Stalin - Ascent To "Immediate Power"

The Reality of History and the Myths of Politics

Selected articles from the book “Lenin's political testament: the reality of history and the myths of politics” by Sakharov V.A.

Translation from Russian by Comrade Svitlana, Marxist Leninist Discussion Group, and few by paid translator. (Final book and articles here may have slight differences)

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To ensure the implementation of the course of the new economic policy, it was necessary to reorganize the mechanism of political power accordingly.

“Flexibility is now needed to the maximum, and for this flexible maneuvering the greatest hardness of the apparatus” [454]. It was necessary to create a management system that would allow not to miss the prospect of development during the flood of current affairs [455].

Trotsky stood in the way of this reform. He insisted on his version of the reorganization of the management system, the implementation of which actually meant the removal of real economic, and therefore political power from Lenin and the Central Committee of the party. It was clear that the development and implementation of the new economic policy would take place in an environment of acute political struggle with Trotsky, so Lenin, while reorganizing the management system, simultaneously sought to strengthen the political positions of his supporters in the power structures of the party and state.

The new system also had to take into account the realities of the time. Firstly, the growing illness of Lenin, who actually headed the entire system of power, and secondly, the political struggle in the field of the NEP with Trotsky, who proposed both his own version of the NEP and the corresponding version of the management organization.

Lenin's health began to noticeably deteriorate from the end of 1920, more and more fettering his political activity. Already during the discussion about trade unions, he was forced to spend a significant part of his time outside the city. Working capacity remained limited in February-March 1921 [456] He also felt bad during the days of the Tenth Congress of the RCP(b). A new and stronger exacerbation of the disease began with Lenin in the middle of 1921. Since that time, a special regime of work, rest and treatment began to be established for him, which was considered not as a problem relating only to Lenin personally, but as an important political issue affecting the interests of the entire party. In June-mid-August, the Politburo granted Lenin leave and limited his work [457].

These measures seem to have helped little. In August 1921, in view of the exacerbation of Lenin's illness, doctors, not yet understanding any of its causes, no character, they again recommended that he be granted leave for rest [458].

On August 9, in the presence of Lenin, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) decided:

“To oblige Comrade Lenin to continue his vacation exactly at the time and on those conditions, as will be indicated by the doctors (Prof. Getye), with the involvement of Comrade Lenin at meetings (Soviet and party) , as well as for that work, for which there will be a preliminary formal consent of the Secretariat of the Central Committee "[459].

Lenin himself was well aware of his condition, the need to rest and shift part of the work that he had previously done himself to assistants. He wrote to A.M. Gorky: "I'm so tired that I can't do anything" [460].

Returning to work, Lenin soon again felt bouts of illness, manifested in severe headaches, constant insomnia, and decreased performance. Thus, September and half of October passed. In mid-October, the disease began to manifest itself with new threatening manifestations (loss of consciousness) [461].

In early December, even limited work became completely impossible. From then on, Lenin's illness turned into an important political factor in the life of the party and the state. On December 5, on the advice of doctors, Lenin applied to the Politburo with a request for leave for medical treatment. On December 3, the Politburo granted him leave between December 2 and 17 for a period of 10 days, while at the same time entrusting the chairmanship of the Council of People's Commissars during Lenin's absence to his deputy for STO A.D. Tsyurupu [462]. On December 6, Lenin left for Gorki, and on December 8, 1921, the Politburo adopted a resolution:

“Recognize it necessary to observe absolute peace for Comrade Lenin and forbid his secretariat from sending him any papers so that Comrade Lenin could make a short (at least half an hour) speech at the Congress of Soviets” [463].

Lenin was in Gorki until January 13, 1922 (on December 16, he was again forced to ask for an extension of his leave for up to two weeks) [464]. But the additional rest did not bring improvement. The inability to take an active part in the work of the IX Congress of Soviets and in the current work of the Politburo and the Council of People's Commissars depressed him greatly.

On December 31, 1921, the Politburo granted him "a 6-week vacation from 1/1-22 with a ban on coming to Moscow to work without the permission of the Secretariat of the Central Committee" and limited the time of working contacts by telephone "on the most important issues" to an hour a day. According to M.I. Ulyanova, Lenin at that time was "gloomy, exhausted ... he felt so bad that it was scary for him” [465].

Efficiency fell, there was no improvement, moreover, fainting began. He came to Moscow only for meetings of the Politburo and some other important meetings. On January 31, he was no longer able to come to the meeting of the Politburo [466]. February did not bring relief either. His state was unpredictable. In a letter to Kamenev and Stalin on February 21, he wrote:

“Today, after a beautiful night, I am completely ill” [467].

Under these conditions, on February 23, 1922, the Politburo extended Lenin's vacation until the party congress [468].

The congress was approaching, a number of the most complex political and organizational problems had to be solved, and the illness more and more limited Lenin's ability to systematically participate in the affairs of government. He had to refuse meetings with senior officials of the party and the state, even to discuss the most important issues: he could hardly endure conversations and meetings. Decreased ability to communicate. Increasingly, they had to be supported with short notes [469].

