19 ).

2 See note 3 to document No. 16.

3 See note 4 to document No. 16.

4 “Out-of-town” are not Cossacks who lived on Cossack lands.

5 The Cossack Committee is a governing body of the Cossack regions, formed by decree of the Council of People's Commissars of May 31, 1918.

6 The North Caucasian Military District was formed in May 1918 on the territory of the Don, Kuban, Terek and Dagestan regions. The headquarters was in Tsaritsyn. The district was disbanded in September 1918 after the creation of the Southern Front. Stalin was a member of the Military Council of the district, Snesarev was the military leader from May to September 1918.

On July 16, 1918, Stalin again complained to Lenin about Snesarev. Lenin received his telegram on July 17, 1918 and wrote on it that he considered it necessary to agree with Stalin (V. I. Lenin. Biographical chronicle. T. 5. October 1917 - July 1918. M., 1974. S. 645- 646).

No. 18

I. V. Stalin - G. K. Ordzhonikidze.

July 17 [1918]

Received a letter, Sergo, as well as greetings from Kalnin. I don't have much time, so I'll get straight to the point .

1. First question. Interruption of railway communication and complete isolation, on the one hand, of Russia from the only grain region, which makes famine inevitable (keep in mind that the paths to Kizlyar, as well as to Petrovsk, are also interrupted) and, on the other hand, the Rostov Front from supply centers which will inevitably lead to the collapse of this front. Without the immediate restoration of the line, food riots in the North and the loss of the North Caucasus become inevitable. We do not have sufficient forces here to restore the line immediately. I believe that you most likely can find free forces to strike from the south (the line is interrupted to Zimovniki). In any case, a simultaneous strike from the south and from the north is absolutely necessary . Hurry before it's too late.

2. You have a radio station of great power, you could regularly inform Tsaritsyn where there is a receiving radio station. Why don't you use this path? The air route is undoubtedly convenient, but the pilots are capricious and inefficient, and besides, they cannot always be trusted.

3. About the adventures of the Left SRs in Moscow 3 and Muravyov near Samara 4 You must be aware that in Moscow the Left SRs, wishing to draw Russia into the war, killed Mirbakh. Assassins shot 5 . In this regard, the Germans demand the introduction of one battalion to Moscow to guard the embassy. The Council of People's Commissars and the Central Executive Committee resolutely rejected the demand of the Germans, declaring that Russia was ready to support its refusal by all means, up to and including war. Lenin believes that the Germans will yield. Nevertheless, all members of the Council of People's Commissars recommend to Kalnin extreme vigilance and full combat readiness just in case. Ants, wishing to support the adventure of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, made an attempt to open the front to the Czechoslovaks and move troops to Moscow and St. Petersburg. The attempt failed, Muraviev shot himself 6 .

4. Collect information about the quantity of grain shipments, firstly, on wheels, and secondly, at procurement points, and report immediately 7 .

5. How are your negotiations with the Germans going? What is the political situation in the Kuban and Terek regions?

6. I am sending you a code.

Commissar Stalin.

PS There are rumors that Kalinin is retiring. We all urge him not to leave his post at this grave moment.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. On. 6. D. 83. L. 1-2. Certified typewritten copy.

Notes:

1 The letter was sent from Tsaritsyn to the Terek region, where Ordzhonikidze, being the Extraordinary Commissar of the South of Russia, was suppressing the uprising of the Terek Cossacks led by Bicherakhov.

2 In July 1918, the Don Army of Krasnov launched the first offensive against Tsaritsyn. After the capture of the Torgovaya and Velikoknyazheskaya stations (July 25 and 28), Tsaritsyn's connection with the North Caucasus was interrupted. On the other hand, in July 1918, the White Cossacks captured Mozdok and, having created the Provisional People's Government of the Terek Territory, laid siege to Grozny and Kizlyar.

On July 6, 1918, at 2 o'clock in the afternoon, the German ambassador, Count Mirbach, was killed by the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries in Moscow. Lenin informed Stalin of this by telegram on July 7, 1918. “[...] The Left SRs, not wanting to hand over the killer, arrested Dzerzhinsky and Latsis and started an uprising against us. We will liquidate this very night mercilessly and tell the people the whole truth: we are within a hair's breadth of war. We have hundreds of Left Socialist-Revolutionaries hostage [...] ”(Lenin V.I. PSS. T. 50. P. 114).

4 On June 13, 1918, the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Muravyov was appointed commander of the Eastern Front. After the Left SR rebellion in Moscow, he announced his withdrawal from the Left SR party. However, on July 10, Muravyov arrested the Iggab of the 1st Army in Simbirsk and, declaring himself the commander-in-chief of the army acting against Germany, ordered the troops of the front to move to the Volga and further to the West. By decree of the Council of People's Commissars of July 11, 1918, he was declared a traitor (Decrees of Soviet Power. T. 3. S. 9-10). The troops of the front did not support Muravyov.

5 In reality, Mirbach's killers were not shot.

6 When arrested on July 11, 1918, Muravyov offered armed resistance and was killed rather than shot himself, as Stalin says in a letter.

7 By the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of March 18, 1918, signed by Lenin and Tsyurupa, Ordzhonikidze was authorized to take emergency measures to evacuate grain and other food cargoes deep into the Russian Republic, as well as other essentials from the south of Russia.

No. 19

J. V. Stalin - V. I. Lenin

August 31, 1918

31 days of August [mouth] 1918

Dear Vlad[imir] Ilyich!

We know for certain that the position of Voronezh militarily and politically is precarious, if not hopeless. Meanwhile, Voronezh and the Voronezh Front are of decisive importance for the entire southern front. In view of this, I, Minin and Voroshilov decided to send a group of loyal people to Voronezh to work in the sense of clearing Voronezh and the front from counter-revolutionary elements. I ask you to provide them with a letter signed by you, which could give the comrades we are sending to Voronezh direct access to the most important posts. Fulfill this request of ours, please 1 .

I firmly shake my hand. Your Stalin 2 .

RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 5411. L. 4. Autograph.

Notes:

oneOn August 30, 1918, after a rally at the Michelson plant in the Zamoskvoretsky district of Moscow, an attempt was made on Lenin. Stalin sent this letter without knowing about Lenin's injury. Apparently, until September 5, 1918, Sverdlov received correspondence addressed to Lenin. He also responded to the recipients. Sverdlov gave the order on September 5, 1918, at the request set out in Stalin's letter. Enclosing this letter from Comrade Stalin, I ask you to provide Comrade Krusser and four others, whom he indicates, with appropriate mandates ”(RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 5411. L. 3). Reports to Lenin on the state of affairs, as well as his acquaintance with correspondence, begin on September 6, 1918. It is on this day that Lenin reads correspondence from Stalin dated August 31, 1918 (V. I. Lenin. Biographical Chronicle. Vol. 6.

2 The letter was found in the archives of the Cheka and sent to Stalin on August 8, 1935 by Yagoda (RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 5411. L. 5). On the letterhead: “Russian Federative Soviet Republic. Military Council of the North Caucasian Military District. Tsaritsynn.