By Lenin's own admission, the main thing that weighed him down lately was the impossibility of reading the way he read before. This made it impossible to follow the information and "constantly draw all the necessary conclusions from it." “In the old days, it was easy for him, which did not cause him any emotional excitement and never required him such an amount of time that would not be enough for all other things. Now it’s different: “the moment he overworks any extra time, he begins to have severe headaches.” The situation was aggravated by insomnia:

“His sleep is generally bad, but lately, when he has to work hard, he completely sometimes loses sleep. A night doomed to insomnia is a truly terrible thing when in the morning you have to be ready for work. On March 6, speaking at the committee of the All-Russian Congress of Metalworkers with a report on the international and internal situation of the Soviet Republic, Lenin publicly admitted: “My illness ... for several months does not give me the opportunity to directly participate in political affairs and does not at all allow me to fulfill my Soviet position, on which I am placed" [471]. The statistics of his participation in the work of the Council of People's Commissars and the STO [472] also speak of a significant decrease in his efficiency.

“From March 2, 1922,” writes Professor Osipov, “such phenomena began that attracted the attention of others”: short-term loss of consciousness with numbness of the right side of the body and arm, accompanied by a speech disorder, as a result of which he lost the ability to “freely express his thoughts." At this time, Lenin wrote to E.S. Varge: "I'm sick. Completely unable to take on any work.”[474]

Then the doctors explained it as before - overwork. Hence their recommendations: take a break, take another break, take a break again... And limit the amount of work, etc. With such a diagnosis, Lenin left for the village of Kostino, near the village of Troitse-Lykovo. Here he lived from March 6 to March 25, 1922, preparing for the XI Party Congress [475]. Lenin no longer flattered himself with hopes of recovery, he was sure that doctors could do nothing to help him, and, losing faith in doctors, believed that they “hid from him the true nature of his illness”, that he “won’t get better ... I am sure that paralysis will happen to him.

It is not surprising that Lenin began to think about his political future. His thought went in two directions: about how to "outsmart" the disease and how to ensure the future of the revolution - the cause to which he devoted his whole life. In both plans, he linked his calculations with Stalin.

“I don’t know,” writes M.I. Ulyanov, - how ... Vladimir Ilyich came to the idea that he would have paralysis, but long before May 25 [1922], when he had the first obvious signs of a brain disease, he spoke about this with Stalin, asking for this case, give him poison, since his existence will then be aimless. Stalin promised Vladimir Ilyich to fulfill his request, if necessary, apparently being rather skeptical that this could ever happen and wondering where Vladimir Ilyich could have such thoughts. [477].

An interesting testimony about the moods and thoughts of Lenin at that time was left by Professor L.O. Darkshevich. He wrote that on March 4, Lenin confessed to him that “in recent months he has been going through a very difficult condition until he has completely lost the ability to work intellectually in the direction in which he has always worked until recently. With himself, he decided positively that his loss of the ability to work is an irreparable thing," that "he will no longer be able to continue working as before; it is not only difficult for him to conduct some business for two, but also to work for himself alone, he becomes unable to answer for his own business. “I have become completely unemployed,” Lenin concluded. “He,” Darkshevich wrote, “is close to the idea that he will no longer work the way he worked before ... his song has already been sung, the role has been played, he will have to transfer his work to someone” (emphasis added) - V. S). That he "is inclined to think that his song has been sung," Lenin also told other doctors [478].

These are the conditions under which Lenin came up with the idea of a successor. But this problem cannot be understood in a simplistic way. Within the framework of the existing political system, the political struggle that took place within it, and the political traditions of the Bolsheviks, Lenin could not point directly to his successor. The only thing he could really do was to secure for this potential successor a solid political position that would enable him to pursue the line that Lenin considered necessary for the revolution.

The party congress was approaching, Lenin's state of health did not improve, and this circumstance could only strengthen him in these thoughts. On March 22, he writes a letter to Molotov for the Plenum of the Central Committee, in which he outlines his plan for the political report of the Central Committee at the XI Congress and asks to be released "from participation in the plenum due to illness (and I will not be able to sit at the plenum and report at the congress"), although he expresses his full willingness to come to the Plenum for explanations about the report. He concludes his letter with a request:

“I ask the Plenum of the Central Committee to appoint an additional reporter from the Central Committee, because my report is too general, then I am not absolutely sure that I can do it, and most importantly, I have already lagged behind the current work of the Politburo for months” [479].

For health reasons, Lenin could not even attend the last Plenum of the Central Committee before the congress. Regarding the return to work at this time, he was extremely vague [480].

Under these conditions, Lenin began to form such a system of political management in which, despite the limitation of his ability to work, he would retain key positions that would at least provide general guidance for current work and the ability to decisively influence the formation of policy.

ECONOMY

The growing wave of economic and social problems demanded an urgent improvement in the work of state and economic bodies.

On November 28, 1921, Lenin proposed a plan for the reorganization of the highest bodies of state administration:

“In addition to the position of deputy chairman of the STO Rykov (with the right to vote in the SNK), the position of the second deputy chairman of the STO is established on equal terms” - Tsyurupa. Rights of deputies: casting vote in the Council of People's Commissars and SRT, chairmanship in the absence of the chairman (i.e. Lenin himself). They were given "all the rights of the Chairman in relation to work in collegiums and institutions on issues of unification and direction of the work of economic people's commissariats."

The meaning of this reform was to “unify in practice, tighten up and improve economic work as a whole, especially in connection with and through the State Bank (trade)and Gosplan. “Free SNK from trifles; to distinguish its functions more accurately from the functions of the STO and the small SNK, to raise the authority of the SNK by attracting leading comrades, people's commissars, and not just their deputies to participate in it. The deputies were tasked with personally studying the work of major workers in the center and in the localities, and personally participating in solving various economic issues, and supervising the work. The deputies must conduct their work through the apparatus of the people's commissariats. Tsyurupa agreed, and Lenin raised this issue at a meeting of the Politburo on December 1, 1921, which accepted his proposal [482].

Then the Politburo, according to the report of L.B. Kamenev decided to create the Higher Economic Commission "to unite all economic and financial issues, consisting of comrades Kamenev, Tsyurupa, Kursk, Preobrazhensky and Schmidt ..." Kamenev was appointed Chairman of the Higher Economic Commission [483].

On March 23, 1922, the Politburo approved the leading troika of the Gosplan: Krzhizhanovsky, Pyatakov, Osadchy [484], which personified the Leninist approach to the Gosplan as a commission of experts. Lenin was engaged in the improvement of this system throughout 1922, coordinating the work of deputies with the work of the RCT and using the apparatus of this people's commissariat to ensure the work of deputies, improving the division of labor between deputies, increasing their number [485].

Thus, the system of economic management bodies was formed, which not only relieved Lenin of his current work, but actually began to replace him in everyday economic activity.

Lenin's documents, as well as documents from the records management of his secretariat, show that at that time he exercised general supervision over the progress of these works and, if he considered it necessary, took control of the solution of this or that issue or was directly involved in its solution. Occupying a central position in the system as the leader of the party and Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and the STO of the RSFSR, he, despite the reduction in efficiency, retained full power in the economic sphere. The most significant role in this system was taken by Kamenev, who, as chairman of the Higher Economic Commission, became Lenin's closest assistant in solving current economic issues.

In political terms, this meant strengthening the positions of the Leninist group in the Politburo and the Central Committee of the party and its ability to implement the new economic policy developed under the leadership of Lenin.

THE CONSIGNMENT

At the same time, Lenin was taking steps to strengthen the political positions of his supporters in the Central Committee of the party, to increase the ability of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) to lead the party, to direct the activities of state and economic bodies. The key positions here belonged to the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP(b), which directed the current organizational and party work of local party organizations and organized the work of the Central Committee of the party. After the Tenth Congress of the RCP(b), it included Molotov, Yaroslavsky and Mikhailov. Molotov was the eldest among them and was considered the responsible secretary.

Lenin wanted the Secretariat of the Central Committee to be a political body. Molotov recalled that Lenin advised him, as secretary of the Central Committee, to "engage in political work," shifting "all the technical work to deputies and assistants." “Here,” said Lenin, -

Krestinsky was still our secretary of the Central Committee, so he was the manager of affairs, and not secretary of the Central Committee! He was engaged in all sorts of nonsense, not politics!” [486].

However, setting this task was easier than accomplishing it. According to Molotov, even in the middle of 1921, the Secretariat, overwhelmed with the current organizational and party work, paid insufficient attention to political work, and it was he who represented the Central Committee of the party in contacts with state bodies, economic and other organizations. He carried out the selection and placement of personnel.

Personnel issues related to the highest echelons of power, sometimes associated with conflicts and interests of different political forces, required significant political experience and authority for their solution, which Molotov lacked. He was a good assistant to Lenin, but this was not enough, since Lenin could no longer, as before, enter into all these questions. This was the situation that led to personal changes in the composition of the Secretariat, which were of paramount importance for the topic of interest to us. Light on this story is shed by the memoirs of V.M. Molotov.

The secretariat of the Central Committee was inundated with petty economic questions. Molotov asked Lenin to receive the secretaries of the Central Committee in order to solve some of them. Lenin "agreed, appointed a day." They came together. First, minor current issues were resolved. “I said: “It is impossible to work, Vladimir Ilyich, time is wasted on nonsense.” Lenin paused, did not say anything definite to me... And in August, at the plenum, after Yaroslavsky's report, when the plenum was over, Lenin said:

"I have one more question." And suddenly he declared: - I'm talking about Comrade Yaroslavsky. I propose to send him to Siberia. Here we will find a person instead of him, a member of the Central Committee, and in Siberia there are not enough people, we need to help them. Who is against it? There is no one. So the decision has been made. [487]

Since, according to Molotov, Lenin considered him “an insufficient politician” to turn the Secretariat into an organ of political leadership, Stalin [488] was introduced instead of Yaroslavsky, who actually headed the work of the Secretariat. His political experience and authority, according to Lenin, should have been enough to turn the Secretariat of the Central Committee into a full-fledged political body.

The exact time and circumstances of the appointment of I. V. Stalin as Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) are not indicated in the literature. We also failed to find a document fixing the decision of the Party Central Committee on his appointment. The secretariat worked in close contact with the Orgburo of the Central Committee, and in it Stalin occupied a strong position:

he was the only member of the Politburo in the Orgburo, which determined his dominant position [489].

On August 22, 1921, shortly after returning from vacation, the Orgburo instructed Stalin (despite objections on his part) to exercise overall leadership of the Agitprop Department of the Party Central Committee, which led all ideological work. A day later, this decision was approved by the Politburo with clarification (at the request of Stalin) about the temporary nature of this appointment [490].

This not only expanded the scope of Stalin's activities, but also significantly strengthened his political positions. The center of gravity of his activities was transferred to party work.

On September 13, 1921, the Politburo specially heard the question “On the work of Comrade Stalin” and decided:

“To oblige Comrade Stalin to devote about three-quarters of his time to party work, and at least 1 1/2 hours to the Agitprop department; from the rest of the time, devote most of the time to the Workers' and Peasants' Committee. His work in the positions of People's Commissars of the People's Commissariat of the RKI and People's Commissariat of Nationalities was more and more reduced to the implementation of their general leadership. At the same time, he was relieved from work in the commission engaged in clarifying the availability of the gold fund [491].

On September 26, 1921, Stalin's secretariat was created. Unfortunately, in the documents available to historians, we were unable to find the decisions of the Central Committee of the party on the creation of the secretariat, on its tasks and functions. They can only be judged by individual documents characterizing his work. For example, according to Stalin's letters to the leaders of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR, the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR, the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs (L.D. Trotsky), the Supreme Economic Council, the People's Commissariat of Food, the People's Commissariat of the RCT, containing a request to give "instructions to persons subordinate to you who are in charge of correspondence, about so that correspondence addressed to me, both "personally", "secretly", and general, should be sent to the address: Secretariat comrade Stalin, Trubnikovsky lane, 19, 2nd floor, tel. No. 3-08-56” [492].

Since that time, documents have appeared (including those sent to Lenin), on which Stalin signs as “Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (b)” [493].

WHY STALIN BECAME THE SECRETARY OF THE RCP(b) CC?

This question has long been of interest to historians, most often the answer to it is associated with Stalin's good organizational skills, while emphasizing his political insignificance and Lenin's very critical attitude towards him.

In our opinion, this happened because Stalin was more suitable than others for solving the tasks that Lenin set for the secretaries of the Central Committee. Stalin was closer to the party, its organizations, and activists than other members of the Politburo who were part of Lenin's inner circle [494]. Years of underground work, prisons and exile, rough party work gave him knowledge of the organization and cadres of the party. And they, in turn, knew Stalin [495]. They formed the backbone of party leaders with whom the secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) had to work.

During the period of preparation for the October Revolution, Stalin was known to the party as a member of the Central Committee, the Bureau of the Central Committee, a representative of the Central Committee in the Central Executive Committee, one of the editors of Pravda and other newspapers. On behalf of the Central Committee, he made two most important reports at the Sixth Party Congress and made more other delegates adopt the course of an armed uprising by the congress. When voting for the Central Committee of the party at the 7th Congress of the RCP (b), Stalin (along with Zinoviev and Sverdlov) received one vote "against" (only Lenin and Trotsky received all the votes "for") [496].

His activities at the fronts not only introduced him to a much wider circle of Party and Soviet workers than before, but also gave him knowledge of local conditions and personnel, a mass of new people. The Tsaritsyn Front and Tsaritsyn, the Eastern Front and Vyatka, the Western Front and Petrograd, the Southern and Southwestern Fronts, Central Russia, the Donbass, Ukraine, and finally the Caucasus - this was the geography of Stalin's activities during the Civil War. Stalin's authority was used in resolving all kinds of conflicting political situations in the party [497], which, in turn, brought him new knowledge of working conditions, personnel, and increased his authority.

The letter of V.V. Osinsky (Obolensky) V.I. Lenin (October 16, 1919), in which he wrote:

“We have a great political leader, to whom belongs the indisputable leadership of the party and the revolution- Comrade Lenin. This is a great and tactical politician and an incomparable creator of political and organizational lines and slogans - a political algebraist. But at the same time, he is not an organizer-technician according to individual abilities - not an expert in organizational arithmetic. This has always been acknowledged by them."

Previously, these functions were taken over by Ya.M. Sverdlov, after whose death organizational and party work went wrong. To correct the matter, Osinsky proposed creating a troika, which “can be formed only from Stalin, Serebryakov and Krestinsky (with the replacement of one by Dzerzhinsky)” [498]. Stalin's authority was high in matters of national politics, so almost all these issues went "through him", and this allowed him to get acquainted with the people and problems of other regions of the RSFSR. Thus, in a letter to Lenin from representatives of the communist organization of the peoples of the East (January 20, 1920), noted Stalin's ability to work with people, his attentiveness, accessibility and high authority, his knowledge of the problems of the national life of the peoples of the East, and it was proposed "to withdraw from the front and entrust him with the leadership of the entire internal and the foreign policy of Soviet power in the East, appoint him Commissar for Foreign Affairs in the East, and reorganize the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs accordingly” [499].

At the XI Party Congress V.I. Lenin actually supported all the main characteristics given by I.V. Stalin in these letters, drawing attention to Stalin's ability not to wallow in petty intrigues, but to raise and resolve all issues as political [500].

Describing the political culture and writing of Stalin, it is often pointed out that he did not live long abroad and did not join European culture, like many other party leaders of that time. The long stay of a party worker abroad in the literature is considered exclusively as a positive factor, and people who did not have this experience were actually assessed as relatively second-rate party cadres, intellectually and politically inferior to the first. Lenin was of a different opinion. In the inability to conduct party work, he saw a great shortcoming of the party leader. Thus, he wrote that Sverdlov

“did not have to ... go abroad, this gave him the opportunity not to lose touch with the practical side of the movement” [501].

These qualities of Stalin in this situation were of fundamental importance for Lenin since the main battle with Trotsky was to take place in the party and for influence on it.

Therefore, the appointment of Stalin as secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) cannot be attributed to simple personnel movements. It meant not only a measure aimed at increasing the authority and efficiency of the Central Committee Secretariat, but also a major political shift within the Central Committee, the Politburo and within the Leninist group. For Trotsky and other opponents of Lenin, the appointment of Stalin as secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) meant the expansion of the powers of the politician who, more than others, was able to wage a principled and uncompromising struggle with them with greater chances of success than others.

A new field of activity - organizational and party work - ensured the growth of his political influence. He gained control over the most important structures of the Central Committee of the party, which were in charge of the daily life of the party, the current work of the central apparatus, the selection and placement of personnel - not only party, but also Soviet, trade union, military, Komsomol, etc.[502] ,[503], as well as party finances.

Stalin became the only member of the Central Committee who was a member of all its governing bodies: he was both a member of the Politburo and a member of the Orgburo (actually heading it as the only member of the Politburo included in its composition), and the secretary of the Central Committee, who took precedence over other secretaries. A number of the most important cases that had previously been under the jurisdiction of Molotov were switched over to him, including a significant part of the contacts between Lenin and the Politburo.

As secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP(b), Stalin became increasingly involved in solving various issues of foreign and domestic policy, state building.

Lenin purposefully and systematically involved Stalin in the solution of specific economic issues. So, on August 18, 1921, he wrote to V.A. Stomonyakov:

“I ask you to assist Comrade. Stalin in getting acquainted with all the economic materials of the Council and the State Planning Commission, especially the gold industry, the Baku oil industry, etc. ”[504].

Lenin coordinated with him the issues of constituting and organizing the work of the financial committee, the most important body coordinating and regulating the activities of the main sectors of the national economy and involved him in resolving issues of replenishing and spending Russia's gold reserves. Stalin participates in the discussion of questions of the monopoly of foreign trade and concession policy, lease, restoration of the coal industry of Donbass, issues of organizing agriculture and horse breeding, organization of food procurement, takes part in the work of Pomgol, in the preparation of a decree on salt [505]. Moreover, a number of documents devoted to the discussion of economic and social issues indicate that the business relations that developed at that time between Lenin and Stalin were not of a formal, but of a trusting comradely character [506].

Stalin traditionally actively participated in resolving issues of military development, reported on them to the Politburo in the absence of Trotsky [507]. But from the autumn of 1921, he became a rapporteur on military issues at the Politburo along with Trotsky, and even in those cases when Trotsky was present at the meeting. The fact that Stalin became Trotsky's rapporteur is an indicator of how the position of both in the Politburo has changed. Previously, Trotsky reacted sharply to any attempts to "invasion" into the sphere of his activity, but now he was not only forced to allow such "invasions", but also to reckon with the opinion of Stalin, to put up with those decisions that were taken at the insistence of the latter.

On September 14, 1921, The Politburo decided to reduce the navy and created a commission to monitor the acceleration of the solution of this issue and submit proposals to the Politburo. The convening of the commission was entrusted to Stalin (chairman), it included Gusev, Sudakov and a representative of the RVSR [508]. On September 22, 1921, the Politburo rejected Trotsky’s proposal to suspend the demobilization of the army and decided:

“Agreeing with the arguments of Comrade Stalin, as well as Comrade Chicherin (in today’s letter on parades), to speak out against Comrade Trotsky’s proposal on the issue of suspending demobilization” [509].

The current activities of the military department also fall under his control. So, for example, Trotsky's deputy for the RVSR Sklyansky appeals to the service station with a request for a vacation of five hundred thousand rubles in gold "for emergency special expenses of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs.". The letter "passes" through Stalin, which imposes a resolution: "I have no objection"[510].

Another example. The military department wanted to place an order in Germany for the purchase of rifles and machine guns. On October 10, 1921, Krasin wrote a letter from London, in which he protested this intention from all sides (from a political, economic, military-technical point of view). Stalin, having read Krasin's opinion, writes a letter to Trotsky (copy to Lenin):

"1. - “Comrade Krasin's considerations ... seem serious to me;

2. - Paragraph 3 of your draft telegram about the old twelve million order is not clear to me (I know only about three million allocated for aviation).

Therefore, I find it difficult to vote by telephone and propose to consider the issue at the Politburo, at least tomorrow morning, and in view of the initiation of a new question about the previous 12 millionth order (in addition to the ten million), it would be desirable to have at tomorrow's meeting of the Politburo (if it is scheduled ) materials relating to the 12 millionth order” [511].

Stalin's participation in solving problems related to the activities of the Comintern, as well as in solving foreign policy issues [512], expanded. He was one of Lenin's main (if not the main) assistants in the political leadership of the Soviet delegation at the international conference in Genoa.

On January 17, 1922, the Politburo instructed him to draw up an appeal in connection with the upcoming international conference. Together with Kamenev, he participated in the formation of a delegation to the Genoa Conference (experts, support staff) [513]. Stalin's note to Lenin dated March 29, 1922, is indicative:

“I agree to send a telegram (addressed to Deputy Krestinsky in Berlin) about Avanesov. Your signature is enough (you can be sure of it). I. Stalin” [514].

On April 27, 1922, Stalin sent a telegram to Chicherin in Genoa with a message of his opinion on the negotiations on mutual financial claims of the Soviet Republics and creditor countries.

“Personally, I think that one could agree with you only under two conditions: If the minimum amount of claims is not very large, but the moratorium is large enough. If our conditions set out in the April 25 directive are met.”

At the same time, Stalin asked to be informed of the minimum amount of claims, the maximum term of the moratorium, as well as the term and amount of the loan that the Soviet republics could count on. [515]

In the center of his attention were the problems of improving the management system. On November 29, 1921, he sent a letter to Lenin, in which he informed him of his proposals for the reorganization of the work of the Central Committee, which he intended to submit to the Politburo. He wrote:

"Comrade Lenin! Before putting this question in the PB, I decided to ask you a question: what is your opinion on this matter? It is hardly necessary to prove that the preparation and elaboration of questions of an economic nature (finance, money, cooperatives of all kinds, industry, rent, concessions, trade), which then go to the resolution of the Politburo, proceeds in our country in more than abnormal conditions. To begin with, the various commissions on economic issues (the cooperative commission under the organizing bureau, the Kamenev commission on the cooperative bank, the financial commission under the STO, monetary, tariff, etc.) are not interconnected, they act randomly on the one hand, on the other hand, they are not always directly connected with the Politburo, i.e. not all of these commissions include one or another member of the Politburo.

Further, the Central Committee itself and its top leadership, the Politburo, are structured in such a way that there are almost no experts in economic affairs among them, which also affects (negatively, of course) the preparation of economic questions. Further, the members of the Politburo are so overwhelmed by the current and sometimes extremely diverse work that the Politburo as a whole is sometimes forced to decide questions on the basis of trust or distrust in this or that commission, without entering into the essence of the matter. that in their composition there are almost no experts in economic affairs, which is also reflected (negatively, of course) in the preparation of economic questions. Finally, the members of the Politburo are so overwhelmed by the current and sometimes extremely diverse work that the Politburo as a whole is sometimes forced to decide questions on the basis of trust or distrust in this or that commission, without entering into the essence of the matter. that in their composition there are almost no experts in economic affairs, which is also reflected (negatively, of course) in the preparation of economic questions. Finally, the members of the Politburo are so overwhelmed by the current and sometimes extremely diverse work that the Politburo as a whole is sometimes forced to decide questions on the basis of trust or distrust in this or that commission, without entering into the essence of the matter.

It would be possible to put an end to this situation by changing the composition of the Central Committee in general, the Politburo in particular, in favor of experts in economic affairs. I think that this operation should be carried out at the 11th Party Congress (because before the Congress, I think, there is no way to fill this gap). In the meantime, it would be possible to carry out the following measures that could more or less streamline the preparation of economic and financial questions: To reduce all existing economic commissions to 4 commissions (financial-monetary, industrial, trade with consumer cooperation), agricultural with the corresponding types of cooperation, defining them along the party line under the Politburo, and along the Soviet line under the STO; Schedule four members of the Politburo for these commissions, obliging them to take the most active part in the work of the commission (the fifth member of the Politburo, Comrade LENIN, not to be bound by the obligation to participate in the work of the commission, giving him the opportunity to link all four commissions into the work of all four commissions through four members of the Politburo or in another order); To relieve as much as possible from any other work of the above-mentioned four members of the Politburo”[516].

A number of proposals formulated here were soon embodied in the system of administration created by Lenin.

As secretary of the Central Committee of the party, Stalin began to act as the official representative of the Central Committee more often at various non-party events: from participating in the work of the Presidium of the IX All-Russian Congress of Soviets to attending the laying of a new foundation for the Bolshoi Theater stage. Stalin took an active part in the creation of the society of old Bolsheviks. At the organizational meeting (January 28, 1922), when discussing the goals and objectives of the society, the methods of its work, Stalin's opinion had a decisive influence on the nature of the decisions made and many important formulations of the society's charter [517].

All of the above testifies to the rapid growth of Stalin's political influence, authority, and real power even before the Eleventh Congress, before he was elected General Secretary.

Thus, Lenin, rejecting the scheme proposed by Trotsky for the reorganization of economic management and a clear delineation of the functions of the party and the state in the matter of administration, carried out the reorganization step by step according to his own scheme [518], securing in it for himself and his closest associates (Stalin and Kamenev) the key positions and main control levers. There is reason to talk about the formation in the second half of 1921 within the Politburo of a "troika" consisting of Lenin, Stalin, and Kamenev, which became the ideological, political, and organizational core of Lenin's supporters in the Central Committee of the party and concentrated in its hands the main levers of power in the party and the state.

In the system of government being created, Lenin reserved control over the main levers of power and the ability to intervene at any moment in the solution of any issue and control the progress of the implementation of the decision. Stalin received an independent section of work (the party), in whose problems Lenin (as his documents show) did not often enter. Kamenev, acting as Lenin's closest assistant in matters of the current management of the national economy, to a greater extent than Stalin, worked under the direct supervision of Lenin. Consequently, compared to Kamenev, Stalin was a more independent political figure. Moreover, Lenin involved Stalin in solving many issues that were within the competence of Kamenev, or he participated in their solution on an equal basis with Kamenev. This is evidenced by the clerical documents of the Leninist secretariat (registration books for incoming and outgoing correspondence), as well as Lenin's letters themselves on economic issues, often sent simultaneously to Kamenev and Stalin. This almost never happened in relation to questions of party building and others related to Stalin's work in the Central Committee of the party. From this we can conclude that in this "troika" Stalin stood above Kamenev. Since all this happened with the active participation of Lenin and at a time when he was reorganizing the system of government and placing his supporters in key positions in it, these changes in Stalin's position indicate that it was Lenin who gave him a key place in this system.

If we evaluate the reorganization carried out by Lenin in the second half of 1921 from the point of view of the inner-party struggle, then we must admit that Lenin managed to strengthen the positions of his supporters in the Central Committee and central government bodies, and also strengthened the positions of the RCP (b) in the political system of the dictatorship of the proletariat by based on their own ideas about the relationship between the party and the state.

Trotsky found no place at all in the mechanism created by Lenin. Zinoviev also turned out to be aloof from him.

The next stage of the struggle in this field was associated with the work of the XI Congress of the RCP (b), at which Lenin not only consolidated these results, but also achieved a significant strengthening of the system of power he was creating. This was due to the introduction of a new highest position in the party - the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), which should be considered precisely in the framework of the reorganization of the mechanisms for managing the party and the state carried out by Lenin and in connection with the political struggle that took place in the leadership of the party.

Notes:

[454] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 43. S. 373.

[455] Ibid. T. 44. S. 158.

[456] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 2. S. 128.

[457] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 174. L. 5; News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 2. S. 129, 130, 137; Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. Biography. T. 11. S. 47.

[458] See: Volkogonov D.A. Lenin ... Book. 2. S. 263.

[459] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 71. L. 2.

[460] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 2. S. 129.

[461] Fire. 1990. No. 4. S. 7.

[462] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 240. L. 1.

[463] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 54. S. 65; News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 2. S. 137.

[464] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 54. S. 75; News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 2. S. 137.

[465] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 247. L. 1; News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 2. S. 130.

[466] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 54. S. 149; Lenin collection. T. XXXVII. S. 347; News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 2. S. 130, 136.

[467] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 54. S. 176.

[468] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 277. L. 2.

[469] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 44. S. 411; News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 1. S. 215.

[470] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 2. S. 131.

[471] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 6.

[472] In 1920, only 69 meetings of the Council of People's Commissars were held, all under the chairmanship of Lenin. In 1921, there were 51 and 49, respectively, and in 1922, 83 and 7. There were 107 meetings of the STO in 1921, including 49 under the chairmanship of Lenin, and in 1922, 96 and 5. The number of published decrees written by Lenin or adopted with his amendments and additions, there were 16 and 11, respectively, in 1920, and only 5 and 6 in 1921. STO resolutions, respectively, in 1920, 36 and 1, and in 1921 9 and 1. The number of reports and messages in the Council of People's Commissars, as well as the Council of Defense and the Council of Labor and Defense was 21 and 13, respectively, in 1920, 7 and 7 in 1921, and 1 in 1922 ( Genkina E.B. About reports VI Lenin in the Council of People's Commissars, the Council of Defense and the Council of Labor and Defense (1917-1922) // History of the USSR, 1973, No. 4, pp. 69, 71, 72).

[473] Fire. 1990. No. 4. S. 6.

[474] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 54. S. 203.

[475] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 2. S. 132, 137; Twinkle. 1990. No. 4. S. 6.

[476] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 1. S. 215; 1991. No. 2. S. 132; No. 3. S. 18.5, 188.

[477] Ibid. 1991. No. 3. S. 185.

[478] Ibid. No. 2, pp. 131–132, 185.

[479] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 60, 62.

[480] Ibid. pp. 6, 114, 412.

[481] Ibid. S. 61.

[482] Ibid. T. 44. S. 253–254.

[483] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 238. L. 2.

[484] Ibid. D. 285. L. 8, 9.

[485] See: Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 44, pp. 364–370, 522, 579–581; T. 45, pp. 55–56.

[486] One hundred and forty conversations with Molotov. S. 181.

[487] Ibid. pp. 229–230.

[488] Ibid. S. 181.

[489] Stalin was introduced to the Orgburo during the formation of the new Central Committee at the Tenth Congress of the RCP(b) and remained in it after its reorganization on August 8, 1921, by the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP(b). The Organizing Bureau included: "members of comrades Molotov, Mikhailov, Zalutsky, Stalin, Dzerzhinsky, Rudzutak and Rykov. Candidates: comrades Kutuzov, Kalinin, V.V. Schmidt" (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 68. L. 1).

[490] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 193. L. 2.

[491] Ibid. D. 201. L. 5, 6.

[492] Ibid. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 4505. L. 1, 3; D. 1860. L. 1–4.

[493] Ibid. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 263. L. 1; D. 265. L. 1–2.

[494] According to Molotov, none of Lenin's supporters in the Politburo had such connections with localities more than Stalin: “Stalin, of course, was simpler and was closer to the top. It was difficult for Lenin, of course. The main ones were very dubious friends. And the character is different” (One hundred and forty conversations with Molotov, pp. 181, 236). Rich material on this problem is available in the book by Yu.V. Emelyanov (see: Emelyanov Yu.V. Stalin: the path to power. M., 2002).

[495] This is evidenced by the course of the discussion of candidates for the Central Committee of the party and the results of the elections to the Central Committee at the VII (April) Conference of the RSDLP, when Stalin received 97 votes out of 109, losing only to Lenin (104) and Zinoviev (101). (Seventh (April) All-Russian Conference of the RSDLP (Bolsheviks). April 1917. Protocols. M., 1958. S. 207–208, 228, 323).

[496] RGASPI. F. 40. Op. 1. D. 8. L. 25–53.

[497] Stalin took part in the settlement of conflicts connected with the “Myasnikov case”, with the appearance of the “workers’ opposition”, conflicts in the Donetsk, Petrograd party organizations, in overcoming the crisis that arose at the IV All-Russian Congress of Trade Unions (May 1921, when the congress rejected the draft resolution of the Central Committee and adopted Ryazanov's resolution, in which a line was drawn on the independence of the trade unions, while Tomsky did not defend the position of the Central Committee and actually sided with the oppositionists). (Eleventh Congress of the RCP(b). March-April 1922. Verbatim report. M., 1961. S. 748, 781; RGASPI. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 24202. L. 1-1 ob. ).

[498] Laws of political algebra. (From a letter from N. Osinsky (Obolensky) to V.I. Lenin). October 16, 1919 // Unknown Russia. XX century. M., 1992. S. 17-19.

[499] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 174. L. 1–1 rev.

[500] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 122.

[501] Lenin V.I. Speech dedicated to the memory of Ya.M. Sverdlov. March 16, 1920 // Kommunist. 1977. No. 6. S. 5.

[502] See: Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. 54, pp. 51, 73, 106, 112, 126, 127, 144, 155, 162, 177, 199, 247, 265, 573–574; RGASPI. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 24198. L. 1; D. 24201. L. 1–1 rev.; D. 24527. L. 1; F. 5. Op. 1. D. 57. L. 1; Op. 2. D. 1816. L. 11; Source. 1993. No. 2. L. 60; Questions of the history of the CPSU. 1990. No. 8. S. 28.

[503] This fully corresponded to Lenin's principled attitude, who saw the main task of the party's policy in the period being lived through in "the selection of people and in checking the performance" (V. I. Lenin, Poln. sobr. soch. Vol. 45, pp. 109-113).

[504] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 53. S. 129.

[505] Ibid. T. 53, pp. 125–126, 129, 140; T. 54, pp. 32–33, 81, 137–138, 139, 190, 207; Lenin collection. T. XXXIV C. 427; RGASPI. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 24203. L. 1–3; F. 5. Op. 2. D. 43. L. 33; D. 243. L. 1; D. 267. L. 1–1 rev.; F. 17. Op. 3. D. 276. L. 3; Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. Biography. T. 10. S. 72.

[506] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 266. L. 1; F. 558. Op. 1. D. 2227. L. 1.

[507] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 53. S. 16; Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. Biography. T. 10. S. 658; RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 211. L. 1; D. 216. L. 4; D. 225. L. 1; D. 289. L. 4.

[508] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 202. L. 3.

[509] Ibid. D. 207. L. 1.

[510] Ibid. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 2126. L. 1.

[511] Ibid. D. 5185. L. 2, 3.

[512] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 43. S. 153; T. 45. S. 41; Lenin collection. T. XXXVII. pp. 333, 334; RGASPI. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 24616. L. 4–4 rev.; F. 17. Op. 3. D. 194. L. 3; D. 210. L. 2.

[513] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 1954. L. 16–19; D. 1961. L. 1–2; F. 558. Op. 1. D. 2479. L. 155.

[514] Ibid. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 5179. L. 1.

[515] Ibid. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 1954. L. 14.

[516] Ibid. Op. 2. D. 263. L. 1–2.

[517] Ibid. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 2240. L. 1.

[518] On December 26, 1921, he wrote the "Instruction on Economic Work" and passed it through the Politburo. "Nakaz" was adopted by the IX All-Russian Congress of Soviets on December 28, 1921 (V. I. Lenin, Complete collection of works, vol. 44, pp. 335-338).